Lessons Learned From Electrical Submersible Pumps Installed in High-Salinity and Corrosive Reservoir, TAGI Formation

PO184181 DOI: 10.
2118/184181-PA Date: 7-June-18 Stage: Page: 1 Total Pages: 15
Lessons Learned From Electrical

Submersible Pumps Installed in High-Salinity
and Corrosive Reservoir, TAGI Formation
Hichem Brahmi, Groupement Sonatrach AGIP
Summary
An experience of electrical-submersible-pump (ESP) -issues troubleshooting to overcome the high-corrosion media of GSA wells is
presented. Additionally, actions taken to extend the run life of pumps are explained. GSA is the company in Algeria that adopted the
ESP system including all services; therefore, there was no chance to share experience with other entities in the country. Thus, it became
necessary to try all available approaches during a period of 10 years to mitigate ESP failures and, eventually, production downtime.
To overcome the high salinity of >320 g/L, several actions were introduced by either of two ways—ESP equipment or well comple-
tion. Simple motors and protectors were changed to tandem to prevent water penetration inside the motor. Power cable was changed
from galvanized to Monel armor for high resistance to corrosion. For well completion, single or double 1=2-in. water-dilution lines were
adopted and were run along tubing and connected to tail pipe, which runs to perforations. Modification in completion metallurgy also
took place, when carbon steel was replaced by Super 13Cr. Supplementary actions were taken at the surface; the pressure switch was
connected with a variable-speed drive (VSD) to smoothly shut down the ESP for unforeseen surface-controlled subsurface-safety-valve
(SCSSV) closures.
The adopted actions yielded considerable positive results. ESP failures that originated from the motor were reduced from four per
year during 2012 to only one failure in 2016. However, salt-deposition blocs were almost prevented, and resulted in decrement in bull-
heading and coiled-tubing interventions by 85%, except for some wells when salt-bloc buildup was occasionally quicker and more im-
portant than water-dilution rate. Running a 1=2-in. injection line along with the tail pipe lowered ESP-shutdown frequency. Also,
changing the power-cable type gave roughly good results. After running Monel armor, the number of related power-cable failures
decreased, contributing to the reduction of whole failures, because related power-cable failure represented 70% of ESP failures in 2015.
Considering Super 13Cr instead of carbon-steel tubing gave positive indications, and reduced sharply related tubing-integrity failure.
The problem still exists, however, with very low frequency. For surface equipment, all unforeseen SCSSV closures actuated from the
control panel are always accompanied by a gradual decrement of frequency and, consequently, smoother ESP shutdown.
Because our organization is the company that uses ESP with a proper sense in Algeria, this paper presents some best practices to be
considered for other companies and ESP contractors that are based in the country or abroad that intend to install an ESP system in very
high-salinity and corrosive fields and to adopt a lease model for downhole equipment.
Introduction
The artificial-lift system in GSA became fundamental to sustain the production for wells operating in critical conditions. Therefore, 10
years ago, GSA adopted the ESP as an alternative technique to maintain production on wells facing a lack of reservoir energy or heavier
hydrostatic column (depletion, high water cut). The ESP system has proved its effectiveness as an artificial-lift method that contributes
to the improvement or sustainability of production inside the BRN concessions. Actually, it represents more than 10% of total produc-
tion. However, the ESP pump could not run perfectly in all well conditions as a result of the many issues that created problems for most
ESPs installed in GSA wells. The majority of the problems were related to:
• Salt deposition
• Corrosion
• Quality of dilution water
The objective of this paper is to outline the criticalities experienced in a time span of 10 years (2006–2016) with ESP application. In
fact, GSA is continuously confronting many challenges related to corrosion phenomena originating from high-salinity water and is try-
ing to discover all possible outlets. Therefore, the solutions considered by the company so far also have been presented in this paper;
the aim is to highlight the gain achieved by improving ESP performance in GSA wells and ultimately decrease well interventions for
ESP replacement with associated cost-saving and production-downtime reduction.
• The presence of water in the wellbore has deteriorated the ESP run life considerably, incorporating new issues to deal with (salt
deposit and corrosion).
• Changing ESP cable material and considering increasing freshwater-injection-line diameter to 1=2 in. are effective solutions.
• Forty-three total failures on 20 wells have been experienced within 10 years, mainly because of corrosion. Even though measure-
ments were taken by the company to improve ESP reliability in this challenging environment, high salinity and corrosion still
penalized ESP run life. Table 1 indicates clearly the examples of wells that suffered from high water salinity and experienced sev-
eral ESP failures. Among the failures that follow, 20 were electrical in nature.
Corrosion and Scaling Tendencies

The presence of high-salinity water encourages corrosion phenomena that can severely damage the completion and the ESP assembly.
Corrosion issues have been observed in almost all wells in which workover has been executed for ESP replacement. Corrosion also has
been observed in surface facilities.
Copyright V
C 2018 Society of Petroleum Engineers
This paper (SPE 184181) was accepted for presentation at the SPE Middle East Artificial Lift Conference and Exhibition, Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain, 30 November–1 December 2016, and
revised for publication. Original manuscript received for review 1 October 2016. Revised manuscript received for review 9 June 2017. Paper peer approved 5 September 2017.
2018 SPE Production & Operations 1
ID: jaganm Time: 18:51 I Path: S:/PO##/Vol00000/170050/Comp/APPFile/SA-PO##170050

PO184181 DOI: 10.2118/184181-PA Date: 7-June-18 Stage: Page: 2 Total Pages: 15
Number of Average
Well Failures Formation Run Life (days)
A–8 4 TAGI formation 473
B–2 3 TAGI formation 287
Table 1—Examples of wells that experienced repetitive ESP failures.
GSA fields present a very challenging environment for downhole-completion materials:

