INTENTIONAL SELF-DEVELOPMENT

AND POSITIVE AGEING

Are we in control of our own development in adulthood, or are we shaped

by  circumstances beyond our control? By adopting the concept of intentional
self-development (ISD), this text outlines an action-theoretical approach to
human development that emphasizes both an individual’s ability to shape their
own development throughout the lifespan, and the extent to which this potential
is limited.
By examining general age-related changes and critical life events, Intentional
Self-Development and Positive Ageing explores the adaptive cognitive-motivational
processes that generate positive development in adulthood, including
developmental tasks, cognitive changes, life-stage transitions, and biological and
neural processes. Leipold goes on to discuss the concept of positive ageing,
highlighting the flexibility of the term and evaluating it from multiple perspectives
to demonstrate its subjectivity, as well as its importance. This text also discusses
the importance of resilience in positive development, contributing to the search
for conditions conducive to positive life conduct across the lifespan.
This book will be essential reading for undergraduates and postgraduates
studying lifespan development and gerontology, positive psychology, or health
psychology, as well as researchers in those fields. It will also be of interest to
developmental counsellors, clinicians, and other applied occupational groups
who are seeking to understand the psychological basis of actions.

Bernhard Leipold is an Associated Professor of Psychology at Bundeswehr

University Munich, Germany. He received his PhD at Free University Berlin.
His research focuses on coping, resilience, and positive development across the
lifespan.
INTENTIONAL
SELF-DEVELOPMENT
AND POSITIVE AGEING
How Individuals Select and
Pursue Life Goals

Bernhard Leipold
First published 2020
by Routledge
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© 2020 Bernhard Leipold
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Leipold, Bernhard, author.
Title: Intentional self-development and positive ageing : how individuals
select and pursue life goals / Bernhard Leipold.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019018191 (print) | LCCN 2019019233 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781351261807 (Ebook) | ISBN 9780815365341 (hardback :
alk. paper) | ISBN 9780815365372 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Autonomy (Psychology) | Self-management
(Psychology) | Autonomy (Psychology) in old age. | Developmental
psychology.
Classification: LCC BF575.A88 (ebook) | LCC BF575.A88 .L45 2020
(print) | DDC 155.2/5--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019018191

ISBN: 978-0-8153-6534-1 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-8153-6537-2 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-351-26180-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo
by Nova Techset Private Limited, Bengaluru & Chennai, India
CONTENTS

Preface ix
1 What is intentional self-development (ISD)? 1
Preliminary remarks: The roles we play in life............................................... 2
Psychological approaches to ISD.................................................................. 4
Self and identity....................................................................................... 5
Self-regulation......................................................................................... 5
Self-efficacy, competence, and the development of control........................ 8
Self-efficiency and self-cultivation............................................................ 9
Contingency, knowledge, and experience as prerequisites of
self-efficient and self-cultivating actions...............................................11
Time perspectives and the role of culture................................................... 12
Life planning and life management in adulthood.................................... 12
Life review: Historical embeddedness and culture....................................13
The study of ISD: General courses and intraindividual changes................14
ISD, time, and culture..............................................................................16
Theoretical perspectives and approaches to the study of ISD........................17
Mechanistic models: The will as epiphenomenon and the
steam-whistle hypothesis.....................................................................18
Contextual models, dynamic interactionism, and developmental
systems................................................................................................21
Constructivism....................................................................................... 22
Biocultural co-construction.................................................................... 23
Summary................................................................................................... 24
vi Contents

2 Developmental prerequisites and challenges across the

lifespan 25
Age-related changes in adulthood.............................................................. 25
Development between growth and decline: Physical changes
and diseases........................................................................................ 26
Chronic impairments and diseases.......................................................... 29
The experience of an illness and coping................................................. 30
Structural changes in the brain and cognitive decline.................................. 33
Plasticity: Biological and cultural foundation........................................... 34
Lifestyle and physical exercise................................................................. 36
Intention, volition, and action: Biological and neural processes.................... 38
Volition and involved brain regions........................................................ 39
Affective neuroscience and emotional brain circuits.................................41
Age-related changes in brain functions................................................... 42
Implications and open questions............................................................. 42
Developmental tasks and life plans.............................................................. 44
Midlife transitions.................................................................................. 45
Life tasks and developmental deadlines....................................................47
Chance encounters and non-normative life events...................................47
Developmental regulation theories............................................................. 48
The SOC model.................................................................................... 48
The motivational theory of lifespan development................................... 49
The dual-process model of assimilation and accommodation.................. 50
Limits of intentional control....................................................................51
Summary....................................................................................................52

3 The role of non-intentional processes, affect, and evaluation 55

A short-term perspective on ISD: Mental processes in social
context...................................................................................................55
The interconnection of events and intentions......................................... 56
Sources of behaviour and development....................................................57
Intentions between conscious and unconscious processes:
A pendulum........................................................................................59
From intentions to actions..........................................................................61
Plans and volitions................................................................................. 62
Mental control strategies........................................................................ 62
Goals and everyday problem solving....................................................... 64
Limits of intentional control: The role of affect........................................... 65
Socio-emotional development................................................................ 66
Emotion regulation.................................................................................67
Affective processing in action regulation: Counter-regulation
and control-dependency..................................................................... 68
 Contents  vii

From attitudes to intentions........................................................................69

Attitude-behaviour relations: Moderating processes..................................70
Changeability of attitudes and preferences...............................................71
Values and intentions..................................................................................74
Age differences of attitudes and values in adulthood................................75
Implicit attitude measurement.................................................................76
The adaptive function of attitudes in adulthood...................................... 77
Summary....................................................................................................78

4 Cognitive-motivational processes of intentional

self-development 79
Expectation and attribution........................................................................ 79
Expectation-value models...................................................................... 80
Attributions........................................................................................... 80
Decision-making between rational choice, uncertainty, and randomness......... 83
Decisions and heuristics......................................................................... 83
Uncertainty and randomness.................................................................. 85
Conscious control and automatic information processing........................... 87
Attention and cognitive control.............................................................. 87
Exogenous and endogenous influences................................................... 88
Cognitive routines and mental sets......................................................... 90
Congruity and dissonance.......................................................................91
Preference and similarity judgements...................................................... 93
Perception and context effects................................................................ 96
Lifelong learning and memory................................................................... 98
Learning and differentiation................................................................... 99
Autobiographical memory....................................................................101
The structure of the concept of action: The difficulties..............................103
Summary..................................................................................................104

5 Positive development and resilience 105

Positive development in the face of adversity: The process of
resilience...............................................................................................105
Resilience from a developmental perspective.........................................106
The role of intentions...........................................................................109
Evaluation criteria for development: Equilibrium and structural
characteristics........................................................................................109
Equilibrium and disequilibrium............................................................. 110
Equilibrium and structural features of the self........................................ 111
Stability, growth, and decline.................................................................112
Dimensions of well-being and developmental maturity.............................113
viii Contents

Quality of life: Subjective and objective criteria.....................................115

Hedonic and eudaimonic well-being..................................................... 116
Wisdom and personality growth............................................................ 117
Summary..................................................................................................120

6 Balance and dimensions of meaning 123

Balance as a challenge...............................................................................124
The concept of balance in psychological models....................................124
Balance from an intentional point of view.............................................128
Mistakes and freedom of interpretation..................................................128
Dimensions of meaning and areas of action...............................................131
Zo-on politikon.....................................................................................134
Love and work......................................................................................135
Homo ludens, beauty, and the art of living...............................................137
Transcendence, religious beliefs, and spiritual experience....................... 141
Summary and concluding remarks............................................................ 141

References 145
Index 165
PREFACE

How do individuals shape their development across the lifespan? This book
focuses on the fascinating question of whether and to what extent human
development can be conceptualized as the aim of the individual’s actions or
merely as a by-product of non-intended circumstances. The basic assumption is
simple: man is a striving organism that tries to govern his behaviour and
development through action and in accordance with his intentions. The second
part of the title – ‘positive development’ – includes an evaluative moment that
refers to the degree to which we have been successful in realizing our life plans.
The basic concept of this book, intentional self-development (ISD), denotes an
action-theoretical approach to human development that emphasizes the potential
(and limits) of individuals as producers of their own development.
This perspective is not new. Within the last three decades, the concept of ISD
and related constructs have been introduced in lifespan psychology by several
authors. Jochen Brandtstädter probably achieved the transition from intention to
development in the most differentiated way. Nonetheless, the wish to develop
positively in a self-regulated way, despite limited resources, is old and can be
traced back to Greek philosophy. Answers that are generally valid still have to be
found. We are still making an effort to clarify how intentions, that is, the creative
(motivational, volitional) processes, are interconnected with developmental
outcomes. The phenomenon is well known: it is easy to notice deficits – but
harder to solve them. Why? Well, we are not in a position to provide valid
answers to several basic problems. There is (a) no guide to positive development
and (b) no single answer to what exactly positive ageing means. Rather, the
processes in intentional psychology (the ‘inner life of soul’) are complex and do
not follow our wishes: Not everything that is possible is important and not
everything that is important is possible. In the present book, the attempt is made
to (provisionally) order the basic processes that are related to human action.
x Preface

Intentions and related concepts such as goals and personal projects are the points
of reference from which social, biological, and physical changes are treated and
discussed.
Questions about how to improve strategic competencies and how to flexibly
adjust intentions and standards gain in importance. A better understanding of the
regularities of intentional and non-intentional processes and their correlations to
age would be important in applied settings (such as clinical or counselling
contexts) in which goal engagement and detachment are part of the interventions.
However, this book is not intended to be a manual. There will be no enumeration
of factors that can be intentionally controlled and no strategies on how to enhance
self-regulatory skills will be taught. Rather, the mental processes and regulating
factors that contribute to a positive development and interact with intentions will
be discussed. In fact, the complex phenomenon of positive development can be
viewed from different perspectives. These include biological changes and social
aspects that play a crucial role in people’s actions and development planning. The
book considers theoretical perspectives and provides an overview of the mental
processes that are involved when individuals make plans and act. It is directed to
a wide audience of both graduate and undergraduate students in the social and
behavioural sciences. Its content is also relevant for developmental counsellors,
psychologists, and therapists who are interested in the psychological processes of
intentional development. The present book is divided into six parts which are
arranged according to the following issues.
The first chapter introduces the concept of ISD and briefly describes current
concepts of self-regulation (e.g. self-efficiency and control, self-efficacy, and self-
cultivation) and research related to ISD to provide a theoretical background.
Chapter 1 highlights the distinction between competence (beliefs that one can
produce effective responses; what individuals know how to do in the world) and
contingency/causality (beliefs about whether or not contingencies exist between
actions and outcomes; what people know about the world). The purpose of this
chapter is to examine two dimensions of ISD which entail processes that interact
when individuals plan their development: (a) expectations about one’s abilities
(motivational approach) and (b) insight into contingencies, that is, experience,
knowledge, and problem-solving competencies (cognitive approach).
Chapter 2 focuses on developmental prerequisites across the lifespan and
provides insights into the biological and social foundation of ISD. Age-related
changes in adulthood (e.g. physical changes and diseases, structural changes in
the brain, cognitive decline, and changes in social relationships) can serve as a
standard, a challenge or be used as a resource for ISD. The chapter highlights the
role of individual actions in social and biological contexts. The concepts of
developmental tasks or midlife transitions highlight rather normative, more or
less age-correlated and expectable periods in the lifespan, whereas the life-event
approach or the concept of chance encounters offer views that oppose the idea of
anticipatory preparation and the planned use of prospective coping strategies.
Chapter 2 ends with basic assumptions of the developmental regulation models
 Preface  xi

which entail valuable indications of how individuals deal with age-related losses
and non-normative challenges.
Chapter 3 starts with the well-known assumption that people are limited in
their abilities to plan and foresee long-term outcomes in accordance with their
wishes. Anticipation of future states and processes (calculation of positive
opportunities and one’s capacity to take an active role) is based remarkably on
automatic processes that are not under personal control. Chapter 3 focuses on the
short-term perspective and illustrates how (changes in) affect, attitudes, and
values are associated with intentions. Chapter 4 refers to psychological models of
expectations, attributions, and decision-making. Also, mental concepts are
addressed that can be denoted as rather ‘cognitive’. It will be argued that ideal
forms of ISD cannot be realized through motivation alone, but also require
cognitive competencies. Planning and action are a mixture of previous
experiences and momentary mental set. A successful move from intention to
action requires being able to change the situation (e.g. the intentions of others) as
well as to manage one’s own intentions. The challenge for the individual is to
monitor and coordinate cognitive-motivational processes of attention, reasoning,
and insights as well as emotional states, interests, and values.
The last two chapters move from adaptive processes to the difficult and
controversially discussed question of what positive ageing means. From the
perspective of the individual, several subjective criteria offer standards for positive
developmental outcomes, whereas other views of life success focus on
developmental tasks or objective criteria (e.g. physical and cognitive functioning).
Chapter 5 introduces the resilience concept and shows that adaptive processes
can result in manifold ways of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Against this
background of the multiple facets of positive ageing or successful development,
the concepts of decline, growth, and balance have to be clarified in order to
understand what positive ageing and mental health in adulthood means.
Chapter 6 concentrates on the concept of balance that has been applied in several
developmental models to describe a state of optimal functioning. The chapter
ends with examples of human concerns, that is, areas of human action to which
humans devote time and resources, from generation to generation.
I am aware that I am trying the patience of my students who ask for factual
knowledge, or take-home messages. Much is left open and fragmentary, and the
text is far from complete. Mental processes of ISD are complex and only partly
suitable to be presented as a fact shed or 10-point program. There are many
strategies of mental control, but they do not replace intensive study of the basic
processes. A challenge that remains is how to tell a fairly plausible story exactly
and in detail of how the several parts of the present situation interact (i.e. the
individuals in a specific context with their personal assumptions, stereotypes,
wishes, and life goals). To write on ISD means to give an account of previous
work of colleagues. The present book should not be taken as the particularly
important/hoped-for ISD psychology, but only as ‘another’ developmental
psychology.
xii Preface

There are many people who are important in preparing a manuscript.

