Journal of CriminalJustice, Vol. 11. pp. 241-263 (1983) (~7-2352/83/030241-235113.

110/~1
Pergamon Press, Printed in U.S.A. Copyrighl © 1983PergamonPress Ltd.

FAIR A N D IMPARTIAL R A I L R O A D : THE JURY, THE

M E D I A , A N D POLITICAL TRIALS

JAMES P. BRADY

Department of Sociology
University of Massachusetts
Boston, Massachusetts 02125

ABSTRACT

The clash between social movements and political authority is often played out in the court rooms in
criminal cases which are loosely described as "political trials." While prosecutors, judges, and defen-
dants rarely agree as to the "political" nature of a particular case, all parties usually regard the jury as
the pivotal factor. The jury, of course, is enshrined in Anglo-American legal theory as the final check
against suppression o f liberty by the state. Plea bargaining is out of the question when the very
legitimacy of the state is challenged and when dissident defendants are determined to use the trial
process as a means o f political expression. The crucial question is whether the jury has in fact lived up
to its Constitutional role.
The article attempts to answer this question at two levels. First, the history of political trials in the
United States is reviewed with the general finding that radicals have faced juries which were both
grossly unrepresentative of the general population and typically hostile to the ideas, life styles, and
social origins of the defendants. Second, the article considers in some detail the impact of media
coverage on potential jurors on one particular recent political case, the 1977-1978 trial of accused
"'guerrilla-bombers" Richard Picariello and Eduard Guilion in the Federal District Court of Southern
Maine. The survey opinion data presented for this case strongly indicate that any chance of a fair trial
for the defendants was compromised by effects of sustained hostile media coverage before the onset of
the trial, k-inally, the article considers available remedies in the form of either legislative reforms
designed to ensure representative juries, or voir dire procedures aimed at eliminating biased jurors. A
review of these remedies offers little hope that future political trials will be substantially fairer than in
the past. Moreover, the direction of current criminal justice reforms, as in the proposed S-1722
Federal Criminal Code, promise to criminalize further important forms of political expression.
The conclusion is not that jury trials should be avoided or minimized, since judges are apt to be
even more predisposed against dissidents. Rather, the point is that the social and ideological biases
which intrude especially in political trials are rooted in the political economy of capitalism which
underlies the legal svstem itself. The jury system remains the best available defense against legal
repression, but "justice" must ultimately await the outcome of continued social struggle, rather than
further refinements of legal process.

In N o v e m b e r 1976, Judge Braithwaite of D a k o t a law. Within hours, local officials,