• Reservoir water with high salinity up to 350 g/L and related halite-deposition problem
• Presence of CO2 in reservoir fluids (Newton and Mclay 1977)
• Service/dilution waters with scaling problems, mainly carbonates and gypsum
• Aerated water used to dilute salt and to increase oxygen content downhole
• Presence of bacteria in water-producer wells
O2 Corrosion Risk. The solubility of oxygen in aerated water decreases with temperature and salinity. Reservoir fluids are oxygen-free.
If the production fluid is contaminated with oxygen, the effect on corrosion phenomena can be severe, and a careful assessment is required.
In GSA, water used for salt dilution from the Miocene/Pliocene exceeds the limit values of oxygen present. This water should be
treated against this issue by
• Using a proper oxygen scavenger injected into the skid
• Avoiding putting it in contact with air before the injection of the chemical product
Most oil producers equipped with ESPs are characterized by very aggressive corrosion effects caused by the aerated Miocene/Plio-
cene water used to dilute the TAGI formation water (very salty) in the equipped ESP wells. Unfortunately, the Miocene/Pliocene water
that is used without any chemical additives is only filtered to remove solid impurities.
In the GSA case, for all wells, the Miocene/Pliocene water has a neutral pH of 7.7. Neither chemicals nor acids are added to this
water. However, it is rich in oxygen and carbon dioxide (CO2) because the tank-skid dilution is not airtight and has only a cover-over to
fill the tank regularly (Newton and Mclay 1977).
The Miocene/Pliocene and TAGI water chemistry is shown in Table 2 [total dissolved solids (TDS) ¼ 3500 mg/L compared with
340 000 mg/L for TAGI water, respectively]. There is a significant presence of Naþ and Cl– concentration in the composition makeup
for TAGI, which identifies the root cause of halite precipitation. For Miocene/Pliocene water, it contains reduced TDS, however, and is
rich in positive divalent ions such as Mgþþ, Caþþ. This makes it an example of “hard” water.
TAGI (MDT) Miocene/Pliocene
pH 5.22 7.699
Na+1 89045 926
K+1 2607.39
Ca+2 19106 196
Mg+2 14223 83
Sr+2 220.03
Ba+2 12
Fe+2 447.07 0.2
Cl–1 213305 1175

–1
SO4 189.03 1000
HCO3–1 383.31 176
TDS (mg/L) 339537.83 3556.2
Density 1.23 1.001
Supersaturated NaCl CaCO3
Source Report No: WPS-033-10YF135HTD

198a0174 J580, Sep 2010
Table 2—TAGI and Miocene/Pliocene water chemistry.
2 2018 SPE Production & Operations

Fig. 1 shows a good example of calcium carbonate (calcite) self-scaling in dilution lines. Unlike other scale species in which solubil-
ity increases with temperature, calcite precipitation is formed usually within an environment in which temperature increases downhole.
This condition could be the possible operating envelope for the dilution line, because geothermal gradient/heat transfer from production
fluid would heat the line as dilution water moves from wellhead to side-pocket mandrel (SPM).
Fig. 1—Sample of Well A-5 dilution line, plugged in 2010.
Scaling Identification in Dilution Line. An obvious trend to identify the likelihood of calcite-scale deposition in the dilution lines
is by monitoring monthly dilution data. As shown in Fig. 2, during October 2012, injection pressure increased linearly to maintain at
8 L/min. This is an indication of an increased frictional pressure drop in the line caused by constrictions and, hence, an indication of
possible scale depositions.
BRSW10 Dilution-Line Pressure and Rate (From Bonatti)

300.0 12.0
250.0 10.0
200.0 8.0
150.0 6.0
Injection pressure (bar)

100.0 Injection flow rate (L/min)
4.0
Linear injection pressure (bar)

50.0 2.0
0.0 0.0
28/9/12 0:00 3/10/12 0:00 8/10/12 0:00 13/10/12 0:00 18/10/12 0:00 23/10/12 0:00 28/10/12 0:00 2/11/12 0:00 7/11/12 0:00
Fig. 2—Recorded pressure for October 2012 at 8 L/min.
Salt/Halite Deposition. A common problem in North Africa fields is the presence of halite scale [sodium chloride (NaCl)] in
produced water.
For all GSA wells, whether natural-flowing or ESP wells produced from TAGI reservoirs, after TAGI water breaks through, the
self-scaling halite problem begins. Salt plugs start to precipitate and then halite dynamically deposits in production tubing; liquid flow
could be restricted consequently.
TAGI water has a measured NaCl salinity of more than 300 000 mg/L with TDS content approaching 340 000 mg/L. Because of the
high-salinity nature of this fluid, water is prone to severe salt precipitation, which then leads to a deposition risk when it is being pro-
duced. The main production-chemistry and flow-assurance challenge with most TAGI producers is the precipitation of halite (Fig. 3).
Small amounts of oxygen, water, and chlorides can ruin a chrome-tubing completion in a few months. This is the main reason
to treat dilution water with respect to O2. It could be useful to evaluate corrosion inhibition against chlorides in the case of
chrome completions.
In Fig. 4, a clear example is illustrated in the screenshot taken from ESP parameters of Well A-6. Since the startup of the latter
pump run in March 2014 and despite the dilution system already in place, the ESP experienced 66 unexpected shutdowns originating
from rapid salt buildups leading to limited flow passage upstream of the pump.
The easiest and least costly way to avoid salt precipitation and scale buildup is to mix high-salinity reservoir water with low-salinity
“fresh water” (4 to 15 L/min in GSA case). This is performed in the field using water produced by the Miocene/Pliocene shallow aqui-
fer. Somehow, this solution proved its effectiveness to combat the salt-precipitation challenge.
Water is injected along the dilution-line (SPM) and dedicated tail pipes run below the ESP string. In some severe wells, fresh water
is also injected at choke level toward the manifold to protect further flowlines.

Flowline
Duse
Fig. 3—Halite deposition in GSA wells and surface facilities.
Intake pressure Discharge pressure Intake temperature Motor temperature Drive frequency Average amps
70 150 400 400 150 150
60
125 125 125
300 300
50
Discharge Pressure (bar)

100 100 100
Motor Temperature (°C)

Intake Temperature (°C)
Average Amps (A)

Drive Frequency (Hz)
40
Intake Pressure (bar)
75 200 200 75 75
30
50 50 50
20
100 100
25 25 25
10
0 0 0 0 0 0
May 2014 September 2014 January 2015 May 2015 September 2015 January 2016 May 2016 September 2016
Fig. 4—Well A-6 enormous shutdowns caused by salt plugging.
ESP-Failure Examples in GSA Wells

Field-Corrosion Evidence in the Downhole Equipment. Some field evidence of corrosion on carbon steel and Super 13Cr has been
collected by the GSA Drilling Department and is reported here.
Corrosion Issues on Carbon-Steel Tubing—Well A-6 Second ESP Replacement, January 2012.
• The aim of the workover was to replace the ESP.
• Motor-lead-extension armor was found corroded and leads were separated. The 1.66-in. N80 injection tail pipe (Fig. 5) below the
ESP was retrieved corroded and parted downhole (370 hours of nonproductive time caused by tubing fishing operations);
• Even though the dilution system was running, frequent shutdowns occurred because of salt plugging at perforations level. Thus,
the degradation of MLE insulation occurred.
Well A-7 Second ESP Replacement, June 2013.
• The aim of this workover was to replace the ESP completion caused by a tubing leak (Fig. 6).
• During decompletion operations, corrosion effect was discovered on retrieved 312-in. N80 9.2-lbm/ft new VAM tubing.
• In this well, water injection for salt dilution was not continuously applied.
Well B-4, October 2013.
• The aim of the workover on Well B-4 was initially to install the first ESP. Following an obstruction on the 412-in. liner, the well
was abandoned.
• During the decompletion phase, the 1.9-in. HYD L80 tubing (Fig. 7) (injection tail pipe below the ESP) and the 238-in. VAM ACE
P110 tubing was retrieved corroded.
• In this well, water injection was not applied continuously for salt dilution.

