Progressive Development Corp. V. Secretary of Labor G.R. No. 96425 / 205 SCRA 802

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. No.
96425
/ 205 SCRA 802
Topic: Government Regulation: Union Registration Requirements
FACTS:
1. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election among
the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor
federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union, was
issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153.
2. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP claimed that
there was no existing collective bargaining agreement and that no other legitimate labor
organization existed in the bargaining unit.
3. Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that the local union failed to
comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as
amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names,
addresses and list of officers and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.
4. Respondent KILUSAN-TUCP submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion to dismiss
claiming that it had submitted the necessary documentary requirements for registration,
such as the constitution and by-laws of the local union, and the list of officers/members
with their addresses. Kilusan further averred that no books of accounts could be
submitted as the local union was only recently organized.
5. Petitioner PDC insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), it found that the alleged minutes of the organizational meeting was
unauthenticated, the list of members did not bear the corresponding signatures of the
purported members, and the constitution and by-laws did not bear the signature of the
members and was not duly subscribed. It argued that the private respondent KILUSAN-
TUCP therefore failed to substantially comply with the registration requirements
provided by the rules.
6. MED-ARBITER Dela Cruz: held that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements for the formation of the chapter. He further stated that mere issuance of
the charter certificate by the federation was sufficient compliance with the rules.
Considering that the establishment was unorganized, he maintained that a certification
election should be conducted to resolve the question of representation.
7. Petitioner filed an MR to the Office of the Secretary.
8. SECRETARY Laguesma: denied the MR.
9. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was correct that a labor organization such as the
respondent (KILUSAN)-TUCP may not validly invest the status of legitimacy upon a
local or chapter through the mere expedient of issuing a charter certificate and
submitting such certificate to the BLR and as such local or chapter must at the same
time comply with the requirement of submission of duly subscribed constitution and by-
laws, list of officers and books of accounts
RULING:
1. YES, because, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required
documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.
In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted
documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case
may be, and attested to by president is apparent.
The submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00 registration fee)
becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the application for registration. Upon
approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is entitled to all the rights and
privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization. The employer naturally
needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which
has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion
of the certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these
apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and
misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and
(d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.
In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are
found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote
as follows:
(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a
constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes,
the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or
national unions shall be observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers
to the certification and attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it
follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts
submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these requirements. The
same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union
registration exists in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to
exact compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as
previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union registration
are no longer required in the case of formation of a local or chapter. The policy of the
law in conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the
policy of providing preventive measures against the commission of fraud.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation won.
DOCTRINE: Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor

organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or local thereof."
Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate
labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and
includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof.
Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR.
A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon
submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or
national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of
accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case
may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not
become a legitimate labor organization.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the
commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting
employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose
sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends.
FACTS:
The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a local or chapter of a f
ederation may file a petition for certification election and be certified as the sole and exc
lusive bargaining agent of the petitioner’s employees.
Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP (hereinafter referred to as Kilusa
n) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner alleging that it is a legitimat
e labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union, wa
s issued charter certificate. Kilusan claimed that there was no existing collective bargain
ing agreement and that no other legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining u
nit.
Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that the local union failed to compl
y with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amende
d, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addres
ses and list of officers and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a local union need to be a Legitimate Labor Union on despite its issuanc
e of charter certificate.
RULING:
Yes. But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of
a certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition
for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 242 enu
merates the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor organization among which is the right t
o be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate coll
ective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Meanwhile, Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as “any labor organizat
ion duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or local thereof.” (Emphasis
supplied) Rule I, Section 1(j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legiti
mate labor organization as “any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and in
cludes any branch, local or affiliate thereof.”
It is important to clarify the relationship between the mother union and the local union. I
n the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 5
12 [1975]), the Court held that the mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, h
ad the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association
, free to serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints impo
sed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus, whereas in this case the p
etition for certification election was filed by the federation which is merely an agent, the
petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal, which must be a legitimate la
bor organization. The chapter cannot merely rely on the legitimate status of the mother
union.
G.R. No. 96542 February 4, 1992

PROGRESIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
Vs.
THE HON. SEC. DOLE, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ and (KILUSAN)-
TUCP, respondents.
FACTS:
 Respondent Pambansang Paggawa (KILUSAN)-TUCP filed with the DOLE a petition
for certification election among the rank-and- file employees of the petitioner alleging
that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development
Employees Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153.
 Kilusan claimed that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement and that
no other legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
 Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss dated July 11, 1990 contending that the
local union failed to comply with the rules as provided for under the Labor code.
 Respondent Kilusan submitted a rejoinder to PDC’s motion to dismiss claiming that it
had submitted the necessary documentary requirements for registration.
 Kilusan further averred that no books of accounts could be submitted as the local
union was recently organized.
 On its supplemental Position Paper PDC insisted that upon verification with the BLR,
it found that the alleged minutes of the organizational meeting was unauthenticated,
the list of members as well as the constitution and by-laws did not bear the
signatures of the purported members and the same was not duly subscribed as
required.
 Additionally, it prayed that Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz inhibit himself from
handling the case for the reason that he allegedly had prejudged the same.
 Med-Arbiter dela Cruz held that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements for the formation of the chapter.
 He further stated tthat mere issuance of the charter certificate by the federation was
sufficient compliance with the rules. Considering that the establishment was
unorganized, he maintained that a certification election should be conducted to
resolve the question of representation.
 PDC filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was treated as an appeal
before the secretary of the DOLE, who eventually denied the same.
 PDC filed a petition seeking for TRO which was granted by the court which enjoined
public respondents from carrying out the assailed resolutions and orders of from
proceeding with the certification election.
ISSUE: WON private respondents failed to substantially comply with the registration
requirements provided by the rules in the labor code.
HELD: YES
 Upon perusal of the records, the SC found that the private respondents failed to
substantially comply with the requirements provided by the rule; specifically Rule ii
sec. 3 Book v of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which
requires the submission of:
a) the constitution and by-laws;
b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or members; and
c) books of accounts.
 Petition granted, the assailed resolution and orders of respondent Med-arbiter and
Sec. of DOLE, respectively, are hereby set aside.
 The TRO dated feb. 25, is made permanent.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (MANDAUE PACKAGING PRODUCTS PLANTS) vs.

MANDAUE PACKING PRODUCTS PLANTS-SAN PACKAGING PRODUCTS –SAN
MIGUEL CORPORATION MONTHLIES RANK-AND-FILE UNION – FFW (MPPP-
SMPP-SMAMRFU-FFW),
FACTS:
Respondent Free Workers (FFW), filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE
Regional Office No. VII. In the petition, respondent stated that it sought to be certified
and to represent the permanent rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election on the sole
ground that herein respondent is not listed or included in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations based on the certification issued by DOLE Regional Office.
Ptitioner reiterated that respondent was not a legitimate labor organization at the time of
the filing of the petition. Petitioner also propounded that contrary to respondent’s
objectives of establishing an organization representing rank-and-file employees, two of
respondent’s officers, namely Vice-President Emannuel L. Rosell and Secretary Bathan,
were actually supervisory employees. In support of this allegation, petitioner attached
various documents evidencing the designation of these two officers in supervisory roles,
as well as their exercise of various supervisory functions.9 Petitioner cited Article 245 of
the Labor Code, which provides that supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees.10
Issue: Whether or Not Rank and File and Supervisors may be a member of same
union.
Held:
We rule in the negative.
Under the law, a managerial employee is "one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer,
suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees." A supervisory
employee is "one who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommends
managerial actions if the exercise of such recommendatory authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.’" Finally, "all
employees not falling within the definition of managerial or supervisory employee are
considered rank-and-file employees". It is also well-settled that the actual functions of
an employee, not merely his job title, are determinative in classifying such employee as
managerial, supervisory or rank and file.
Xxxx
We take administrative notice of the realities in union organizing, during which the
organizers must take their chances, oftentimes unaware of the fine distinctions between
managerial, supervisory and rank and file employees. The grounds for cancellation of
union registration are not meant to be applied automatically, but indeed with utmost
discretion. Where a remedy short of cancellation is available, that remedy should be
preferred. In this case, no party will be prejudiced if Bathan were to be excluded from
membership in the union. The vacancy he will thus create can then be easily filled up
through the succession provision of appellee union’s constitution and by-laws. What is
important is that there is an unmistakeable intent of the members of appellee union to
exercise their right to organize. We cannot impose rigorous restraints on such right if we
are to give meaning to the protection to labor and social justice clauses of the
Constitution.
San Miguel Corp.
VS
Mandaue
467 SCRA 107
[Aug. 16, 2005]
Facts
-CA affirmes DOLE Undersecretary for Labor Relations, Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz,

ordering the immediate conduct of a certification election among the petitioner’s rank-
and-file employees.
-Federation of Free Workers (FFW/ respondent) filed a petition for certification election
with the DOLE Regional Office No. VII. It sought to be certified and to represent the
permanent rank-andfile monthly paid employees of the petitioner. The following
documents were attached to the petition: (1) a Charter Certificate certifying that
respondent as of that date was duly certified as a local or chapter of FFW; (2) a copy of
the constitution of respondent prepared by its Secretary, Noel T. Bathan and attested by
its President, Wilfred V. Sagun; (3) a list of respondent’s officers and their respective
addresses, again prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun; (4) a certification
signifying that respondent had just been organized and no amount had yet been
collected from its members, signed by respondent’s treasurer Chita D. Rodriguez and
attested by Sagun; and (5) a list of all the rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the
Mandaue Packaging Products Plants and Mandaue Glass Plant prepared by Bathan
and attested by Sagun. -SMC (Petitioner) filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
certification election on the sole ground that herein respondent is not listed or included
in the roster of legitimate labor organizations based on the certification issued by the
Officer-In representative, then right to be represented by a bargaining agent should not
be denied to other members of the bargaining unit.”
HELD
1. NO. Ratio EFFECT NON-PARTICIPIATION PREVIOUS ELECTION. No law,

administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of
neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections.
2. NO. Ratio RELIGION/PAST NON-PARTICIPATION. Neither law, administrative rule

nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization
may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible
intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the
bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.
6.3.
CERTIFICATION ELECTIONPROCESS
1. The Union as Initiating Party ART. 212. Definitions. -(h) “Legitimate labor
organization” means any labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof. Charge, Regional
Director of the DOLE Regional Office No. VII, Atty. Jesus B. Gabor.
-Respondent submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations the same documents earlier
attached to its petition for certification. The accompanying letter, signed by respondent’s
president Sagun, stated that such documents were submitted in compliance with the
requirements for the creation of a local/chapter pursuant to the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules; and it was hoped that the submissions would facilitate the listing of
respondent under the roster of legitimate labor organizations.The Chief of Labor
Relations Division of DOLE Regional Office No. VII issued a Certificate of Creation of
Local/Chapter No. ITD. I-ARFBT-058/98, certifying that from 30 July 1998, respondent
has acquired legal personality as a labor organization/worker’s association, it having
submitted all the required documents.
San Miguel Corp.
VS
Mandaue
467 SCRA 107
[Aug. 16, 2005]
Facts
-CA affirmes DOLE Undersecretary for Labor Relations, Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz,

ordering the immediate conduct of a certification election among the petitioner’s rank-
and-file employees.
-Federation of Free Workers (FFW/ respondent) filed a petition for certification election
with the DOLE Regional Office No. VII. It sought to be certified and to represent the
permanent rank-andfile monthly paid employees of the petitioner. The following
documents were attached to the petition: (1) a Charter Certificate certifying that
respondent as of that date was duly certified as a local or chapter of FFW; (2) a copy of
the constitution of respondent prepared by its Secretary, Noel T. Bathan and attested by
its President, Wilfred V. Sagun; (3) a list of respondent’s officers and their respective
addresses, again prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun; (4) a certification
signifying that respondent had just been organized and no amount had yet been
collected from its members, signed by respondent’s treasurer Chita D. Rodriguez and
attested by Sagun; and (5) a list of all the rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the
Mandaue Packaging Products Plants and Mandaue Glass Plant prepared by Bathan
and attested by Sagun. -SMC (Petitioner) filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
certification election on the sole ground that herein respondent is not listed or included
in the roster of legitimate labor organizations based on the certification issued by the
Officer-In representative, then right to be represented by a bargaining agent should not
be denied to other members of the bargaining unit.”
HELD
1. NO. Ratio EFFECT NON-PARTICIPIATION PREVIOUS ELECTION. No law,
administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of
neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections.
2. NO. Ratio RELIGION/PAST NON-PARTICIPATION. Neither law, administrative rule

nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization
may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible
intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the
bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not.
6.3.
CERTIFICATION ELECTIONPROCESS
1. The Union as Initiating Party ART. 212. Definitions. -(h) “Legitimate labor
organization” means any labor organization duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or local thereof. Charge, Regional
Director of the DOLE Regional Office No. VII, Atty. Jesus B. Gabor.
-Respondent submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations the same documents earlier
attached to its petition for certification. The accompanying letter, signed by respondent’s
president Sagun, stated that such documents were submitted in compliance with the
requirements for the creation of a local/chapter pursuant to the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules; and it was hoped that the submissions would facilitate the listing of
respondent under the roster of legitimate labor organizations.The Chief of Labor
Relations Division of DOLE Regional Office No. VII issued a Certificate of Creation of
Local/Chapter No. ITD. I-ARFBT-058/98, certifying that from 30 July 1998, respondent
has acquired legal personality as a labor organization/worker’s association, it having
submitted all the required documents.
SAMMA-LIKHA vs. SAMMA CORP DIGEST
DECEMBER 19, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 167141 March 13, 2009
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG

KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSA (SAMMA-LIKHA), Petitioner,
vs.
SAMMA CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma– Lakas sa Industriya ng
Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) filed a petition for certification election
on July 24, 2001 in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office
IV.4 It claimed that: (1) it was a local chapter of the LIKHA Federation, a legitimate labor
organization registered with the DOLE; (2) it sought to represent all the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3) there was no other legitimate labor
organization representing these rank-and-file employees; (4) respondent was not a
party to any collective bargaining agreement and (5) no certification or consent election
had been conducted within the employer unit for the last 12 months prior to the filing of
the petition.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation
failed to establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its existence as a
local chapter; (3) it failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4) it
had a prohibited mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
Med-arbiter ordered the dismissal. , Acting Secretary Manuel G. Imson, treating the
motion for reconsideration as an appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of the
med-arbiter. He ruled that the legal personality of a union cannot be collaterally attacked
but may only be questioned in an independent petition for cancellation of registration.
Thus, he directed the holding of a certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of respondent, subject to the usual pre-election conference and inclusion-
exclusion proceedings. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether a certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for
certification election
HELD: NO
In ruling against petitioner, the CA declared that under Administrative Circular No. 04-
94,16 a certificate of non-forum shopping was required in a petition for certification
election. The circular states:
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are
the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint,
or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or applicationwherein a party asserts his claim
for relief. (Emphasis supplied)
According to the CA, a petition for certification election asserts a claim, i.e., the conduct
of a certification election. As a result, it is covered by the circular.
We disagree.
The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-

claims, cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their
respective positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner
or applicant. A certification proceeding, even though initiated by a “petition,” is
not a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding
character.
Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring
relief, but, rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. The Board’s functions are
not judicial in nature, but are merely of an investigative character. The object of the
proceedings is not the decision of any alleged commission of wrongs nor asserted
deprivation of rights but is merely the determination of proper bargaining units and the
ascertainment of the will and choice of the employees in respect of the selection of a
bargaining representative. The determination of the proceedings does not entail the
entry of remedial orders to redress rights, but culminates solely in an official designation
of bargaining units and an affirmation of the employees’ expressed choice of bargaining
agent.
Under the omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code as amended by D.O. No. 9,22 it
is supposed to be filed in the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal
office of the employer or where the bargaining unit is principally situated.23 The rules
further provide that where two or more petitions involving the same bargaining unit are
filed in one Regional Office, the same shall be automatically consolidated.24 Hence, the
filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions will rarely happen in this
proceeding and, if it does, will be easy to discover.
Notably, under the Labor Code and the rules pertaining to the form of the petition for
certification election, there is no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping
either in D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 or in D.O. No. 40-03, series of 2003 which replaced
the former.
Considering the nature of a petition for certification election and the rules governing it,
we therefore hold that the requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping is
inapplicable to such a petition.
31 SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA– LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG

KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSA (SAMMA–LIKHA) V. SAMMA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 167141 March 13, 2009
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Requirement of certificate of non forum shopping is not

required in a petition for certification election. The erroneous inclusion of one
supervisory employee in the union of rank-and-file employees was not a ground to
impugn its legitimacy as a legitimate labor organization which had the right to file a
petition for certification election.
EMERGENCY RECIT: SAMMA-LIKHA filed for PCE, denied by Med-Arbiter due to (1)
lack of legal personality for failure to attach the certificate of registration purporting to
show its legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rank-andfile and supervisory
employees and (3) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping. SC: Unless
petitioners union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall continue
to have all the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to petition for
certification election.
FACTS:
 Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang
Haligi ng Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) filed a petition for certification election on July
24, 2001. It claimed that: (1) it was a local chapter of the LIKHA Federation, a
legitimate labor organization registered with the DOLE; (2) it sought to represent
all the rank-and-file employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3) there was
no other legitimate labor organization representing these rank-and-file
employees; (4) respondent was not a party to any collective bargaining
agreement and (5) no certification or consent election had been conducted within
the employer unit for the last 12 months prior to the filing of the petition.
 Samma Corp. moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA
Federation failed to establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its
existence as a local chapter; (3) it failed to attach the certificate of non-forum
shopping and (4) it had a prohibited mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees.
 Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) lack of legal
personality for failure to attach the certificate of registration purporting to show its
legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rank-andfile and supervisory
employees and (3) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for MR. The Regional Director of DOLE forwarded the case to
the Secretary of Labor. During pendency of the petition, Samma Corp. filed a
petition for cancellation of petitioner’s union registration in the DOLE Regional
Office IV.
 Sec. of Labor reversed the order of the med-arbiter, the legal personality of a
union cannot be collaterally attacked but may only be questioned in an
independent petition for cancellation of registration. Thus, he directed the holding
of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees. Meanwhile,
Director of DOLE revoked the charter certificate of SAMMA-LIKHA as local
chapter of LIKHA Federation on the ground of prohibited mixture of supervisory
and rank-and-file employees and noncompliance with the attestation clause
under paragraph 2 of Article 235 of the Labor Code.
 CA reversed SOL’s decision, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 which required
the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping applied to petitions for certification
election. It also ruled that the Secretary of Labor erred in granting the appeal
despite the lack of proof of service on respondent. Lastly, it found that petitioner
had no legal standing to file the petition for certification election because its
members were a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
ISSUES:
1. Whether certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for certification
election? NO
2. Whether petitioners MR which was treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Labor
should not have been given due course for failure to attach proof of service on
respondent? NO
3. Whether SAMMA LIKHA had the legal personality to file the petition for certification
election? Remanded to the DOLE office of origin for determination of the status of
petitioners legal personality.
HELD:
1. REQUIREMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF NONFORUM SHOPPING IS NOT
REQUIRED IN A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION. The requirement for a
certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims, crossclaims,
petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their respective positions
regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A
certification proceeding, even though initiated by a petition, is not a litigation but an
investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character. Such proceedings are not
predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring relief, but, rather, are merely of
an inquisitorial nature. The Board's functions are not judicial in nature, but are merely of
an investigative character. The object of the proceedings is not the decision of any
alleged commission of wrongs nor asserted deprivation of rights but is merely the
determination of proper bargaining units and the ascertainment of the will and choice of
the employees in respect of the selection of a bargaining representative. Under the
omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code as amended by D.O. No. 9, the PCE is
supposed to be filed in the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal
office of the employer or where the bargaining unit is principally situated. The rules
further provide that where two or more petitions involving the same bargaining unit are
filed in one Regional Office, the same shall be automatically consolidated. Hence, the
filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions will rarely happen in this
22 proceeding and, if it does, will be easy to discover.
2. The MR was properly treated as an appeal because it substantially complied with the
formal requisites of the latter. The lack of proof of service was not fatal as respondent
had actually received a copy of the motion. Consequently, it had the opportunity to
oppose the same. Under these circumstances, we find that the demands of substantial
justice and due process were satisfied. Specifically, technical rules and objections
should not hamper the holding of a certification election wherein employees are to
select their bargaining representative.
3. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF PETITIONER: The erroneous inclusion of one

