UNIT – 1

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN

PERIOD
Although the term ‘international order’ is a relatively recent innovation, some accounts trace
the historical origins of international orders to the period when nomadic groups first settled
and became sedentary communities. The earliest recorded example of this process took place
around 13,000–14,000 years ago in Sumer—modern day Iraq.
Sedentary communities in Sumer accumulated agricultural surpluses that allowed for year-
round subsistence. These surpluses generated two dynamics: first, they fostered trade
between groups; and second, they put groups at risk of attack. The response of sedentary
communities was to increase their capabilities: they got bigger, they developed
specializations (such as dividing people into distinct ranks of soldiers and cultivators), and
they developed political hierarchies, establishing order through the command of a leader or
group of leaders. These leaders increasingly interacted with their counterparts in other
groups, establishing rituals that we now know as diplomacy.
Every region in the world has been home to regular, widely shared practices of commerce,
war, diplomacy, and law. Many of these historical international orders developed through
encounters with other parts of the world: the extensive interactions between the Byzantine
and Ottoman empires is one example; a second is the early modern international order
centred on the Indian Ocean that incorporated actors from Asia, Africa, and Europe.
Most accounts of international order, however, begin not in early modern South Asia, but in
early modern Europe. The majority of accounts date the birth of ‘modern’ international order
to a specific date—the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which marked the end of the wars of
religion in Europe.
The choice of when to date the emergence of modern international order depends on what
people consider to be the most important components of international order. One type of
regularized exchange occurs through economic interactions. Here we might stress the
importance of long-distance trade routes in silks, cotton, sugar, tea, linen, porcelain, and
spices that connected places as diversely situated as Malacca, Samarkand, Hangzhou, Genoa,
Acapulco, Manila, and the Malabar Coast.
It is also possible to combine economic and infrastructural interactions, highlighting
dynamics such as the trafficking of African slaves, which fostered a ‘triangular trade’ in
which the demand for sugar in London fostered the plantation system in the Caribbean, which
was supplied by African slaves and North American provisions.
Before the last two centuries or so, the ties of interdependence that bound international orders
were relatively limited in scope. We should locate the emergence of a distinctly modern
international order only in the last two centuries. During this period, multiple regional
international orders were linked in a global order in which all parts of the world were closely
connected. This period is sometimes known as the ‘global transformation’: a term used to
denote the shift from a world of multiple regional international systems to one characterized
by a global international order.
The global transformation brought to an end a long period in which human history was
mainly local and contact among peoples fairly light. It replaced this with an era in which
human history was increasingly global and contact among far-flung peoples intense.
The global transformation brought to an end a long period in which human history was
mainly local and contact among peoples fairly light. It replaced this with an era in which
human history was increasingly global and contact among far-flung peoples intense. For
better or worse, and often both together, the nineteenth century saw the transformation of the
daily condition of peoples nearly everywhere on the planet.
Up until around 1800, there were no major differences in living standards among the most
developed parts of world.
A century later, the most advanced areas of Europe and the United States had levels of GDP
per capita between tenfold and twelvefold greater than their Asian equivalents. In 1820,
Asian powers produced 60.7 per cent of the world’s GDP, and ‘the West’ (defined as Europe
and the United States) only 34.2 per cent; by 1913, the West produced 68.3 per cent of global
GDP and Asia only 24.5 per cent. Between 1800 and 1900, China’s share of global
production dropped from 33 per cent to 6 per cent and India’s from 20 per cent to 2 per cent.
First, European success was predicated on imperialism. Between 1878 and 1913, Western
states claimed 8.6 million square miles of overseas territory, amounting to one-sixth of the
Earth’s land surface. Second, European powers assumed control, often coercively, over the
trade of commodities as diverse as sandalwood, tea, otter skins, and sea cucumbers, as well as
silver, cotton, and opium. Europeans used silver from the Americas and opium from India to
buy entry into regional trading systems. This led to radically unequal patterns of trade.
European control of trade also led to radically unequal patterns of growth: whereas India’s
GDP grew at an average of 0.2 per cent per year in the century before independence, Britain’s
grew at ten times this rate.

SUMMARY
• International orders are regularized practices of exchange among discrete political units that
recognize each other to be independent.
• It is possible to speak of multiple international orders in world history, perhaps even as far
back as ancient Sumer.
• In International Relations, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia is often considered to be the
benchmark date from which ‘modern’ international order emerged.
• More recently, scholars have viewed the emergence of modern international order as the
product of the last two centuries, as this is when various regional systems were forged into a
deeply interdependent, global international order.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Relations International law is a part of law that regulates the activities of internationalscale
entities that have relations with the international community.7 International law is the overall
principles and principles governing relations or issues that cross national borders between
countries and countries and countries with other non-state legal subjects or non-state legal
subjects to each other. International relations, which are relations between countries, are
basically "legal relations" which implies that international relations have created
interconnected rights and obligations between legal subjects (states). International relations
are relations between countries or between individuals from different countries, both in the
form of political, cultural and economic relations. international relations has the aim of
enhancing friendship and bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation through various
forums in accordance with national interests and capabilities. In order to create a world peace
that is eternal, just and prosperous, our country must continue to carry out a free and active
foreign policy.
The function of international law, namely as a system, international law is an autonomous
legal system, independent from international politics. But its main function is to serve the
needs of the international community including an authentic State system. 8 And in particular
Koskenniemi concludes that the function of international law is to emphasize its task as a
relatively autonomous formal technique, as well as an instrument for increasing special
claims and agendas in relation to political struggles. international law and its institutions have
the purpose and purpose and function of maintaining the realization of the idea of a balance
of interests, the idea of the harmony of interests.9 So to achieve all goals in each country,
international law has a role in international relations including: First, international law is
intended as an effort to maintain peace and ignores all forms of regulations that do not like
various regulations related to high policy (a high policy), namely those related to issues of
peace or war. Problems that occur between one country and another or a country with and
many countries will cause conflict and conflict, both in relation to the rights of a country or
many countries, or with the customs of a head of state, diplomat or ambassador.10 All of
these subjects have their respective rights and obligations, which in practice must follow
international games and follow the rules that have been agreed upon collectively or
internationally. Second, international law functions for foreign offices and the practice of
international lawyers who daily apply and consider settlement with the rules of international
law relating to various related matters and cases. Cases for example, regarding claims for
compensation of foreigners who have been involved in an accident, incidents of deportation
of foreigners, extradition, national or nationality, or acts and rights of extra-territoriality in a
country, an interpretation of the rules of a complex treaty. Third, international law also aims
to assess various violations of international law, as a result and result of war or conflict or
because of military aggression, or the inability of a country to prevent epidemic problems, as
a matter of disarmament, international terrorism and violations in practice of conventional
military conflict and non-international military conflict. 11 Seeing that the function of
international law is related to policy theory (policy) and interests, there are two important
aspects in seeing the aims and objectives of using the term policy in international law. Fourth,
international law is related to the term policy (as an objective) which must be seen in the law
itself. Each of these policies is generally aimed at peace, security, cooperation (peace,
security and co-operation) or at more specific matters. Fifth, the aims and objectives of
international law can be seen from the policy, which emphasizes the importance of the
international community (international community). The existence of policy, as a special law
in the international community, especially in special situations that require testing.

UNIT – II
IDEALISM
As Hoffman put it “international affairs have been the nemesis of Liberalism”. the essence of
Liberalism is self-restraint, moderation, compromise and peace’, whereas ‘the essence of
international politics is exactly the opposite: troubled peace, at best, or the state of war’.
Idealism allegedly dominated the study of international relations from the end of the First
World War until the late 1930s. Sometimes referred to as utopianism, idealism is in fact a
variant of liberal internationalism. Notable liberal idealists are Immanuel Kant, Richard
Cobden, John Hobson, Norman Angell, Alfred Zimmern, and Woodrow Wilson. The term is
not a flattering one. Idealists are out of touch with current thinking, they put moral principles
before practical or prudential considerations, and are naïve about the world around them.
They are futurists who seek a perfect world. It is not surprising, then, that it was the self-
proclaimed realists who coined the term to describe the liberal internationalism of the
interwar years. Whether it deserves such a label is debatable. Recent research indicates that
the idealist thinkers of the period were not as ‘other-worldly’ as many realists suggested. Yet,
the label has stuck and continues to be used both by realists in their ongoing debate with
liberals, and by theorists writing on the interwar years. Idealism came to prominence in
reaction to the carnage of the First World War. Most intellectuals and policymakers of the
day pointed the finger at the Realpolitik of the European great powers and set themselves the
task of abolishing war as an instrument of statecraft. Philanthropists such as Andrew
Carnegie donated money to study the problem, peace groups formed, universities began to
teach international relations, and many intellectuals began to try to educate people about the
benefits of developing an internationalist orientation. Indeed, the birth of international
relations as a separate discipline coincided with these developments. However, the best
summary of the thinking of the period is to be found in Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’,
a set of principles that he took with him to the Versailles Peace Conference in December
1918. This document not only provided an outline for the settlement of the First World War,
it was also the basis for the establishment of the League of Nations. Generally speaking, the
idealists shared a belief in progress and were of the view that the procedures of parliamentary
democracy and deliberation under the rule of law could be firmly established in international
diplomacy. This is why they placed so much importance on the League of Nations and on
strengthening international law. A central characteristic of idealism is the belief that what
unites human beings is more important than what divides them. The idealists rejected
communitarian and realist arguments that the state is itself a source of moral value for human
beings. Instead, they defended a cosmopolitan ethics and sought to educate individuals about
the need to reform the international system. Interwar idealism was as much a political
movement as an intellectual one. Alfred Zimmern, for example, regarded his professorial
chair at Oxford University as a platform ‘for the preaching of international relations’.
Idealism fell into disrepute with the collapse of the League of Nations and the outbreak of the
Second World War in 1939. Although the idealists had sought to use the League system to
replace European Realpolitik, in fact it simply became a forum that reflected the competing
national interests of the great powers of the day. From an intellectual perspective, however, it
was the critique of E. H. Carr, a British Marxist, that completely undermined its credibility.
In his famous text entitled The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1946), Carr argued that the aspirations
of the idealists (whom he disparaged as utopians) were only to be expected in a new field of
study where the desire for change and the dictates of the moment overshadowed all else. Only
with disillusionment and failure do scholars become more circumspect and clear-headed
about the nature and purpose of their subject matter. Carr refers to this attitude as realist
because such a view does not shy away from a hard, ruthless analysis of reality. Furthermore,
he suggested that idealism was an expression of the political philosophy of the satisfied great
powers. It was simply the product of a particular set of social, political, and historical
circumstances rather than a timeless moral code devoted to universal ends. When it came to a
concrete political problem, it could not find an absolute and disinterested standard for the
conduct of international politics. The idealists were also naïve about the role of power in
international relations. Not all states had, according to Carr, an interest in peace. Those who
dominated the international system were more likely to pursue peace because it was in their
interests to maintain the international status quo. Contrary to the belief of the idealists, then,
there was no natural harmony of interests among states. Since the outbreak of war in 1939,
idealism has been regarded as an example of both policy failure and theoretical naïveté in
international relations. However, the tide seems to be turning. There is now much more
acceptance of liberal thinking in international relations than there was during the cold war,
and a number of scholars are also revising some of the conventional wisdom about ‘idealist’
thinking in the 1920s and 1930s.

