(USCA 3. CiR JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 4.C. No’s. 03-21-90070, 03-20-90036, 03-21-9037, 03-21-9041, J.C. Nos. 03-22- 90005, J.C. Nos. 03-22-90070-10 REQUEST FOR TRANSFER PURSUANT TO RULE 26 AND AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION OF MCKEE, CHAGARES, SMITH, AMRBO, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENWAY, JR. SANCHEZ, HORNAK, WOLFSON, CONNOLLY, BRANN, Members of the Judicial Council BASED UPON THE PECUNIARY INTEREST, APPEARANCE OF BIAS, ACTUAL BIAS, SPECIAL BIAS, PERVASIVE BIAS, AND PREJUDICE AGAINST EL MUJADDID BECAUSE OF MEMBERSHIP IN A PROTECTED CLASS “MOORS” PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 455; 18 U.S.C. § 205; RULE 21; RULE 25 (DISQUALIFICATION), IN RE ASBESTOS LITIG, (3d Cir. 1992); U.S. V. BERTOLI (3d Cir, 1994); THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SOURCE DOCTRINE AND K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 12.04 “Three centuries ago, Edmund Burke.... warned... All that is necessary for the Triumph of evil is for good people to do nothing Edmund Burke” Quoting Judge McKee Source: Temple University Beasley School Commencement 2014 (Filed: apa], 2022) (To close, the Committee notes that recusal decisions are also governed by the recusal statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144, and the case law interpreting them. Although the Committee is not authorized to render advisory opinions interpreting §§ 455 and 144, Canon 3C of the Code closely tracks the language of § 455.) Source: Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2B, Ch. 2 Page 99 (The Code of Conduct for United States Judges and 28 US.C. § 455(a) require recusal when the impartiality of a judge might reasonably be questioned. The Code also directs recusal where an appearance of impropriety might exist.) Source: Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2B, Ch. 2 Page 100(Rule 25(¢) recognizes that participation in proceedings arising under the Act or these Rules by a judge who is the subject of a special committee investigation may lead to an appearance of self-interest in creating substantive and procedural precedents governing such proceedings. Rule 25(e) bars such participation. See Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2E, Ch. 3 Page 59. In providing that the adoption of the Code will not abrogate or modify any conflicting provisions of statutes or resolutions of the Conference, the Conference noted particularly the following statutes and resolutions Interest in Litigation: 28 U.S.C. 455. (but note where Code 1s more restrictive, the Code prevails) ‘Conflict of Interest: 18 US.C. 205. The Conference approved several recommendations of the Review Committee, as follows:(9) That the Conference adopt as a standard for the guidance of referees in bankruptcy in conflict-ofinterest situations the same standards for disqualification in contested matters as apply to federal judges; REPORT of the PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL 5-6, 1973 WASHINGTON, D.C. 1973! When a chief judge identifies a complaint, a written order stating the reasons for the identification must be provided: this begins the process articulated in Rule 11. Rule 11 provides that once a chief judge has identified a complaint, the chief judge, subject to the disqualification provisions of Rule 25, will perform, with respect to that complaint, all functions assigned to the chief judge for the determination of complaints filed by a complainant. Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2E, Ch. 3 Page 14 The Rule makes the prohibition against retaliation explicit in the interest of promoting public confidence in the complaint process Rules 4(a)(2), (3), and (4) reflect the judiciary’s commitment to maintaining a work environment in which all judicial employees are treated with dignity, fairness, and respect, and are free from harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3A(3) emt. (“The duty to be respectful includes the responsibility to avoid comment or behavior that could reasonably be interpreted as harassment, prejudice or bias.") C. Standards of Conduct (1) A judicial employee should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous to all persons with whom the judicial employee deals in an official capacity, including other employees and the general public. A judicial employee should not engage in sexual or other forms of harassment of court employees or retaliate against those who report misconduct. A judicial employee should hold court personnel under the judicial employee's direction to similar standards. A judicial employee should take appropriate action upon receipt of reliable information indicating a likelihood of conduct contravening this code. Appropriate action depends on the circumstances and may include, for example, reporting such conduct to a supervisor, court executive, or chief judge. For Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2A, Ch. 3 Page 6, see Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Commentary to Canons 3B(4) and 3B(6). (2) A judicial employee should diligently discharge the responsibilities of the office in a prompt, efficient, non- discriminatory, fair, and professional manner. A judicial employee should never influence or attempt to influence the assignment of cases, or perform any discretionary or ministerial function of the court in a manner that improperly favors any litigant or attorney, nor should a judicial employee imply that he or she is in a position to do so.? Guide to Judiciary Policy Vol. 2: Ethics and Judicial Conduct Pt. A: Codes of Conduct * hitps:/www.uscourts,gov/sites/default/files/1973-04,pdf * https://www-uscourts,gov/sites/default/files/guide-vol02a-ch03.pdf 2‘ode of Conduct for Judicial Employees. Rule 21(c) provides: “Any member of the Committee from the same circuit as the subject judge is disqualified