supervisory employee in the union of rank-and-file employees was not a ground to
impugn its legitimacy as a legitimate labor organization which had the right to file a
petition for certification election. LIKHA was granted legal personality as a federation.
With certificates of registration issued in their favor, they are clothed with legal
personality as legitimate labor organizations. Such legal personality cannot thereafter
be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for
cancellation of certificate of registration.
Unless petitioners union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall

continue to have all the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to
petition for certification election. Samma Corp. filed a petition for cancellation of the
registration of petitioner on December 14, 2002. In a resolution dated April 14, 2003,
petitioners charter certificate was revoked by the DOLE. But on May 6, 2003, petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of this resolution. Neither of the parties alleged that this
resolution revoking petitioners charter certificate had attained finality. However, in this
petition, petitioner prayed that its charter certificate be reinstated in the roster of active
legitimate labor [organizations]. The proceedings on a petition for cancellation of
registration are independent of those of a petition for certification election. This case
originated from the latter. If it is shown that petitioners legal personality had already
been revoked or cancelled with finality in accordance with the rules, then it is no longer
a legitimate labor organization with the right to petition for a certification election.
A FINAL NOTE Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a
certification election among its rankand- file employees. This should not be the case.
We have already declared that, in certification elections, the employer is a bystander; it
has no right or material interest to assail the certification election. WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the office of
origin, the Regional Office IV of the Department of Labor and Employment, for
determination of the status of petitioners legal personality. If petitioner is still a legitimate
labor organization, then said office shall conduct a certification election subject to the
usual pre-election conference.
Case Dig: National Union vs. Philnabank Employees Association
G.R. No. 174287, 12 August 2013
Posted by: James L. Jalon on July 25, 2018
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-owned and

controlled banking institution. Its rank-and-file employees, being government personnel,
were represented for collective negotiation by the Philnabank Employees Association
(PEMA), a public sector union. In 1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission
approved PNB's new Articles of Incorporation and By-laws and its changed status as a
private corporation. PEMA affiliated with petitioner National Union of Bank Employees
(NUBE), which is a labor federation composed of unions in the banking industry,
adopting the name NUBE-PNB Employees Chapter (NUBE-PEC). Later they wanted to
disaffiliate with the NUBE as stated in their Resolution. NUBE filed a petition to the
Secretary of Labor but was denied.
ISSUE:
WON The Secretary of Labor acted without grave abuse of discretion and without
serious error in ruling that PEMA's alleged disaffiliation was invalid.
HELD:
We deny the petition.
Whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a factual issue. It is elementary that a question
of fact is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The parties may raise only questions of law because the Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts. As a general rule, We are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the
evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the
parties and are not reviewable by this Court, except: (1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the CA, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
parties; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the findings of fact of
the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record. The Court finds no cogent reason to apply these recognized
exceptions.
Even a second look at the records reveals that the arguments raised in the petition are
bereft of merit.
G.R. No. 174287 : August 12, 2013
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES (NUBE), Petitioner, v. PHILNABANK

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEMA) AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-owned and

controlled banking institution established under Public Act 2612, as amended by
Executive Order No. 80 dated December 3, 1986 (otherwise known as The 1986
Revised Charter of the Philippine National Bank). Its rank-and-file employees, being
government personnel, were represented for collective negotiation by the Philnabank
Employees Association (PEMA), a public sector union.
In 1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved PNBs new Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws and its changed status as a private corporation. PEMA
affiliated with petitioner National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), which is a labor
federation composed of unions in the banking industry, adopting the name NUBE-PNB
Employees Chapter (NUBE-PEC).
Later, NUBE-PEC was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the PNB
rank-and-file employees. A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was subsequently
signed between NUBE-PEC and PNB covering the period of January 1, 1997 to
December 31, 2001.
Pursuant to Article V on Check-off and Agency Fees of the CBA, PNB shall deduct the
monthly membership fee and other assessments imposed by the union from the salary
of each union member, and agency fee (equivalent to the monthly membership dues)
from the salary of the rank- and-file employees within the bargaining unit who are not
union members. Moreover, during the effectivity of the CBA, NUBE, being the
Federation union, agreed that PNB shall remitP15.00 of theP65.00 union dues per
month collected by PNB from every employee, and that PNB shall directly credit the
amount to NUBEs current account with PNB.
Following the expiration of the CBA, the Philnabank Employees Association-FFW

(PEMA-FFW) filed on January 2, 2002 a petition for certification election among the
rank-and-file employees of PNB. The petition sought the conduct of a certification
election to be participated in by PEMA-FFW and NUBE-PEC.
While the petition for certification election was still pending, two significant events
transpired the independent union registration of NUBE- PEC and its disaffiliation with
NUBE.
With a legal personality derived only from a charter issued by NUBE, NUBE-PEC, under
the leadership of Mariano Soria, decided to apply for a separate registration with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). On March 25, 2002, it was registered as
an independent labor organization under Registration Certificate No. NCR-UR-3-3790-
2002.
Thereafter, on June 20, 2003, the Board of Directors of NUBE-PEC adopted a