KEY POINTS (INTERNATIONAL LIBERALISM)

• Early liberal internationalist thought on International Relations took the view that the
natural order had been corrupted by secret treaties and outdated policies such as the balance
of power.
• Enlightenment liberals believed that the problem of war could be solved through the
development of a body of international rules and laws constraining the selfinterest of states.
In addition, they believed that trade and other crossborder flows would further facilitate more
peaceful international relations.
• Jeremy Bentham, the creator of the term ‘international’, argued for a new concept of
international jurisprudence that was based on the equality of sovereigns. He saw the task for a
judge or legislator to be to establish the greatest happiness among the family of nations.
• Immanuel Kant argued that a ‘perpetual peace’ could be achieved through the
transformation of individual consciousness, republican constitutionalism, and a federal
contract among states to abolish war.
• In the 1980s, Michael Doyle revived Kant’s claim that liberal states are pacific in their
international relations with other liberal states. Although the empirical evidence seems to
support the democratic peace thesis, it is important to bear in mind the limitations of this
argument.
• In ‘The End of History’ (1989), Francis Fukuyama famously celebrated the triumph of
liberalism over all other ideologies, contending that liberal states were more stable internally
and more peaceful in their international relations than illiberal states. Others, such as Doyle,
recognize that liberal democracies are as aggressive as any other type of state in their
relations with authoritarian regimes and stateless peoples.
• The idea of a natural harmony of interests in international political and economic relations
came under challenge in the early part of the twentieth century as Britain and Germany went
to war, despite their high degree of economic interdependence.
• The First World War shifted liberal thinking towards a recognition that peace is not a
natural condition but is one that must be constructed. To this end, Woodrow Wilson
advocated for the creation of a League of Nations to regulate international anarchy through
the exercise of collective security.
• The League’s constitution also called for the selfdetermination of all nations. However,
despite widespread agreement on this principle, a host of practical and moral problems
limited its implementation.
• Although there are important continuities between Enlightenment liberal thought and the
‘idealist moment’, the thinkers of the interwar period were flawed. They overlooked the
distribution of power and interests in the international system (a critique mounted by E. H.
Carr), and they failed to understand that values and purposes were inextricably linked to
power. Notably, leading internationalists in the interwar period tied the future of the League
of Nations to the dominance of international society by European colonial powers.
• The imperial impulse of the AngloAmerican powers continued in the post1945 order—in
fact, after the fall of communism in 1989 internationalists hoped that the UN could impose
collective security in response to a state that had traduced the rulesbased order.
Some observers argue that the internationalist principles that have been a feature of the liberal
order since 1945 are in crisis.
• The following arguments support this view: the relative power of the United States is
diminishing and hence its capacity to deal with global risks is also reducing; rising powers
want a greater share of authority; the hope that Europe could emerge as a second superpower
which could strengthen internationalist rules and values has proven to be false; and there is
widespread evidence of a return to a form of state sovereignty in which intervention on
internationalist grounds will not find support in the UN Security Council or among the
majority of member states in the UN.
• If Ikenberry is right and liberal internationalism is in decline, it is not clear what will
replace it. If the liberal order associated with the UN system collapses, then history will have
repeated itself: in the first half of the twentieth century, great power rivalry led to major
power wars which the League was powerless to prevent. If liberal internationalism 2.0 is
reinvigorated, then global institutions will adapt to the challenge of new emerging powers
without losing their distinctively liberal character.
• Alongside those who lament the inability of the state and global institutions to deliver a
liberal peace are more critical voices who point out how structural patterns of hierarchy
persist. These patterns are actively reproduced by security and development doctrines and
policies. As a result, the liberal international order remains conveniently favourable to the
most powerful states in the system.

CONCLUSION
The pattern of conflict and insecurity present at the beginning of the twenty-first century
suggests that liberal internationalism remains at best an incomplete project. At worst,
internationalism continues to be imbued with an imperial impulse in which new schemes for
governing the world reproduce patterns of dominance and dependence established during the
era of empires.

REALIST THEORY
The development of realism after the Second World War is often claimed to rest on an older
tradition of realist thought. For the realists, tradition connects seminal texts with context. In
other words, it is important to understand the political circumstances in which various realist
thinkers were living. Contemporary realists are commonly portrayed as belonging to an
ancient tradition of thought that includes such illustrious figures as Thucydides (c.460–406
bc), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and JeanJacques
Rousseau (1712–78).
Those in the realist tradition contend that the condition of international politics is analogous
to a state of war in which political actors have little choice but to be concerned with their own
security. The everpresent possibility of war necessitates that political actors take appropriate
measures, including the use of lethal force, to ensure their own survival.
The insights these political theorists offered into the way in which state leaders should
conduct themselves in the realm of international politics are often grouped under the doctrine
of raison d’état, or reason of state.
According to the historian Friedrich Meinecke (1957: 1), raison d’état is the fundamental
principle of international conduct, the state’s First Law of Motion: ‘It tells the statesman what
he must do to preserve the health and strength of the State.’ Most importantly, the state,
which is identified as the key actor in international politics, must pursue power, and it is the
duty of the statesperson to calculate rationally the most appropriate steps that should be taken
to perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile and threatening environment.
Realists are sceptical of the idea that universal moral principles exist, and therefore warn state
leaders against sacrificing their own self-interests in order to adhere to some indeterminate
notion of ‘ethical’ conduct. Moreover, realists argue that the need for survival requires state
leaders to distance themselves from traditional notions of morality. Machiavelli argued that
these principles were positively harmful if adhered to by state leaders.
Proponents of raison d’état often speak of a dual moral standard: one moral standard for
individual citizens living inside the state and a different standard for the state in its external
relations with other states.
But before one reaches the conclusion that realism is completely immoral, it is important to
add that proponents of raison d’état argue that the state itself represents a moral force, for it is
the existence of the state that creates the possibility for an ethical political community to exist
domestically.
Some in the realist tradition attribute the war-like condition of international politics to certain
propensities found in human nature, while others emphasize the unique environment in which
international politics takes place. Still others combine these two levels of analysis—human
nature and the environment or structure of international politics—to account for the state of
war.
The sovereign state has been the principal actor in international politics. This is often referred
to as the state-centric assumption of realism. Statism is the term given to the idea of the state
as the legitimate representative of the collective will of the people.
The legitimacy of the state is what enables it to exercise authority within its domestic borders.
Yet outside the boundaries of the state, realists argue that a condition of anarchy exists.
Anarchy means that international politics takes place in an arena that has no overarching
central authority above individual sovereign states. Thus, rather than necessarily denoting
chaos and lawlessness, realists use the concept of anarchy to emphasize the point that the
international realm is distinguished by its lack of a central authority.
KEY POINTS
• Realism has significantly influenced both the theory and practice of world politics.
• Outside the academy, realism has a much longer history in the work of classical political
theorists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau.
• The unifying theme around which all realist thinking converges is that states find
themselves in the condition of anarchy such that their security cannot be taken for granted.
• Statism, survival, and self-help are three core elements of the realist tradition

NEO-REALIST THEORY (STRUCTURAL REALISM)

In 1979, the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics established
structural realism, or neorealism, as a dominant theory of world politics.
Writing in the context of the cold war, Waltz concurred that international politics is a struggle
for power, but he did not attribute this to human nature. Instead, Waltz argued that security
competition, inter-state conflict, and the difficulties of achieving international cooperation
resulted from the structure of the international system: namely, the lack of an overarching
authority above sovereign states.
Neorealists define the structure of the international system in terms of three elements:
organizing principles, differentiation of units, and distribution of capabilities. Waltz identifies
two different organizing principles: anarchy, which corresponds to the decentralized realm of
international politics; and hierarchy, which is the basis of domestic order.
He argues that the units of the international system are functionally similar sovereign states;
hence unit-level variation, such as whether a state is a democracy or not, is inconsequential.
He argues that the units of the international system are functionally similar sovereign states;
hence unit-level variation, such as whether a state is a democracy or not, is inconsequential.
According to structural realists, the relative distribution of power in the international system
is the key independent variable in understanding war and peace, alliance politics, and the
balance of power. Structural realists are interested in providing a rank ordering of states so
that they can discern the number of great powers that exist at any particular point in time. The
number of great powers, in turn, determines the overall structure of the international system.
For example, during the cold war from 1945 to 1989, there were two great powers—the
United States and the Soviet Union—that constituted a bipolar international system, and since
the end of the cold war most argue that the international system has been unipolar.
States, especially the great powers, have to be concerned about the capabilities of other states.
The possibility that any state may use force to advance its interests causes all states to worry
about their survival.
According to Waltz, power is a means to an end, the end being security. In a significant
passage, Waltz writes: ‘because power is a possibly useful means, sensible statesmen try to
have an appropriate amount of it’. He adds, ‘in crucial situations, however, the ultimate
concern of states is not for power but for security’.
In other words, rather than being power maximizers, states are security maximizers according
to neorealists. Waltz argues that power maximization often proves to be counter-productive
because it triggers a counterbalancing coalition of states. Like Morgenthau, Waltz firmly
believed that balances of power recurrently form.
KEY POINTS
 Structural realism divides into two camps: those who argue that states are security
maximizers (neorealism), and those who argue that states are power maximizers
(offensive realism).
• Neoclassical realists bring individual and unit variation back into the theory.

