1

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA

ROMEO AND JOSE SANCHEZ

Represented by MIRZA L. PRESADO,
Petitioners,

CA G.R. S.P. No. 159874

-v e r s u s-

SPS. ANTONIO LAURIO and

BENITA LAURIO snd those whose
occupancy depends on the rights
of the spouses,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PETITIONER

COMES NOW, Petitioners, through the undersigned counsel, and unto

this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

I. NATURE OF THE PETITION

1. This is a Petition for Review pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of Court

of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) of Masbate City,
Branch 46 entitled ROMEO AND JOSE SANCHEZ, represented by
MIRZA L. PRESADO versus SPS. ANTONIO LAURIO and BENITA
LAURIO and those whose occupancy depend on the rights of the
spouses, and Resolution of the RTC, Branch 46, Masbate City, resolving
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner, which
affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Masbate City, in Civil Case No. 1555 dismissing petitioner’s complaint
for ejectment, on the ground that the RTC, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, committed in its decision errors of law and of
facts.

II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL DATES AND

TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION
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2. On December 18, 2020, the petitioner received a Resolution dated

November 17, 2020, a pertinent portion as follows:

“The Court resolves to Grant and Note

respectively, petitioners’ Motion for Extension
to Submit Reply praying for five (5) days from
September 15, 2020 or until September 20,
2020 and the Reply (to the Comment dated
November 25, 2019) filed on September 21,
2020.

The parties are directed to file their respective

memoranda within fifteen (15) days from
notice”

[Emphasis applied]

3. In the said Resolution, the parties are directed to file their respective
memoranda within fifteen (15) days from notice or until January 2,
2020. Considering that January 2, 2020 falls on a Saturday, the
fifteenth days falls on Monday, June 4, 2020 to consider that petitioner
filed the same on time. Hence, the timeliness of the Memorandum.

III. THE PARTIES

4. PETITIONERS ROMEO AND JOSE SANCHEZ represented by MIRZA L.

PRESADO, who are both of legal ages, Filipino citizens, with address
at Purok 2, Brgy. Kinamaligan, Masbate City, and where notices,
orders, resolutions and other legal processes may be served upon them
or thru their counsel of record, are the petitioners in said Civil Case No.
1555, MTCC, Masbate City, AND the appellants in said Civil Case No.
7383, RTC, Branch 46, Masbate City,

5. RESPONDENTS, SPS. ANTONIO LAURIO and BENITA LAURIO, who are

both of legal ages, married, and residents of Brgy. Kinamaligan,
Masbate City, where they may be served with notices, orders,
resolution and other legal processes of this Honorable Court or thru
the undersigned counsel, are the respondents in said Civil Case No.
1555, MTCC, Masbate City, AND the appellees in said Civil Case No.
7383, RTC, Branch 46, Masbate City.

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6. On December 6, 2017, herein petitioners filed a Complaint for

Ejectment with Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Masbate City
dated December 4, 2017 against herein respondents.
3

7. Respondents filed their Answer with MTCC, Masbate City dated

December 21, 2017.

8. On May 3, 2018, petitioners filed their Position paper dated May 2,

2018.

9. Respondents also filed their Position Paper dated April 27, 2018.

10. On June 19, 2018, petitioners received the Judgment dated June
8, 2018 of the MTCC of Masbate City dismissing the case for lack of
cause of action.

11. On July 3, 2018, a Notice of Appeal was filed by herein petitioners

with the MTCC.

12. On August 11, 2018, petitioners filed their Appeal Memorandum

with the RTC, Branch 46 of Masbate City.

13. On January 14, 2019, petitioners received the Decision dated

December 7, 2018 rendered by RTC, Branch 46 of Masbate City.

14. On January 25, 2019, petitioners filed their Motion for

Reconsideration dated January 23, 2019 with the RTC, Branch 46 of
Masbate City.

15. On February 26, 2019, petitioners received the Resolution dated

February 6, 2019 rendered by the RTC, Branch 46 of Masbate City,
denying the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated February 23,
2019, which is hereunder quoted as follows:

“RESOLUTION

For resolution is Petitioners-Appellants’ Motion for

Reconsideration on December 7, 2018 Decision of this Court
dismissing their Appeal.

After a perusal of the Motion, the Court finds no cogent or

meritorious reason to amend, much less reverse, the Decision.
The arguments raised in the Motion are mere rehash of those
which have been judiciously considered and passed upon by this
Court.

The Court takes exception to the assertion in the Motion

that the affidavit of Rosario B. Andres dated May 2, 2018 was
shown in the Position Paper as Annex “K” of the complaint and
4

position paper”. The Record would show that there is no such

Annex “K” in the Complaint as well as in the Pre-Trial Brief, nor
any mention in them about the said Affidavit.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Motion for

Reconsideration is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated
December 7, 2017 stands.

