BURGOS V.

CHIEF OF STAFF - CASE DIGEST -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

FACTS:

l The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of
the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in
the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized based on the strength of the two [2] search warrants issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.
l Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated
by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc.
were seized although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles, instruments, etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they conducted surveillance of the
premises could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause.
l Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only impugned the search warrant six
months later.

ISSUE:

WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

HELD:

l NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.

l Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.

l The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree
885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.  Bereft of
such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as the
basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for the respondent judge to have done so.

t is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided
sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in
accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner
"is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is
a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
 existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to
be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters,

cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to

promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organization known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent
judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The
prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO - CASE DIGEST -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STONEHILL V. DIOKNO    G.R. No. L-19550    June 19, 1967

FACTS:

l Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were alleged to have committed acts in “violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
l Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for
which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2)
major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

l Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by:

(1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.
l The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law; The defects of said
warrants were cured by petitioners consent; and in any event, the effects are admissible regardless of the
irregularity.
 The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However, by a resolution, the writ was
partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD:

NO the search warrant is invalid.

l The SC ruled in favor of petitioners.

l The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; ( 1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met.

l The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”

l In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract.

l As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

l As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

l The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to  all business transactions of petitioners
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
 Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly
described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

l However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their
corporation because petitioners are not the proper party.

l The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled
that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

pon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges 2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges —
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the
corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution
and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted
to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of
Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

wo points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same
were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.
 Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989),
11/28/2020

0 COMMENTS
 

Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)

FACTS:
In pursuant to Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, magazines,
publications and other reading materials that are alleged to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent were seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks and later burned in public at the University belt along CM
Recto Avenue Manila in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of
various student organizations. One of which was Pinoy Playboy magazines published and co-
edited by Leo Pita, the plaintiff.

The plaintiff then filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narciso Cabrera (superintendent of Western Police
District of the City Manila), seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents
from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation
thereof claiming such materials is a decent, artistic and educational magazine and that
publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

 Then, an Urgent Motion was filed by the petitioner for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and was later granted.

In defense of Mayor Bagatsing, he claimed that the confiscation and seizure was done in
pursuant to PD No 960 which the materials were voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities
and the plaintiffs’ establishment was not raided.

While, the plaintiff filed his Memorandum raising the issues as to whether or not the defendants
and/or their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any
judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not".

The trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing for the parties to adduce evidence
on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized,
confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscene per se or not". Later, the Court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion to be given three days to file a reply to the defendant's opposition;
however, after following such order, the plaintiff’s motion was denied and the case was
dismissed for lack of merit.

The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors:

1.  The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding
that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's
magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
 
2.   The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding
that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what
was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of
preliminary injunction.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure was constitutional
 
RULING:
No. As strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the
presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate
the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to
justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It
has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and
present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process.

The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify
a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been
sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way
of a search warrant.

The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license
to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, the
Court defined police power as "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare ." Presidential Decrees Nos.
960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities
for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the
twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the commandments of the Constitution, the right
to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.
CITY FISCAL NESTORIO M. PLACER, ASST. CITY FISCALS AGELIO L. BRINGAS, ERNESTO
M. BROCOY, RAFAEL V. FLORES, FELIXBERTO L. GUIRITAN, MACARIO B. BALANSAG and
ROSARIO F. DABALOS, all of Butuan City, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA, in his capacity as City Judge of
Butuan, respondent.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

ESCOLIN, J.:

The legal question raised in this petition is whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the
information as to the existence of probable cause obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant
of arrest.

The antecedent facts are not disputed. During the period from March 30 to April 14, 1982,
petitioners, The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in the City Court of Butuan the
following informations

Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge issued an order setting on April 5, 1982 the
hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders dated
April 13, 15, 16 and 19, 1982, requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in
the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners.  3

Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration of said orders, contending that under P.D.
Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a
preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute
sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court.   On April 28, 1982, respondent
4

judge denied said motions and reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits
and other documents within five (5) days from notice.  5

Hence, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the aforesaid orders
and to compel respondent to issue the warrants of arrest in Criminal Cases Nos. 12209-12222.