NEO-LIBERALIST THEORY

FEMINSIM
A simple definition of feminism means the study of and movement for women not as objects
but as subjects of knowledge. Until the 1980s, and despite the inroads of feminism in other
social sciences, the role of gender (i.e. the relationship between sex and power) in the theory
and practice of international relations was generally ignored. Today, this is no longer the case
as a number of feminist thinkers have turned their critical sights on a field that has
traditionally been gender-blind. Over the last decade, feminism has emerged as a key critical
perspective within the study of international relations. The initial impetus of this critique was
to challenge the fundamental biases of the discipline and to highlight the ways in which
women were excluded from analyses of the state, international political economy, and
international security. One can now distinguish between at least two main types of feminism
in the study of international relations. The first wave of feminist scholarship in the 1980s is
now called feminist empiricism, in which international relations scholars have sought to
reclaim women’s hidden voices and to expose the multiplicity of roles that women play in
sustaining global economic forces and state interactions. For example, women’s participation
and involvement facilitate tourism, colonialism, and economically powerful states’
domination of weak states. The maintenance of the international political economy depends
upon stable political and military relations among states. In turn, the creation of stable
diplomatic and military communities has often been the responsibility of women (as wives,
girlfriends, and prostitutes). Feminist empiricism exposes the role of women and
demonstrates their importance in a wide variety of arenas. In case one might think that the
role of women is marginal to the real business of the international economy, it should be
noted that Philippine women working abroad as domestic servants annually contribute more
to the Philippine economy than do the national sugar and mining industries.
A second focus of feminist research has been directed at deconstructing major discipline-
defining texts and uncovering gender biases in the paradigmatic debates that have dominated
the field since its inception in 1919. Sometimes referred to as standpoint feminism, this type
of feminist scholarship argues for the construction of knowledge based on the material
conditions of women’s experiences, which give us a more complete picture of the world since
those who are oppressed and discriminated against often have a better understanding of the
sources of their oppression than their oppressors. Whilst feminist empiricism exposes the role
of women in international relations, standpoint feminism alerts us to the ways in which the
conventional study of international relations is itself gendered. Despite the rise of feminism in
the field, there remains a major imbalance between male and female academics in
international relations, and many feminists attack the ways in which men’s experiences are
projected as if they represent some universal standpoint. According to standpoint feminists,
the major Western intellectual traditions of realist and liberal thought have drawn from
culturally defined notions of masculinity, emphasising the value of autonomy, independence,
and power. Those traditions have formulated assumptions about interstate behaviour,
security, progress, and economic growth in ways that allegedly perpetuate the marginalisation
and invisibility of women. Feminism is a rich, complicated, and often contradictory body of
research in the study of international relations at the end of the twentieth century. In a broad
sense, feminism is an umbrella term. It embraces a wide range of critical theory aimed at
examining the role of gender in international relations. However, there is liberal feminism,
radical feminism, Marxist feminism, post-Marxist or socialist feminism, postmodernist
feminism, and the list continues. Given the commitment by all feminists to some kind of ethic
based on equality between men and women, their work is sometimes equated with idealism,
and they have themselves been criticised for ignoring men in their zeal to promote the
emancipation of women. It remains to be seen how feminist scholarship evolves to include a
broader agenda of questions about gender in international relations theory and practice.
SOCIAL-CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY
Even more than the other approaches, Constructivism is not an it but a they, and so even
more than previously I will have to overgeneralize. I will also put aside approaches that are
non-positivist in the sense of denying that evidence or events could falsify their views. We
live in a world constructed by men – and for many constructivists, it matters a great deal that
it has been males rather than females (whose roles are developed socially rather than being
given by biology) who have had most power. Drawing on sociology, seeing beliefs and
theories as creating our social world rather than, or at least in addition to, reflecting it, and
focusing on the importance of the way people and collectivities think of themselves, this
approach was synthesized by Hedley Bull, formulated in a particularly abstract and
challenging way by Richard Ashley, and developed in a form that received increasing
American attention by Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein.19 International politics is not
created by the imperatives of the international system or the objective economic interests
within a country, but is socially constructed through the subjective understandings that are
developed and shared through the interactions. Agents and structures do not exist
independently, but form, reproduce, and change each other. Central to these processes are the
ideas that permeate society. Contrary to orthodox Marxism and the cynical Realist view of
the world, these ideas are not mere superstructure or rationalization for material interests, but
are the basis on which individuals and states see their interests. I just noted the crucial role of
the rejection of mercantilism in favor of what now seems to be the self-evident truth that
trade can be mutually advantageous. Absent this shift, it is hard to imagine significant and
lasting cooperation among states. In the late nineteenth century, world politics was also
transformed by the salience of the notion that colonialism was morally appropriate,
economically advantageous, and a part of what it meant to be a great power. The equally
powerful wave of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s similarly did not merely reflect self-
evident material interests. World War II and the Cold War were, to a large extent, rooted in
competing ideologies; Realist notions of the national interest or Liberal conceptions of the
contest between domestic interests do not take us very far here. Also striking is the fact that
in the post-Cold War era almost all countries proclaim their dedication to democracy and
human rights.
Ideas about international politics are part of it, not observations from the outside. Realism has
been at least in part a self-fulfilling prophecy. States behave according to Realist precepts
because that is what their leaders have been taught is the way to behave. For Constructivists,
Realist theory is at least part of the cause of conflict and the inability of countries to solve
common problems. Two objections should be noted, however. First, the relationships
between ideas and material interests can be reciprocal and complex. It is impossible to
summarize the literature here, but I will just note that while the relevant chapter of Wendt’s
book makes a very strong claim with its title “Ideas all the Way Down,” the analysis of
changes over time points toward material factors. Second, the Constructivist claim that
Realist thinking has led to Realist behavior sits uneasily alongside the claim that Realism
cannot account for much of world politics. Leaders, foreign policy professionals, and
members of the interested public learn how the country should behave from formal
instruction (although anyone who grades undergraduate papers may doubt how effective this
mechanism is), reading the newspaper and related media, and hearing stories about current
and past events. To take only the most obvious example, almost everyone in the United States
knows the “lessons of Munich,” and while the “lessons of Vietnam” are more contested, they
have left a powerful imprint. This kind of socialization is vertical, as ideas and
understandings are passed on from one generation to the next. Horizontal socialization occurs
through the interaction of leaders and countries, as most states conform to the modes of
thinking and behavior employed by their peers. Emulation, conscious and unconscious, is
common; being out of synch with others can be dangerous. Like individuals, states not only
adopt the habits of some others and seek to join desired ingroups, they simultaneously seek to
differentiate themselves from those with low status or who they see as different from
themselves. Linked to the processes of socialization is the centrality of identity. National
leaders and their countries think of themselves in certain ways that mold their outlooks on the
world and how they behave. The United States sees itself as devoted to universal values and
willing to make sacrifices for the greater good. Cynics see this as a mere cover for the
expansion of American power, but Realists point to the myriad instances, Iraq being only the
latest, in which this behavior generates great costs and few benefits. Identities are also linked
to discourses that constitute and embody how issues and practices are framed, conceived, and
articulated. Thus, a great deal of subsequent American policy followed from seeing and
explaining the attacks of September 11, 2001, as an act of war, not a crime, and the
appropriate response as a “War on Terror.” Discourses, identities, and many ideas sustained
through socialization become so deeply ingrained that they escape awareness. This will be
familiar to many historians, who will immediately think of James Joll’s argument about the
role of unspoken assumptions in bringing about World War I.20 For Constructivists, a central
modern example would be the concept of sovereignty, upon which so much of international
politics rests. But Stephen Krasner has shown that sovereignty has actually been quite
flexible and that very little about it has been taken for granted.21 Self-consciousness and
manipulation may then play a greater role than Constructivists envision. Related, the stress on
socialization entails a troublesome tension. On the one hand, this leads to the expectation that
patterns will continue, and for Constructivists it is socialization rather than the anarchic
nature of the system or the internal distribution of interests within the state that produces
continuity. On the other hand, however, Constructivists stress the possibilities for change and
alternative modes of behavior and interaction. If resocialization is fairly easy, however, then
socialization must not be terribly powerful.22 The ideas important to international politics are
normative as well as instrumental. Realists deny the role of conceptions of right and wrong in
the international arena; Liberals generally ignore it. For Constructivists, by contrast,
normative ideas do not stop at the water’s edge. The broad trends of international politics
cannot be understood without the moral imperatives felt by individuals and leaders. Can we
explain the end of the slave trade and then of slavery otherwise? Colonialism could hardly
have taken place had most of European society not believed that it was a moral duty to
civilize the rest of the world, and decolonization was similarly produced by more than a cost–
benefit analysis. Indeed, the frequent Realist injunctions to statesmen to put aside
considerations of morality and what would be best for the world as a whole make sense only
if moral impulses are strong.

UNIT – III
CONCEPT OF POWER
Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects on actors that shape their
capacity to control their fate. This concept has two dimensions at its core:
(1) the kinds of social relations through which actors' capacities are affected (and effected);
and,
(2) the specificity of those social relations.
Conventionally for social theorists, social relations can be viewed as being broadly of two
kinds: relations of interaction among previously constituted social actors; or relations of
constitution of actors as particular kinds of social beings. For the second dimension, the
crucial distinction is whether the social relations of interaction or constitution through which
power works are direct and specific, or indirect and socially diffuse. Below we explore each
dimension, then show how the polar positions within each dimension combine to generate our
taxonomy of power.

National power
National Power is a key component of International Politics. Basically, International Politics
is the process of struggle for power among Nations in which each nation seeks to secure its
desired goals and objectives of National interests. Because of the absence of sovereign or of a
fully powerful centralized international machinery making authoritative allocation of values
among the nations and because of the sovereign status of each nation-state, the securing of
national interest by each state is always done by the use of its national power. National power
is the capacity or ability of a nation with the use of which it can get it will be obeyed by other
nation. It involves the capacity to use force or threat of the use of force over other nations.
With the use of National Power, a nation is able to control the behaviour of other nations in
accordance with one’s own will.

ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Noted authors of international relations have clarified these elements differently. Morgenthau
has divided them into two categories permanent and changeable. Relatively stable elements
are geography and natural resources whereas elements subject to constant change are military
preparedness, population, national character and morale, diplomacy and government.
Organski classified them into natural and social determinants. The natural determinants are
geography, natural resources and population social determinants are economic development,
political structure and national morale. Carr gave three categories: military power, economic
power and power over opinion. Mahendra Kumar broadly divided them into three categories:
natural, social and ideational. First covers the elements of geography, resources and
population, while the second includes economic development, political structure and national
morale. The third category consists of ideals, intelligence and wisdom of leadership. Palmer
and Perkins divided them into tangible and intangible. Geography, raw material, natural
resources and population are tangible whereas morale and ideology are intangible. There are
several elements and factors which constitute national power. Wealth, resources, manpower,
army etc. are the components, which determine the power of a nation. The important
elements are:
1. GEOGRAPHY: Geography is a most important element of National Power. Geo-
politicians give most importance to this component. All other elements develop from the
geography only. (I) Extent: The power of a nation depends upon its size. A small nation
cannot become powerful. It may be recognized as a member of the United Nations, but it
could not possess all the essential requisites of national power. Contrary to it, a large nation
can have large extent of land, population, natural resources and thus can become more
powerful. Example: U.S.A, the U.S.S.R, India. (ii) Climate: The development of the nation
depends upon its climate. The State situated in North developed industrially due to their
temperate climate. North enjoys a permanent natural advantage and thus it developed
industrially and economically. The States of South are located in the tropical and subtropical
zone, which adversely effects on agricultural development, industrialization, trade and
transport and efficiency etc. (iii) Topography: Topography plays an important role in
determination of a nation’s power. The USA has vast coastal area, rivers which help cheap
and efficient water transport, good ports and harbor etc. Great Britain, France, Spain, India,
China etc. also have vast coastal areas. Himalayas in the North to India serve as barrier to it
from the aggression. Laciness of sea-shores and possessing hill-areas could not help
Afghanistan, Nepal etc. in developing.
2. POPULATION: It is also an important and essential element to national power. Large
populated states could possess strong army. It can utilize the natural resources fully. Small
states could not utilize their natural resources, or could not possess armed strength. Example:
Kuwait, Bhutan, etc. At the same time, the largest population can also become hindrance to
the development of a country. Example: - India, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan etc. The largest
population is not only important but it should be equipped with literacy, morals and
dedication to nation etc. There must be a good quality among the population, viz., it must
possess greater technical capacity, ability to exercise more effective control over the forces of
nature and contribute to the growth of national power. The Gulf countries suffer with lesser
populations and they require foreigners to bring their natural resources viz, Petrol, Gas etc.
3. NATURAL RESOURCES: Petrol, Gas, Minerals, Water, Fertility of Soil etc., are the
natural resources. The Gulf countries, the USA have abundant reserves of Petrol and Gas.
Therefore, they could earn ore. Great Britain has enormous reserves of coal, that is why it has
become an industrially developed state. The USA has vast agricultural land, having good
climate, that is why it is in a position to produce more food grains and is in a position to
export. However, the natural resources do not by themselves create power. They have to be
exploited with the help of capital, technical know-how and skilled labour. The countries
should enjoy self-sufficiency in food grains. India has vast natural resources, viz vast area of
fertile lands, waters in the rivers. But the water of rivers is flowing into the seas westly. India
has no sufficient petroleum, natural gas, due to which it has to incur major portion of its
foreign exchange towards them. Thus, the natural resources contribute to the national power.
4. TECHNOLOGY: Technology means the application of science and newer methods of
production. It has three dimensions (i) industrial technology (ii) communicational technology
and (iii) military technology. Industrial technology strengthens the State with economic
surplus and stability. It eradicates unemployment. Communicational Technology increases
the business and vast and speed development. Military technology defends the nation from
aggression. Great Britain could establish its empire three-fourths of the world by its military
technology in 18th century and could rule it for three centuries. Even now, the USA ranks the
Big Power (now mono-polar power) by its military technology. During the Second World
War, Japan, Italy and Germany were defeated only due to their backwardness in military
technology comparing with the USA and its alliances. North States are dominating South
States by their technology only North States developed industrially and most advanced due to
possessing high quality of technology.
5. NATIONAL CHARACTER AND MORALE: These are intangible factors. Quantity of
the people is not sufficient to make a nation powerful. They must possess good national
character and morale in peace or in war. National morale is the degree of determination with
which a nation supports the home and foreign policies of its government in times of peace or
war. It permeates all activities of a nation, its agricultural and industrial production as well as
its military establishment and diplomatic service. The people of nation must love their mother
land and devote for the integration of it. They must be prepared to sacrifice. There should not
be any internal struggles, regional conflicts and discriminations in a nation. The people of
every nation sacrifice their personal interests to the nation’s welfare during war times. All
stand on the foot, irrespective of their caste, religion, region, language, race, sex, etc.
6. MILITARY: Military is one of the essential elements of national power. Military
preparedness is the most apparent and tangible factors capable of supporting the foreign
policy and promoting national interest. This factor has been recognized as the most important
of a nation since the time immemorial. It is apparent and tangible factor. There must be good
quantity and quality of military. The technological innovation, leadership and quantity and
quality of armed forces are vital factors essential elements in the military preparedness of a
State. Military technology pioneer’s national integrity and defense. The State which is weak
in military can easily be subdued by other State. Examples: - India was defeated by China in
1962. India defeated Pakistan three times and in 1971 it caused the division of Pakistan into
two countries. Great Britain subdued three-fourths of the world in 18th century. In the First
World War, Germany gained superiority over British because of the use of submarines. In the
Second World War, America gained superiority over Japan and Germany because of the use
of nuclear power. A small state cannot be well equipped with sufficient military. Example: -
Kuwait.
7. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: The technology of modern warfare and
communications has made the overall development of heavy industries an indispensable
element of national power. The quality and productive capacity of the industrial plant, the
know-how of the working man, the skill of the engineer, the inventive genius of the scientist,
the managerial organization…. all these are the factors upon which the economic
development of a nation and hence it power depend. America, Soviet Russia, Great Britain,
Japan, Taiwan etc. got economic development abundantly. Japan was defeated in Second
World War, but its retaliated America by developing itself in economy and got it ’sweet
revenge’. Japan could only give an appropriate challenge to American economy. Having
population, natural resources, geography etc. are not sufficient for the economic
development. There must be good industrial policy and dedication of the people. India, Brazil
etc. have sufficient human resources, natural resources but could not develop economically,
due to their worst policies. The country must have surplus production if it wants to become
economically developed. To achieve this target, the entire nation should struggle with
devoted mind and good policies.
8. POLITICAL STRUCTURE: Having human resources, natural resources etc. are not
sufficient to build a strong nation. There must be a proper political structure, whether it is
democratic, autocratic or communist, which should coordinate all the essential elements of
national power. Whatever the form may be, the government should get the majority people’s
support in formulating its policies nationality and internationality. The government is
answerable for its failure or success in economy, industry, military, foreign policy etc. the
government should seek its popular support through propaganda, through political parties and
through bureaucracy. Again, the working of bureaucracy reflects in the working of
government. Bad bureaucracy causes the decrease of the prestige of government. Thus,
national power is also decreased by it. There must be a good political structure commanding
over bureaucracy. There should be no briberies, scandals in the working of political structure.
9. IDEOLOGICAL ELEMENT: Ideas and ideology are important elements of national
power. Ideology is a body of ideas concerning economic, social and political values and goals
which pose action programmed for attaining these goals. Ideology is modern concept.
Socialism, Communism. Nazism, Democracy, Liberalism, Nationalism etc. are various
concepts of ideology. Different states follow different ideology. Among all these ideologies,
democracy stands first. To-day majority of nations follow democracy ideology. Communism
spreader in Soviet Russia, Cuba North Korea, China etc. At present it is declining. Now there
is no communism I Russia and its sister nations. The ideology gives unity to nation and a
sense of common interest to people. It helps to raise the morale of the people. It tries to solve
the problems of the nation. The foreign policy of a nation is guided by the ideology of nation.
10. ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP: Palmer and Perkins observed: “Without
leadership people cannot even constitute a state; without it there can be no well-developed or
integrated technology and without its morale is totally useless, if indeed it can exist at all.”
Each State develops and formulates its national and international policies under the
leadership of an eminent leader. The leadership must be possessed of both the qualities of the
‘wisdom’ and the ‘knowledge’. The leader inspires the entire nation. Example: - Mahatma
Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru etc. of India; Nelson Mandela of South Africa; Hitler of Germany;
Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, Kennedy etc. of America; Mao of China;
Stalin, Brezhnev etc. of Soviet Russia etc. Like this History shows numerous examples to
show that the leaders succeeded in rousing their people as one man to give a concerted fight
and brought laurels to their country.

