©  2019, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

doi:
Online First:

Complexity without Composition:

Duns Scotus on Divine Simplicity
Jeff Steele and Thomas Williams

Abstract. John Duns Scotus recognizes complexity in God both at the level of
God’s being and at the level of God’s attributes. Using the formal distinction and
the notion of “unitive containment,” he argues for real plurality in God, but in
a way that permits him to affirm the doctrine of divine simplicity. We argue that
his allegiance to the doctrine of divine simplicity is purely verbal, that he flatly
denies traditional aspects of the doctrine as he had received it from Augustine,
Anselm, and Aquinas, and that his denial of the doctrine allows him to escape
certain counterintuitive consequences of the doctrine without falling afoul of the
worries that motivated the doctrine in the first place. We note also an important
consequence of Scotus’s approach to simplicity for the correct interpretation of
his view of the foundation of morality.

I. Motivations for Divine Simplicity

U
nlike other attributes of God, divine simplicity is a negative at-
tribute: it tells us what God is not, namely, that God lacks all
metaphysical complexity or composition.1 God does not have
attributes of which he is composed. Rather, God is identical with his attributes.
God does not have goodness, he is goodness. God does not have power, he is
power. God is an utterly simple being. On the face of it, the doctrine might seem
strange: what would be objectionable about claiming that God has attributes,
like you and me?
One motivation behind divine simplicity stems from concerns about com-
position and aseity. Suppose God has metaphysical components that make him

1
We recognize that there are other aspects of divine simplicity, such as the view that God is
not composed of spatial parts, nor is God composed of temporal parts. On these aspects Scotus
is loyal to the tradition, and for the purposes of this paper we set them aside to focus on an area
in which he is not.
2 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

what he is, such as attributes distinct from his essence. If so, then it seems that
God would depend upon such attributes for his existence. Anselm states the
problem in this way: “Every composite needs the things of which it is composed
if it is to subsist, and it owes what it is to them, since whatever it is, it is through
them, whereas those things are not through it what they are. And consequently
a composite is absolutely not supreme.”2 Thomas Aquinas raises this worry as
follows: God is absolutely simple, he says, because “every composite is posterior
to its components, and depends upon them. But God is the first being.”3 If God
is composed of anything, then he would depend upon his parts to be what he is.
But that runs afoul of the doctrine of divine aseity, which we’ll define as follows:
AS God does not depend on anything distinct from himself to be what
he is.
Divine aseity is firmly rooted in the Anselmian tradition of perfect being theol-
ogy: that God is a being than which none greater can be conceived.4 If God
depends on his attributes to be what he is, then we could conceive of a being
greater than “the being than which no greater can be conceived.” Hence, God
must not depend upon his attributes for his existence. So God cannot have any
metaphysical complexity. In other words, God must be absolutely simple.
So what do we mean when we say things such as “God is good” and “God
is powerful”? These seem like distinct things: God’s power is a matter of what
God can do—what God can actualize. God’s goodness seems to be an attribute
pertaining either to God’s value as the most perfect being or to the moral perfec-
tion of his character and acts (or, of course, to both). But if God is simple these
attributes can’t be distinct things in God, the way that they are in us. Perhaps,
then, when we distinguish various divine attributes, it is our minds that make
the distinction. Let’s call this the “conceptualist solution”: the distinction is on
our part, not on God’s part. The distinction between God’s various attributes is
mind-dependent: we distinguish these various attributes in our mind, but they
are not distinct things in God. As Brian Shanley puts it, “Normally, an attribute
picks out some property or feature of a thing that is metaphysically distinct from
the nature of the thing. In God, however, what are described as ‘attributes’ are
really all just different descriptions of the one divine nature, not something

2
Anselm, Monologion 17: “Omne enim compositum ut subsistat, indiget iis ex quibus
componitur, et illis debet quod est; quia quidquid est, per illa est, et illa quod sunt, per illud non
sunt; et idcirco penitus summum non est.” (All translations are our own. Latin texts are taken
from the standard critical editions, except in the case of Reportatio II-A, where, in default of a
critical edition, we have relied on Merton College MS 61.)
3
Aquinas, ST I, q. 3, a. 7: “Secundo, quia omne compositum est posterius suis componenti-
bus, et dependens ex eis. Deus autem est primum ens.”
4
Anselm, Proslogion 2–5.
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 3

distinct from it.”5 On this view, God is altogether one, without any distinction
among his attributes or any distinction between his attributes and himself. And
this is the standard account defended by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas.
While the conceptualist solution to the problem of God’s attributes staves
off the composition worry, it leads to a difficult complication. If God is justice
and God is mercy, then it seems by implication (transitivity of identity) that
justice is mercy, goodness is power, and so on. Many medievals seem to bite
the bullet and accept this surprising conclusion. For example, Augustine in De
Trinitate states:
God is certainly described in many ways, such as great, good, wise, blessed,
true, and whatever else does not seem to be said unworthily of him. But
his greatness is identical with his wisdom (for he is not great in bulk but
in power), and his goodness is identical with his wisdom and greatness,
and his truth is identical with all of these. And it is not one thing for
him to be blessed, and another to be great, or wise, or true, or good, or
to be entirely himself.6

Anselm echoes this sentiment in Monologion 17:

Therefore, since that nature is in no way a composite and yet is in every
way those many good things [supreme essence, justice, wisdom, truth,
goodness, greatness, beauty, immortality, incorruptibility, immutability,
happiness, eternity, power, unity, etc. (See Monologion 16)], it must be
that all those things are not a plurality but one. So each of them is the
same as all the others, whether all at once or individually. Thus, when he
is said to be justice or essence, those words signify the same thing that
the others do, whether all at once or individually. And therefore, just as
whatever is said essentially of the supreme substance is one, so whatever
he essentially is he is in one way and under one aspect. For when a hu-
man being is said to be body and rational and human, these three things
are not said in one way or under one aspect. For he is body according to
one, rational according to another, and neither of these individually is
the whole of the fact that he is human. By contrast, the supreme essence
is in no way like this. Whatever he is in any way, he is in every way and
under every aspect. For whatever he in any way essentially is, that is the

5
Brian J. Shanley, trans. and comm., Thomas Aquinas: The Treatise on the Divine Nature,
Summa Theologiae I, 1–13 (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006), 203.
6
Augustine, De Trinitate 6.7.8: “Deus vero multipliciter quidem dicitur magnus, bonus,
sapiens, beatus, verus, et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur; sed eadem magnitudo eius
est quae sapientia (non enim mole magnus est sed virtute), et eadem bonitas quae sapientia et
magnitudo, et eadem veritas quae illa omnia; et non est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum
aut sapientem aut verum aut bonum esse aut omnino ipsum esse.”
4 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

whole of what he is. Therefore, whatever is truly said of his essence is

not understood as expressing what sort of thing or how great he is, but
rather as expressing what he is. For whatever is a thing of a certain quality
or quantity is something else with respect to what it is, and so it is not
simple but composite.7