Sioux Falls dismissed the g o v e r n m e n t ' s case newspaper editors, and "influential citi-
against V e r n o n Bellecourt et al., charged zens" joined to d e m a n d the judge's imme-
with m u r d e r and conspiracy under South diate resignation. It was not only the
241
242 JAMES P. BRADY
seriousness of the charges or the fact that
the defendants were Sioux activists from
the American Indian Movement (AIM)
which so inflamed the citizens; rather it was
t h e judge's reason for dismissal. The case
did not turn on a legal technicality cleverly
argued by the defense, but rather on the
fundamental question of a fair trial in an
intensely polarized community. The judge
was unable, in good conscience, to approve
a jury from among hundreds of impaneled
citizens. After days of fruitless voir dire
examinations, the exasperated judge dis-
missed the case and declared (South Da-
kota v. Bellecourt, 1976, Circuit Court,
Northwest Reporter, II): "I am convinced
that the atmosphere of prejudice against
the defendants is such that a fair and
impartial jury cannot be assembled in
South D a k o t a . "
If the conclusion of this case is unusual,
the issues it raises are increasingly familiar.
The problem of juror prejudice has been
thrust to the fore since the sixties in a long
series of courtroom struggles popularly
known as political trials. Though presiding
judges often deny that cases involving the
Black Panthers, anti-Vietnam war activists,
feminists, or militant Indians are more than
ordinary criminal matters, the defendants
have consistently departed from purely legal
questions of guilt or innocence to challenge
the legal system itself.
In these contests, the jury occupies a
pivotal position, in both legal and political
terms. The state defends itself against the
charge of political repression by pointing to
its system of judgment by "twelve peers
good and true" (Moore, 1973:60) as the
final democratic safeguard. The defense has
often countered that juries are neither true
peers nor unbiased toward the defendants'
ideas and affiliations. Sorting out the truth
of this is important, not only because
political trials present a continuing problem
of legitimacy for the state and survival for
dissident social movements, but also be-
cause the fairness of the jury system is the
theoretical foundation of the entire court
system, notwithstanding the vast growth of
plea bargaining.
T A S K AND THESIS
This article will consider juries and their
role in political trials in the United States.
The discussion will proceed through four
phases. First, it will consider what it is that
makes a trial political, the varieties of such
cases in recent years, and their importance
to both the state and challenging social
movements. This is followed in the second
section by summaries of the jury's contem-
porary and historic roles in political cases
and ordinary criminal matters. Third, the
study will consider the role of the media in
influencing jury attitudes in one particular
recent political trial: the Picariello/Guilion
case in Portland, Maine. It will conclude
with an analysis of the political economy of
repression in the United States and a review
of the prospects for reform as evidenced in
recent Supreme Court decisions and legisla-
tive initiatives.
Standing on both historical research and
the quantitative data drawn from the Picari-
elio/Guilion trial, the article will argue that
a fair trial for radical defendants in this
country is highly unlikely, given that:
1. The government, at the federal and
state levels, has throughout the last
century consistently resorted to crimi-
nal and illegal methods in order to
create and sustain charges against left-
ists. Such means as fabrication of
evidence, use of agents provocateurs,
and orchestrated false testimony are
doubly effective given judges" consis-
tent bias and juries' general tendencies
to believe prosecution attorneys over
defense (Wolfe, 1971).
2. The jury selection process effectively
minimizes the role of minorities, poor
people, youth, and working people
who are most likely to sympathize
with political dissidents, while over-
representing those population groups
whose age, sex, race, and class charac-
teristics are most associated with au-
thoritarianism and hostility toward po-
litical dissent.
3. Media coverage in political cases adds
a new dimension of prejudice to a jury
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and PoliticalTrials
system already stacked against the
defense. So great in intensity and so
consistently hostile is media portrayal
of radical defendants that it makes
their guilt among the public an as-
sumed fact, a matter of "common
knowledge." Indeed this assumption
of guilt is so imbedded that citizens
convinced of the defendants' guilt and
dangerousness can nevertheless de-
scribe themselves as fair and impartial
enough to serve as jurors on the case.
. Existing corrective procedures, such as
changes of venue, voir dire examina-
tions, and juror dismissal for cause or
preemptory challenge are not suffi-
cient to offset the prejudicial effects of
the jury selection process, hostile me-
dia coverage, and public remarks of
politicians and law enforcement of-
ricers. Indeed, some of these correc-
tive measures such as judicial censor-
ship or gag rules imposed after the
indictment serve mainly to freeze the
prior advantages of the prosecution, by
preventing the defendants from carry-
ing their political and legal arguments
to the public which will ultimately
comprise the jury.
W H A T IS A P O L I T I C A L T R I A L ?
C O N T R A D I C T I O N S IN DEFINITIONS
A N D G O V E R N M E N T RESPONSE
There is considerable debate over the
question, What is a political trial? Some
would deny that such cases exist in this
country, arguing that codification and legal
professionalization have removed politics
from the justice process. They would attri-
bute the few politicized exceptions to the
artificial effects of media publicity and the
disruptive rhetoric of right or left wing
extremists demanding either legal lynchings
or public vindication. For those of such
liberal views, political trials occur only
under totalitarian regimes and are discussed
only at international jurists" conventions
under the topic of human rights.
Serious critics dispute this and some
243
would go so far as to argue that all criminal
trials are ultimately political. Certainly the
business of lawmaking and the appointment
or election of judges is nothing if not a
political process. Those who wear the robes
are affected by biases which arise from their
social background (typically elder white
males from relatively affluent families) and
from their previous careers (usually as
prosecuting attorneys (Hagan, 1978: 342-
364). The adversary system of trial by
lawyers has obvious disadvantages for poor
and minority defendants represented by
hard-pressed public defenders and forced
into wholesale plea bargaining. Ultimately
the prisons are filled, not by those whose
crimes have involved the greatest loss of life
or property, but by the less successful street
criminals who are predominantly black,
brown, and/or poor (Wright, 1973: 23-34;
Reiman, 1979: 95-137; Nagle, 1977: 257-
269).
The evidence of social bias is undeniable
and originates in the political economy
which creates unemployment, institutional-
ized racism, and stratified inequality. Ne-
vertheless, to use the blanket term of
political repression is confusing. Most poor
criminals prey on other poor, minority, and
working people (Nettler, 1978: 92-93; Po-
korny, 1977: 106-108; President's Commis-
sion, 1967: 80-84). This makes their arrest
and imprisonment seem necessary and non-
political. But, in dealing with political dissi-
dents, the means and motives of police,
judges, and prosecutors more clearly ex-
press the ideological loyalties of the state.
Those who owe their income, ideas, and
position to the state are inclined to deny that
political trials exist even in the midst of
courtroom demonstrations and inflamed
public opinion. Judge Julius Hoffman, while
presiding over one of the most irregular and
highly politicized cases in recent history,
stoutly maintained this view. The judge
engaged in the following exchange with
Chicago Eight defense attorney William
Kunstler (Danielski, 1971: 167):
Judge Hoffman: This is not a political case
so far as I am concerned.
244 JAMES P. BRADY
Kunstler: Well, Your Honor, as far
as some of us are con-
cerned, it is quite a politi-
cal case.
Judge Hoffman: It is a criminal case. There
is an indictment here. I
have the indictment right
up here, I can't go into
politics here in court.
While trial judges typically adopt such a
"see no evil" attitude toward the political
stakes in such cases, the police and prosecu-
tors have been far more candid. For ex-
ample, District Attorney Schalz, ranging
beyond the specific of individual charges
against the Chicago Eight, stated to the
jury:
The point is that they came here wanting a
r i o t . . , where it would appear that the
demonstrators were being oppressed,
people would be magnetized, would be
polarized, would join in with the demonstra-
tors, and a national liberation front would
be started. People would take to the streets
to overthrow, to revolt . . . . (Danielski,
1971: 171)
The trial of the Chicago Eight is reminiscent
of other trials; Schalz's remarks are similar
to those of the Utah District Attorney who,
while prosecuting the case of the Interna-
tional Workers of the World (IWW) Wob-
blies in 1918, urged the jury to:
enforce the majesty of the law . . . so that
anarchy and murder and crime shall be
pushed back beyond the pale of civiliza-
t i o n . . , free from the danger of those
parasites on society who murder and
rob . . . . (Foner, 1970: 45)
The great political significance of such
cases for the state is apparent also in the vast
appropriation of sums for investigation and
prosecution, as well as in the systematic
violation of the law by police and prosecu-
tors intent on building a case against radical
defendants. These abuses of authority in-
clude the routine use of secret agents as
infiltrators and agents provocateurs, dis-
semination of false propaganda, fabrication
of evidence, and the intimidation and coach-
ing of witnesses (Karmen, 1974). Such
practices of surveillance and entrapment
have become increasingly commonplace and
local actions have been encouraged and
coordinated by such national secret police
operations as the FBI's C O I N T E L P R O ,
Nixon's Houston Plan, and various federally
convened grand juries directed against dis-
sent (Halperin, 1976; Wolfe, 1973: 118-124;
Marine, 1973; Crewdson, 1974).
Some might take comfort in the belief that
the Watergate crimes of political interfer-
ence were a bizarre departure from Ameri-
can traditions, set straight by the removal of
Nixon and his gang of spies and burglars.
Such optimists overlook the fact that Nixon
was only indicted for minor offenses. The
Congress, courts, and media chose to ignore
the more serious crimes of surveillance,
burglary, official perjury, frame-ups, and
assassination of leftists and civil rights and
anti-Vietnam war activists (Rodino, 1975:
2-9). Virtually every American president
has relied on assorted dirty tricks and brute
repression as the answer to any political
opposition demanding fundamental changes
in the distribution of wealth, power, and
privilege.
The opening decades of this century were
marked by a spectacular series of police
raids, vigilante attacks, and orchestrated
grand jury indictments culminating in the
trials of hundreds of leading socialists,
feminists, and trade unionists, guilty of
organizing people against the draft and the
capitalist system, and for women's suffrage,
better wages, and working conditions
(Hoyt, 1969: 79-96; Clark, 1975: 23-24).
The direct and often violent attacks upon
these movements and their leaders were not
the work of political fossils and individual
hanging judges. President Wilson, the
father of modern liberalism, authorized mail
censorship, treason, indictment, new re-
pressive legislation, and the midnight Red
Raids (led by young J. Edgar Hoover)
against the socialist IWW offices in over 50
cities (Preston, 1963: 139-148; Dubofsky,
1969: 400-410; Quinney, 1974: 277-280). In
writing to the Attorney General and the
Congress of Western Governors, Wilson
made the position of his administration
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and Political Trials
clear: " O u r interest is no less keen and
active than y o u r s . . , the I W W s are cer-
tainly worthy of being repressed (Preston,
1963: 130). Organizing efforts of the Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations and the
C o m m u n i s t Party in the thirties met with a
similar response from Presidents Roosevelt
and T r u m a n . The U.S. Congress introduced
legislation to isolate and outlaw leftist oppo-
sition. This was followed by secret indict-
m e n t s from handpicked federal grand
juries, witch hunts convened by the House
U n - A m e r i c a n Activities C o m m i t t e e , and a
series of police raids and political trials
( K i r c h h e i m e r , 1961: 158, 233; Danielski,
1971: 179).
Presidents K e n n e d y and Johnson author-
ized and e x p a n d e d surveillance against the
civil rights and anti-Vietnam war move-
ments. T h r o u g h o u t his tenure as FBI direc-
tor, J. E d g a r H o o v e r directed more federal
funds, agents~ and attention against the new
left and black liberation groups than was
spent combatting organized crime (Gold-
farb, 1974: 105-114; Wise, 1978: 274-321),
even after Senate investigations and media
revelations exposed the scale and power of
the "'cosa nostra" ( C R C J , 1976: 98-114;
Chambliss, 1978: 150-188). The Defense
D e p a r t m e n t , the C I A , and the local police
d e p a r t m e n t s in m a j o r cities contributed to
this attack. A new generation of grand juries
was spawned to bring secret conspiracy
indictments and initiate trials against oppo-
nents ranging from the student anti-war
m o v e m e n t to the Catholic left, the Vietnam
V e t e r a n s against the War, and the Black
Panthers. So specious and fabricated was
federal and local evidence that these trials
b e c a m e a rallying point for the g o v e r n m e n t ' s
opposition and a source of international
e m b a r r a s s m e n t (Halperin, 1976; Burke,
1974: 158-176; Raines, 1974: 152-159).
T h e controversy and attention drawn by
these trials has forced their recognition by
law scholars and criminologists and higher
justice officials (Meiklejohn, 1972: 44-56;
Somerville. 1956: 106-126). Their c o m m e n t s
are notably different from those of trial
judges and prosecutors: for example, Long
and his colleagues discuss the following:
245
A trial is termed "political" if the prosecutor
hopes to gain political benefits from his
successful prosecution . . . . Community
hostility toward the accused generally leads
to political trials, since the prosecution acts
as a community agent . . . . They feel a need
to act in accordance with the disapproval of
the masses. In such a hostile environment,
the community views the political trial as
long overdue action against anarchists, radi-
cals and revolutionaries who threaten the
climate of law and order in the community.
(Long, 1975: 82-83)
Justice Douglas, a foremost liberal spokes-
man for the Supreme Court, admitted to the
peculiar characteristics and importance of
such cases which were analyzed as follows:
The Court's real problems . . . do not arise
in trials like Allen's, which was "the classical
criminal case without any political or sub-
versive overtones." They arise in two other
types of trials. The first are political trials
that involve either a political indictment or
political judges. The second "are trials used
by minorities to destroy the existing consti-
tutional system and bring on repressive
measures." The social compact has room for
tolerance, patience and restraint; but not for
sabotage and violence. (Becket, 1971: 179)
Long sees the justice system as an essen-
tially defensive institution forced into a
repressive role only by the massive weight of
public consensus or a clear threat of political
violence. Douglas identified as political the
trials of Eugene Debs, Sacco and Vanzetti,
and Dennis (Becker, 1971: 177-180). But,
Long says~ such cases are brought on by the
inflamed passions of the m o m e n t and must
be viewed as rarities. Moreover, if the
courts have been harsh with radicals on
these occasions, it is only because the public
demands it (Long, 1975: 83). Douglas thinks
the radicals bring down the sword on their
Own heads as part of their scheme to destroy
the government by provoking repression
(Becker, 1971: 177-180).
The contradictory functions of the capital-
ist state are apparent when one compares the
attitudes and actions of these various officials
and spokesmen. The straightforward, re-
pressive role of the police, the FBI, and
246 JAMES P. BRADY
prosecuting attorneys is manifest in their cru-
sading language and in their willingness to
violate the law in efforts to build a case
(Goldfarb, 1974: 105-110). Judges and
criminologists, on the o t h e r hand, have a
more priestlike role and must reassure the
public that the state is fair, reasonable, and
respectful of civil liberties. Trial judges like
Hoffman often strive for this in an even more
rigid insistence on proper courtroom deco-
rum and by ignoring political issues raised by
the defense and illegal actions of police and
prosecutors (Epstein, 1970a: 152-153; Mit-
ford, 1969: 208-210, 240-241).
Appellate jurists and criminal justice
theorists like Douglas and Long have a
wider commitment to the maintenance of
legitimacy and the management of conflict.
Thus, they are obliged to reverse some
convictions won by clearly illegal means or
procedural violations (Bannon, 1974: 102-
106; Goodell, 1973: 225-227), and must
recognize the existence of a few political
cases (Stermberg, 1975: 274-288; Danielski,
1971; Epstein, 1970b). These discrepancies
in official response, while important, do not
offset more fundamental agreement in loy-
alties and outlook. If appellate judges admit
unfairness, it is in isolated instances, and
they deny the historically repressive role of
the state (Mitford, 1969: 242-245; Gold-
farb, 1974: 129-130).
THE STATE VERSUS SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS:
CLASS, R A C E , A N D S T R A T E G I E S OF
POLITICAL DEFENSE
As a recurring phenomenon, the political
trial demands a far more serious critical
analysis than liberals are prepared to ad-
vance. Whether one examines courtroom
transcripts, or the outside activities of the
media, government, and defense sup-
porters, it is readily apparent that political
trials are not isolated collisions between
courts and activists. These cases arise from
fundamental, unresolved contradictions of
capitalism (Wright, 1973: 147-163; O'Con-
nor, 1979), between movements ,for equality
and the state's commitment to the unequal
order, between the state's need both to
repress dissent and maintain its legitimacy
(Silvergate, 1974; Wolfe, 1974). There are
three important varieties which may be
summarized as follows.
1. The classic political trial. Political activ-
ists are tried for explictly political offenses,
such as treason, conspiracy, sabotage, or
draft evasion. This sort of trial is most
problematic for a bourgeois democracv as in
the United States, since prosecution neces-
sarily shows the state in a repressive role,
often raises constitutional issues, and im-
plicitly recognizes the defendants as political
opponents. In this country the state has
brought these charges mainly against white
defendants whose class, position, or organ-
izational roles made them seem imposing
threats. These include Socialist Party mem-
bers such as presidential candidate Eugene
Debs, IWW trade unionists who actively
opposed World War I, leading members of
the U.S. Communist Party in the fifties, and
some white anti-war activists of the Vietnam
era (including Daniel Ellsberg, Dr. Spock,
the Berrigan Brothers, and the Chicago
Eight) (Ferber, 1970: Chomsky, 1970).
2. The criminalization of political dissent.
Radical activists are charged with nonpoliti-
cal offenses and tried under regular criminal
procedures. Sometimes these crimes were in
fact committed for deliberate political pur-
poses, as in the bombing of government or
corporate installations (Weatherpeople,
1974), kidnapping of officials or corporate
executives to secure the release of impris-
oned comrades, or bank robberies under-
taken to raise funds for clandestine opera-
tions (Berry, 1971: 228-229: Davis, 1971:
176-180, 222-245). More often, the gov-
ernment takes the initiative, using secret
agents to fabricate evidence to entrap activ-
ists or create "conspiracies" (Karmen, 1974:
209-226; Goodell, 1973: 141-144). In the
case of deliberate crimes for political pur-
poses, the government usually attempts to
obscure the defendants' political motives by
portraying them as "dangerously irrational"
(Hays, 1970: 320-327; Zimroth, 1974: 36-
45). In the case of arranged frame-ups the
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury. The Media, and Political Trials 247