Resolutiondisaffiliating itself from NUBE.
The duly notarized Resolution was signed by the officers. It is claimed that said
Resolution was overwhelmingly ratified by about eighty-one percent (81%) of the total
union membership.
On June 25, 2003, NUBE-PEC filed a Manifestation and Motionbefore the Med-
Arbitration Unit of DOLE, praying that, in view of its independent registration as a labor
union and disaffiliation from NUBE, its name as appearing in the official ballots of the
certification election be changed to "Philnabank Employees Association (PEMA)" or, in
the alternative, both parties be allowed to use the name "PEMA" but with PEMA-FFW
and NUBE-PEC be denominated as "PEMA-Bustria Group" and "PEMA-Serrana
Group," respectively.
On the same date, PEMA sent a letter to the PNB management informing its
disaffiliation from NUBE and requesting to stop, effective immediately, the check-off of
theP15.00 due for NUBE.
Acting thereon, on July 4, 2003, PNB informed NUBE of PEMAs letter and its decision
to continue the deduction of theP15.00 fees, but stop its remittance to NUBE effective
July 2003. PNB also notified NUBE that the amounts collected would be held in a trust
account pending the resolution of the issue on PEMAs disaffiliation.
On July 11, 2003, NUBE replied that : it remains as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the PNB rank-and-file employees; by signing the Resolution (on
disaffiliation), the chapter officers have abandoned NUBE-PEC and joined another
union; in abandoning NUBE-PEC, the chapter officers have abdicated their respective
positions and resigned as such; in joining another union, the chapter officers committed
an act of disloyalty to NUBE-PEC and the general membership; the circumstances
clearly show that there is an emergency in NUBE-PEC necessitating its placement
under temporary trusteeship; and that PNB should cease and desist from dealing with
Serrana, Roma, Latorre, Garcia, Medrano, and Magtibay, who are expelled from NUBE-
PEC.With regard to the issue of non-remittance of the union dues, NUBE enjoined PNB
to comply with the union check-off provision of the CBA; otherwise, it would elevate the
matter to the grievance machinery in accordance with the CBA.
Despite NUBEs response, PNB stood firm on its decision. Alleging unfair labor practice
(ULP) for non-implementation of the grievance machinery and procedure, NUBE
brought the matter to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for
preventive mediation.In time, PNB and NUBE agreed to refer the case to the Office of
the DOLE Secretary for voluntary arbitration. They executed a Submission Agreement
on October 28, 2003.
Meantime, the DOLE denied PEMAs motion to change its name in the official ballots.
The certification election was finally held on October 17, 2003.
On April 28, 2004, PEMA filed before the voluntary arbitrator an Urgent Motion for
Intervention,alleging that it stands to be substantially affected by whatever judgment
that may be issued, because one of the issues for resolution is the validity of its
disaffiliation from NUBE. It further claimed that its presence is necessary so that a
complete relief may be accorded to the parties. Only NUBE opposed the motion,
arguing that PEMA has no legal personality to intervene, as it is not a party to the
existing CBA; and that NUBE is the exclusive bargaining representative of the PNB
rank-and-file employees and, in dealing with a union other than NUBE, PNB is violating
the duty to bargain collectively, which is another form of ULP.
Barely a month after, DOLE Acting Secretary Manuel G. Imson denied PEMAs motion
for intervention and ordered PNB to release all union dues withheld and to continue
remitting the same to NUBE.
Aggrieved, PEMA filed before the CA a petition under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI). On November 2, 2004, the CA denied the application for
WPI.PEMAs motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 24, 2005, noting
PNBs manifestation that it would submit to the judgment of the CA as to which party it
should remit the funds collected from the employees.
On June 21, 2005, however, petitioner again filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of
a TRO against the June 10, 2005 Resolution of DOLE Acting Secretary Imson, which
ordered PNB to properly issue a check directly payable to the order of NUBE covering
the withheld funds from the trust account.Considering the different factual milieu, the CA
resolved to grant the motion.
Subsequent to the parties submission of memoranda, the CA promulgated its May 22,
2006 Decision, declaring the validity of PEMAs disaffiliation from NUBE and directing
PNB to return to the employees concerned the amounts deducted and held in trust for
NUBE starting July 2003 and to stop further deductions in favor of NUBE.
As to the impropriety of denying PEMAs motion for intervention, the CA noted
Among the rights of the [PEMA] as an affiliate of a federation is to disaffiliate from it.
Any case in which this is an issue is then one in which the union has a significant legal
interest and as to which it must be heard, irrespective of any residual rights of the
members after a decision that might deny a disaffiliation. It is a non-sequitur to make the
intervention of the union in this case dependent on the question of whether its members
can pursue their own agenda under the same constraints.
NUBE filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied;hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was effective disaffiliation of PEMA from NUBE?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
LABOR LAW
Whether there was a valid disaffiliation is a factual issue.It is elementary that a question
of fact is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The parties may raise only questions of law because the Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts. As a general rule, We are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the
evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the
parties and are not reviewable by this Court, except : (1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the CA, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
parties; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the findings of fact of
the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.The Court finds no cogent reason to apply these recognized
exceptions.
Even a second look at the records reveals that the arguments raised in the petition are
bereft of merit.
The right of the local union to exercise the right to disaffiliate from its mother union is
well settled in this jurisdiction. In MSMG-UWP v. Hon. Ramos,We held -
A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its autonomy. A
local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interests of
all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its autonomy from the
federation which it belongs when circumstances warrant, in accordance with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.
The purpose of affiliation by a local union with a mother union [or] a federation.
"is to increase by collective action the bargaining power in respect of the terms and
conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve
their own and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for
mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into
existence."
Thus, a local union which has affiliated itself with a federation is free to sever such
affiliation anytime and such disaffiliation cannot be considered disloyalty. In the absence
of specific provisions in the federation's constitution prohibiting disaffiliation or the
declaration of autonomy of a local union, a local may dissociate with its parent union.
Likewise, Philippine Skylanders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commissionrestated
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is not a novel thesis
unillumined by case law. In the landmark case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.
Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., we upheld the right of local unions to separate from their
mother federation on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations, local
unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national federation to which they
are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their members. The sole essence of affiliation is
to increase, by collective action, the common bargaining power of local unions for the
effective enhancement and protection of their interests. Admittedly, there are times
when without succor and support local unions may find it hard, unaided by other support
groups, to secure justice for themselves.
Yet the local unions remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own
interests subject to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the national
federation, and free also to renounce the affiliation upon the terms laid down in the
agreement which brought such affiliation into existence.
Such dictum has been punctiliously followed since then.
And again, in Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Employment
Office of the Secretary,this Court opined
Under the rules implementing the Labor Code, a chartered local union acquires legal
personality through the charter certificate issued by a duly registered federation or
national union, and reported to the Regional Office in accordance with the rules
implementing the Labor Code. A local union does not owe its existence to the federation
with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its
creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local union of its
own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act
independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the
former acts in representation of the latter. Hence, local unions are considered principals
while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent. As such principals, the unions
are entitled to exercise the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization,
including the right to seek certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent in the
appropriate employer unit.
Finally, the recent case of Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers v.
Cirtek Electronics, Inc. ruled -
[A] local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any
showing that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such, however, does
not result in it losing its legal personality altogether. Verily, Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng
Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila Bar Spinning Mills At J.P. Coats enlightens
A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure and
maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-
members. A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is
affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will
of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of its own
personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of
the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in
representation of the latter.
These and many more have consistently reiterated the earlier view that the right of the
local members to withdraw from the federation and to form a new local union depends
upon the provisions of the union's constitution, by-laws and charter and, in the absence
of enforceable provisions in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a
local union, a local may sever its relationship with its parent.In the case at bar, there is
nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by NUBE that PEMA was expressly
forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a
valid breakaway. This being so, PEMA is not precluded to disaffiliate from NUBE after
acquiring the status of an independent labor organization duly registered before the
DOLE.
Also, there is no merit on NUBEs contention that PEMAs disaffiliation is invalid for non-
observance of the procedure that union members should make such determination
through secret ballot and after due deliberation, conformably with Article 241 (d) of the
Labor Code, as amended.Conspicuously, other than citing the opinion of a "recognized
labor law authority," NUBE failed to quote a specific provision of the law or rule
mandating that a local unions disaffiliation from a federation must comply with Article
241 (d) in order to be valid and effective.
Granting, for arguments sake, that Article 241 (d) is applicable, still, We uphold PEMAs
disaffiliation from NUBE. First, non-compliance with the procedure on disaffiliation,
being premised on purely technical grounds cannot rise above the employees
fundamental right to self-organization and to form and join labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining.Second, the Article nonetheless
provides that when the nature of the organization renders such secret ballot impractical,
the union officers may make the decision in behalf of the general membership. In this
case, NUBE did not even dare to contest PEMAs representation that "PNB employees,
from where [PEMA] [derives] its membership, are scattered from Aparri to Jolo,
manning more than 300 branches in various towns and cities of the country," hence,
"[to] gather the general membership of the union in a general membership to vote
through secret balloting is virtually impossible."It is understandable, therefore, why
PEMAs board of directors merely opted to submit for ratification of the majority their
resolution to disaffiliate from NUBE. Third, and most importantly, NUBE did not dispute
the existence of the persons or their due execution of the document showing their
unequivocal support for the disaffiliation of PEMA from NUBE. Note must be taken of
the fact that the list of PEMA members (identifying themselves as "PEMA-Serrana
Group") who agreed with the board resolution was attached as Annex "H" of PEMAs
petition before the CA and covered pages 115 to 440 of the CA rollo. While fully
displaying the employees printed name, identification number, branch, position, and
signature, the list was left unchallenged by NUBE. No evidence was presented that the
union members ratification was obtained by mistake or through fraud, force or
intimidation. Surely, this is not a case where one or two members of the local union
decided to disaffiliate from the mother federation, but one where more than a majority of
the local union members decided to disaffiliate.
Consequently, by PEMA's valid disaffiliation from NUBE, the vinculum that previously
bound the two entities was completely severed. As NUBE was divested of any and all
power to act in representation of PEMA, any act performed by the former that affects
the interests and affairs of the latter, including the supposed expulsion of Serrana et al.,
is rendered without force and effect.
LABOR LAW
Also, in effect, NUBE loses it right to collect all union dues held in its trust by PNB. The
moment that PEMA separated from and left NUBE and exists as an independent labor
organization with a certificate of registration, the former is no longer obliged to pay dues
and assessments to the latter; naturally, there would be no longer any reason or
occasion for PNB to continue making deductions.As we said in Volkschel Labor Union
v. Bureau of Labor Relations
In other words, ALUMETAL [NUBE in this case] is entitled to receive the dues from
respondent companies as long as petitioner union is affiliated with it and respondent
companies are authorized by their employees (members of petitioner union) to deduct
union dues. Without said affiliation, the employer has no link to the mother union. The
obligation of an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with his affiliation or
membership. "The employees' check-off authorization, even if declared irrevocable, is
good only as long as they remain members of the union concerned." A contract
between an employer and the parent organization as bargaining agent for the
employees is terminated bv the disaffiliation ofthe local of which the employees are
members.
On the other hand, it was entirely reasonable for PNB to enter into a CBA with PEMA as
represented by Serrana et al. Since PEMA had validly separated itself from NUBE,
there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from collectively bargaining
with PNB.
National Union of Bank Employees v. Philnabank Empoyees Association G.R.

No.174287
FACTS:
Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-owned and controlled banking

institution established under The 1986 Revised Charter. Its rank-and-file employees,
being government personnel, were represented for collective negotiation by the
Philnabank Employees Association (PEMA), a public sector union.
In 1996, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved PNB’s new Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws and its changed status as a private corporation. PEMA
affiliated with petitioner National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), which is a labor
federation composed of unions in the banking industry, adopting the name NUBE-PNB
Employees Chapter (NUBE-PEC). NUBE-PEC was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the PNB rank-and-file employees. A collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) was subsequently signed between NUBE-PEC and PNB covering the
period of January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2001.
Pursuant to Article V on Check-off and Agency Fees of the CBA, PNB shall deduct the
monthly membership fee and other assessments imposed by the union from the salary
of each union member, and agency fee from the salary of the rank- and-file employees
within the bargaining unit who are not union members.
Moreover, during the effectivity of the CBA, NUBE, being the Federation union, agreed
that PNB shall remit P15.00 of the P65.00 union dues per month collected by PNB from
every employee, and that PNB shall directly credit the amount to NUBE’s current
account with PNB.

(PEMA-FFW) filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees
of PNB. The petition sought the conduct of a certification election to be participated in
by PEMA-FFW and NUBE-PEC.
While the petition for certification election was still pending, two significant events
transpired – the independent union registration of NUBE- PEC and its disaffiliation with
NUBE.
With a legal personality derived only from a charter issued by NUBE, NUBE-PEC, under
the leadership of Mariano Soria, decided to apply for a separate registration with DOLE.
Thereafter, the Board of Directors of NUBE-PEC adopted a Resolution disaffiliating
itself from NUBE, because the latter has miserably failed to extend and provide
satisfactory services and support to the former in the form of legal services, training
assistance, educational seminars, and the like.
PNB informed NUBE of PEMA’s letter and its decision to continue the deduction of the
P15.00 fees, but stop its remittance to NUBE effective July 2003. PNB also notified
NUBE that the amounts collected would be held in a trust account pending the
resolution of the issue on PEMA’s disaffiliation.
NUBE replied that it remains as the exclusive bargaining representative of the PNB
rank-and-file employees; by signing the Resolution (on disaffiliation), the chapter
officers have abandoned and committed an act of disloyalty to NUBE-PEC and the
general membership
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an effective disaffiliation?
RULING: Yes there is a valid disaffiliation from NUBE. Whether there was a valid