There are not many attributes in God; there is simply God, who is these things.
Any distinction between various attributes is on the part of our mind, not God’s
nature. So goodness is identical with power is identical with wisdom, is identical
with God’s essence is identical with God’s existence. Thus the classical account
of divine simplicity, best exemplified by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, holds
that (1) God is identical with his attributes; (2) these attributes are all identical
with each other; and (3) any distinctions between these attributes are the result
of the human mind and not God’s nature.8
Philosophical difficulties arise immediately.9 For example, let us suppose (as
many theists do) that God’s creation could have gone otherwise than it did (say,

7
Anselm, Monologion 17: “Cum igitur illa natura nullo modo composita sit, et tamen
omnimodo tot illa bona sit, necesse est ut illa omnia non plura, sed unum sint. Idem igitur est
quodlibet unum eorum quod omnia, sive simul sive singula. Ut cum dicitur iustitia vel essentia,
idem significat quod alia, vel omnia simul vel singula. Quemadmodum itaque unum est quidquid
essentialiter de summa substantia dicitur, ita ipsa uno modo, una consideratione est quidquid est
essentialiter. Cum enim aliquis homo dicatur et corpus et rationalis et homo, non uno modo vel
consideratione hæc tria dicitur. Secundum aliud enim est corpus, et secundum aliud rationalis,
et singulum horum non est totum hoc quod est homo. Illa vero summa essentia nullo modo sic
est aliquid, ut illud idem secundum alium modum aut secundum aliam considerationem non sit;
quia quidquid aliquo modo essentialiter est, hoc est totum quod ipsa est. Nihil igitur quod de eius
essentia vere dicitur, in eo quod qualis vel quanta, sed in eo quod quid sit accipitur. Quidquid enim
est quale vel quantum, est etiam aliud in eo quod quid est; unde non simplex, sed compositum est.”
8
In his Sentences commentary, Aquinas says that God’s goodness and wisdom are distinct in
ratio, not merely on the part of someone who thinks about them, but in virtue of the character of
the thing itself (“sunt diversa ratione, non tantum ex parte ipsius ratiocinantis sed ex proprietate
ipsius rei”: Sent. I, d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, co.). (We are grateful to a reader for this journal for drawing
this passage to our attention.) Whatever exactly Aquinas means by ex proprietate ipsius rei, he
cannot be recognizing any kind of mind-independent plurality in God, since even in this article
he insists that the attributes “are one in God, and there remains plurality only according to rea-
son” (“in eo sunt unum, et remanet pluralitas tantum secundum rationem”: ad2). Moreover, the
reason Aquinas gives for holding that goodness and wisdom are diversa ex proprietate ipsius rei
is that the rationes of goodness and wisdom must be in God if he is to be the cause of goodness
and wisdom in creatures. But in SCG I, c. 29, n. 2 Aquinas denies that God and creature agree
in ratione, because creatures are effects that fall short of their cause. (See also SCG I, c. 31, n. 2;
ST I, q. 4, a. 3, co., ad3.) The discussions of simplicity in both ST and SCG make it clear that
the divine attributes are only conceptually distinct.
9
For a much more thorough account of Aquinas’s doctrine of simplicity, including responses
to the philosophical difficulties we sketch in this paragraph (along with a good many others), see
Eleonore Stump, Aquinas, Arguments of the Philosophers (New York: Routledge, 2005), 92–130.
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 5

because it contains free creatures who could have acted otherwise than as they
did). Then God’s act of knowledge, which includes his knowledge of creatures,
could have been otherwise than it is. But this contingent act of knowledge is
supposed to be identical with God’s essence, which is necessary. Or consider the
sorts of things that are traditionally said about God’s justice and mercy: that by
his justice God punishes sinners but by his mercy he spares them. When Anselm
expounds this difficulty in Proslogion 8–11, he avails himself of a distinction
between mercy and justice. No one can understand why God punishes some
sinners through his justice and spares others through his mercy, he says, though
we know that he does. But on the understanding of divine simplicity that Anselm
goes on to develop, the problem is far worse than mere mystery. Divine justice
and divine mercy are one and the same, and both identical with the divine es-
sence, so they can’t be available to serve distinct roles in the economy of salvation.
We will argue that Scotus’s solution presents a middle way between the
problematic view that God has attributes that are distinct from his essence and
upon which he depends, and the classical medieval view of simplicity that the
distinction between the various attributes in God is merely a distinction on our
part and not a mind-independent feature of the divine nature itself. Scotus does
so by claiming that the distinctions between God’s various attributes or features
are not mind-dependent; instead, these attributes are already distinct on God’s
part, and their distinctness grounds our ability to make intelligible assertions
about God. At the same time, by positing a formal distinction between God
and his attributes, he insists that the attributes are all inseparable in God. But
if Scotus posits distinct attributes in God, would that not lead to precisely the
worries about aseity and composition that the doctrine of simplicity was erected
to overcome? Scotus says “no,” because there can be complexity in God without
composition.
While this move to limit the types of complexity that introduce composi-
tion in God (and therefore would undermine divine simplicity) seems ad hoc, it
allows Scotus to escape the unwanted conclusion that each attribute in God is
identical with God and identical with each other, while at the same time uphold-
ing the motivation for simplicity in the first place: God’s aseity. It does, however,
constitute a rejection—in fact, though not in words—of the doctrine of divine
simplicity as Scotus had received it. While we are not the first scholars to have
noticed the differences between, say, Aquinas and Scotus on divine simplicity,10
we are the first to argue for this much larger implication: that at the end of

On the matter of divine knowledge in particular, see W. Matthews Grant, “Divine Simplicity,
Contingent Truths, and Extrinsic Models of Divine Knowing,” Faith and Philosophy 29 (2012):
254–74.
10
See especially Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God (New York: Routledge, 2005), 99–114.
6 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

the day, what is left in Scotus is not a mere tweaking of the doctrine of divine
simplicity but rather a rejection of the doctrine in its traditional form. For the
types of complexity that Scotus is willing to allow in God would have counted,
for most of his predecessors, as composition, and therefore as incompatible with
simplicity. To put it another way, the mainstream doctrine of divine simplicity is
precisely the denial that there is any plurality in the divine nature; Scotus affirms
that there is, and must be, plurality in the divine nature. Therefore, though he
affirms that God is simple, he flatly denies the doctrine of divine simplicity as
he had received it.
Our exposition proceeds in two stages. In the first (Section II), we develop
the point that Scotus recognizes complexity in God not only at the level of the
divine attributes but also (as has seldom been noticed) at the level of the divine
essence. We show how he deploys the formal distinction and the notion of
unitive containment to argue that there is, and must be, plurality in God, thus
denying the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity. In the second (Section III),
we consider the relevance of Scotus’s account of the divine attributes as it relates
to the debate over his view of the foundation of morality, arguing that it fatally
undercuts one of the most powerful arguments in mitigation of his apparent
voluntarism with respect to the contingent part of the moral law.

