violations of the petitioners right.

Judge McKee has been trying to bully the petitioner by depriving

him of his right of access to the courts and to petition for redress which is extremely egregious.

The principle of exculpatory evidence relevant to the judicial misconduct that took place

in El Mujaddid v. Wehling concerns the whitewash of forged arrest warrant applications lacking

the signature and approval of a judicial officer, signed, and prepared by Lynn Wehling using El

Mujaddids name and the obstruction of justice as to a complaint of Peonage (18 U.S.C. 1581)

issued against the criminal conduct of Lynn Wehling by State or Local Judge John A. Kasper.

Both the April 19th and 20th memorandums and orders are unsupported by evidence and

fail to address the aforementioned public record evidence in violation of the Federal Rule of

Evidence 803 and the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings. As to the

Subject Judges that suppressed the invalid subpoena evidence in El Mujaddid v. Brewer and related

judicial conduct proceedings have also violated the due process clause of the United States

Constitution. Each memorandum opinion and order issued in these proceedings fail to comply with

the Internal Operating Procedure and Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability

Proceedings because they unreasonably address matters reasonably in dispute and they fail to

demonstrate that any investigation of the evidence submitted by El Mujaddid has been actually

investigated. They simply prove Judge McKee’s commentaries in the public as to his bias and the

bias of his colleagues highlighting their inability to be fair and impartial.

An accepted definition of the term "impartial" is "disinterested," BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 752 (6th ed.1990), and it is not easy to envisage an amicus who is
"disinterested" but still has an "interest" in the case. Neonatology Assoc. P.A., et
al. v. Comm. MAY. 20, 2002

2
 THE FAILURE OF JUDGE MCKEE TO DISQUALIFY HIMSELF AND HIS
DUAL POSITION AS ACCUSER AND DECISIONMAKER IN THESE PROCEEDINGS
VIOLATED DUE PROCESS

Judge McKee has violated the Due process clause by continuing to remain involved with

the proceedings when he acts as both an accuser and judge. Judge McKee has also violated due

process by failing to provide an evidentiary hearing, speaking on matters reasonably in dispute,

and failing to comply with his duty to investigate, the duty to recuse, the duty to transfer, and the

duty to address the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the disqualification affidavit. As a result

of the conflict of interest, Judge McKee’s orders and opinions are void as a matter of law and fact

and must be vacated. Judge McKee failed to recognize that the allegations in the affidavit must be

taken as true and are not subject to controversy in any manner. Judge McKee took improper actions

to question the good faith of the petitioner but did not pass upon the extrajudicial sources upon

which disqualification relied and this has created another matter of extraordinary, exceptional, and

special circumstances.

18 U.S.C. § 1503 defines "obstruction of justice" as an act that "corruptly or by

threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences,
obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due
administration of justice https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-
manual-1724-protection-government-processes-omnibus-clause-18-usc-1503 The
Code of Conduct for United States Judges directs federal judges to avoid both
actual impropriety and its appearance. Code of Conduct for United States Judges,
Canon 2. As Justice Frankfurter put it, “justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954).
No. 15–90072. 03-14-2016 In re COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL
MISCONDUCT. It is the duty of the judge against whom a section 144 affidavit
is filed to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged. Simmons v. United
States, 302 F.2d 71 (C.A. 3, 1962). Neither the truth of the allegations nor the
good faith of the pleader may be questioned. Simmons, supra. "[T]he section
withdraws from the presiding judge a decision upon the truth of the matters
alleged." Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36, 41 S.Ct. 230, 234, 65 L.Ed. 481
(1921); see Parker Precision Products Co. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 407 F.2d
1070 (C.A. 3, 1969). United States v. Townsend United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit Apr10, 1973 478 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1973) Simmons v. United States
302 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1962) And the allegations in the affidavit must be taken as

3
 true, and are not subject to controversy in any manner. Berger v. United States
(1921), 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L. Ed. 481. On the other hand the judge
against whom an affidavit under § 144 is filed must pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the facts alleged. Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 593 (3 Cir. 1958).
If the reasons and facts, regardless of their truth or falsity, fairly support "the
charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment" then
it is his duty.

Judge McKees replies to the disqualification affidavit fails to comply with the statutory

law as to disqualification.

Stating that § 455(b) "duplicated the grounds for recusal set forth in § 144 (`bias
or prejudice'), but made them applicable to all justices, judges, and magistrates
(and not just district judges), and placed the obligation to identify the existence of
those grounds upon the judge himself, rather than requiring recusal only in
response to a party affidavit". Source: Liteky v. United States
510 U.S. 540 (1994)

Judge McKee’s actions are troubling and perplexing because he is not authorized by the

Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings to relax or disregard the commands

of the due process clause and the disqualification statutes.

While there is no indication that Chief Justice Castille was aware of the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, it would be difficult for a judge in his position not to view
the PCRA court's findings as a criticism of his former office and, to some extent, of
his own leadership and supervision as district attorney. Williams v.
Pennsylvania136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) The Supreme Court has recognized only a few
circumstances in which an appearance of bias necessitates recusal to ensure due
process of law.” Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 806 (9th Cir.2011). Typically,
the Supreme Court has only mandated recusal where a judge has a direct, personal,
or substantial connection to the outcome of a case or to its parties. See, e.g., In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 Sects. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (concluding that
“no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome”); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (concluding that
judges should not preside over cases involving a “direct, substantial pecuniary
interest” in the outcome); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556
U.S. 868, 872, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) Beliefs or opinions that
merit recusal generally must stem from an extrajudicial source. Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 554, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). "Concededly,
a `fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' In Re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). This
applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts. Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). Not

4
only is a biased decision-maker constitutionally unacceptable but `our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.' In Re
Murchison, supra, 349 U.S., at 136, 75 S.Ct., at 625; cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 532, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). Railey v. Webb 540 F.3d 393 (6th
Cir. 2008) In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which
experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Among these cases are
those in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in
which he has been the target of ….criticism from the party before him. Taylor v.
Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 -503 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455
(1971); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 578 -579, n. 2 (1968). Cf.
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584 (1964).This Court overturned the convictions
on the ground that the judge's dual position as accuser and decisionmaker in the
contempt trials violated due process: "Having been a part of [the accusatory]
process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the
conviction or acquittal of those accused." Id ., at 137. Williams v. Pennsylvania
136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) Holding that recusal was required based on a newspaper
report of an interview with the trial judge. In re Boston's Children First 244 F.3d
164 (1st Cir. 2001). With such public attention to a matter, even ambiguous
comments may create the appearance of impropriety that 455(a) is designed to
address. In fact, the very rarity of such public statements, and the ease with which
they may be avoided, make it more likely that a reasonable person will interpret
such statements as evidence of bias. See In re Allied Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 971
(1st Cir. 1989). Holding the evidence to have been sufficient to support a finding of
actual malice because the published facts at issue were denied by six witnesses
prior to publication and the newspaper which published them failed to listen to
tapes of a pertinent interview that were provided to it before publishing the story
at issue. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton 491 U.S. 657 (1989)
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. Inc. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) On the other side
Justice Starcher granted Massey's recusal motion, apparently based on his public
criticism of Blankenship's role in the 2004 elections. In his recusal memorandum
Justice Starcher urged Justice Benjamin to recuse himself as well. He noted that
"Blankenship's bestowal of his personal wealth, political tactics, and 'friendship'
have created a cancer in the affairs of this Court." Id., at 459a-460a. Justice
Benjamin declined Justice Starcher's suggestion and denied Caperton's recusal
motion. With such public attention to a matter, even ambiguous comments may
create the appearance of impropriety that 455(a) is designed to address. In fact,
the very rarity of such public statements, and the ease with which they may be
avoided, make it more likely that a reasonable person will interpret such statements
as evidence of bias. See In re Allied Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 971 (1st Cir. 1989)
("Other things being equal, the more common a potentially biasing circumstance
and the less easily avoidable it seems, the less that circumstance will appear to a
knowledgeable observer as a sign of partiality."). Second, the "appearance of
partiality" at issue here, as in Cooley, stems from the real possibility that a judge's
statements may be misinterpreted because of the ambiguity of those statements. In
both cases, the judge's public comments could easily be characterized as legitimate