Appreciation is due to Achim Cyran and Alexandro Folster who did the tedious
job of preparing the references, and the students who reminded me to improve
the meaningfulness or relevance of the ‘issue’. I am grateful to my colleagues
Cathleen Kappes, Tim Loepthien, and Wolfgang Mack for fruitful discussions
and their valuable remarks on parts of the manuscript. I would like to thank the
team at Routledge for valuable assistance in the many tasks required to get this
manuscript ready for publication. Finally, I want to give special thanks to my
colleagues Werner Greve and Amy Michéle-Malkowsky. It was from the former
that I learned to see human development as a matter of intentions. The latter
provided valuable assistance in the translation of this book and kept reminding
me to express my thoughts clearly.
Bernhard Leipold
Berlin, 2019
1
WHAT IS INTENTIONAL
SELF-DEVELOPMENT (ISD)?

The quest to conduct our lives in line with our wishes and, at the same time,
hopefully with what is possible is not a new one, but remains a fascinating and
strenuous challenge. For generations, individuals have asked the advice of
acquaintances, counsellors, psychologists, fortune-tellers, or oracles because they
experienced loss or were confronted with the task of finding a successful and
meaningful way during difficult times. Humanists and natural scientists have
devoted their attention to the conditions of life management to ask what a person
could or should do to improve one’s situation in life. This book is about intentional
self-development in adulthood, a life period that, compared with childhood and
adolescence, has been less acknowledged by developmental scientists for a long
time.
Before I shed light on the positive aspects of growing older, I attend to the first
part of this book’s title that focuses on the deliberate and creative developmental
potential of humans. The concept of intentional self-development (ISD) denotes an
action-theoretical approach to human development that emphasizes the potential
(and limits) of individuals as producers of their own development (Brandtstädter,
1999, 2009; Brandtstädter & Lerner, 1999; Greve, Rothermund, & Wentura,
2005; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981). One important characteristic of ISD is
that it is concerned with going forward. ISD is not something at rest, but rather
life being lived, and implies a self-regulating system equipped with various
forward-looking competencies. In ordinary life situations (e.g. if we make a
coffee), we take smooth, short-time courses for granted and do not notice the
behavioural routines we are used to doing. Instead, we notice our intentions
when something else happens and blocks our plans. Intentions are, however,
lifelong processes, and ISD, in general, refers to the self or identity of an ageing
person in the sense of the conduct or construction of the life course from the
early beginnings until dusk.
2  What is ISD?

The present investigation focuses mainly on adulthood and a developmental

window with a disappearing future, and not on the evolving self during the
childhood. The main aim of the first chapter is to position the concept of ISD
among other related concepts. Many of its core assumptions have been formulated
in psychological models during the last decades, and we will introduce some of
these models to illustrate the scope of the intentional approach to development.
We are aware of the long tradition that the underlying question of how individuals
strive for positive development has – outside of psychological research. A
comprehensive discussion including the insights from other disciplines is beyond
the intended scope of this book. Indeed, in psychology, there is much theory and
empirical research on ISD, and we have to be content with bringing a few
assumptions, empirical results, and, of course, some open questions about this
difficult venture home to the reader.

Preliminary remarks: The roles we play in life

To better understand the theoretical background and related psychological
concepts, and to put into a nutshell certain central features and perspectives of
ISD, one can use the metaphor of roles we wish to have in our life. Central to
ISD are two perspectives in particular:
Action perspective: ISD presupposes an acting self, that is, a person who monitors,
adjusts, and evaluates his or her situation and surroundings (Brandtstädter, 2006).
The role metaphor suggests that individuals play an active and effective part in
pursuing life projects. Some issues gain or lose significance and require the ability
to reverse prior decisions. That means, for instance, that one could be disappointed
with a particular health insurance company and endeavour to negotiate better
conditions or leave the company. Acting individuals who expect, perform, and
evaluate (in short, play) their role in social life are the units from which we start
to investigate ISD.
Time perspective: Human development and ISD include both a short-term as
well as a long-term perspective. The metaphor of role-taking illustrates
developmental changes in the context of the whole life course. Although many
deliberate decisions in everyday life pertain to imminent problems, they
sometimes occur with regard to the distant future. For instance, parents wish to
offer a better education for their children and invest time and money, not only
because it needs to be decided now and quickly, but also driven by the expectations
that education would be useful in later life.
The following examples (Box 1.1) describe three case studies of persons in
different periods of life and illustrate the phenomenon of ISD and identity from
different points of view.
The different examples demonstrate that in all three cases individuals are
embedded in social relations and have meaningful goals. They want to influence
and shape their life in accordance with their ideals, are confronted with concrete
tasks, and have to protect themselves from long-term losses. They are convinced
 What is ISD?  3

BOX 1.1  THREE EXAMPLES FOR ISD

Michael, age 25, recently completed a degree in business sciences quite

successfully. He would like to pursue a career and therefore is thinking about
a move to another city where he can obtain a leading position. He plans his
life around business meetings and occupational success. He spends most of
his leisure time hanging around the country club and joins professional
organizations.
Linda, 57 years old and married, is a committed teacher and satisfied with
her life. She and her husband have been planning their approaching
retirement together. Recently, however, the doctor diagnosed her with a
severe form of cancer. She is now thinking about what she should do and
how she can restructure their life goals.
Mary, age 72 and widowed, has three sons and one daughter. She is
family oriented, likes music, and is content with her situation. As a friend asks
her whether or not she would relive her life again in the same way, Mary
becomes pensive and regrets that she decided in her youth to concentrate on
her family and not to take up a profession. In addition, she regrets that she
had not learned to play an instrument.

that they can, at least partly, influence the status quo or the next project. Linda
and Michael want to play their well-chosen roles, but they have different
opportunities to reach them (see also Mary), and they differ in the current
situations giving cause for concern. In general, some important questions remain
regarding the developmental perspective. First, the challenging question of this
book is to ask to what degree can individuals who act, and evaluate themselves
and their surroundings, intentionally contribute to their future. A second
question is whether we can compensate for losses and missed opportunities? In
this book, we also have to deal with the time perspective, which is essential for
developmental changes across the lifespan.
Because we are often used to thinking, or finding the idea captivating, that we
(should) build our lives autonomously and with self-determination, and not by
following a prescribed plan, it seems quite intriguing to take note of the
counterpart. The Italian writer Luigi Pirandello (1922) provides an interesting
view of a fundamental role problem in the play Six Characters in Search of an
Author. Six strange people interrupt the rehearsal of a play and explain that they
are unfinished characters in search of an author to bring their story to its
conclusion. There is no manuscript in which their story is written, but they want
to act out their drama on stage instead of it being half finished or even irrelevant.
Their playwright has left them unfinished and they asked the producer to perform
their drama. They wish to play an appropriate part. This is a general need for
identity many persons have in the play of their life.
4  What is ISD?

From the perspective of intentional self-development, individuals are the

co-authors of their life stories and are able to make substantial contributions
to their development over the lifespan. The wishes cited can be quite
comprehensible: the wish to get what one deserves, the wish for authority
over one’s life, being able to shape one’s prospective development without
constraints, and being able to bear responsibility for one’s actions. The answers
are modest. ISD does not proceed like a magnet that aligns iron filings and
assembles them into an individual life course. For the moment, I will introduce
several mental processes involved when people plan their lives. It seems useful
to begin with a closer examination of psychological constructs similar to those
to which ISD refers.

Psychological approaches to ISD

Charlotte Bühler was one of the earlier developmental psychologists who
emphasized an individual’s process of setting goals at different phases in life
and across the life course (Bühler, 1933, 1935). Her observations on the human
life course grew out of a systematic study of over 200 biographies. She emphasized
the role of life goals taking shape in adolescence and becoming developmental
tasks during adulthood (see also Erikson, 1959; Havighurst, 1948). The active
and intentional conduct of life, the ideas of how individuals can create their
future states in adulthood, came to the fore in Bühler’s work, before systematic
complex longitudinal and cross-sectional research designs investigated
whether claims about age differences were actually valid and representative for
many adults.
In psychology, over the last four decades we have witnessed a growing interest
in lifelong development (Baltes & Schaie, 1973; Baltes, Lindenberger, &
Staudinger, 2006) and the importance of action-theoretical approaches (e.g. the
constructs of self-efficacy, agency, and control experience; Bandura, 1977;
Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010; Skinner, 1985, 2017). The major link
between ISD and control beliefs or self-regulative competencies is the creative
potential which is assumed to be based on the expectation that the individual is
in control of skills producing specific developmental outcomes one has wished.
As mentioned above, questions about how to develop positively have a long
tradition, but the answers are still far from conclusive or comprehensive. A
central intent of the present book is to draw attention to several mechanisms
taking place when individuals plan and create their future. The following
selection of psychological concepts or theories is intended to provide simple
examples demonstrating processes that are involved when individuals plan to
solve short-term problems or long-term concerns for themselves and their
relatives. At the moment, I will refer to psychological constructs that are
characteristic of ISD and aimed at several developmental outcomes, for instance,
developmental growth (e.g. to improve one’s abilities), survival, and resistance
against loss:
 What is ISD?  5

Self and identity

Self-regulation
Self-efficacy, competence, and control
Self-efficiency and self-cultivation

These concepts cannot be sharply distinguished from one another. Each is

part of the creative potential of human actions and refers to persons’ evaluative
standards (ideal, ought, or feared standards). They are essential facets of ISD and
include general and, in part, abstract mechanisms that have been used to explain
specific interests and preferences of the individual.

Self and identity

ISD includes the unwieldy term of the ‘self ’ and relates to concepts such as I,
person, or character, which have stimulated generations of philosophers and
scientists to extensive and countless treatises. For the present purpose, it is
sufficient to highlight the relevance of two concepts that have often been used as
introductions into the subject: The Oracle of Apollo at Delphi (‘know thyself ’ –
Greek: gnothi sauton) and William James’ (1890) distinction between the ‘I’ and
the ‘me’. The first concept has led in part to quite different epistemological,
ethical, and theological interpretations about what could have been meant. In
any case, the oracle presents a comprehensive task and puts a finger on man’s need
to learn more about his nature and position.
The concept of the ‘self ’ is marked by several ambiguities. William James
distinguishes the agency – the dynamic or creative power (the ‘I’) – from the
different contents, roles, or self-definitions (the ‘me’) of a person. The latter (the
‘me’) can be seen as the whole of several subjects or life projects persons have
chosen to strive for. Following William James, a research tradition developed that
speaks of the self or identity in terms of a ‘self-concept’, a cognitive structure that
incorporates all of a person’s answers to the question ‘Who am I?’. In a similar
way, Baltes, Lindenberger, and Staudinger (2006, p. 620) clarify ‘self-conceptions
are not meant to encompass any self-referent attitude but rather are confined to
those beliefs or cognitions that constitute important (fundamental) self-
components’. Many contemporary models assume that an individual has multiple
self-concepts (e.g. physical abilities, social roles, values, or interests). Insofar, the
different contents of the ‘me’ denote the range of possible examples with which
individuals define themselves and which they intentionally strive to fulfil
according to specific standards they have. In terms of ISD, the ‘I’ refers to processes
of self-regulation or coping. They become evident when the answers to the
identity questions ‘Who am I?’ and ‘Who would I like to be?’ are not balanced.