II. The Formal Distinction and Scotus’s Account of

God’s Essence and Attributes

Thus far we have been emphasizing the divine attributes as an element

of complexity or multiplicity in God. But for Scotus there is complexity in
God not merely at the level of God’s attributes but even at the level of God’s
being.11 Scotus’s characterization of the complexity at both levels is rooted in
his formal distinction. The formal distinction falls in between a real distinction
and a conceptual distinction: two realities are formally distinct when they are
really identical but have different rationes (essential characteristics that make

11
We treat these two levels of complexity separately because Scotus does: though there is
some commonality between the two discussions (his treatments of both kinds of complexity
invoke the formal distinction and unitive containment, for example), they are not the same. This
is no doubt because, although for Scotus the divine attributes count as transcendentals, in that
they transcend the division of being into infinite and finite, they had not generally counted as
transcendentals for other thinkers. Being, goodness, truth, and unity (the standard transcendentals)
therefore required different arguments from those given concerning the divine attributes. There
is also a heuristic value to treating the two levels separately: the complexity Scotus introduces to
account for the (standard) transcendentals has largely been missed, and with it the extent of his
departure from the standard understanding of divine simplicity.
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 7

something what it is) rooted in some aspect of the thing itself.12 Two realities
are really identical if and only if they are really inseparable. Thus, for any x and y,
RI x and y are really identical = df. (a) it is logically impossible that x
exist in reality without y; and (b) it is logically impossible that y exist
in reality without x.13
Conversely, two realities are really distinct if and only if they are capable of sepa-
rate existence, at least by divine power. So, for any x and y,
RD x and y are really distinct = df. (a) it is possible (at least by divine
power) that x exists in reality without y; and (b) it is possible (at least
by divine power) that y exists in reality without x.
So Scotus’s test for numerical identity is not complete sameness but insepa-
rability. Once we have established that some x and y are numerically identical,
we can then ask whether they are completely the same. If we can think about
the same thing in different ways, or form distinct concepts about it, the aspects
of that thing are conceptually distinct. Precisely, two realities are conceptually
distinct when they are really identical (RI) and the distinction is caused by the
mind alone. So, for any x and y,
CD x and y are conceptually distinct = df. (1) x and y satisfy the conditions
of (RI); and (2) x and y are only distinct insofar as (a) some mind
has some concept that applies to x and not y; and (b) some mind has
some concept that applies to y and not x.
In other words, x and y are conceptually distinct if they are really identical but
some mind conceives x without conceiving y, and some mind conceives y with-
out conceiving x. Hence x and y are inseparable in reality but separable in the
mind. For example, the Morning Star is really identical with the Evening Star,
since both are Venus. But the concept Morning Star applies to the Morning Star
and not the Evening Star, and the concept Evening Star applies to the Evening
Star and not the Morning Star, and so the Morning Star and the Evening Star
are conceptually distinct.
In contrast, two realities are formally distinct when they are really identical,
but not entirely the same, and the difference between the two realities is not
mind-dependent. So, for any x and y,

See Ordinatio I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 193.

12

Scotus thinks that real inseparability is both necessary for real identity (Ordinatio II, d.1,
13

qq. 4–5, nn. 200–2) and sufficient for real identity (see Quodlibet q. 3, n. 15). See Peter King,
“Scotus on Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15–68, at 22–4; and Richard Cross, Duns Scotus,
Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 149.
8 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

FD x and y are formally distinct = df. (1) x and y satisfy the conditions of
(RI); and (2) (a) the ratio of x does not include the ratio of y; and (b)
the ratio of y does not include the ratio of x; and (3) even if there were
no minds thinking about x and y, (a) the ratio of x would not include
the ratio of y and (b) the ratio of y would not include the ratio of x.14
Although two formally distinct realities are existentially inseparable, they have
different rationes, not because the intellect thinks of the same thing in differ-
ent ways, but because there is a formal difference in the thing itself. A formal
difference is not made, but discovered, by the intellect.15 In other words, while
two formally distinct concepts refer to exactly the same reality, something about
each thing’s respective ratio enables the mind to distinguish them. And this dis-
tinction is not mind-dependent, but a feature of the thing itself (ex parte rei).16
On Scotus’s account, “two really identical but formally distinct realities will be
something like distinct essential (i.e., inseparable) properties of a thing.”17
Scotus conscripts the formal distinction for analyzing God in two ways
relevant to divine simplicity: God’s essence and God’s attributes. In terms of
God’s essence, Scotus posits a formal distinction between God’s being and its co-
extensive attributes, namely, goodness, truth, and unity. Being is an unqualifiedly
simple (simpliciter simplex) concept that cannot be broken down or explained
in terms of something more fundamental; every other concept presupposes the
concept being and cannot be conceived apart from being, while being can be con-
ceived distinctly without the aid of another concept.18 Scotus describes “good,”
“one,” and “true” as proper attributes ( passiones) of being, formally distinct from
14
In “Ockham on Identity and Distinction,” Franciscan Studies 36 (1976): 5–74, at 35,
Marilyn Adams formulates clause (2) of Scotus’s formal distinction in the following way: “if x
and y are capable of definition, the definition of x does not include y and the definition of y does
not include x; and [3] if x and y are not capable of definition, then if they were capable of defini-
tion, then the definition of x would not include y and the definition of y would not include x.”
Scotus too formulates the formal distinction in this way at times (See Ordinatio I, d. 8, pars 1,
q. 4, n. 193). On her schematization of the formal distinction, being and good would fall under
clause (3) since they are incapable of a real definition in terms of an Aristotelian classification—in
terms of a genus, species, and differentia. But then (3) is completely unhelpful in determining
the relationship between being, goodness, and other transcendentals, since it would simply
claim that if being and goodness were definable, the definition of being would not be included
in the definition of good and vice versa. It is helpful here to follow Peter King in noting that all
definitions are rationes, but not all rationes are definitions. Something can lack a real Aristotelian
definition while still having a set of characteristics that make it what it is—i.e., a ratio. So instead
of formulating the formal distinction in terms of definitions, we have formulated it in terms of
rationes. See King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” 23.
15
Ordinatio I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 193.
16
See Ordinatio I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 4, nn. 172–93.
17
Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, 149.
18
Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 71.
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 9

being itself.19 Scotus holds that being is predicated univocally of everything of