5
efforts to explain operative law. For example, the judge in Cooley could be
understood merely as reminding potential law-breakers of the binding nature of a
judicial order, and the potential for punishment that may accrue upon its violation.
Similarly, Judge Gertner's comments can be understood as a reflection of language
in her prior orders, i.e., that class certification could not yet issue because the
standing questions were more difficult ("more complex") than those in Mack. Still,
in both cases the comments were sufficiently open to misinterpretation so as to
create the appearance of partiality, even when no actual prejudice or bias existed.
In Cooley, a reasonable person might interpret the comments as an affirmative
effort to enforce the law, and an indication that a guilty verdict would be
forthcoming. Here, a reasonable person might interpret Judge Gertner's comments
as a preview of a ruling on the merits of petitioner's motion for class certification,
despite the fact that defendants had not yet filed a response to that motion. This
petition involves the difficult question of whether a sitting district court judge
should have recused herself after commenting publicly on a pending matter.
Because we find that it was, in this case, an abuse of discretion for the judge not to
recuse herself based on an appearance of partiality, we grant the writ of
mandamus. In so doing, we emphasize that such a grant in no way indicates a
finding of actual bias or prejudice, nor does it suggest that the trial judge abdicated
any of her ethical responsibilities. Source: Liteky v. United States 510 U.S. 540
(1994). Another example of an appearance of impropriety is furnished by Offutt v.
U.S., 348 U.S. 11, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954). There, the court held that, where
a judge had cited a lawyer for contempt and had become "personally embroiled"
with that lawyer, it was improper for that judge to preside over the hearing on the
contempt charge. The appearance of impropriety may also result where the judge
has evidenced a bias directed against a class of which the defendant is a member.
See Berger v. U.S., 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921) (espionage
convictions of German-American defendants overturned as result of trial judge's
alleged anti-German-American remarks); U.S. v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir.
1973), (draft violator's conviction overturned because judge's alleged statement
that he had a policy of ordering a standard sentence for all such violators evidenced
a bias against the class of which defendant was a member). In In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955), the Supreme Court well
expressed the deep-seated concern basic to our system of criminal procedure for
maintaining the appearance of justice on the part of the trial judge: A fair trial in
a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires
an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can
be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an
interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision.
Circumstances and relationships must be considered. This Court has said,
however, that `every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between
the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law.' Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 532 [47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749]. Such a stringent rule may sometimes
bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to

6
 weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its
high function in the best way `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 [75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11]. Recognizing "an
unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both
accuser and adjudicator in a case. This objective risk of bias is reflected in the due
process maxim that no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted
to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome." Williams v. Pennsylvania 136
S. Ct. 1899 (2016) U.S. v. Sciarra 851 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1988) Relying upon our
decision in United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1983), he noted
that disqualification is mandated "when a reasonable man knowing all the
circumstances would harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality." The judge
added that evidence of impartiality must relate to extrajudicial events or sources of
information, "what a judge learns through proceedings in the case from which
recusal is sought does not give rise to bias. . . ." See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629
F.2d 287, 290-291 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999, 101 S.Ct. 1704, 68
L.Ed.2d 200 (1981).

El Mujaddid provided multiple extrajudicial sources including comments from Judge

Mckee made in the public demonstrating his bias and the fact that he and other colleagues are

making decisions based on the individuals coming before them seeking justice and not the

evidence, as shown in these matters. The problem with Judge McKee’s claims about El Mujaddid’s

evidence is obvious where Judge McKee continues to exclude or whitewash that same evidence

from consideration. He refers to forged arrest warrant applications and evidence supporting the

fact that they are forgeries as voluminous materials. He never identifies any specifics regarding

said public records. For example, on April 19, 2022, the memorandum states:

“It is apparent that the Complainants’ allegations in both complaints are primarily
intended to collaterally challenge the merits of decisions rendered by the five
Subject Judges. Such allegations are merits related.” Page 2. April 19, 2022,
Memorandum Opinion Judge McKee

“To the extent, Complainants allegations are not merits-related, they are
unsubstantiated. A review of the record in the relevant proceedings as well as the
voluminous materials Complainant submitted to support his claims does not
reveal evidence of Judicial misconduct on the part of any Subject Judge.” Page 3
April 19, 2022, Memorandum Opinion Judge McKee

7
 The above statements from Judge McKee are frivolous and not substantiated by

evidence, in fact, contradicting the memorandum opinion issued by Judge Smith. Judge McKee

and Chagares’s brief reference to the excluded Subpoena evidence does not somewhere change

the memorandum opinion issued by Judge Smith. Judge Smith’s opinion remains the same, it does

not mention the principal evidence filed with the judicial conduct complaint. To the extent that

said comments were directly related to the El Mujaddid v. Wehling matter, such a notion is

frivolous and again not supported by evidence. Judge McKee’s memorandum opinions fail to

demonstrate that the Subject Judges statements described by El Mujaddids Judicial Conduct

complaints to be False Statements are supported by evidence that demonstrates otherwise. Judge

Mckee simply has a bias against the petitioner. The Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2A, Ch. 3

Pages 5-61 demonstrate that false statements made in judicial opinions are not merits related and

are in fact criminal acts under 18 U.S.C. 1001 and thus cognizable misconduct. See Pages 5 and

6 of the Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2A, Ch. 3 which state:

Canon 3: A Judicial Employee Should Adhere to Appropriate Standards in

Performing the Duties of the Office In performing the duties prescribed by law, by
resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States, by court order, or by the
judicial employee's appointing authority, the following standards apply:

A. A judicial employee should respect and comply with the law and these canons.
B. Note: A number of criminal statutes of general applicability govern federal
employees' performance of official duties. These include:

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (fraud or false statements);

18 U.S.C. § 2071 (concealing, removing, or mutilating a public record).

Congress amended the statute to apply to the judiciary as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)

(stating that a violation is committed by "whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the

executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and

1
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/guide-vol02a-ch03.pdf
8
willfully conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact") (emphasis added).