state typically tries to discredit the defen- prosecution at their own game" (Mitford,
dants as "common criminals" (Davis, 1971: 1969; Raines, 1974). Poor and minority
41-64). Poor, black, red, or brown activists activists are less able to match the state's
are most often framed as common criminals, legal resources and the ordinary criminal
as in the case of the Irish Molly McGuire charges brought against them may conceal
miners, the Black Panthers, Le Roi Jones the state's political motives in the case
(Amiri Barata), Angela Davis, the Young (Zimroth, 1974: 13-15; Bannon, 1974).
Lords, American Indian Movement leaders, They are also more likely to suffer from
and others (Lens, 1973: 172-173; Bimba, racist and elitist sentiments held by judges,
1932: 93-100; Dolbeare and Grossman, prosecutors, and jurors, and so to remain
1971: 230-232). silent on such extralegal issues as racism that
3. Politicization of routine cases. Ordinary might be dangerous even from the stand-
criminal charges against nonactivist defen- point of winning the case (Hagan, 1978:
dants are politicized and made into causes 346-358; Kennebunk, 1973: 32-40).
c616bres through the intervention of move- Whatever the choice of strategy, the
ment organizations. Activists may decide to defense focuses on the jury. Over the course
make a point of a case if it raises broad politi- of the political trials of the last century, and
cal issues. Feminist groups mobilized sup- particularly the last ten years, the defense
port for Joanne Little and Inez Garcia be- has not only addressed its arguments to the
cause the prosecution of these nonwhite jury, but has also made an issue of jury
women for killing white alleged rapists selection and composition (Hays, 1970:
pointed to the sexist and racist nature of state 102-112; O'Rourke, 1972: 45-49; Bannon,
justice (CSJ, 1975; Hays, 1970: 81-100). 1974: 94-95; Ostrow, 1972: 216-218).
Historically the more respectable white
defendants have usually chosen to remain
within the limits of the legal adversary LIBERTY, DISSENT, AND T H E JURY:
model (Stermberg, 1975: 277-278). White I D E O L O G Y AND T H E TEST OF
radicals from poorer backgrounds, and es- CONFLICT
pecially black, brown, and red activists
more often choose confrontational defenses It is comm6nly believed, if not under-
and have used the court for political argu- stood in clear historical terms, that the jury
ment (Keating, 1970: 123-149; Lens, 1973: system was created to protect citizens
177-182; Foner, 1970: 34-37). There are, against the government's abuse of the courts
of course, exceptions to this pattern. The as an instrument of political repression.
mostly white and middle-class Chicago Every English and American schoolchild
Eight defendants conducted a fairly political has memorized the story of Magna Carta.
defense, but Bobby Seale was the one who Standard lithograph illustrations show a
insistently moved from legal issues to politi- frowning king forced by his nobles to
cal discussions and to attacks on the courts' guarantee that henceforth:
racism. Likewise, Angela Davis's trial was
fought largely on legal terrain, but her No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned,
or be disseized of his Freehold, or Liberties,
poorer, ex-convict codefendant, Ruchel
or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled,
McGee, chose to set a far more antagonistic or otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass
course, repeatedly denouncing the judge, upon him or condemn him but by lawful
prosecutors, and state witnesses as racists judgement of his Peers. (McCart, 1964: 6-7)
(Seale, 1968: 324-326; Burnham, 1971;
Davis, 1971: 241-245). This pattern in Political Legitimacy and Ideal of Trial by
defense strategies is hardly surprising. More Jury
affluent white radicals have better access to
defense funds and more credibility as wit- Blackstone went to great length to make
nesses and are thus better able to "beat the his Commentaries, England's first codifica-
248 JAMES P. BRADY
tion of law, a monument to the jury system.
For once he departed from his usually dry
and measured language to intone: "Trial by
jury ever has been, and I trust ever shall be
looked upon as the glory of English
Law . . . . The liberties of England cannot
but subsist so long as this Palladium of
Liberty remains sacred and inviolate"
(Blackstone, 1880: 379).
The quasi-religious attachment of English
jurists is equalled by the consistent praise
which American judges and lawmakers have
lavished on the ideal of trial by jury.
Contemporary scholarly commentaries and
jurists' opinions amply demonstrate that the
jury has continued to occupy a central
position in legal thought. In the crucial
Duncan v. Louisiana (1968, U.S. 391) civil
rights case, the appellate judge attached the
following pronouncement to his opinion:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal "
defendants in order to prevent oppression
by the Government. Those who wrote our
constitutions knew from history and experi-
ence that it was necessary to protect against
unfounded criminal charges brought to
eliminate enemies and against judges too
responsive to the voice of higher author-
ity . . . . Providing an accused with the right
to be tried by jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the com-
pliant, biased, or eccentric judge.
Historical facts show clearly that the
founding fathers had every reason to fear
the abuse of the American courts as an
instrument of political domination. The
crucial question is, Has the jury been an
effective safeguard?
A Century of Political Trials: The Jury as
Peers
A review of political trial history is not
reassuring, for neither the grand nor the
petit trial juries have been true peers of the
defendants or even a fair cross-section of the
public. The result has been disastrous for
radicals.
The 1900-1920 trials of socialist activists
were decided by juries whose background
was unrepresentative of the general public
and diametrically opposite to that of the
defendants. Joe Hill, in perhaps the most
famous of political trials, was shot to death
after conviction by a jury of eight capitalists.
two white-collar professionals, and two
workers, supposedly representative of the
people of Utah, who were overwhelmingly
small farmers and laborers (Foner, 1970:
29). Feminist Susan B. Anthony was con-
victed by an all-male jury who were, for the
most part, wealthy businessmen (Kates,
1972: 313; Flexner, 1959: 165-170). The
Seattle mass trial of anti-war trade union
organizers in 1918 was also decided by a jury
which in no way resembled the city's work-
ing-class population. As one observer noted
at the time, "For the socialist trial, [12] good
men and true, mostly real estate and insur-
ance dealers, employers, and well-heeled
ranchers were empaneled. Not a single
workingman was named" (O'Connor, 1964:
117). Contemporary political case juries
have not been more democratically repre-
sentative. Huey Newton's Oakland trial was
heard in a city with a 38 percent black
population; but only 16 of 180 in the jury
panel were minority members and only one
black would ultimately sit in the jury box
(Keating, 1970: 131-133; Newton, 1968:
202-204). Chicano activist Reis Lopez
Tijerina was likewise tried before a largely
white jury in a predominantly Mexican-
American New Mexico town (Becket, 1971:
190-194). Amiri Baraka (Le Roi Jones)
was charged and convicted by an all-white
jury of professional and business people, in
racially divided, working-class Newark
shortly after the bloody 1968 race riots
(Dolbeare and Grossman, 1971: 231-233).
Black, brown, and red activists from the
Black Panthers, Young Lords, National
Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP), Congress for Racial
Equality (CORE), and the American Indian
Movement groups have faced juries which
were overall whiter and wealthier than the
surrounding community (Cole, 1973: 208-
209).
Similarly, the young, new left defendants
of the anti-war movement rarely saw jurors
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and Political Trials
of their own age or subculture even when
tried in university towns or counterculture
centers. Trials of the Chicago Eight, Viet-
nam Veterans against the War in Gainse-
ville, Florida, the Berrigan Brothers in
Philadelphia, and the Venceremos in
Northern California followed a well-worn
pattern. Twelve much older, wealthier and
"straighter" people sat to judge those
whose life styles and ideas were so different
that attorneys found it repeatedly necessary
to explain the language used by defendants
and witnesses (O'Rourke, 1972: 71-75;
Ginsberg, 1975).
The fact that the new left radicals of the
sixties and seventies were judged by older
jurors with different life styles was made
more crucial by the prosecution's emphasis
on the "strangeness" of the defendants'
counterculture. Chicago Eight defendant
Tom H a y d e n noted, "Our underlying crime,
the evidence of which was revealed every day
in the courtroom, was that we were begin-
ning to live a new lifestyle beyond that of
capitalist America" (1970: 28-29).
In early IWW, socialist, anarchist, femin-
ist, and unionist trials, the defense typically
engaged in a fencing match with the judge
and prosecutor over each juror. Anarchist
Louise Olivereau acted as her own lawyer
when brought to trial for passing out anti-
war leaflets and speaking against the draft.
She examined jurors herself and court trans-
cripts record the following exchange:
Olivereau: (to prospective juror)
Have you any prejudice
against a declared anarch-
ist?
Juror: 1 certainly have.
Olivereau: Then withdraw.
Judge: All we want to know is can
you give her a fair trial.
Anarchism is not an issue
(O'Connor, 1964: 252-
• 253)
The judge declared the juror in question
unbiased and admitted him to the jury.
Olivereau was found guilty and sentenced to
ten years in prison. She served two years.
There was no appeal (O'Connor, 1964: 252-
249
253). Similarly, a man who declared before
the Sacc~) and Vanzetti trial that the defen-
dants "ought to hang" was approved by the
judge and served as foreman of the jury
which convicted and hanged the radicals
(Morgan, 1948: 39). Judges in such political
cases have consistently resisted defense
probes, denied indications of bias, and
approved grossly unrepresentative juries
(O'Rourke, 1972: 70-71; Bannon, 1974:
94-95; Epstein, 1970a: 146-149). As a
result from 1900 to 1920 hundreds of Social-
ist Party members, IWWs, unionists, and
feminists were deported, imprisoned, or
executed (Foner, 1970: 28-29).
More recently, radicals on trial have
challenged not only individual "jurors, but
the juror selection system, which is based on
lists of registered voters and property
owners. The Chicago Eight's defense at-
torneys argued that voter registration lists
consistently underrepresent those social
groups which are more likely to sympathize
with dissidents (Hayden, 1970: 104). Youth,
minorities, and poor citizens are more mo-
bile than the established and more affluent
elder whites; changes of address mean that
mobile citizens are often dropped from
voter roles. Moreover, these same most
sympathetic groups are more likely to miss
voting in an election because they have less
confidence in the political process or are
dissatisfied with the choice of candidates
(Kairys, 1974). Famed Black Panther
lawyer Charles Garry urged the court to
"quash the master panel of jurors, that is,
the entire jury venire, on the grounds that
the black person is culturally different and
persons of lower economic status have been
systematically excluded and are systemati-
cally unrepresented in said panel" (Black-
burn, 1971: 18). Similarly, the defense of
the Soledad Brothers made motions to open
the selection process to "allow prisoners,
exprisoners, blacks, chicanos and poor
people to be included on panels for prospec-
tive jurors" (Mann, 1974: 129).
Judges have refused almost unanimously
to consider these arguments. They have
rejected out of hand all of the various
alternative methods for drawing a more
250 JAMES P. BRADY