Petitioners therefore filed a motion with this Court to restrain respondent from enforcing the orders
subject of the main petition and to compel him to accept, and take cognizance of, all the informations
filed in his court. They contend that the fiscal's certification in the information of the existence of
probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue a warrant of arrest; and that
such certification binds the judge, it being supported by the presumption that the investigating fiscal
had performed his duties regularly and completely.

Upon the other hand, respondent justifies his order as an exercise of his judicial power to review the
fiscal's findings of probable cause. He further maintains that the failure of petitioners to file the
required affidavits destroys the presumption of regularity in the performance of petitioners' official
duties, particularly in the light of the long standing practice of the Office of the City Fiscal of Butuan
of attaching to the informations filed with the court the affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing
a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other
documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

We sustain the position of respondent judge

The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of probable cause.
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that-

... no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer, as may be recognized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmance of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce ....

P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to determine the existence of probable cause.
Thus,

If on the basis of complainant's sworn statements and documents submitted, the

investigating dismiss the raise. If probable cause is established by complainant's
evidence, he shall notify the respondent by issuing a subpoena .... (Sec. 1 [b], RA
5180, as amended by P.D. Nos. 77 and 911).

The fiscal or state prosecutor shall certify under oath in the information to be filed by
him that he has examined the complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of the
sworn Statements and other evidence submitted before him there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof ... (Sec. 1[d], Id.).

There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, But does such certification bind
the judge to come out with the warrant? We answer this query in the negative. The issuance of a
warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of
the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court:

Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing ,
a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule
since U.S. vs. Ocampo   and Amarga vs. Abbas.   And this evidently is the reason for the issuance
8 9

by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the
affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing
practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations
inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show,
after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the
warrants of arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.

In said cases, the filing of the affidavits of witnesses with the court is mandatory. Section 9, par. 2 of
said Rule prescribes that "the complaint or information must be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are defendants plus two (2)
copies for the court's files. The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the
complainant and of his witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case
outright or to require further proceedings..

G.R. No. 122746 January 29, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO VILLANUEVA y FAUSTINO, 

In a decision   rendered in Criminal Case No. 93-127826, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
1

28, found accused-appellant MARIO VILLANUEVA y FAUSTINO (hereafter MARIO) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P53,800.00 as actual damages, P1,663,668.00
for the loss of earning capacity of the victim, P50,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of suit.

The Information charged MARIO with murder allegedly committed

MARIO pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment

In its decision   of 14 June 1995, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the
22

witness for the prosecution, describing them as candid, straightforward and frank. The trial court took
judicial notice of the volume of traffic from Caloocan City to Tondo, and concluded that it was not
impossible for MARIO to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The trial
court likewise dismissed MARIO's contention that the Nacionals wanted to get even with him for his
refusal to testify for Joaquin Nacional in the criminal cases filed against the latter. The court noted
that these cases were filed several years before the victim was even married, hence MARIO's
refusal to testify was inconsequential.

On the third assigned error, MARIO claims the prosecution presented no hard evidence, such as a
paraffin test, fingerprints, blood samples or clothing, to indubitably link him to the crime. The
prosecution merely had and relied on the prosecution witnesses' testimony; which MARIO claims
was insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt. In sum, he assesses the prosecution's evidence as
circumstantial and conjectural.

MARIO'S reliance on the transcripts of the testimonies, which he quoted out of context, has led him
to unfounded conclusions and justifies our well-ingrained rule that when the issue is one of credibility
of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that
the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered; might affect the result of the case.   For this
38

case boils down to an appraisal of the credibility of the witnesses, and we cannot undertake the
assessment with accuracy when all we have before us are the cold, unspeaking records of the case;
otherwise we would make the same mistakes that Mario committed. Instead, we rely on the
evaluation by the trial judge, who had the advantage of directly observing witness' deportment and
manner of testifying, as well as having certain potent aids in understanding and weighing the
testimony of witnesses, such as the emphasis, gesture and inflection of the voice of the witnesses
while on the stand.  39
MAXIMO SOLIVEN v. RAMON MAKASIAR (D)
G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988

FACTS:

Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a
coup d' etat. The President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because
the President was immune from suit.
President Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran
Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity
from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial
court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from
suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.

FACTS:
Three cases were consolidated. A libel case was filed against petitioner
Beltran in which Pres. Aquino herself was the complainant. In his defense,
Beltran contended, among others, that the reason which necessitate
presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit for if
criminal proceedings would ensue, the President may have to be brought
under the trial court’s jurisdiction.

