Mark Anthony G.

Lopez

CRESCINI vs. E. ASPE PAWNSHOP

G.R. No. 195130. August 8, 2018

FACTS:

The dispute involves an unlawful detainer case filed by Crescini against Aspe
over one commercial door of the building standing on the former's land
located at San Roque, Iriga CITY. Crescini acquired the land and building
from its former owner Purita Lee by virtue of a sale when he assumed and
paid the latter's mortgage with the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Crescini
registered his ownership and was issued TCT No. 1521 on October 19, 1998.
At that time, Lee had an existing six-year lease contract from December 28,
1999 until December 28, 2005 with Aspe over the property. With knowledge of
this lease, Crescini sent a written notice to Aspe on October 19, 1998,
informing the latter that the property was transferred to him.

However, those letters were ignored. Without the knowledge of Crescini, Aspe
entered into another lease contract with Lee. Crescini, through counsel, made
a formal demand on October 12, 2006 for Aspe to vacate and pay the monthly
rentals of P15,000.00 starting from January 1, 2006. For Aspe's failure to
comply with his demands, Crescini initiated the action for unlawful detainer.
Subsequently, the MTCC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. It
ruled that Crescini is not entitled to rents because there is no lessor-lessee
relationship between him and Aspe. Upon appeal, the RTC reversed the
MTCC finding that Crescini established that he is the owner of property, it
ruled that Crescini has the right not only to exclude any and all persons from
enjoyment, use, and disposition of the property, but also to receive the
natural, industrial, and civil fruits from the occupants of the property.

ISSUE:

Whether Aspe is liable for rental payments or reasonable compensation to

Crescini for the period of January 2006 until surrender of the property to the
latter

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.

The MTCC and CA erred when they concluded that a lease contract is always
necessary to establish a cause of action for an unlawful detainer case. An
action for unlawful detainer pertains to specific circumstances of
dispossession. It refers to a situation where the current occupant's initially
lawful possession became unlawful due to the expiration of the right to
possess, which may be sourced from a contract, express or implied, or by
mere tolerance. Thus, a lease contract is not at all times necessary for a
successful unlawful detainer action. An ejectment complaint based on
Mark Anthony G. Lopez

possession by tolerance of the owner is a category of unlawful detainer cases,

which may also succeed after establishing the key jurisdictional facts. For an
unlawful detainer action to be successful, the plaintiff must allege and
establish the following key jurisdictional facts: (1) initially, possession of
property by the defendant was by contract with, or by tolerance of, the
plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the
plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from
the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment. If successful, the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer
case is entitled to the following reliefs: (1) restitution of the premises; (2) rental
arrears or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises; and (3) attorney's fees and costs. The finding that Crescini did not
have a lease contract with Aspe is incorrect. When Crescini bought the land
and building covered by TCT No. 1521, he was subrogated to the rights and
obligations of Lee as lessor in the 1999 lease over the property as the latter's
successor-in-interest. Thereafter, upon expiration of the lease in 2006, Aspe's
possession and occupation of the property was converted into one by mere
tolerance or permission of Crescini. This was evident in Crescini's letters to
Aspe, allowing the latter to occupy the property with the view that they will
eventually enter into a formal lease contract. Later, this tolerance ceased
upon Crescini's written notice to vacate to Aspe, making Aspe's possession
unlawful. In this case, a declaration on the issue of possession still has
practical value. Here, Crescini asked for three reliefs: (1) restitution of the
premises; (2) rental arrears or reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises; and (3) moral damages, attorney's fees and
costs. We note that the turnover of the possession of the property rendered
only the first relief moot and fait accompli, but the second and third reliefs
remain available. It recognized that while the issue of possession de facto
was rendered moot, there is still value in determining the issues on the
propriety of: (1) reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property for that period; and (2) damages, attorney's fees and costs.
Unfortunately, the MTCC incorrectly ruled that there is no lease contract
between Aspe and Crescini, and that Aspe's possession finds its legitimacy
under the invalid lease contract with Lee.