UMIL V.

RAMOS

FACTS:

Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be
one of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.

Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is Rolando
Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).

Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.

Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols.

In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on
the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a
valid ground for his arrest without warrant.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:

YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113,
Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of the
New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized and for subversion which,
like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.
People vs. Burgos

Facts: Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities stating that he was
forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of
firearm against his life, if he refused. Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to the house
of the Burgos (D) and saw him plowing his field when they arrived. One of the arresting offices called
Burgos (D) and asked him about the firearm. At first, Burgos (D) denied having any firearm, but later,
Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.

After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the officers recovered
alleged subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that the firearm was issued to him by Nestor
Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?

Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense
must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by the wife of Burgos (D).

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is
not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.

In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led
the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence
of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of
information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without
warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

-----------------expulsion----------------

Summary:

The Mayor of City of Manila ordered deportation of 170 women, from Manila to Davao. Some or most of
them were ill refute and/or prostitutes. The petitioners applied for writ of habeas corpus. In granting the
petition for the issuance of the writ, the SC upheld the right of these women, despite having ill
reputation, to liberty of abode and travel.

Doctrine:

[In relation to constitutional right to liberty and travel of the prostitutes, the SC explained:] "These
women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens."

VILLAVICENCIO ET AL. v. LUKBAN ET AL.,

Facts:

The Mayor of the city of Manila ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute. The women
were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.

In one midnight, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the
Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into
patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given
no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were
being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for
a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither
directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao where the women were landed and receipted for as
laborers.
The friends of the victim filed a case for issuance of habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.

Issues Ratio:

Whether or not, the writ [of habeas corpus] should be granted.

The court awarded the writ, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann,
chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano
Ynigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be
deprived of their liberty.

According to the Supreme Court, there is no law that justifies the action of the respondent in deporting
the women of ill refute to Davao. In upholding the right of the victims on liberty to abode and travel, the
SC explained that: these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens.

Dispositive:

Writ granted.

Other Notes:

Although the case was decided prior to the enactment of 1987 Constitution, the case remains to provide
a good basis for discussions of the constitutional right to travel and abode.

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)

FACTS:

Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as “violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”

The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may
be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrants are null and void and violated the constitution and the rules of
court.

RULING:

YES. warrants for the search of 3 residences null and void; searches and seizures made are illegal. To
uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. The warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in
the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent.

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984 133 SCRA 800 (1984

Fact: Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon
City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum”
newspaper, were seized. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-
quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during
the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of
Col. Abadilla and his witnesses. In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held “that the executing officer’s prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true
where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also
been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an
ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched.”

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

Issue: Whether general description of the things to be seized is enough to constitute probable cause to
validate the issuance of a search warrant and seizure

Held: No, Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the
search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending
to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in of the respondent’s
application that petitioner “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being
used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended …” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft
of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have
done so. Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained
in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, “that the evidence gathered and
collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things
above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with,
and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for
Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement.”

In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, …
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. this Court ruled that “the oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.” As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency
established by this Court.

People vs. Baes68 Phil. 203

FACTS: Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna, charged the
accusedwith an offense against religion for causing the funeral of a member of the “Church of Christ” to
passthrough the churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, belonging to said church and devoted
to thereligious worship thereof. The parish priest opposed this, but through force and
threats of physicalviolence by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the
said churchyard.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, thereby violating Article 133 of the RPC.

HELD: The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of
theRevised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a
trial bethereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court may find the
accusedguilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of
the RevisedPenal Code.Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question offact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and
not those of other faithfulones.Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to
depend upon the more or less broador narrow conception of any given particular religion, but should be
gauged having in view the nature ofthe acts committed and after scrutiny of all the facts and
circumstance which should be viewed throughthe mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise,
the gravity or leniency of the offense would hingeon the subjective characterization of the act from the
point of view of a given religious denomination orsect, and in such a case, the application of the law
would be partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous,especially in a country said to be "once the scene of
religious intolerance and persecution.”

Article 133, RPC:Offending the religious feelings. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prisioncorreccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place
devoted to religiousworship or during the celebration of any religious ceremoncy, shall perform acts
notoriously offensive tothe feelings of the faithful

TITLE 3

People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil 515 (1956)

FACTS:

Amado Hernandez is a member of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), an active agency and
instrumentality which synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities of the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan' (HMB), otherwise or formerly known as the 'Hukbalahaps' (Huks) o rise publicly
and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public
uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the
government and laws.