which it is predicated in quid—both God and creatures. Before being is divided
into the ten categories, it is “quantified” under two modes: infinite and finite.
Finite being is then divided into Aristotle’s ten categories, which represent finite
modes of being.20 Thus in both modes of being, finite and infinite, being has
these coextensive attributes: goodness, unity, and truth.
How these quasi-attributes function vis-à-vis God’s being can be best seen
in Scotus’s understanding of predication. Following Porphyry, Scotus conceives
of two types of predication: in quid predication and in quale predication. In in
quid predication, the predicate expresses the essence of a thing (either its genus
or its species); such predication answers the question “what is it?” (Quid est?). By
contrast, in in quale predication, the predicate expresses some further qualification
of the essence (such as a specific difference, property, or accident); such predica-
tion answers the question “what it is like?” (Quale est?).21 These distinctions are
nothing new. However, in Ordinatio I, d. 8, Scotus applies the language of in
quid/in quale predication to the transcendental order itself.22
There the passage concerns whether Aristotle teaches the doctrine of the
transcendentals. In answering the question, Scotus proposes several of Aristotle’s
teachings that imply he does. First, Scotus claims that Aristotle says that truth
and being are predicated univocally of both God and creatures. Second, Aristotle
teaches that if being is predicated of God, it will be predicated in quid. Scotus
concludes that Aristotle implicitly teaches (1) univocity of being and (2) that
some transcendental predications are said in quid—he has in mind “being”—
while other transcendental predications are said in quale. Scotus gives “true” as an
example of the latter.23 On this scheme, “being” is predicated in quid, while “true,”
19
Ordinatio I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 114. See also Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis
VI, q. 3, n. 20; Ordinatio II, d. 1, qq. 4–5, n. 273; and Reportatio II-A, d. 16, q. un.
20
Ordinatio I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 113. See also Lectura I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 107.
21
See Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of John Duns
Scotus (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1946), 79.
22
See ibid., 81; Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the
Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters
107 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 414; and Ordinatio I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 126–7.
23
Ordinatio I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 126: “Sed numquid Aristoteles ista praedicata generalia
numquam docuit? Respondeo. Ex VIII Metaphysicae docuit nihil dici de Deo ut genus (ex auctori-
tate praeallegata), et tamen docuit univoce dici de Deo et creatura ‘veritatem’ II Metaphysicae, sicut
supra allegatum est (ubi dicit ‘principia sempiternorum esse verissima’); et in hoc docuit entitatem
dici univoce de Deo et creatura, quia subdit ibi (II Metaphysicae) quod ‘sicut unumquodue se
habet ad esse, sic se habet ad veritatem’; patet etiam—secundum eum—quod si ens dicitur de Deo,
hoc erit in ‘quid’. Ergo implicite in istis docuit aliquod praedicatum transcendens dici in ‘quid’,
et non esse genus nec definitionem, et alia praedicata transcendentia dici in ‘quale’ (ut verum),
et tamen non esse propria nec accidentia secundum quod ista universalia competunt speciebus
aliquorum generum, quia nihil quod est species alicuius generis competit Deo aliquo modo.”
10 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

“good,” and “one” are predicated in quale. Since truth, goodness, and unity are
coextensive attributes of being, of whatever being is predicated in quid—namely,
everything that exists—truth, goodness, and unity will be predicated in quale.
Predication in quid answers the question “What is it?”, so the fact that being can
be predicated in quid of everything that exists means that everything that exists
is a being; predication in quale describes the way something is,24 and so the fact
that unity, truth, and goodness can be predicated in quale of everything of which
being is predicated in quid means that everything that exists has the qualities
of unity, truth, and goodness. So the proper attributes of being—such as unity,
truth, and goodness—are necessarily inseparable qualifications or properties of
being. But since being comes in two modes—finite and infinite—this schema
applies equally and univocally to God’s infinite being and the finite being of his
creatures.25 In both cases, being has proper attributes that are really identical
(inseparable) and formally distinct.
The parallel here between God and creatures is striking and worth reiter-
ating: although God and creatures have differing modes of being—finite and
infinite—the manner in which proper attributes are ascribed to each entity is
identical, and differs only in degree: just as every finite being has the necessarily
coextensive properties of (finite) goodness, truth, and unity, so also infinite being
has the necessarily coextensive properties of (infinite) goodness, truth, and unity.
Scotus’s terminology concerning the proper attributes of being fluctu-
ates in many places. Sometimes, he simply calls them “attributes” ( passiones)
of being,26 occasionally “proper attributes” ( passiones propriae) of being,27 and
often “quasi-attributes” (quasi passiones).28 Why the divergence in terminology?
It seems that Scotus wavers in his terminology in order to emphasize different
aspects of the relationship between being and its attributes. On the one hand,

24
See King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” 59n17.
25
In univocal predication a predicate is applied with exactly the same meaning to two
things. Scotus holds that such predicates as “being,” “good,” and “wise” are said univocally of
God and creatures. For an accessible exposition of Scotus’s doctrine of univocity and his reasons
for accepting univocity and rejecting analogy, see William E. Mann, “Duns Scotus on Natural
and Supernatural Knowledge of God,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas
Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 238–62, at 244–8. For a defense
of univocity, see Thomas Williams, “The Doctrine of Univocity Is True and Salutary,” Modern
Theology 21 (2005): 575–85. For debate, see Richard Cross, “Are Names Said Univocally of God
and Creatures?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2018): 313–20; and Brian Davies,
“Response to Cross on ‘Are Names Said Univocally of God and Creatures?’” American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2018): 333–6.
26
See Ordinatio II, d. 1, qq. 4–5, n. 273.
27
See Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 134.
28
See Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis VI, q. 3, n. 20; Ordinatio III, d. 8, q. un.,
n. 50; and Reportatio II-A, d. 16, q. un.
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 11

Scotus seems to call them “attributes” or “proper attributes” to emphasize (1)

their necessary coextensiveness with being and (2) their real identity with and
formal difference from being.
On the other hand, when Scotus refers to them as “quasi-attributes,” he
means to emphasize the peculiar relationship they have with being. Since being
isn’t a thing, it doesn’t have real attributes in the strict sense, but it does have
metaphysical “add-ons.” So in the case of being and its proper attributes, we are
dealing with one further level of abstraction than from ordinary existent things.
Accordingly, in order to underscore their peculiar relationship with being, he
calls them “quasi-attributes,” emphasizing the fact that since being isn’t strictly
a “thing,” it can’t have real attributes. Rather, it has “quasi-attributes” which
function for being in the same way that real attributes of a subject function for
that subject.
In his Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle IV.2, Scotus introduces the
notion of unitive containment to explain the sense in which being and unity
are convertible. Here, Scotus wishes to avoid two accounts of the relationship
between being and its proper perfections. On the one hand, Scotus insists that
being and its perfections are not distinct realities from the essence of the sub-
ject—that is, they are not really distinct from it, capable of independent existence.
On the other hand, Scotus maintains that being and the perfections unitively
contained under it are not simply distinct on the part of the mind (i.e., concep-
tually distinct); rather, the attributes contained under being are real perfections
of the essence. It is noteworthy that he describes the distinction between being
and the perfections unitively contained under it as “a lesser real difference, if we
call any difference not caused by the intellect ‘real.’”29
In Reportatio II-A, d. 16, appealing to Pseudo-Dionysius, Scotus claims
that when one thing is unitively contained in another, the “two things” are nei-
ther completely the same nor completely distinct. Rather, unitive containment
requires both unity and distinction.30 One type of unitive containment occurs