SO ORDERED.

February 6, 2019, Masbate City, Philippines.”

16. Within the 15-day period from receipt of said Resolution dated
February 6, 2019, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with
the Honorable Court of Appeals.
17. On November 25, 2019, respondents filed their Comment.

18. On September 21, 2020, petitioners filed their Reply.

V. STATEMENT OF FACTS

19. Petitioners are brothers and children/heirs of the late Teresita

Boada Andres Sanchez, and by succession, are the true and real
owners of the property or estate left by their mother who is the
absolute owner of the property occupied by the respondents; the
petitioners are represented by their attorney-in-fact, Mirsa L. Presado
with address at Purok 2, Brgy. Kinamaligan, Masbate City. Certificates
of Live Birth and Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, OCT NO. P-11879
and the Pre Patent No. 599931 BIR Certificate authorizing registration
(CAR) and other documents of ownership were attached and marked
in the complaint and position paper as Annexes “B”,”B-1”, “C”, “C-
1”,”C-2”,”C-3”,”C-4”,”C-5”, “C-6”,”C-7”,”D”,”D-1”, “D-2”,”D-3”, and
“E”.

20. The late Teresita A. Sanchez, mother of petitioner, also inherited

the subject property from her late parents, spouses Manuel and Paz
Andres in 1976.

21. Sometime in 2010, the respondents and their son known as

“Junior” asked permission from the said mother of petitioners, Teresita
A. Sanchez, owner of the property, to stay temporarily on the place
subject to the condition that when the family will eventually need the
place or property, the respondents will voluntarily vacate and turnover
the property to the petitioners, because the respondents’ occupancy is
only by tolerance and without consideration;
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22. Thereafter, the owner of the property Teresita A. Sanchez died

on February 11, 2017;

23. The death of the owner of the property resulted to the needs of the
Petitioners, as the true and legal heirs of the deceased, to partition
their lawful share and to put up their family houses and develop the
area.

24. The petitioners requested their lawyer to send a demand letter,

personally and by mail, to the respondents to peacefully vacate the
premises;

25. In September 2017, a second demand was personally made by the

petitioners thru Romeo Sanchez. They personally talked to the
respondent spouses in Masbate City demanding the respondents to
peacefully vacate the property;

26. Accordingly, petitioners thru their attorney-in-fact filed a complaint

before the Barangay of Kinamaligan, Masbate City for conciliation or
mediation but, just the same, the respondents still failed and continue
to refuse to vacate to the damage and prejudice of the respondents.
Barangay Certification to file action was marked and attached to the
complaint and position paper as Annex “J”.

27. Due to the unlawful acts of the respondents, petitioners were

compelled to hire the services of counsel to enforce their rights and
protect their interest for which they are obliged to pay the amount of
Fifty thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos as and for attorney’s fees.

28. Because of the continued refusal and failure of the respondents to

vacate and clear the area despite talks, reminders, notices and
demands, the petitioners suffered damages by way of rental for the
continued unlawful occupancy of respondents in the amount of five
thousand (Php5,000.00) monthly rental.

29. On December 6, 2017 the petitioners filed a complaint of ejectment/

unlawful detainer against the respondents with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Masbate City and was docketed as Civil Case No.
1555;

30. In their Answer, respondents claimed that petitioners had no cause of

action against them because they were just hired as caretakers of
M.T. Andres Realty, who allegedly has a joint venture agreement with
the petitioner’s mother, Teresita A. Sanchez, to develop the subject
property. They also alleged that Teresita issued a General Power of
6

Attorney in the favor of M.T. Andres Realty. According to respondents,

considering that their occupancy was only under the authority of the
M.T. Andres Realty being caretakers, they are not the real parties in
interest; that petitioners should have been the one impleaded as an
indispensable party.

31. On June 8, 2018, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities released a

judgment ruling in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion of
which is hereunder quoted:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, for lack of cause of action

this case is DISMISSED.”

32. The MTCC found that petitioners Romeo and Jose have no cause of
action against respondents since they are merely caretakers of the
developer M.T. Andres Realty Company over the subject property
(Exhibit "2", Page 131, Record). Marites Andres, General Manager, of
M.T. Andres Realty Company holds a valid and existing Joint Venture
Agreement (Exhibit "3", Pages 132-13 Record) with General Power of
Attorney (Exhibit "4", Pages 134-135, Record), respectively executed
by the Original Owner of the subject property, Teresita A. Sanchez.
MTCC ruled that respondents’ interest in subject property is not real
nor direct or material.