representative jury, such as the use of TABLE 1

automobile license lists (Hayden, 1970).
SYSTEMATIC BIAS IN MARYLAND TRIAL
The challenges to the jury selection process
JURORS
continue and have grown increasingly so-
phisticated (NJP, 1979).
Percentage Reflected in
Social Composition: The Jury as
Representatives Characteristic Trial Area
by Category Jurors Population
Statistics compiled from early surveys
conducted by the Chicago Jury Project Sex
(CJP) show that elder, more affluent An- Male 60.94 47.4
glo-German males have been consistently Female 39.06 52.2
overrepresented in trial juries, with a corre- Education
sponding underrepresentation of racial mi- 0-11 years 32.9 59.5
norities, younger citizens, women, poor, 12-15 years 44.8 33.2
16-more years 22.4 7.4
and working-class citizens (Chambliss and
Seidman, 1971: 438). Garfinke (1971: 106- Age
21-29 3.3 18.7
108) has more recently demonstrated that 30-33 12.4 24.6
women are greatly underrepresented in 40-49 56.7 27.4
juries across the country. A recent large- 50 plus 26.5 18.3
scale study, compiled from data on nearly
Source: Mills, 1971:55-61
3,000 trial jurors who served in federal
district courts in Maryland, corroborates
the earlier findings (Mills, 1971: 60-61). and working-class citizens, who are the sort
The data are summarized in Table 1, with of people usually indicted. Table 2 com-
correlations which are significant at the pares the composition of recent grand juries
.001 level. in Baltimore and Houston with the popula-
It should be remembered that most politi- tions of the communities which they suppos-
cal trials originate from indictments drawn edly represent.
by grand juries. In theory, the grand jury Consistent racial bias is also typical, as
(like the trial jury) is a check on government reported by Lefcourt (1972: 255-257) and
abuse and political repression. In fact, the by Finkelstein (1966: 338), who shows that
grand jury has cooperated in legal attacks the chances that the racial imbalance in
on leftists and dissidents throughout the last specified cases would result from chance
century (Clark, 1975; Strick, 1977: 174- alone are statistically impossible. There was
179). virtually no minority representation among
Analysis of grand jury composition re- the affluent grand jurors who followed
veals that these powerful bodies are more government request and brought charges
unrepresentative and undemocratic than against black activists such as the Charlotte
trial juries. Typically, they are chosen by the 3, the Wilmington 10, New York Panther
"key man" system; that is, from among a list 21, and the Soledad Brothers (Michaelow-
of names drawn up by the state supreme ski, 1976; Goodell, 1973: 250-251).
court justices (Cole, 1973: 209-210; Long, Rarely have social scientists reported such
1975: 85-86). The judges generally choose clear and unchallenged statistics as in
prominent businessmen, lawyers, and studies of jury composition. The results are
others whom they consider to be influential similar across the country, whether one
citizens or responsible civic leaders (Frankel considers trial juries or grand juries,
and Naftalis, 1975: 33-35). Rarely is there whether one defines class by occupation,
anything approaching adequate representa- income or education. As Erlanger (1970)
tion of young people, minorities, the poor, summarized in his review of jury research in
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and Political Trials 251

TABLE 2

SYSTEMATIC BIAS IN GRAND JURY COMPOSITION

Baltimore Houston

Percentage Reflected in Percentage Reflected in

Characteristic Grand Area Grand Area

by Category Jury Population Jury Population

Sex
Male 71 48 78 49
Female 29 52 22 51
Age
20-29 years 4 19 21-35 years 10 23
30-39 years 17 25 36-50 years 43 54
40-59 years 55 38 51-65 years 37 18
60 plus 24 17 65 plus 10 5
Education
0-11 years 24 60 3 47
12-15 years 52 33 41 38
16-17 24 7 55 15
Income
not available below $10,000 4 47
$10-20,000 41 38
over $20,000 55 15
Average $25,000 $10,340

Source: Carp, 1973: 863; Mills, 1971:57-61

this c o u n t r y , " t h e r e is a p p a r e n t l y no study crucial to trial o u t c o m e . C J P data show that

or a n y a r g u m e n t which concludes such
divergencies do not exist." H e further
states, " T h e p r i m a r y cause of the divergen-
cies is, of course, the sources used for
venire . . . . " O n e could m a k e the a r g u m e n t
that social bias m a y not m a t t e r if jurors are
"'objective." Is there any reason to assume
that a jury of affluent, older white males
c a n n o t fairly j u d g e radical d e f e n d a n t s w h o
are c o m m o n l y y o u n g , p o o r , black, or
b r o w n ? A g a i n there is a large b o d y of
r e s e a r c h to a n s w e r this question and it is
clear that defense feelings of " w e ' v e b e e n
h a d " are w e l l - f o u n d e d .
jurors vote in consistent race and class
patterns. T h e project report noted differ-
ences between m o r e affluent jurors of G e r -
m a n or English b a c k g r o u n d and the p o o r e r
jurors o f Italian, Slavic, or black p a r e n t a g e :
Whereas persons from German or British
background were more likely to favor the
government, Negroes and persons of Slavic
or Italian descent were more likely to vote
for a c q u i t t a l . . . "blue ribbon" jurors,
chosen because of their higher social, eco-
nomic, and educational status, were consid-
erably more likely to convict. (Chambliss,
1971: 437)