LIMITATIONS OF NATIONAL POWER:

The humankind fully realizes the dangers of an unregulated use of national power by each
state. The states now themselves realize their increased international interdependence and the
need for exercising restraint in the use of power. In this nuclear age, the danger resulting from
an unlimited use of power involves the possibility of a total destruction of the humankind by
a nuclear war. The new need for sustainable all-round development has again compelled all
nations to accept the need for controlling and regulating the use of power by all states in the
interest of preventing war and anarchy in the international relations. This objective is sought
to be realized with the help of several devices which act as limitations on national power.
1. BALANCE OF POWER: Balance of Power is a device of both power management and
limitation of power. Its underlying principle is that the power of several equally powerful
actors can be a source of limitation on their powers. The major actors should maintain a sort
of balance in their power positions. No state should try to become unduly powerful as can
endanger the balance. If a state becomes or tries to become unduly powerful, another state or
states should collectively pool their powers and create a preponderance of power against the
offending state. Through use of force or coercion or other devices, these states should act to
reduce the power of the threatening state and restore the balance. No state should be
eliminated completely but the power of the state should be kept under control in the name of
‘balance’. Balance of power places restraints upon the states by preventing all attempts at an
unjustified increase of power on the part of any member of the balance of power system.
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW: International Law is the body of rules that the nation-states
accept as binding upon them, and which regulates their behaviour in international relations. It
is an important limitation on the power of a nation. It directs and controls the behaviour of the
nations engaged in international relations. International law constitutes a legal framework for
the orderly conduct of international relations both in times of peace and war. Backed by
common consent, natural law, international morality, world public opinion and its utility,
International law acts as a major limitation on the misuse of power by the states. It enunciates
the do’s and don’ts for the states. It declares war as an illegal means for the promotion of
interests. It lays down rules for the establishment and conduct of diplomatic relations.
Violations of International Law can invoke sanctions against the violating states.
3. INTERNATIONAL MORALITY: Just as human behaviour in a society is regulated by a
set of moral norms or rules, likewise behaviour of states in the international environment is
limited by International Morality. International community accepts certain values peace,
order, equality, goodness, mutual help, respect for life and liberty of all, and respect for
Human Rights of all, as right and good values which must be accepted and followed by all
states. International Morality is “a generally accepted moral code of conduct which nations
usually follow in international relations”. It acts as a limitation on the national power of each
state. It has played a role in strengthening human consciousness against war i.e. against
misuse of national power.
4. WORLD PUBLIC OPINION: The democratization of foreign policy and the coming of
communications and IT revolutions have together made possible the rise of organized and
strong World Public Opinion in contemporary international relations. It has emerged as an
important factor of international relations. The presence of strong global peace movements,
strong movements in favour of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament, a very strong and
healthy global movement for the preservation of Earth’s ecological balance, the environment
protection movements, Human Rights protection movements and several other such
movements clearly show the presence of a strong World Public Opinion.
5. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS: Since 1919, the world has been living with a
world organisation, except for the years of the Second World War. Since 1945, the United
Nations has been functioning as a global organisation of all the members of the international
community. Its Charter specifies certain aims and objectives which its members are
committed to follow. It specifies certain means for pacific settlement of disputes among the
member states. It provides for collective security of peace in times of war and aggression.
The United Nations constitutes a global platform for the conduct of international relations in
a peaceful and orderly manner. Nations are bound by the UN Charter and they are expected
to use their powers only in accordance with the dictates of the UN Charter. However, the
continued love and respect for sovereignty and nationalism continues to keep the role of
international organisation and nonstate actors limited.
6. COLLECTIVE SECURITY: It is a device of power-management which also acts as a
limitation on national power. The system of Collective Security is based on the principle that
international peace and security is the common objective to be secured by all the states
through collective action against any violation by any state or states. It is a device of power
management and its purpose is to maintain international peace and security by the collective
efforts of all the states. As such, the power of a state which violates or seeks to violate the
freedom, sovereignty or territorial integrity of any other state is limited by the fear that any
aggression or any such act committed by it will be met by the collective power of all other
states. In this way collective security is considered to be a deterrent against war and
aggression i.e. against the misuse of power by any state.
7. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL: Since military power is a formidable
dimension of national power and armaments form a formidable part of military power, Arms
Control and Disarmament are regarded as devices of limiting the national power. Both Arms
Control and Disarmament are based on the belief that by eliminating or reducing the
possession and production of weapons, the military power of a nation i.e. the national power
of the state can be limited. Any success towards Arms Control and Disarmament can be a
source of limitation upon the national power of the states. The decision to adopt arms control
and limited disarmament due to internal economic necessities has decidedly limited the role
of power in contemporary international relations.

UNIT – IV (NOTES)
UNIT – V
SHRIA NOTES 1,4,5 APRIL. {CONFLICT AND ITS TYPES}
GLOBALISATION OF WORLD POLITICS PG 60-64 {POST WORLD WAR}

UNIT VI
NATIONAL INTEREST
The concept of National Interest is usually used in two related ways. On the one hand, the word
interest implies a need that has, by some standard of justification, attained the status of an acceptable
claim on behalf of the state. On the other hand, the national interest is also used to describe and
support particular policies. The problem is how to determine the criteria that can establish a
correspondence between the national interest expressed as a principle and the sorts of policies by
which it is advanced. In formal terms, one can identify two attributes of such policies. The first is one
of inclusiveness, according to which the policies should concern the country as a whole, or at least a
sufficiently substantial subset of its membership to transcend the specific interests of particular
groups. In contrast, the second attribute is one of exclusiveness. The national interest does not
necessarily include the interests of groups outside the state, although it may do so. Given these
attributes, what criteria link the concept to specific policies? Those who tackle this question do so in
one of three ways. First, one may simply equate the national interest with the policies of those
officially responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. The national interest is what decision-makers
at the highest levels of government say it is. They are the best judges of various policy trade-offs,
therefore the national interest is something to be dispassionately defined and defended by those who
possess the appropriate expertise and authority to speak for the whole country. The difficulty with this
elitist approach is that it does not help in distinguishing a good foreign policy from a bad one. For
according to this argument, as long as the government pursues what it deems to be general societal
objectives and does so for long enough, it can never act contrary to the national interest. A second
approach, closely identified with the realist school of thought, conceives of the national interest in
terms of some basic assumptions about the nature of international relations and the motivations of
states. These include the idea that anarchy makes security the paramount foreign policy concern of
states. Security, in turn, requires the acquisition and rational management of power (which can never
be wholly divorced from military force), and only policies conducted in this spirit can serve the
national interest. Of course, this approach depends on the truth of the underlying assumptions. At the
risk of oversimplifying a very complex debate, there are at least two problems with this approach.
First, it often suffers from the resort to tautology in that interest is often defined in terms of power,
and power in terms of interest. It is not very helpful to say that nations must seek power because they
seek power! Second, there is an important tension between free will and determinism in the realist
approach. For if international relations are indeed determined by a struggle for power, it should not be
necessary to exhort leaders to abide by the national interest as defined by realists. If it is necessary to
do so, the alleged constraints of anarchy cannot be invoked as the basis for identifying the national
interest. In complete contrast, a third approach to the national interest suggests that the rules for its
identification are given by tenets of the political process that have an independent normative value –
those of democratic procedure. In other words, the national interest can best be identified when it
resolves itself into a verifiable expression of the nation’s preferences. On the assumption that a
nation’s interests cannot be more accurately expressed by some external observer than by the
standards of the nation itself, this approach undermines both elitist and realist views. In the absence of
democratically aggregated and expressed judgements on the matter, the link between foreign policy
and the national interest cannot be known. This does not mean that nondemocratic countries lack a
national interest – merely that we cannot know what it is if it is not defined by democratic procedures.

SHRIA NOTES 23/03/22 29/03/22 30/03/22

UNIT – VII
ALLIANCES
The historically most important manifestation of the balance of power, how- ever, is to be
found not in the equilibrium of two isolated nations but in the
relations between one nation or alliance of nations and another alliance.