29
Quaestiones super Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IV, q. 2, n. 143: “Sustineri ergo potest illa
opinio de identitate reali sic: quod sicut essentia divina infinitas perfectiones continet et omnes
unitive, sic quod non sunt alia res, sic essentia creata potest alias perfectiones unitive continere.
Tamen in Deo quaelibet est infinita; et ideo proprie non potest dici pars unius totalis perfectio-
nis; nec ab aliquo potest sumi ratio generis et differentiae quae semper per se important partem
perfectionis specie potentialem et actualem, et ideo perfectionem limitatem. In creatura quaelibet
perfectio contenta limitata est, et limitatior essentia continente secundum totalitatem considerata.
Ideo quaelibet potest dici pars perfectionis, non tamen realiter differens quod sit alia natura, sed
alia perfectio realis—alietate, inquam, non causata ab intellectu, nec tamen tanta quantam intel-
ligimus cum dicimus ‘diversae res’; sed differentia reali minori, si vocetur differentia realis omnis
non causata ab intellectu.”
30
Reportatio II-A, d. 16, q. un. (Merton College MS 61, 179v–180r): “De continentia
unitiva loquitur Dionysius, 5 De divinis nominibus, quia continentia unitiva non est omnino
12 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

when a subject unitively contains things which are quasi-attributes. For example,
the attributes of being are not distinct things from being itself (that is, capable
of separate existence). The reason for this, according to Scotus, is that being and
its proper attributes are necessarily coextensive: no matter which one of these
attributes is attributed to a thing, Scotus claims, that thing will be a being, true,
and good. Scotus concludes that these proper attributes are not things other
than being itself. However, he warns, just because these quasi-attributes are not
completely distinct from being does not mean that they are part of the quid-
dity or essence of a thing: “Nonetheless, they are no more of the essence [of the
thing], or identical with its quiddity, than [they would be] if they were distinct
things.”31 They are, after all, predicated in quale and not in quid.
So prior to any discussion of the divine attributes themselves, Scotus pos-
its necessary qualities of being that describe everything that has being, in both
finite and infinite modes. Thus God, as infinite being, has the infinite qualities
of unity, truth, and goodness that are necessary attributes of God’s being. Hence
at the fundamental level of God’s being, a fair amount of complexity exists that
was ruled out as incompatible with simplicity by the main lines of the tradition
that Scotus inherits.
The other type of unitive containment concerns the relationship between
God’s nature and his attributes, which is the second way in which Scotus posits
a formal distinction in God relevant to divine simplicity. For Aquinas, all of
God’s attributes are identical with each other and identical with God’s essence
(distinguished only in our minds). In contrast, Scotus argues that the divine
attributes must be necessarily coextensive with each other and with God’s es-
sence, but distinct from each other (independently of our conception of them).
In Ordinatio IV, d. 46, q. 3, Scotus considers whether justice and mercy are
distinguished in God. Scotus claims that the divine essence unitively contains
the divine attributes:
The divine essence unitively contains every actuality of the divine essence.
Now things that are contained without any distinction are not unitively

eiusdem, ita quod idem omnino contineat se unitive, nec etiam omnino manentium distincte,
requirit ergo unitatem et distinctionem.”
31
Reportatio II-A d. 16 q. un.; ibid., 180r: “Est ergo continentia unitiva duplex: uno modo
sicut inferius continet superiora essentialia, et ibi contenta sunt de essentia continentis, sicut
eadem est realitas a qua accipitur differentia in albedine et a qua genus proximum, ut color et
qualitas sensibilis et qualitas, et quamquam essent res aliae, unitive continerentur in albedine.
Alia est continentia unitiva quando subiectum unitive continet aliqua quae sunt quasi passiones,
sicut passiones entis non sunt res alia ab ente, quia quaecumque detur, ipsa res est ens, vera, bona.
Ergo vel oportet dicere quod non sunt res aliae ab ente, vel quod ens non habet passiones reales,
quod est contra Aristotelem, IV Metaphysicae expresse. Nec tamen magis sunt tales passiones de
essentia, nec idem quiditati [MS = quiditatem], quam si essent res aliae.”
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 13

contained, because there is no union if there isn’t any distinction. Nor is

there unitive containment of things that are unqualifiedly really distinct,
because such things are contained in such a way that they remain many,
that is, disparate. Therefore, this word “unitive” implies some sort of
distinction between the things that are contained—enough of a distinc-
tion that they can be said to come together in some union, and yet the
sort of union that rules out any composition or aggregation of distinct
things. This can obtain only if one posits formal non-identity along with
real identity.32

According to Scotus, unitive containment requires some degree of sameness and

some degree of distinction. Yet this is only possible when a formal distinction is
posited with a real identity; hence, a formal distinction between two things is a
necessary condition of unitive containment.
The reason is as follows: unions require parts or components. On the one
hand, if two things are really distinct (capable of separate existence), then there
is no true union in which one contains the other. On the other hand, if the two
realities are completely the same, then there isn’t a true union because there is
only one thing—it would lack the metaphysical complexity needed. So both a
union and a distinction are required for unitive containment, and this is pos-
sible only if the two realities are more than conceptually distinct. A conceptual
distinction isn’t enough because there is no real complexity and so no real union,
but simply one thing. So unitive containment requires (1) some type of essential
union and (2) some type of plurality. Only the formal distinction allows for both
(1) and (2). Notice, then, that both at the level of God’s being and at the level of
God’s attributes, Scotus suggests there exists complexity without composition.
So on Scotus’s view, God has formally distinct quasi-attributes of being
at one level, and formally distinct attributes of the essence at the other. We
can admit, therefore, that some degree of complexity exists in God that is not
dependent upon our minds: “there is, therefore, in God a distinction that is in
every way prior to the intellect.”33 But doesn’t that open up Scotus’s account
to the very worry for which simplicity (and a merely conceptual distinction
between attributes) was originally deployed: namely, to stave off the concern