33. The MTCC also held that the death of the original owner, Teresita, did
not automatically dissolve the joint venture agreement or partnership
between Teresita and M.T. Andres Realty. The MTCC believes that the
death of Teresita does not ipso facto dissolve the Joint Venture
Agreement. According to the MTCC, to quote hereunder:

“xxx respondents correctly observed that

as far as the Joint Venture Agreement is
concerned, it is a bilateral contract entered into
for the common interest of both the contracting
parties. Thus, the same constitute as an
encumbrance or obligation burdening the
subject property which transcend even the
death of the original owner. In relation to the
General Power of Attorney, the same was
likewise constituted for the common interest of
both the contracting parties and a means of
fulfilling the obligations stated in the Joint
Venture Agreement.

xxx Thus, petitioners cannot unilaterally

disregard or unilaterally revoke said Joint
7

Agreement and General Power of Attorney and

subsequently demand from herein respondents
to vacate the subject property since the latter
are the personnel of M.T. Andres Realty
Company which has a valid and binding
contracts with the original owner of said
property. With due respect, Petitioners must
follow the correct procedure on how to rescind
the assailed Joint Venture Agreement and
General Power of Attorney. When finally
rescinded, respondents, surely losses its sting
to stay in the premises of subject property.

Also, Petitioners contend that

respondents in 2010 sought permission from
their mother Teresita to stay temporarily in
subject property on the condition that once the
lot will be needed by the family members, the
respondents would vacate therefrom. With due
respect, the Court refused to believe as such
because it simply defies logic. In 2010, their
mother Teresita executed a Joint Venture
Agreement and General Power of Attorney in
favor of M.T. Andres Realty Company and of
Marites Andres it's General Manager,
respectively, granting the latter full power and
authority to develop and market it. Was there
really tolerance to stay under the alleged
condition to vacate when needed for the
family, granted by the petitioner's mother,
Teresita? There was none because it would run
counter to the natural course of human
experience with the existence of Joint Venture
Agreement and General Power of Attorney. The
truth, however, was, respondents were
installed as caretakers of construction
equipment therein by Marites powered by
General Power of Attorney in furtherance of the
Joint Venture Agreement and not by tolerance
from petitioners' mother, and thus, this
contention has no leg to stand on. Again
ejectment is not warranted against the
respondents. xxx”

[Emphasis supplied.]
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34. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Masbate City but was also denied.

35. On July 03, 2018, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal to the

Regional Trial Court Branch 46 of Masbate City and was docketed as
Civil Case No. 7383;

36. On December 7, 2018, the Regional Trial Court Branch 46 of

Masbate City released a decision affirming the decision of Municipal
Trial Court in Cities – Masbate City.

37. On January 14, 2019, the petitioners received the decision of the
Regional Trial Court – Masbate City.

38. The RTC agrees with the findings of the court a quo on the lack
of cause of action that the petitioners are not the real parties in
interest. The significant portion of the Decision of the RTC is hereunder
quoted as follows:

“xxx The issue can very well ventilated by

resolving the Petitioners-appellants first
assigned error. If the occupation of the
Respondents-appellees was by virtue of
TOLERANCE of the original owner, the
Petitioners-appellants would have a cause of
action to eject the Respondents-appellees. But
this Court, upon review of the records, rules
otherwise and concurs with the findings of the
court a quo.

Petitioners-appellants claim that the May 2,

2018 Affidavit executed by Rosario Andres was
not refuted by the Respondents-appellees. Said
Affidavit stated that sometime in 2010, Mr.
Franky and Mrs. Marites Andres asked
permission from Teresita Sanchez to allow the
Respondents-appellees to stay in the property.
The Court notes that the self-serving Affidavit
was never alleged/attached to the complaint
nor to the pre-trial brief, but was on appended
in the position paper (simultaneous filing) of
the Petitioner-Appellants. Even if the said
Affidavit be given credence, it shows that Sps.
Franky and Marites Andres were really the ones
who asked permission from Teresita Sanchez,
and not the Repondents-appellees themselves.
9

Petitioners-appellants admitted in their

complaint that Repondents-appellees who are
workers/utilities of Spouses Francisco and
Marites Andres of Coltland Developers Inc., are
staying in subject property and are the ones
overseeing and safeguarding the construction
equipment. But in their appeal memorandum
they are questioning the employment status of
the Respondents-appellees.

On the other hand, the Respondents-appellees

presented a Certification (Exhibit 2) dated
December 19, 2017 issued by Theresa Andres,
the Company Secretary of M.T. Andres Realty
Company. It stated that the Respondents-
appellees are the caretakers of the company
and that they were authorized to stay and
reside within the subject property to safeguard
and protect the interest of the company. The
same matters were also affirmed in the Judicial
Affidavit of Theresa Andres.