The General Nature of Alliances

Alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state
system. Nations A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain
and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add
to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other
nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice, they embark upon an
armaments race. When they choose the second and third alternatives, they pursu
a policy of alliances. Whether or not a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances is, then,
a matter not of principle but of expediency. A nation will shun alliances if it believes that it is
strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of the commitments resulting from
the alliance is likely to outweigh Une ad-vantages to be expected. It is for one or the other or
both of these reasons that, throughout the better part of their history, Great Britain and the
United States have refrained from entering into peacetime alliances with other nations. Yet
Great Britain and the United States have also refrained from concluding an alliance with each
other even though, from the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to the attack on
Pearl Harbor in 1941, they have acted, at least in relation to the other European nations, as if
they were allied. Their relationship during that period provides another instance of a situation
in which nations dispense with an alliance. It occurs when their interests so obviously call for
concerted policies and actions that an explicit formulation of these interests, policies, and
actions in the form of a treaty of alliance appears to be redundant.
With regard to the continent of Europe, the United States and Great Britain have had one
interest in common: the preservation of the European balance of power. In consequence of
this identity of interests, they have found themselves by virtual necessity in the camp opposed
to a nation which happened to threaten that balance. And when Great Britain went to war in
1914 and 1939 in order to protect the European balance of power, the United
States first supported Great Britain with a conspicuous lack of that impartiality befitting a
neutral and then joined her on the battlefield. Had in 1914 and 1939 the United States been
tied to Great Britain by a formal treaty of alliance, it might have declared war earlier, but its
general policies and concrete actions would not have been materially different than they
actually were. Not every community of interests, calling for common policies and actions,
also calls for legal codification in an explicit alliance. Yet, on the other hand, an alliance
requires of necessity a community of interests for its foundation.3 Under what conditions,
then, does an existing community of interests require the explicit formulation of an alliance?
What is it that an alliance adds to the existing community of interests?
An alliance adds precision, especially in the form of limitation, to an existing community of
interests and to the general policies and concrete measures serving them.'
" The interests nations have in common are not typically so precise and limited as to
geographic region, objective, and appropriate policies as has been the American and British
interest in the preservation of the European balance of power. Nor are they so incapable of
precision and limitation as concerns the prospective common enemy. For, while a typical
alliance is directed against a specific nation or group of nations, the enemy of the Anglo-
American community of interests could in the nature of things not be specified beforehand,
since whoever threatens the European balance of power is the enemy. As Jefferson shifted his
sympathies back and forth between Napoleon and Great Britain according to who seemed to
threaten the balance of power at the time, so during the century following the Napoleonic
Wars, Great Britain and the United States had to decide in the light of circumstances ever
liable to change who posed at the moment the greatest threat to the balance of power. This
blanket character of the enemy, determined not individually but by the function he performs,
brings to mind a similar characteristic of collective security, which is directed against the
abstractly designed aggressor, whoever he may be. The typical interests which unite two-
nations against a third are both more definite as concerns the determination of the enemy and
less precise as concerns the objectives to be sought and the policies to be pursued. In the last
decades of the nineteenth century, France was opposed to Germany, and Russia was opposed
to Austria, while Austria was allied with Germany against France and Russia. How could the
interests of France and Russia be brought upon a common denominator, determining policy
and guiding action? How
could, in other words, the casus foederis be defined so that both friend and foe would know
what to expect in certain contingencies affecting their respective interest? It was for the treaty
of alliance of 1894 to perform these functions. Had the objectives and policies of the Franco-
Russian alliance of 1894 been as clear as were the objectives and policies of Anglo-American
cooperation in Europe, no alliance treaty would have been necessary. Had the enemy been as
indeterminate, no alliance treaty would have been feasible. Not every community of interests
calling for co-operation between two or more nations, then, requires that the terms of this co-
operation be specifed through the legal stipulations of a treaty of alliance. It is only when the
common interests are inchoate in terms of policy and action that a treaty of alliance is
required to make them explicit and operative. These interests, as well as the alliances
expressing them and the policies serving them, can be
distinguished in five different ways according to: their intrinsic nature and relationship, the
distribution of benefits and power, their coverage in relation to the total interests of the
nations concerned, their coverage in terms of time, and their effectiveness in terms of
common policies and actions. In consequence, we can distinguish alliances serving identical,
complementary, and ideological interests and policies. We can further distinguish mutual and
one-sided, general and limited, temporary and permanent, operative and inoper-
ative alliances.
The Anglo-American alliance with regard to Europe provides the classic example of an
alliance serving identical interests; the objective of one partner--the preservation of the
balance of power in Europe--is also the objective of the other. The alliance between the
United States and Pakistan is one of many contemporary instances of an alliance serving
complementary interests. For the United States it serves the primary purpose of expanding the
scope of the policy of containment; for Pakistan it serves primarily the purpose of increasing
her political, military, and economic potential vis-à-vis her neighbors.
The pure type of an ideological alliance is presented by the Treaty of the Holy Alliance of
1815 and the Atlantic Charter of 1941. Both documents laid down general moral principles to
which the signatories pledged their adherence, and general objectives whose realization they
pledged themselves to seek. The Treaty of the Arab League of 1945 provides a contemporary
example of an alliance, expressing, since the war against Israel of 1948, primarily ideological
solidarity.
Much more typical is the addition of ideological commitments to material ones in one and the
same treaty of alliance. Thus the Three Emperors League of 1873 provided for military
assistance among Austria, Germany, and Russia in case of attack on any of them and, at the
same time, emphasized the solidarity of the three monarchies against republican subversion.
In our times, the ideological commitment against Communist subversion, inserted in treaties
of alliance, performs a similar function. The ideological factor also
manifests itself in the official interpretation of an alliance, based upon material interests, in
terms of an ideological solidarity transcending the limitations of material interests. The
conception of the Anglo-American alliance, common before the British invasion of Egypt in
1958, as all-inclusive and world-embracing, based upon common culture, political
institutions, and ideals, is a case in point.
As concerns the political effect of this ideological factor upon an alliance, three possibilities
must be distinguished. A purely ideological alliance, unrelated to material interests, cannot
but be stillborn; it is unable to determine policies or guide actions and misleads by presenting
the appearance of political solidarity where there is none. The ideological factor, when it is
superimposed upon an actual communiy of interests, can lend strength to the alliance by
marshaling moral convictions and emotional preferences to its support. It can also weaken it
by obscuring the nature and limits of the common interests which the alliance was supposed
to make precise and by raising expectations, bound to be disappointed, for the extent of
concerted policies and actions. For both these possibilities, the Anglo-American alliance can
again serve as an example. The distribution of benefits within an alliance should ideally be
one of complete mutuality; here the services performed by the parties for each other are
commensurate with the benefts received. This ideal is more likely to be approximated in an
alliance concluded among equals in power and serving
identical interests; here the equal resources of all, responding to equal incentives, serve one
single interest. The other extreme in the distribution of benefits is one-sidedness, a societas
leonia in which one party receives the lion's share of benefits while the other bears the main
bulk of burdens. In so far as the object of such an alliance is the preservation of the territorial
and political integrity of the receiving party, such an alliance is indistinguishable from a
treaty of guarantee. Complementry interests lend themselves most easily to this kind of
disproportion, since they are by definition different in substance and their comparative
assessment is likely to be distorted by subjective interpretation. A marked superiority in
power is bound to add weight to such interpretations. The distribution of benefits is thus
likely to reflect the distribution of power within an alliance, as is the determination of
policies. A great power has a good chance to have its way with a weak ally as concerns
benefits and policies, and it is for this reason that Machiavelli warned weak nations against
making alliances with strong ones except by necessity.° The relationship between the United
States and South Korea exemplifies this situation. However, this correlation between benefits,
policies, and power is by no means inevitable. A weak nation may well possess an asset
which is of such great value for its strong ally as to be irreplaceable. Here the unique benefit
the former is able to grant or withhold may give it within the alliance a status completely out
of keeping with the actual distribution of material power. In recent history, the relationships
between the United States and Spain with regard to bases and between the United States and
Saudi Arabia with regard to oil come to mind.
The misinterpretation of the Anglo-American alliance, mentioned before, also illustrates the
confusion between limited and general alliances. In the age of total war, wartime alliances
tend to be general in that they comprise the total interests of the contracting parties both with
regard to the waging of the war and the peace settlement. On the other hand, peacetime
alliances tend to be limited to a fraction of the total interests and objectives of the signatories.
A nation will conclude a multitude of alliances with different nations which may overlap and
contradict each other on specific points. A typical alliance attempts to transform a small
fraction of the total interests of the contracting parties into common policies and measures.
Some of these interests are irrelevant to the purposes of the alliance, others support them,
others diverge from them, and still others are incompatible with them. Thus a typical alliance
is imbedded in a dynamic field of diverse interests and
purposes. Whether and for how long it will be operative depends upon the strength of the
interests underlying it as over against the strength of the other interests of the nations
concerned. The value and the chances of an alliance, however limited in scope, must be
considered in the context of the over-all policies within which it is expected to operate.
General alliances are typically of temporary duration and most prevalent in wartime; for the
overriding common interest in winning the war and securing through the peace settlement the
interests for which the war was waged is bound to yield, once victory is won and the peace
treaties are signed, to the traditionally separate and frequently incompatible interests of the
individual nations. On the other hand, there exists a correlation between the permanency of
an alliance and the limited character of the interests it serves; for only such a specific, limited
interest is likely to last long enough to provide the foundation for a durable alliance.7 The
alliance between Great Britain and Portugal, concluded in 1703, has survived the centuries
because Portugal's interest in the protection of her ports by the British fleet and the British
interest in the control of Atlantic approaches to Portugal have endured. Yet it can be stated as
a general historical observation that while alliance treaties
have frequently assumed permanent validity by being concluded"in perpe-
tuity or for periods of ten or twenty years, they could not have been more durable than the
generally precarious and fleeting configurations of common interests which they were
intended to serve. As a rule, they have been short-lived. The dependence of alliances upon the
underlying community of interests also accounts for the distinction between operative and
inoperative alliances. For an alliance to be operative--that is, able to coordinate the general
policies and concrete measures of its members--those members must agree not
only on general objectives, but on policies and measures as well. Many alliances have
remained scraps of paper because no such agreement was forthcoming, and it was not
forthcoming because the community of interests did not extend beyond general objectives to
concrete policies and measures. The classic case of an inoperative alliance is that of the
United States and France, made inoperable by Washington's Neutrality Proclamation of 1793
after the War of the First Coalition had broken out between France and the monar-
chies of Europe. Hamilton justified that Proclamation with an argument of general
applicability: There would be no proportion between the mischiefs and perils to which the
United States would expose themselves, by embarking in the war, and the benefit which the
nature of their stipulation aims at securing to France, or that which it would be in their power
actually to render her by becoming a party,
" The Franco-Russian alliances of 1935 and 1944 and - the Anglo-Russian alliance of 1942
are other cases in point. The legal validity of a treaty of alliance and its propagandistic
invocation can easily deceive the observer about its actual operational value. The correct
assessment of this value requires examination of the concrete policies and measures which
the contracting parties have taken in implementation of the alliance. These considerations are
particularly relevant for alliances between a nuclear power (A) and a non-nuclear power (B),
directed against another nuclear power (C). Will A risk nuclear destruction at the hands of C
in order to honor the alliance with B? The extremity of the risk involved casts doubt upon the
operational quality of such an alliance. This doubt, first explicitly raised by
DeGaulle, has weakened the alliances between the United States and some of its major allies.