Self-regulation
The concept of self-regulation (Bandura, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1999, 2016) is
widely accepted and empirically well-underpinned. It describes regulatory
6  What is ISD?

processes which are characterized by intentionality and automaticity. The idea that
human behaviour is a self-regulatory process goes back to Miller, Galanter, and
Pribram (1960) who assume that behaviour is goal-directed and feedback-
controlled. A basic assumption of self-regulation is that individuals solve problems
and tend to regulate deviations and disruptions of a norm. These adaptive
processes have been compared to cybernetic circles and information processing.
Based on thinking-program and human-machine analogies, their system uses the
idea of feedback and servomechanisms and operates with Test-Operate-Test-Exit
(TOTE) units. A popular example of a feedback system describes the cognitive
processes involved in hammering a nail: test nail; if it sticks up, test hammer and
strike nail; if not possible, test nail; etc. Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960)
argued that TOTE units are the building blocks of all kinds of complex
behaviours. Human behaviour has been compared to a cybernetic control system
using feedback loops, although one could argue that organic systems are
characterized by greater flexibility and adaptation. In the ‘test’ phases, persons
compare their current states (input function, see Figure 1.1), for example, to
desired or socially expected norms (goals, standards). Personal goals and standards
serve as reference values and perceived discrepancies lead to coping or problem-
solving strategies (operation). These processes continue until the initial
discrepancies have been resolved. A comparison between self-regulation and ISD
reveals a similar basic schema and similar processes (e.g. problem-solving and
emotional-regulation competencies). ISD considers, in particular, the role of
personal goals and intentional strivings regarding age-related changes. In
comparison to the schematic regularity of self-regulation, the term ISD draws
attention to creative potential to shape the course of personal development.

FIGURE 1.1  Basic schema of a self-regulation model.

 What is ISD?  7

This model assumes that people act in order to reach certain standards because
they feel a commitment or a personal need. They compare their wishes with
their actual states and adjust these, if possible, in accordance with their wishes.
To me it seems important to highlight two aspects not depicted in Figure 1.1 that
could possibly be taken for granted (see also Chapter 3). Actions and action
outcomes are evaluated by individuals as to the degree to which they have been
proved to be valuable. Second, the model follows a circuit and suggests that self-
regulation could be repeated by routine, assuming man is a machine in perpetual
motion without wear and tear. But what about learning and improvement?
Presupposing that we have a memory system that influences human action, how
can we learn through experience and errors?
Another key characteristic of self-regulation and ISD are the processes of self-
monitoring or self-perception. These serve an updating function (Giesbrecht,
Müller, & Miller, 2010) in that they provide important information for self-
regulation. They signal when there is a discrepancy between a goal and current
functioning and, in this way, signal a need for action. They also provide feedback
concerning specific regulatory efforts. Because many of the problems individuals
have are socially mediated (e.g. the desire to please others or interpersonal
conflicts), these updating processes require a personal and social sensitivity.
Despite denoting current states of information processing, persons do differ in
their disposition to monitor emotional or other behavioural states (see self-
monitoring, Snyder, 1979, or self-consciousness, Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975).
Self-monitoring tendencies possibly enhance the readiness to compare one’s
status with personal standards (evaluative processes). The conscious control of
thought and action has been referred to as executive function (Dick & Overton,
2010) and includes the intentions and problem-solving strategies individuals use
to manage their tasks.
Affect or emotion plays a central but manifold part in a person doing their
duties and managing everyday life. Feelings, for example, are a consequence of a
feedback process that runs rather automatically. Affect arises when a current state
is compared to a reference value, for instance, when personal goals are blocked or
when a social project of our club gets acknowledgment. Positive emotions are
often associated with feelings of competence and are assumed to be important
resources in problem solving (Fredrickson, 2013).
Central information processes treated in the theory of self-regulation are
similar to those presented within the framework of ISD (Bauer, 2009;
Brandtstädter, 1999; Greve et al., 2005). The loop system makes deviations from
ideal states that require corrective actions evident. Existing differences in focus
are, in particular, due to differences in the time perspective that is of interest.
The time perspective of ISD is typically more future-oriented inasmuch as long-
time goals are being taken into consideration. Desired developmental states that
require a couple of years or decades in which to be realized (e.g. retirement plans)
are often less clearly elaborated than short-term goals. Their realization may
depend on many possible difficulties that are less foreseeable. On the other hand,
8  What is ISD?

particular contents of ISD, preferences, or meanings may change as individuals

become older and, from a developmental point of view, there is such a thing as
being ‘too late’ (developmental deadlines; Heckhausen et  al., 2010). Self-
regulation is qualified by age-related changes, for example, personal gains and
losses (see biological ageing studies and biographical studies). Individual
adaptation can be observed in many ways. For the individual, however, it seems
that personal values and their development over time cannot be replaced by
iterations and cybernetic metaphors, but cybernetic models can be used to
formalize or generalize specific mental representations and problem-solving
processes and order them in a meaningful way.

Self-efficacy, competence, and the development of control

Over the last decades, we can follow a similar line in psychological research on
human action. This research emphasizes the role of self-efficacy and control
(Bandura, 2001; Carnevale & Fujita, 2016; Maddux & Gosselin, 2003). People are
used to maintaining control over their behaviour, thoughts, and feelings in many
situations and sometimes experience conflict or chaos when the consequences are
unexpectedly not under control. Self-control requires prioritizing between several
outcomes and successful action depends to a certain degree on competence beliefs.
Similarly, the concept of competence (Weisz & Stipek, 1982) denotes beliefs that one
can produce effective responses. Personal competence is construed in terms of
whether persons possess specific abilities: the individual’s capacity to produce the
behaviour upon which a specific outcome is contingent. Competence in this sense
denotes individuals knowing or believing how to act in the world. As shown in
several studies, self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 1977) and attributions of competence or
incompetence correlate with, or can even influence, behaviour. Findings on self-
efficacy in different age groups show relationships, for example, to students’ physical
stamina or mathematical abilities (see Bandura, 1992, for an overview), or that
elderly persons receiving nursing home care show more independent behaviour in
terms of observed self-care (Wahl, 1991). In addition, it has been shown that
persons who believe that goal attainment or personal success are dependent on
their own activities show a higher degree of well-being and optimism.
Control theories in general emphasize planning and acting competences but
sometimes tend to ignore the fact that many behaviours are not intended or
‘outcome-driven’. Some control theories in the social-cognitive tradition (Miller
& Seligman, 1975; Rotter, 1966; Seligman, 1975) emphasize behaviour-outcome
contingencies but do not take developmental changes during adulthood into
consideration. Developmental regulation theories reflect a growing interest in
how control strategies vary across the lifespan (see Chapter 2). In the lifespan
theory of personal control, Jutta Heckhausen and colleagues (Heckhausen &
Schulz, 1995; Heckhausen et al., 2010) differentiate between two types of control:
Primary control denotes direct acts of an individual on the external world to
attain desired outcomes (e.g. investment of time, effort, abilities, or the use of
 What is ISD?  9

social support and technical aids). Secondary control is targeted at internal processes
that accommodate to circumstances (e.g. enhancement of goal commitment,
goal change, strategic social up- and downward comparison, shift in responsibility
attribution).
Both types of control are not only conceived of as different categories; primary
control also holds functional primacy in the lifespan theory of control. It is
directed outward and enables individuals to shape a situation to fit their needs.
The focus is on the wish to have control over outcomes: One is in command of
skills producing specific outcomes, and the world, as far as we can survey, is a
contingent one; one deals with an environment which is responsive to one’s
wishes and developmental goals. The secondary control processes take into
account that personal goals and standards need to be adjusted to age-related
changes and losses in order to maintain self-efficacy and primary control.
Both processes require time in which they can develop. The control theory
demonstrates this by referring to (the intentional) process of optimization in which
the processes of primary and secondary control are made servant to long-term
outcomes. One of the intriguing challenges for intentional theories is to explain
how individuals maintain balance when confronted with life demands, to
consider the possible limits of control, and to explain the impact of non-intended
processes (e.g. defensive mechanisms or processes of self-immunization; Greve &
Wentura, 2003) that can hardly be captured by control-oriented idioms. I will
argue in Chapters 3 and 4 that many processes are automatic, subliminal in
nature, and supplement the story of how intentions can contribute to human
development.

Self-efficiency and self-cultivation

The diversity of concepts about self-regulative and control processes makes it
desirable to order them into a manageable system. Brandtstädter and Lerner
(1999, p. xii) differentiate between two overarching themes of intentional
development: self-efficiency and self-cultivation. Both are conceptualized as
motivational tendencies that underlie the actions of individuals.
Self-efficiency denotes the tendency for people to strive to expand their radius
of action or defend their developmental resources. For example, we often pursue
goals to improve professional abilities or communication skills (e.g. via self-study
or professional training) and broaden our areas of responsibility. If, however, we
take the age-related losses that occur during the second half of life or later (e.g.
physical illness, decreased visual and hearing function) into consideration,
developmental goals often change their adaptive function from optimization
towards compensation: in this case, the primary goal is to minimize disadvantages
and being protected from loss of control at best. At young ages, we grow and
strive for independence; so too can dependency in later life be seen, as we avoid
what makes us dependant (Baltes, 1996). Self-control (Skinner, 2017) or
improving skills in resource or time management involve processes that serve to
10  What is ISD?

achieve growth or maintain having influence (possibly using a little cunning or

vigour). Whether or not beliefs in the ability to organize and execute specific
action courses (e.g. self-efficacy, Bandura, 2001) really promise success depends on
intentionality beliefs in specific life paths, but also has to do with chance encounters
and with knowledge about the factors that mediate the impact of chance
encounters on life paths (Bandura, 1982). Although people often intentionally
seek certain situations or experiences, for instance, the assignment to specific
university courses or making somebody’s acquaintance by chance will influence
their life course.
Self-cultivation comprises all efforts through which we bring our development
or behaviour in concordance with our ideals and ethical standards. Meant here
are ideal states such as ideology or philosophy of life. ‘Activities of self-cultivation
may reflect notions of virtue and competence, aesthetic ideals, moral or ethical
maxims, or socially shared notions of a “good life”; they involve visions of
development or conduct that we admire or respect and that influence our choice
of developmental paths within culturally performed opportunity structures’.
(Brandtstädter & Lerner, 1999, p. xii). The authors emphasize that the capacity
to control our own mental states intentionally is not without limits. These limits
to our being able to form particular intentions will become important because
they mark the limits of self-control (over having or not having particular
intentions, e.g. emotional states). We do not feel irritated, grateful, or amazed
immediately after we intended or wished to do so. Rather, we cannot be sure
that we will experience particular emotional states – often they do not fulfil our
expectations. How a person would like to be depends to some degree on her
constructive abilities and intentional competencies. Too many non-intended
events, however, interrupt one’s long-term plans and question the effectiveness
and constructive powers through which an individual can be a co-constructor of
his or her own development (Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981). Although we
cannot differentiate clearly between self-efficiency and self-cultivation, the
motivational orientations of self-efficiency and self-cultivation show different
centres of gravity:

1. The need for competence or effectiveness is based on the observation that

humans desire to produce the outcomes they wish (Ryan, 1998). We tend to
strive for optimal developmental outcomes and invest available resources
that can hopefully be used later for optimizing the life situation in accordance
with our wishes. This avenue to positive development throws into relief the
strategies of actions, individuals, and their power or ability to act effectively
and presupposes that individuals already have (positively or negatively
valued) ideals which serve as normative standards.
2. Self-cultivation denotes that we try to conform to our own standards and
reminds us of the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi (‘know thyself ’). Our aesthetical
and ethical ideals (= personal standards and the importance of what we care
about; Frankfurt, 1982) can or have to develop, and delineate further limits
 What is ISD?  11

of such intentional life projects: If we want to change our character or

identity, we cannot force or demand this immediately from ourselves. This
wish is not directly subject to our will. Development in adulthood
presupposes a basis of history and memory (personal experiences which have
been learned and serve as evaluative standards). For example, some of our
ethical or political beliefs have developed without our explicit approval and
cannot be changed simply by the fact that we want to change them.