Based on the above discussions, the Court is

convinced that the occupation of the
Respondents-appellees of the subject property
was by the authority M.T. Andres Realty Co.
which had a Joint Venture Agreement with
Teresita Sanchez; and NOT because of
TOLERANCE by the latter

It is now clear that Respondents-appellees are

occupying the subject property in behalf of
M.T. Andres Realty Co. If the Petitioners-
appellants want them to vacate the property,
they have to implead and go against the M.T.
Andres Realty Co. as indispensable party.

This Court will no longer delve on the other

assigned errors involving the validity and
existence of the Joint Venture Agreements
after the death of Teresita Sanchez. These are
matters between the Petitioners-appellants
and M.T. Andres Realty Co. and are no longer
material to the resolution of this case.
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WHEREFORE premises judiciously pondered,

the Decision of Municipal Trial Court in Cities-
Masbate City is hereby AFFIRMED.”

[Emphasis supplied.]

39. On January 25, 2019, the petitioners filed a motion for

reconsideration to set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court dated
on December 7, 2018;

40. On February 6, 2019, the Regional Trial Court – Masbate City

denied the motion for reconsideration, which was received by the
petitioners on February 26, 2019.

VI. ISSUES.

41. The issues are:

I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF

ACTION AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS.

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT

PROPERTY BY MERE TOLERANCE.

III. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE REAL-PARTIES IN

INTEREST.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT AND THE

GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY ARE STILL VALID AND
SUBSISTING DESPITE THE DEATH OF PETITIONERS’ MOTHER.

V. WHETHER OR NOT EJECTMENT AND DAMAGES ARE WARRANTED.

VII. DISCUSSION/ REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THE PETITIONERS HAVE A

VALID CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINTS THE
RESPONDENTS.

42. Cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party

violates a right of another.1 In pursuing that cause, a plaintiff must first
plead in the complaint a "concise statement of the ultimate or essential

1
Soloil Inc. v. Philippine Coconut Authority, 642 Phil. 337 (2010), citing Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
11

facts constituting the cause of action."2 In particular, the plaintiff must

show on the face of the complaint that there exists a legal right on his
or her part, a correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such
right, and an act or omission of such defendant in violation of the
plaintiff’s rights.3

43. A cause of action has three elements, to wit,

(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and

under whatever law it arises or is created;

(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to

respect or not to violate such right; and

(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative

of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.4

44. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful

detainer if it states the following:

1) possession of property by the defendant was

initially by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;

2) eventually, such possession became illegal

upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;

3) thereafter, the defendant remained in

possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment of the same; and

4) within one (1) year from the last demand on

defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.5

45. Here, the Petitioners sufficiently alleged a cause of action for

unlawful detainer in the Complaint, as follows:

2
Philippine Daily Inquirer v. Hon. Alameda, 573 Phil. 338, 345 (2008).
3
Spouses Noynay v. Citihomes Builder and Development, Inc., G.R. No. 204160, September 22, 2014, 735 SCRA
708, citing Fluor Daniel Inc. v. E.B. Villarosa Partners Co., Ltd., 555 Phil. 295, 301 (2007), citing further Alberto v.
Court of Appeals, 393 Phil. 253, 268 (2000).
4
Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139420, 15 August 2001, 363 SCRA 223, 231.
5
Cabrera v. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59, 66 (2009).
12

“Petitioners are brothers and children/heirs of

the late Teresita Boada Andres Sanchez, by
succession, are the true and real owners of the
property or estate left by their mother who is
the absolute owner of the property occupied by
the respondents.

That the children/heirs of the late spouses,

Manuel and Paz Andres, namely; Lourdes B.
Andres, Anita B. Garcia, Carlos Andres, Teresita
A. Sanchez, and Rosario Andres, divided and
partitioned their inherited property equally at
eleven (11) hectares each in 1976.

Sometime in 2010, the respondents and

their son known as “Junior” asked
permission to the mother of petitioners,
Teresita B. Andres, owner of the
property, to stay temporarily on the place
subject to the condition that when the
family will eventually need the place or
property, the respondents will
voluntarily vacate and turnover the
property to the petitioners, because the
respondents’ occupancy is only by
tolerance and without consideration.

Thereafter, the owner of the property Teresita

A. Sanchez died on February 11, 2017.

The death of the owner of the property

resulted to the needs of the Petitioners, as the
true and legal heirs of the deceased, to
partition their lawful share and to put up their
family houses and develop the area.

The petitioners requested their lawyer to

send a demand letter, personally and by
mail, to the respondents to peacefully
vacate the premises;

In September 2017, a second demand

was personally made by the petitioners
thru Romeo Sanchez. He personally
talked to the respondent spouses in
Masbate City demanding the
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respondents to peacefully vacate the

property.

Despite repeated demands, the

respondents refused and failed to vacate
the property to the prejudice of the
petitioners”

II. RESPONDENTS OCCUPIED

THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY
MERE TOLERANCE.