32
Ordinatio IV, d. 46, q. 3, n. 74: “Ad primum, divinum ‘esse’ unitive continet omnem
actualitatem divinae essentiae. Unitive non continentur quae sine omni distinctione continentur,
quia unio non est sine omni distinctione; nec unitive continentur quae simpliciter realiter distincta
continentur, quia illa multipliciter sive dispersim continentur. Hoc ergo vocabulum ‘unitive’ in-
cludit aliqualem distinctionem contentorum, quae sufficit ad unionem, et tamen talem unionem
quae repugnat omni compositioni et aggregationi distinctorum; hoc non potest esse nisi ponatur
non-identitas formalis cum identitate reali.”
33
Ordinatio I, d. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 192: “Est ergo ibi distinctio praecedens intellectum
omni modo.”
14 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

that there is composition in God? A composite, Anselm argues, is posterior

to its components and depends on them.34 Aquinas repeats that objection to
composition in God and adds three more: a composite requires a cause to bring
its components together; every composite involves potentiality and actuality;
and in any composite there is something that is not the whole.35 For all these
reasons, composition threatens divine aseity. Does Scotus’s acknowledgment of
complexity in God not introduce precisely that kind of composition?
Scotus’s answer is straightforward: he claims that only some types of com-
plexity threaten divine aseity, and divine simplicity means the absence of only
those types of complexity. According to Scotus, the only type of complexity that
is incompatible with divine simplicity or threatens divine aseity is what he calls
“real composition.” Real composition, as Scotus conceives it, involves either the
existence of both potentiality and actuality or matter and form in a subject.36
So while the formal distinction introduces a real complexity in God, it does not
introduce real composition.
This solution, however, seems completely ad hoc: why is it the case that
some types of complexity make for “real composition,” while other types of
complexity do not? It seems as though Scotus has offered us a sneaky redefini-
tion of simplicity by redefining what it means to be a complex object: for he
understands simplicity in terms of unitive containment, and unitive containment
does not merely allow for plurality but actually requires plurality.37 To someone
committed to the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity, it seems that Scotus
admits there is plurality and therefore complexity in God and yet denies there
is real composition simply to sidestep the criticism that his view amounts to
a denial of divine simplicity. To such a person Scotus’s solution will appear ad
hoc and unsatisfying. But we want to highlight two considerations that Scotus’s
account has in its favor vis-à-vis this worry.
First, with respect to aseity, Scotus can sidestep the problem as follows: the
definition of divine aseity (AS) claimed that God does not depend on anything
distinct from himself to be what he is. Since both the formal attributes of be-
ing and the rest of God’s attributes are really identical with God as set forth in
Scotus’s formulation of real identity (that is, necessarily inseparable), Scotus can
claim that these attributes are not distinct from God in a way that would threaten
God’s aseity: for that to be the case, they would have to be really distinct, as

34
Monologion, 17.
35
ST I, q. 3, a. 7, co.
36
Ordinatio I, d. 2, pars 2, qq. 1–4, n. 403, and d. 8, pars 1, q. 3.
37
For this reason an appeal to Scotus’s notion of intensively infinite attributes will not suffice
to exclude real complexity in God. (We owe this point to a reader.) Yes, the divine attributes are
intensively infinite, but there is a plurality of such attributes, which are all unitively contained
in the divine essence.
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 15

set forth in Scotus’s formulation of the real distinction (RD). Since the formal
distinction implies a real identity and formal difference, it staves off this worry,
both at the level of essence and at the level of attributes. Formalities are really
identical with God’s essence.
Second, it may not be ad hoc for the following reason: according to Scotus,
some complexity among God’s attributes is necessary for explaining distinct
divine actions. One needs formalities—contra Aquinas—to explain distinct
ways in which God acts in the world. Divine actions, according to Scotus,
must find their grounding in attributes of God. If God lacks all metaphysical
distinctions—as Aquinas emphatically states—then it seems difficult, perhaps
impossible, to explain why God acts in accordance with his mercy at some times
and with respect to certain persons, and he acts in accordance with his justice
at other times and with respect to other persons:
I concede that just as in God intellect is not formally will and vice versa,
even though one is the same as the other in terms of the truest identity of
simplicity, so too justice is not formally the same as mercy or vice versa. And
because of this formal non-identity one can be the proximate principle of some
external effect of which the other is not a formal principle, just as if they were
two things, since being a formal principle belongs to something insofar as it has
such-and-such a formal character.38

III. Simplicity and the Foundations of Ethics

Scotus’s de facto denial of divine simplicity—that is, his insistence that

there is mind-independent plurality in God—is important for more than just
his metaphysics. It is also fundamental for defending the view that Scotus is a
voluntarist with respect to the moral law. For the purposes of the present paper,
we will take it for granted that there is a strong prima facie case for reading Scotus
as a voluntarist with respect to God’s willing of the moral law.39 To put the matter

38
Ordinatio IV, d. 46, q. 3, n. 71: “Concedo igitur, ad illam rationem, quod sicut in Deo
intellectus non est formaliter voluntas, nec e converso, licet unum sit verissima identitate sim-
plicitatis idem alteri, ita et iustitia non est formaliter idem misericordiae vel e converso. Et propter
hanc non-identitatem formalem potest istud esse proximum principium alicuius effectus extra,
cuius reliquum non est principium formale eo modo sicut si hoc et illud essent duae res, quia
‘esse principium formale’ competit alicui ut est tale formaliter.”
39
The debate over the nature and extent of Scotus’s voluntarism flourished in the 1990s and
petered out without any particular resolution; contemporary treatments of Scotus’s ethics often
restate the issues in the terms in which that debate was carried on—with Thomas Williams as the
lone voice of voluntarism and Allan B. Wolter and Mary Beth Ingham as the leading voices of a less
uncompromisingly voluntaristic reading—and then move on to other matters without attempting
to adjudicate between the different readings or to reframe the debate in some more productive
way. See, for example, Oleg Bychkov, “‘In Harmony with Reason’: John Duns Scotus’s Theo-aesth/
16 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

precisely, Scotus repeatedly says (1) that most of the moral law is contingent, (2)
that contingent moral truths have their truth values only because of God’s will,
and (3) that God’s will with respect to those truths is not constrained by any
facts about God’s nature, human nature, or the content of the truths themselves.
Let us call the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3) “voluntarism with respect to the
moral law” (or “voluntarism” for short) and stipulate for the purposes of this
paper that Scotus’s repeated and unqualified affirmations of (1), (2), and (3)
constitute a strong prima facie case that Scotus accepts voluntarism.40
How might one resist this prima facie case? There are several different ap-
proaches in the literature, all of them intended to undermine (3) by pointing
to some fact or combination of facts about divine or human nature that would
limit God’s freedom with respect to the moral law and thereby mitigate the
apparent arbitrariness of Scotus’s voluntarism. Some writers appeal to divine
justice,41 others to divine rationality,42 and others, more recently, to divine aes-
thetic sensibility.43 One such challenge, defended most compellingly by Mary
Beth Ingham, comes from an appeal to divine simplicity.

