G.R. No.

178512, November 26, 2014

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

BERSAMIN, J.:

“Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such
intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through
the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the assault, or by
the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.”

In the case at hand, accused, the brother of private complainant’s land lady, initially hit
private complainant on the nape. The latter then informed the landlady of the incident. Two
hours later, accused stabbed private complainant on his face and chest while private
complainant was fetching water. The son in law of the private complainant immediately brought
the latter to the hospital upon seeing him bleeding and asking for help. He was confined to the
hospital for two days. According to the physician who treated the private complainant, his
second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical
intervention.

The defense version, on the other hand, denied stabbing private complainant. He said
that it was an accident when he hit private complainant’s back which caused the latter to throw
invective words against him. He felt insulted which ensued the fistfight between them. He then
hit private complainant on the face which caused the blood to ooze from the latter’s face.

Accused was found guilty by the RTC. Said decision was affirmed by the CA.

Ruling:

The Court finds the appeal no merit.

The Supreme Court discussed that the elements of frustrated homicide are (1) the
accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.

“ Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove
by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent,
which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of
mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and
conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v.
People, we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely:
(1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and
the motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the
offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.”
 The Court believes that there was intent to kill and the wounds sustained by private
complainant were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as a result of fistfight.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide, on the other hand, is the
intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
of injuries.

February 7, 2018, G.R. No. 206632

EDEN ETINO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

In the case at hand, the prosecution versions stated that at about 4:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of November 5, 2001, while the private complainant and his companions were
walking on their way home to Bgy. Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo, he was shot with a 12 gauge shotgun by
the accused hitting the back portion of his right shoulder and other parts of his body. This was
corroborated by private complainant’s companion who categorically stated that private
complainant was shot by accused from behind, and was thereafter brought to the hospital for
treatment.

To prove the injuries suffered, the prosecution presented Sonza, in her capacity as the
officer in-charge of the security of all the medical records of the patients, for the reason that the
doctor who treated private complainant was unable to testify as he is now based in General
Santos City. Sonza brought the medical records of private complainant to court which included:
a) Medical Certificate10 dated December 20, 200, b) Trauma Sheet dated November 5, 2001, c)
Admission and [Discharge] Record and d) Operative Records dated November 16, 2001, and
certified the same to be true and faithful reproductions of the original documents.

The defense’s version, on the other hand, states that at about 4:30 in the afternoon of
accused was with Bgy. Captain Manuel Bomejan, Wenifredo Besares at the accused’s house
which was situated about one kilometer away from where they heard shots that
afternoon. Prosecution also alleged that the filing of the criminal complaint was precipitated by
a pending Comelec gun-ban case before the RTC filed against private complainant, wherein
accused was the witness.

The RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated
homicide. It ruled that petitioner was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime
charged against him, especially so, when the complainant, was alive to tell what actually
happened.

CA confirmed RTC’s ruling.

The Court discussed that in order to determine whether the crime committed is
attempted or frustrated parricide, murder or homicide, or only lesiones (physical injuries), the
crucial points to consider are: a) whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal, and
b) whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused.

In the case at hand, the Court ruled that there was no proof of the extent of injury
sustained by the victim. The Court cited the case of Epifanio v. People, 552 Phil. 620, 631 (2007)
where it discussed that it is a settled rule that "where there is nothing in the evidence to show
that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is
doubtful," and such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.

The prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the victim would have died from
his wound without timely medical assistance, as his Medical Certificate alone, absent the
testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated him, or any physician for that
matter, is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of his injury. This is especially true, given
that said Medical Certificate merely stated the victim's period of confinement at the hospital, the
location of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received, and his period of healing.

Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the victim sustained
enters the realm of doubt, which the Court must necessarily resolve in favor of petitioner.

“The intent to kill was not sufficiently established”. The Court dicussed that the intent to kill is
the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide.
The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven. The intent to kill must be proven
in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the
aggressor.

The Court also cited the case of Rivera v. People, where the Court ruled that "intent to kill is a
specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence" which
may consist of:

a) the means used by the malefactors;

b) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim;

c) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
victim;

d) the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and,

e) the motives of the accused,

Moreover, the Court held in Rivera that intent to kill is only presumed if the victim dies as a

Related laws
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public
calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

Art. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder or homicide. — The courts, in

view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime of
parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding articles, a penalty lower
by one degree than that which should be imposed under the provision of Article 50.

The courts, considering the facts of the case, may likewise reduce by one degree the penalty
which under Article 51 should be imposed for an attempt to commit any of such crimes.