from considering or voting on a petition for review related to that subject judge. The Rules specify certain mandatory disqualifications from judges who otherwise would have responsibility for deciding a judicial misconduct complaint at one or more levels of review. Rule 25(b). And @ member of the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability is disqualified if the member is from the same circuit as the subject judge. Rule 21(c). In re. Complaint of Judicial Misconduct 591 F.3d_638 (9 Cir. 2009) A favorable oF unfavorable predisposition can... . deserve to be characterized as ‘bias’ or ‘prejudice’ because, even though it springs from the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme 4s t0 display clear inability to render fair judgment.” Id. At__, 114 S.Ct. at 1155. In order for such bias to create a duty to recuse, however, the court's actions must “reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Id. At __, 114 S.Ct, at 1157. (“The judge does not have to be subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.") (emphasis in original); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 135, 162 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[TThe public's confidence in the judiciary, which may be irreparably harmed if a case is allowed to proceed before a judge who appears to be tainted”, requires that “justice must satisfy the appearance of Justice.”) (quoting In re Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 1992)). The extrajudicial source doctrine, as it is commonly known, provided at one time that recusal ‘was not warranted unless the grounds for recusal emanated from an extrajudicial source Ghe., a source outside of the judicial proceedings at hand). See Liteky v. United States, 510 US. 540, 544-545, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). [A]ctual bias or a likelihood of bias must appear if an otherwise valid administrative sanction is to be overturned because of a denial of due process.” In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 925 (3d. Cir. 1994). “[A]etual bias is grounds for disqualification when the decisionmaker has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the matter or has been the target of criticism from one seeking relief." Carberry, 114 N.J. at 586, 556 A.2d 314, Actual bias, ‘also known as bias in fact, is “the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 43. United States ¥. Mitchell 690 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2012) In Withrow v, Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), the Court noted that the probability of bias on the art of an adjudicator is intolerably high when the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome, and when he or she has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the litigant, “The prevalence, and pervasiveness?, of racial discrimination, might ‘make the situation look hopeless, but we remain hopeful. Let us expose the racism and racial discrimination endemic to every society, around the globe. Let us press forward, to root out that discrimination and remove the rot from our foundations, And on this day dedicated to ending racial discrimination, let us ieave our children a less hateful, more hopeful world.” Calling for Action at the UN Human Rights Council: At the UN Human Rights Council, more than 140 nations joined the United States in a statement outlining the continuing scourge of racism and racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance. This historic cross-regional statement is a call to action for all nations to. *https://www whitehouse. gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/202 1/03/21 /fact-sheet efforts-to-combat-systemic-racism/acknowledge and address the legacy and persistence of systemic racism review and revise long-standing practices and policies to ensure all individuals are treated equally embed fairness and inclusivity in decision-making processes redress inequities in policies that serve as barriers to equal opportunity eliminate barriers to political participation. Source: Fact Sheet: U.S. Efforts to Combat Systemic Racism MARCH 21, 2021, « STATEMENTS AND RELEASES. Holding that judge’s personal pecuniary interest in imposing fines supported the presumption of bias. There was at the common law the greatest sensitiveness over the existence of any pecuniary interest, however small or infinitesimal, in the justices of the peace. Tumey v. Ohio 273 U.S. 510 (1927)Holding that “those with a substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes.” It is sufficiently clear from our cases that those with a substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. $10 (1927). And Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), indicates that the financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey. It has also come to be the prevailing view that “[mJost of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with equal force to . . . administrative adjudicators.” K. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 12.04, p. 250 (1972), and cases cited. The District Court proceeded on this basis and, applying the standards taken from our cases, concluded that the pecuniary interest of the members of the Board of Optometry had sufficient substance to disqualify them, given the context in which this case arose. As remote as we are from the local realities underlying this case and it being very likely that the District Court has a firmer grasp of the facts and of their significance to the issues presented, we have no good reason on this record to overturn its conclusion and we affirm it. Gibson v. Berryhill 411 U.S. 564 (1973) Both modem versions of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct impose a duty on judges to take appropriate disciplinary action with regard to unprofessional conduct by lawyers and other judges. This reporting requirement applies to full-time and part-time judges.6 Canon 3B(3) of the 1972 Code provides that part of a judge’s administrative responsibility is to “take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware.”’ Since 1972, some states have decided to make the standard mandatory rather than hortatory,9 expand the measures which a “fudge should take to include “corrective” or “investigative” measures or clarify the Appropriate actions that a judge must follow.” Canon 3B(3)(b) (providing that the judge who becomes aware of unprofessional conduct by a lawyer is to take “appropriate investigative or disciplinary measures” against that lawyer). For example, ifthe situation is clearly within the accepted legal definition of a conflict of interest, a “judge should refuse to allow such a practice in proceedings over which the judge presides. A judge's continued control over a case where an impermissible conflict of interest exists might suggest judicial approval of the conflict. Source: The Judge’s Ethical Duty to Report To Report Misconduct By Other Judges y Other Judges and Lawyers and its Effect on Judicial Independence Leslie W. Abramson Hofstra Law Review Volume 25 Issue 3 Article 4 1997REASONS FOR THE BELIEF THAT BIAS OR PREJUDICE EXISTS Tam the complainant in the above-entitled actions, and the Judges of the Third Circuit Judicial Council, before whom the present action is pending, are prejudiced against me to such an extent that I cannot receive a fair and impartial hearing or proceeding before them. In 2014, I filed Judicial Conduct Complaint in relation to the obstruction of justice regarding a criminal complaint issued by the Vineland Municipal Court. The judicial conduct complaint described the interference with the criminal complaint process and the rights guaranteed to crime victims. Judge Mckee presided over that matter. Judge Mckee falsely purported to not have found any misconduct and dismissed the matter. Judge Mckee’s conduct was prohibited by the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act and Rules. Judge Mckee failed to contact Judge Kasper of the Vineland Municipal Court before dismissing the matter. Judge Mckee opposed the allegatiosn regarding the issuance of the criminal complaint against Lynn Wehling, the rules obliged Judge Mckee to contact Judge Kasper in regard to the criminal complaint(s) he issued against Lynn A. Webling. Judge Mckee failed to investigate the matter before making a decision. Judge Mckee issued a memorandum opinion exonerating the Subject Judges that obstructed justice and intereferd with the criminal complaint process. Judge Mckee’s conduct falls within the scope of retaliation and obstruction of justice. This situation is clearly within the accepted legal definition of a conflict of interest, Judge Mckee should have refused to allow such a practice in proceedings over which he presides. Judge Mckee’s and the Third Circuit's continued control over this case where an impermissible conflict of interest exists suggest judicial approval of the conflict. The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that the inquiry is often a private one, simply underscore the need for objective rules. Otherwise, there may be no adequate protection against a judge who simply misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the case. The judge’s own inquiry into actual bias, then, is not one that the law can easily superintend or review, though actual bias, if disclosed, no doubt would be grounds for appropriate relief. In lieu ofexclusive reliance on that personal inquiry, or on appellate review of the judge’s determination respecting actual bias, the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias, See Tumey, 273 U.S., at 532, 47 S.Ct. 437;Mayberry, 400 U.S., at 465-466, 91 S.Ct. 499;Lavoie, 475 U, S., at 825, 106 S.Ct. 1580. In defining these standards, the Court has asked whether, “under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness,” the interest “poses such a risk of actual bias or rejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.” Withrow, 421 U.S., at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 556 U.S. 868 (2009) To show that the appearance of bias exists and that the bias is actual, special, pervasive, and personal, El Mujaddid contends that previous filings i.e., transfer requests related to J.C. No’s. 03-20-9036, 03-21-90037, 03-21-9041, J.C. Nos. 03-22-9005, J.C. Nos. 03-22-90070-10, 03- 21-90070 criticized an extrajudicial source derived from Judge McKee’s public commentaries in the media conceming the Constitution, African Americans and his conduct in the administrative proceedings related to El Mujaddid v, Wehling (2014-2016). “the Court regarded “actual bias" as including “not only prejudice in the subjective sense but also such as might be thought implicitly to arise ‘in view of the nature or circumstances of his employment, or of the relation of the particular governmental activity to the matters involved in the prosecution, or otherwise.'” Frazier v. United States, supra, at 510-511, n. 19 (quoting United States v. Wood, Supra, at 133-134).Smith v. Phillips 455 U.S. 209 (1982) The Respondent argues strongly in favor of applying an actual bias standard. In doing so, the Respondent relies almost exclusively on Kaplan's footnote 30 where the Third Circuit borrows ‘Sixth Circuit language to indicate that evident partiality is only present “when a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial” to one of the parties. Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1523, n. 30 (3d Cir. 1994). In Kaplan, the Third Circuit's cursory mention of the evident partiality standard consists largely of a single sentence taken from the Sixth Circuit's Apperson v, Fleet Carrier Corp. The ‘Sixth Circuit's approach in Apperson is directly taken from the Second Circuit's Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York City District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d. Cir. 1984). Thus, the origins of the actual bias standard can be traced directly to the Second Circuit's break from the Commonwealth Coatings holding in Morelite. Crow Construction v. Jeffrey M. Brown Assoc. Inc. 264 F. Supp. 2d 217 (ED. Pa. 2003) Holding that the defendant demonstrated actual bias where the murder victim had made allegations concerning the trial court prior to her death, the trial court had a personal interest in protecting his name and the county's judiciary, and the trial court made rulings calculated to remove any mention of himself or implication of his alleged wrongdoing from thedefendant's defense Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be tried before a fair and impartial judge. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05, 117 S.Ct, 1793, 138 LEd.2d 97 (1997). The due process clause “requires that a defendant receive a fair trial in a fair tribunal before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case.” Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases."). Harrison v. Anderson 300 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D. Ind. 2004) Judge Mckee issued invalid orders with the intent to deprive El Mujaddid of his Constitutional rights as they relate to the filing of Judicial Misconduct complaints when it was clear that he had a pecuniary interest* in the outcome of the matter and where El Mujaddid previously submitted the news article expounding on Judge Mckee’s commentaries about Aftican Americans, which were the target of El Mujaddid’s criticism, Judge Mckee also had a pecuniary interest in seeing that no actual investigation of the exculpatory evidence would occur and that El Mujaddid’s First Amendment right to petition would be gagged, an incident of slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Moreover, even if there is no showing of actual bias in the tribunal, this Court has held that due process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias. This rule, too, was well established long before the right to jury trial was made applicable in state trials, and does not depend on it. Thus it has been invoked in trials to a judge, e. g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); and in pre- Duncan state jury trials, e. g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550 (1965). In Tumey v. Ohio, ‘Holding magistrate lacked neutrality because he had a pecuniary interest in seeing the warrant issue. Connally v. Georgia 429 U.S. 245 (1977) Pecuniary interest” was shown, the District Court said, by the fact that “their incomes as hearing officers are entirely dependent upon the carrier's decisions regarding whether, and how often, to call upon their services.” Id,, at 415. Schweiker v. McClure 456 U.S. 188 (1982) Holding that a hearing where the judge has a “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in the outcome of the case violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This Court held that “it certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.” Id., at 523.Ward v. Village of Monroeville 409 US. 57 (1972)supra, this Court held that a judge could not, consistent with due process, try a case when he had a financial stake in the outcome, notwithstanding the possibility that ‘he might resist the temptation to be influenced by that interest. And in Turner v. Louisiana, supra, the Court held that a jury could not, consistent with due process, sry a case after it had been placed in the protective custody of the principal Prosecution witnesses, notwithstanding the possibility that the jurors might not be influenced by the association. As this Court said in In re Murchison, supra, “Mairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” 349 U.S., at 136. Peters v. Kiff 407 U.S. 493 (1972) ‘The Second extrajudicial source derives from the National Constitution Center. Judge McKee participated in a National Constitution Center interview where the question “Does a Judge's personal opinion ever affect his or her decision?” Judge McKee stated: ‘onderful, Wonderful question, and, and Chief Judge Tucker said something very important, that is, We are who we are, most of the time, the law is so clear, as she said we've taken an oath to uphold it, and the law is either a statute an act of congress, or state statute or something, the statute requires a certain result, or supreme court law or our own own court, has decided a case, so close to this case, that the law is clear, and you, if you don't like it, you hold your nose, and just do it, and that’s happened at times, but there are times where the law is ambiguous, and it could be interpreting a statute, or whether or not another case law applies, and it’s not really clear, what the results should be, in those cases, I personally think and judges..... this... that who you are can have you impact most of the time that’s subliminal, can in that case impact how you decided things ‘The Third extrajudicial source derives from Judge Mckee’s participation in the August 4, 2009, National Press Club event hosted by the American Constitution Society on the importance of diversity on the federal bench.’ Judge McKee spoke on the Bias within the Third Circuit Supervised Courts and himself. Judge McKee stated: “Because in this day and age, ..... decisions, no one sits around and uses the N- word, wh there’s not an overt manifestation of racism, and I would submit to you, the problem is all of us have biases, that we are just not aware of, we are bombarded with images from the day we are born, we get it on television, we get in the music, we get it every time we open a book or magazine article, and I recall and 5 https:/Awww. youtube. comy/watch?v=ct25uYNdJjs § https://www. youtube.cI was thinking about this yesterday, that that the Doll experiments, that were brought up in brown v, board of education, we even young black kids by the age of Jive, when their given a black doll and white doll, then asked to identify which Doll is prettiest to them, they picked the white doll, and I read recently where that experiment was duplicated by someone, I didn’t read that much about it and the same results held true, that the black, the young black kids were identifying the white doll as being prettier and having better qualities, so all of us have those kinds of biases within ourselves, So for us to joke, uhh to the public or to ourselves and say that we, can decide cases based upon total objectivity, if, if someone really believes that, !would submit who's a Judge, their either lying to themselves or lying to the audience, and I don't want to castigate ummm ...... to anyone, cause I have a lot of respect for people who have said that, but there some circumstances where you have to say that, umm but its a very naive position to take, we have biases that we are not aware of so, how in the world can we say that those biases don’t affect judgment.” The Doll test results reveal similarities that may be observed in this matter, where Judge Mckee has taken an active role in denying the complainant a Black Man, due process an equal protection. Even here, Judge Mckee’s bias functions in the same manner as the Black Children in the Doll test he used as a comparison regarding the Subject of “Bias”. As the Black Children choose the White Doll, Judge Mckee chooses to rule in favor of the White individuals subject of my complaints without evidence to support his decisions. For example, the criminal complaint of peonage issued by Judge Kasper (Vineland Municipal Court) against Lynn Wehling was subjected to the obstruction of justice, despite having its own prohibition against being obstructed. This should interest Congress. ‘The (3) three criminal complaints prepared by Lynn Webling against El Mujaddid were never signed by a Judge in direct violation of the Fourth Amendment but were used to obtain a conviction’ without due process of law and fine payments in direct violation of the Thirteenth "In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 9Amendment. El Mujaddid provided these documents to the Third Circuit, Judge Mckee issued a ‘memorandum opinion implying that he did not find cognizable misconduct and that the evidence submitted wasn’t sufficient. This conduct amounts to a deprivation of the right to give evidence and testimony as they are enumerated in 42 U.S.C. 1981. In, Sum without contacting State Judges Becker and Kasper, Judge Mckee has treated arrest warrant applications lacking the signature of a judge and lacking probable cause findings as if they had those fourth amendment requirements, simply because they were prepared by a White defendant, this type of bias is the same bias used by Black children in choosing the White Doll, during the Doll test. Judge Mckee has put arrest warrant applications signed only by a White detective above criminal complaints actually signed and issued by a Judge against that same White detective with probable cause findings because the victim of that White Detectives” criminal actions is Black. The Fourth extrajudicial source derives from the Second Founding celebration of the 150th anniversary of the Reconstruction Amendments, Judges Janice Rogers Brown of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Bernice Donald of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Theodore McKee of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the history of the 14th Amendment. Judge McKee spoke on the Bias within the Third Circuit Supervised Courts and himself. Judge McKee stated: Before you go into the court, he will not know what the race of the defendants going 10 be, I don't know how you do that because in Philadelphia the residence is going to give you that...........We often do it, some of it, is who we identify with, who we are afraid of, umm and I think the only way we can fight against that is t0 recognize that it’s there, not be threatened by the fact that it’s there, not be defensive by the fact that is there, Ihave it, we all have it, be honest about it, and then try to see what we can do to deal with it, I think the shooter’s bias, I think it's explains, why so many incidents of black kids are being shot unarmed, the social science on that is Legion, to document something called a shooters bias... police I determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S. C. § 2254.Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) 10think don't want to do that but is something that has been grained, drilled into us since we were born..." ‘The Fourth extrajudicial source which is the paper is published by Rutgers University and is informative as to the bias of Federal Courts under the Third Circuit and how deep-seated that bias is against the protected class i.e., race or ethnicity “Moors”. “The very definition of the class is judicial and legal. Against this may be contrasted a class whose unifying trait is extraneous to the judicial process. Examples abound @ prejudice against women, a bias against long-haired youths, a bent against Orientals.” Source: United States v. Thompson 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973). Such an allegation against a class is sufficient under the statute. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed,2d 481 (1921), The Class is statutorily protected at 8 Stat. 484-487(1836) and defined in the Dictionary of Races Or Peoples By the United States Immigration Commission. Moor. (“They are of mixed Berber, Arab and often Negro blood”) Source: Dictionary of Races Or Peoples By United States. Immigration Commission (1907-1910) Daniel_Folkmar. “Moor. Maurus, Lat] A negro; a black-a-moor.” Source: A Dictionary Of The English Language by Samuel Johnson, (MORE. mor, sm. moor, blackamoor, black, negro. Source: Boyer's Royal Dictionary Abridged: In Two Parts, L French And English, li, English And French ... Paperback — Abridged. October 11, 2011 by Abel Bover (Author), J. C. Prieur (Creator),“As late as 1398 ‘we find the following reference to the ‘Moors’: “Also the nacyn (nation) of Maurys (Moors) theyr blacke colour comyth of the inner partes.” Source: A New English dictionary on historical principles: founded mainly on the materials collected by the Philological society / edited by James A. H. Murray ... with the assistance of many scholars and men of science. (Moor: Originally, this term was applied to ‘Muslims who conquered parts of Spain in the 8th century and settled there until they were driven out in the 15th century; it also denotes people from Morocco or Mauritania in North Africa. In Britain, it was often used to refer to any Black person (particularly Muslims). The word Moor’ appears in Shakespearean literature. It was spelt in a variety of ways (such as ‘more’, ‘moir’, ‘moorish’ ‘moris' 'moryen') and often combined with ‘black’ or ‘blak’, as in ‘black moor’, 'bllackamoor' and ‘black more’. ® The 14 Amendment: Judicial Perspective. Panel 2 https:/Avww. youtube.com/watch?v=mhz3I5pu_ss cre‘Blackamoor' was also used as a synonym for ‘negroe' in the 15th°, 16", and 17th centuries. ”)'" Source: Black Presence United Kingdom National Archives. El Mujaddid leamed of the deep-seated bias and prejudice against his class “Moors” by the Federal Judges from within the Third Circuit's supervision from!" the published"? works of Kaitlyn ‘Compari, now an assistant Camden County Prosecutor and Rutgers graduate, and from Katheryn Hayes Tucker a reporter for the Legal Intelligencer. Katheryn Hayes published an article titled: 3RD CIR. JUDGE SAYS THE CONSTITUTION HASN'T WORKED AS WELL FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS Mrs. Hayes reported the following commentaries from Judge McKee made in a virtual town hall hosted by the National Constitution Center at Independence Mall in Philadelphia conducted via Zoom on June 5 where Judge McKee stated: “T hear people say this is not who we are. I’m not so sure about that. This country was founded on the slave trade,” Judge Theodore McKee said. "The Constitution protected it.” The Constitution hasn't worked as well for African Americans as it ‘has for whites—a reality not lost on the people in the streets crying out against the Killings of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Breonna Taylor in Louisville, Kentucky, Ahmaud Arbery in Brunswick, Georgia, and too many others by law enforcement officers and those acting as police. That was the takeaway from a keynote conversation with Judge Theodore McKee of the US. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a virtual town hall hosted by the National Constitution Center at Independence Mall in Philadelphia conducted via Zoom on June 5, ® (Slave, conquistador, and the first African in Texas “As long as the concept of an African ‘American is current and as long as African American history is seen as beginning with enslavement in Africa, then Esteban [a Moroccan] is important because he is the first African-American.” — Robert Goodwin, historian, and author, “Crossing the Continent, 1527-1540, The Story of the first African-American Explorer of ~—sthe_~— American. South”) https://www.pvamu,edw tiphe/research-projects/the-diaspora-coming-to-texas/esteban/ (He is referred to as simply Esteban or Estevan, more commonly as Estevanico, and also referred to as Esteban the Moor.) hitps://www.nps.gov/coro/learn/historyculture! -dorantes.htm *° https:/www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/blackhistory/early times/moors.htm "' https://lawandreligion.com/sites/law-religion/files/Moorish-Science-Temple-Compari,pdf ” (appellate court may take judicial notice of the existence of a newspaper article); Peters v. Delaware River Port Authority of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 16 F.3d 1346, 1356 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1994) (same). Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. 360 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2004) 2El Mujaddid’s criticism disagrees with Judge Mckee commentaries and finds the Constitution is sufficient. E] Mujaddid contends it is the lack of enforcement of Constitutional Provisions such as in these matters that has created such hostile circumstances as described by Judge Mckee, which is today known as the New Jim Crow. Even here, in these matters, Judge Mckee stands on the wrong side of history, where he has allowed the District Court to exclude exculpatory evidence in both El Mujaddid v. Brewer (invalid subpoena to testify evidence) and El Mujaddid v. Webling (forged arrest warrant application evidence) and where they exclude that same evidence from analysis or adjudication when reviewing complaints whether through appellate or administrative proceedings contrary to 42 U.S.C. 1981 and in violation of 18 U.S.C. 241 and 18 U.S.C. 242. Kaitlyn Compari published a paper for Rutgers University (Camden) titled: “THE MOORISH SCIENCE TEMPLE OF AMERICA AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: EXPLORING THE NEED TO TAKE PROACTIVE MEASURES AGAINST RADICAL MEMBERS OF AN INCORPORATED RELIGION" Compari’s theories are no different than the White Supremacist information found in the Black Identity Extremist Report which relied on the term “Moorish Sovereign Citizen”. The BIE Report notions were denounced by Congress as “Racis/”. Compari’s material relies heavily on the Murakush Caliphate District Court of New Jersey decisions authored and published by Subject Judge I (Mr. Kugler). Judge Kugler suppressed and excluded exculpatory invalid subpoena to testify evidence in El Mujaddid v. Brewer, et. al, which violated 18 U.S. Code § 2071 - Concealment, removal, or mutilation generally. Id. at 599, 601 (“To deprive a