Social Bias a n d Deliberation: The Jury as a
Decision M a k e r
In its study of voting patterns, the Chi-
cago J u r y P r o j e c t was the first to d e m o n -
strate that the j u r y ' s social c o m p l e x i o n is
These results have been confirmed repeat-
edly. Fried and his colleagues reviewed
lawyers' strategies and jury voting patterns,
and identified elder white males of affluent
m e a n s and R e p u b l i c a n sympathies as consis-
tently m o r e receptive to the p r o s e c u t o r ' s
252 JAMES P. BRADY
evidence and more ready to convict than
women, poor, middle-income, black, or
brown jurors (Fried, 1978: 274-280).
Some might still argue that even a minor-
ity of sympathetic jurors can sway the others
or at least prevent a conviction with a hung
jury. Strodbeck, (1956, 1957) demonstrates
that women and p o o r e r citizens are not only
underrepresented as jurors, but are rarely
chosen for the role of foreperson. Beven
(1958) and his associates confirm that the
foreperson is typically a male with the
highest class position and plays a critical role
in guiding jury deliberations. Erlanger
(1970) has shown that the arguments of men
of affluent means carry greater weight in
jury decision making.
The hung jury is in fact a rare occurrence,
largely because of the decisive role of the
foreman and the pressure of the dominant
majority. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has, since 1972, accepted the principle of
nonunanimous verdicts in state jury trials
(Johnson v. Louisiana, 1972). In cases of
disagreement the issue is commonly re-
solved through a compromise facilitated by
the foreperson (Kalven, 1966: 488). In a
review of grand jury voting patterns in
nearly 1,000 Houston cases, Carp (1973:
856-857) notes that over 95 percent of all
juror voters were unanimous and in keeping
with the prosecutor's recommendation. He
argues that this is most certainly "due to the
highly nonrepresentative composition of the
grand jury."
The "natural" bias arising from the jury's
composition handicaps the defense in all
cases at law, but it is particularly important
in political trials. As the National Jury
Prgject has noted in its commentary on jury
research:
government techniques reflect, among other
things, the government's recognition of a
very obvious fact; the people who constitute
the jury can have as much to do with the
outcome of the trial as the evidence and
arguments. This is particularly true in a
political trial, where the people .on trial
and/or their activities represent a challenge
to the government and the political activities
and perspectives of the jurors are therefore
crucial. (NJP: 1975: 1)
Overlaid on the "natural" or internal bias
arising from jurors" class, sex, age. and race,
there is a second artificial bias resulting
from media coverage. The impact of media
on public consciousness has been thor-
oughly documented in opinion research on a
wide range of topics (Doob, 1946: 423-448:
Blackburn, 1971: 50-52; Friendly and Gold-
farb, 1968: 88-93). For radical defendants
facing hostile and distorted accounts of their
ideas and actions, the results can be devas-
tating (Sullivan, 1967: 1-24; Lofton, 1966:
72-110). This study will now shift from
general and historic matters to consider a
recent political case in detail, the Picariello/
Guilion bombing trial of 1976-77.
M E D I A AND P R E J U D I C E IN T H E
T R I A L OF T H E H A M P T O N
GUERRILLA UNIT
The state of Maine would seem an odd
place for revolutionary guerrillas, FBI man-
hunts, and courtroom confrontations. Be-
hind the postcard imagery of moose and
mountains lies a stagnant local economy,
high unemployment, and rural poverty. A
miserable assortment of crowded dungeons
and walled camps serves as the Maine prison
system. In 1976, an underground group
calling itself the Hampton Unit began de-
manding improvements in prison condi-
tions, punctuating its urgings with a series of
bombings of courthouses and government
and corporate installations in New England.
By the time Richard Picariello and Ed-
ward Guilion had been identified as alleged
members of the Hampton Unit, captured,
and charged with these bombings, their
names had become household words. Media
coverage was so intense and protracted that
UPI reporters voted this case the "'New
England news story of the year." The
notoriety of the case and the extreme
hostility of media coverage presented seri-
ous problems for the defense, which sought
a fair trial before a relatively unbiased jury.
As part of the defense team, John Baumann
and the author were called on to assess
media impact and to assist in the develop-
ment of pretrial motions.
In grappling with this charge, they pre-
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and PoliticalTrials 253

pared two studies for presentation in court. 5. specific attitudes of respondent toward
These were a content analysis of case the defendants
coverage in the most influential local media 6. self-image regarding personal fitness
source and a large-scale opinion survey and impartiality for jury duty
measuring the extent of pretrial prejudice Responses to the opinion survey concerning
among potential jurors. The findings on the sources of information on crime (num-
both media coverage and pretrial prejudice ber 2 above) determined the focus for the
parallel results obtained in similar defense second element of the research: the analysis
research in the Susan Saxe Weatherman of media coverage in the trial district. ~
case in Boston and the Wendy Yoshimura Respondents described newspapers as their
SLA case in San Francisco. most significant source of crime information
and specifically identified the Portland Press
Herald and Portland Evening Express as the
Methods most influential publications. The trial was
held in Portland and, because it is the
A finding of prejudicial opinion is legally largest city in the district, the researchers
significant only if it can be shown potentially concentrated on their coverage of the Picari-
to affect the attitude of jurors. Therefore, ello/Guilion case.
the opinion survey was aimed at those Content analysis of these papers included
citizens who were registered voters living all stories, commentaries, and editorials
within the boundaries of the southern Maine over the nine-month period (from May 12,
federal court district where the defendant 1976 to December 20, 1976). The study
would be tried. A survey was developed measured the quantitative scale of coverage,
along the lines of a random stratified model tabulating the total number of articles men-
to provide a representative sample of pre- tioning either defendant, the total number
trial attitudes among potential jurors. The of times either of their names was used in
sample included approximately 500 respon- connection with the indictments, the total
dents from a total jury pool of 120,000 number of headlines bearing one of the
registered voters. defendant's names, and the total number of
Data were gathered by trained volunteer days in which the defendants' names ap-
aides using a standard questionnaire. Re- peared. In addition, it tabulated the scale of
spondents chose among scaled-answer op- coverage given to the Hampton Unit in the
tions in telephone interviews. The number early period before the defendants' names
of random calls made within each telephone were released in connection with the indict-
exchange inside the district was based on the ments. It also reviewed the quality of media
number of registered voters in that ex- coverage, noting the repeated use of key
change area. Only residential numbers were phrases and characterizations in connection
called and only registered voters were inter- with either defendant's name or the alleged
viewed. The questionnaire was designed to crimes. 2 These characterizations included
measure the following items: "mad bombers" or "terrorists" (Portland
1. demographic characteristics of the Evening Express, May 13, 14, 16, 22;
respondent Portland Press Herald, May 13, 14, 22).
2. most important sources of information
about crime for the respondent Findings
(friends, literature, mass media); if
media, which radio, television or news- Discussion of the case in the Portland
paper most important newspapers is divided into two periods. The
3. familiarity of the respondent with the first covers the time between the May 12
Picariello/Guilion case bombing of the Central Maine Power Cor-
4. general attitudes regarding any defen- poration and the July 4 capture of alleged
dants in criminal matters; presumption Hampton Unit members Joseph Aceto and
of guilt before trial Robert "Pinky" Carlson. In these first seven
254 JAMES P. BRADY

TABLE 3

THEMATIC CONTENT OF PORTLAND PRESS COVERAGE

Frequency Samples
Time Themes Article Days Headlines Copy

Period 1 terrorists 6 5 A Terrorist Attack Terrorists will

May 12- strike again
July 4
In a free society
there is no defense
against terrorism
mad bombers 4 3 A Mindless Act Madness is loose
in Maine
An aberration of
the first order
guerrillas 10 8 Guerrillas Claim Hampton Group
Credit threatens to con-
tinue attacks
FBI in Dark on Hampton Outfit cares
Hampton Unit nothing about the
people of Maine
Period 2 Picariello and 20 18 Hampton Group Member of
July 5- Guilion are 19 17 Identified radical terrorist
Dec. 20 guerrillas group
Picariello and 48 42 Charged or linked with bombings of Central
Guilion are 24 22 Maine Power Company. Seabrook, NH Post
responsible Office, an aircraft at Boston's Logan Air-
for bombings port, National Guard Armory in Dorchester,
in New England and State Police Barracks and headquarters
in Topsfield, MA
Picariello and 24 19 Baystate Manhunt FBI now lists P&G
Guilion are 21 16 Widens among its ten most
fugitives wanted fugitives
wanted by FBI
Picariello 20 18 Picariello in Canada FBI agent Yablonsky
leader of has termed Picariello
Hampton Unit the leader

weeks, n e i t h e r Picariello n o r G u i l i o n were that the m e m b e r s of the H a m p t o n U n i t are

i d e n t i f i e d as m e m b e r s of the H a m p t o n U n i t
or c h a r g e d with associated crimes. T h e
s e c o n d p e r i o d dates from July 5 to D e c e m -
b e r 20, w h e n the d e f e n d a n t s were n a m e d as
b o m b i n g suspects, lasting until the o n s e t of
the 1977 b o m b i n g trial.
D u r i n g the first p e r i o d t h e r e were 22
articles, 18 of which were f r o n t page fea-
tures. T h r e e m a j o r t h e m e s are pervasive:
"terrorists," " i r r a t i o n a l , " " m a d b o m b e r s . "
(Portland Press Herald, May 12, 13, 14, 22;
Portland Evening Express, May 13, 14, 17,
18). T h e guerrillas are described as "indis-
c r i m i n a t e l y v i o l e n t , " and a "'threat to the
safety a n d security of all the p e o p l e of
M a i n e " (Portland Press Herald, May 13,
14). T h e r e also are three central t h e m e s in
the second period: that Picariello a n d G u i l -
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and Political Trials 255

TABLE 4
QUANTITATIVE SCALE OF COVERAGE BY PORTLAND NEWSPAPERS

Total Days Total Days

Total No. Total No. Picariello's Total No. Total No. Guilion's
Articles Usages of Name Appears Articles Usages o f Name Appears
Mentioning Picariello "s with Mentioning Guilion's with
Time Picariello Name Accusations Guilion Name Accusations