Fig. 5—Piece of retrieved 1.66-in. tail pipe used for salt dilution.
Fig. 6—Hole causing a leak in tubing: crevice corrosion.
Fig. 7—Piece of retrieved 1.9-in. tail pipe, pitting corrosion.
After considering corrosion problems experienced on Well A-6 and Well A-7, and taking into account the increasing trend of
water cut in the field, it was decided to deploy Super 13Cr tubing in all production wells (natural flow and ESP) on the basis of
material availability.
Corrosion Issues on Super 13Cr Tubing—Well A-6 Third ESP Replacement, February 2014.
• Well A-6 completed in July 2013 with an ESP, 31=2-in. Super 13Cr-95 VAM top tubing, and 1.66-in. carbon-steel injection tail
pipe (Fig. 8).
• In December 2013, a decrease of the discharge pressure accompanied by an increase of the intake pressure was recorded. This
caused fluid recirculation. As a result, the pump became unable to deliver fluid to the surface.
• On 2 January 2014, an integrity test was performed on the tubing string. A leak at the completion tubing was confirmed.
• In February 2014, a new workover was performed on the well. During the workover, while pulling out the completion, a 312-in.
tubing was found cracked.
Well A-2 First ESP Replacement, August 2014.
• In August 2013, deployment was made of a 3 12-in. Super 13Cr tubing, ESP, dilution line, and 1.66-in. tail pipe (Fig. 9).
• In August 2014, the ESP revealed very small production at the surface, whereas intake pressure increased and discharge pressure
remained constant. A pressure test confirmed a leak in the tubing. Workover for tubing and ESP replacement was chosen as a
proper solution.
• While pulling out the completion, 312-in. tubing was found cracked.

Fig. 8—Corrosion issue on Well A-6 Super 13Cr results in tubing leak.
Fig. 9—Vertical crack in Super 13Cr tubing.
Well A-1 Fourth ESP Replacement, September 2014.

• In April 2013, the deployment of 3 12-in. Super 13Cr tubing, ESP, dilution line, and 1.66-in. tail pipe occurred (Fig. 10).
• In August 2014, the pump was shut down because of the accidental closure of the subsurface safety valve (SSSV). Several
attempts to restart the pump were made, very little production was observed at the surface, and a hole in the tubing was suspected.
• In September 2014, a workover was performed to replace the ESP. While pulling out the completion from the well, a tubing crack
was found.
Fig. 10—Leak of 3.5-in. Super 13Cr tubing during decompletion.
Field-Corrosion Evidence on ESP Flat-Cable MLE. Well A-6 First ESP Replacement, 10 June 2010.
• Evidence of high corrosion was found in a critical component of the ESP system, suspected as a root cause of the failure: MLE-
galvanized armor (Fig. 11).
• No clear evidence of corrosion was identified in the main cable.

Fig. 11—Several locally corroded MLEs.
Well A-7 First ESP Replacement, May 2012.

• Galvanized round cable was severely corroded over a length of 200 m above ESP, with 40 m directly above ESP missing pieces of
armor (Fig. 12).
• Motor phase-to-ground readings showed poor insulation and electrical failure (10,000 X); motor also tested as unbalanced (Ph1 to
Ph2: 1.1 X/Ph2 to Ph3: 1.1 X/Ph3 to Ph1: 1.4X).
• Motor contained well fluid inside. Protector bottom chamber was completely full of well fluid.
• MLE, pumps, and intake were in good condition, and no foreign material was found inside.
Fig. 12—Damaged galvanized round cable.
Super 13Cr Tubing-Failure Analysis. A qualified local analysis service company performed a study of tubing-leaks failure faced on
Well A-6. A specimen of damaged tubing was analyzed following criteria shown in Fig. 13.
A pitting effect was observed inside the tubing, with the rupture following the direction of the pitting. Hence, the service company
recommended continuing the use of Super 13Cr tubing and following these actions:
• Optimization of water-injection parameters
• Visual inspection of tubing before running in hole
• Implementation of a proper-injection water-treatment system
ESP-Failure Root-Cause Distribution 2006–2016

Most of the ESP failures (70%) are connected to the corrosion of well tubular (tubing) or corrosion of electrical components (MLE,
cable, motor, and protector). It is clearly illustrated in Fig. 14 that only 23% of ESP-system failures are tubing-leak related.
The following is an illustration of the ESP system, which pulls distribution from 2006–2016:
Clearly, it can be seen that, among 46 total pulls, 74% are ESP-equipment related, whereas 20% of ESP-system failures originated
from non-ESP related. It is worth mentioning that, during 10 years, three pulls (6% total pulls) were elective (Fig. 15).
Table 3 and Fig. 16 report the different contributions of the corrosion, scale deposition, overheating, and electrical connection on
the ESP failures in the period 2006–2016.
Failure Analysis of Some ESPs Pulled. Some failure analyses have been performed ahead of taking corrective actions to extend ESPs
installed in GSA wells. Several examples are discussed next.

Chemical analyses
Microhardness filtrations, Metallographic observation
Electrochemical testing
Nondestructive control (CND)
Traction, bending, and

resilience tests
Sense of sampling (along the tubing)
Fig. 13—Super 13Cr damaged-tubing test criteria.
GSA ESP Installations—Component Failure 2006–2016
14% 23%
21%
9% 33%
Tubing Motor Pump Cable MLE
Fig. 14—Failure distribution of ESP-system components, 2006–2016.
Pull Distribution
2006–2016
Elective pulls
6%
Failures ESP-related
74%
Failures not ESP-related

20%
Failures ESP-related Failures not ESP-related Elective pulls
Fig. 15—ESP-system pull distribution 2006–2016.
Corrosion
Scale
Corrosion of Corrosion of Electrical Deposition on
Well Tubular Component (MLE, Cable, Pump/Bearing Electrical
(Tubing) Motor, Protector) Failure Overheating Connection Total
9 24 5 0 5 43
21% 56% 12% 0% 12% 100%
Table 3—Distribution of failure root-cause distribution, 2006–2016.