disaffiliation is a factual issue. It is elementary that a question of fact is not appropriate
for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
of its members.
The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither
does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It
only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the
latter.
The purpose of affiliation by a local union with a mother union [or] a federation is to
increase by collective action the bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions
of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own
and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and
By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare
upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence.
Also, there is no merit on NUBE’s contention that PEMA’s disaffiliation is invalid for non-
observance of the procedure that union members should make such determination
through secret ballot and after due deliberation, conformably with Article 241 (d) of the
Labor Code, as amended. Conspicuously, other than citing the opinion of a "recognized
labor law authority," NUBE failed to quote a specific provision of the law or rule
mandating that a local union’s disaffiliation from a federation must comply with Article
241 (d) in order to be valid and effective.
Granting, for argument’s sake, that Article 241 (d) is applicable, still, We uphold PEMA’s
disaffiliation from NUBE. First, non-compliance with the procedure on disaffiliation,
being premised on purely technical grounds cannot rise above the employees’
fundamental right to self-organization and to form and join labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining. Second, the Article nonetheless
provides that when the nature of the organization renders such secret ballot impractical,
the union officers may make the decision in behalf of the general membership.
Consequently, by PEMA's valid disaffiliation from NUBE, the vinculum that previously
bound the two entities was completely severed. As NUBE was divested of any and all
power to act in representation of PEMA, any act performed by the former that affects
the interests and affairs of the latter, including the supposed expulsion of Serrana et al.,
is rendered without force.
Also, in effect, NUBE loses it right to collect all union dues held in its trust by PNB. The
moment that PEMA separated from and left NUBE and exists as an independent labor
organization with a certificate of registration, the former is no longer obliged to pay dues
and assessments to the latter; naturally, there would be no longer any reason or
occasion for PNB to continue making deductions.
On the other hand, it was entirely reasonable for PNB to enter into a CBA with PEMA as
represented by Serrana et al. Since PEMA had validly separated itself from NUBE,
there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from collectively bargaining
with PNB.
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES VS PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION and PNB
G.R. No. 174286, August 12, 2013
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-owned
and controlled banking institution. Its rank-and-file employees, being government
personnel, were represented for collective negotiation by the Philnabank Employees
Association (PEMA), a public sector union. In 1996, the Securities and Exchange
Commission approved PNB’s new Articles of Incorporation and By-laws and its changed
status as a private corporation. PEMA affiliated with petitioner National Union of Bank
Employees (NUBE), which is a labor federation composed of unions in the banking
industry, adopting the name NUBE-PNB Employees Chapter (NUBE-PEC).
Later, NUBE-PEC was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
PNB rank-and-file employees. A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was
subsequently signed between NUBE-PEC and PNB covering the period of January 1,
1997 to December 31, 2001. Pursuant to Article V on Check-off and Agency Fees of the
CBA, PNB shall deduct the monthly membership fee and other assessments imposed
by the union from the salary of each union member, and agency fee (equivalent to the
monthly membership dues) from the salary of the rank- and-file employees within the
bargaining unit who are not union members. Moreover, during the effectivity of the CBA,
NUBE, being the Federation union, agreed that PNB shall remit P15.00 of the P65.00
union dues per month collected by PNB from every employee, and that PNB shall
directly credit the amount to NUBE’s current account with PNB. 5
(PEMA-FFW) filed on January 2, 2002 a petition for certification election among the
rank-and-file employees of PNB. The petition sought the conduct of a certification
election to be participated in by PEMA-FFW and NUBE-PEC. While the petition for
certification election was still pending, two significant events transpired – the
independent union registration of NUBE- PEC and its disaffiliation with NUBE.
On June 25, 2003, NUBE-PEC filed a Manifestation and Motion before the Med-
Arbitration Unit of DOLE, praying that, in view of its independent registration as a labor
union and disaffiliation from NUBE, its name as appearing in the official ballots of the
certification election be changed to "Philnabank Employees Association (PEMA)" or, in
the alternative, both parties be allowed to use the name "PEMA" but with PEMA-FFW
and NUBE-PEC be denominated as "PEMA-Bustria Group" and "PEMA-Serrana
Group," respectively. On the same date, PEMA sent a letter to the PNB management
informing its disaffiliation from NUBE and requesting to stop, effective immediately, the
check-off of the P15.00 due for NUBE.
Acting thereon, on July 4, 2003, PNB informed NUBE of PEMA’s letter and its
decision to continue the deduction of the P15.00 fees, but stop its remittance to NUBE
effective July 2003. PNB also notified NUBE that the amounts collected would be held
in a trust account pending the resolution of the issue on PEMA’s disaffiliation. On July
11, 2003, NUBE replied that: it remains as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the PNB rank-and-file employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not effective disaffiliation took place.
HELD:
A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any
showing that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such, however, does
not result in it losing its legal personality altogether. Verily, Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng
Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila Bar Spinning Mills At J.P. Coats
enlightens:
of its members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of its own
personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of
the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former acts in
representation of the latter.
These and many more have consistently reiterated the earlier view that the right
of the local members to withdraw from the federation and to form a new local union
depends upon the provisions of the union's constitution, by-laws and charter and, in the
absence of enforceable provisions in the federation's constitution preventing
disaffiliation of a local union, a local may sever its relationship with its parent. In the
case at bar, there is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by NUBE that PEMA
was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions
imposed for a valid breakaway. This being so, PEMA is not precluded to disaffiliate from
NUBE after acquiring the status of an independent labor organization duly registered
before the DOLE
Also, there is no merit on NUBE’s contention that PEMA’s disaffiliation is invalid
for non-observance of the procedure that union members should make such
determination through secret ballot and after due deliberation, conformably with Article
241 (d) of the Labor Code, as amended. Conspicuously, other than citing the opinion of
a "recognized labor law authority," NUBE failed to quote a specific provision of the law
or rule mandating that a local union’s disaffiliation from a federation must comply with
Article 241 (d) in order to be valid and effective.
Consequently, by PEMA's valid disaffiliation from NUBE, the vinculum that
previously bound the two entities was completely severed. As NUBE was divested of
any and all power to act in representation of PEMA, any act performed by the former
that affects the interests and affairs of the latter, including the supposed expulsion of
Serrana et al., is rendered without force and effect. Also, in effect, NUBE loses it right to
collect all union dues held in its trust by PNB. The moment that PEMA separated from
and left NUBE and exists as an independent labor organization with a certificate of
registration, the former is no longer obliged to pay dues and assessments to the latter;
naturally, there would be no longer any reason or occasion for PNB to continue making
deductions.
PEA-PTGWO vs NLRC DIGEST
DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
TOPIC: (Classification of piercing cases; elements)
PEA-PTGWO vs NLRC
No. 170689/170705
17 March 2009
FACTS: Gonzales family owned two (2) corporations, namely, the PNEI and Macris
Realty Corporation (Macris). PNEI provided transportation services to the public. They
incurred huge financial losses and creditors took over the management of PNEI and
Maricris. Full ownership was transferred to one of their creditors, the National
Investment Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary of the PNB
Macris was later renamed as the National Realty Development Corporation (Naredeco)
and eventually merged with the National Warehousing Corporation (Nawaco) to form
the new PNB subsidiary, the PNB-Madecor.
PNEI applied with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for suspension of
payments. A management committee was thereafter created which recommended to
the SEC the sale of the company through privatization. As a cost-saving measure, the
committee likewise suggested the retrenchment of several PNEI employees. Eventually,
PNEI ceased its operation. Along with the cessation of business came the various labor
claims commenced by the former employees of PNEI where the latter obtained
favorable decisions.
Labor Arbiter issued the Sixth Alias Writ of Execution commanding the NLRC Sheriffs to
levy on the assets of PNEI due to its former employees. The sheriffs were likewise
instructed to proceed against PNB, PNB-Madecor and Mega Prime. In implementing
the writ, the sheriffs levied upon the four valuable pieces of real estate owned by PNB-
Madecor. PNB, PNB-Madecor and Mega Prime filed motion to quash the writ and
third-party claims.
Labor Arbiter declared that the subject Pantranco properties were owned by PNB-
Madecor. It being a corporation with a distinct and separate personality, its assets could
not answer for the liabilities of PNEI. Considering, however, that PNB-Madecor
executed a promissory note in favor of PNEI for P7,884,000.00, the writ of execution to
the extent of the said amount was concerned was considered valid.
PNB’s third-party claim – to nullify the writ on the ground that it has an interest in the
Pantranco properties being a creditor of PNB-Madecor, – on the other hand, was denied
because it only had an inchoate interest in the properties.
On appeal to the NLRC, the same was denied and the Labor Arbiter’s disposition was
affirmed. MR denied.
In view of the P7,884,000.00 debt of PNB-Madecor to PNEI, an auction sale was
conducted over the Pantranco properties to satisfy the claim of the PNEI employees,
wherein CPAR Realty was adjudged as the highest bidder
On appeal, CA rule in favor of Respondents upholding the separate and distinct
personalities of Rs from PNEI. As such, there being no cogent reason to pierce the veil
of corporate fiction. MR denied.
ISSUE: Whether former PNEI employees can attach the properties of PNB, PNB-
Madecor and Mega Prime to satisfy their unpaid labor claims against PNEI.
DECISION: No. First, the subject property is not owned by the judgment debtor, that is,
PNEI. Second, PNB, PNB-Madecor and Mega Prime are corporations with personalities
separate and distinct from that of PNEI.
The general rule is that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those
of its stockholders and other corporations to which it may be connected. This is a fiction
created by law for convenience and to prevent injustice.
Clearly, what can be inferred from the earlier cases is that the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil applies only in three (3) basic areas, namely:
1) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for
the evasion of an existing obligation;
2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a wrong, protect fraud, or
defend a crime; or
3) alter ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled
and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit
or adjunct of another corporation. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific
provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made
personally liable for corporate liabilities.
Assuming arguendo, that PNB may be held liable for the debts of PNEI, petitioners still
cannot proceed against the Pantranco properties, the same being owned by PNB-
Madecor, notwithstanding the fact that PNB-Madecor was a subsidiary of PNB. The
general rule remains that PNB-Madecor has a personality separate and distinct from
PNB. The mere fact that a corporation owns all of the stocks of another
corporation, taken alone, is not sufficient to justify their being treated as one
entity. If used to perform legitimate functions, a subsidiary’s separate existence
shall be respected, and the liability of the parent corporation as well as the
subsidiary will be confined to those arising in their respective businesses.
In PNB v. Ritratto Group, Inc., we outlined the circumstances which are useful in the
determination of whether a subsidiary is but a mere instrumentality of the parent-
corporation, to wit:
1. The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of the subsidiary;
2. The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers;
3. The parent corporation finances the subsidiary;
4. The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or
otherwise causes its incorporation;
5. The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital;
6. The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of the
subsidiary;
7. The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corporation or
no assets except those conveyed to or by the parent corporation;
8. In the papers of the parent corporation or in the statements of its officers, the
subsidiary is described as a department or division of the parent corporation, or its
business or financial responsibility is referred to as the parent corporation’s own;
9. The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its own;
10. The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest
of the subsidiary, but take their orders from the parent corporation;
11. The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed.
None of the foregoing circumstances is present in the instant case. Thus, piercing of
PNB-Madecor’s corporate veil is not warranted.
DIGESTED CASES:
ASSOCIATED WORKERS UNION-PTGWO, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISION
NATURE:
Multiple separate certiorari petitions- on a staggered and piecemeal basis
FACTS:
On 26 October 1984, petitioner Associated Workers Union ("AWU")—PTGWO, the then
bargaining representative of the dockworkers at South Harbor, Port Area, Manila, filed a
Notice of Strike against respondent Metro Port Service, Inc. ("Metro"), the then arrastre
contractor in the South Harbor, on the issues, among others, of unfilled vacancies and
union busting.
MOLE- forbade the holding of strike and lock-outs and order NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.
In the latter case, one of the demands raised by AWU was that Metro terminate the
employment of respondents Adriano Yumul and ten (10) others (individual
respondents), for having organized, on 26 October 1984, the Associated Workers Union
in Metroport ("AWUM") among the rank-and-file employees of Metro, ostensibly as a
local or chapter of AWU. AWU had earlier expelled individual respondents from
membership in AUW for disloyalty and, pursuant to the closed-shop provision of the
existing AWU-Metro collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), sought the termination of
their employment.
Metro initially resisted AWU's request to terminate the employment of individual

respondents, contending that the termination would be premature as individual
respondents had not been afforded due process, and that the termination would be
violative of the status quo agreement but later on because of the threat of strike by
AWU made a compromise agreement to suspend the involved employees.
LA- order to provisionally reinstate the individual respondents