U.S. v. Curtis 237 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2001) It makes it illegal, among other things to “knowingly

and willfully… mak[ing] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation”

in a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government. Establishing a violation requires: “(1)

that [the defendant] made a statement or representation; (2) that the statement or representation

was false; (3) that the false statement was made knowingly and willfully; (4) that the statement or

representation was material; and (5) that the statement or representation was made in a matter

within the jurisdiction of the federal government.” To be material, a false statement must have “a

natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the decision of the decision making

body to which it was addressed.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995). USA V.

JOHNSON, 19 F.4TH 248 (3RD CIR. 2021) (FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2021) See H.R. Rep. No.

104-680 at 9. Non-parties may be prosecuted for any false submission within the jurisdiction of

the judicial branch.2 A statement is material if it has a “natural tendency to influence or is capable

of influencing” the agent the statement is made to. In other words, a material statement is important

and relevant to the subject matter being discussed. In criminal investigations, any fact that may be

relevant to finding, charging, or convicting the suspect meets the element of materiality. It’s

irrelevant whether the government believes the false statement. The law still applies even if the

federal agent knows the statement is false. the person making the false statement knew it was

untrue when they made it. Some courts go a step further, however, and require the government to

prove that a defendant knew it was unlawful to make a false statement when he made it. The

Government contends that 'materiality' is not an essential element of the crime of filing a false

2
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-902-1996-amendments-18-usc-
1001
9
written document but that the term applies only to the first section of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 dealing

with making a concealment of a material fact. United States v. Lange, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1955, 128 F.

Supp. 797; United States v. Varano, D.C.M.D. Pa. 1953, 113 F. Supp. 867. The language of Section

1001 seems to justify such a construction. Appellant knew the materiality of his statement. The

statements ultimately proved were certainly material. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

- 231 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1956) Feb. 15, 1956. Rehearing Denied April 18, 1956. See also 28 U.S.C.

§§ 963, 610 (defining “court” that clerk’s office employees may not practice law in as the United

States Supreme Court, “the courts of appeals and district courts of the United States,” and “the

District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States Court of Federal

Claims, and the Court of International Trade”).

THE COGNIZABLE MISCONDUCT IS OBVIOUS

Subject Judges FISHER, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, nonparties in the El Mujaddid v.

Wehling matter within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch of the Government of the United

States, knowingly and willfully— falsified statements a in writing or document styled as a Per

Curium Opinion Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P.

10.6 (filed: October 12, 2016) which falsely states:

“Nor did Mujaddid plausibly allege that the warrants were forged. The mere fact
that Wehling obtained a warrant by telephone, and a later warrant by the issuing
magistrate is not evidence of forgery. Additionally, at least with regards to the false
arrest claim, Madid never alleged that the warrant application was “so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable[.]”

to conceal or cover up Federal Constitutional and Statutory rights violations by

whitewashing, excluding, and suppressing exculpatory evidence and the material facts regarding

10
that exculpatory evidence specifically three (3) forged arrest warrant applications, each bearing

false statements3 prepared and sworn to by Lynn Wehling in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(1).

Subject Judges FISHER, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, non parties in the El Mujaddid v.

Wehling matter within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch of the Government of the United

States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(2) made any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent

statements or representations in a writing or document styled as a Per Curium Opinion Submitted

for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 (filed: October 12, 2016)

stating:

“Nor did Mujaddid plausibly allege that the warrants were forged. The mere fact
that Wehling obtained a warrant by telephone, and a later warrant by the issuing
magistrate is not evidence of forgery. Additionally, at least with regards to the false
arrest claim, Mujaddid never alleged that the warrant application was “so lacking
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable[.]”

Subject Judges FISHER, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, non parties in the El Mujaddid v.

Wehling matter within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch of the Government of the United

States, and in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(3) made or used false writing or document styled as a

Per Curium Opinion Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and

I.O.P. 10.6 (Opinion filed: October 12, 2016) opinion knowing the same to contain materially

false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry stating:

“Nor did Mujaddid plausibly allege that the warrants were forged. The mere fact
that Wehling obtained a warrant by telephone, and a later warrant by the issuing
magistrate is not evidence of forgery. Additionally, at least with regards to the
false arrest claim, Mujaddid never alleged that the warrant application was “so

3
A brief example of Wehling’s obvious false statements is found in El Mujaddids civil complaints
memorializing that Wehling Charged El Mujaddid with (2) loitering for purpose of CDS violations
but wrote in her (Wehling’s) report that El Mujaddid was removed from the bed of a private
residence, owned by another individual. In addition, her report never stated that El Mujaddid was
found to be in possession of CDS. The statement is false and thus cognizable.
11
 lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable[.]”

THE FALSE STATEMENTS MADE BY FISHER, JORDAN, AND

VANASKIE ALSO FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 18 U.S. CODE § 1513 -
RETALIATING AGAINST A WITNESS, VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT
AND 18 U.S. CODE § 1512 - TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, VICTIM,
OR AN INFORMANT

“Nor did Mujaddid plausibly allege that the warrants were forged. FISHER,
JORDAN, and VANASKIE

This false statement is belied first by New Jersey Public Records, El Mujaddids’ civil

complaint(s), and the multiple opinions issued by the District Court memorializing the specifics

and prongs establishing forgery and the arrest warrant applications themselves which were

available on the District Court record. Fisher, Jordan, and Vanaski neglected their duty to

investigate, and neglected their duty to correct their harmful errors. Furthermore, Wehlnig’s

defense counsel did not dispute the forgery allegations made by El Mujaddid. This statement is

also belied by 18 U.S. Code § 505 - Seals of courts; signatures of judges or court officers. The

forged arrest warrant applications prepared by Lynn Wehling lack the signature of a Judicial

officer.

“The mere fact that Wehling obtained a warrant by telephone, and a later
warrant by the issuing magistrate is not evidence of forgery. FISHER, JORDAN,
and VANASKIE

Factually, Wehling did not obtain a warrant by telephone. This false statement

demonstrates that FISHER, JORDAN, and VANASKIE failed to investigate before making

statements on those matters. This above false statement like the previous is belied by the May 2014

letter from the Cumberland County Trial Court Administrator verifying that Wehling did not

obtain a warrant by telephone in relation to El Mujaddid, and that Wehling did not obtain a warrant

for El Mujaddid, generally. In addition, Judge Kasper recognized that no exigent circumstances

12
existed, therefore even if Wehling had applied, she would not have been entitled to a telephonic

warrant because her report fails to establish exigent circumstances. These facts were asserted in

the civil complaint and concealed by FISHER, JORDAN, and VANASKI.

This false statement is also belied by the Transcripts from the Vineland Municipal Court

of hearings before Judges John A. Kasper and Thomas North.