46. The above complaint alleges a cause of action for unlawful

detainer as it describes possession by the respondents being initially
legal or tolerated by the petitioners’ mother and which became illegal
upon termination by the petitioners of such lawful possession.

47. A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case

is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must
have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.6
As in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere
tolerance of the petitioners, and the acts of tolerance were
supported by evidence submitted or attached by herein
petitioners to their position paper.

48. Petitioners offered the Affidavit of Rosario B. Andres dated May

2, 2018 attached and marked as Annex “K” of their position paper
attesting that petitioners’ mother, Teresita A. Sanchez tolerated
respondents’ entry to and occupation of the subject property as when
respondents asked Teresita’s permission to occupy the property.
Petitioners likewise offered as evidence pictures of petitioners and
respondents in the subject property marked and attached to the
position paper as Annexes “F” to “F-5” and “H” to “H-1” to prove that
petitioners personally talked to and demanded respondents to vacate
the subject property; that consequently, respondents agreed to vacate
the same.

49. The cause of action embodied in the petitioners’ complaint is that

the respondents occupied the land in question only by tolerance of
their mother and, after her death, by their own tolerance. Article 537
of the New Civil Code provides that, “Acts merely tolerated, and those
executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of
a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession.”

6
Spouses Macasaet vs Spouses Macasaet, 482 Phil 853 (2004)
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50. Tolentino explains the concept of tolerance under the said article
thus: -

Acts merely tolerated are those which by

reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the
owner of property allows his neighbor or
another person to do on the property; they are
generally those particular services or benefits
which ones property can give to another
without material injury or prejudice to the
owner, who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy. They are acts of little disturbances
which a person, in the interest of
neighborliness or friendly relations, permits
others to do on his property, such as passing
over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting
some water from the well. Although this is
continued for a long time, no right will be
acquired by prescription. xxx.”

51. Thus, based on the evidence presented by the

petitioners, it can be deduced that petitioner's occupation of
the subject lot was by mere tolerance only. Respondents were
initially permitted by petitioners’ mother to occupy the lot and
not because they were hired by M.T. Andres Realty.

52. The allegation that respondents were hired as caretakers by the

third party, M.T. Andres Realty when a joint venture agreement was
made between petitioners’ mother, Teresita, and said M.T. Andres
Realty, does not change the fact that petitioners were in prior
possession of the property before respondents entered the same by
mere tolerance of the petitioners. Undeniably, respondents were
already occupying the subject property when a joint venture
agreement was made between petitioners’ mother and M.T. Andres
Realty.

53. Assuming but without admitting that respondents were

eventually hired by M.T. Andres Realty, still, the cause of action
embodied in the petitioners’ complaint is that respondents entered the
property by asking permission from the petitioners’ mother, Teresita,
to allow them to occupy the property; that the dispossession started
when Teresita tolerated their stay in the property and not because they
were hired by M.T. Andres Realty. Thus, the fact that petitioners have
shown that the acts of tolerance have been present right from the very
start of the possession from entry to the property, the allegation in
15

their defense that respondents were hired by M.T. Andres Realty as

caretakers is of no moment.

54. Furthermore, their defense that they are caretakers of M.T. Andres
Realty cannot also stand. Other than their bare allegations,
respondents failed to present sufficient evidence showing that they are
indeed caretakers or employees of M.T. Andres Realty, like SSS, ID
and other proof of employment. Then again, bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.7

55. The alleged Certification from the M.T. Andres Realty presented
by respondents was merely issued by a corporate secretary without
any accompanying Board Resolution or Secretary’s Certificate
authorizing the corporate secretary to issue and sign the said
certification, hence, should not have been given weight and credence
by the RTC.

56. Also, the General Power of Attorney issued by Teresita during

her lifetime in the favor of M.T. Andres Realty, which respondents
claimed to be the basis of their occupancy in the subject property is of
no moment. Contrary to the allegation of respondents, nowhere in the
said General Power of Attorney that gave the M.T. Andres Realty the
authority to hire respondents as caretakers of the property in question.

57. Verily, perusing petitioners’ complaint, respondent clearly makes

out a case for unlawful detainer, since respondents’ occupation of the
subject property was by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the
land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.8

III. RESPONDENTS ARE REAL-

PARTIES IN INTEREST.

58. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the definition
of a real party in interest as follows:

SEC. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in

interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Unless otherwise provided by
7
Domingo vs. Robles, 453 SCRA 812, 818 [2005].
8
Beltran v. Nieves, G.R. No. 175561, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 242, 249.
16

law or these Rules, every action must be

prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.