12%
21% Corrosion of well tubular (tubing)
12%
Corrosion of electrical component (MLE, Cable, Motor, Protector)
Scale deposition on pump/bearing failure
Electrical connection
56%
Fig. 16—Failure root-cause distribution 2006–2016.
Fluid Ingress Inside Chambers of Protector, Shaft Mechanically Damaged. The ESP failure in Well A-8 was electrical in nature
(the motor had grounded). The pumps were free of debris and turned manually. The power cable was tested electrically and was not
related to the failure.
Well fluid was found throughout all three chambers of the protector. Every shaft seal failed pressure testing and was mechanically
damaged. They showed signs of collapsing into themselves in a downward direction, indicating axial-shaft movement. The protector
elastomer bag was in good condition, but full of water. The protector high-load thrust bearing showed excessive wear, and the bearing
runner had been mechanically eroded from a severe amount of downthrust exerted by the shaft.
The motor contained a small amount of water inside, but this was not determined to be the root cause of failure. The thrust bearing
in the head of the motor was also found to be worn down by more than 0.25-in., and the runner was almost completely worn.
Historically, Well A-8 has instances of running under high downthrust situations. A leading cause of shutdown has been the inadver-
tent closure of the SSV (13 instances), which exerts severe downthrust against the ESP. Also, this well suffered from occasional salt
plugging that required bullheading operations. When unloading the heavy water, this creates a large amount of discharge pressure that
acts against the ESP. Initially, the protector was able to handle the downthrust as per design, but over time, the mechanical metal-on-
metal wear decreased the thickness of the bearing runner and began placing thrust onto the motor.
Even though a small amount of well fluid was found in the motor, no burn was inside the motor windings. This suggests that the
moment of failure occurred when the shaft physically fell downward onto the Y-point connection and severed the electrical system.
MLE: Corrosion of the Galvanized Armor. Dismantle, inspections, and failure-analysis investigation tested the returned pothead,
and the motor lead sample came from Well A-5; it passed the 15-kV high-potential test as well as a 40-psi pressure test.
The most likely root cause of the galvanized-armor crevice corrosion is the rock salt produced in the well that filled and corroded
the gap of the armor strip. The armor wraps in a spiral pattern and can catch rock salt in the gap. The corrosion can start at the edge and
enlarge the damage through time. The gap is a micro-environment in which fluid flow is low. When the corrosion develops deeper into
the armor, the fluid can travel inside and become stagnant. The ion species accelerated the crevice corrosion on the galvanized armor
and the pitting corrosion on the lead.
It was observed that the lead jacket near the pothead was broken, but insulation was not damaged. It is not clear if the lead
jacket was mechanically bent to break in the field-dismantle process, but lead-pitting corrosion might contribute to the broken-lead-
jacket symptom.
Excessive Downthrust and Abrasive Wear to the Protector-Shaft Seals. The ESP in Well B-2 failed electrically after 582 days
downhole. After equipment was pulled out, each pump, advanced gas-handling device, and intake shaft was very difficult to rotate
because of suspected abrasives inside.
Salt deposits were seen at the surface around the pit, and a fine salt layer lightly caked the ESP housings.
Dismantling the pumps revealed partial sand plugging in the stages and light abrasive wear. The downthrust washers were missing,
and impellers showed heavy wear.
All three protector-shaft seals failed pressure test and allowed water ingress through each chamber.
The seal runner was broken, the elastomer bag was deformed, and well fluid and sandy abrasives were seen in every chamber. The
downthrust-bearing chamber had severe damage, including heavy wear between the two metallic components that absorb the pump
thrust and a fragmented bearing face.
The motor was grounded electrically as a result of water entry and migration to the base. The pothead and MLE connection passed
the vacuum test, and O-rings looked good, verifying that the water ingress occurred through the protector.
Evidence indicates that the root cause of failure was a combination of running the ESP in excessive downthrust and abrasive wear to
the protector-shaft seals. Well B-2 pump was subjected to running against a closed SCSSV 22 times. The large amount of downthrust is
exerted against the downhole equipment. The shaft sections around the mechanical seals had sand present, indicating that sand may
have contributed to seal breakdown.
Water Entry to Motor Through Y-Point Adapter. Preliminary failure analysis completed after the system electrically grounded
indicated a fault in the motor. Electrical tests showed that the cable did not have any faults throughout its length, and the depth of the
short circuit was at the ESP. Because this well had been running under stable conditions with few shutdowns and the failure was very
sudden, instant grounding of the motor was suspected, caused by water entry, which was verified during equipment dismantling.
Although the mode of failure with Well A-9 was electrical in nature, potential mechanical issues existed that could have been
detrimental to the pump. Opening the head of the top pump revealed a deposit of hard, sticky foreign material that likely fell back
from the tubing and accumulated after the ESP was shut off. The black abrasive material was composed of small rock pieces and other
well debris. Pump stages were found partially plugged, and as it accumulated inside, it may have led to mechanical issues or a
broken shaft. Otherwise, the pumps were in good working order and free of mechanical damage. Low quantities of sand were found
inside the pumps, but this did not damage the components, and the light scoring on the diffusers/impellers is typical and not a cause
for alarm.