July 36 72 16 32 53 15
August 13 41 9 1i 27 7
September 12 30 6 10 24 6
October 13 92 7 12 62 6
November 64 31 4 4 18 4
December
(9 to 15) 7 17 7 7 14 6
Totals 85 302 49 76 188 44

ion are members of the H a m p t o n Unit
People's Forces, that they are responsible
for a series of New England bombings, and
that Picariello is the leader and theoretician
of the Unit. Media coverage and repetition
of these six themes are summarized in
Tables 3 and 4.
The saturation coverage of the case by the
Portland newspapers was equalled by atten-
tion from local radio and television stations.
The defendants' names and accusations
against them were broadcast an average of
over twice every day during the eight
months between the initial bombing and the
opening of the trial in Portland. The media
impact on jurors' opinion has been demon-
strated by scholars across the country, with
significant implications for social policy
(NJP, 1975). It would be expected that the
insistent accusations and hostile character-
izations of the defendants would have con-
siderable impact on the Portland papers'
readers, who include most of the jury pool
for the southern trial district.
Findings of the Opinion Survey
Initial questions to respondents probed
their general attitudes about criminal defen-
dants rather than specific feelings about the
Picariello/Guilion case. The historic ten-
dency of people to believe police or pro-
secutors over defendants or defense at-
torneys has deepened with mounting public
cynicism and fear of crime in the last decade
(NCS, 1978a, 1978b, 1978c). The survey
data indicate that this trend has touched the
southern Maine district, where the majority
of respondents stated that they considered
any defendants or fugitives to be "probably
guilty.'3
It was almost immediately apparent that
there were strong opinions among respon-
dents about the Picarielio/Guilion case.
Before making any allusions to the trial or
the defendants' names, respondents' recog-
nition of the case was tested, first with a
direct, cold query and then after a one-sen-
tence reminder of the case essentials. The
results obtained are summarized in Tables 5
and 6.
It should be noted that the recognition
level documented in Tables 5 and 6 sur-
passes that usually recorded when registered
voters have been asked to name their
congressional representatives, mayors, or
members of the national cabinet. More to
the point, however, is the image of the
defendants which accompanied recognition
of their names. The data in Table 7 is drawn
from survey question items bearing directly
on the presumption of guilt.
The consistency of Table 6 statistics indi-
cates a clear bias against the defendants.
256 JAMES P. BRADY

TABLE 5

RECOGNITION OF DEFENDANTS

Yes, No,
I recall it 1 don't recall it
% %

Q. Have you heard of Richard Picariello? 66.9 33.1

Q. Have you heard of Edward Guilion? 48.8 51.2
(following two-sentence summary of the case)
Q. Now, do you recall the Picariello case? 87.4 12.6
Q. Now, do you recall the Guilion case? 80.4 19.6

TABLE 6

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECOGNITION AND READERSHIP

Recognize names of defendants (without prompting)

Yes Yes No No
Picariello Guilion Picariello Guilion
% % % %

Respondent relies YES 80.0 62.2 20.0 37.8

primarily on
Portland
newspapers for
news on crime. NO 60.2 54.6 39.8 45.4

*Significant at .05 level

Slight differences are notable between atti-
tudes toward Picariello (identified by the
press as the guerrilla leader) and Guilion,
who was not well recognized nor so roundly
condemned. The limits of space preclude a
complete listing of all tabulations, but a
cross-check between newspaper readership
and anti-defendant bias reveals a consis-
tently positive and statistically significant
(.05 level) relationship between newspaper
readership and prejudice. Respondents'
presumption of the defendants' guilt persists
even after the explicit reminder that the law
places the burden of proof on the state.
Trial Strategy and Outcome
The defense strategy was two-pronged:
first to probe the questionable relationship
between Aceto and law enforcement agents.
Aceto identified himself as the person who
procured the explosives and detonators. He
was known as a firebrand and instigator of
impulsive violence. Police officers admitted
that Aceto had served as an informer and
paid agent; when asked to reveal all hidden
agents and arrangements in the case, the
prosecutor objected ( U.S. v. Picariello and
Guilion, 1977, U.S. Circuit Court for So.
Maine) that: "To comply with this defense
request would undermine the whole basis of
law enforcement in this country."
The first strategy of challenging state
witnesses and police methods usually de-
pends on the openness and independence of
the jury in weighing conflicting testimony.
Thus, the second and most fundamental
defense strategy was to fight for a relatively
unprejudiced jury. Obviously, given the
opinion survey data cited above, this would
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and Political Trials 257

TABLE 7
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT

Response to Same Question

Response on Picariello Using Guilion Name

Yes or No or No Yes or No or No
Agree Disagree A ns. Agree Disagree Ans.
% % % % % %

O. In your personal opinion

did Picariello take part
in these crimes? 59,7 2.9 34.7 56.6 3.1 40.3
Q. Would you agree ot dis-
agree that for these
ciimes Picariello deserves
severe punishment? 88.3 4.2 7.5 86.5 4.8 8.7
Q. Would you agree or dis-
agree that Picariello is
a dangerous person? 83.4 4.5 12.1 81.0 5.5 13.5
Q. In court cases the
defendant is officially
innocent until proven
guilty. Some people think
that it is the defendant
who has to prove their
innocence. In this case do
you think Picariello needs
to prove his innocence? 51.3 38.6 10.1 59.4 39.0 6.6