59. In an action for unlawful detainer, the real party-in-interest as

party-defendant is the person who is in possession of the property
without the benefit of any contract of lease and only upon the
tolerance and generosity of its owner.9

60. Xxx in ejectment cases, the word "possession" means nothing

more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in the
sense contemplated in civil law.10 The only issue in such cases is who
is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of
the party-litigants.11

61. Well settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the
same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against him.12 His status is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner.13

62. The RTC in its decision found that the complaint lacks cause of
action since the respondents are not real parties –in interest, however,
the records in this case show that respondents have been in possession
of the property subject of the complaint not as personnel of M.T.
Andres Realty but by mere tolerance or generosity of the petitioners’
mother. Further, respondents were the real parties-in-interest as
defendants in the instant complaint for unlawful detainer because the
respondents’ possession of the property were in their personal
capacity, and not as the caretakers of the property.

63. Notably, respondents also failed to allege the date when they
were appointed as caretakers of M.T. Andres Realty because they were
already occupying the property by permission of petitioners’ mother
when the joint venture agreement was made between petitioners’
mother and M.T. Andres Realty.

9
G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013, REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA vs. MARIO and MARGIE1 LAURON,
10
Sps. Tirona v. Hon. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285 (2001).
11
Gener v. De Leon, 419 Phil. 920 (2001).
12
Arambulo v. Gungab, 508 Phil. 612, 621-622 (2005), citing Boy v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 102, 114 (2004).
13
Lao v. Lao, supra note 31, at 547.
17

64. Moreover, in one of the decided cases of the Honorable

Supreme Court, Spouses Richard and Cristina Pascual14, the Supreme
Court explained that detainer cases may be filed even against those
whose occupancy of the property is under the authority or on behalf
of another provided they are in possession at the commencement of
the action. The Supreme Court held that, to quote:

“As previously mentioned, the sole issue in an

unlawful detainer case is who has the right to
the physical possession of the property.
Consequently, in an action for unlawful
detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-
repondent is the person who is in possession of
the property without the benefit of any contract
of lease and only upon the tolerance and
generosity of its owner. Such occupant is
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
the premises upon demand.As earlier
pronounced in Domalsin v. Valenciano, an
action of forcible entry and detainer may be
maintained only against one in possession at
the commencement of the action, and not
against one who does not in fact hold the land.”

65. In the case of Domalsin vs. Spouses Valenciano15, the Supreme

Court also held that the one in possession at the commencement of
the action is a proper party to be sued in an ejectment case. The
Supreme Court elucidated that:

“A look at the Amended Complaint filed by

petitioner clearly shows a case for forcible
entry. Petitioner alleged therein that he has
been in possession of the subject land for the
last nineteen years and that respondents, in
the first week of August 1998, without his
permission and consent, entered the land by
means of force, strategy and stealth and
started the construction of a building thereon;
and upon being informed thereof, he requested
them to stop their construction but
respondents refused to vacate the land forcing
him to file the instant case to recover
possession thereof.

14
G.R. No. 159292, July 12, 2007
15
G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006
18

The Court of Appeals pronounced that

petitioner cannot interpose an action for
forcible entry against respondents and that the
same should have been filed against Gloria
Banuca. It added that the right to file against
the latter had already lapsed because more
than a year had passed by from the time, she
wrestled possession of the property from the
petitioner.

We find such pronouncement to be flawed. An

action of forcible entry and detainer may be
maintained only against one in possession at
the commencement of the action, and not
against one who does not in fact hold the land.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
the action may be filed against persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving possession
or any person claiming under them.
Considering that respondents are the ones in
present actual possession and are depriving
petitioner of the possession of the land in
question, it is proper that they be the ones to
be named respondents in the case. The fact
that Gloria Banuca was supposedly the one
who first committed forcible entry when she
allegedly demolished the house of petitioner
does not make her the proper party to be sued
because she is no longer in possession or
control of the land in controversy.”

66. The rule governing the matter of who should be made

respondents in a suit for forcible entry and detainer or for unlawful
detainer is stated in 22 Am. Jur., 936:

As a general rule, every person who has

participated in the acts complained of is a
proper party respondent, provided he remains
in possession of the property, because, since
the proceeding is to recover possession, there
is no doubt that it is not maintainable against
the person not in possession when it has
commenced, even though he was guilty of a
forcible entry, and although at some time prior
to the beginning of the proceeding and after he
made the entry he might have been a proper
19

and even necessary party respondent. The best

test by which to determine who should be
parties respondents, therefore, is to inquire
who were guilty, either in person or by agents,
of the acts amounting to forcible entry, and
who remain in possession, so that the
judgment in favor of the petitioner may not be
sufficient to afford him complete relief unless
they are removed from the premises.