Alliances vs. Counteralliances

The struggle between an alliance of nations defending their independence against one
potential conqueror is the most spectacular of the configurations to which the balance of
power gives rise. The opposition of two alliances, one or both pursuing imperialistic goals
and defending the independence of their members against the imperialistic aspirations of the
other coalition, is the most frequent configuration within a balance-of-power system.
To mention only a few of the more important examples: the coalitions that fought the Thirty
Years' War under the leadership of France and Sweden, on the one hand, and of Austria, on
the other, sought to promote thevimperialistic ambitions, especially of Sweden and Austria,
and, at the same time, to keep the ambitions of the other side in check. The several treaties
settling the affairs of Europe after the Thirty Years' War tried to establish a balance of power
serving the latter end. The many coalition wars that Alled the period between the Treaty of
Utrecht of 17\3 and the first partition of Poland of 1772 all attempted to maintain the balance
that the Treaty of Utrecht had established and that the decline of Swedish power as well as
the rise of Prussian, Russian, and British strength tended to disturb. The frequent
changes in the alignments, even while war was in progress, have startled the historians and
have made the eighteenth century appear to be particularly unprincipled and devoid of moral
consideration. It was against that kind of foreign policy that Washington's Farewell Address
warned the American people. Yet the period in which that foreign policy flourished was the
golden age of the balance of power in theory as well as in practice. It was during that period
that most of the literature on the balance of power was published and
that the princes of Europe looked to the balance of power as the supreme principle to guide
their conduct in foreign affairs. As Frederick the Great
wrote: It is easy to see that the political body of Europe finds itself in a violent condition:
it has, so to speak, lost its equilibrium and is in a state where it cannot remain
for long without risking much. It is with it as it is with the human body which
subsists only through the mixture of equal quantities of acids and alkalies; when
ether of the two substances predominates, the body resents it and its health is
considerably affected. And when this substance increases still more, it can cause the total
destruction of the machine. Thus when the policy and the prudence of the princes of Europe
lose sight of the maintenance of a just balance among the dominant powers, the constitution
of the whole body politic resents it: violence is found on one side, weakness on the other; in
one, the desire to invade every- thing, in the other impossibility to prevent it; the most
powerful imposes laws, the weakest is compelled to subscribe to them; finally, everything
concurs in augmenting the disorder and the confusion; the most powerful, like an impetuous
torrent, overflows its banks, carries everything with it, and exposes this unfortunate body to
the most disastrous revolutions.
It is true that the princes allowed themselves to be guided by the balance of power in order to
further their own interests. By doing so, it was inevitable that they would change sides, desert
old alliances, and form new ones whenever it seemed to them that the balance of power had
been disturbed and that a realignment of forces was needed to restore it. In that period,
foreign policy was indeed a sport of kings, not to be taken more seriously than games and
gambles, played for strictly limited stakes, and utterly devoid of transcendent principles of
any kind. Since such was the nature of international politics, what looks in retrospect like
treachery and immorality was then little which all players recognized as binding. The balance
of power of that period was amoral rather than immoral. The technical rules of the art of
politics were its only standard. Its fexibility, which was its peculiar merit from the technical
point of view, was the result of imperviousness to moral considerations,
such as good faith and loyalty, a moral deficircy that to us seems deserving of reproach.
From the beginning of the modern state system at the turn of the fifteenth century to the end
of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, European nations were the active elements in the balance of
power. Turkey was the one notable exception. Alliances and counteralliances were formed in
order to maintain the balance or to restore it. The century from 1815 to the outbreak of the
First World War saw the gradual extension of the European balance of power into a world-
wide system. One might say that this epoch started with President Monroe's message to
Congress in 1823, stating what is known as the Monroe Doctrine. By declaring the mutual
political indpendence of Europe and the Western Hemisphere and thus dividing the world, as
it were, into two political systems, President Monroe laid the groundwork for the subsequent
transformation of the European into a world-wide balance-of-power system.
This transformation was for the frst time clearly envisaged and formulated in the speech
George Canning made as British Foreign Secretary to the house of Commons on December
12, 1826. Canning had been criticized for not having gone to war with France in order to
restore the balance of power which had been disturbed by the French invasion of Spain. In
order to disarm his critics, he formulated a new theory of the balance of power. Through the
instrumentality of British recognition of their independence, he included the newly freed
Latin-American republics as active elements in the balance. He
reasoned thus:
But were there no other means than war for restoring the balance of power?-Is the balance of
power a Axed and unalterable standard? Or is it not a standard perpetuaily varying, as
civilization advances, and as new nations spring up, and take their place among established
political communities? The balance of power 8 century and a half ago was to be adjusted
between France and Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, and England. Some years after, Russia
assumed her high station in European politics. Some years after that again, Prussia became
not only a substantive, but a preponderating monarchy.-Thus, while the balance of
power continued in principle the same, the means of adjusting it became more varied and
enlarged. They became enlarged, in proportion to the increased number of considerable
states--in proportion, I may say, to the number of weights which might be shifed into the one
or the other scale. Was there no other mode of resistance, than by a direct attack upon France-
or by a war to be undertaken on the soil of Spain? What, if the possession of Spain might be
rendered harmless in rival hands-_harmless as regarded us- _and valueless to the
possessors? Might not compensation for disparagement be obtained by means better adapted
to the present time? If France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the
consequences of that occupation-_-that we should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked another
way-_I sit materials for compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as
our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain "with
the Indles. called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old. This
development toward a worldwide balance of power operating by
means of alliances and counteralliances was consummated in the course of the First World
War, in which practically all nations of the world participated actively on one or the other
side. The very designation of that war as a "world" war points to the consummation of the
development. In contrast to the Second World War, however, the First World War had
its origins exclusively in the fear of a disturbance of the European balance of power, which
was threatened in two regions: Belgium and the Balkans. Belgium, located at the northeastern
frontier of France and guarding the eastern approaches to the English Channel, found itself a
focal point of great power competition, without being strong enough to participate actively in
that competition. That the independence of Belgium was necessary for the balance of power
in Europe was axiomatic. Its annexation by any of the great European nations would of
necessity make that nation too powerful for the security of
the others. This was recognized from the very moment when Belgium gained its
independence with the active support of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France.
These nations, assembled at a conference in London, declared on February 19, 1831, that
"They had the right, and the events imposed upon them the duty to see to it that the Belgian
provinces, after they had become independent, did not jeopardize the general security and the
European balance of power."?
In furtherance of that aim, in 1839 the five nations concerned concluded a treaty in which
they declared Belgium to be*an independent and perpetually neutral state" under the
collective guaranty of the Ave signatories. This declaration sought to prevent Belgium
forever from participating, on one or the other side, in the European balance of power. It was
the German violation of Belgium's neutrality which in 1914 crystallized the threat to the
balance of power emanating from Germany and enabled Great Britain to justify its
participation in the war on the side of France, Russia, and their allies. The concern of Austria,
Great Britain, and Russia in the preservation of the balance of power in the Balkans was
concomitant with the weakening of Turkish power in that region. The Crimean War of 1854-
56 was fought by an alliance of France, Great Britain, and Turkey against Russia for the
purpose of maintaining the balance of power in the Balkans. The alliance treaty of March 13,
1854, declared "that the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present extent, is of essential
importance to the balance of power among the states of Europe."
The subsequent rivalries and wars, especially the events that led to the Congress of Berlin of
1878 ark: the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, are all overshadowed by the fear that one of the
nations mainly interested in the Balkans might gain an increase in that region out of
proportion to the power of the other nations concerned.
In the years immediately preceding the First World War, the balance of power in the Balkans
increased in importance; for, since the Triple Alliance between Austria Germany, and Italy
seemed approximately to balance the Triple Entente between France, Russia, and Great
Britain, the power combination that gained a decisive advantage in the Balkans might easily
gain a decisive advantage in the over-all European balance of power. It was this fear that
motivated Austria in July 1914 to try to settle its accounts with Serbia once and for all, and
that induced Germany to support Austria uncondition-ally. It was the same fear that brought
Russia to the support of Serbia, and France to the support of Russia.
After the First World War, France maintained permanent alliances with Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania and, in 1835, concluded an alliance-which was,
however, not implemented-_with the Soviet Union. This policy can be understood as a kind
of preventive balance-of-power policy which anticipated Germany's comeback and attempted
to maintain the status quo of Versailles in the face of such an eventuality. On the other hand,
the formation in 1836 of an alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan, called
the Axis, was intended as a counterweight against the alliance between France and the
Eastern European nations, which would at the same time neutralize the Soviet Union. Thus
the period between the two world wars stands in fact under the sign of the balance of power
by alliances and counteralliances, although in theory the principle of the balance of power
was supposed to have been superseded by the League of Nations principle of collective
security. Yet, actually, collective security, as will be shown later in greater detail,'
" did not abolish the balance of power. Rather, it reaffirmed it in the form of a universal
alliance against any potential aggressor, the presumption being that such an alliance would
always outweigh the aggressor. Collective security differs, however, from the balance of
power in the principle of association by virtue of which the alliance is formed. Balance-of-
power alliances are formed by certain individual nations against other individual nations or
an alliance of them on the basis of what those individual nations regard as their separate
national interests. The organizing principle of collective security is the respect for the moral
and legal obligation to consider an attack by any nation upon any member of the alliance as
an attack upon all members of the alliance. Consequently, collective security is supposed to
operate automatically; that is,aggression calls the counteralliance into operation at once and,
therefore, protects peace and security with the greatest possible efficiency. Alliances within a
balance-of-power system, on the other hand, are frequently uncertain in actual operation,
since they are dependent upon political considerations of the individual nations. The
defection of Italy from the Triple Alliance in 1915 and the disintegration of the French
system of alliances between 1935 and 1939 illustrate this weakness of the balance of power.
UNIT – VII
DIPLOMACY
Introduction
Diplomacy stands accepted as the mainstay and the core process of relations among nations.
The process of establishment of relations among nations begins effectively by the
establishment of diplomatic relations among nations. A new state becomes a full and active
member of the family of nations only after it gets recognition by existing states. The
common way in which this recognition is granted is the announcement of the decision to
establish diplomatic relations. Thereafter diplomats are exchanged and relations among
nations get underway. As such diplomacy is the means through which nations begin to
develop their relations. “Diplomacy is the management of international relations by means of
negotiations; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors
and envoys the business or art of the diplomats” Harold Nicholson. “Diplomacy is the
inevitable outcome of the coexistence of separate political units (states) with any degree of
contact.” Frankel Diplomacy is a basic means
by which a nation seeks to secure the goals of its national interest. Foreign policy always
travels on the shoulders of diplomacy and gets operationalized in other states.

WHAT IS DIPLOMACY?
The term Diplomacy is used in a variety of ways. Sometimes it is described as “the art of
telling lies on behalf of the nation”, or “as instrument for employing deceit and duplicity in
international relations.” Stalin once observed: “A diplomat’s words must have no relation to
action otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Good words are a mask for concealment of
bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.” Another
statesman has also observed, “When a diplomat says yes, he means perhaps; when he says
perhaps, it means no; and when he says no, he is not a diplomat.” No doubt, diplomacy at
times attempts to cloak the real goals of national interests with several ideational principles or
morality or rules of international behaviors, yet it cannot be described as the art of deceit and
concealment. Diplomacy is, in fact, the art of negotiations and conduct of foreign relations. It
is the key instrument for implementing the foreign policy of the nation.
DEFINITIONS:

❖ Paddleford and Lincoln- Diplomacy is the process of representation and negotiation by

which states customarily deal with one another in times of peace.

❖ Sir Ernest Satow - Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of
official relations between governments of independent states.
❖ K.M. Panikar - Diplomacy is “the art of forwarding one’s interests in relation to other
countries.

❖ Harold Nicholson - Diplomacy is the management of international relations by means of

negotiations; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors
and envoys the business or art of the diplomats.