Transcript of Hearing on Motions May 01, 2013, State v. El Mujaddid No. W-2010-
001690 to 0001692 Vineland Municipal Court before Judge John A. Kasper

THE COURT: for purposes of clarifying this, is the fact that the warrant wasn't
signed. That would be one. What would be the next defect of the warrant? (Pg.
12) The Court: All right. One would be that it's not signed by a judge; (Pg 13)The
Court: In order for it to be done telephonically, there must be exigent
circumstances-… The Court: And you're- you're stating that there have to be
reasons given why it's exigent circumstances. (Pg. 14)”

Transcript of Hearing on Motions June 20, 2013, State v. El Mujaddid No. W-2010-001690
to 0001692 Vineland Municipal Court Judge Thomas North

THE COURT: “the CDR form says what it says, and it demands, I think
adherence. There's no notation on the front of the probable cause has been
found.” [Page 25] “In the end, there is a court rule that says that this Court can
conform the signature but I'm uncomfortable doing so three years down the road.
It seems to me that even if I did that would I then be saying that the summons is
now issued..." [Page 25] “It's quite puzzling to the Court. It's not a clear answer,
and it's not clear because the CDR form which really demands clarity upfront
when it's signed and then probable cause is being found and it does so for a
reason, I think good very reasons, to make clear what otherwise would be
unclear. In the end, I make my decision based on not only the lack of conformance
of that signature in so many years… In any event, I am impressed by the age of the
case most of all, and so therefore I do dismiss all three charges, but also, I am
concerned about the lack of adherence to what I'll call the formalities of CDR-2
which is the finding of probable cause. We all know the finding of probable cause
is separate from filing-finding of probable cause for the complaints themselves,
but I do dismiss all three charges. [Page 26-27]...

This false statement is also belied by the Brief of Special Prosecutor Gretchen A. Pickering

confirming that El Mujaddid was a bystander, not a target, and purporting that El Mujaddid was

never charged in an effort to suggest to the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Lynn Wehling,

13
that Wehling did not charge El Mujaddid, that she committed no crime because she did not charge

El Mujaddid. The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel and Collateral Estoppel bars the aforementioned

false statements, entirely.

“Mujaddid never alleged that the warrant application was “so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable[.]”
FISHER, JORDAN, and VANASKIE

El Mujaddid was the successful party in the probable cause hearings held before Judges

Kasper and North of the City of Vineland Municipal Court who found that the forged arrest warrant

applications lack the signature of a judicial officer and lacked findings of probable cause. This

statement is also belied by the findings of fact made by Judge Robert G. Millenky of the Superior

Court of New Jersey Law Division who found that El Mujaddid established a lack of probable

cause for both the superior court charges and municipal court level charges prepared by Lynn

Wehling.

THE COURT: “Prongs one and four of this analysis are not in dispute in this case
because all parties concede there was a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff
and that was ultimately dismissed. The question at this juncture is whether the
pleadings suggest that there was a lack of probable cause for the proceedings and
that the prosecution of the plaintiff was actuated by malice. The court finds that
Mr. El Mujaddid has alleged a lack of probable cause for first, the criminal action
against him, and later, the disorderly person charges against him in municipal
court. In addition, Mr. El Mujaddid has raised the prospect of malice, by alleging
the actions of Lynne Wehling, who was allegedly instrumental in charging him after
his arrest, were later subject to a criminal investigation. In addition, the plaintiff
has alleged a scheme of discriminatory conduct by law enforcement and the
prosecutors which may also support a finding of malice.” (Pg. 26-27) Written
Opinion of Judge Millenky Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division
(Camden) El Mujaddid v. City of Vineland, et. al. CAM-L-4550-13

This statement is also belied by the Brief of Special Prosecutor Gretchen A. Pickering

further proving that El Mujaddid was not lawfully charged.

State of New Jersey Brief In Opposition To El Mujaddids Petition For Certification

by Gretchen A. Pickering. State v. Lynn A. Wehling Docket Number A-004435-13T3)
filed in the Supreme Court of New Jersey Before Chief Justice Rabner

14
 THE STATE: “El Mujaddid (hereinafter "Petitioner") was the complainant and
alleged victim. The complaints were precipitated by the execution of a search
warrant at a residence where Petitioner was a bystander. Ultimately, no charges
were filed against Petitioner. See Page 1 (Procedural history)”

THE STATE: “Petitioner was a bystander during the execution of a search

warrant by the CCPO. Petitioner was not the owner of the resident of the location
targeted by the search warrant. Petitioner was not the target of the search
warrant.” See Page 4 (Statement of Facts)

FISHER, JORDAN, and VANASKIE had a legal duty to disclose the facts as to the forged

arrest warrant applications at the time they concealed them. Judges are not constitutionally nor

statutorily empowered to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 2071. Violations of these statutes are

considered cognizable misconduct and require corrective action, which has yet to take place. While

Judge McKee may relax the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings in

certain cases, he is not authorized to do so in this matter because violations of 18 U.S.C. 1001 and

2071 were described in the underlying judicial misconduct complaints. In addition, Judge McKee

may not relax United States Codes at all, which he has clearly done with respect to the

disqualification statutes. The misconduct described by El Mujaddid that Judge McKee refers to is

covered under 1001 and 2071, thus he was not authorized to dismiss under the Rules for Judicial-

Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings.

In an effort to give the appearance of legitimacy to the April memorandum opinions,

exculpatory evidence was not considered or excluded, and constitutional and statutory law was not

observed. As a matter of fact, and under the law under 1001 the memorandum opinions issued by

Judges are not outside administrative review. Such a notion is frivolous, upon review of 18 U.S.C.

1001 and 18 U.S.C. 2071. In fact, the Rules of Judicial Conduct and Disability. Unlawfully

practicing law in these matters is far from acting impartial. Judge McKee attempts to hide the

15
judicial misconduct of his colleagues under the frivolous notion that El Mujaddid is challenging

the rulings of the Subject Judges. A false statement made by a Judge is not a ruling and the fact

that the statement was made in a writing or document titled an opinion does not place it outside

the scope of cognizable misconduct because it is criminal and violates due process.

“Indeed, the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, a sub-part of the

Judicial Conference of the United States, recently recognized that “a judge's
pattern and practice of arbitrarily and deliberately disregarding prevailing
legal standards and thereby causing expense and delay to litigants may be
misconduct.” In re Judicial Conduct and Disability, 517 F.3d 558, 562
(U.S.Jud.Conf.2008). Delay haunts the administration of justice. It postpones
the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly accused. It crowds
the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges
to take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of
those causes in which all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and
overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility.
But even these are not the worst of what delay does. The most erratic gear in
the justice machinery is at the place of factfinding, and possibilities for error
multiply rapidly as time elapses between the original facts and its judicial
determination. Vasquez v. Hernandez 60 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 1995) In re Charge
of Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.1980), they do exist ‘to provide
an administrative remedy for misconduct of a judge for which no judicial
remedy is available.’ In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 595 F.2d 517 (9th
Cir.1979).” Richardson–Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 435 n. 2, 105
S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985). See also Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. &
Proc. § 3939 (“Judicial council action is most obviously proper even with
respect to isolated conduct if there is no apparent remedy by appeal or
writ....”).

Congress outlawed retaliation against federal witnesses under §1513 at the same time it

outlawed witness tampering under §1512. Although somewhat more streamlined, §1513 shares a

number of attributes with §1512. The definitions in §1515 apply to both sections. Consequently,

the prohibitions apply to witnesses in judicial, congressional, and administrative proceedings.

