A Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Notation and Definitions

Let S be the set of alternatives, with #S ≥ 3; N the finite set of individuals with
#N ≥ 2; T the set of all orderings (reflexive, transitive and connected binary relations)
over the set S; Ri ∈ T denotes an ordering for the individual i ∈ N . Let < = (R1 , ...Rn )
be a preference profile consisting of n orderings with one ordering for each individual;
< = (R1 , ...Rn ) ∈ T n , where T n denotes the set of all possible preference profiles that can
be generated this way. Let D ⊆ T n and f : D 7→ T is a social welfare function (SWF).
We shall write f (<) = R. The relations P, Pi are derived respectively from R, Ri in the
usual manner.

The SWF satisfies:

1. Unrestricted domain (U) if and only if (iff ) D = T n

2. Weak Pareto criterion (P) iff

(∀< ∈ D)(∀x, y ∈ S)[(∀i ∈ N )(xPi y) → xP y]

3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives (I) iff

(∀(R1 , ...Rn ), (R10 , ...Rn0 ) ∈ D)(∀x, y ∈ S)

[(∀i ∈ N )[(xRi y ↔ xRi0 y) ∧ (yRi x ↔ yRi0 x)] → [(xRy ↔ xR0 y) ∧ (yRx ↔ yR0 x)]]

4. Non-dictatorship (ND) iff there is no j ∈ N who is a dictator.

j ∈ N is a dictator iff (∀< ∈ D)(∀x, y ∈ S)(xPj y → xP y).

Let V ⊆ N ; V is said to be almost decisive for (x, y) ∈ S × S iff (∀< ∈ T n )[(∀i ∈

V )(xPi y) ∧ (∀i ∈ N − V )(yPi x) → xP y]. We shall write: V is D(x, y).

V is said to be decisive for (x, y) ∈ S × S iff (∀< ∈ T n )[(∀i ∈ V )(xPi y) → xP y]. We

shall write: V is D(x, y).

V is said to be decisive iff V is decisive for all (a, b) ∈ S × S.

V ⊆ N is a minimally decisive set iff V is decisive and no proper subset of V is decisive.

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Lemma: Let f : T n 7→ T satisfy P and I. Then if V ⊆ N is almost decisive for some
ordered pair of distinct elements then V is a decisive set.

Proof:
Let V be D(x, y), x 6= y. Let z be a distinct element from x and y. Consider any
(R1 , ..., Rn ) ∈ T n such that,
∀i ∈ V : xPi y ∧ yPi z
∀i ∈ N − V : yPi x ∧ yPi z
Thus, xP y as V is D(x, y). yP z by virtue of condition P. Consequently, xP z by transi-
tivity of R.
Thus V is D(x, z) by virtue of condition I since V is the only set of persons whose choice
over the alternatives x and z have been specified.
Thus, we have: D(x, y) → D(x, z) where z is any third alternative distinct from x and y.

Similarly by considering any (R1 , ..., Rn ) ∈ T n such that,

∀i ∈ V : zPi x ∧ xPi y
∀i ∈ N − V : zPi x ∧ yPi x
we may conclude that D(x, y) → D(z, y).

D(x, z) → D(x, z) → D(x, y)

D(x, z) → D(y, z) → D(y, z) → D(y, x) → D(y, x) → D(z, x)
Therefore, D(x, y) → D(a, b); ∀(a, b) ∈ {x, y, z} × {x, y, z}, a 6= b.
In other words, V is decisive over any ordered pair of distinct alternatives that can be
formed from the triple {x, y, z}.

Now consider (a, b) ∈ S × S, a 6= b. If (a = x ∨ a = y ∨ b = x ∨ b = y) then V is

D(a, b) has been shown already. Suppose then (a 6= x ∧ a 6= y ∧ b 6= x ∧ b 6= y). Now
apply the argument to the triplet {x, y, a} first and conclude that D(x, a). Next apply
the argument to the triplet {x, a, b} and conclude that V is D(a, b). This proves the claim.

Theorem: There is no SWF satisfying U, P, I and ND.

Proof:
Suppose to the contrary, there is an SWF satisfying U, P, I and ND. Note that N is a
decisive set by virtue of condition P. Thus ∃V ⊆ N such that V is minimally decisive;
follows by virtue of finiteness. V is non-empty by condition P. By ND, #V > 1. Consider
a partition of V into V1 and V2 such that V1 6= ∅, V2 6= ∅, V1 ∩ V2 = ∅, V1 ∪ V2 = V .

Now consider any (R1 , ..., Rn ) ∈ T n such that,

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∀i ∈ V1 : xPi y ∧ yPi z
∀i ∈ V2 : yPi z ∧ zPi x
∀i ∈ N − V : zPi x ∧ xPi y
Note that for the society yP z must hold as the set V is decisive. Social Preferences are
connected, therefore either xRy or yP x. Suppose xRy.
xRy ∧ yP z → xP z by transitivity of R. This implies V1 is D(x, z) and by the lemma, V1
is decisive, which is a contradiction to the minimality of V . Therefore yP x.
yP x → V2 is D(y, x). Then by the lemma V2 is decisive, which is a contradiction to the
minimality of V .
Thus both xRy and yP x lead to contradictions and the theorem is established.

Taposik Banerjee
SLS, AUD
13/03/2019