The top-shaft seal in the protector failed pressure testing, and the first chamber contained well fluid, but this is expected because it
communicates directly with the wellbore. The second- and third-shaft seals tested good, the elastomer bag was full of clean motor oil,
and both bottom chambers did not contain any water. Electrical grounding of the motor was caused by the settling of well fluid in
the base that shorted the circuit. The MLE/pothead connection was properly sealed, and the O-ring was in good condition. However,
the O-ring between the base of the motor and the gauge adapter was twisted and had a small cut; reliability was compromised by the
misplacement of this O-ring, and it resulted in the loss of sealing ability. The ESP string used a Dominator motor that required a Y-point
adapter to its slimline gauge, and this was determined to be the point of water entry.
This explains why Well A-9 experienced a loss in functionality of the downhole gauge approximately 5 weeks before the
motor grounded.
Actions Taken To Improve Downhole-System Performance

Because of all the drawbacks encountered since 2006, there was a large incentive to improve the efficiency of the actions already put in
place and to assess new initiatives for further optimization (Lea et al. 1994; Lea and Bearden 1999).
The following is a brief summary of the work already performed on the different topics.
Modifications on Well-Completion Configuration. Because of the challenges faced since the first ESP installation in company wells,
there was a continuous effort to improve well-completion configuration for the aim of mitigating severe salt deposition downhole.
The system is composed of an injection line running along the tubing and electrical cable, crossing the ESP packer through special
ports, and connecting to a dedicated injection-mandrel SPM below the ESP string. Because the primary objective is to bring fresh water
in front of the perforations, the injection mandrel is connecting to a tail pipe of 1.66 in.
The idea of adopting the installation of a dilution system was by running one 3=8-in. line. Afterward, because of the bad quality of
injected water, precipitations of calcium carbonates inside the injection line started to engender serious problems. Progressing injection
pressure originated by plugging led to the incapability of injecting sufficient water rate to dissolve salt. Therefore, it became mandatory
to run a 1=2-in. line instead. However, because CaCo3 precipitations persist, salt buildup is very quick in some wells. Low dilution-rate
still takes place when consequent ESP shutdown on underload or overload caused by plugging upstream or downstream of the intake of
the pump occurs. This issue led to some workover interventions to change the completion—in particular, when dilution stops com-
pletely and there is no way to put it back in service.
As a result, the company decided to add an extra dilution line, the main for the usual water dilution and the backup used in case of
total plugging of the main or to increase water rate or for chemical injection if needed (Fig. 17).
For all installations, the following steps are being considered to ensure the best service quality of water injection:
• Secure continued water injection from the first day of completion—availability of injection skid.
• Inject chemical inhibitors to avoid scale deposits to plug the capillary injection line.
• Use oxygen scavenger to minimize O2 content in Miocene/Pliocene water in dilution skid, and evaluate the use of corrosion inhib-
itor in dilution water.
• Use a proper corrosion inhibitor during acidizing operations of wells to mitigate corrosion.
• Equip “1=2-in. line end” with a check valve.
• Improve the monitoring of pressure and injection rates by issuing daily monitoring reports.
• Use a 1=2-in. line in Inconel material to support corrosion.
Well-Completion Assembly-Materials Upgrade. A general upgrade of the materials of well completions has generated a signifi-
cant improvement on the run life of the whole system. Actions are still ongoing to further improve the resistance to downhole
corrosive environments.
Tubing and Tail-Pipe Upgrade. BRN wells, particularly those completed at the TAGI reservoir level, are potentially exposed to
salt-deposition issues. The findings of a study conducted by the company on the different types of tubing metallurgies used for wells
that target high-salinity formations proved the following:
• Carbon steel is highly susceptible to uniform and localized corrosion; tubing and tail-pipe metallurgy already have been upgraded
to Super 13Cr to address corrosion issues.
• The Super-Martensitic stainless steel is not immune to corrosion in Algerian well conditions because a slight tendency toward
localized corrosion is possible. Super-Martensitic steel with higher content of Mo and Ni (SM S13Cr) showed a higher corrosion
resistance and is considered the most suitable metallurgy for the field. However, for economic constraints, this solution has not
been adopted yet.
• Martensitic with 13Cr and also Martensitic with 15Cr are considered not suitable for this environment for their high susceptibility
to localized corrosion at high-salinity values.
• Duplex stainless steel also gave satisfactory corrosion resistance.
• The use of the Super-Martensitic with chemical composition equivalent to SM S13Cr (high Mo and Ni content) represents an ac-
ceptable compromise. Better resistance to erosion/corrosion is ensured with respect to carbon or Martensitic steel.
• Moreover, the localized corrosion, which depends mainly on the salinity value, is expected to be not so high if the NaCl content
remains approximately equal to or less than 300 g/L.
Upgrade of ESP Material. Information is available in Table 4.
Routine Operational Rigless Operations. Water Bullheading. There are some wells that experience intense salt plugging to the
extent that salt deposition is quicker than downhole water dilution. Even though the downhole injection is at the highest flow rate and
corresponding maximum downhole injection pressure, frequent ESP shutdown occurs because of
• Low fluid passage resulting in low intake pressure and high motor temperature yielded by salt plugging below the ESP assembly
• High discharge pressure engendered by salt plugging above the pump
GSA is contending with this frequent problem by performing bullheading interventions of 10 to 30 m3 of fresh water, generally,
left for soaking overnight to ease ESP restart on the next day. This practice became established procedure in GSA for some well-
known wells.

Water flows and mixture Fresh water used to

dilute the NaCl salt; it is
often saturated in
Water produced from the reservoir
Mio/Pliocene Water calcite (carbonates).
is a mixture of different waters, the
Tanks are saturated in
composition of which depends on
O2, and no oxygen
mixing occurring in the reservoir.
SCSS/ ’X’ scavanger is used.
2,813 ‘NE’
at 41.16 m
Port PKR
at 144.74 m
‘X’L. N. 2,813
at 149.36 m
Top liner 7-in.

at 2218 m
HS DB
SMITH
95/8-in. CSG
Shoe at
3125 m
SSD at
2930,52 m
Breakthrough water is ESP

Pressure
injected into water- Transfer
injection wells; used to s/b at
2933,49 m
maintain the Voidage Mixture R + Mio/Pliocene water
Ratio = 1; often (toward ESP inlet)
saturated in sulfates
(gypsum-barite)
SPM at
2966.20 m
Mixture R Albian water
Not always present TAGI Bottom of
Trains treated water 3277 Sting at
<–> 3,292.19 m
Not always present Reservoir water 3290 m
7-in. liner shoe
at 3367 m
Mio/Pliocene water
TAGI water supersaturated in
NaCl salt (Halite) TEOP
Fig. 17—Dilution system adopted in GSA.
Coiled-Tubing Nitrogen Lifting. In some cases where we have salt plugs, to avoid high discharge pressure, we proceed for lifting
using a coiled-tubing unit to lighten the column.
Diesel Bullheading. In case the bullheading with water is unsuccessful, and if there is suspected scale, sand, or other debris, then
gas/oil are to be considered.
Further Requirements To Improve Surface-Equipment Performance.