Subject Judges RENDELL, FISHER, and GREENAWAY, non parties in the El Mujaddid

v. Wehling matter within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch of the Government of the United

States, knowingly and willfully— falsified statements contradicted by exculpatory evidence in a

16
Per Curium Opinion Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and

I.O.P. 10.6 (filed: April 17, 2014) which falsely states:

“He seeks a writ to compel the District Court to “process,” in compliance with
Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal complaint
against a retired state or local judge for peonage under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (Pg. 1-
“It is unclear from the document that El Aemer El Mujaddid presented whether
probable cause existed; there are checkmarks next to probable cause is found
and probable cause is not found.” (Pg. 3-4) RENDELL, FISHER, and
GREENAWAY, JR, Circuit Judges

to conceal or cover up Federal Constitutional and Statutory rights violations by

whitewashing, excluding, and suppressing exculpatory evidence and the material facts regarding

that exculpatory evidence specifically a complaint of Peonage issued by Judge John A. Kasper

against the conduct of Lynn Wehling in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(1).

Subject Judges RENDELL, FISHER, and GREENAWAY, JR, non parties in the El

Mujaddid v. Wehling matter within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch of the Government of the

United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(2) made any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent

statements or representations in a Per Curium Opinion Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant

to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 (filed: October 12, 2016) stating:

“He seeks a writ to compel the District Court to “process,” in compliance with
Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal complaint
against a retired state or local judge for peonage under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (Pg. 1-
“It is unclear from the document that El Aemer El Mujaddid presented whether
probable cause existed; there are checkmarks next to probable cause is found
and probable cause is not found.” (Pg. 3-4) RENDELL, FISHER, and
GREENAWAY, JR, Circuit Judges

Subject Judges RENDELL, FISHER, and GREENAWAY, JR, nonparties in the El

Mujaddid v. Wehling matter within the jurisdiction of the judicial branch of the Government of

the United States, and in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(3) made or used false writing or document

styled as a Per Curium Opinion Submitted for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR

17
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 (Opinion filed: April 17, 2014) opinion knowing the same to contain

materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry stating:

“He seeks a writ to compel the District Court to “process,” in compliance with
Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal complaint
against a retired state or local judge for peonage under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (Pg. 1-
2) “It is unclear from the document that El Aemer El Mujaddid presented
whether probable cause existed; there are checkmarks next to probable cause is
found and probable cause is not found.” (Pg. 3-4) RENDELL, FISHER, and
GREENAWAY, JR, Circuit Judges

THE FALSE STATEMENTS MADE BY RENDELL, FISHER, and GREENAWAY, JR,

ARE COVERED BY 18 U.S. Code § 1513 - RETALIATING AGAINST A WITNESS,
VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT AND 18 U.S. Code § 1512 - TAMPERING WITH A
WITNESS, VICTIM, OR AN INFORMANT AND 18 U.S. Code § 1581 (b)- PEONAGE;
OBSTRUCTING ENFORCEMENT

“He seeks a writ to compel the District Court to “process,” in compliance with
Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal complaint
against a retired state or local judge for peonage under 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (Pg. 1-
2). RENDELL, FISHER, and GREENAWAY, JR

This false statement is belied first by the petition for mandamus which unmistakably sought

a writ to compel the District Court to “process,” in compliance with Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal complaint issued by a now-retired state or local judge

against Lynn A. Wehling for peonage under 18 U.S.C. § 1581. This false statement is also belied

by State of New Jersey Public Records, El Mujaddids’ civil complaint(s), petitions and motions

for mandamus, and the multiple opinions issued by the District Court memorializing the specifics:

THE COURT: (“Plaintiff appears to contend that Judge Kasper found probable
cause against Wehling for "crimes in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-8 (Human
Trafficking), N.J.S.A. 2C:30-6 (Crime of Official Deprivation of Civil Rights),
N.J.S.A 2C:28-2 (False Swearing), N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4 (False Reports) and 18 U.S.C.
1581 (Peonage) (Id. Ex. at 1) the federal human trafficking act." (Id. ¶ 97.) Citing
from United States District Court For The District Of New Jersey Apr 23, 2015,
Civil Action No. 12-7750 (JBS/JS) (D.N.J. Apr. 23, 2015)

The complaint of peonage was available upon both the District and Appellate dockets.

Rendell, Fisher, and Greenway neglected their duty to investigate, and neglected their duty to

18
correct their harmful errors. This statement is also belied by the Peonage complaint itself which

clearly identifies Lynn Wehling as a defendant. Lynn Wehling has never been a state or local

judicial officer. For RENDELL, FISHER, and GREENAWAY, JR to suggest that El Mujaddid

submitted a complaint of peonage against a state or local judge when that complaint was

unmistakably against Lynn Wehling, demonstrates their intent to deprive El Mujaddid of Equal

benefits of laws and proceedings for the security of his person and property, as well as to exempt

Wehling from like pains and punishments that El Mujaddid unlawfully suffered as a result of her

criminal conduct in direct contravention of the right of access to the courts, the Due Process Clause,

the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1981.

“It is unclear from the document that El Aemer El Mujaddid presented whether
probable cause existed; there are checkmarks next to probable cause is found
and probable cause is not found.” (Pg. 3-4) RENDELL, FISHER, and
GREENAWAY, JR, Circuit Judges

It must be further asserted that FISHER didn’t make any mention of the blank checkboxes

on the forged arrest warrant applications prepared by Lynn Wehling. Each check box on all (3)

applications is completely blank. Yet, when it came to the Complaint of Peonage against Lynn

Wehling, issued by Judge John A. Kasper, RENDELL, FISHER, AND GREENWAY challenged

the issuance of the complaint in bad faith. The bad faith is further recognizable where RENDELL,

FISHER, AND GREENWAY failed to contact Judge John A. Kasper. Factually, the check box

“No” on the Complaint of Peonage in State v. Wehling is identified by the signature of the City of

Vineland Municipal Court Administrator. RENDELL, FISHER, AND GREENWAY omitted

these material facts from their statement about the “No” check box. Corrective action must be

taken.

Factually, the check box “Yes” is identified by the signature of Judge John A. Kasper.

Judge Kasper had the final say as to probable cause at that stage in the proceedings in State v.

19
Wehling. RENDELL, FISHER, AND GREENWAY omitted these material facts from their

statement about the “YES” check box. Corrective action must be taken. This false statement

demonstrates that RENDELL, FISHER, and GREENWAY neglected their duty to contact Judge

John A. Kasper about the complaint of peonage he issued and failed to contact the Vineland

Municipal Court to investigate before making statements on those matters. This above false

statement like the previous false statement is belied by the Cumberland County and Cape May

County Transcripts from State v. Wehling proceedings. Judge McKee was in possession of those

transcripts before he issued the April memorandum opinions and orders. Judge McKee’s

memorandums make no mention or accounting of those transcripts, nor any of the exculpatory

evidence submitted with the judicial conduct complaint in relation to El Mujaddid v. Wehling

proceedings. The above false statement is also belied by the Brief of Special Prosecutor Gretchen

A. Pickering filed in the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Wehling. The Doctrines of

Judicial Estoppel and Collateral Estoppel barred the aforementioned false statements, entirely.