❖ Hans J. Morgenthau - Diplomacy is the promotion of the national interest by peaceful

means.
On the basis of these definitions, it can be said that, Diplomacy is the mechanism for the
promotion of national interest of the nation that it represents. It is done by means of
negotiations
and conduct of relations with other nations. Diplomacy is always guided and conditioned by
the foreign policy of the nation that it represents.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY
In ancient world, tribes made agreements with other tribes based on hunting and trade and
maintained their relationship through marriages. During primitive times, people had their
trust in women the task of negotiating peace. In middle east, Akkadian was considered as the
first diplomatic language to have come into existence which served as an international
language of the middle east. Later it was changed. Like changes in nature, traditions and law,
every century had its own sense of power, different kinds of intellectuals and moral
incentives that helped in shaping the international system based on their values. It is said that,
if the world truly needs peace, then it should consider applying or practicing American’s
moral principles of diplomacy. In the 17th century France, under Cardinal Richelieu who was
the King’s chief minister, who introduced a modern approach towards diplomacy in
international relations which was based on the nation-state principle and here, national
interest was the ultimate purpose. In 18th century Great Britain talked about the balance of
power, which continued to dominate the European Diplomacy for years to come. Later in the
19th century, Metternich’s Austria, restructured European diplomacy the superiority of power
in the coldblooded game of politics. In the 20th century, there is no other country than
America has influenced in international relations throughout the world with their unique
approach in diplomacy which was firmly decisive and its intervention in the domestic affairs
of other states, with good intentions, which
meant that their values were applied universally. India had a more sophisticated and
systemized traditional approach to diplomacy. Kautilya has given a detailed and exclusive
description of the meaning of Diplomacy in his book ‘Artha-shastra’. It has stated six forms
of state policy which are – peace, war, non-alignment, alliances, shows of force and double
dealing. To ensure these policies are well executed in reality, ancient India classifies
diplomats into 3 categories – ones who are in charge with managing commercial relations and
transactions, then there were those who were in charge of collection of intelligence, and those
who were acting like secret agents for the king. Later on, memories of artha shastra were
forgotten and replaced by those who came and conquered India. VIENNA CONVENTION
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 1961 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
1961 outlines the rules of diplomatic law, ratified by Canada and implemented by the Foreign
Missions and International Organizations Act. This Convention codifies the rules for
exchange and Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger, Touchstone book publications, 1994. treatment
of representatives between states, which have been firmly established in customary law. It
has become an almost universally adopted Convention with 179 states part in it. This
Convention on Diplomatic Relations is a fundamental to the conduct of foreign relations and
it also ensures that diplomats can conduct their duties
without threat of influence by the host government. Some of the rules given in this
convention are –
• rules for the appointment of foreign representatives
• the inviolability of mission premises
• protection for the diplomat and his or her family from any form of arrest or detention
• protection of all forms of diplomatic communication
• the basic principle of exemption from taxation
• immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction, with limited exceptions and
• that diplomats must respect the laws of the host state.
The convention also requires the diplomats to obey local laws and prevents the potential
abuse to diplomats in embassy by local authorities of the power of a state's law enforcement
system and the diplomats should do the same.
FUNCTIONS AND IMPORTANCE OF DIPLOMACY
1)Communication and negotiation: The reason to negotiate well and communicate well is one
of the foremost important features of diplomacy. Being able to make the representatives of
other nations understand their intentions is something really unique feature or importance of
diplomacy. Over the course of time, the structure of diplomacy has changed from being a
messy one to that of a more organized one. Even though the structures of diplomat’s post
changed, their function always remain the same. Usually, by law of nature, in olden times,
when people didn’t get something, they snatched it from the person who has what they want
but how long can that be fine? With change in time people became more systemised than they
used to be and with the knowledge of communication and negotiation, they now used this to
get what they want in a simpler and less harm way. Negotiations between two representatives
or two diplomats are a key component in diplomacy and in doing so the diplomats find a
common interest. When you find
a common interest, then it will be easy for negotiations to take place and reciprocal promise
could be taken easily because even we agree to do something for them.
2)Intelligence gathering, image management and policy implementation. Second important
function is being able to put down what they have the knowledge of. Diplomats are in
charged in collecting of the information and this information are sent back to their home
country after it is organized. The foreign ministry of the home country looks after what is
been sent to them. They analyze the data and also determine what foreign policy should be
enacted in that situation. All the decisions based on foreign policy implementation is not
made by the diplomats themselves.
3)Representation, reporting and promotion of friendly relations: this means that the diplomat
that is the Ambassador is the personal representative is head of the home country to that of
the host country. Diplomats are considered as representatives of their governments who are
working in the host country under the leadership of the Head of Mission. Diplomats are not
allowed to interfere in the host country’s domestic affairs that is, they don’t have the right to
make public political comments or they cannot carry out commercial activities in their host
country. They have to live in discretion while they are there. These diplomats enjoy
inviolability, immunity of jurisdiction, and they are exempted from paying taxes. Even
though they are not governed by local law, they are not supposed to break the local law, and
if they do so then they are punished and prosecuted by their home countries and they can also
be expelled for this. Therefore,
diplomats must act professionally, have integrity and should behave with dignity.
4)Protection of interests: The protection of interest includes upholding of the political,
cultural and any other ties that one country has with the other. Both, our country’s and the
other country with whom we are negotiating with, interests must be taken into account. Only
when we join hands with them will we protect foreign policy so it is a need and importance
for us to protect interests of both the participating parties. Diplomats are supposed to promote
the national interests whatever the sphere may be. These diplomats must be patriotic towards
their home country, loyal to their own nation, have national pride and should also hold good
knowledge of national policies.

MAIN SIX DEVICES OF DIPLOMACY:

(i) Persuasion: Through logical reasoning, Diplomacy seeks to convince others of the
justification of the goals which it is trying to uphold or promote.
(ii) Rewards: Diplomacy can offer rewards for securing acceptance of desired view of a
particular international dispute or issue or problem.
(iii) Promise of Reward and Concessions: Diplomacy can promise matching rewards and
concessions for securing a particular change or maintaining a particular view in the policies
of other nations.
(iv) Threat of use of Force: Diplomacy cannot use force or violence in promoting the national
interest. However, it can use threat of use of force ultimatums, symbolic boycotts, protest
walkouts or even threat of war etc., for securing its objectives.
(v) Non-violent Punishment: By depriving a promised reward or concession, Diplomacy can
inflict non-violent punishment on other nations.
(vi) Use of Pressure: By using pressure tactics Diplomacy can force other nations to accept
the desired view or policy or decision or goals that it represents. Besides these, Diplomacy
also uses propaganda, cultural links, exploitation of situations, creation of particular scenes
and situations, rigidity or flexibility in negotiations etc. Kautilya, in his Arthashastra,
suggests “Sam, Dam, Danda Bheda and Niti” as the tactics of Diplomacy.
KINDS OR TYPES OR STYLES OF DIPLOMACY

❖ Old Diplomacy

❖ New Diplomacy

❖ Secret Diplomacy

❖ Open Diplomacy

❖ Democratic Diplomacy

❖ Totalitarian Diplomacy

❖ Shopkeeper Vs Warrior Diplomacy

❖ Summit- Conference Diplomacy

❖ Personal Diplomacy

❖ Economic Diplomacy

❖ Atomic-Nuclear Diplomacy

OLD DIPLOMACY
Diplomacy in its traditional form is known as Old Diplomacy. Old diplomacy is a term which
has been used both politically and analytically since the French Revolution. Politically, it
emerged as a term of abuse, used to criticize all which had been wrong with inter-state
interaction
before 1789.
Main Features Old Diplomacy
(i) European Diplomacy, (ii) Aristocratic, (iii) Special Emphasis upon Virtues, (iv) Secrecy,
(v)
Freedom of Action for the Ambassadors.
NEW DIPLOMACY
New diplomacy is international relations in which citizens play a greater role. Under the old
diplomacy, global policymaking was more strictly the purview of governments. New
diplomacy
began to be observed in the 1990s New diplomacy is being used to address many issues such
as
humanitarian assistance, labor rights, environmental issues, and fair trade.
Salient Features of New Diplomacy
(i) New Diplomacy is Global; Old Diplomacy was mainly European
(ii) New Diplomacy is mostly Multilateral, whereas Old Diplomacy was mostly Bilateral
(iii) New Diplomacy is less formal than Old Diplomacy
(iv) New Diplomacy is mostly open and Old Diplomacy was mostly secret
(v) Democratic Nature of New Diplomacy versus Aristocratic nature of Old Diplomacy
(vi) New Diplomacy depends more on Propaganda than Old Diplomacy
(vii) Under New Diplomacy, the role of a Diplomat has suffered a Decline

SECRET DIPLOMACY
Secret diplomacy means diplomacy carried on by kings, presidents and other rulers, without
the
knowledge or consent of the people and behind closed doors. The term Secret Diplomacy is
used
to designate the diplomatic practice of conducting secret negotiations and making secret
pacts,
decisions, alliances and treaties. In Secret Diplomacy no attempt is made to take the people
into
confidence.

OPEN DIPLOMACY
Open diplomacy means the negotiations and discussions carried out in handling affairs
without arousing hostility. It is usually carried on with free access to interested observers and
members of the press. it is argued that the people have the right and duty to know and to
participate in foreign policy decision-making. It is also known as PUBLIC or PEOPLE'S
Diplomacy. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF OPEN DIPLOMACY OR ARGUMENTS
AGAINST
SECRET DIPLOMACY
1) It is the natural right of the people to know everything about the affairs of their
government.
2) It is the right of the people to keep the government responsible for its acts.
3) It is the duty of the people to keep Diplomacy under check and prevent it from leading the
nation into an environment of tensions, strains and war.
4) Open Diplomacy is the best way of involving the people in the process of securing national
interests and making them politically conscious.
5) Secret Diplomacy leads to deceit, double dealings, and irresponsibility on the part of
diplomats.
6) There exists no justification for making secret treaties and alliances because every such
instrument has a direct bearing upon the future of the people of the state.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST OPEN DIPLOMACY OR ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF

SECRET DIPLOMACY:
1) Secrecy in the interest of nation is an absolutely necessary condition for the success of
diplomacy.
2) Secret negotiations help the diplomats to be free and frank in expressing their views.
3) Open Diplomacy can be misleading in practice, because the need for securing public
sympathy for an essential state act can make the diplomats practice window- dressing and
false propaganda.
4) General public has neither the ability nor the time to participate constructively in
diplomatic debate that may emerge as a result of public access to all information regarding
diplomatic
negotiations.

DEMOCRATIC DIPLOMACY
Participation of People in the politics of state and framing of affaires. If the policies of the
state
are framed on the basis of public opinion, is known as democratic diplomacy.

TOTALITARIAN DIPLOMACY
Diplomacy pursued by totalitarian states like Germany & Soviet in post-World War 1 era was
called totalitarian diplomacy where these totalitarian states used their military, economic
migh to keep countries in their spheres of influence and further expand it.

SHOPKEEPER VS WARRIOR DIPLOMACY

The “Shopkeeper,” diplomacy is characterized as practical, open-minded, candid, and
compromising. This characterization was put forth by some scholars and diplomats who
either observed or participated in North Korea-United States negotiations and in the inter-
Korean summit. In fact, Kim Jong’s practical, candid negotiating style surprised many people
who had held a different image of him and other North Korean officials.
The “Warrior,” diplomacy is aggressive, intransigent, recalcitrant stubborn, rigid, impolite,
and undiplomatic and usually is found among nations which share a tragic history of conflict
and War.

SUMMIT- CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY

Conference diplomacy can be defined as that part of the management of relations between
governments and of relations between governments and intergovernmental organizations that
takes place in international conferences. It involves direct participation of Foreign Ministers,
Heads of State and Heads of Governments in Diplomatic negotiations. Operate through
regional organization as well.

PERSONAL DIPLOMACY
Personal diplomacy is a type of diplomacy. It can be defined as when a Head of
State/President or Foreign Minister decides to embark on diplomatic visits or meetings by
himself rather than using an Ambassador or envoy. The Head of State travels to countries to
negotiate personally with the Head of State/President of other countries. Use of normal
channels of diplomacy are limited. Heads of States use personal agents to settle delicate
Problems in IR. Though it provides a secrecy to the affairs of the world it does tend to make
the process a bit undemocratic.