• Placing a large fan on the VSD skid to help with air circulation, powered by the generator
• Oversizing the VSDs using kVA derating methods to lower internal temperatures
• Constructing large enclosures around the skid and using air conditioning to cool the VSDs
• Changing the VSD internal thermostat from 60 to 90 C to avoid shutdowns during summer when very high temperature causes
VSD overheating
• Auto restart system for the backup generator in case the first one shuts down to allow remote restart

Action Taken Advantages
Upgrade in equipment capability and reliability;
Reduces steps in installation procedure to reduce rig time and

opportunities for assembly errors;
Upgrade of motors and protectors: Mid-2011 converted Operate at higher temperature to be more compatible with
ESP design to higher-grade protectors and motors. well-operating conditions;
Redesigned MLE, plug-in style to simplify field installation

and provide consistency over tape-in method;
Multisensor shrouds required as well, accommodating

Maximus motors;
Corrosive environment has proved corrosion of galvanized

armored cable;
Mid-2010 change all galvanized MLE material to KELB Monel-cable
armored; update the power cable to be resistant to corrosion Monel (copper/nickel alloy) is the highest grade material
environment; ESP housing materials have been upgraded available for corrosion resistance;
from carbon steel to red-alloy (chrome) material.
Monel (copper/nickel alloy) used to protect cable leads
and to ensure electric-power supply integrity;
Table 4—Upgrade of some ESP equipment.
Results and Path Forward

Some statistics have been compiled on all ESPs installed by the company in 20 wells. The results reveal that the mean-time-before-
failure (MTBF) trend shows changes in the last years (Lea and Bearden 1999).
After a decline occurred from 2009 to the first-half of 2012 (Fig. 18), an increment started from the second-half of 2013, as reported
in Fig. 19. This is basically caused by corrective actions implemented for new installations:
• Tandem protectors and advanced protectors
• One or dual injection lines to address salt-plugging issues
• Tubing and tail pipe in chromium metallurgy to prevent corrosion
• Monel cables to mitigate corrosion and erosion
GSA ESP Performance 2009–2012

1,200
1,100
1,000
900
800
MTBF (days)
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2009 2010 2011 2012
Run life ESP failed MTBF Poly. (run life ESP failed) Poly. (MTBF)
Fig. 18—ESP performance of unmodified GSA installations, 2009–2012.
The improvements are continuously ongoing. During the preparation of all new ESP tenders, all technical specifications already
standardized within the last 10 years are first demanded from vendors.
MTBF started to increase in 2012, exactly after implementing some actions intended to mitigate premature failures (Fig. 20).
Starting from 2010, some modifications took place on completion and equipment metallurgy. It was not possible to make a compari-
son between unmodified and modified from MTBF and the run life standpoint, because only one unmodified installation remained
after 2010.
It can be seen from the next graph that the number of ESP failures started to escalate after 3 years from the first installation in 2009,
when it reached the maximum number of 10 failures. After adopting some actions to improve the performance of the whole ESP system
starting from 2011, the number of failures has been decreasing when only three failures within the nine first months of 2016 have
occurred (Table 5).
Likewise, ESP-related failures are taking a descending trend and dropped from 8 in 2012 to currently one failure registered in 2016
so far (mid-September 2016).


800
700
600
MTBF (days)
500
400
300
200
100
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Fig. 19—ESP performance of modified GSA installations, 2012–2016.

1,200
1,100
1,000
900
800
MTBF (days)
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Fig. 20—Whole-field ESP performance, 2006–2016.
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Tubing-Related
Tubing-Related
Tubing-Related
Tubing-Related
Tubing-Related
Tubing-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
ESP-Related
Total failures per type 2 1 0 6 3 4 2 7 2 8 4 3 1 0 0 0
Total failures per year 3 6 7 9 10 4 3 1 0 0 0
Table 5—GSA ESP-failure statistics, 2006–2016.
On the other hand, tubing-related failures have been encountered right after changing completion from carbon steel to Super 13Cr.
The average number of tubing-related ESP failures is approximately two per year since 2012. It became dominant with respect to ESP-
related failures for the first time in 2016 (Fig. 21).
Findings.
• As explained previously, the major causes of ESP failures and disturbances are related to high salinity and severe corrosive
media.
• Aerated dilution-water (Miocene/Pliocene) reach of carbonates is the reason behind the carbonate-scales formation and eventually
injection-line plugging.
• Installation of a freshwater-injection line along with the ESP system contributed significantly in the delay of halite depositions,
the reduction of the EPS frequent start/stops, and, consequently, the increase of the ESP run life.

Number of ESP Failures Trend 2006–2016
ESP-related failures per year Tubing-related failures per year Total failures per year
12
10
10 9
8
Number of Failures
8 7 7
6
6
4 4
4 3 3 3 3
2 2 2
2 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Years
Fig. 21—GSA ESP-failure evolution, 2006–2016.
• The following upgrades on the ESP assembly have proved to be considerably effective in mitigating corrosion related to halite
content in produced water. These measures affected directly the reliability of downhole equipment, and contributed to the exten-
sion of ESP run life:
* Upgrades of ESP housing materials from carbon steel to red-alloy (chrome) material
* Cable: upgrade on cable from galvanized to Monel material

* MLE: maxlock pothead with direct plug-in and the use of an extra polytetrafluoroethylene tape barrier over MLE lead barrier
and Monel armor

* Motor: oil prefilled/upgraded motor technology and plug-in motor MLE pothead
* Protector: double number of shaft seals (tandem protector connected in series), additional capacity to handle downthrust, tung-
sten bearings that resist wear and corrosion

* Pump: installed shedder and retainer on top pump to prevent sand from entering bearing and sleeves
• Measurements taken on surface facilities (VSD, Generator, Control Panel) gave good results in terms of less-frequent ESP shut-
downs and mitigation of ESP failure caused by SCSSV-system glitch.
• Some routine and special operations such as coiled-tubing nitrogen lifting and water/diesel bullheading are efficient to restart the
pump in some frequent-shutdown cases.
Way Forward.
• Keep using the upgraded downhole and ESP equipment already standardized in all GSA ESP applications.
• Increasing Cr content of the alloy increases the Cr content and film resistivity of the corrosion layer.
• Completion planning is to be reviewed, and must reflect corrosion potential over any particular well.
• For any future corrosion inhibitors, ensure their compatibility with materials and reservoir.
• If tubing corrosion is suspected, bullheading jobs are not recommended.
• Keep monitoring closely the dilution system to prevent any unforeseen shutdowns; increasing dilution-water flow rate might be
considered also, especially in a well that faces intense salt plugging.
• Conduct a technical feasibility study to run a rigless ESP system (i.e., coiled tubing or wireline) to reduce operational costs and
production downtime (ongoing). In fact, some technical proposals received already from ESP vendors showed the capability to
deploy most of the string, such as retrievable cables and inverted motors. However, some other components would be run perma-
nently and require rig intervention.
References
Lea, J. F., Wells, M. R., Bearden, J. L. et al. 1994. Electrical Submersible Pumps: On and Offshore Problems and Solutions. Presented at the SPE Interna-
tional Petroleum Conference & Exhibition of Mexico, Veracruz, Mexico, 10–13 October. SPE-28694-MS. https://doi.org/10.2118/28694-MS.
Lea, J. F. and Bearden, J. L. 1999. ESPs: On and Offshore Problems and Solutions. Presented at the SPE Mid-Continent Operations Symposium,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 28–31 March. SPE-52159-MS. https://doi.org/10.2118/52159-MS.
Newton Jr., L. E. and Mclay, R. A. 1977. Corrosion and Operational Problems, CO2 Project, Sacroc Unit. Presented at the SPE Permian Basin Oil and
Gas Recovery Conference, Midland, Texas, 10–11 March. SPE-6391-MS. https://doi.org/10.2118/6391-MS.
Appendix A—Example of Well Equipped With Double Injection Lines