Hernandez was then charged with and convicted of rebellion complexed with murders arsons and
robberies

He contends that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder arson or robbery

Such issue not having been settled, Hernandez filed for a petition for bail which was denied
ISSUE: Whether or not Hernandez is entitled to right to bail

RULING:

- YES

It was held that the murders, arsons and robberies committed are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed as means necessary for the perpetration of the said offense of rebellion
and that the crime charged is simple rebellion and in conformity with the policy of the court in dealing
with accused person amenable to a similar punishment, Hernandez should then be allowed bail.
Although such may risk the security of the State given the crime involved, it was also held in Montano v.
Ocampo that, “ * to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also appear
that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment.
No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has been made.” It must be noted that Hernandez was
sentenced not to the extreme penalty but to life imprisonment. Individual freedom is too basic , too
transcendental and vital in a Republican State, like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and
abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed , the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation
of our political system that, not satisfied with the guarantee of enjoyment in the very first paragraph of
the Bill of Rights the framers of our constitution devoted other parts of which to the protection of
several aspects of freedom. It should be noted that Hernandez has already been detained for more than
5 years and it would still take some time to dispose of the case. The decision appealed from the
opposition to the motion in question do not reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the
accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release, during the pendency of the appeal, would
jeopardize the security of the State.

Juan Ponce Enrile vs Jaime Salazar

Criminal Law – Complex Crimes – Compound Crimes – Rebellion Absorbs Common Crimes

Fact:

In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose
from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile
due to the seriousness of the crime charged against him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal.
Enrile later filed a habeas corpus case questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being
charged against him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder.Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where
it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the
proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion – which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He claimed
that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to
issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have
been able to examine the voluminous record of the case from the prosecution’s office – that being, the
constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the
existence of probable cause has not been complied with.

For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and
that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.

2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.

HELD:

1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually a previous
law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that graver
crimes may not be complexed with rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by
virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez
doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot
change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law (which
the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there is no
such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed. He can only be
charged with rebellion – which is bailable.

2. Yes. There is nothing irregular with the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes
to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution
transmitted quite a voluminous record from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient
that the judge follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only
a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Enrile vs. Amin 189 SCRA 573N

Petition for review on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/dismiss the information filed
against Enrile.

Facts:

On or about the same time when Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and multiple murder. Government prosecutors filed another information
against Enrile for violation of PD 1829, a statute penalizing obstruction of apprehension and prosecution
of criminal offenders. The said information alleged that herein petitioner, harbored and concealed in his
home Col. Honasan who, at the time was wanted for rebellion charges as well thus frustrating the
latter's apprehension. Petitioner however, contends that the alleged harboring or concealing of Col.
Honasan is absorbed in, or is a component element of rebellion

Issue:

1.Whether or not petitioner could be charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
murder.

2. Whether or not petitioner could be charged separately for rebellion and violation of said statute

Held:

1.NO. Petitioner’s act of concealing and harboring Honasan was on occasion of the crime of
rebellioncharged against petitioner in a different case, thus, it should be absorbed as it is a necessary
means to further petitioner's political purpose. Furthermore, complexing the crime of rebellion with
common crimes committed on the occasion thereof would not be beneficial for the accused, contrary to
the purpose as to why Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code was enacted.

2: NO.Although the instant case involves a statute (PD 1829), the same rationale applies to crimes mala
in se committed on occasion of rebellion- the same would be unfavorable to the accused.

Decision: Petition was granted. The information against appellant for violation of PD 1829 was quashed
OCAMPO V. ABANDO (G.R. NO. 176830; FEBRUARY 11, 2014)

FACTS: On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1The mass grave contained
skeletal remains of 67 individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD)
launched by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.

P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army
Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).The
letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71
named members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with several
other unnamed members.

Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),Randall B.
Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then members of the
Central Committee.

From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by
members of the CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to Operation VD.

On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring,
among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.Petitioner
Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit.Petitioners Echanisand Baylosis did not file counter-affidavits
because they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or
evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during
the preliminary investigation. However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was
allegedly not served a subpoena.

In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple
murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and
Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were
vital to the success of the prosecution.

The Information was filed before the (RTC) of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided
by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando).

On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all
mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them
with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.

On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo
from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.

Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including petitioners
Echanis and Baylosisand Ladlad) was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC
Makati).Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes,
such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a
necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.

While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested by virtue of the warrant of
arrest issued by Judge Abando. On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and
Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.

Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order transmitting the
records of Criminal Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.

Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post
Bail respectively.The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of aP100,000 cash bail to them. The
Court granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount
ofP100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their
actual participation in the peace negotiations

ISSUE: [1] Were petitioners denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of
the warrant of arrest?

[2] Should the murder charges against petitioners be dismissed under the political offense doctrine?

HELD: "The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in
support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has
been afforded a chance to present ones own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be
found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo
@ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However,
Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of
appearance by their respective counsels.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on
the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named
respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a
majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served
copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.

Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsels formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation.
Instead, he refused to participate.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For him
to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of
Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental
Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective
affidavits of several other witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution
in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested." Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994.Although the
Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under
oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not
necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal examination of the complainant
and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant
of arrest.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting documents
showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's
resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence. Delos Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr. 317 Phil. 101

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is
addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.

Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." People v.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion.Thus, when a
killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing
assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
punished as rebellion alone.
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for
the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the
political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 401 Phil 905 if during trial, petitioners
are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy of Amendment or substitution.

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial
court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as
petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy.

People vs Lovedioro

Facts:

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public
Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun
at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him,
one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun,
the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.

The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old
welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal
shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew
(appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter
was a resident of Bagumbayan.

Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest,
and other parts of the body. On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as
hypovolemic shock.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant committed Rebellion under Art. 134 and 135 or Murder under Article
248 of the RPC?

Held:

The court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in
conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus
Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of
Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.

In his appeal, appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as
supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his
Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's
Army.

However, the appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being
a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. Finally, treachery was
adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without
warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all
the accessories provided by law. The trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the
accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED

--------------sedition------------------
People vs Umali

Facts:

The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have been
committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening
of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete
destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house
of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo
Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro
Lacorte and five civilians.

During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house
and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the
Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?

Held:

Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical
injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional
and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life
imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for
which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code,
for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they
knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady,
the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each
of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the
decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70
of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy
penalties already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the
prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded
the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With
these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs

People v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 17755, March 4, 1922

FACTS:

As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of thePhilippine Constabulary to inflict
revenge upon the police of the city ofManila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First Instance
of thecity of Manila against the participants in the public disturbance.Convicted in the trial court of a
violation of Act No. 292 of the PhilippineCommission.The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against
the police of Manila andthey want to inflict revenge for the following reasons:(1) On December 13,
1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is amember of the household of a constabulary soldier and
was allegedlyabused by the said policeman.(2) Private Macasinag of the Constabulary was shot by a
Manila policeand was mortally wounded. A day after the incident, a rumor spreadamong the
Constabulary that the Police who shot Macasinag was back tohis original duties while Macasinag was
declared dead. There were alsorumors that the said shooting was ordered.On the night of December 15
some members of the Constabularyescaped their barracks through a window (the saw out the window
bars). They had rifles and ammunitions and were organized in groupsunder the command of their
sergeants and corporals. They attackedsome Manila policemen in these specific instances:(1) On Calle
Real, Intramuros, a group of the Constabulary shot andkilled an American Policeman and his friend.(2)
The Constabulary indiscriminately shot at a passer-by, causing adeath and wounding most of the
passengers.(3) While riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, CaptainWilliam E. Wichman(asst.
chief of police in Manila) was shot and killedtogether with Saplala.

ISSUE:

Are the accused properly convicted of a violation of the Treason andSedition Law?

RULINGS:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that sedition, in its more general sense, isthe raising of commotions or
disturbances in the State.In order or there to be a violation of paragraph 3 of section 5 of Act No.292, it
is not necessary that the offender should be a private citizen andthe offended party a public
functionary.The declaration of the trial court that there was a conspiracy betweenthe accused in the
instant case held not to constitute reversible error. Itis incontestable that all the defendants were
imbued with the samepurpose, which was to avenge themselves on the police force of the cityof
Manila.It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform acriminal act, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others done infurtherance of the common design; and "the result is
the same if the actis divided into parts and each person proceeds with his part unaided."Conspiracies
are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts,conditions, and circumstances which vary according
to the purposes tobe accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by theiracts the same
object, one performing one part and another another partof the same, so as to complete it, with a view
to the attainment of thatsame object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they wereengaged in a
conspiracy to effect that object