NLRC -directed Metro to comply with the Agreement, and Metro complied and re-
suspended individual respondents.
Both AWU and Metro filed separate motions for reconsideration of the consolidated
Decision. Meanwhile, on 21 July 1986, petitioner Marina Port Services, Inc. ("Marina"),
by virtue of a Special Permit issued by the Philippine Ports Authority, started operations
as the arrastre operator at the Manila South Harbor vice Metro. On November 1986,
individual respondents in a Motion/Manifestation prayed that Marina be included as
party-respondent as sanctioned by Par. "7" of the Special Permit granted to Marina
which states that "Labor and personnel of previous operator, except those positions of
trust and confidence, shall be absorbed by the grantee."
NLRC rendered decision that Metro/Marina and AWU will be held solidarily liable with
AWU except as to the time that respondent NLRC ordered it to re- suspend the private
respondents and the case to be remanded to LA of origin for writ of execution.
LA- issued MARINA to reinstate these individuals.
ISSUES:
1) WON there was grave abuse of discretion when NLRC held that respondent
Metro cannot be compelled to fill up vacancies?
HELD:
The existing CBA grants respondent Metro the right to compulsorily retire any member
of AWU who had reached 60 years of age, which right has been exercised by Metro.
2) WON the expulsion made by AWU with these involved individuals is valid?
HELD:
YES.
While it is true that AWUM as a local union, being an entity separate and distinct from
AWU, is free to serve the interest of all its members and enjoys the freedom to
disaffiliate, such right to disaffiliate may be exercised, and is thus considered a
protected labor activity, only when warranted by circumstances. Generally, a labor union
may disaffiliate from the mother union to form a local or independent union only during
the 60-day freedom period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. 6 Even
before the onset of the freedom period (and despite the closed-shop provision in the
CBA between the mother union and management) disaffiliation may still be carried out,
but such disaffiliation must be effected by a majority of the members in the bargaining
unit. 7 This happens when there is a substantial shift in allegiance on the part of the
majority of the members of the union. In such a case, however, the CBA continues to
bind the members of the new or disaffiliated and independent union up to the CBA's
expiration date. 8
The record does not show that individual respondents had disaffiliated during the
freedom period. The record does, however, show that only eleven (11) members of
AWU (individual respondents) had decided to disaffiliate from AWU and form AWUM.
Respondent Metro had about 4,000 employees, and around 2,000 of these were
members of AWU 9 It is evident that individual respondents had failed to muster the
necessary majority in order to justify their disaffiliation. So the expulsion was justified
and therefore valid.
3) WON METRO is liable to the suspended individuals?
HELD:
YES.
By failure of Metro to accord individual respondents procedural due process by giving

them reasonable opportunity to explain their side before suspending or dismissing them,
such dismissal was accordingly in violation of the Labor Code. Notwithstanding AWU's
closed-shop clause in the CBA, Metro was bound to conduct its own inquiry to
determine the existence of substantial basis for terminating the employment of
individual respondents.
4) WON MARINA should be compelled to recognize the legality of the

organization and registration of AWUM (now MWU)?
HELD:
NO.
What was in fact eventually established by individual respondents was a separate,
independent union called Metro Port Workers Union (MWU) which was not entitled,
during the time periods here relevant, to recognition as the bargaining unit in CBA
negotiations. MWU cannot have its own organization because it is still within the
prohibited period and not within the 60 FREEDOM DAY PERIOD and thus still bound by
the CBA Agreement that has not expired yet. And with it they still cannot be recognized
as the bargaining unit in CBA negotiation.
-----------------------
G.R. No. 115949 March 16, 2000

EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, EVELYN SIA, RODOLFO
EUGENIO, ISAGANI MAKISIG, and DEMETRIO SALAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and SIMEON
SARMIENTO et. al (AND ALL OTHER SOLID BANK UNION MEMBERS)
FACTS: Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union, the duly
recognized collective bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of Solid Bank
Corporation. Private respondents are members of said union.
The union’s Executive Board decided to retain anew the service of Atty. Ignacio P.
Lacsina (now deceased) as union counsel in connection with the negotiations for a new
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA); majority of all union members approved and
signed a resolution confirming the decision of the executive board to engage the
services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel.
As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the total economic
benefits that may be secured through the negotiations be given to Atty. Lacsina as
attorney’s fees. It also contained an authorization for SolidBank Corporation to check-off
said attorney’s fees from the first lump sum payment of benefits to the employees under
the new CBA and to turn over said amount to Atty. Lacsina and/or his duly authorized
representative.
The bank then, on request of the union, made payroll deductions for attorney’s fees
from the CBA benefits paid to the union members in accordance with the
abovementioned resolution.
Private respondents instituted a complaint against the petitioners and the union counsel
before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction of
attorney’s fees as well as for quantification of the benefits in the 1992 CBA.
Med-arbiter granted the complaint; Secretary partially granted and the Order of the
Med-Arbiter dated 22 April 1993 is hereby modified as follows: (1) that the ordered
refund shall be limited to those union members who have not signified their conformity
to the check-off of attorney’s fees; and (2) the directive on the payment of 5% attorney’s
fees should be deleted for lack of basis. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the deductions made by petioner-company is valid.
HELD: NO
Private respondent’s contention: claim that the check-off provision in question is illegal
because it was never submitted for approval at a general membership meeting called
for the purpose and that it failed to meet the formalities mandated by the Labor Code.
In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from
employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter’s wages and remits them
directly to the union. It assures continuous funding; for the labor organization. As this
Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union
and only indirectly for the individual employees.
The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and Article 241
(o) of the Labor Code.
Art. 222 (b) states:
No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any
collective bargaining negotiations or conclusions of the collective agreement shall be
imposed on any individual member of the contracting union: Provided, however, that
attorney’s fees may be charged against unions funds in an amount to be agreed upon
by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall
be null and void. (Emphasis ours)
Art. 241 (o) provides:
Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorney’s
fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any
amount due to an employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by
the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction. (Emphasis ours).
Art. 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union’s
incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses. These are: 1)
authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general
membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretary’s record of the minutes of the
meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the
employees concerned.
Clearly, attorney’s fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an
employee without his written consent.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that the General Membership Resolution
of October 19, 1991 of the SolidBank Union did not satisfy the requirements laid down
by law and jurisprudence for the validity of the ten percent (10%) special assessment for
union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses. There were
no individual written check off authorizations by the employees concerned and so the
assessment cannot be legally deducted by their employer.
From all the foregoing, we are of the considered view that public respondent did not act
with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the workers through their union should be
made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of a lawyer. And accordingly
the reimbursement should be charged to the union’s general fund or account. No
deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned employees other than those
mandated by law.
Petition is DENIED.
Gabriel, et al v. Secretary of Labor [G.R. No. 115949, March 16, 2000]

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Labor Law
FACTS: Petitioners compromise the Executive Board of Solidbank union, the collective

bargaining agent for the Solidbank Corporation. Private respondents are members of
said union. The union’s EB decided to retain the services of their counsel in connection
with negotiations for a new CBA. A general membership meeting was called where
majority of union members approved a resolution confirming the decision to engage the
services of the union’s counsel, Atty. Lacsina. The resolution provided that 10% of the
total economic benefits that may be secured be given to the counsel at attorney’s fees.
Also it contained an authorization for Solidbank Corporation to check-off said attorney’s
fees the first lump sum of payment of benefits under the new CBA. Private respondents
issued a complaint for illegal deduction.
ISSUE: W/N the union may check-off attorney’s fees.
HELD: No. Article 241 has 3 requisites for the validity of the special assessment for
union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses. They are:
1. authorization by a written resolution of majority of all the members at the general
membership meeting called for the purpose.
2. secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting
3. individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the employees concerned.
Such requirements were not complied with as there were no individual written check-off
authorizations; thus, the employer cannot legally deduct thus the assessment. The
union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of a lawyers
and accordingly, reimbursement should be charged to the union’s general fund or
account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned employees
other than those mandated by law.
Gabriel vs Sec of Labor
March 16, 2000 | Ponente: QUISUMBING, J
Overview: Union hired a lawyer to negotiate CBA. Bank tried to check off Atty’s fees
from the benefits of the CBA. This is not allowed. They should have followed the
requisites provided by art. 241. The Union must shoulder the expenses from the
common fund
Statement of the Case

special civil action for certiorari seeking to reverse partially the Order of public
respondent dated June 3, 1994,which ruled that the workers through their union should
be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the professional services of a lawyer in
connection with the collective bargaining negotiations and that the reimbursement for
the deductions from the workers should be charged to the union’s general fund or
account.
Statement of Facts
-Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union, the duly recognized
collective bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of Solid Bank Corporation.
Private respondents are members of said union.
-Sometime in October 1991, the union’s Executive Board decided to retain anew the
service of Atty. Ignacio P. Lacsina (now deceased) as union counsel in connection with
the negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). -October 19, 1991,
the board called a general membership meeting for the purpose. At the said meeting,
the majority of all union members approved and signed a resolution confirming the
decision of the executive board to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as union
counsel.
-As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the total economic
benefits that may be secured through the negotiations be given to Atty. Lacsina as
attorney’s fees. It also contained an authorization for SolidBank Corporation to check-off
said attorney’s fees from the first lump sum payment of benefits to the employees under
the new CBA and to turn over said amount to Atty. Lacsina and/or his duly authorized
representative
-The new CBA was signed on February 21, 1992. The bank then, on request of the
union, made payroll deductions for attorney’s fees from the CBA benefits paid to the
union members in accordance with the abovementioned resolution.
- October 2, 1992, private respondents instituted a complaint against the petitioners and
the union counsel before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for illegal
deduction of attorney’s fees as well as for quantification of the benefits in the 1992
CBA. Petitioners, in response, moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing litis
pendentia, forum shopping and failure to state a cause of action as their grounds [
- On April 22, 1993, Med-Arbiter Paterno Adap of the DOLE- NCR issued an order
directing Union officers to immediately return or refund to the Complainants the illegally
deducted amount of attorney’s fees from the package of benefits due herein
complainants under the aforesaid new CBA and to pay five percent (5%) of the total
amount to be refunded or returned by the Respondent Union Officers and Counsel to
them in favor of Atty. Armando D. Morales, as attorney’s fees, in accordance with
Section II, Rule VIII of Book II (sic) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
-On appeal, the Secretary of Labor rendered a Resolution which modified 1) that the
ordered refund shall be limited to those union members who have not signified their
conformity to the check-off of attorney’s fees; and (2) the directive on the payment of
5% attorney’s fees should be deleted for lack of basis.
-On Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent affirmed the said Order with
modification that the union’s counsel be dropped as a party litigant and that the workers
through their union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the attorney’s
services. Accordingly, the reimbursement should be charged to the union’s general
fund/account.
-Petitioners argue that the General Membership Resolution authorizing the bank to
check-off attorney’s fee from the first lump sum payment of the benefits to the
employees under the new CBA satisfies the legal requirements for such assessment.
Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that the check-off provision in question is
illegal because it was never submitted for approval at a general membership meeting
called for the purpose and that it failed to meet the formalities mandated by the Labor
Code
Issues:
W/N the bank can check-off attorney’s fee from the lump sum payment of the benefits to
the employees- NO
Rationale]
-In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from
employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter’s wages and remits them
directly to the union It assures continuous funding for the labor organization. The
system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly for the
individual employees.
The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and Article 241
(o) of the Labor Code.
-Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for
union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses. These
are: 1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at
the general membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretary’s record of
the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check off
duly signed by the employees concerned.
Clearly, attorney’s fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an
employee without his written consent.
The General Membership Resolution of October 19, 1991 of the SolidBank Union did
not satisfy the requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence for the validity of the
ten percent (10%) special assessment for union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees
and representation expenses. There were no individual written check off authorizations
by the employees concerned and so the assessment cannot be legally deducted by
their employer.
-Palacol vs. Ferrer-Calleja - express consent of employees is required, and this

consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be
followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed.
-Stellar Industrial Services, Inc. vs. NLRC [- written individual authorization duly
signed by the employee concerned is a condition sine qua non for such deduction.
-ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting

Corporation, et. al.,upheld BPIEU-ALU vs. NLRC that (1) the prohibition against
attorney’s fees in Article 222, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code applies only when the
payment of attorney’s fees is effected through forced contributions from the workers;
and (2) that no deduction must be take from the workers who did not sign the check-off
authorization, applies to the case under consideration."
-The obligation to pay the attorney’s fees belongs to the union and cannot be
shunted to the workers as their direct responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the
union itself may require the individual worker to assume the obligation to pay
attorney’s fees from their own pockets sc
-workers through their union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the
services of a lawyer. And accordingly the reimbursement should be charged to the
union’s general fund or account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the
concerned employees other than those mandated by law.
Judgment: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Order dated June 3,
1994, of respondent Secretary of Labor signed by Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Peninsula Employees Union (PEU) Vs. Michael B. Esquivel, et al.
G.R. No. 218454. December 1, 2016
Facts:
On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU) Board of Directors passed
Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of 20078 authorizing, among others, the affiliation
of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual members thereto.
On the same day, the said act was submitted to the general membership, and was duly
ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to
increase the union dues/agency fees from one percent (1 % ) to two percent (2%) of the
rank and file employees’ monthly salaries, brought about by PEU’s affiliation with
NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of
their monthly salaries.
The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees arguing
that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA has been formally signed
and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant
and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements for such increase.
Issues:
1. Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased agency fees.
2. Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for

such increase.
3. Whether the agency is exorbitant and unreasonable.
Rulings
1. Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the

CBA with the employer is given the right to collect a reasonable fee called “agency
fee” from non-union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining
unit, in an amount equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in
case they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of agency fees is
recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code, as amended,
the legal basis of the union’s right to agency fees is neither contractual nor
statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-
union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from
employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case,
PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is not disputed.
2. Yes. Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and ( o ) of the Labor Code mandates the
submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of
increased union dues. These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the
majority of all the members at the general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall
include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special
assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees; and (c) individual
written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees concemed. In the
present case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with the
foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the “inadvertent omission” of the
matter of the approval of the deduction of two percent (2%) union dues from the
monthly basic salary of each union member.
While the matter of implementing the two percent (2%) union dues was taken up during
the PEU-NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting on October 28, 2008, there
was no sufficient showing that the same had been duly deliberated and approved. The
minutes of the Assembly itself belie PEU-NUWHRAIN’s claim that the increase in union
dues and the corresponding check-off were duly approved since it merely stated that
“the [two percent (2%)] Union dues will have to be implemented,” meaning, it would still
require the submission of such matter to the Assembly for deliberation and approval.
3. Yes. Having failed to establish due deliberation and approval of the increase in union
dues from one percent ( 1 % ) to two percent (2% ), as well as the deduction of the two
percent (2%) union dues during PEU-NUWHRAIN’s 8th General Membership Meeting
on October 28, 2008, there was nothing to confirm, affirm, or ratify through the July 1,
2010 GMR. Contrary to the ruling of the OSEC in its March 6, 2012 Order, the July 1
2010 GMR, by itself, cannot justify the collection of two percent (2%) agency fees from
the non-PEU members beginning July 2010. The Assembly was not called for the
purpose of approving the proposed increase in union dues and the corresponding
check-off, but merely to “confirm and affirm” a purported prior action which PEU-
NUWHRAIN, however, failed to establish.
Corollarily, no individual check-off authorizations can proceed therefrom, and the

submission of the November 2008 check-off authorizations becomes inconsequential.
Jurisprudence states that the express consent of the employee to any deduction in his
compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by the
law, which must be followed to the letter; however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that there is no legal basis to impose union dues and
agency fees more than that allowed in the expired CBA, .e., at one percent (1 %) of the
employee’s monthly basic salary.
Peninsula Employees Union (PEU) Vs. Michael B. Esquivel, et al.

G.R. No. 218454. December 1, 2016
PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one percent
(1%) to two percent (2%) of the rank and file employees' monthly salaries, brought
about by PEU's affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its affiliates to
remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries.
The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees arguing
that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA has been formally signed
and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant
and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements for such increase.
1. Based on the facts given, may PEU-NUWHRAIN increase the rate of agency fees?
No.
Failure to comply with the three documentary requirements under the labor code
precludes PEU-NUWHRAIN to increase the rate of agency fees.
Jurisprudence states that the express consent of the employee to any deduction in his
compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by the
law, which must be followed to the letter; however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply.
2. Under the labor code, what are the three documentary requirements to justify a valid
levy of increased union dues?
These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members
at the general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (b) the secretary's
record of the minutes of the meeting, which shall include the list of all members present,
the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such
assessment or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by
the employees concerned.
Asian Institute of Management vs. Asian Institute of Management Faculty Association

G.R. No. 207971
January 23, 2017
Facts:
On May 16, 2007, respondent filed a petition for certification election6 seeking to
represent a bargaining unit in AIM consisting of forty faculty members. Petitioner
opposed the petition, claiming that respondent's members are neither rank-and-file nor
supervisory, but rather, and managerial employees. On July 11, 2007, petitioner filed a
petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration on the grounds of
misrepresentation in registration and that respondent is composed of managerial
employees who are prohibited from organizing as a union.
Issues:
Whether or not the members of AIMFA are managerial employees.
Held:
The Supreme Court finds the employees to be managerial employees.

Article 212 of the Labor Code defines managerial employees as:
ART. 212. Definitions.
Managerial employee' is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the
interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise
of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are
considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book.'
There are, therefore, two kinds of managerial employees under Art. 212 of the Labor
Code. Those who 'lay down management policies', such as the Board of Trustees, and
those who 'execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees'.
Asian Institute of Management vs. Asian Institute of Management Faculty Association

GR No. 207971, January 23, 2017
Facts: Respondent AFA is a duly registered labor organization composed of members

of the AIM faculty. AFA filed a petition for certification election seeking to represent a
bargaining unit in AIM consisting of forty (40) faculty members. AIM opposed the
petition, claiming that respondent's members are neither rank-and-file nor supervisory,
but rather, managerial employees. Subsequently, AIM filed a petition for cancellation of
respondent's certificate of registration on the grounds of misrepresentation in
registration and that respondent is composed of managerial employees who are
prohibited from organizing as a union.
On the first case, the Med-Arbiter of DOLE denied the petition for certification election
on the ground that AIM' s faculty members are managerial employees. This Order was
appealed by respondent before the SOLE who reversed the same. Meanwhile, in the
second case, the Regional Director of DOLE granted AIM's petition for cancellation of
respondent's certificate of registration and ordering its delisting from the roster of
legitimate labor organizations. This Order was appealed by AFA before the BLR which
reversed the same and ordered AFA's retention in the roster of legitimate labor
organization.
AIM insists that the members of its tenure-track faculty are managerial employees, and
therefore, ineligible to join, assist or form a labor organization. It ascribes grave abuse
of discretion on SOLE for its rash conclusion that the members of said tenure-track
faculty are not managerial employees solely because the faculty's actions are still
subject to evaluation, review or final approval by the board of trustees (BOT). AIM
argues that the BOT does not manage the day-to-day affairs, nor the making and
implementing of policies of the Institute, as such functions are vested with the tenure-
track faculty.
The first case remains pending before the Supreme Court via Certiorari. As to the
second case, the CA affirmed the decision of the BLR to retain AFA in the list of
legitimate labor organizations. This decision is what’s being assailed in this case.
Issue: Whether or not AFA’s members are all managerial employees who are
disqualified from joining, assisting, or forming a labor organization.
Ruling: Jurisprudence already provides that "in case of alleged inclusion of disqualified
employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly
file a petition for cancellation of the union's certificate of registration due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in
Article 239 of the Labor Code.”
AIM was therefore correct in filing a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate
of registration. Petitioner's sole ground for seeking cancellation of respondent's
certificate of registration - that its members are managerial employees and for this
reason, its registration is thus a patent nullity for being an absolute violation of Article
245 of the Labor Code which declares that managerial employees are ineligible to join
any labor organization --- is, in a sense, an accusation that respondent is guilty of
misrepresentation for registering under the claim that its members are not managerial
employees.
However, the issue of whether respondent's members are managerial employees is still
pending resolution in the first case. To avoid conflicting decisions, this case cannot be
resolved until the first case is first resolved.
57. CASE TITLE: ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT vs. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF

MANAGEMENT FACULTY ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 207971, January 23, 2017.
BAR SUBJECT: LABOR LAW; REMEDIAL
Synopsis: If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.
Identity of cause of action is not required, but merely identity of issues.
FACTS: Petitioner Asian Institute of Management (AIM) is a duly registered non-stock,

non-profit educational institution. Respondent Asian Institute of Management Faculty
Association (AFA) is a labor organization composed of members of the AIM faculty, duly
registered under Certificate of Registration. On May 16, 2007, AFA filed a petition for
certification election seeking to represent a bargaining unit at AIM consisting of 40
faculty members. AIM opposed the petition claiming that the members are neither rank-
and-file nor supervisory, but managerial employees. On July 11, 2007, AIM filed a
petition for cancellation of AFA’s certificate of registration on the grounds of
misrepresentation in registration and that they are composed of managerial employees
who are prohibited from organizing as a union. On August 30, 2007, the Med-Arbiter
issued an order denying the petition for certification election on the ground that AIM’s
faculty members are managerial employees. The Order was appealed by AFA before
the Labor Secretary and was reversed. In another order, the DOLE-NCR RD granted
the petition of AIM for cancellation of the certificate of registration of AFA and ordered
the delisting from the roster of legitimate labor organizations. AFA appealed before the
Bureau of Labor Relations where it reversed the same and ordered retention of AFA in
the roster. AIM appealed both orders to the CA and the CA ruled that with regard to
petition for certification election, the bargaining unit with AIM sought to be represented
is composed of managerial employees who are not eligible to join, assist, or form a
labor organization. AFA is not a legitimate labor organization that may conduct a
certification election. With regard to the petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Bureau of Labor
Relations. The grounds for cancellation under the Labor Code are exclusive. No other
grounds is acceptable except for the 3 grounds under Article 239.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certificate of registration of AFA should be cancelled.
RULING: Article 239. Grounds for cancellation of union registration. - The following may
constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration: (a) Misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and
by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who
took part in the ratification; (b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in
connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of
voters; (c) Voluntary dissolution by the members. In this case, AIM did not allege any
specific act of fraud or misrepresentation committed by AFA. What is clear is that the
Institute seeks the cancellation of the registration of AFA based on Article 245 of the
Labor Code on the ineligibility of managerial employees to form or join labor unions. It
should be stressed that a Decision had already been issued by the DOLE in the
Certification Election case; and the Decision ordered the conduct of a certification
election among the faculty members of the Institute, basing its directive on the finding
that the members of AFA were not managerial employees and are therefore eligible to
form, assist and join a labor union. As a matter of fact, the certification election had
already been held on October 16, 2009, albeit the results have not yet been resolved as
inclusion/exclusion proceedings are still pending before the DOLE. The remedy
available to the Institute is not the instant Petition, but to question the status of the
individual union members of the AFA in the inclusion/exclusion proceedings pursuant to
Article 245-A of the Labor Code, which reads: Article 245-A. Effect of inclusion as
members of employees outside the bargaining unit. - The inclusion as union members
of employees outside the bargaining unit shall not be a ground for the cancellation of
the registration of the union. Said employees are automatically deemed removed from
the list of membership of said union. Petitioner insists that Article 245-A is not applicable
to this case as all AFA members are managerial employees. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, even assuming that there is a violation of Article 245, such violation will not
result in the cancellation of the certificate of registration of a labor organization. In the
case of Holy Child Catholic School vs. Hon. Sto. Tomas, in case of alleged inclusion of
disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for employer is to directly file a
petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code. Based on the said ruling,
AIM was correct in filing a petition for cancellation of registration since the sole ground
alleged was that the members are managerial employees. But the issue of whether the
members are managerial employees is still pending and is better left to the DOLE.
REFORMIST UNION OF R. B. LINER, INC., HEVER DETROS, ET AL., vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 120482. January 27, 1997
DAVIDE, JR., J
FACTS:
Petitioner union was organized in May 1989 "by affiliating itself with Lakas
Manggagawa sa Pilipinas (hereinafter Lakas)." Lakas filed a notice of strike on
13 November 1989 because of alleged acts of unfair labor practice committed
by the private respondents. Despite conciliation hearings held on 4 and 6
December 1989, the parties failed to reach an agreement. Later, another act of
unfair labor practice allegedly committed by the private respondents impelled
Reformist, with the authorization of Lakas, to go on strike on 13 December 1989
even as conciliation proceedings continued.
On 21 December 1989, R.B. Liner, Inc. petitioned then Secretary Fanklin
Drilon of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume
jurisdiction over the ongoing dispute or certify it to the NLRC. Secretary Drilon
determined that "[t]he ongoing work stoppage in the company . . . . adversely
affects an industry indispensable to the national interest;" thus on 28 December
1989, he certified the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and issued
a return-to-work order.
The certified case (NLRC Certified case No. 0542, entitled In Re: Labor
Dispute at RB Liner, Inc.) was dismissed on 13 February 1990 after the union
and the company reached all agreement on 19 January 1990 providing, among
other matters, for the holding of a certification election.
On 31 January 1990, a certification election was held where Lakas won as

the collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. On 13 February
1990, Lakas presented a proposal for a collective bargaining agreement to
Bernita and Rodelia Dejero, but they refused to bargain. Meanwhile, as
admitted by private respondents' witness Arcile Tanjuatco, Jr., eight R.B. Liner
buses were "converted" to Sultran Lines, one "became MCL," and another
"became SST Liner."
The petitioners filed with NLRC a case charging the private respondents with unfair
labor practice, i.e., illegal lock out. The private respondents countered with NLRC
Case, which sought to declare as illegal the union's 13 December 1989 strike, as well
as other "work stoppages/boycotts" staged by the petitioners. The two cases were
consolidated and simultaneously tried.
In his decision, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the evidence indicated against an illegal
lockout while finding that Reformist staged an illegal strike. On appeal, the NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s finding. Reformist and its members moved to reconsider the
NLRC decision, which was however, denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was in this case a waiver of the issue on the illegality of the strike
by the employer.
HELD:
YES. The private respondents can no longer contest the legality of the strike held by
the petitioners on 13 December 1989, as the private respondents themselves sought
compulsory arbitration in order to resolve that very issue, hence their letter to the Labor
Secretary read, in part:
This is to request your good office to certify for compulsory arbitration or to

assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute (strike continuing) between R.B. Liner
Inc . . . . and the Lakas Manggagawa sa Pilipinas . . .
The current strike by Lakas which started on December 13, 1989 even
before Certification Election could be held could not be resolved by the NCR
Conciliation-Mediation Division after six meetings/conferences between the
parties.
The dispute or strike was settled when the company and the union entered into an
agreement on 19 January 1990 where the private respondents agreed to accept all
employees who by then, had not yet returned to work. By acceding to the peaceful
settlement brokered by the NLRC, the private respondents waived the issue of the
illegality of the strike.
The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement binding upon the
private respondents, for compulsory arbitration has been defined both as "the process
of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to
investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties," ] and as a mode of
arbitration where the parties are "compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute
through arbitration by a third party." Clearly then, the legality of the strike could no
longer be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter, much less by the NLRC, as this had already
been resolved. It was the sole issue submitted for compulsory arbitration by the private
respondents, as is obvious from the portion of their letter quoted above. The case
certified by the Labor Secretary to the NLRC was dismissed after the union and the
company drew up the agreement mentioned earlier. This conclusively disposed of the
strike issue.

Progressive Development Corp. V. Secretary of Labor G.R. No. 96425 / 205 SCRA 802

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Progressive Development Corp. V. Secretary of Labor G.R. No. 96425 / 205 SCRA 802

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PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. No.

DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation won.

DOCTRINE: Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor

G.R. No. 96542 February 4, 1992

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION (MANDAUE PACKAGING PRODUCTS PLANTS) vs.

We rule in the negative.

San Miguel Corp.

467 SCRA 107

[Aug. 16, 2005]

-CA affirmes DOLE Undersecretary for Labor Relations, Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz,

1. NO. Ratio EFFECT NON-PARTICIPIATION PREVIOUS ELECTION. No law,

2. NO. Ratio RELIGION/PAST NON-PARTICIPATION. Neither law, administrative rule

467 SCRA 107

[Aug. 16, 2005]

-CA affirmes DOLE Undersecretary for Labor Relations, Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz,

2. NO. Ratio RELIGION/PAST NON-PARTICIPATION. Neither law, administrative rule

SAMMA-LIKHA vs. SAMMA CORP DIGEST

DECEMBER 19, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 167141 March 13, 2009

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG

The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-

31 SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA– LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Requirement of certificate of non forum shopping is not

3. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF PETITIONER: The erroneous inclusion of one

Unless petitioners union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall

Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-owned and

We deny the petition.

G.R. No. 174287 : August 12, 2013

NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES (NUBE), Petitioner, v. PHILNABANK

Respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-owned and

Following the expiration of the CBA, the Philnabank Employees Association-FFW

Thereafter, on June 20, 2003, the Board of Directors of NUBE-PEC adopted a

As to the impropriety of denying PEMAs motion for intervention, the CA noted

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.

Likewise, Philippine Skylanders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commissionrestated

Such dictum has been punctiliously followed since then.

National Union of Bank Employees v. Philnabank Empoyees Association G.R.

Philippine National Bank (PNB) used to be a government-owned and controlled banking

Following the expiration of the CBA, the Philnabank Employees Association-FFW

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an effective disaffiliation?

RULING: Yes there is a valid disaffiliation from NUBE. Whether there was a valid

DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

TOPIC: (Classification of piercing cases; elements)

Metro initially resisted AWU's request to terminate the employment of individual

LA- order to provisionally reinstate the individual respondents

LA- issued MARINA to reinstate these individuals.

3) WON METRO is liable to the suspended individuals?

By failure of Metro to accord individual respondents procedural due process by giving

4) WON MARINA should be compelled to recognize the legality of the

G.R. No. 115949 March 16, 2000

Art. 241 (o) provides:

Gabriel, et al v. Secretary of Labor [G.R. No. 115949, March 16, 2000]

FACTS: Petitioners compromise the Executive Board of Solidbank union, the collective

ISSUE: W/N the union may check-off attorney’s fees.

2. secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting

Gabriel vs Sec of Labor

March 16, 2000 | Ponente: QUISUMBING, J

Statement of the Case

-Palacol vs. Ferrer-Calleja - express consent of employees is required, and this

-ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting

Peninsula Employees Union (PEU) Vs. Michael B. Esquivel, et al.

G.R. No. 218454. December 1, 2016