ethics,” Open Theology 1 (2014): 45–55; and A. Vos et al., eds., Duns Scotus on Divine Love: Texts
and Commentary on Goodness and Freedom, God and Humans (New York: Routledge, 2003), 58–64.
This is unfortunate, since the completion of the critical edition of the Ordinatio in the meantime
has rendered a fair bit of that earlier debate obsolete. To take just one example, a major point of
contention (and the focus of Wolter’s “The Unshredded Scotus,” American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly 77 [2003]: 315–56) was how to interpret Scotus’s statement that “things other than
God are good because God wills them, and not vice versa.” That statement appears nowhere in the
critical editions. Moreover, some recent work, most notably Tully Borland and T. Allan Hillman’s
“Scotus and God’s Arbitrary Will: A Reassessment” (American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 91
[2017]: 399–429) and and Thomas Ward’s ‘A Most Mitigated Friar: Scotus on Natural Law and
Divine Freedom’ (American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 93 [2019]: 385–409), has introduced
new complexity into the debate. The time is therefore right for a fresh consideration of Scotus’s
voluntarism, though we do not attempt such a thing in the present paper.
40
For the texts, see Thomas Williams, “The Unmitigated Scotus,” Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie 80 (1998): 162–81; “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” The
Thomist 62 (1998): 193–215; “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-
Problem Dissolved,” The Modern Schoolman 74 (1997): 73–94; and “How Scotus Separates
Morality from Happiness,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 425–45.
41
For defenses of such an argument, see Wolter, “Introduction,” Duns Scotus on the Will
and Morality (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 3–29; and Mary
Beth Ingham, “Letting Scotus Speak for Himself,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001):
173–216. For rebuttals, see Richard Cross, “Duns Scotus on Goodness, Justice, and What God
Can Do,” Theological Studies 48 (1997): 48–76, and Thomas Williams, “A Most Methodical
Lover? On Scotus’s Arbitrary Creator,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2000): 169–202.
42
For defenses of such an argument, see Wolter, “Introduction,” and Ingham, “Letting Scotus
Speak for Himself.” For a rebuttal, see Williams, “The Unmitigated Scotus.”
43
For defenses of such an argument, see Oleg Bychkov, “‘In Harmony with Reason’: John
Duns Scotus’s Theo-aesth/ethics., Open Theology 1 (2014): 45–55; and Richard Cross, “Natural
Law, Moral Constructivism, and Duns Scotus’s Metaethics: The Centrality of Aesthetic Explana-
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 17

The crucial point of Ingham’s argument is that a voluntaristic reading of

Scotus’s moral theory requires a fairly stark separation between the divine intel-
lect and the divine will. According to voluntarism, the divine intellect cognizes
nearly all moral propositions as “neutral”—that is, as neither true nor false—prior
to any act of the divine will. God then wills that some of these propositions be
true and others false, and there is nothing in the divine intellect’s presentation
of these neutral moral propositions that constrains his choice as to which will
be true and which will be false. Only after the divine will determines the truth
values of such propositions does the divine intellect know those truth values.
Ingham objects that by driving such a wedge between the divine will and
the divine intellect, the voluntarist reading of Scotus “overlooks the importance
of divine simplicity in any discussion of God.”44 She argues:
The divine will necessarily expresses the divine essence, since God is one.
Divine will-acts are harmonious with the nature of God, that is, with
love. Scotus’s basic insight about the divine will is that God always acts
according to his own nature. In other words, divine simplicity requires
that divine acts of will necessarily express the divine essence as love. . . .
The identity of the divine will with the divine essence is central to Scotus’s
discussion of the nature of God’s justice.45

But in fact divine simplicity is not so much as mentioned in the question on

divine justice (Ordinatio 4, d. 46, q. 1), even though an appeal to simplicity
could sometimes give Scotus the conclusion he is after with rather less fuss.
For example, at nn. 28–36, Scotus argues at great length that there is only one
justice in God—one both really and conceptually—without mentioning divine
simplicity. If Scotus had thought simplicity were relevant here, he could have
invoked it to settle the issue much more quickly and decisively, at least as regards
the claim that there is only one justice in reality. (Divine simplicity does not
guarantee conceptual simplicity, of course.)
But this, admittedly, is weak evidence. Scotus is not really known for taking
the easiest argumentative route to his conclusions. More important is the fact
that throughout his discussion of divine justice Scotus contrasts God’s will with

tion,” in Reason, Religion, and Natural Law: From Plato to Spinoza, ed. J. A. Jacobs (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 175–97. For a rebuttal, see Jeff Steele, “Duns Scotus, the Natural Law, and
the Irrelevance of Aesthetic Explanation,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 4 (2016): 78–99.
44
Ingham, “Letting Scotus Speak for Himself,” 197.
45
Ibid., 198. Ingham’s appeal to simplicity is twofold: there is the negative appeal to rule
out the voluntarist reading’s sharp distinction between the divine intellect and the divine will, and
then the positive appeal to ground an alternative reading of the foundation of the moral law on
the identity between the divine essence and the divine will as love. (The two steps are not explicitly
distinguished.) Scotus’s understanding of divine simplicity as we present it undercuts both appeals.
18 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

his intellect in a variety of ways that militate against a straightforward appeal to

simplicity.46 Their respective activities take place at different instants of nature:
“The divine intellect apprehends a possible action before the will wills it” (n. 42).
They relate to their objects in different ways: “The intellect tends to its object
in its way, naturally, and the will in its way, freely” (n. 43). And the distinction
between their primary and secondary objects is different: “The intellect relates to
its secondary objects necessarily, whereas the will relates to its secondary objects
only contingently” (n. 30).
Indeed, Scotus regularly makes just the sort of sharp distinction between
divine will and divine intellect that Ingham’s use of divine simplicity would
forbid. Consider these representative passages, the first taken from the discus-
sion of divine justice, the second and third from discussions of contingency:
The intellect apprehends a possible action before the will wills it, but it
does not apprehend determinately that this particular action is to be done,
where “apprehend” means “dictate.” Rather, it offers that possible action
to the divine will as something neutral; and when the will through its
own volition determines that this action is to be done, the intellect as a
consequence apprehends “This is to be done” as true.47

We can distinguish instants of nature: in the first instant the divine intel-
lect apprehends everything within the domain of possible action (both
the principles of possible actions and particular possible actions); in the
second instant it presents them all to the divine will, which accepts some
of them—both some of the practical principles and some of the particular
possible actions; and then in the third instant the intellect knows those
particulars and those universals equally immediately.48

Hence, when the divine intellect, before an act of the will, apprehends the
proposition “x is to be done,” it apprehends it as neutral, just as when I