Please refer to Fig. A-1.

GENERAL INFORMATION Packer

DRILLING PERIOD 20/04/2008>13/05/2008 Nom. O.D. Manufact. Model type I.D. Depth (Middle Element)
RIG USED National 110 UE - 5894 95/8-in. HALLIBURTON ESP 2,970 157,63
RT/TIE DOWN 9,19 m
WELL HEAD RATING 5 K psi - Working Pressure
TOTAL DEPTH 3150 m MD RKB
TOP CMT PLUG 3125 m
BP RETAINER m MD WL SIZE 95/8-in. 47-53.5# SN: 2975661-01 TRSSV 'NE' 10k
ANNULUS FLUID 1.03 Kg/l NaCl Brine TYPE Retrieval method: Cut to release at 48.39 m
"X" 2.813"
BTM CHECKED ON 3071 On March 2015 COMPLETION STRING
GEOG COORD LAT 31° 13' 17.65" Nord Tubing
GEOG COORD LONG 08° 29' 55,62"Est Nom. O.D. Thread lb/ft Steel Gr. % Dow n to
WELL HEAD DESCRIPTION 31/2-in. Vam Top 9,2
SM13CRS-95 2286,78
X-MASS TREE 41/16-in. 5K x 41/16-in. 5K x 21/16-in 5k 1.66-in. NTS-80 2,4 N-80 3062
95/8-in. 'ESP
LOWER MASTER VALVE 41/16-in. 5K x 41/16-in. 5K MAKE UP TORQUE : 3020 ft.lb GREASE : Bestolife mid '
Element
TBG HEAD ADAPTER (ESP) 135/8-in.10K SL x 41/16-in. REF COMPLETION ASSEMBLY ID OD DEPTH (BTM) Packer
TUBING SPOOL 135/8-in. 10 K psi TBG HGR FMC 'TC-B-ECC' 131/2-in. x 31/2-in." 9.2# Vam Top UP x at 157.63 m
1
A 2,940 13,60 7,92
TUBING HANGER 13 /12-in. NOM. - TYPE TC-B-ECC Vam Top box dow n w /'RPT' BPV 2.875" profile
WELL HEAD COMPACT HOUSING ASSY B X-over Pup Joint 31/2-in. 9.2#SM13CRS-95 Vam Top Pin x Pin 2,938 3,500 8,14
PRODUCTION CASING C X-over Pup Joint 31/2-in. 9.2#SM13CRS-95 Vam Top Box x TN-Blue Pin 2,931 3,500 46,39 2.813-in. "X" LN
at 162.62 m
Nom OD Thd lb/ft S. Grade Top (m) Bottom (m) D TRSV Halliburton 'NE' 5.62-in. 10k w /2.813-in. 'X' Profile TN-Blue 2,813 5,620 48,39
95/8-in. TB DL 47 P 110 9,8 2240,6 E X-over Pup Joint 31/2-in. 9.2#SM13CRS-95 Vam Top Pin x TN-Blue Box 2,918 3,500 12,13
7-in. TB 29 P 110 2051,4 2899 F X-over Pup Joint 31/2-in. 9.2#SM13CRS-95 Vam Top Box x TN-Blue Pin 2,980 3,500 156,57
Top liner 7-in.