Contingency, knowledge, and experience as prerequisites of

self-efficient and self-cultivating actions
In this section, I focus on the relationship between self-efficiency (control,
competence, self-efficacy) and contingence (Maddux & Gosselin, 2003;
Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Skinner, 2017) because this seems important
for an understanding of whether or not and how later developmental states can
be conceived to be a product of our intentions. Contingency (in the context of
motivated behaviour and control theories) is defined as the degree to which a
specific outcome (e.g. a problem resolution) depends on a specific intention of the
acting individual. That individuals learn to control their behaviour is seen as an
important prerequisite to being efficient. We are inclined to probe representations
of contingency with a hypothesis of regularity that is not abandoned unless it is
refuted. According to the control theory, persons who experience failure and
realize that problems have no solution that can be produced by their own doing
are prone to become depressed or angry. Several studies, and perhaps our personal
experience, have shown that prolonged non-contingency (e.g. fruitless effort)
can block actions and result in learned helplessness or cognitive and motivational
deficits (Seligman, 1975).
One main purpose of the present book is to examine the cognitive-
motivational basis of ISD. Here I should mention at least two essential tendencies
that are involved when individuals plan to act intentionally or influence their
development:

1. The degree of contingency between specific actions and desired outcomes

mediates the development of contingency beliefs. Expectations about one’s
own ability and motivation to put certain strategies into practice emerge
through contingencies (motivational approach). The human organism can
be seen as an active agent motivated to shape his surroundings efficiently.
2. It should be emphasized that individuals learn to optimize their strategies
through the process of acting and evaluating the results, for example, by trial
and error. They learn which outcomes are a consequence of which specific
means or strategies (cognitive approach; what people know about the world).

The idea that efficient actions require both motivation and knowledge about
contingencies (i.e. experience, knowledge, problem-solving competencies) is,
12  What is ISD?

admittedly, not new. Ernst Meumann (1908), for example, described the
relationship between volition and intelligence. According to Meumann,
intelligence is bare talent or a possibility that needs volition in order to come to
action. Volition without intelligence is blind will, but the more volition is driven
by intelligence, the better the volition becomes (‘sehender Wille’; Meumann,
1908, p. 3). Each of the two dimensions highlights different qualities of ISD and
the growth of one of the two sometimes goes hand in hand with the other.
Whether people continue to use (supposedly) proven strategies to pursue long-
term and partly ambiguous goals (e.g. different meanings of success in one’s
career) sometimes depends on to what extent they interpret interim results as
success and a consequence of the strategy used. For example, interest in plants
possibly sharpens one’s eyes to problems that are characteristic of professional
fields as gardening or biology. I will come back to this issue later and argue
(especially in Chapter 4) that ideal forms of ISD cannot be realized through
motivation alone, but also require cognitive competencies (analogous thinking,
recognizing similarities), which can at best be learned but not directly,
intentionally controlled by the individual.

Time perspectives and the role of culture

The ISD approach assumes that the person is an active agent that plans and lets
his life unfold within a limited span of time and action resources. The time
perspective has several implications for the development of self or identity
projects across the lifespan. It was assumed that time, similar to age, has no
intrinsic explanatory power, for instance, for later developmental states such as
cognitive decline (e.g. Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2003). Time is perceived
as a limited resource over which individuals have only limited control. It
becomes valuable when it is needed to manage current tasks in order to pursue
desired life goals. Augustine made an effort to explain the mental activity of
subjective time experience using three components (Augustine, 1913, p. 272).
Three interwoven mental time experiences (memoria, contuitus, expectatio)
describe a central characteristic of ISD that pertains to processes of memory,
observation/direct experience, and expectations. These processes have been
discussed within the framework of contemporary psychological research on life
reflection and in relation to critical events and the uncertainty of life (Staudinger
& Glück, 2011).

Life planning and life management in adulthood

Developmental gains or losses emerge in time and their weight in decision-
making changes as individuals become older. Many of our daily plans have a
limited horizon and pertain to a manageable time window. We plan our duties
for the next days, the business and holidays for the next month. Some of the goals
are distant and refer to retirement or the welfare of our children. Individuals
 What is ISD?  13

pursue their goals until they are interrupted by unexpected restrictions or lose
their interest because they are bored.
Are there any age differences in these common observations in adulthood?
The concepts of a turning point in life (‘Lebenswende’, Jung, 1933), a ‘social
clock’ (Neugarten & Hagestad, 1976), or the midlife crisis denote times of
reorganization (internalized clocks) in midlife, when former priorities are
subjected to change for many individuals. The need for time to slow down in
one’s progress through life or to say goodbye to the illusion of having to compete
with youth to take this adventure trip is, however, not so strongly tied to a very
limited span of years that we must call it a normative crisis. There is probably
too little awareness of the ‘Big Ben’ (before it is too late) to be indicative of a
severe midlife crisis for most people, but it rather marks an insidious emotional
experience in adulthood that is loosely correlated with age. In advanced age, for
example, finding personal meaning in life has been argued to be the major
developmental task (Erikson, Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986) and that we have
grounds to worry because we cannot compensate for shortcomings and cannot
get rid of the feelings of sorrow. Schopenhauer (1999/2017) assumed that, in the
second half of life, needs and cognitions such as the search for a time out, having
no pain, having a lot of worries, having comfort, and feeling secure become
predominant in advanced age. ‘If, when I was young, the doorbell rang, I felt
happy because I thought something would come. Now, if something is knocking
at the door, I get a fright because I think: There it comes!’ Schopenhauer
(1999/2017, p. 62).
The expected shortness of the remaining life time and age-related losses have
been used to explain changes in coping strategies across the lifespan.
Accommodative coping forms (Brandtstädter, 2009) or secondary control
strategies (Heckhausen et al., 2010) such as flexible goal adjustment, downward
comparison, or cognitive reappraisal enable individuals to keep their goals
flexible throughout the second half of life. Despite inevitable threats, and under
the pressure of novel demands, we adapt our standards and choose rather realistic,
age-appropriate goals. The concept of developmental tasks (Havighurst, 1948),
which emphasizes the emergence of specific life tasks or crises at different ages,
can also be used as an example that the ageing self is characterized by a large
degree of plasticity in identity projects. Life planning (e.g. goal contents, the
processes of adjustment) is subjected to change and it remains a compelling
challenge to better understand how the adaptive self-concept protects itself from
damages and stabilizes the self-esteem.

Life review: Historical embeddedness and culture

Times of bereavement, celebration, or the end of the year remind us that human
goals have a history: the process of life review (Butler, 1963; Staudinger, 2001)
consists of memories that do not merely call back to mind several previous
episodes of life. Life review also includes the reconsideration of previous
14  What is ISD?

experiences and their meanings by means of interpretation and re-evaluation. I

do not want to treat the adaptive, self-esteem enhancing function of reminiscence
now, but rather emphasize the part played by traditions (learning history, culture)
in the shaping of our goals and interests. Although individuals often have to deal
with novel challenges, they do not reinvent their coping strategies or redefine
their values completely new. Indeed, they refer to prior internalized standards
when they evaluate their actual situation.
According to the self-memory system model (Conway, Meares, & Standart,
2004), autobiographical memories are mental constructions comprising the
working self as well as transitory and long-term memories. Goals, like other
representations in human memory, are based on individuals’ earlier experiences.
These knowledge structures are assumed to be essential for automatic self-
regulation, for instance, when we ride a bike or make tea (Papies & Aarts, 2016).
Many of the decisions we make in life are linked to scripts and skills we have
learned within a culture. Many developmental ideals that serve as the normative
standards against which we compare whether or not or to which degree we have
reached what we had wished are socially anchored. A characteristic of goals is
that we evaluate them and their consequences as being positive or less desirable,
with the corresponding emotions. When we struggle with obsolete social norms
or defend traditional values, we are able to recognize this. The assumption that
goals presuppose a memory system and are linked to culture (e.g. the social
mediation of norms and goals) is essential for the understanding of development
through intentions. Sometimes individuals become aware that they have been
pursuing a goal for a long time (e.g. refusing to undergo retraining despite bad
career prospects, having sympathy with a political party). Such examples make
plausible how life plans depend on factors of biography or learning history.

The study of ISD: General courses and intraindividual changes

Before cross-sectional and longitudinal studies were established as frequently
used empirical research methods to detect age differences across the lifespan,
Charlotte Bühler (1933) studied the life courses of individuals. Using single
biographies, she showed that individuals compensate for lost competencies (e.g.
social position) and invest energy in new domains of life until losses in late life
make compensation no longer successful. A comparison with the biological
ageing curve revealed that the age-related decline in mental functions is clearly
reduced. Later, this pattern was replicated with refined empirical methods in
specific domains of cognitive or personality development as compared to
biologically based losses of ageing (Horn & Cattell, 1967; Baltes, Lindenberger,
& Staudinger, 2006).
The study of biographies can make a remarkable variability of concrete goals,
preferences, or assumptions about the world evident through which the individual’s
behaviour is influenced: some people are inclined to refine their skills to prepare
Ćevapi because they would like to see themselves as experts in Balkan cuisine.
 What is ISD?  15

Some biographies are characterized by competition and possibly use athletic

performances for a paramount criterion of success. Some people recommend the
study of Shakespeare’s plays as a mirror to life. What does this great variety mean
for the study of ISD? One challenge that remains is whether one can conclude from
single biographies to developmental regularities. Some would avoid this conclusion
in order to grant uniqueness to each individual. Since the beginnings of empirical
investigation into lifespan development, many prospective and retrospective
research methods have been developed to detect short-term and long-term changes.
Some research branches that are more interested in rule-bound processes of
development propose that it would be useful to combine empirical research
methods on interpersonal differences and intraindividual change (see Box 1.2).
As may have become evident by now, the study of ISD is a complex task that
pertains to several developmental perspectives. One is the period of time in which
developmental changes become evident. The focus of studies can vary between
short-term fluctuations of goals and long-term changes over years. In addition, it is
important to specify whether intentions can contribute to changes in other domains
and, for example, influence the development of physical health during the next
years. Third, the intentions in themselves can be of interest (e.g. the development of

BOX 1.2  INTRAINDIVIDUAL CHANGE AND STABILITY

IN THE STUDY OF ISD

It has been argued that interpersonal differences in mental properties should

be paid more attention when long-term development is the aim of the study.
For example, a within-person-centred approach (see Diehl & Hooker, 2013;
Nesselroade, 1990) has been proposed as a promising way for the study of
ISD. Such an approach considers not only remarkable differences among
subjects in several personality domains (e.g. the degree of extraversion,
curiosity), but also in the daily fluctuation of mood, attitudes towards others,
or in making decisions.
A study with middle and older adults by Hooker and colleagues (2013)
provided evidence for the relationship between short-term processes (daily
progress in pursuing social and health goals within 100 days) and more stable
personality traits. They found that those high in conscientiousness and
extraversion but low in neuroticism made more progress in health and social
goals. In addition, less goal progress was reported on days when participants
noted stressful events. This study used an intensive, repeated-measurement
approach to measure changes in goal pursuit. From the perspective of ISD, it
would be interesting to see whether daily progress (or setbacks) in goal
pursuit also has the potential to influence the usually more stable dispositions.
This could be true if people were to come to conclusions about what should
be done to shape their development in a particular direction.
16  What is ISD?

specific goals in adulthood). Fourth, a central topic of research asks whether

developmental changes are age-normative or characteristic of specific groups or
single individuals. All of these aspects promise interesting insights in the function of
ISD and related mental processes and will still engage our attention in later chapters
in which I will provide evidence on how individuals select and pursue life goals.

ISD, time, and culture

Careful investigation of the part that intentions play in human development
(what can they cause and how do they function?) requires that many individual
and social aspects should be considered. Because there is no agreement as to what
intentions can and what ‘positive development’ actually means, there is no lean
theory or fact sheet that can simply be applied or learned by rote. ISD denotes a
paradigm of human development that treats part of future (e.g. goals, ideal states)
in mind and includes a bundle of basic assumptions.
One assumption is that individuals construe representations of themselves and
their (social) environment through actions and through the consequences of
their actions (Brandtstädter, 2006). Actions include intentions, which are part of
a cognitive-motivational system that connects anticipations (e.g. desired states: to
make a career in the next years) with the accompanying experiences of intended
consequences and non-intended chance encounters. These will be integrated in
the self-concept to a greater or lesser degree. Thus, intentions like concrete goals
have a time extension that presupposes a learning history, for example, as to
which means is appropriate to pursue a specific goal successfully or which goals
one likes at all. Figure 1.2 depicts the interconnectedness among the intentional
self, memory processes, and the cultural context.

FIGURE 1.2  The intentional self as co-producer of culture and development.