not be easy. The aim was to thoroughly REFORM PROSPECTS, POLITICAL

document the extent of pretrial prejudice to
win equalizing concessions from the judge.
Judge Gignoux refused to hear evidence of
pretrial prejudice and made no concessions
to the defense in the voir dire process.
Picariello and Guilion were convicted and
received maximum sentences to be served in
federal maximum security prisons. Aceto
disappeared after receiving a minimum sen-"
tence. A second group of the "People's
Forces." the "George Jackson Unit," is still
at large. Recently, it has claimed credit for
the destruction of a major insurance corpo-
ration's headquarters in Massachusetts and
has threatened further action if prison con-
ditions are not improved in New England.
ECONOMY, AND THE FUTURE
The media has been decisive in the trials
of radicals before. The press has distorted
and vilified Black Panthers, Indian mili-
tants, and anti-war activists with effects at
trial (Blackburn, 1971: 50-51, 184-186).
The chances of IWW defendants during
World War I trials were dashed by press
attacks which depicted them as violent,
irrational agents of foreign powers (Dubof-
sky, 1969: 405-407; Preston, 1963: 140-141;
Bimba, 1932: 83-88). The Sacco and Van-
zetti case turned on the impact of hostile
media as one scholar of the period noted:
"Under the pressure of hysterical and hos-
258 JAMES P. B R A D Y
tile press c o v e r a g e . . , the jury system
collapsed because the charged atmosphere
rendered the public unfit to deal with the
issues" (Morgan, 1948: 204-205). There is
little reason to anticipate more balanced
press treatment of radical defendants in the
future. Individual reporters may be objec-
tive or sympathetic to some dissidents, but
they do not set media policy. Management
decides how events are interpreted in edito-
rials. The continuing process of media ag-
glomeration means that newspapers, net-
works, an.d publishing houses are forged
into larger chains and ultimately controlled
by fewer and fewer hands (Erlich, 1972).
The press enjoys a measure of political
freedom in that it can criticize individual
political leaders and policies. This does not
extend to an analysis and critique of the
corporate interests which lie behind political
policies, let alone embrace a serious consid-
eration of egalitarian or socialist ideas such
as those advanced by radicals in the streets
or from the defendant's chair. Indeed, even
the limited freedom of opposition allowed
the press is likely to be seriously reduced in
the near future.
In the past decade there have been three
major efforts to " r e f o r m " .the federal crimi-
nal code, culminating in Congressional bills
S-l, S-1437, and S-1722 (U.S. Senate, 1973,
1976, 1980). All of these have called for
substantial restrictions of traditional press
privileges, with new categories of crime,
long prison terms, and heavy fines to be
imposed on reporters, editors, publishers,
and news sources who "disclose information
that had been provided to the government
by another person." The penalties would be
imposed even if it were proven that the
"information disclosed" was wrongly classi-
fied, or if it revealed crimes committed by
government agencies. The proposed bills
criminalize political expressions which "in-
terfere with the functions of government
officials" and specifically prohibits demon-
strations outside military bases and draft
induction centers. The legal definition of
"conspiracy" is enormously expanded to
include collective actions which entail
"criminal intent," without any "overt crimi-
nal act" (U.S. Senate. 1976, 1980). The
language, provisions, and penalties of these
three bills are remarkably similar, showing
an interesting consistency between the spon-
soring Nixon, Ford, and Carter administra-
tions, and legislative leaders like Edward
Kennedy, who has been the chief Congres-
sional advocate for these bills (Segal, 1975;
Emerson, t978).
One needs little information to sense the
implications of S-1722 and its predecessors
for the future of political trials and press
coverage. Were any of the proposed statutes
in effect ten years ago, Daniel Ellsberg and
the reporters and publishers of the Washing-
ton Post would all have been liable to fines
and ten years imprisonment for revealing
government war crimes in the publication of
the "Pentagon Papers" (Barth, 1976: 86-
89). The standards of proof required in the
various "conspiracy" trials of anti-war activ-
ists and Black Panthers would have been far
less stringent (Ostrow, 1972: 290-297;
Schrag, 1974: 379-381; Mitford, 1969: 221-
235). A whole range of legal political
expressions would have been liable to prose-
cution, and the number of "political trials"
in the future could be far larger with a wider
net of jurisdiction available to the govern-
ment. Perhaps most directly relevant to the
future of political trials is Section 1328 of
S-1437, which creates another new category
of crime, described as "Demonstrating to
Influence a Judicial Proceeding" (U.S. Sen-
ate, 1978; Merwick, 1976: 6-9). If the law is
passed, a person would be guilty of a felony
if:
with intent to influence another person in
the discharge of his duties in a judicial
proceeding," he or she pickets, parades,
displays a sign, uses a sound amplifying
device, or otherwise demonstrates within
100 feet of a Federal courthouse, while any
judicial proceeding is in process, or at any
time within 100 feet of a building occupied
by a judicial official. (NCARL, 1977)
One has only to remember the trials of
Huey Newton, the "Chicago Eight," the
New York "'Panther 21," and the more
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and Political TriaDs
recent A m e r i c a n Indian M o v e m e n t cases to
recall how crucial were the demonstrations
outside the c o u r t r o o m s (Schrag, 1974: 379-
381; B a n n o n , 1974: 27-28). The defendants
in those cases, as well as Angela Davis, Dr.
Spock, and others, have often declared that
their ultimate victories were due as much or
m o r e to the effect of demonstrating sup-
porters as to the legal arguments of their
attorneys (Stermberg, 1975). T o m H a y d e n ' s
c o m m e n t s on the Chicago Eight trial are
fairly typical: " T h e scene of a political trial
should extend into the final c o u r t r o o m of
public opinion . . . through speeches,
rallies, and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . . . . We have to
appeal to the jury outside as well as inside
the court to accept our politics as legiti-
m a t e " ( H a y d e n , 1970: 99).
The future looks only slightly m o r e pro-
mising with respect to the second dimension
of jury p r e j u d i c e - - t h e issue of "trial by
peers" and fair c o m m u n i t y representation.
T h o u g h seven bills were introduced in the
90th Congress to b r o a d e n jury participation,
none of these has survived c o m m i t t e e re-
view and no other significant jury reform
bills have a p p e a r e d since (Mills, 1971: 55).
T h e S u p r e m e Court has, in recent de-
cades, heard a great m a n y appeals based on
the issue of jury representation. The Court's
holdings have consistently distinguished be-
tween the process of drawing jury venire
and the actual composition of juries. The
process cannot, in the Court's view, be
systematically discriminatory lest it violate
the r e q u i r e m e n t s imposed by the Sixth
A m e n d m e n t of the Constitution. H o w e v e r ,
if the process can be defended as fair, it
matters not if the jury panel actually chosen
is unrepresentative of the community and
alien to the defendant (Taylor v. Louisiana,
1975, 419 U.S. S u p r e m e Court, 324; Duren
v. Mississippi, 1979, 439, U.S., 357).
In H o y t v. Florida (1961, U.S. Supreme
Court, 324) the S u p r e m e Court rejected an
appeal based upon sexual discrimination in
jury selection. H o y t ' s attorneys presented
statistical data showing that w o m e n had
been systematically excluded from juries in
the country. H o y t was convicted by an
all-male jury of murdering her husband.
259
The county population was 55 percent fe-
male. In rejecting the appeal the Supreme
Court noted:
At the core of the appellant's argument is
the claim that the nature of the crime of
which she was convicted peculiarly de-
manded the inclusion of persons of her own
sex on the jury. She was charged with killing
her husband . . . . The affair occurred in the
context of a marital upheaval involving,
among other things, the suspected infidelity
of [the] appellant's husband . . . . It is
claimed in substance, that women jurors
would have been more understanding or
compassionate than men in assessing the
quality of the appellant's act and her de-
fense. (Garfinkle, 1971)
Appeals on the grounds of racial dis-
crimination in jury selection have likewise
been consistently turned down by the Su-
p r e m e Court. At the highwater mark of the
Civil Rights m o v e m e n t the Court heard
Swain v. Alabama (1965, 380, U.S.). At-
torneys for black appellant Swain pointed
out that the convicting jury was entirely
white in a county with a 25 percent black
adult population. Moreover, they showed
that exclusion of blacks on juries was an
historic and routine pattern in the county.
The gross underrepresentation of minori-
ties on juries was so marked that it was
beyond the realm of statistical probability
(Bell, 1973: 950-953). The Supreme Court
did not deny this evidence, but rejected
Swain's appeal:
Although there have been an average of 6 or
7 Negroes on petit jury venires in criminal
cases, no Negro has actually served on a
petit jury since about 1950.
It is wholly obvious that Alabama has not
wholly excluded a racial group . . . . Un-
doubtedly the selection of prospective jurors
was somewhat haphazard and little effort
was made to ensure that all groups in the
community were fully represented. But an
imperfect system in not equivalent to pur-
poseful discrimination based on race. (Bell,
1973: 952-953)
The Supreme Court's position on these
and subsequent appeals is well illustrated in
260 JAMES P. BRADY
a m o r e recent 1975 case, T a y l o r v. L o u i s i -
ana. In this instance, the court did find in
favor of a male defendant who claimed that
the Louisiana jury selection procedure led
to the systematic underrepresentation of
w o m e n as jurors (Long, 1975: 89-92). The
Court noted:
We accept the fair cross section requirement
as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed
by the Sixth.Amendment and are convinced
that the requirement has solid founda-
tion . . . . It should also be emphasized in
holding that petit juries must be drawn from
a source fairly representative of the commu-
nity, we impose no requirement that petit
juries actually chosen must mirror the com-
munity and reflect the various distinctive
groups in the population. Defendants are
not entitled to a jury of any particular
composition. (Emphasis added.) (Chambliss
and Seidman, 1971: 439)
For defendants who would challenge
juries as unrepresentative, the burden of
p r o o f is heavy indeed. It is not sufficient to
show that the jury panel at trial is dramati-
cally unlike the surrounding population. It is
not enough to show even that juries in a
given c o m m u n i t y have historically been
unrepresentative. It must be established
that the p r o c e s s of selection is itself system-
atically and purposefully discriminatory.
Reflecting on the course of the.se events
and the long history of the jury and political
trials, there is little cause for liberal opti-
mism that progressive reforms will originate
from legislators, judges, or editors. Does
this m e a n that activist defendants should
avoid jury trials and trust to the discretion of
the judge and the mechanics of the plea
bargaining process? N o . Judges are consis-
tently m o r e hostile and alien to radical
ideas, activities, and social backgrounds
than even biased juries (Mariana, 1975;
M c C o n a h a n and Frederick, 1977; Lown,
1975). In some cases, as in the trials of
J o a n n e Little and Susan Saxe, defense
arguments and jury research on social bias
and media coverage have convinced trial
judges to m a k e concessions to the defense in
the matter of jury selection (Long, 1975:
86-88; O ' R o u r k e , 1972: 54-75). Moreover,
as the Panther, American Indian, and anti-
Vietnam war activist trials have shown, it is
possible to educate politically even initially
hostile jurors by exposing false prosecution
evidence, and describing the defendants"
political values and motivations (Zimroth,
1974: 136-139, Kennebunk, 1973: 235-237:
Schrag, 1974: 324-325).
In conclusion, those who support egalitar-
ian change and social justice must learn
from the painful history of the past and form
a realistic appraisal of the political-
economic interests behind the present legal
system. We must not "look to the moun-
tains" for enlightened reforms in the courts,
the jury system, or the society as a whole.
The 1980s hold the specter of economic
recession and renewed social protest which
will most likely lead to another series of
political trials. In the short run, the best
defense lies in resisting repressive laws like
S-1722 and in appeals to the public as
citizens and as jurors. But justice is a social
and not a legal condition and must be won
through the process of consciousness rais-
ing, organization, and militant action
(Brady, 1981a, 1981b, 1982) that is the
prerequisite for fundamental and egalitarian
social change.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This article was presented as a paper at the
American Society of Criminology, National Meet-
ings. Philadelphia, November. 1979.
NOTES
Affidavits and questionnaire data available for Susan
Saxe case unpublished but available from author on
request. The Susan Saxe defense committee was
helpful in preparation of the Picariello-Guilion
defense.
-" Data drawn from content analysis of Portland press
coverage based on all relevant articles. Total news-
paper file available on request. Newspapers abbrevi-
ated in tables as follows: PEE--Portland Evening
Express. PPH--Portland Press Herald
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and Political Trials 261

3 Table 8: Survey of General Bias and Attitudes

Toward Criminal Defendants among Potential Ju-
rors in the Southern Maine Trial District.

Don't Know "

Agree Disagree No Answer
% % %

Q. If someone who is accused of a crime

flees to avoid arrest, that person
is probably guilty 71.6 23.0 5.4
Q. Anyone on the FBI "Most Wanted" list
is probably guilty. 86.9 9.9 3.2
Q. If the government goes to the
trouble to bring someone to trial,
that person is probably guilty. 55.7 37.3 7.0

REFERENCES Carp, R. (1973). The behavior of grand juries:

Arlen, M. (1974). A n American verdict. New York:
Doubleday.
Bannon, ,i. (1974). Law, morality and Vietnam.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Barth, A. (1976). Pentagon Papers. In Rights in
conflict, ed. A. Barth. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Becker, T. (1971). Political trials. New York: Bobbs-
Merrill.
Bell, D. (1973). Race, racism, and American law.
Boston: Little Brown.
Berry, M. (1971). Black resistance, white law.
Englewood Cliffs, N.I: Prentice Hall.
Beven, R. (1958). Jury behavior as a function of
prestige of foreman. J. o f Pub. Law 7.
Bimba, A. (1932). The Molly McGuires. New York:
International Publishers.
Blackburn, S. (1971). White justice. New York:
Harper and Row.
Blackstone, R. (1880). Commentaries on the laws o f
England, Vol. III. London: Murray.
Brady, ,i. (1981a). Sorting out the exile's confusion:
Dialogue on popular justice. Contemp. Crisis 5.
--(1981b). Towards a popular justice in the
United States, Contemp. Crisis 5.
---(1982). Arson, fiscal crisis, and community
action. Crime and Delinq. 28 (April).
Acquiescence or justice? Soc. Sci. Q. 4.
Chambliss, W. (1978). On the take. Bloomington:
Indiana University.
Chambliss, W., and Seidman, R. (1971). Law, order
and power. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Chomsky, N. (1970). Reflections. In Trials o f the
resistance, ed. N. Chomsky. New York: Random
House.
Clark, L. (1975). The grand jury. New York:
Quadrangle.
Cole, G. (1973). Politics and the administration o f
justice. London: Sage.
Center for Research on Criminal Justice (CRCJ)
(1976). The iron fist and the velvet glove, 2nd ed.
Berkeley: CRC,I.
Crewdson, J. (1974). FBI's drive to disrupt Black
Panthers. New York Times, November 19.
Crime and Social Justice Editors (CSJ) (1975). The
case of ,ioanne Little. Crime and Social Justice
(Summer).
Danielski, D. (1971). The Chicago conspiracy trial.
In Political Trials, ed. T. Becker. New York:
Bobbs-Merrill.
Davis, A., ed. (1971). I f they come in the morning.
New York: Signet.
Dolbeare, K., and Grossman, J. (1971). Le Roi
Jones in Newark. Political trials, ed. T. Becker. New
York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Burke, M. (1974). Issues on trial. In Conspiracy, ed. Doob, L. (1946). Public opinion and propaganda.
W. Raines. New York: Harper and Row. New Haven: Henry Holt.