US V TOLENTINO

FACTS: Wrote and published libels against the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which said seditious words and speeches are false and
inflammatory, and tend to incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the government
established by law within the Philippine Islands, and tend to incite, move, and persuade great numbers
of the people of said Philippine Islands to insurrection; said false, seditious, and inflammatory words and
scurrilous libels are in Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by said Aurelio Tolentino, and which
was presented by him and others on the said 14th day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city
of Manila, Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon Ñgayon at Bukas'. Guilty of a violation of section 8 of Act
No. 292 of the Philippine Commission: Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write,
publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing
his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which
suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who
shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

SC: United States vs. Fred L. Dorr and Edward F. O'Brien. the theory that a writing, in order to be
punishable as a libel under this section, must be of a scurrilous nature and directed against the
Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, and must, in
addition, tend to some one of the results enumerated in the section (Act No. 292) In accordance with
the principles laid down in the preceding paragraph the judgment of conviction in this case must be
sustained, if it appears from the evidence in the record that the accused was guilty as charged of any
one of those offenses. We are all agreed that the publication and presentation of the drama directly and
necessarily tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest
and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to
disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government. Appellant: insists that
the intent of the accused to commit the crime with which he is charged does not appear from the
evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely literary and artistic production as imagined
by the author, are presented merely for the entertainment of the public.
SC: This contention can not be maintained. The public presentation of the drama took place less than
two years after the establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering embers of a wide-spread
and dangerous insurrection were not yet entirely extinguished. The manner and form in which the
drama was presented at such a time and under such conditions, renders absurd the pretense that it was
merely or even principally a literary or artistic production, and the clumsy devices, the allegorical figures,
the apparent remoteness, past and future, of the events portrayed, could not and in fact were not
intended to leave the audience in doubt as to its present and immediate application, nor should they
blind this court to the true purpose and intent of the author and director of the play. It is further
contended that even though the accused were in fact guilty as charged, the court erred in imposing an
excessive and unjust penalty, and in fixing the amount of the fine in dollars instead of Philippine
currency. The judgment and sentence appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant

Martinez y Festin v. Morfe,

FACTS:The question raised in this case is the scope to be accorded theconstitutional immunity of
senators and representatives from arrestduring their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in
going to andreturning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach ofthe
peace.Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista are facing criminalprosecutions. Martinez
was charged for falsification of a public documentbefore the sala of Judge Morfe. The basis of the case
against him washis statement under oath that he was born on June 20, 1945 instead ofJune 20, 1946.
On the other hand, Bautista was charged for violation ofthe Revised Election Code. Bautista was accused
to be in violation ofSection 51 of the RPC when he gave and distributed free of charge food,drinks and
cigarettes at two public meetings. Thus, the petitioners, asdelegates of the 1972 Constitutional
Convention invoke what theyconsider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision,
ifconsidered in connection with Article 145 of the RPC penalizing a public officer or employee who shall,
during the sessions of Congress, “arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committeda crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prisionmayor.The Solicitor
General, on behalf of the respondent judges in the case atbar, disputed such a contention on the ground
that the constitutionalprovision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely anexemption
from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code
would expand such animmunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative.

ISSUE:

Whether Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest

HELD

:No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides that immunityfrom arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony andbreach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war
againstthe Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort.Breach of the peace covers
any offense whether defined by the RPC orany special statute. Any person who acted against public
peace is susceptible to prosecution.There is a full recognition of necessity to have members of
Congress,and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to theutmost freedom to
enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.In this case, the crimes for which Martinez and
Bautista were arrested fall under the category of “breach of peace,” therefore, they cannot invoke the
privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution.

Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272

FACTS:1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by thepresident w/ the condition
that he shall not violate any penal laws again.Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded
against in themanner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardonand was
consequently released from confinement. In 1982, Torres wascharged with multiple crimes of estafa. In
1986, Gonzales petitioned forthe cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the
pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his pardonbecause the estafa charges against him were not yet final and
executoryas they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a courtis necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested andrecommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon
andaccordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence

HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionallypardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of hispardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i)
ofthe Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicialact consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditionalpardon.Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequentcrime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of acourt, in order that a convict may be recommended for the
violation ofhis conditional pardon.Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as
havingviolated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted andconvicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the penaltyprescribed.In the case at bar, President has chosen to
proceed against thepetitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an
exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.*Who determines
if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person wasconditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by
the Chief Executiveof his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convictor prisoner
carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive todetermine whether a condition or conditions
of the pardon has or havebeen violated. To no other department of the Government [has] suchpower
been intrusted