 What is ISD?  17

Culture sets up a horizon of expectations (e.g. cultural norms and values), but
also provides developmental assets. Cultural institutions and instrumental support
(educational institutions, healthcare systems, medical and technical progress) do
not only secure survival of passive organisms. They can serve as a means that
enables individuals to influence their own development intentionally. Intervention
programs with (older) adults (cognitive and health-related trainings) in many
studies have provided evidence that the negative impact of age-related losses or
critical life events can be compensated for (Kruse, 2007). On the other hand,
culture itself depends on the interplay of anticipation, observation, and memory.
According to some central assumptions of ISD (Brandtstädter, 2006), culture is
also a result of acting individuals: they use the gains in technical skill and try to
improve their own situation, and perhaps that of their groups. Developmental
outcomes can be compared to personal standards and guide intentional activity.
In sum, the intentional self has a history (prior experiences), through which it
regulates its own development by shaping its cultural ecology, at least in part. It
can respond to cultural norms and social expectations in a variety of ways,
however, how exactly intentions and biography interact remains an open
question. Before I begin to illustrate the creative developmental potential of
individuals, however, I will focus on contemporary theoretical avenues to human
development that also refer to intentions, but use a different focus. If we really
want to treat intentions as relevant for developmental paths, we should not do so
without some alternative models.

Theoretical perspectives and approaches

to the study of ISD
As should become evident, the concept of intentional development does not
imply that persons are the sole producers of their development. But which are the
relevant factors that contribute to ISD? What are the explaining factors about
how individuals develop across the lifespan? These rather general questions may
be of interest for many people, and if we pose the questions more precisely, of
importance for empirical research too. Several arguments and perhaps causes
have been in part passionately and controversially discussed in search of the
appropriate paradigm for human development. Merely two questions should
present us with the basic problems, which have haunted the minds of philosophers
and scientists for many generations, though strictly speaking, they pose problems
which are still unsolved.
The first is on the inside and outside perspective (Figure 1.3a). Concerned is
the role of our private subjective experience or personal goals compared to the
underlying natural processes such as brain activities and neuronal signals. Does
the phenomenal awareness of intentions, the private perspective of a person,
cause behaviour or is this rather a matter of the related physical and physiological
processes? The second question is to what extent do physical development and
also mental states follow an innate, genetic structure? Or have they been acquired
18  What is ISD?

FIGURE 1.3  Components and prerequisites of ISD.

by (social) learning (Figure 1.3b). The classical nature-nurture discussion

negotiates the status of both poles as a source of human development. This
discussion refers to the question as well of the degree to which development can
be modified through social or societal interventions too.
Both questions are important because they touch upon the general issue of to
what extent we are free to wish, to choose, and to act in order to shape our
development according to our wishes, or to what extent we must accept social
forces. Are we able to learn, or do we have to accept the dictates of our genetic
structure? In the following, I describe perspectives or paradigms that have been
used, on the one hand, to illustrate central prerequisites of intentions and the self
or the identity of a person and, on the other hand, to pertain to the interplay of
socio-cultural, biological, or biographic-historical factors.

Mechanistic models: The will as epiphenomenon and the

steam-whistle hypothesis
In accordance with the ISD perspective (Brandtstädter & Lerner, 1999; Greve &
Leipold, 2018), I have argued that individuals are, at least in part, creative
constructors of their development. Within this theoretical framework,
development is assumed to be mediated to a certain degree through subjective
representations (e.g. decisions, goals, beliefs about best means, or expectations
about desired or feared states). But is it plausible to assume that mental states can
actually serve as causes for how individuals behave or develop? Some authors
have doubts as to whether or not they can (Dennett, 2007; Prinz, 2012; for an
overview Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011). The British biologist Thomas
Huxley conceives of animals as conscious machines and used the steam whistle
as a basis for a comparison. The current so-called steam-whistle hypothesis says
that conscious thoughts are a collateral product of the working mechanism,
without any modifying power, and their volition is indicative of, but not a cause
of, physical changes. The steam whistle accompanies the work of the locomotive’s
engine without influencing its machinery (Huxley, 1874). The root metaphor
from a mechanistic perspective is of a machine composed of several components.
Thus, by the constitution of his body is man a microcosm of biological processes.
 What is ISD?  19

More recently, partly similar but more nuanced views on the role of social
origins have been submitted in accordance with a naturalistic mechanistic
world view. According to Prinz (2012), mental states (e.g. intentions, volitions)
will enable us to set and keep goals active, suppress distractors and competing
actions, and evaluate outcomes. They denote a set of mental functions that play
a crucial role in our understanding of how the mind works in a social context.
Human behaviour is guided by representations of goals, but such mental states
are a matter of social construction rather than an unfolding of natural
endowment. Several difficulties lead to the reservations about mental states
being causes (Prinz, 2012, p. 102): if intentional processes are conceived of as
private mental experiences (e.g. certain desires of individuals), they can hardly
be observed or studied on the basis of scientific standards, for instance, in terms
of their general observable inducibility and predictability. In addition, goals are
subsumed into the category of teleological explanations that provide a
description of how persons act rather than a causal explanation of why specific
actions and outcomes result.
When these reservations are taken seriously, differences in mental states and
actions need to be explained by variables other than mental states. Mental states
are developed and influenced by social rules and internalized values on the basis
of a memory system (Prinz, 2012). Intentions can be explained by social
attributions and are construed through the perception of foreign actions. Sharing
communities and communication result in a control system, and we can use
social skills for informative and strategic purposes (Dennett, 2007). The brain
and mind thus make contributions to their owner’s fitness and chances of survival.
Social artefacts such as societal ideals influence human behaviour (insofar as they
are real) – but we are not completely free to act but rather are controlled by social
and situational factors.
According to the ISD perspective, intentional and causal factors are intertwined
when individuals become older. The causal dynamics unfold in time and humans
develop within physical constraints. It has been argued that human development
is not only shaped by physical changes (e.g. age-related declines in health, changes
in brain functioning), but that these changes can serve as action resources and
shape the intentional strivings of individuals (Brandtstädter, 2006). Intentional
processes are not reduced to epiphenomena but qualify the physical and
mechanical processes, because they refer to life planning: losses in physical health
and a reduced lifetime perspective contribute to the intentional strivings and life
projects through which subjects invest time and other resources to compensate
for age-related declines. In this sense, one can describe the development over the
life course as a self-referential process: ‘Development creates and shapes
intentionality and intentional strivings, and developing intentionality in turn
shapes the course of development.’ (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2003, p. 106).
That intentions are related to phenomenological or personal aspects is not
beside the point but rather has been elaborated as a key characteristic of ISD and
human actions (Greve, 1994). Subjective representations of anticipated states
20  What is ISD?

imply the awareness or perceived importance of wishes, fears, or values individuals

have but could have disappeared in a mechanistic world view. I will provide
evidence, however, that not everything concerned with consciousness is entirely
subjective and excludes the use of objective standards. Mechanistic models focus
especially on external regulation and the doctrine that all natural events have
physical causes, and a key assumption of this position is that the events can be
understood by the same set of laws (of physics, chemistry).
Although the ISD approach pays tribute to the natural basis of brain
functioning and mind, the reducibility to simple natural laws is not without
difficulties. As a consequence, we should describe the situation, for example, of
the short-term goals and long-term life projects of Michael, Linda, and Mary (see
Box 1.1) applying the vocabulary of natural sciences. Anderson (1972; p. 393)
emphasized this problem, ‘that the more the elementary particle physicists tell us
about the nature, the less relevance they seem to have to the very real problems
of the rest of science, much less to those of society’. Anderson’s article title ‘More
is different’ refers to the problem he sees: at each level of complexity, qualitative
different characteristics emerge. The difficulty arises, for example, if one tries to
make the mediating links between different levels of analyses (e.g. neuronal
activities, muscular moves) and the decision to cross a street in order to take out
health insurance for the family members).
Still unresolved in this debate is the role of teleological explanations. The
assumption that nature is determined by causes or antecedents is well-accepted
in the natural sciences, but is this also true for the final cause in action? Do the
ends that we anticipate (e.g. expectations, hopes, worries) initiate behaviour?
This kind of explanation is considered to be an action explanation and can be
attributed to Aristotle (causa finalis; Physics, II, 3; Aristotle, 1980). Are intentions
and goals mighty enough to govern development in a specific way? Whether the
search for appropriate goals, reasons, or ends to predict actions is a successful way
to predict specific physical processes (e.g. motoric behaviour) by causes is a
crucial question that has been discussed in contemporary psychology several
times (Greve, 1994; Lewin, 1931).
However one evaluates the possible qualitative gap between physical and
mental states (apart from saying that the analysis of mental representations is
similar to the search for the locomotive’s steam – in other words, worthless in
explaining and understanding later developmental states), a simple terminology
or language allowing the transition from physical antecedents to the intentional
and valued representations to be described seems still to remain out of sight.
A remaining challenge is to understand what it means when we say that
intentional states can influence behaviour but, on the other hand, cannot be
understood as causes. According to contemporary models of contextual
human development, the complex interplay among neuronal architecture,
genetic dispositions, and socio-cultural changes is important when we try to
explain what subjects do when they intentionally strive in order to play a role
in their lives.
 What is ISD?  21

Contextual models, dynamic interactionism, and

developmental systems
The ISD approach emphasizes both the social influences shaping the development
of individuals as well as individuals’ creative powers to influence social relations.
Contextual models and developmental system theories (Lerner & Schmid Callina,
2013; Magnusson & Stattin, 2006; Overton, 2015; Thelen & Smith, 1994)
remind us that developing individuals are embedded in ecological, social, and
institutional contexts. This means that planning and acting individuals are
influenced by social factors (e.g. social expectations, societal norms) but at the
same time influence their environment (e.g. by breaking rules or by currying
favour in order to gain recognition).
Many ecological approaches (e.g. Tinajero & Páramo, 2012) refer to the
ecological systems theory of Urie Bronfenbrenner (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006).
Bronfenbrenner distinguished several levels of environmental systems within
which an individual interacts, for example, proximal levels (i.e. an individual’s
relationships with members of the nuclear family or significant others) or socio-
cultural levels (i.e. relations within the larger social institutions of policy and
economic systems). The ecological approach thus demonstrates that interdependent
socio-cultural factors contribute to the individual development. Similarly, the
interactionist approach of Magnusson and Stattin (2006) highlights the
psychobiological-contextual continuum and discusses the interdependence
among social context, biological (hormonal, neuronal) processes, and
psychological (cognitive, affective) processes. The age-related changes in
biological maturation and decline are conceptualized within their contextual
prerequisites. A central component of developmental system theories is that ecological
settings are in flux. These theories note the dynamic nature of theoretical concepts
in interdependence with the context (e.g. the concepts of complexity,
organization, globalism, diversity, nonlinearity). Relativism and holism lead to a
perspective ‘which accepts novelty as a possibility and denies pre-determinism’
(Tinajero & Páramo, 2012, p. 460). Given that individuals are influenced by
experiences (e.g. through learning and internalized habits) too, the question
arises as to what pre-determinism exactly means.
According to temporal developmental system theories, traditional splits
between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ become obsolete (Lerner & Walls, 1999; Overton,
2015). They refer to modifying relationships (‘Dynamic interactions, unlike the
previous versions, would mean the chance of real change in the different related
elements for all of the others.’; Tinajero & Páramo, 2012; p. 459). One aspect of
the nature versus nurture debate leads to the question of which of the two sides
is more important for human development, the presumably given side (inherited
genes) or the manageable side which stresses that we have the power to influence
later developmental states by interventions. This dichotomy is toned down by the
concept of interactions, which require, per definition, that both sides be
important.
22  What is ISD?

Common features of developmental systems theories are that they focus on

embeddedness, complexity and integration, integrated coactions, and they
emphasize the fused influence of the context on the development of the individual
that is influencing his surroundings. By focusing on the complex nature of
interdependent influences, system theories tend to relativize the possible
developmental determinants to a high degree and to use an abstract terminology
so that one asks for the centre of gravity. In any case, it seems fruitful to understand
the diversity and the similarity of development. This leads to the challenges of
how to adequately describe the interacting social and biological forces and how to
provide convincing empirical support.