67. Corpus Juris (Vol. 26, p. 836), citing Leaño vs. Leaño16, among
American decisions, says:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, an

action of forcible entry and detainer maybe
maintained only against one in possession at
the commencement of action, and not against
one who does not in fact hold the land.

68. This is in harmony with Section 1, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court.
This rule does not require that the lessee or the person who committed
forcible entry should be made a party even though his whereabouts be
unknown. Xxx (Co Tiac vs. Natividad at al. G.R. No. L-1457, January
28, 1948).

IV. THE JOINT VENTURE

AGREEMENT IS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND THE
GENERAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY IS NO LONGER
VALID UPON THE DEATH OF
PETITIONERS’ MOTHER.

69. Assuming also for the sake of argument without admitting that
respondents were employed by M.T. Andres Realty, it is to be
emphasized that respondents entered the subject property when they
asked permission from petitioners’ mother to occupy the property and
not because they were employees of M.T. Andres Realty. Moreover,
the Joint Venture and SPA between petitioners’ mother and M.T.
Andres Realty were already dissolved and no longer valid, respectively,
upon the death of petitioners’ mother, so respondents could no longer
anchor their defense on the said agreements.

16
12 Phil., 508
20

70. The Philippine Supreme Court has described a joint venture as

an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some
commercial enterprise; generally, all contribute assets and share risks
which requires a community of interest in the performance of the
subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in connection
therewith, and a duty, which may be altered by agreement to share
both in profit and losses. [ Kilosbayan vs, Guingona, 232 SCRA 110
(1994)]

71. In the case of Aurbach, et. al. v. Sanitary Wares Manufacturing

Corporation, [180 SCRA 130 (1989)], the Supreme Court further
explained:

“The legal concept of a joint venture is of

common law origin. It has no precise legal
definition, but it has been generally understood
to mean an organization formed for some
temporary purpose. It is hardly distinguishable
from the partnership, since their elements are
similar—community of interest in the business,
sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual right
of control. The main distinction cited by most
opinions in common law jurisdiction is that the
partnership contemplates a general business
with some degree of continuity, while the joint
venture is formed for the execution of a single
transaction, and is thus of a temporary nature.
This observation is not entirely accurate in this
jurisdiction, since under the Civil Code, a
partnership may be particular or universal, and
a particular partnership may have for its object
a specific undertaking. It would seem
therefore that under Philippine law, a joint
venture is a form of partnership and should
thus be governed by the law of partnerships.”

72. Considering that a joint venture is a particular partnership, it

would have the following characteristics:

1. It would have a juridical personality

separate and distinct from that of each of
the joint venturers.
21

2. Each of the co-venturers would be liable

with their private property to the creditors
of the joint venture beyond their
contributions to the joint venture.

3. Even if a co-venturer transfers his interest

to another, the transferee does not
become a co-venturer together with the
others in the joint venture unless all the
other co-venturers consent. This is in
consonance with the principle of delectus
personarum.

4. Generally, the co-venturers acting on

behalf of the joint venturers are agents
thereof with capacity to bind the joint
venture.

5. Death, retirement, insolvency, civil

interdiction or dissolution of any co-
venturer dissolves the joint
venture.17

73. As a general rule, a corporation cannot become a partner. This

limitation is based on public policy, since in a partnership, the
corporation would be bound by the acts of persons who are not duly
appointed and authorized agents and officers. This would be entirely
inconsistent with the policy of the law that the corporation shall
manage its own affairs separately and exclusively.

74. The Supreme Court, in the case of Tuason vs. Bolanos [95 Phil.
106 (1954)] noted that even if a corporation has no power to enter
into a partnership, it may nonetheless validly enter into a joint venture
agreement where the nature of the venture is in line with the business
authorized by its charter. Such joint venture need not be registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) provided it does
not result in the formation of a new corporation or partnership. [SEC
Opinion, 18 March 1993]

75. It must however be emphasized that such joint venture may be

registered as a partnership provided:
17
[Cesar L. Villanueva, Philippine Corporate Law 730-731, Rex Printing Company, 1998]
22

1. The articles of incorporation of the

corporations involved must expressly
authorize the corporation to enter into
contracts of partnership with others in the
pursuit of its business;

2. The agreement or articles of partnership

must provide that all the partners will
manage the partnership; and

3. The articles of partnership must stipulate

that all the partners are and shall be jointly
and severally liable for all the obligations of
the partnership.18

76. It is to be emphasized that respondents failed to allege and prove

in their Answer and Position Paper that the Articles of Incorporation of
M.T. Andres Realty authorized the said corporation to enter into
contracts of partnership to make the said joint venture agreement
valid.

77. Thus, considering the dissolution of the joint venture by the

death of the parents of petitioners, it entitles the petitioners to exercise
their right to recover the possession of the land from the respondents
who are the actual possessors of the property subject of the complaint.