This false statement is also belied by the findings of fact made by Judge Robert G. Millenky of the

Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division who found that:

“Because the matter of access to the subject warrant materials has been
adjudicated and resolved, because the plaintiff was a party to that adjudication
and because the resolution in the prior proceeding was a dismissal in the
plaintiff's favor based on, the insufficiency of the CDR-2 form...” [Page 14] “In
fact, it would appear to the court that, given that a criminal complaint had already
been issued against Lynn Wehling, that these certifications and accompanying
materials may be more appropriately characterized as potential evidence to
support the charges that plaintiff pressed and that Judge Kasper found to be
supported by probable cause.” [Page 17] Written Opinion of Judge Millenky
Superior Court of New Jersey (Camden) See El Mujaddid v. Cumberland
County Criminal Division Manager CAM-L-4550-13

FISHER, JORDAN, and VANASKIE had a legal duty to disclose the facts as to the

complaint of peonage issued by Judge Kasper against Lynn A. Wehling at the time they concealed

20
the fact that the complaint was issued and was against Wehling by stating that it was against a state

or local judicial officer, simply substituting the word “against” with “issued” to avoid compliance

with Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 3 and 4. Judges are not constitutionally nor statutorily empowered to relax

18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 2071. Violations of these statutes are considered cognizable misconduct in

the Guide to Judiciary Policy and require corrective action. While Judge McKee may relax the

Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings in certain cases, he is not

authorized to do so in this matter because violations of 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 2071 were described

in the underlying judicial misconduct complaints. In addition, Judge McKee may not relax United

States Codes requiring his disqualification at all, which he has clearly done as a matter of unlawful

practice of law. The cognizable misconduct described by El Mujaddid that Judge McKee refers to

is covered under 1001 and 2071, thus he was not authorized to dismiss under the Rules for Judicial-

Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, aside to the fact that he was disqualified.

In an effort to give the appearance of legitimacy to the April memorandum opinions,

exculpatory evidence again was not considered or excluded, and constitutional and statutory law

was not observed. As a matter of fact, under 1001 the memorandum opinions, per curium opinons,

orders issued by Judges are not outside administrative review, where they possess false statements,

statements unsupported by evidence. Such a notion as relied upon by Judge McKee is frivolous

and unlawful practice of law, upon review of 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 18 U.S.C. 2071.

JUDGE MCKEE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN HE FAILED TO

SCHEDULE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING REGARDING THE FORGED
ARREST WARRANT APPLICATIONS (WEHLING et. al) AND THE INVALID
SUBPOENA EVIDENCE (BREWER, et. al. )

Judge McKee’s approach to reference El Mujaddids subpoena allegations after being

disqualified by affidavit is an obvious whitewash of that evidence, where he fails to address

whether or not El Mujaddid was outside or inside the use of said subpoena evidence which further

21
demonstrates his intent of denying due process. Because the civil and appellate proceedings failed

to address the subpoena evidence issues, the Council or Judge McKee is in error to suggest that El

Mujaddid’s complaint seeks to challenge the rulings, because there are no appellate or civil rulings

regarding the subpoena evidence. However, that same subpoena evidence may be found on the

appellate and civil dockets. El Mujaddid was the successful party in the motion to quash invalid

subpoena proceedings during the municipal process and collateral estoppel applies to that fact.

Any common man can read the memorandum opinion issued by Judge Smith and find that

it possesses an exhibit list, unlike Judges Chagares and McKee’s opinions. Any common man can

read the exhibit list in the memorandum opinion made by Judge Smith and find that said opinion

omitted, excluded, and suppressed the principle subpoena evidence submitted with the complaint.

Any common man can read El Mujaddid’s complaint and find that it regards the suppression,

exclusion, and omission of that same evidence in civil and appellate proceedings. Any common

man can read the appellate and district court opinions and find that each opinion lacks discussion

of the subpoena evidence. Any common man can find that said subpoena evidence was filed with

the civil proceedings, appellate proceedings, and administrative proceedings. In addition, Judge

McKee and the Council fail to provide a rule, statute, or citation where it has ruled that the

exclusion of exculpatory evidence submitted with a complaint is proper or constitutional practice.

Several decisions cited in El Mujaddid’s memorandum of subpoena citations from members of the

Judicial Council suggest the contrary.

Judge Smiths’ memorandum opinion is evidence of cognizable misconduct because it

evidences false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001 where he stated that El Mujaddid

received a traffic citation, when he was aware that El Muajddid received a subpoena to testify

which was an unlawful practice of law that excluded and suppressed the subpoena evidence in

22
violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and the evidentiary clauses set forth in the Rules

on Judicial Conduct and Disability to control the outcome of the judicial conduct proceedings.

Because the Council has spoken on matters reasonably in dispute, matters of credibility, excluded,

whitewashed, or suppressed evidence, misstated evidence, or misstated material facts. An

evidentiary hearing is demanded pursuant to Breyer Committee Report, 239 F.R.D. at 243, Guide

to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2E, Ch. 3 Pg. 20, Walker (1941), N.L.R.B. (3d Cir. 1986) and 28 U.S.

Code § 358(b)(3).

Holding that disputed issues of fact cannot be resolved based on affidavits and must
be decided based on evidentiary hearings, "the only admissible procedure" for
resolving such issues. Citing Walker v. Johnston 312 U.S. 275 (1941) If material
facts are in dispute the administrative investigation is suspended and the dispute is
resolved through a hearing. N.L.R.B. v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. 789 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.
1986) Petitioner, El Mujaddid contends that the decisions of Judges Smith,
Chagares and Mckee are not rational, reasonable, lawful, or consistent with the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.

El Mujaddid’s petition for review must be granted in the interest of justice because Judges

Smith, Chagares, and McKee failed to properly consider the invalid subpoena to testify evidence

filed with the judicial conduct complaints against the three (3) Subject District Court Judges who

excluded4, suppressed, whitewashed, and covered up exculpatory evidence i.e., invalid subpoena

to testify evidence in District Court and Appellate proceedings to control the outcome.

El Mujaddid’s petition for review must be granted in the interest of justice because Judge

Mckee failed to properly consider forged arrest warrant application evidence and federal

probable cause finding evidence filed with the judicial conduct complaints against the Subject

Judges Rendell, Fisher, Greenway, Vanskie who excluded, suppressed, whitewashed, and covered

4
“the issues petitioner raises were addressed by neither the District Court of New Jersey nor the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit below.” Brief by Attorney John C. Gillespie.”
El Aemer El Mujaddid, Petitioner v. Andrew Brewer; et al No. 20-6649 4 See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 54.

23
up exculpatory evidence i.e., forged arrest warrant applications and federal probable cause

finding evidence against Lynn Wehling in Appellate proceedings to control the outcome.