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY
Economic diplomacy is concerned with economic policy issues, e.g. work of delegations at
standard setting organizations such as World Trade Organization (WTO). Economic
diplomats also monitor and report on economic policies in foreign countries and give the
home government advice on how to best influence them. ED employs economic resources,
either as rewards or
sanctions, in pursuit of a particular foreign policy objective.
NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY
ATOMIC -NUCLEAR diplomacy refers to attempts to use the threat of nuclear warfare to
achieve diplomatic goals. After the first successful test of the atomic bomb in 1945, U.S.
officials immediately considered the potential non-military benefits that could be derived
from the American nuclear monopoly. During the Second World War, the United States,
Britain, Germany and the U.S.S.R. were all engaged in scientific research to develop the
atomic bomb. By mid-1945, however, only the United States had succeeded, and it used two
atomic weapons on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to bring a rapid and conclusive end
to the war with Japan.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF A DIPLOMAT

International Law confers diplomatic immunity on diplomats from the exercise of jurisdiction
by
receiving States. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 lays down the different
rights and privileges which are granted to diplomatic agents.
1. INVIOLABILITY OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS:
• Article 29 of the Vienna Convention; “the person of a diplomatic agent shall be
inviolable”.
• Para 2 of Article 37 says that members of the administrative and technical staff shall enjoy
the immunities and privileges as mentioned from Article 29 to Article 35 if they are not
nationals or are not permanent residents of receiving State.
2. INVIOLABILITY OF PREMISE;
• Article 20 of the Vienna Convention; The sending State has the right to use its flag and
emblem on the premises
• Article 21 of the Vienna Convention lays down that, “a permanent diplomatic mission
needs premises to operate and receiving State must help the sending State to obtain the
premises form mission”.
• Article 22 of the Vienna Convention “the premises of the mission shall be inviolable”.
• Article 30 “private residence of a diplomatic agent shall also enjoy inviolability”.

• Article 41 of the Convention itself lays down that “premises of the mission should not be
used in any manner as incompatible with functions of mission or by rules of general
International Law.
3. INVIOLABILITY OF FAMILY MEMBERS
• Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations in its Article 37 Para 1 states that
“immunities and privileges to the family members of diplomats.
4. INVIOLABILITY FROM BEING A WITNESS;
• Diplomatic agents are completely immune from being a witness in any civil or criminal
or administrative court of State to which they are accredited.
• Article 31(2) lays down that “diplomat agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness”.
• He is also immune from giving evidence before the Commissioner.
5. IMMUNITY FROM INSPECTION OF PERSONAL BAGGAGE
• The bag used by the diplomatic agents for sending articles, letters or documents to the
sending states or any other missions of its State to abroad be known as a diplomatic bag
• Para 3 of Article 27; “diplomatic bag should not be opened or detained. But this right is
not absolute.
• Article 36 Para 2 inspection can be conducted in presence of a diplomatic agent or his
agent if there are serious grounds for suspecting that the article is not for official use”.
6. IMMUNITY FROM TAXES AND CUSTOMS DUTIES;
• Article 34 of Vienna Convention lays down that, “diplomatic agents shall be exempted
from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, municipal or regional”.
7. FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION:
• Diplomatic agents are free to communicate any information for official purposes to the
State by which they are accredited. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention lays down that
“the freedom of communication also involves the use of code messages and couriers”.
8. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND TRAVEL:
• Article 26 Empowers diplomatic agents to move and travel in the territory of receiving
State but subject to laws and regulations of International Law and rules made by receiving
State concerning security zone.
9. IMMUNITY FROM THE LOCAL JURISDICTION:
• Article 31, paragraph 1 diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State; The immunity extends both to criminal as well as civil
jurisdiction.
10. RIGHT TO WORSHIP:
• Article 3(1) diplomatic agents have the right to worship any religion they like within the
mission premises or residence. But they cannot invite any nationals of the receiving State
to take part in the worship and have no right to preach their religion in receiving State.
ROLE OF DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
1) Diplomacy is a technique to implement foreign policy, but it is not the substance of
Foreign
policy.
2) Foreign policy is What you do; and diplomacy is how you do.
3) Diplomacy is considered as the Central Technique as: It involves direct government to
government interactions so that a particular state can draw inference from such talks or
negotiations while formulating its foreign policy.
4) Use of Economic measures and embargos and sanctions to influence the events or actions
of
an aggressor state.
5) Diplomacy Leads to better cooperation and helps in resolution of conflict.
6) Post-cold war diplomacy has become more complex and also has emerged as foremost
weapon in modern day International Relations. Diplomacy is Used to mold the Foreign
Policy of Other parties.

DECLINE OF DIPLOMACY:
In this age of science, technology and IT revolution, Diplomacy has suffered a substantial
decline. Its role has suffered a big setback. It no longer performs that spectacular role which it
used to perform in the 19th Century. Four Factors Responsible for The Decline of
Diplomacy:
(1) Speedy means of Communication:
(2) The Deprecation of Diplomacy:
(3) Advent of New Diplomacy:
(4) The Nature of International System and Role of Diplomacy:
FUTURE OF DIPLOMACY:
Despite a change in its role and functions, Diplomacy still continues to be a valuable
instrument of international relations. It continues to be an important element of both National
Power and Foreign Policy. A change or decline in its role does not mean that Diplomacy
stands rejected as an instrument of international relations.

Balance of power – quincey right 5 assumption

Game theory- -bargaing strategic bargaining

UNIT IX
Liberal internationalism developed after the First World War, in a period defined by competing but
unstable empires, class conflict, women’s suffrage, and experiments in international organization
(Sluga and Clavin 2017). the main themes that run through liberal thought are that human beings
and societies can be improved, that representative democracy is necessary for liberal improvement,
and that ideas—not just material power—matter. They see individuals, multinational corporations,
transnational actors, and international organizations as central actors in some issue areas of world
politics. Liberals tend to think of the state not as a unitary or united actor, but as made up of
individuals and their collective, societal preferences and interests. They also think of the state as
comprised of a set of bureaucracies, each with its own interests. Therefore, there can be no such
thing as one ‘national interest’ since it merely represents the result of whatever societal preferences
or bureaucratic organizations dominate the domestic decision-making process. In relations among
states, liberals stress the possibilities for cooperation; the key issue becomes devising international
institutions in which economic and political cooperation can be best achieved. The picture of world
politics that arises from the liberal view is of a complex system of bargaining among many different
types of actors. Military force is still important, but the liberal agenda is not as restricted as the
realist one of relations between great powers. Liberals see national interests in more than just
military terms and stress the importance of economic, environmental, and technological issues.
Order in world politics emerges from the interactions among many layers of governing
arrangements, comprising laws, agreed norms, international regimes, and institutional rules to
manage the global capitalist economy. Fundamentally, liberals do not think that sovereignty is as
important in practice as realists believe. States may be legally sovereign, but in practice, they have to
negotiate with all sorts of other actors, with the result that their freedom to act as they might wish is
seriously curtailed. Interdependence between states is a critically important feature of world
politics. For liberals, globalization is the end product of a long-running, progressive transformation of
world politics. Liberals are particularly interested in the revolution in economy, technology, and
communications represented by globalization. This increased interconnectedness among societies,
which is economically and technologically led, results in a very different pattern of world political
relations from that which has gone before. States are no longer such central actors as they once
were. In their place are numerous actors of differing importance according to the issue-area
concerned.

for realists, the main actors on the world stage are states, which are legally sovereign actors.
Sovereignty means that there is no actor above the state that can compel it to act in specific ways.
According to this view, other actors such as multinational corporations or international organizations
have to work within the framework of inter-state relations. realists see human nature as centrally
important, and they view human nature as rather selfish. As a result, world politics (or, more
accurately for realists, international politics) represents a struggle for power among states, with each
trying to maximize its national interest. Such order as exists in world politics is the result of the
workings of a mechanism known as the balance of power, whereby states act so as to prevent any
one state from dominating. Thus, world politics is all about bargaining and alliances, with diplomacy
a key mechanism for balancing various national interests. But finally, the most important tool
available for implementing states’ foreign policies is military force. Ultimately, since there is no
sovereign body above the states that make up the international political system, world politics is a
self-help system in which states must rely on their own military resources to achieve their ends.
Often these ends can be achieved through cooperation, but the potential for conflict is ever present.
For realists, globalization does not alter the most significant feature of world politics, namely the
territorial division of the world into nation-states. While the increased interconnectedness among
economies and societies might make them more dependent on one another, the same cannot be
said about the state system. Here, powerful states retain sovereignty, and globalization does not
render obsolete the struggle for political power among those states. Nor does it undermine the
importance of the threat of the use of force or the importance of the balance of power.
Globalization may affect our social, economic, and cultural lives, but it does not transcend the
international political system of states. We might think of the decision of the British people to leave
the European Union as a demonstration of the enduring significance of national sovereignty

social constructivism argues that we make and remake the social world and so there is much more of
a role for human agency than realism and liberalism allow. Moreover, constructivists note that those
who see the world as fixed underestimate the possibilities for human progress and for the
betterment of people’s lives. To this degree, social constructivism strongly overlaps with liberalism
and can even be seen as providing the social theory underpinnings of liberal political theories of
world politics. In the words of one of the most influential constructivist theorists, Alexander Wendt,
even the self-help international system portrayed by realists is something that we make and remake:
as he puts it, ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992). Therefore, the world that realists
portray as ‘natural’ or ‘given’ is in fact far more open to change, and constructivists think that self-
help is only one possible response to the anarchical structure of world politics. Indeed, not only is
the structure of world politics amenable to change, but so also are the identities and interests that
neorealism or neoliberalism take as given. In other words, constructivists think that it is a
fundamental mistake to think of world politics as something that we cannot change. The seemingly
‘natural’ structures, processes, identities, and interests of world politics could in fact be different
from what they currently are. Social constructivism is not a theory of world politics in itself. It is an
approach to the philosophy of social science with implications for the kinds of arguments that can be
made about world politics. Constructivists need to marry their approach to another political theory
of world politics, such as realism but usually, liberalism, to actually make substantive claims.
globalization tends to be presented as an external force acting on states, which leaders often argue
is a reality that they cannot challenge. This, constructivists argue, is a very political act, since it
underestimates the ability to change social norms and the identity of actors to challenge and shape
globalization, and instead allows leaders to duck responsibility by blaming ‘the way the world is’.
Instead, constructivists think that we can mould globalization in a variety of ways, notably because it
offers us very real chances.
Globalization and the Transformation of Political Community

Globalization presents several related challenges to traditional approaches to the study of world
politics. First, in focusing attention on worldwide interconnectedness —those global flows, networks,
and systems that transcend societies and states—it invites a conceptual shift from a state-centric
imaginary to a decidedly geocentric, world-centric, or global imaginary (Steger 2008). It takes a
holistic global systems (economic, political, social) perspective, rather than one principally focused
on the state system (Albert 2016). Second, the focus on the global highlights the Western-centric
nature of many scholarships in International Relations and thereby challenges the discipline to be
more reflective about its principal assumptions and theories (see Box 1.6) (Hobson 2004; Mahbubani
2018). Third, much globalization scholarship focuses on disruptive change or transformations in
world politics, compared with those traditional approaches which emphasize the essential
continuities in world politics. Drawing from this transformationalist scholarship, this final section will
discuss briefly several of the most significant transformations associated with globalisation.

UNIT X
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES- THE GLOBALISATION OF WORLD POLITICS PG 388-91

GLOBAL TRADE AND FINANCE- THE GLOBALISATION OF WORLD POLITICS PG-436-439

HUMAN INTERVENTION- THE GLOBALISATION OF WORLD POLITICS PG-515-519