78. There is no question that, under the Civil Code the death of any
one of the partners dissolved the old partnership the case not being
one where there are surviving partners continuing the partnership with
the heirs of deceased partners.

79. Further, respondents claimed that Teresita issued a General

Power of Attorney (GPA) in favour of M.T. Andres Realty, which was
also the basis of their occupation of the property. The said GPA,
however, does not contain any authority given to M.T. Andres Realty
to hire respondents as caretakers of the subject property.

80. Assuming that an authority was given to M.T. Andres Realty to

hire respondents as caretakers, still, the principal’s death (Teresita)
voided the General Power of Attorney issued to the M.T. Andres Realty.
Jurisprudence clarifies this rule by stating that any act of an agent after
18
[SEC Opinion, 29 February 1980]
23

the death of his principal is void ab initio unless the agency was
instituted for the common interest of the principal and the agent and
if the death of the principal was unknown to the agent.19

81. Respondents failed to allege, however, the exact date when they
were appointed as caretakers of M.T. Andres Realty and whether M.T.
Andres Realty had no knowledge about the death of the principal
(Teresita).

82. In a contract of agency, one party called the principal authorizes

another person, called the agent, to act for and in his behalf in
transactions with a third party (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article
1868). The scope of the authority given to an agent is limited to those
provided and enumerated in the GPA. In connection to this, the period
of effectivity of the authority given to an agent can be specified in the
GPA. However, the absence of any provision indicating the period of
effectivity of the SPA does not mean that the agency relation is
permanent.

83. The law provides that an agency can be extinguished in a

number of ways. One of the modes of extinguishing an agency is the
death of the principal (Art. 1919, Civil Code of the Philippines) unless
the agency was instituted for the common interest of the principal and
the agent and if the death of the principal was unknown to the agent.
Notwithstanding the exceptions mentioned, the general rule is that the
death of the principal extinguishes the authority given the agent. In
other words, the authority given by Teresita to M.T.Andres Realty
ceases immediately upon the death of the former. Thus, M.T. Andres
Realty has no legal rights anymore to act on Teresita’s behalf. And
since Art. 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no one can enter into a
contract in the name of another without being authorized or being
legally represented by the latter, it follows that transactions done by
the M.T. Andres Realty on Teresita’s behalf after her death is void ab
initio.

V. DAMAGES ARE WARRANTED

IN FAVOR OF THE
PETITIONERS.

19
(Ramon Rallos v. CA, G.R. L-24332 January 31, 1978).
24

84. Sec. 1720. Judgment. – If after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due
as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that
said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant
to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall
render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and
award costs as justice requires. [Emphasis supplied]

85. Petitioners are entitled to damages, rentals, attorney’s fees and

cost of suit due to the unlawful acts of the respondents, the petitioners
were compelled to hire the services of counsel to enforce their rights
and protect their interest for which they are obliged to pay the amount
of Fifty thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos as and for attorney’s fees.

86. Because of the continued refusal and failure of the respondents

to vacate and clear the area despite talks, reminders, notices and
demands, the petitioners suffered damages by way of rental for the
continued unlawful occupancy of respondents in the amount of five
thousand (Php5,000.00) monthly rental.

87. In any case, respondents have the better right to possess the
subject property.

VIII. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Petitioners respectfully prays to

this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in favor of the petitioners
and for granting the following:

1. The petition be given due course;

2. After due proceedings, judgment be rendered setting aside the
questioned Decision.
3. Adjudging respondents liable for damages and attorney's fees in the
total amount of fifty thousand pesos (PHP 50,000.00), PLUS costs.
4. Ordering the respondent to pay the petitioner the the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) as monthly rental from the demand
until vacated.

Petitioners likewise prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may
be just and equitable.

Paranaque City for City of Manila, January 4, 2021.

20
Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
25

COS GUEVARRA & ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES

Counsel for the Plaintiff
Tel. No.825-99-18 / Mobile No.: 0998-9984009
Email: melanieoguevarra@yahoo.com

By:

ATTY. MELANIE OBRIQUE-GUEVARRA

IBP No. 121497; 01-02-2021; Pasig City
PTR No. 2571839; 01-04-2021; Parañaque City
Roll No. 56511
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0014042

EXPLANATION

This Certifies that personal service was not resorted to for the reason
that due to Covid-19 pandemic, time, distance and manpower constraints,
the same is not practicable.

ATTY. MELANIE OBRIQUE-GUEVARRA

Copy furnished:

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

BRANCH 46
Masbate City

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES

Masbate City

ATTY. JOHN MARTIN SESE

Counsel for the Dependants-Appellee/s
Grd. Flr. Chinese Chamber Bldg.
Municipal Road, Masbate City.