“Accordingly, the petition for review is granted and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Chen v. Bureau of Citz. and
Immig. Servs., 470 F.3d 509, 514-15 (2d Cir. 2006)(vacating and remanding
because BIA committed legal error by applying de NoVo review to IJ's factual
finding). As in Kaplun, the Board "is free to revisit the underlying facts (including
the likelihood of future events), butit must do so under the clearly erroneous
standard that applies to facts."Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 272. Johnson v. Att'y Gen. U.S.
380 F. App'x 225 (3d Cir. 2010) agency determinations must be supported by
substantial evidence. See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 248 (3d Cir. 2003)
“A review of the IJ's decision and the administrative record reveal that the BIA's
conclusion that Liu failed to introduce any specific evidence to support her fear of
forced sterilization is not supported by substantial evidence. The petition for review
is granted, and the proceedings remanded to the BIA to permit the agency to
demonstrate that substantial evidence supports the BIA's decision. I.N.S. v.
Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 123 S.Ct.353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002). (". . . the proper
course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional
investigation or explanation."). qiao miao liu v. attorney general of united states
300 f.app'x 137 (3d cir. 2008)” Thus, to succeed on her petition for review, Liu
must show that the BIA’s decision was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. See
In Liu’s case, however, the BIA sufficiently considered the relevant documents and
evidence of record. See Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 328 (3d Cir.2004). we
cannot now consider this evidence because it was not presented before the BIA and
is not part of the administrative record There, we concluded that Part 718
regulations should have been used for a claim filed before 1980 and granted the
petition for review. That decision binds this panel. Lin timely filed a petition for
review. We granted the petition, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case to
the BIA because by neglecting to state it considered the evidence Lin presented, it
failed to meet the standards we articulated in Zheng v. Attorney Gen., 549 F.3d 260
(3d. Cir. 2008). See Lin, 306 Fed. App'x at 748. Lin v. Att'y Gen. U.S. 463 F. App'x
81 (3d Cir. 2011) An alien's petition for review may be granted if the BIA "fail[s]
to discuss most of the evidentiary record." Zheng v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d
260, 269 (3d Cir. 2008). In Liu's case, however, the BIA sufficiently considered the
relevant documents and evidence of record. Citing Yan-Ying Liu v. Attorney
General of the United States, 440 F. App'x 105 (2011) July 28, 2011 United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · No. 10-4012 440 F. App'x 105 “Because
the BIA used the wrong standard of review to overturn the IJ's decision, in
accordance with Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we will grant the
petition, vacate the BIA's decision, and remand for further proceedings. Forteau v.
Attorney General” Citing Forteau v. Attorney General. United States Court of
Appeals, Third Circuit. Jul 20, 2007. 240 F. App'x 531 (3d Cir. 2007)

24
 In general, (1) legal claims assert that Judges McKee erroneously applied or interpreted the

Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability

Proceedings, Rule 3(H)(1)(G) (Retaliation Clause), Rule 4(A)(4) (Retaliation Clause), Article Iv.

(Review Of Complaint Clause, Material Information Not Previously Considered Clause), (Rule

4(A)(5) (Cooperate In The Investigation Of A Complaint Clause ) Rule 10 (Merits Clause), Rule

11 (Disputed Issues Clause, Matters Of Credibility Clause, Investigation Of Evidence Clause,

Witnesses Clause) Rule 25 (F) (Merits Clause) 28 U.S.C. § 352(A), Failure To Comply With I.O.P

6.2.2. (A) (C) (D) Substantial Evidence On The Record Clause; (D) Appearance Of Error Of Law

And ( C ) Abuse Of Discretion Clause, Code of Conduct for United States Judges, the Third Circuit

Internal Operating Procedures, Rule 25 Disqualification, and Merits Clause, 28 U.S. Code § 455 -

Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge; 28 U.S. Code § 454 - Practice of law by

justices and judges, 18 U.S. Code § 205 - Activities of officers and employees in claims against

and other matters affecting the Government, 18 U.S. Code § 1001 - Statements or entries generally,

18 U.S. Code § 2071 - Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally, 18 U.S. Code § 505 - Seals

of courts; signatures of judges or court officers; 18 U.S. Code § 1581(b) - Peonage; obstructing

enforcement, 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Crime victims' rights, 18 U.S. Code § 1513 - Retaliating against a

witness, victim, or an informant, 18 U.S. Code § 1512 - Tampering with a witness, victim, or an

informant, 18 U.S. Code § 241 - Conspiracy against rights; 18 U.S. Code § 242 - Deprivation of

rights under color of law;

Second, (2) legal claims assert that Judges Smith and Chagares erroneously applied or

interpreted the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-

Disability Proceedings, Rule 3(H)(1)(G) (Retaliation Clause), Rule 4(A)(4) (Retaliation Clause),

Article Iv. (Review Of Complaint Clause, Material Information Not Previously Considered

25
Clause), (Rule 4(A)(5) (Cooperate In The Investigation Of A Complaint Clause ) Rule 10 (Merits

Clause), Rule 11 (Disputed Issues Clause, Matters Of Credibility Clause, Investigation Of

Evidence Clause, Witnesses Clause) Rule 25 (F) (Merits Clause) 28 U.S.C. § 352(A), Failure To

Comply With I.O.P 6.2.2. (A) (C) (D) Substantial Evidence On The Record Clause; (D)

Appearance Of Error Of Law And ( C ) Abuse Of Discretion Clause, Code of Conduct for United

States Judges, the Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedures, 28 U.S. Code § 455 -

Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge; 28 U.S. Code § 454 - Practice of law by

justices and judges, 18 U.S. Code § 205 - Activities of officers and employees in claims against

and other matters affecting the Government, 18 U.S. Code § 1001 - Statements or entries generally;

18 U.S. Code § 2071 - Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally; 18 U.S. Code § 1513 -

Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant; 18 U.S. Code § 1512 - Tampering with a

witness, victim, or an informant;

Third, (3) constitutional challenges assert that Judges McKee, Chagares, and Smith

violated constitutional rights (e.g., right to petition for redress, right to be free from retaliation,

right of access to the courts, right to due process-impartial tribunal, equal protection, equality

speech, equal justice, right to be free from incidents of slavery), equal benefit of all laws &

proceedings.

Holding that constitutional claims raised in a petition for review elude the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the INA For the foregoing reasons, the petition
for review will be granted, the order of the BIA vacated, and this case remanded
for further proceedings consistent with the dictates of this opinion. Sukwanputra v.
Gonzales 434 F.3d 627 (3d Cir. 2006)

Fourth (4) statutory challenges assert that subject Judges who are colleagues of Judge

McKee violated statutory rights and that Judge McKee aided and abetted the violation of the same

statutory rights at 42 U.S. Code § 1981 - Equal rights under the law to sue, give evidence, and to

26
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is

enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,

and exactions of every kind, and to no other and the Crime Victims' Rights Act at 18 U.S.C. §

3771.