Constructivism
In psychology, the term constructivism includes many schools of thought and
applied fields that share assumptions about human knowledge. Constructionist
approaches conceive of knowledge and scientific progress as process of
construction: what we know is more a matter of social construction than a
reflection of natural facts that exist independently of our constructions. To
illustrate the interconnection with intentional self-regulation, I briefly focus on
three different psychological perspectives. George Kelly emphasized the client’s
record of personal experience. He developed a psychotherapy approach and a
technique (repertory grid interview) that helps patients to analyze their schemas
or ways of seeing the world (Kelly, 1955). He drew attention to interindividual
differences (personal constructs). Social constructivism (e.g. Gergen, 1985), on
the other hand, emphasizes that human knowledge is constructed through
interaction with others. Piaget’s theory of constructivism addresses, from a
developmental point of view, how learning occurs. Thus, people produce
knowledge and form meaning by constructing their own understanding on the
basis of their experiences. The human mind actively gives meaning and order to
that reality to which it is responding. Constructionist and ISD approaches
emphasize that individuals’ knowledge structures develop through interaction.
Many would probably agree that agents are actively involved in the subjective
and social constructions. From an ISD standpoint, the question arises whether
our intentions, if they are (based on) subjective constructions, can be objective,
true, or real. Or more generally, how accurately can our knowledge describe or
represent (i.e. correspond with) the world or reality (and not just be constructed)?
These and other questions have been controversially discussed (see Hacking,
1999; Putnam, 1988, for further arguments). The criterion of truth served as a
bone of contention in several debates. From an ISD perspective, one needs not to
deny the concept of truth and replace it with an epistemology of subjective
experience and adaptive or collective viability (e.g. Greve, 1994). Intention can
shape or determine a developmental outcome and its objects of inquiry (e.g.
mental, physiological processes), which in turn shape the constructive processes
and intentions.
 What is ISD?  23

Biocultural co-construction
During the last three decades, several authors emphasized the role of social
interaction and biological factors for ISD. The emergence of intentionality in
human evolution and the capacity to share attention (Tomasello, 2014) or the
inherently social nature of self and other understanding (Gergely, 2002) are
examples of avenues to the development of the self with a strong focus on social
motivation. According to these models, social interactions are important factors
for the early construction of a reflective and intentional self in childhood
development (for an overview, see Mack & Reuter, 2009). The meta-theoretical
framework of biocultural co-constructivism (Baltes, Rösler, & Reuter-Lorenz, 2006)
is similar to the interactionist approach of lifespan development in many respects,
but has led to empirical studies and hypotheses examining the results of brain
science and biological maturation in more detail than social scientists are usually
interested in. Within biocultural co-constructivism, researchers have used
cognitive neuroscience methodology during the last decade to investigate the
interactive systems that shape the human mind and its development. Empirical
studies in this approach followed the often-formulated desiderata of interdisciplinary
research and provided evidence for the plasticity of the brain. The rapid growth
of neuroimaging and techniques to measure brain functioning in vivo have led to
many studies combining brain-science methods and the techniques of psychological
approaches (e.g. social or learned paradigms) in combination.
The concept of developmental plasticity (Lövdén et al., 2010) denotes that the
human organism is open to change. The potential for change lies in several
domains of cognition and personality as well in the anatomy and neurochemistry
of the brain, all of which can be altered by experience and trainings (e.g. activity,
task demands, learning). Thus, the brain is an adaptive system, an organ that is
co-shaped by culture and exercise techniques. In the domains of learning and
memory, evidence from cognitive (neuro)science has demonstrated that the
developing brain in adulthood can be trained and influenced by cultural factors
(Li, 2006). Cultural influences on psychiatric disorders have also been identified
and it has been argued that psychopathology cannot be reduced to brain
functioning (Choudhury & Kirmayer, 2009). What was obviously often
overlooked in the empirical research is that the brain itself can be conceived of as
a dependent variable too (Baltes, Rösler, & Reuter-Lorenz, 2006), and
experimental interventions using memory training offer possibilities to
investigate the potential of developmental neuronal plasticity in advanced age.
Both the social dynamic (see the contextual models) and the related biological
processes (see the biocultural co-constructivism) are closely related to ISD; the
latter one, however, focuses more explicitly on the mediating and constructive
function of human actions in relating causal (e.g. contextual, biological, and
developmental) and intentional factors. The ISD approach anchors the creative
dynamic in mental processes (e.g. of intentions, expectations, goals) that enables
ageing individuals to influence the developmental course.
24  What is ISD?

Summary
Intentional self-development (ISD) denotes an action-theoretical approach to
human development that emphasizes the potential (and limits) of individuals as
producers of their own development. This first chapter introduced the concept of
ISD and described current psychological concepts related to ISD to provide a
theoretical background. Although mainly genuine psychological approaches to
ISD have been introduced, relations to social factors and neuronal processes were
briefly mentioned. It should become evident that individuals, in principle, have
many ways to shape their development intentionally; however, if one tries to
describe more precisely what individuals actually do when they act and try to
influence their situation, a fascinating, but mixed, picture of biological processes,
social interactions, and mental phenomena emerges. Development through
intentions depends on a bundle of self-regulating processes such expectations,
memories, and evaluations. We have to understand and delineate the optimizing
factors and constraints, especially if we want to provide affordances (trainings,
interventions) that enable the ageing individuals to manage the challenges of life.
2
DEVELOPMENTAL PREREQUISITES
AND CHALLENGES ACROSS THE
LIFESPAN

Chapter 2 focuses on developmental prerequisites and challenges across the

lifespan and provides insights into the social and biological foundation of
intentional self-development (ISD). Empirical results on age-related changes in
adulthood (e.g. biological changes, physical changes and diseases, changes in
social relationships) are reported. I argue that each of these changes can serve as
a standard or challenge or be used as a resource for ISD. In addition, I examine
the role of neural and physiological processes in the volitional and emotional-
motivational system. The concepts of developmental tasks (Havighurst, 1948)
and developmental deadlines (Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2019) highlight
rather normative, generally age-correlated and expectable periods in the lifespan,
whereas the life-event approach (Bleidorn, Hopwood, & Lucas, 2016;
Dohrenwend, 2006) and the concept of chance encounters (Bandura, 1982) offer
a view that opposes the idea of anticipatory preparation and the planned use of
prospective coping strategies. This chapter highlights the role of individual
actions in social relationships as elementary units of daily life. With regard to
ISD, I emphasize the role of individuals’ appraisals and projects (see transactional
stress theory; Carver, 2011; Lazarus, 1999). Chapter 2 ends with the basic
assumptions of developmental regulation models (Baltes, Lindenberger, &
Staudinger, 2006; Brandtstädter, 2016; Heckhausen et  al., 2010), which offer
valuable indications of how individuals deal with age-related losses and non-
normative challenges.

Age-related changes in adulthood

The enduring increase in life expectancy is remarkable because it demonstrates
that the harmful influence of many physical diseases can be compressed to the
calendric third and fourth age (60–70 years or older). Many people reach the age
26  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

of 80 years or older, and an increasing number are living to more than 90 or 100
years. Tales of a fountain of youth and the idea of living without health-related
restrictions attest to our yearning for a life without pain. According to
interactionist or sociobiological models of development (Lerner, 2002; Overton,
2015; Shanahan & Hofer, 2011), the ‘fountain of youth’ might be suspected in
the interplay of gene reproduction, cellular processes, and environmental factors
that regulate the activation of genes and their effects. Growing older, disease, and
biological processes are intricately intertwined. Some physical and physiological
changes occur with advancing age and are assumed to be the result of biological
decline. According to classical theories of life course, development across the
entire lifespan is characterized by growth (maturity, differentiation) and decline
(Baltes, 1987): from childhood to early adulthood, maturation promotes the
organism from complete dependency to a well-functioning person. From middle
adulthood, biological decline increasingly affects physical functioning and leads
to a decline in competencies in old age. This process involves progressive cellular
damage and dysfunction (Story & Attix, 2010). ‘Do people, like fruits and
vegetables, ripen and rot as they grow older, or is there more to life than that?’
(Katchadourian, 1987, p. 26). From a biological point of view, the first part of
this question might seem to be obvious. The second part points to the values,
goals, and meaning that individuals associate with this issue.
The ISD approach emphasizes the implications of the latter part and stresses
the mediating role of intentions. It asserts that the results of these changes and
trajectories over the lifespan (e.g. the speed of biological ageing, health
development) depend to a remarkable degree on actions and can be modified by
those actions. Orientation towards an important action goal is a self-regulating
component for the individual in the face of age-related loss, which implies that
we recognize that we play a role in and share responsibility for our health and
other life domains. Interest and indifference are not merely mental by-products
but can contribute to the development of quality of life across the lifespan.
Although a high life expectancy with comparatively high quality of life has
become a realistic goal for many, growing older is associated with physical and
cognitive decline. A closer look reveals that age-related losses in some domains
become prevalent in early adulthood, even if we are not aware of such changes.
Biologically and socially based changes influence our health-related behaviour,
which in turn modifies the expression of these changes.

Development between growth and decline: Physical changes

and diseases
Among the most observable changes associated with the ageing process are
changes in the skin or body build and ageing of the face. First, we slowly
recognize that hairs grey and thin, and the skin becomes less elastic and wrinkled.
Fitness centres and the cosmetics industry are evidence that many people try to
mitigate the symptoms of growing older beginning in early adulthood. The
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  27

fading of beauty and the loss of potency might be experienced as a source of

subjective threat; however, these outward signs are not necessarily good markers
of what is happening inside the body. In any case, the ageing body becomes a
developmental task in the second half of life. The lifespan approach emphasizes
the principle of interindividual and intra-individual differences (Baltes, Lindenberger,
& Staudinger, 2006) to highlight the heterogeneity of ageing processes. People
of the same age can differ from each other so much (in cognitive functioning,
physical health, and body appearance) that they resemble people from different
age groups (interindividual differences). One man at 60 years of age needs a heart
operation, while another is ‘fit as a fiddle’. On the other hand, not all systems
develop at the same rate and in the same direction within a person. Some health
functions can show negative changes and others positive changes or stability over
time, even within the same function (e.g. memory; see intra-individual
differences and multidirectionality of development; Baltes et al., 2006).
Despite this heterogeneity, biological changes and physical illness limit
actions, and they show strong age-related declines in comparison to the weak age
correlations observed, for instance, in the domains of self and personality (see
Chapter 5). The loss of abilities can have serious consequences in everyday life
when it deprives people of the ability to engage in activities. Sensory deficits and
chronic disease are regarded as limits on quality of life and can be the source of
dependency in old age (Baltes, 1996). Since these are negative states that people
wish to avoid through preventive and compensatory strategies, they become an
important topic of ISD during the second half of life. I draw attention to physical
changes because, on the one hand, they often serve as coping resources that are
necessary for executing plans to reach specific goals. On the other hand, they
become developmental goals by themselves. People can optimize their physical
development by investing increased effort in protecting and achieving desired
developmental states.
I use the phase of middle adulthood to illustrate a time when many people
become aware of changes in several domains of physical, social, and psychological
functioning. Midlife is a period that is situated at the crossroads of growth and
decline and represents a prime period for connection across earlier and later
periods (Lachman, Teshale, & Agrigoaei, 2015). It is characterized by roles such
as working, parenting, mentoring, and caregiving. The experience of efficacy
and control beliefs are regarded as important prerequisites for health and
subjective well-being. In midlife, people are at the peak of their competence in
several domains (e.g. professional leading positions, number of social roles,
cognitive complexity). On the other hand, several physical resources recognizably
begin to decline. Easily attainable goals in young adulthood can sometimes be
difficult to achieve in late midlife and old age (e.g. child bearing, continuing
work in good health). Biological declines can mark final reference points
(developmental deadlines, Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2005) for realizing certain
goals and can make it necessary to adjust one’s goals and priorities. During one’s
twenties and thirties, many declines in body functioning are so gradual that they
28  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

are hardly noticeable. Slowly they become evident. We are not as quick as we
used to be. Bones become less dense and fractures harder and slower to heal.
Visual acuity and hearing are affected. The ability to distinguish details begins to
decline, and hearing sensitivity, especially to high frequency sounds, declines
(for an overview, see Berk, 2018). At the age of approximately 40 years,
farsightedness can be observed. Impairments in sensory systems increase along
with age during the adult years. Surgical treatments and advances in technology
(e.g. methods to aid hearing) make it possible to compensate for many losses. We
recognize such deficits when we make statements such as ‘I will wait. It is not bad
enough that I need to go to the doctor’.
In old age, a strong, negative age pattern in several domains of sensory
functioning and biological factors can be observed. The results of the Berlin
Aging Study demonstrated that vision, hearing, and balance/gait are strongly
correlated, and each sense is strongly negatively associated with chronological
age (Marsiske et al., 1999). One interesting result of this study was the relationship
among a broad array of outcome variables in different domains. Social
relationships, self-care activities, cognitive functioning, and well-being can
suffer from reduced sensory functioning. Changes in perception reduce the
quality of input that reaches the brain to be integrated in subsequent information
processing. When the awareness of age-related decline can no longer be denied,
negative consequences for well-being become probable. Self-regulating processes
(problem-focused coping strategies, flexible goal adjustment) can be expected to
dampen the negative impact of sensory restrictions on subjective quality of life.
Regarding the individual’s developmental plans and preventive efforts, positive
evaluations of the future seem to predict preventive behaviour. Interestingly,
younger adults in particular have been observed to be more strongly concerned
about the domains of appearance and fitness and preparation for age-related
changes (Kornadt, Voss, & Rothermund, 2015).
Some body systems decline more rapidly than others. During adulthood, the
body loses its capacity for peak performance and extreme exertion. The resulting
social/motivational pressure becomes evident in, for instance, athletes who aim
to reach the performance levels they attained before an accident or older adults
who seek to maintain independence in activities of daily living. During physical
exertion, breathing rate increases, and respiratory capacity and vital capacity (the
amount of air that we can draw in with a deep breath and then expel) decrease.
When stressed by exercise, the ability to meet the body’s oxygen requirements is
reduced. Many athletic skills peak between the ages of 20 and 30 years and then
gradually decline. Physicians and neuropsychologists sometimes assess cognitive
and health-related function to distinguish normal from optimal or abnormal/
pathological ageing (Story & Attix, 2010). Figure 2.1 depicts the age trajectories.
In older age, some degree of loss in bodily functions (e.g. vital capacity, nerve
conduction velocity) may be consistent with normal ageing. Poor vision or
breathing capacity can be considered normal changes in old age, whereas these
conditions are not normative in 30-year-old people and are indicative of
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  29

FIGURE 2.1  Decline of organ functioning (according to Katchadourian, H. 1987.