5 1
41/2-in. AMS28 12,6 T95 CR 2342 3149 G Packer Halliburton 'ESP' 9 /8-in. 47-53.5# 3 /2-in. 9.2# TN Blue 2,970 8,293 158,41
at 2051 m
H X-over Pup Joint 31/2-in. 9.2#SM13CRS-95 Vam Top Pin x TN-Blue Box 2,866 3,500 161,13 2.750-in. "RPT"
L. Nipple at
CSG/LIN OD 5 3 5
18 /8-in. 13 /8-in. 9 /8-in.
1
7-in. 4 /12-in. I Landing Nipple 'X' 2.813-in. 9.2 # 13Cr Vam Top Box x Pin 2,813 3,932 162,62 2288.57 m
1
TOP AT m 11,3 10,2 9,8 2051 2342 L Pup Joint 3 /2-in. 9.2# SM13CRS-95 Vam Top Pin x Box 2,945 3,500 162,97
SHOE AT m 85 377 2241 2899 3149 M X-over Pup Joint 31/2-in. 9.2#SM13CRS-95 Vam Top Box x TN-Blue Pin 2,965 3,500 2286,78
95/8 shoe
CMT UP m surf. surf. 270 2051 2342 N Landing Nipple "RPT" 2.750-in. 9.2# 9Cr TN-Blue Box x Pin 2,750 3,933 2288,57 at 2240 m
LINER HANGER : 7-in. TOP at 2051 m, 41/2-in. TOP at 2342 m O X- Over 31/2-in. TN-Blue Box x 31/2-in. EUE Pin 2,888 3,882 2288,99
CASINGS CHARACTERISTICS BOH 540 Series RLOY 31/2-in." EUE 2289,35
OD NOM TO m STEEL THRD lbf/ft ID mm Discharge Pressure Sub REDA 538 AFL 13 Cr 31/2-in. 9.3# 2289,59
185/8-in. 85 J-55 ANTARES 96,5 448 Pump #1, G6200N, Stage 68 Type CR-CT-ARZ Hsg 150 RLOY 2289,80
135/8-in. 377,5 J-55 BUTTRES 54,5 320 Pump #2, G6200N, Stage 68 Type CR-CT-ARZ Hsg 150 RLOY 2296,45
ESP Intake
95/8-in. 2240,6 P 110 TN-BlueDL 47 221 Intake VGSA S70-150 Type 540 RLOY 2303,10 at 2303.10 m
7-in. 2899 P 110 TN-Blue 29 157 ESP Protector Advanced 540 NTB/HL Type BPBSL RLOY 2304,35
ESP Gauge
41/2-in. 3149 S13Cr95 AMS-28 12,6 101 Protector Maximus 540 NTB/HL Type BPBSL RLOY 2306,95 at 2326 m
Adapter Prot 540 Maximus X MTR 456 Maximus RLOY 2309,65 Duble Side
Pocket
Motor #1 456 Maximus RA-UT RLOY 2309,90 mandrel
Motor #2 456 Maximus RA-LT RLOY 2317,98 at 2326.81 m
Production interval f/ perforated zone:
Top (mMD) Bottom (mMD) Level Gauge XT-150 Type 1 2326,03
41/2-in. Top liner
3029,0 3031,0 P X-over 23/8-in. 4.7# EU pin x pin 2,375 2326,60 at 2342 m
3035,0 3039,5 TAGI 1 Q * Double Injection Mandrel 23/8-in. 4.7# EUE Box x Pin 2326,81
3042,0 3046,0 R X-over 23/8-in. EUE Box x 1.66-in. NTS-80 pin 2,375 2327,60
3050,0 3060,0 TAGI 2 S 77 x 1.66-in. 2.4# N-80 NTS-80 Tail Pipe Joints 1,380 1,660 3050,88 7-in. shoe
at 2899 m
Perforation performed on June 2008 T 1.66" NTS-80 2.4# N-80 Half mule joint 1,380 1,660 3060,41
TYPE OF GUNS : Bottom Half mule joint 3061,97
TYPE OF CHARGE :
SHOOT DENSITY :
Isolated perforations NOTE : ALL THE DEPTS REFERING THE TOP OF TOOL
Top (m) Bottom (m) Level TAGI 1
3029 m
3031 m
BRIDGE PLUG AT 3047 m REMOVED ON MARCH 2015
3035 m
3039.5 m
3042 m
3046 m
TAGI 2
3050 m
3060 m 1.66-in.Tailpipe
* First application for Double Injection Mandrel
half mule shoe
at 3061.97 m
TAG BTM On
Mach 2015
41/2-in. Collar at 3071 m
at 3125 m
NOTES : 01-03-2015 Rig GW-124 Bridge Plug at 3047 m Milled out on March 2015 41/2-in. Shoe
at 3149 m
TRSSV 'NE' 10k (Start open at 1,600 psi, Full open at 2,300 psi Rig Supervisors
S.N. 3004747-02) WORKOVER JOB PURPOSE F. Bonincontro - A. Vanoli
AGV (Start open at 1,600 psi, Full open at 2,400 psi), MAX Press. 26/12/2014 RIGLESS - Set BP at 3047 to isolate TAGI-2 level Superintendent / Completion Enginner
4,000 psi. Apply 1,800 psi in annulus to shear and lock open 7/27-03-2015 WORKOVER- First ESP installation Rig GW-124 CELENTANO - BRACONI
Fig. A-1—Example of well equipped with double injection lines.
Hichem Brahmi is a senior production engineer at Groupement Sonatrach AGIP. Previously, he worked 10 years for Sonatrach
Joint Ventures. Brahmi’s current research interests are in production engineering, particularly in a challenging environment. He
holds an MSc degree in oil-and-gas production engineering from the French Institute of Petroleum.

Lessons Learned From Electrical Submersible Pumps Installed in High-Salinity and Corrosive Reservoir, TAGI Formation

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PO184181 DOI: 10.

2118/184181-PA Date: 7-June-18 Stage: Page: 1 Total Pages: 15

Lessons Learned From Electrical

Corrosion and Scaling Tendencies

2018 SPE Production & Operations 1

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Table 1—Examples of wells that experienced repetitive ESP failures.

GSA fields present a very challenging environment for downhole-completion materials:

TAGI (MDT) Miocene/Pliocene

Na+1 89045 926

Ca+2 19106 196

Fe+2 447.07 0.2

Cl–1 213305 1175

HCO3–1 383.31 176

TDS (mg/L) 339537.83 3556.2

Density 1.23 1.001

Supersaturated NaCl CaCO3

Source Report No: WPS-033-10YF135HTD

Table 2—TAGI and Miocene/Pliocene water chemistry.

2 2018 SPE Production & Operations

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Fig. 1—Sample of Well A-5 dilution line, plugged in 2010.

BRSW10 Dilution-Line Pressure and Rate (From Bonatti)

Injection pressure (bar)

Linear injection pressure (bar)

Fig. 2—Recorded pressure for October 2012 at 8 L/min.

2018 SPE Production & Operations 3

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Fig. 3—Halite deposition in GSA wells and surface facilities.

70 150 400 400 150 150

Discharge Pressure (bar)

Motor Temperature (°C)

Average Amps (A)

Fig. 4—Well A-6 enormous shutdowns caused by salt plugging.

ESP-Failure Examples in GSA Wells

4 2018 SPE Production & Operations

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Fig. 6—Hole causing a leak in tubing: crevice corrosion.

Fig. 7—Piece of retrieved 1.9-in. tail pipe, pitting corrosion.

2018 SPE Production & Operations 5

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Fig. 9—Vertical crack in Super 13Cr tubing.

Well A-1 Fourth ESP Replacement, September 2014.

Fig. 10—Leak of 3.5-in. Super 13Cr tubing during decompletion.

6 2018 SPE Production & Operations

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Fig. 11—Several locally corroded MLEs.

Well A-7 First ESP Replacement, May 2012.

Fig. 12—Damaged galvanized round cable.

ESP-Failure Root-Cause Distribution 2006–2016

2018 SPE Production & Operations 7

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Traction, bending, and

Sense of sampling (along the tubing)

Fig. 13—Super 13Cr damaged-tubing test criteria.

GSA ESP Installations—Component Failure 2006–2016

Tubing Motor Pump Cable MLE

Fig. 14—Failure distribution of ESP-system components, 2006–2016.

Failures not ESP-related

Failures ESP-related Failures not ESP-related Elective pulls

Fig. 15—ESP-system pull distribution 2006–2016.

21% 56% 12% 0% 12% 100%

Table 3—Distribution of failure root-cause distribution, 2006–2016.