whole community of this right, 10 refuse their evidence and their sworn complaints, is to brand them with a badge of slavery Merely striking off the fetters of the slave, without removing the incidents and ® https://lawandreligion,com/sites/law-religion/files/Moorish-Science-Temple-Compari.pdf Bconsequences of slavery, would hardly have been a boon to the colored race .. The power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation must be a power to do away with the incidents and consequences of slavery, and to instate the Jreedmen in the full enjoyment of that civil liberty and equality which the abolition of slavery meant.”) William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice Volume 27 (2020-2021) Issue 2 Article 6 February 2021 The Thirteenth Amendment and Equal Protection: A Structural Interpr Interpretation t etation to "Free" the Amendment " the Amendment Larry J. Pittman Judge Kugler took no corrective action, after receipt of a complaint of judicial misconduct highlighting his misconduct in interfering with the disposition of El Mujaddid v. Brewer, et.al ie., removing the state civil rights action to control the outcome. Comparis “White Supremacist” work Published with Rutgers University is an extrajudicial source (i.e., a source outside of the judicial and administrative proceedings at hand). Compari's work states: “Religious freedom and a fair judicial system are two distinct rights that Americans have expected and enjoyed for decades. A. The Federal Courts’ Dismissal of the Claims as Nonsensical In many cases, the federal courts have dismissed the Moorish...... claims as being nonsensical and irrational. The federal court in New Jersey has heard a number of these cases and has responded by dismissing the illogical claims. Similar to Tirado, the court in Bey v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec. Immigration found the claims to be nonsensical. The court said that Bey’s use of the Treaty" as a defense was a “delusory contrivance. “The federal court in New Jersey and numerous other states have been disposing of the Moorish ....claims, considering them irrational and dismissing the claims with Breiudice, The federal courts have determined that the. application of the Treaty" is merely a delusion. While the federal courts have held that these alleged ' The treaties, dating from the late 18th century through the near mid-19th century, set forth a ‘number of agreements that provided certain civil and religious protections to those who arrived in early America from northem Africa.” Source: Before He Was President: Abraham Lincoln And The Man Who Refused To Be Called ‘Negro’. (Political motives had their weight, and it was not as well settled then as it now is, that the Moors were to be treated on a footing with other nations.”) Source: MOXON et al. v. The FANNY. [2 Pet. Adm, 309,]1 District Court, D. Pennsylvania 1793. 5(‘Morocco was one of the first countries to recognize the newly independent United States, opening its ports to American ships by decree of Sultan Mohammed III in 1777. Morocco formally recognized the United States by signing a treaty of peace and friendship in 1786, a document that remains the longest unbroken relationship in U.S. history.) https:/iwww state.gov/u-s-relations- 4sovereign citizens are using this defense solely to avoid prosecution under the laws of the state or of the country, the state courts have seemingly not been as vocal. Recently though, the state courts have begun to answer the radicals’ claims. It has become clear that this defense contains no legally acceptable argument and should be dismissed by all courts, VII. THE STATE COURTS’ RESPONSE TO MOORISH AMERICAN RADICAL GROUPS The recent onslaught of claims by the radicals has required the state courts to answer on a case-by-case basis. The court in Gutloff'v. State shared the sentiment of many other courts when it called the jurisdictional arguments “non-meritorious” and “annoying. “Despite this, the state courts are much less vocal than the federal courts, and New Jersey state case law on the issue seems relatively absent. In determining the best approach for future cases, it is important to explore how the courts have handled similar issues in the past. VII. DRAWING PARALLELS BETWEEN THE MOORISH AMERICANS AND OTHER RADICAL GROUPS “History is possibly the best teacher. This is especially true in the judicial system regarding precedential case Jaw among jurisdictions. When handling complex legal issues, judges may look to the past for guidance when distinct similarities exist. In addition to federal case Jaw, the answer to handling the Moorish American radicals lies in histor how the courts have approached polygamy, Peyotism, and Christian Terrorism may provide some answers.'®” with-morocco/ (“The Treaty of 1836 replaced an earlier treaty between the United States and Morocco which was concluded in 1787. The two treaties were substantially identical in terms and Articles 20 and 21 are the same in both. Accordingly, in construing the provisions of Article 20 - and, in particular, the expression “shall have any dispute with each other it is necessary to take in to account the meaning of the word “dispute at the times when the two treaties were concluded. For this purpose it is possible to look at -the way in which the word “dispute” ot its French counterpart was used in the different treaties concluded by Morocco e.g., with France in 1631 and 1682, with Great Britain in 1721, 1750, 1751, 1760 and 1801. It is clear that in these instances the word was used to cover both civil and criminal disputes.) Source: France v. United States of America ** A copy of this publication is attached. 