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were
denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently,
by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through
the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and
clarified in this resolution.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

G.R. No. 106632 October 9, 1997

DORIS TERESA HO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the
Ombudsman) and the SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), respondents.

G.R. No. 106678 October 9, 1997

ROLANDO S. NARCISO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the
Ombudsman) and the SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the report and recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor, without personally determining probable cause by independently examining
sufficient evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation?
 The Case

This is the main question raised in these two consolidated petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court challenging the Sandiganbayan's August 25, 1992 Resolution   which answered the
1

said query in the affirmative.

The Facts

Both petitions have the same factual backdrop. On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor and investigator, Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint   against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso
2

(petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678, respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin
Santos and Leonardo Odoño. The complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic
Act 3019   prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the
3

government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby. After due notice, all respondents therein filed their respective
counter-affidavits with supporting documents. 

However, after a review of the above resolution, Special Prosecution Officer Leonardo P. Tamayo
(hereafter "SPO Tamayo") recommended that
both Rolando Narciso and Doris Teresa Ho be charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.
The resolution of GIO Labrador, as modified by the memorandum   of SPO Tamayo, was approved
5

by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on May 5, 1992. Thus, herein petitioners were charged
accordingly before the Sandiganbayan in an information   filed on May 18, 1992
6

Acting on the foregoing information, the Sandiganbayan issued the now questioned warrant of arrest
against Petitioners Ho and Narciso. Petitioner Ho initially questioned the issuance thereof in an
"Urgent Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest/Motion for Reconsideration" which was adopted by
Petitioner Narciso. They alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution attached
thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements
of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence

The Issue

Petitioner Ho raises this sole issue:

May a judge determine probable cause and issue [a] warrant of arrest solely on the
basis of the resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted the preliminary
investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such as complainant's
affidavit, respondent's counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been
submitted at the preliminary investigation?  7

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are meritorious.

The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 2 [Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied.)

In explaining the object and import of the aforequoted constitutional mandate, particularly the power
and the authority of judges to issue warrants of arrest, the Court elucidated in Soliven vs. Makasiar  : 9

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
 judge is not required to personally examined the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.   [emphasis supplied]
10

We should stress that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause
"personally." The word "personally" does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous
Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitution's intent to place a greater degree of
responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under the previous Charters.

The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim Sr. were iterated in Allado vs. Diokno   where we
16

explained again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.   Hence,
17

the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, "must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof."   At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet
18

tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient
that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause.   In Webb vs. De
19

Leon,   we stressed that the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the
20

accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the
prosecutor's initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.

 Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held
in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that
which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The
judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.   Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same
24

proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the
prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion that there is
reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must
decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining
personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by
no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of
the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and
his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on
hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue
a warrant of arrest. 
25

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the

case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge.   We do not
26

intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case
all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-
affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to
make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on
the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions,
which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution we repeat, commands
the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court
has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or
the report of the investigating officer.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED and the assailed Resolution is SET ASIDE. The warrant
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) on May 20, 1992 in Case No. 17674 for the arrest
of Petitioners Doris Teresa Ho and Rolando Narciso is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
 Salazar vs Achacoso 183 SCRA 145

FACTS:

Public respondent issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to

petitioner after knowing that the latter had no license to operate a
recruitment agency and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia are being used or intended to be used as means of
committing illegal recruitment. Petitioner filed for the return of the
confiscated materials with the contention that these were seized
against her will and were done with unreasonable force and
intimidation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the POEA or the Secretary of Labor can validly issue
warrants of search and seizure.

HELD:

No. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest,
neither it may be done by a mere prosecuting body. The Secretary of
Labor, for not being a judge must go through the judicial process.

Further, the Supreme Court held that a warrant must identify clearly
the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void.

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment

The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the
Court's resolution.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo   is not well-taken. Vivo involved a
9

deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by
Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an
undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry
out a final decision of deportation is valid.   It is valid, however, because of the recognized
10

supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held:  11

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It
(the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the
Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was
validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void, thus:

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other,
who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom

the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a
final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
G.R. No. L-22196             June 30, 1967

ESTEBAN MORANO, CHAN SAU WAH and FU YAN FUN, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
HON. MARTINIANO VIVO in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Immigration

etitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon the constitutional mandate in
Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of Rights] of the Constitution, to wit:

(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and that the
legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of
Rights.

Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the
execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation
contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power 4 as a step preliminary or incidental
to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure
 indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of
deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of,
crime; nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision
may constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the
government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of local penal law
with the policy of Congress is purely accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a
criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and independent.

In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution
aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings.

ALVAREZ V. CFI - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

ALVAREZ V. CFI G.R. No. L-45358     January 29, 1937

FACTS:

l Petitioner Alvarez asks that the warrant issued by Judge Gutierrez ordering the search and seizure of certain
accounting documents at any time of day and night as well as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury
Board to retain the articles seized be declared illegal and set aside and the items be returned to him.

l Petitioner contends that Agent Almeda has no personal knowledge of the facts which was served as the basis for the
issuance of the warrant. That he got it only from a reliable source. Thus, the search warrant issued is illegal.

l The articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant.

l The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search
warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional
rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal
proceeding or proceedings.

ISSUE:

WON the requirements to find probable cause was sufficiently made by the judge

WON the search and seizure warrant is valid.

HELD:

1.

l NO. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must, before issuing the
warrant, examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the
application.

l It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant, in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other
witness. The affidavit of the agent, in this case, was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not
personal but merely hearsay.

 When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient the judge is satisfied that there existed probable cause;

l  when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having
a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary.
l We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the
affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

2
l NO. In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath
was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents, and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the
petitioner was subjected.

Moreover, Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search is made at night when it is positively
asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. However, as
declared, the affidavits are insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it is illegal, Therefore, the search
could not legally be made at night.
MATA V. BAYONA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
MATA V. BAYONA G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984

FACTS:

l Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306 "AN ACT GRANTING THE PHILIPPINE JAI-ALAI AND
AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A FRANCHISE TO OPERATE, CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN A FRONTON FOR BASQUE
PELOTA AND SIMILAR GAMES OF SKILL IN THE GREATER MANILA AREA".

l The information against herein petitioner alleged that he offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by
"selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."

l During the hearing of the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the
warrant is missing from the records of the case.

l This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized

l The court dismissed his motion stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath
of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District
II INP and the court made a certification that the documents were not attached immediately and that there’s
nowhere in the rules which specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.

l Petitioner’s MR was also denied

l Hence, this petition praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles
confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant is valid.

HELD:

NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.
Furthermore, While the SC held that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be
ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the
things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
Hilario Camino Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil 1 (1948)
CASE DIGEST
Facts:
Petitioner stands accused of treason before the people’s Court, the information against him having
been filed by Prosecutor Ladaw on February 28, 1946. Almost a year before, on April 4, 1945, at about
6:00 p.m., petitioner was arrested by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States
Army at his residence at 199-A San Rafael St., Manila, without any warrant of arrest, and taken to the
Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa, where he was detained.
On April 11, 1945, petitioner's wife, who transferred to their house at 3 Rosario Drive, Quezon City, was
approached by several CIC officers, headed by Lt. Olves, and ordered to accompany them to the house
at San Rafael to witness the taking of documents and things belonging to petitioner. Upon hearing from
the officers that they did not have any search warrant for the purpose, she refused to go with them,
but after the officers told her that with or without her presence they would search the house at San
Rafael, Mrs. Moncado decide to accompany them. Upon arrival at the house, Mrs. Moncado noticed that
their belongings had been ransacked by American officers and that the trunks which she had kept in
the attic and in the garage when she left the house, had been ripped open and their contents scattered
on the floor. Lt. Olves informed Mrs. Moncado that they were going to take a bundle of documents and
things, which were separated from the rest of the scattered things, because they proved the guilt of
her husband. Mrs. Moncado protested in vain. No receipt was issued to her. Subsequently, after making
an inventory of their belongings at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado found the important documents and
correspondence missing.

Issue:  Whether or not illegally seized evidence is admissible in court.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court, following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that evidence illegally obtained
is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence in such case, the
evidence admitted, without prejudice to any criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer
who illegally seized it. In other words, the admissibility of the evidence is not effected  by the
illegality of the means by which it was acquired.
The evidence illegally seized is still admissible as long as it is not excluded by the rules of
court, on the theory that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely because “the
constable has been blundered”.