Burnham. M. (1971). Rushell and Angeta. In I f they
come in the morning, ed. A. Davis. New York:
Signet.
Cagle, C.. and Stampf, H. (1971). The trial of Reis
Lopez Tijerina. In Political trials, ed. T. Becker.
New York: Bobbs-Merrill.
Dubofsky, M. (1969). We shall be all. New York:
Quadrangle.
Emerson, T. (1978). Testimony before Senate Judi-
ciary Committee. Cong. Record (March 6).
Epstein, ,i. (1970a). The great conspiracy trial. New
York: Random House.
262 JAMES P. BRADY
--(1970b). The trial of Bobby Seale. Trials of
the resistance, ed. N. Chomsky. New York: Random
House.
Erlanger, H. (1970). Jury research in America. Law
and Soc. Rev. 4.
Erlich. H. (1972). The politics of news media
control. Insurgent Sociologist, no. 4.
Ferber, M. (19701. On being indicted. In Trials o f
the Resistance, ed. N. Chomsky. New York: Ran-
dom House.
Finkelstein, R. (1966). Application of statistical
decision theory to jury discrimination cases. Harvard
Law Rev. 8.
Flexner, E. (1959). Century of struggle. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Foner, P. (1970). The case o f Joe Hill. New York:
International Publishers.
Frankel, M., and Naftalis, G. (1975). The grand
jury: An institution on trial. New York: Hill and
Wang.
Fried, M. (1978). Juror selection. In Justice and
Corrections, ed. N. Johnston and L. Savitz. New
York: John Wiley.
Friendly, A., and Goldfarb, R. (1968). Crime and
publicity. New York: Vintage.
Garfinkle, A. (1971). Women's servitude under the
law. In Law against thepeople, ed. R. Lefcourt. New
York: Random House.
Ginsberg, A. (1975). Chicago trial testimony. San
Francisco, City Lights.
Goldfarb, R. (1974). Politics and the Justice Depart-
ment. In Conspiracy, ed. J. Raines. New York:
Harper and Row.
Goodell, C. (1973). Political prisoners in America.
New York: Random House.
Hagan, J. (1978). Extra legal attributes and criminal
sentencing. In Justice and Corrections, ed. N. John-
ston and L. Savitz. New York: John Wiley.
Halperin, M. (19761. The lawless state. New York:
Penguin.
Hayden, T. (19701. Trial. London: Jonathan Cape.
Hays, A. (197[)). Trial by prejudice. Westport:
Negro University Press.
Hoyt, E. (19691. The Palmer raids. New York:
Seabury.
Jaworski, L. (1976). The right and the power. New
York: Gulf.
Kairys, D. (19741. Juror selection: The law, mathe-
matical methods of analysis and a case study. Am.
('rim. Law Rev. 10.
Kalven, H. (19661. The American lurv. Boston:
Little Brown.
Karmen. A. (19741. Agents provocateurs in the
contemporary U.S. left. In The Criminologist, ed. C.
Reasons. Santa Monica: Goodyear.
Kates, A. (1972). Red Emma speaks. New York:
Vintage.
Keating, E. (19701. Free Huev. New York: Detl.
Kennebeck, E. (19731. Juror number four. New
York: Norton.
Kirchheimer, O. (1961). Political justice. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Lefcourt, R., ed. (1972). Law against the people.
New York: Random House.
Lens. S. (1973). The labor wars. Garden City:
Doubleday.
Lofton, J. (1966). Justice and the press. Boston:
Beacon.
Long, R. (1975). American minorities: The justice
issue. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
Lown, C. (19751. Legal approaches to juror stereo-
typing. Law and Hum. Behav. 1. no. 1.
Mann, E. (1974). Comrade George. Boston: Hovey
Street Press.
Mariana, G. ( 19751, Preemptory challenge: Divining
rod for a sympathetic jury. Catholic Lawyer 21.
Marine, G. (19731. The persecution and assassina-
tion of the Black Panthers. Ramparts 17.
Merwick, C. (1976). The reform of the federal
criminal code. First Principles (April).
Michaelowski, R. (1976). Trial of the Charlotte
Three. Crime and Soc. Just. 7.
Meiklejohn, A. (1972). Free Speech. London: Ken-
nikat Press.
Mills, E. (197l). A statistical profile of jurors in a
U.S. district court. In The Jury: Selected Readings,
ed. G. Winter. Chicago: American Judicature So-
ciety.
Mitford, J. (19691. The trial of Dr. Spock. New
York: Alfred Knopf.
Moore, L. (19731. The jury: Tool of kings, palladium
of liberty. Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson.
Morgan, E. ( 19481 The legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti.
New York: G. L. Joughin.
McCart, R. (19641. Trial by jury. New York: Chilton
Books.
McConahan, J., and Frederick, J. (1977). The uses
of social sciences in trials with political or racial
overtones. Law and Contemp. Prob. (Winter).
Nagle, W. (19771. On behalf of a prison morato-
rium. Crime and Delinq. 23 (April),
National Coalition Against Repressive Legislation
(NCARL) (1977). S-1437--Why we must stop it.
Los Angeles: NCARL pamphlet.
 Fair and Impartial Railroad: The Jury, The Media, and Political Trials
National Crime Survey (NCS) (1978a). Minneapolis:
Public attitudes about crime. Washington, DC: Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration.
(1978b). Milwaukee: Public attitudes about
crime. Washington, DC: Law Enforcement Assis-
tance Administration.
---(1978c) Houston: Public attitudes about
crime. Washington, DC: Law Enforcement Assis-
tance Administration.
National Jury Project (NJP) (1975). The jury system:
New methods for reducing prejudice. Philadelphia:
NJP.
Nettler, G. (1978). Explaining crime. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Newton. H. (1968). Revolutionary suicide. New
York: Harcourt. Brace and World.
North American Congress on Latin America (NA-
CLA) (1976). Under the cloak and behind the
dagger. NA CLA Report 11, no. 2.
O'Connor, H. (1964). Revolution in Seattle. New
York: Monthly Review Press.
O'Connor. J. (1979). The fiscal crisis of the state. In
Capitalist Society, ed. R. Quinney. Homewood, IL:
Dorsey.
O'Rourke. W. (1972). The Harrisburg Seven and the
Catholic left. New York: Thomas Crowell.
Ostrow, R. (1972). The FB1 and the Berrigans. New
York: Coward-McCann.
Pearce. F. (1974). Crime corporations and the
American social order. In Politics and Deviance, ed.
F. Pearce. New York: Penguin Books.
Pokorny. A. (1977). A comparison of homicides in
two cities. Crime in America, ed. B. Cohen. Itasca,
IL: F. E. Peacock.
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice (1967). Crime and its
impact. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office.
Preston. W. (1963). Aliens and dissenters. New
York: Harper and Row.
Pritchett, C. (1959). The American Constitution.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Quinney, R. (1974). Criminal justice in America.
Boston: Little, Brown.
Raines. J. (1974). The Pursuit of Legitimacy. In
Conspiracy, ed. J. Raines. New York: Harper and
Row.
Reiman. J. (1979). The rich get richer.and the poor
get prison. New York: John Wilex.
Rodino. P. (1975). Impeachment o f Richard M.
,Vi.rotl. New York: Viking.
263
Schrag, P. (1974). A test of loyalty. New York:
Simon and Schuster.
Schultz, J. (1972). The motion will be denied. New
York: William Morrow.
Seale, B. (1968). Seize the lime. New York: Random
House.
Segal, J. (1975). Stop S-I. Guardian pamphlet. New
York: Guardian.
Silvergate, H. (1974). The 1970s: A decade of
repression'? In Criminal justice in America. ed. R.
Quinney. Boston: Little-Brown.
Somerville, J. (1956). The Communist trials and the
American tradition. New York: Cameron Asso-
ciates.
Stermberg, D. (1975). The new radical criminal
trials. In Criminal justice in America, ed. R, Quin-
hey. Boston: Little-Brown.
Strick, A. (1977). Injustice for all. New York:
Putnam's.
Strodbeck, W. (1956). Sex role differentiation in
jury deliberations. Sociolmetrv 19.
---(1957). Social status in jury deliberations.
Am. Sociol. Rev. 22.
Sullivan, H. (1967). Trml by newspaper. Hyannis:
Patriot Press.
U.S. Senate (1973). Senate Bill S-I, Judiciary
Committee.
---(1976). Senate Bill S-1437, Judiciary Commit-
tee.
--.(1980). Senate Bill S-1722, Judiciary Commit-
tee.
Warner, M. (1969). Decision making in American
TV political news. In Sociology o f mass media
communications, ed. P. Halmos. London: Sociologi-
cal Review Monograph, no. 13.
Weatherpeople's Underground (1974). Prairie~re.
secret location and press.
Wise, G. (1978). The American police state. New
York: Vintage Random.
Wolfe, A. (1971). Political repression and the liberal
democratic State. Monthly Review 23, no. 7.
--(1974). The limits of legitimacy. In Criminal
justice in America, ed. R. Quinney. Boston: Little,
Brown.
--(1973). The seamy side of democracy. New
York: McKay.
Wright. E. (1973). The politics of punishment. New
York: Harper and Row.
Zimroth, P. (1974). Perversions o f justice. New
York: Viking.