Fifth (5) factual claims assert that certain findings of fact made by Judges McKee,

Chagares, and Smith violated Rule 3(H)(1)(G) (Retaliation Clause), Rule 4(A)(4) (Retaliation

Clause), Article Iv. (Review Of Complaint Clause, Material Information Not Previously

Considered Clause), (Rule 4(A)(5) (Cooperate In The Investigation Of A Complaint Clause ) Rule

10 (Merits Clause), Rule 11 (Disputed Issues Clause, Matters Of Credibility Clause, Investigation

Of Evidence Clause, Witnesses Clause) Rule 25 (F) (Merits Clause) 28 U.S.C. § 352(A), Failure

To Comply With I.O.P 6.2.2. (A) (C) (D) Substantial Evidence On The Record Clause; (D)

Appearance Of Error Of Law And ( C ) Abuse Of Discretion Clause; 18 U.S. Code § 1001 -

Statements or entries generally, 18 U.S. Code § 1513 - Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an

informant, 18 U.S. Code § 1512 - Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant, 18 U.S. Code

§ 241 - Conspiracy against rights; 18 U.S. Code § 242 - Deprivation of rights under color of law.

Sixth (6) evidentiary claims assert that the concealment or removal of exculpatory evidence

submitted in support of Judicial Conduct Complaints may be observed from reading the

memorandum opinions and orders issued by Judges McKee, Chagares, and Smith. That said

conduct violated 18 U.S. Code § 1001 - Statements or entries generally, 18 U.S. Code § 2071 -

Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally, Article IV. (Review Of Complaint Clause,

Material Information Not Previously Considered Clause), (Rule 4(A)(5) (Cooperate In The

Investigation Of A Complaint Clause ) Rule 10 (Merits Clause), Rule 11 (Disputed Issues Clause,

27
Investigation Of Evidence Clause, Witnesses Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 352 (A) and the Federal Rules

of Evidence 803.5

Seventh (7) discretionary claims assert Judges McKee, Chagares and Smith reached the

wrong conclusion when exercising discretion and were negligent because they failed to uphold

their duty to disqualify themselves and to investigate. That common law and the Rules for Judicial-

Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings required investigation into the validity of (1) forged

arrest warrant applications in Wehling, (2) Criminal Complaint Summons issued under Federal

law by a State or Local Judge John A. Kasper against the official misconduct of Wehling, and (3)

Subpoena to testify evidence enforced upon an accused party in Brewer (4) a Moorish race-related

opinion issued by a Subject Judge (Kugler). The failures of Judges McKee, Chagares, and Smith

were a derogation of the duties to investigate and disqualify which constitutes negligence under

Common law.

El Mujaddid’s petition for review must be granted in the interest of justice and corrective

action because Judge McKee failed to properly consider the invalid subpoena to testify evidence

filed with the judicial conduct complaints against Subject Judge Smith who excluded, suppressed,

and covered up said evidence and Judge Chagares who whitewashed the Subpoena to testify

evidence issuing a memorandum opinion exonerating Judge Smith’s exclusion and suppression of

that Subpoena evidence did not constitute cognizable misconduct when it clearly interferes with

the complaint process was retaliation and is cognizable misconduct.

5
(8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: (A) it sets out: (i) the office’s
activities; (ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal
case, a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; or (iii) in a civil case or against the
government in a criminal case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation.

28
 El Mujaddids’ most recently filed misconduct complaints are related in part to Judges

Smith and Chagares’s rejection of and failure to consider invalid Subpoena evidence. El Mujaddid

has provided the Subpoena evidence in civil, appellate, and administrative proceedings. A period

of at least three years has passed, and the subpoena evidence was submitted to the District Court

by both parties but has yet to receive federal consideration. Judge Chagares rejected El Mujaddid’s

complaint as to Judges Smiths’ exclusion6 of the Subpoena evidence in judicial conduct

administrative proceedings, despite the exclusion of Subpoena evidence falling within the scope

of interference with the complaint process, which is cognizable misconduct, his opinion

contradicts itself.

El Mujaddid’s petition for review must be granted in the interest of justice and corrective

action because Judge McKee failed to properly consider exculpatory evidence such as (3) forged

arrest warrant applications lacking probable cause findings and lacking the signature of a judicial

officer, Transcripts (State v. El Mujadddid, [Vineland Municipal Court]), USA/State v. Lynn

Wehling (Cumberland County and Cape May County), the Letters 7 from Cumberland County

Superior Courts written by Judge Becker and Mark Sprock, the CCPO replies for OPRA request

and the list continues, especially with regard to the civil and appellate proceedings filed with the

judicial conduct complaints against Circuit Judges who excluded, suppressed, whitewashed, and

covered up said exculpatory evidence to control the outcome of the proceedings. Judges Smith,

6
Stating that in limine hearing is important where exclusion will result in summary judgment, and
that magistrate judge abused discretion by excluding evidence without holding in limine
hearing. In re TMI Litigation 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000) BEFORE: GREENBERG and
McKEE, Circuit Judges, and GREENAWAY, District Judge. Nos. 96-7623, 96-7624, 96-
7625. January 4, 2000.
7
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge clearly erred by failing to consider whether the Giorgetti
Letter constitutes a process.” Avaya, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. Civil Action No. 10-5881(FLW)
(D.N.J. Jun. 6, 2012) Hon. Freda L. Wolfson PA
29
Chagares, and McKee failed to consider the relevant documents and evidence of record. Each

Subject Judge neglected their duty to investigate after speaking on matters reasonably in dispute

and failed to provide evidence to support their findings.

A review of Judges Smith, Chagares, and Mckee’s decisions and the administrative record

reveals Judges Smith, Chagares, and Mckee’s conclusion that El Mujaddid failed to introduce any

specific evidence to support his non-merits related claims, or that his claims are merits related or

that he lacked sufficient evidence is not supported by substantial evidence 8, is contrary to statutory

law and has only caused a delay in the administration of justice and further interference with the

complaint process. The same delay tactics were employed in civil and appellate proceedings.

A copy of the unreasonable decisions is attached. To date, no impartial, neutral, and

detached court has upheld the validity of the orders issued by Judges Smith, Chagares, and McKee.

Each complaint of judicial misconduct filed by El Mujaddid incorporated by reference or repeated

his underlying grievances i.e., exclusion, suppression, omission, whitewash, and cover-up of

exculpatory evidence in civil and appellate proceedings pursuant to Article IV. 11. (c)(2) of the

Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2E, Ch. 3 Page 21 (material information not previously considered

clause). Most notably forged arrest warrant application evidence and invalid subpoena evidence

prepared and signed by nonjudicial state actors. 9

8
Defendant has neither argued nor presented any evidence suggesting any of its witnesses
are outside the subpoena power of this Court. This case may be resolved largely based on
documentary evidence, rendering the need for fact witnesses and any attended costs for
transportation and lodging expenses for such witnesses unnecessary. See Trs. of the Nat'l Elevator
Indus. Pension, Health, Benefit Educ. Funds v. Cont'l Elevator Co., No. 98-5311, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7062, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 1999). MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JUAN
SANCHEZ, Judge
9
“For the district court to compel enforcement of the subpoena would, if Doe 1 and Doe 2 are
right on the merits, be in direct contradiction of these statutory provisions, and would
therefore involve the district court in the commission of a federal crime. ” United States Court
of Appeals, Third Circuit. IN RE: GRAND JURY. Nos. 97-7016, 97-7017. Decided: April 25,
30