G.R. No. 136396               September 21, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO ZASPA and JULIUS GALVAN, accused-appellants.

The case originated from an Information, dated 13 October 1994, which read:

"That on or about April 29, 1994, in the Municipality of Tarragona, Province of Davao Oriental,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent
to use did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously own and possess five point six (5.6) kilos
of marijuana dried leaves with stalks, a prohibited dangerous drugs, without proper license or permit
from the authorities."1

Zaspa, taking the witness stand in his defense, testified that sometime in January 1994 he was hired
by Maturino Masanguid to cut an Antipolo round timber for the amount of P5,000.00. He was paid
P3,500.00 and was about to get the balance of P1,500.00 on 29 April 1994 when the incident
transpired. He stated that he was walking towards Barrio Sambarangay when an armed man in
civilian outfit pointed a gun at him and proceeded to examine the brown bag he was holding. He was
thereafter dragged to the side of the road and questioned whether a black bag also belonged to him.
He denied either ownership or possession of the bag. He was brought to the police station in
Tarragona with another man whom he later learned to be Julius Galvan. At the police station, a
certain Francisco slapped him and made him and Galvan crawl on the floor. The man also tried to
smash the face of Galvan. He was detained in Tarragona Municipal jail from 29 April until he was
brought, on 02 May 1994, to the PC Barracks at Menzi, Mati, Davao Oriental.

After trial, the court a quo found the two accused guilty of the crime with which they were charged;
the trial court held:

Zaspa and Galvan appealed their conviction, albeit the penalty imposed, to the Court of Appeals for
review. The appellate court upheld the conviction; it sai

On the validity of the warrantless arrest, along with the corresponding search and seizure, suffice it
to say that any objection regarding the regularity of an arrest must be made before the accused
 enters his plea; otherwise, the defect shall be deemed cured by the voluntary submission by the
9 

accused to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 10

No significant value could be given to the allegations of accused-appellants that they were
maltreated. Zaspa only decided to file charges against the apprehending police officers after almost
a year following the incident. For his part, Galvan chose to remain silent. Neither one of the two
accused-appellants submitted himself to medical examination. The attendant circumstances scarcely
augur well to support the asseveration of maltreatment allegedly suffered by accused-appellants
from the police authorities.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in toto

NOLASCO V. CRUZ-PANO - CASE DIGEST -

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NOLASCO V. CRUZ-PANO G.R. No. L-69803October 8, 1985

FACTS:

l (At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th) Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at
the intersection of Mayon Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously
been issued against NOLASCO.

l (At 12:00 N. on August 6th) On the same day, a searched was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno;
l (On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M)applied for search warrant from the respondent judge Cruz-Pano, to be served
at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
after a month of “round the clock” surveillance of the premises as a “suspected underground house of the
CPP/NPA”,
l AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.
l The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes.
l The City Fiscal filed the information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents.
l Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable cause had not been
properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant is a general warrant

HELD:

YES. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding
what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in
the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring the particular description of
the things to be seized.

Moreover, the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently
searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant
thereof.

u Out of the 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th pertain to Identity.
u The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions.
u The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search
Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity.

The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of the said witness.
Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant
may issue. 
TERRY V. OHIO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
 TERRY V. OHIO 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

FACTS:

l One night, while Officer McFadden was patrolling on plain clothes, he observed two suspicious looking men who
keeps on looking back the windows of a store.
l The police officer suspect that this might be a “casing job or a stick up”. After 10 to 12 minutes of observing them, the
police officer finally approached the two men and one man who joined them later.
l The officer asked for their identifications but when one of them mumbled something, police officer McFadden
grabbed herein petitioner Terry, spun him around so that they were facing the other two, with Terry between
McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing.
l The patting was done outside a store named Zucker. During the frisking, the officer felt a pistol. Therefore, the officer
ordered them to go inside the store and to face the wall with their hands raised. Did and there patted their outside
clothing for concealed weapons.
l The officer confiscated 2 guns from Terry and Chilton but no weapons for Katz, the 3 rd guy who joined them lately.
l Later on, a police wagon came after the store owner called for help and took all three men to the station, where
Chilton and Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons.
l Judge Bernard Friedman found the men guilty and ruled that, given the suspicious nature of their behavior and
McFadden’s concern for his safety, the decision to frisk was permissible.
l The appeals court affirmed the decision.
l Terry appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1967.