45“Rutgers University is confronting its historical ties to slavery. The New Jersey school founded in 1766 has compiled research that sheds new light on its beginnings, including an untold story of a slave who helped build the university's iconic Old Queens administration building. The detailed report released Friday is Published in the book “Scarlet and Black.” It shows how intertwined slavery is with the early history of Rutgers, a common theme among America’s colonial colleges.” Rutgers’ first president owned slaves. Its first tutor owned slaves. And its namesake Henry Rutgers owned slaves, including the "negro wench" he supported in his will.” “And its namesake Henry Rutgers owned slaves, including the "negro wench" he supported in his will. A slave named Will, leased for construction work by the New Brunswick doctor who owned him, helped lay the foundation for the Old Queens administration building in the early 1800s. Famed abolitionist Sojourner Truth was originally owned by the family of Rutgers' first president. Some early university trustees owned slaves'* and were among the most ardent anti-abolitionists in the mid-Atlantic region. Others were proponents of the colonization movement, which supported sending former slaves to Africa rather than allowing them to live alongside whites. Rutgers' early faculty and curriculum reinforced the racism that justified slavery and the separation of races. "Like most early American colleges, Rutgers depended on slaves to build its campuses and serve its students and faculty," the book states, "It depended on the sale of black people to fund its very existence," noting donors who gave money or land to the university-owned slaves.'° "” bttps:/lapnews.convarticle/5533,afb37974bdfb798A07bSTbSble (We take judicial notice of the existence of a letter-to-the-editor by Attorney Rohn published in the St. Croix Source. See, e.g., Ieradi v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 230 F.3d 594, 598 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2000) "® Beyond these early explorers and the occasional free Muslim mentioned in early histories, recent historians of Muslim America suggest that the most significant influx of Muslims before the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was slaves. Muhammad, supra note 7, at 9; Freeland, supra note 1, at 450. Muhammad notes that “Moors” from the Barbary Coast—captured by the Portuguese and enslaved—successfully. Although authors of American history commonly acknowledge that Muslims were among the slaves imported into the United States, recent scholarship suggests that they were more numerous than previously thought, and that many practiced their faith or a syncretic version of Islam and Christianity well into the nineteenth century. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 20-21 (describing syncretic Islamic and hoodoo practices of slaves); GhaneaBassiri, supra note 7, at 63-64, 80-96 (describing Islamic-faith among slaves); Freeland, supra note 1, at 450-51. Freeland notes that not all Muslim slaves were black Africans; Malaysians and Turks were also enslaved because Christians could own “infidels” whereas “infidels” could not own Christian slaves. Freeland, supra note 1, at 450- 51. Noting that the immigration form requires applicants to state their color and complexion, the court implied that the law continues to be concemed with the race of immigration applicants. Id. The South Carolina District Court thus determined that Albanians, Spanish, and Portuguese “Moors” are white, while “all inhabitants of Asia, Australia, the South Seas, the Malaysian Islands and territories, and of South America” are not unless they can show European descent. Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. at $14— 16* Source: Islam in the Mind of American Courts: 1800 to 1960 By Marie A. Failinger '° https://www-nj.com/education/2016/1 I/rutgers slavery _racism_report. html 16SPECIAL BIAS: EL MUJADDID V. BREWER OPINION FORMED BY ROBERT KUGLER ON THE BASIS OF EVENTS OCCURRING IN THE COURSE OF MURAKUSH CALIPHATE PROCEEDINGS THAT DISPLAY A DEEP-SEATED ANTAGONISM THAT MADE FAIR JUDGMENT IMPOSSIBLE ‘The Third Cireuit and District Court of New Jersey (Camden) judges have a special bias against the complainant as one of those Moors, a race which the Courts under Third Circuit Supervision have been defining as meaning Sovereign Citizen or Redemptionist. Under the Fifth Amendment, the complainant is entitled to administrative process before judges who are not biased against him at any point of the proceedings and, indeed, most importantly, at the judgment. The Subject District judge had a special bias against Plaintiff as one of those Sovereign Citizens ot Redemptionists. The Third Circuit's actions and inactions thus far have supported such special bias. The court reasoned that if during "a lengthy trial . . . the presiding judge for the First time learns of an obscure religious sect, and acquires a passionate hatred for all its adherents," the fact that the beliefs arose through a judicial proceeding is of no consequence. Id. at __, 114 8.Ct. at 1154, The duty to recuse would arise. This is because the words "extrajudicial bias" really are intended to convey the notion of a "wrongful or inappropriate" bias, regardless of whether the improper bias arises from the evidence adduced at trial or from some extraneous source. "A favorable or unfavorable predisposition can . . . deserve to be characterized as ‘bias! or ‘prejudice’ because, even though it springs from the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, itis so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair Jjudgment."Id. at___, 114 8.Ct. at 1155. US. v. Bertoli 40 F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994) “The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified. The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. ” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 {certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false. I am subject to punishment. Dated: 04/7/2022 EI Aemer El Mujaddid, Pro Se Crime Victim Witness 7