46
As we have shown, even prior to the distinction between God’s attributes (including his
powers) there is a distinction at the level of God’s being, between God’s being and his goodness.
In the first passage we quote from Ingham, the argument from simplicity is developed at the level
of God’s being; in other passages, it is developed at the level of God’s powers or attributes. Scotus’s
actual treatment of divine simplicity rules out both versions of the argument.
47
Ordinatio IV, d. 46, q. 1, n. 42: “dico quod intellectus apprehendit agibile antequam vol-
untas illud velit, sed non apprehendit determinate ‘hoc esse agendum’, quod ‘apprehendere’ dicitur
‘dictare’; immo, ut neutrum, offert voluntati divinae, qua determinante—per volitionem suam
‘istud esse agendum’—intellectus consequenter apprehendit tamquam verum ‘istud agendum’.”
48
Ordinatio I, d. 38, q. un., n. 10: “sed distinguendo de instantibus naturae, in primo
apprehendit quodcumque operabile (ita illa quae sunt principia operabilium, sicut operabilia
particularia, et in secundo offert omnia ista voluntati (quorum omnium alia acceptat, tam prin-
cipiorum quam particularium operabilium), et tun in tertio signo intellectus scit aeque immediate
illa particularia sicut illa universalia.”
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 19

apprehend the proposition “There is an even number of stars”; but once

x is produced in being by an act of the divine will, then x is apprehended
by the divine intellect as a true object.49

The most decisive evidence, however, comes when Scotus explicitly considers
the relevance of divine simplicity to the question raised in Ordinatio IV, d. 46,
q. 3: “Are justice and mercy distinct in God?” The argument that they are not
distinct is the expected argument from simplicity: “City of God XI.10: ‘God is
simple: whatever he has, he is.’ . . . Therefore, God is justice, and God is mercy.
Therefore, God’s justice is God’s mercy.”50 Scotus replies that divine simplicity,
as he understands it, does not warrant such a strong conclusion:
As for the argument for the negative, it proves the true identity of any-
thing in God to anything else, speaking of whatever is intrinsic to God. But
from this it does not follow that everything in God is formally the same as
everything else, since true identity—indeed the very truest identity, which is
sufficient for something’s being altogether simple—is compatible with formal
non-identity.51And the formal non-identity of the divine attributes is enough
to open up the possibility that a particular divine act proceeds from one divine
attribute and not another:
Just as in God intellect is not formally will and vice versa, even though
one is the same as the other in terms of the truest identity of simplicity,
so too justice is not formally the same as mercy or vice versa. And because
of this formal non-identity one can be the proximate principle of some
external effect of which the other is not a formal principle, just as if they
were two things, since being a formal principle belongs to something
insofar as it has such-and-such a formal character.52

49
Lectura I, d. 39, qq. 1–5, n. 44: “Unde quando intellectus divinus apprehendit ‘hoc esse
faciendum’ ante voluntatis actum, apprehendit ut neutrum, sicut cum apprehendo ‘astra esse
paria’; sed quando per actum voluntatis producitur in esse, tunc est apprehensum ab intellectu
divino ut obiectum verum.”
50
Ordinatio IV, d. 46, q. 3, n. 62: “XI De civitate 10: ‘Eo simplex est Deus, quod est quidquid
habet’ . . . ergo Deus est iustitia, Deus est misericordia,—igitur hoc est hoc.”
51
Ordinatio IV, d. 46, q. 3, n. 78: “Ad argumentum in oppositum, probat veram identitatem
in Deo cuiuscumque ad quodcumque, loquendo de intrinsecis ipsi Deo; sed ex hoc non sequitur
‘ergo quidlibet est formaliter idem cuilibet’, quia vera identitas, immo verissima, quae sufficit ad
omnino simplex, potest stare cum nonidentitate formali.”
52
Ordinatio IV, d 46, q. 3, n. 71: “Concedo igitur, ad illam rationem, quod sicut in Deo
intellectus non est formaliter voluntas, nec e converso, licet unum sit verissima identitate sim-
plicitatis idem alteri, ita et iustitia non est formaliter idem misericordiae vel e converso. Et propter
hanc non-identitatem formalem potest istud esse proximum principium alicuius effectus extra,
cuius reliquum non est principium formale eo modo sicut si hoc et illud essent duae res, quia
‘esse principium formale’ competit alicui ut est tale formaliter.”
20 American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly

This sort of argument militates rather strongly against any straightforward ap-
peal to simplicity to support the claim that every divine act of will proceeds
from love. Maybe that claim is true, but it does not follow from the doctrine
of divine simplicity, since Scotus argues here that simplicity is consistent with
the claim that some particular divine attribute is not a formal principle of some
actual divine act ad extra.

IV. Conclusion

Views about what types of plurality or multiplicity are excluded by divine

simplicity depend upon a whole host of unshared metaphysical assumptions,
such as what counts as complexity in God. Aquinas and Scotus would agree
that God lacks composition in terms of a form/matter structure. However, they
disagree concerning the claims (1) that God is altogether identical with his at-
tributes, (2) that such attributes are altogether identical with each other,53 and
(3) that the distinctions between these attributes are the result of the human
mind and not God’s nature.
Aquinas’s account of simplicity, like that of Augustine and Anselm, affirms
all of these claims; Scotus adamantly rejects them. Scotus’s view seems like a
sneaky reinterpretation of simplicity in order to fit within his unique metaphysi-
cal framework, namely, the univocal predication of being with respect to God
and creatures. Given that (for example) being, truth, unity, and goodness are
not altogether identical, when we predicate being, truth, unity, and goodness of
something—whether that something is God or a creature—those predications
do not pick out altogether the same thing.
Scotus’s account does have its virtues, however: it can explain why distinct
types of divine acts can be grounded in distinct attributes of God, and it can do
so without compromising divine aseity. So on divine simplicity—as on many
other issues, such as natural law—Scotus writes within the language of his day,
while undermining the concepts with subversive interpretations. Is his account
of divine simplicity plausible? We think it depends upon the metaphysical un-
derpinnings, specifically, upon whether the formal distinction itself is defensible.
But in either case, this much is clear: if we define divine simplicity in the manner
insisted upon by the classical theism best exemplified by Augustine, Anselm,
and Aquinas—namely, that God is altogether identical with his attributes and
these attributes are altogether identical with each other—then it’s obvious that
Scotus rejects the doctrine of divine simplicity. What he calls simplicity involves
mind-independent plurality—complexity, even if not (on Scotus’s stipulative

Cross, Duns Scotus, 29.

53
 Complexity without Composition: Scotus on Divine Simplicity 21

understanding of the word) composition—in God: precisely what his predeces-

sors ruled out in the name of divine simplicity.

Santa Clara University

Santa Clara, California

University of South Florida

Tampa, Florida