ISSUE:

WON the search and seizure were validly done in accordance with the 4 th amendment.

HELD:

YES. The search is valid.

Under the Fourth Amendment, it provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ."

The Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it
is the duty of an officer to investigate suspicious behavior and prevent crime.

The Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have
been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was
investigating his suspicious behavior."

The Court found that the searches were undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's
safety incident to the investigation.

Moreover, this case does not provide blanket authority to intrude on an individual’s right to be left alone, nor does
it allow such intrusion based on a police offers inarticulate hunch that a crime is about to occur or is in progress.
However, it does radically expand police authority to investigate crimes where there is a reasonable basis for
suspicion.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and set a precedent that allows police officers to interrogate and frisk
suspicious individuals without probable cause for an arrest, providing that the officer can articulate a reasonable
basis for the stop and frisk. 
 PAPA V. MAGO - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PAPA V. MAGO                G.R. No. L-27360   February 28, 1968

FACTS:

l Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a
reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be
released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks,
l Upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, Petitioner Alagao conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone.
l When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-
intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.
l The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the
Chief of Police.
l Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a
certain Bienvenido Naguit.
l Remedios Mago, herein respondent, said that she owns the goods seized.
Ø That she purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga;
Ø that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657
Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila;
Ø  that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a
competent court;
Ø that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not
opened and the goods contained therein be not examined;
Ø that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the
goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs;
Ø that the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under
Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person
without knowledge that they were imported illegally.
l Hence, respondent Mago filed for prohibition and certiorari.
l Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 67496 (regarding restraining respondents from opening 9 bales), Judge Hilarion Jarencio
issued an order ex parte restraining the petitioners. However, when the restraining order was received by herein
respondent, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of
officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent
Remedios Mago.
l Also, Remedios Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods which the court granted.
l Petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the
goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
l Without waiting for the court's action on the MR, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition and certiorari with a
preliminary injunction before this Court.

ISSUE:

WON the seizure of the imported goods is validly done by herein petitioners
WON an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant

HELD:

1. YES. The seizure is valid.

The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have been
released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings
for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.

It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for
the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or
control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the
goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over
the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular
courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question
after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it
cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of the said warrant was only an attempt to divest the
respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did
not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so
there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the
Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967releasing said
goods.

Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could not seize
the goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained.

The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner
of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures,
and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property
when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws.

He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other containers wherever found when he had
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid.  

It cannot be doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the
search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand the assistance
of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance.
This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure
of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by
the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo.

2. YES. Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the
instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
 house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any
person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning
the need of a search warrant in said cases.  But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said:
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon a warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ."
It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement
of customs laws.
An automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity production
and taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower, animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted
individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a
capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for a successful commission of a crime a disguising means of
silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their
police control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper and
broader than their use in so-called "bootlegging" or "rum running," which is itself is no small matter. While a
possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on
highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards
against search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate
the commission of a crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape,
burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory,
confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether the search of and seizure from an automobile upon
a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as
a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.

Therefore, the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in
accordance with law and by that seizure, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws
PEOPLE V. MALMSTEDT - CASE DIGEST -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PEOPLE V. MALMSTEDT G.R. No. 91107       June 19, 1991

FACTS:

l Accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt is a Swedish National who’s a returning tourist and has been in the Philippines
for three times now.
l In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following
day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
l Accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City where he’s
planning to take another bus to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989.
l Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
l The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs.
l The bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they
were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
l Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus and was seated at the rear thereof.
l During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be
a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the
officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist.
l The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer
noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of
the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
l Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused
stopped to get two (2) traveling bags from the luggage carrier.
l Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag.
l Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam
stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
l Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
investigation.
l At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same
was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
l In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a
derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
l Accused raised the issue of the illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) traveling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
 entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple
intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided
to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the
Dangwa Station.
l The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM Officers
because when accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer
that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation
when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) traveling bags as well as having hashish
in his pouch bag.
l The trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically
Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended

ISSUE:

WON the search was illegally done

HELD:

NO. The search was validly done.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the circumstance laid down in the Rules of Court, Sec. 5. Rule 113.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest.

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over
the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause
for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received
by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on
his way to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a
Caucasian traveling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to
obtain a search warrant.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where
accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one
of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was
required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do
so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his
identification papers when required to do so.

