Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3763323
responses associated with reparation and retribution in conflict management relegated
the legacy of South America transitional justice jurisprudence to a marginal place in the
big picture.
The transitional justice debate in Brazil occupies an even smaller place considered an
exception in its own region for the lack of any criminal transitional justice response to
condemn the dictatorship atrocities. Yet, Brazil is nowadays recognized as one of the
biggest democracies in the global south, even though ruled by the populist right. In this
symposium participation, I would like to share my thoughts to explore the ongoing nature
of Brazil’s transitional justice jurisprudence. First, pointing out contradictory narratives
regarding the dictatorship legacy in Brazilian politics. Second, I would propose to turn the
debate to assess some possible limits of the criminal transitional justice to advance the
end of impunity. Further, the problem of corruption in domestic politics undermines not
only the democratic rule of law in Brazil but seems to be a common feature that threatens
the democratic institutions in other South America countries as well as in South Africa’s
post-transitional experience.
From the Interamerican Court of Human Rights standpoint, Brazil has failed to respond
adequately to its evil past. Both Araguaia (2010) and Herzog (2018) condemn the
Brazilian state for not pursuing criminal persecution to condemn torture and extrajudicial
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executions, including the practice of disappearances. While the state recognizes the need
to repair and find the remaining of former political opponents, the Brazilian Supreme
Court rejected all claims against the validity of its 1979 Amnesty Law.
The impeachment process paved the way for the revival of an idealized and nostalgic
image of the military rule as a part of order and stability. President Bolsonaro, then a
member of the Congress, during the impeachment voting in 2016 even praised former
general Ustra, well known for its torture practices during the dictatorship, claiming that
he was a national hero. Among the heated impeachment debate, Brazilian society was
already too much divided to give too much attention to apology to torture perpetrated by
the predecessor regime. The impeachment took place after the Brazilian society embraced
since 2013 almost routine protests, bringing masses of Brazilians to the streets to show
their rage against local, regional and federal governments. By the election of Bolsonaro in
2018, the judiciary was not only a center for disagreement but also some of its members,
as for example former federal judge Sergio Moro, the head of the CarWash investigations
turned into a symbol in the so-called war against corruption, joining later the Bolsonaro
government as a Justice and Public Security minister. During election year, the political
atmosphere was engulfed in a somber mode following a number of violent events,
including a mysterious plane accident that killed the Supreme Court justice in charge of
the CarWash trial, the political assassination of Marielle Franco, a Rio de Janeiro city
councilor and human rights defender, and the stabbing of Bolsonaro in the middle of a
rally. The fear that the military regime could be back seemed to be a minor issue for most
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Brazilians obsessed with the blaming game between left and right. Even though the
populist right embodied by Bolsonaro leadership enjoyed the support of former military
elite, including the vice president Mourao, his electoral support relied on a broader base,
especially the evangelical base. But his election could not be envisaged without the
previous corruption scandals, identified by a substantial part of the Brazilian population
as a legacy of the left-wing governments. Despite evident similarities to the image of
Brazilian authoritarian past, the setbacks to the democratic rule of law seems to be more
symbolic than concrete.
While the Brazilian society’s perception of the former dictatorship remains divided, it’s
not clear whether this may be attributed to the failure of historic and criminal transitional
justice in this societal context. Yet, this singular experience highlights a less visible role
performed by constitutional and administrative law in the long term process. Ongoing
democratization continues to challenge views on justice, but its transition from
dictatorship towards a liberal rule of law constitutes itself a sui generis paradigm within
transitional justice jurisprudence. The Brazilian post-transitional experience, despite its
exceptional instance on the region regarding the necessity to promote criminal
transitional justice still offers an interesting insight on the tortuous road towards
democracy in this western side of the global south.
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Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3763323