Fifty: Midlife in perspective. New York: Freeman.)

pathological ageing. Abnormal or pathological ageing reflects the early onset of

a disease, while optimal ageing is characterized by physical and mental resilience
to age-related diseases and decline (Story & Attix, 2010). I should note that
concepts such as ‘normal’ and ‘optimal’ ageing are not only simple descriptions.
If we consider the hold that images of normal ageing can have on the formation
of attitudes, we recognize how human action is influenced by ideals and social
reference points. Age norms can serve as important standards for individuals
when they evaluate their own physical developmental state.
Due to biological changes, ageing adults are increasingly concerned with
managing losses. A strong sense of control or tenacious goal pursuit is useful for
defending valued but threatened goals; however, being overambitious can result
in rigidity and negative consequences. Research has provided evidence that Type
A behaviour (being more competitive, highly organized and aware of time
management, ambitious, impatient, or aggressive; Friedman, 1996) in
co-occurrence with stress and critical life events is correlated with negative
health outcomes. It is also related to the risk of coronary heart disease. For most
adults, the peak of health occurs in young adulthood, although most middle-
aged and older adults continue to be healthy.

Chronic impairments and diseases

Chronic (long-term or incurable) diseases (cardiovascular, neurosensorial,
endocrine, blood, malignancy) are much more common in middle and late
adulthood than among young people, whereas in childhood, acute and temporary
diseases show high prevalence rates. In particular, cardiovascular diseases and
30  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

other forms of chronic diseases show an increase during the second half of life
and represent the major diagnoses among older persons.
In the second half of life, cardio- and cerebrovascular diseases and malignancies
are the most important causes of death in Western industrialized countries (in the
first half of life, the main cause is unintentional injury or accidents). Changes in
the heart and blood vessel system may lead to one of the major life-threatening
diseases (arteriosclerosis, coronary heart disease, heart attack). Ageing of the
cardiovascular system begins in middle age – in the heart and the arteries that
circulate blood throughout the body (e.g. increased blood pressure). Blood flow
is reduced as arteries accumulate plaques and stiffen. The heart muscle becomes
more rigid, and maximum heart rate decreases; this important structure becomes
less efficient over time. Deposits of fat interfere with cardiac function and blood
pressure, and the arteries become less able to accommodate the flow of blood.
Hypertension tends to promote thickening and loss of elasticity of the arteries. A
healthy lifestyle and physical training can influence the progression of decline in
functional capacity, although declines in aerobic capacity (i.e. the maximum
amount of oxygen that can be delivered through the blood) occur even in highly
trained people. Continued involvement in physical exercise can maintain aerobic
capacity longer. Coordination training can help compensate for age declines in
physical stamina and stimulate cognitive domains to a certain degree (Voelcker-
Rehage, Godde, & Staudinger, 2011), but it does not stop the biological clock.
Directed effort to improve one’s staying power – despite commendable progress
according to intervention research – nonetheless can involve slowing down and
adapting to the demands of growing old.
Cancer, the second leading cause of death in adulthood (after cardiovascular
diseases), can be influenced to a limited degree. Cancer can arise in and spread to
many body organs. Although prevention (e.g. healthy lifestyle, health screenings)
is possible, and some cancers are curable, many tumours, such as breast and prostate
cancers, are not recognized in an early state because they grow slowly and are
barely noticeable. Cancer can weaken the immune system, and some forms
accompany the affected individual throughout his or her life. Responses to a cancer
diagnosis include an initial defence from the implications of the diagnosis, dysphoria,
and symptoms such as reduced appetite, poor concentration, and insomnia. Physical
consequences arise from the illness in terms of individual functioning, disability,
and social integration and often force individuals to redefine themselves from a
healthy person to one with limitations (Morrison & Bennett, 2016). Thus, it is
clear that becoming sick is a complex and dynamic process that involves the
perception of symptoms, limitations in everyday functioning, and a diagnosis on
the one hand and responses to the illness by the affected persons on the other.

The experience of an illness and coping

One reason that (chronic) diseases are relevant for ISD is that they can change
people’s life plans for several months or years. Diseases present an individual with
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  31

many challenges depending upon the success of treatments and the individual’s
coping responses. They can also cause changes in the relationships and roles of
those involved in the interactions. The illness constellation model (Morse & Johnson,
1991) offers insight into the experience of an illness, from the onset of symptoms
to living with a disease. The model is not limited to a single diagnosis and
incorporates the perspectives of families and friends: illness affects the sick person
and his or her significant others, and the illness experience includes significant
others. The model considers illness trajectories that may be short or prolonged
and vary in intensity. Illness experience is conceptualized as a four-stage process:

• Stage of uncertainty: An individual detects signs of illness and tries to

understand the meaning of these symptoms.
• Stage of disruption: This stage begins when it becomes evident that the
individual has a real illness, for instance, through the confirmation of a
medical diagnosis. The individual experiences intense stress.
• Stage of striving to regain self: The ill person strives to make sense of the illness
and examines the past for reasons that explain the illness. The individual
attempts to gain control over the illness through instrumental coping.
• Stage of regaining wellness: The ill person attains mastery by regaining former
relationships and achieves a new emotional equilibrium.

Although not all individuals will move through these phases smoothly (e.g.
elements of the stages may co-occur), the model has heuristic value for working
with patients. The model draws attention to the experience of illness, stress
appraisals, and coping efforts in the face of severe illness.
The term coping denotes several (not necessarily successful) attempts to bring
is and ought into better alignment. Individuals are required to alter the stressors
or their interpretation by, for instance, ‘changing the world’ or ‘changing the
self ’ (Rothbaum et  al., 1982; see also Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2019).
Coping involves several cognitions and behaviour, some of which are conscious,
intentional processes (planned efforts to reduce the impact of a perceived stressor)
and some of which are unconscious, non-intentional processes (e.g. defence
mechanisms, Vaillant, 1994; immunizing processes, Greve & Wentura, 2003).
Regarding severe or lasting illness, several challenges can arise, which can in
turn evoke different coping responses from individuals. Several authors have
pointed out that illness is also a challenge for supporting partners, family, and
friends who interact with the ill individual (Bodenmann, Randall, & Falconier,
2016; Morse & Johnson, 1991). Adaptive responses include problem-focused
coping (maintaining control, managing symptoms, undergoing treatment),
meaning-focused coping (accepting the disease as disease, making sense of the
symptoms, engaging in emotional adjustment), and immunization or defence
mechanisms (coping through denial, suppression, or avoidance).
Responses to diagnosis, illness, and treatment may include a great variety of
emotions (e.g. anger, anxiety, depression, hopelessness). For many stroke patients,
32  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

significant levels of emotional distress persist for months. The complexity of

these processes becomes evident if one merely considers the mental processes that
interact at the level of information processing. According to Filipp (1999), coping
with loss and trauma is characterized by several attentive, comparative, and
interpretative processes that result in the construction of victims’ ‘perceptive
realities’. Attentive processes (e.g. selective attention to bad news) and comparative
processes (e.g. downward comparisons) allow individuals to carry on living at
relative peace with themselves and help them tolerate the situation. Interpretative
processes refer to attempts to ascribe meaning to one’s current situation through
ruminative thinking. Instead of categorizing coping methods as changing the
world or changing the self, Filipp aimed ‘to highlight the process through which
victims of life crises struggle towards re-establishing a better world to live in’
(Filipp, 1999, p. 47). She reported evidence on temporal comparisons by asking
patients to rate the degree of change they experienced after being diagnosed with
cancer or having a myocardial infarction. One finding from this research was
that illness resulted in perceptions of an ‘altered’ self or life in various domains
(e.g. physical well-being, work, ways of daily living).
We know from our own experience that illness can push us off course,
especially when the illness is severe and we do not know how to cure it. Box 2.1
illustrates two factors associated with uncertainty that are worth considering

BOX 2.1  DEALING WITH THE UNCERTAINTIES

OF ILLNESS

When the chance of healing is uncertain and wider consequences must be

recognized before positive adaptation can begin (Morrison & Bennett, 2016),
questions and decisions arise regarding which outcomes are best for the
individual being treated: living with a handicap for a few years or living in
better health for a shorter length of time? The choice between treatments –
one without major side effects but with only moderate proven success in
healing the illness concerned or another therapy with excellent success rates
but with significant side effects – can become difficult. How would you
decide, and what factors would influence your decision?
There are remarkable interindividual differences in emotional burden
based on whether individuals are inclined to blame external factors, internal
factors, or Lady Luck for being victimized. Regarding the protective function
of causal attributions, research has not produced a clear result. As Filipp
(1999) noted, repeated exposure to an event makes a difference. Individuals
tend to blame themselves by attributing the attack to internal, stable factors,
which promotes intrusive thoughts when they experience a second negative
event. In the case of a single experience, self-blame was found to facilitate the
victim’s posttraumatic recovery.
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  33

because they play a central role in coping with severe illness: (a) difficult decisions
and (b) the role of causal attributions (see also Chapter 4).
I devote attention to these factors because they briefly summarize a never-ending
problem. They represent the attitudes or expectations that influence our behaviour.
Although average life expectancy has been extended due, in part, to advancements
in medical research, the healthcare system, and health-conscious behaviour by
individuals (taking vitamin C, not smoking, engaging in aerobic exercise),
vulnerability cannot be completely avoided (Ebeling, Rau, & Baudisch, 2018; Fries,
2005). Reductions in mortality from specific diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, tetanus,
diphtheria) have been registered during the past century, but new challenges (e.g.
ecological risks), accidents, and crime can lead to illness and result in restrictions on
quality of life. People must sometimes accommodate their illness and accept that
they cannot control everything the way they used to. The experience of several
morbidities may force people to redefine themselves, which can lead to reductions
in self-esteem, hope, and satisfaction with healthcare. In addition to physical
impairments, age-related changes occur in the brain. The task in the following
section is to reflect on the relationship between structural changes in the brain and
cognitive decline. I also examine the relationship among cognitive impairments,
everyday functioning, and the role of intentions that, I argue, regulate our behaviour.

Structural changes in the brain and cognitive decline

Ageing of the neurological system is accompanied by several biological changes,
including the loss of nerve cells and decreased brain weight. Several studies have
provided evidence of an inverse relationship between age and brain volume
(frontal and temporal lobe, anterior lobe, and hippocampus; Williamson, 2010).
Neurons die, the loss of grey and white matter increases, and the ventricles
(spaces) within the brain enlarge. The brain atrophies in late adulthood. Neuronal
function is strongly associated with cognitive decline, and frontal lobe activity in
response to cognitive demand is associated with decreased efficiency in
performance. Limited generation of new neurons and the development of new
synapses can, in part, compensate for these declines; however, age-related change
results in limitations on many cognitive functions in early adulthood (at about 30
years), and the gradual slowing of responses begins in middle age. This slowdown
can affect physical coordination and intellectual performance and interfere with
the ability to learn. Reuter-Lorenz and Park (2010) distinguished four major
domains of age-related cognitive decline:

• Working memory: The cognitive system maintains several pieces of information

for use in higher-order processing tasks. Age-related performance differences
are minimal for simple span tasks (e.g. digit span or item recognition tasks
that require rote rehearsal). Differences are pronounced, however, when
memory load increases or executive functions (reordering or inhibition) are
added to the task.
34  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

• Inhibitory control: This domain involves controlling the content of working

memory by keeping out irrelevant information or deleting non-relevant
content.
• Processing speed: Age-related slowing of processing speed (how quickly one
can complete simple or automatic tasks with a reasonable degree of accuracy)
is well documented. Neuroscience evidence has revealed that different
cognitive measures are associated with different brain structures (white
matter decline).
• Long-term memory: Long-term memory refers to different functions of the
memory system, such as explicit (declarative) and episodic, semantic,
autobiographical, and implicit (procedural) memory. These memory
functions consist of memories that occurred more than a few seconds or
minutes ago. These declines are subject to deficient encoding. Maintenance
rehearsal (several recalls/retrievals of memory) and environmental support
are needed to preserve long-term memories.