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities.
From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the
personal effects of the accused.

In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one
of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2)
travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own
attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession.

To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without a
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.

Hence, trial court decision affirmed.

MALACAT V. CA - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MALACAT V. CA G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997
 FACTS:

l Police officer Rodolfu Yu, in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store
at Plaza Miranda.
l They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted on
opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with [t]heir eyes moving very fast.
l Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes.
l The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions.
l As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner.
l Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waistline.
l Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was
recovered.
l Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.
l On cross-examination, Yu declared that:
1. they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in
the vicinity of Plaza Miranda.
2. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise, at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and
2 others attempt to detonate a grenade.
3. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former
was unable to catch any of the latter.
4. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw
them on 27 August 1990.
5. Although they were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his
companions approached them.
6. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.
7. Also, officer Serapio, took petitioner’s confession without a counsel during the inquest.
l Petitioner as the lone witness denied all the allegations against him and asserted that he was just strolling in Plaza
Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air and that he was surprisingly apprehended by the police with the allegation
that he shoots him and he saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.
l The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a stop and frisk, where a
warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.
l Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called
for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been premature.
l The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were [c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary
to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence and the officers [h]ad to act in haste, as petitioner and
his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and reported cases of bombing. Further,
petitioners group suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus [i]t is
reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence
of a crime but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.
l The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since
petitioner [l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury
Drug Store, concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
l CA affirmed lower court’s decision.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest was valid

HELD:

NO. The warrantless arrest is illegal.

According to the SC, the prosecution failed to establish petitioners guilt with moral certainty.

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures are that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refer to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:

Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped ***

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.

Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:

(1) customs searches;
(2) the search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) (6) a "stop and frisk."

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure of the
grenade from the accused as an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief discussion on the
nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search,
the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as
a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may
search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.

Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner
could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

In the case at bar, at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb
Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by
any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this
likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to
further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be
chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival
of five (5) other police officers, petitioner, and his companions were "immediately collared."

Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and
his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and
his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered i nside the front waistline
of the petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge,
assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.

Hence, petitioner is acquitted of the crime under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (IPF)
at 4:08:00 AM   
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ALMONTE V. GENERAL DE VILLA -CASE DIGEST-
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
VALMONTE V. GENERAL DE VILLA     G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

FACTS:
 Petitioner Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.

According to Petitioners, they filed the petition because they were subjected to searches and seizures without the
benefit of a warrant. The petitioners averred that there’s a recent incident happened, where a certain Benjamin
Parpoon, was allegedly killed in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur
Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.

ISSUE:

WON the installations of the checkpoints violated their constitutional right against illegal search and seizures.

HELD:

NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing an effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as
measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the
Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so
clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not
all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all
sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search
which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner, that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Furthermore, the Court stressed that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure.

Hence, petition dismissed.

UMIL V. RAMOS - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
UMIL V. RAMOS      G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

FACTS:

l Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be one of the five
NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for
having gunshot wounds.
l Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name is Rolando Dural (verified as
one of the sparrows of the NPA).
l Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
l Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
l In this 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners;
that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest
without warrant.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:
 YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was
committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an
outlawed organization, where membership penalized and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine
of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of
organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST,
simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.

Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant, at the St. Agnes
Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in
Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.

Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or
representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is
perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson,
etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base
which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing an organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership
in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts mentioned in this case.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons
(Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it would have been better
for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and
judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of the
law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an
administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of
Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the
crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly
compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an
arrest without warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be
innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said
conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396,

May 3, 2006 (and other consolidated cases)
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the  EDSA
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of
national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines

and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
 In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that
the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some members of the political opposition in
a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.  They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their
way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be
anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the
premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the
building – were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and
AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of
her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress
lawless violence.

II.    THE ISSUE

1.    Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2.    Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP
1017 valid?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

1.    NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017,
were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly

issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)   When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
(b)   When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies
petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and
violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some
rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption
that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with
inciting to sedition.

2.    NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted

pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4
requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house,
room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member
of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be
served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these
rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
GANAAN V IAC

7 NOV

G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault
which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same
morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a
business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the
then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the
Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself
should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was
arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No.
4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present
petition for certiorari.

Issue:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No.
4200

Held:
No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either
a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
“tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed
for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

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