Many of these changes are part of normal cognitive decline in adulthood. In

contrast, dementias such as Alzheimer’s disease and vascular dementia are
examples of pathological changes. Dementias include several cognitive and
behavioural limitations, and they are associated with memory and information
processing loss, as well as personality changes (impaired emotional control,
apathy). It seems obvious that cognitive decline can disturb intentions, actions,
and judgement ability, for instance, by forgetting certain goals or action strategies.
Dementias are regarded as an example of reduced plasticity, a concept that is
assumed to be a key factor in the ability to adapt to demands around the house
or at work. There is evidence that early treatment of dementias can slow the
progression of the disease (e.g. through cholinesterase inhibitors). These
treatments attenuate the loss of the individual’s plasticity, but dementias remain
a challenge for the health system and for quality of life.

Plasticity: Biological and cultural foundation

The intentional aspects of self-development should not be considered
independently of humans’ biological constitution. Their biological predisposition
is what makes humans living organisms. The development of self-representation
in childhood requires a biological maturation process of the brain that is
influenced by cultural factors (cultural and educational history). The capacity for
self-reflection and intentionality enables people to make themselves the object of
development efforts, that is, to work on themselves and achieve specific
developmental results (Brandtstädter, 2006). Plasticity, the ability to change and
adapt, is a product of evolution and a key characteristic of development.
In the research on lifespan development, a central question concerns the
mechanisms through which adaptation to the constraints of the developmental
context across the life course remains possible despite cognitive and biological
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  35

decline. The concept of plasticity has been used to address this question. In
general, it refers to within-person variability, for instance, in the physiological
systems that adjust the heart rate. Plasticity denotes a backup capacity that helps
the body’s systems function; it involves molecular mechanisms and connections
between presynaptic and postsynaptic neurons. Behavioural-oriented
neuroscientists assume that such adaptations require brain plasticity and
investigate the modifiability of behaviour, for instance, the maintenance of
cognitive performance (Li et al., 2006) or the development of disorders such as
Alzheimer’s disease or schizophrenia (Oberman & Pascual-Leone, 2013). In
psychological domains, plasticity refers to changes in self and personality (e.g.
people adapt attitudes or expectations to a changing situation). For a long time,
plasticity has been assumed to be restricted to early periods of development;
however, research has shown that it is present throughout the lifespan, albeit to
different degrees (Kühn & Lindenberger, 2016). Plasticity should not be reduced
to a focus on improvement and growth. If one considers the limits on cognitive,
neuronal, and behavioural levels of functioning, it becomes evident that cognitive
growth becomes difficult for ageing individuals in many life domains. According
to Kühn and Lindenberger, plasticity in adulthood and old age is more associated
with maintenance and less associated with change beyond the existing levels of
functioning.
Although plasticity refers to stability or maintenance of the status quo, this
does not imply a stable body (one could imagine a sluggish mass, a stable
disposition, or a person’s tendency towards robustness, for example). In contrast
to inflexible, static phenomena, plasticity involves developmental stabilization,
which is a dynamic process that unfolds within individuals over time (Martin,
Jäncke, & Röcke, 2012). Compared with short-term fluctuations, plasticity
implies modifiability, that is, central outcomes (e.g. memory span) remain stable
or can be stabilized for a certain time. Many developmental-psychological studies
have focused on plasticity in the cognitive domain. The distinction between
cognitive mechanics and pragmatics (see also fluid and crystallized intelligence) refers
to basic components of everyday problem solving that are worth considering in
more detail because of their relevance to ISD.
The concepts of cognitive mechanics and pragmatics (Baltes, Lindenberger, &
Staudinger, 2006) have been used to differentiate between two general modes of
intellectual development that do not follow the same age trajectories. Both
concepts can be used to illustrate how plasticity can be achieved through training,
technical support, or culture. The mechanics of cognition (i.e. the neurophysiological
architecture of the mind, working memory, spatial orientation, or perceptual
speed) show monotonic decline during adulthood beginning in the third decade.
Fluid intelligence is an indicator of the mechanics of cognitive functioning that
represents the ability to process new information and is usually measured by
dimensions such as speed of information processing and memory. The fluid
intelligence of middle-aged adults falls between that of younger and older adults.
The concept of cognitive pragmatics (e.g. vocabulary, general knowledge, semantic
36  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

memory, crystallized intelligence) directs attention towards the mediating role of

lifelong learning and culture. Cognitive pragmatics, defined as education-
dependent skills, have weak and sometimes positive age relations up to the sixth
or seventh decade of life and start to decline in very old age. Baltes and colleagues
argued that ‘positive developmental changes in the pragmatic component reflect
the lifelong practice of culturally transmitted bodies of declarative and procedural
knowledge that are made available to individuals in the course of socialization
and lifetime experiences’ (Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 1999). The
authors concluded that there is little evidence to suggest that the mechanics of
cognition are altered by domain-specific knowledge. Nonetheless, pragmatic
knowledge has been regarded as a means of compensation for fluid decline.
Acquired knowledge endows ageing individuals with a local (e.g. domain-
bound) ability to withstand the consequences of ageing-related losses in cognitive
and physical functioning. When adults grow older, they face more, or perhaps
more threatening, challenges to their abilities to compensate for age-related
losses. Research on trainings and interventions has provided evidence that this
decline in reserve capacity and plasticity can be attenuated through external
resources or societal support (e.g. available trainings, trainers, physicians). In the
following section, I provide empirical evidence on how mental resources (e.g.
resources for practical problem solving) can be trained through lifestyle and
exercise, which have been shown to be useful when faced with the burden of
growing older. As we will see, such changes require a certain degree of motivation
that can sometimes be executed without effort but sometimes requires iron
discipline.

Lifestyle and physical exercise

The expected increase in the proportion of adults over the age of 65 years may
lead to a correlated increase in the proportion of age-related diseases. Against this
background, there is a need to identify factors that can protect against decline or
be trained through interventions or exercise. Age-related losses result in large part
from contingent contextual conditions such as health restrictions and insufficient
opportunities or willingness to engage in physical training. During midlife and
old age, there is remarkable potential to modify physical restrictions and brain
functions. Many studies have provided evidence that lifestyle, physical exercise,
and cognitive interventions contribute to the states of development. Lövdén,
Ghisletta, and Lindenberger (2005) showed that a healthy lifestyle, physical
activity, and social participation are associated with minimal functional decline.
Those who adopted a healthy lifestyle (defined as not smoking, eating a healthy
diet, engaging in regular physical activity) were less likely to be diagnosed with
heart disease (e.g. Berk, 2018). Improvements in cardiovascular health are regarded
as an important pathway through which physical activity has positive effects on
the brain. In addition, higher income, education, and intellectually engaging
activities are also related to cognitive functioning (Story & Attix, 2010).
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  37

Some research has examined whether or not aerobic exercise and resistance
training change the dynamics of brain function. Although many intervention
studies have reported that three days per week (over approximately six months or
more) is sufficient for detecting significant improvements in brain or cognitive
outcomes, we need more knowledge about the appropriate dose of exercise
(Erickson & Liu-Ambrose, 2016). It is crucial to perform the right exercises in
the right amount, and in some cases, professional support is advisable. Identifying
the proper dosage of, for instance, strength training that focuses on strengthening
specific muscles or resistance training in which people use weight machines to
lower body fat can be a challenge. If individuals encounter any problems, it is
beneficial to design exercise plans in cooperation with trainers and physicians.
Despite some promising results, cellular changes, molecular pathways, and the
interconnected cardiovascular and metabolic factors that explain how exercise
affects the brain are not completely understood. Exercise does not influence the
neurocognitive system equally for all people.
In addition to these physical prerequisites, I draw attention to the motivational
factors that contribute to health-related behaviour. Despite good advice and
scientific findings, some people do little for their physical and mental health,
possibly because they do not want to or do not know better. Without an obvious
reason or need, people sometimes must be lured or convinced. Unfortunately,
compensation for age-related losses can be difficult to achieve in many situations,
and encountering difficulties in compensation can result in less frequent
participation in cognitively demanding activities. The extent to which age-
related changes spur action relies on the values of the individual. Research on
health-related action has demonstrated that feelings of personal control can
improve endurance (Bandura, 1992). Risk perception and self-efficacy beliefs
have been identified as processes that mediate intentions and action. However,
one should not overlook the fact that health is not only an object of actions. It
also serves as a resource for determining the range of concrete action options
from which an action will be selected to initiate coping behaviour. Health-
psychological models (e.g. Lazarus, 1999; Schwarzer, 2016) assume that the
experience of threat and loss serve as a trigger. According to Lazarus, our
evaluations (appraisals or estimates of events, e.g. the subjective appraisals of
stress and the perceived availability of coping resources) cause specific reactions
(Lazarus, 1999). Appraisals are interconnected with stereotypes about age (I am
too young for hearing or walking aids). Successful intervention is often difficult
and requires a specific degree of open-mindedness, discipline, and social support.
Many people who start anti-smoking or weight-loss programmes return to their
original behaviour, and health-related actions can fail for various reasons.
In sum, I have introduced biological and physical changes that are highly
correlated with the age variable. When people grow old, they suffer from many
(chronic) diseases. These biological and physical changes are perceived as losses.
Although reserve levels tend to drop during midlife and old age, possibilities
exist for minimizing further decrements by calling on physical and mental
38  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

resources. Despite strong age correlations, we see a broad range of developmental

flexibility in the individual (i.e. interindividual differences). Good health habits
do not guarantee protection against age-associated diseases, although they can
reduce the risks. With regard to ISD, it is interesting how these age-related
decreases are associated with intentions. These changes can be the focus of our
actions: lifestyle decisions, such as the use of tobacco, alcohol, or drugs, can
hasten physical decline. The experience of being a self-sufficient person can
actually regulate anticipated states (and human development) to a certain degree.
The role of ISD becomes evident insofar as people pay attention to these changes
and try to strategically influence them through physical or mental exercise. On
the other hand, it may become necessary for individuals to adapt their goals as
they grow older. Age-related physical decline is a central assumption of
development theories, which I will present at the end of this chapter. In the
following section, I turn to neuronal processes. These processes occur without us
noticing, but they are important for understanding ISD because they are assumed
to mediate intentions, volitions, and human action. Important contributions
made by neuroimaging have shown how structural brain changes can precede
behavioural changes, and this has led to lively discussions about the extent to
which neuronal processes can determine or explain mental representations.

Intention, volition, and action: Biological and neural

processes
Individual will and related concepts, such as intentions and decisions, fell outside
the scope of empirical (neuroscience) research for a long time (Roskies, 2010).
Neuroscience has dismissed the topic of processes related to future states as
unscientific, possibly because the interconnection between intentions and
causality refers to two temporal perspectives that traditionally have rarely been
reconciled. The mechanisms through which physical forces influence actions –
or vice versa – and the degree to which wishes or intentions can, if at all, regulate
physical laws is still poorly understood (Brandtstädter, 2006). World views
suggest different answers to this problem. Neuroscience investigates how
activities of the brain become organized in patterns or regularities. Due to the
development of techniques for investigating the brain, the topic of volition
currently enjoys substantial attention (see Brass, Lynn, Demanet, & Rigoni,
2013; Fried, Haggard, He, & Schurger, 2017; Klinger & Cox, 2011; Roskies,
2010); nonetheless, conceptual problems exist. Upon closer inspection, the
concept of volition is ambiguous, which makes the search for prerequisites (i.e.
organizing factors, their causal genesis) difficult. For instance, it is difficult to
differentiate between intentions and making a decision in order to provide a
well-accepted explanation for what makes an action voluntary (Fried et  al.,
2017). The term volition (Roskies, 2010) refers to intention and the initiation
and inhibition of action. Volition is involved in the process of making decisions
and is used to denote the endogenous mental act of forming an intention as well
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  39

as the decision itself. Everyday language suggests a difference between a mental

represented ‘I’ that consciously chooses from alternatives or makes plans and, on
the other hand, the results of such choices or effects elsewhere in the system. The
first-person perspective is an integrated part of folk psychology surrounding
human volition and plays a crucial role in the literature on human volition.
There have been several attempts to explain mental experiences based on the
activities of specific brain areas and events that evoke such neural changes. Indeed,
patterns of activations at a particular moment in time are associated with intentional
processes and action outcomes. A central challenge is the use of language or theory
that adequately describes the mediating processes, that is, how exactly the processes
interact. This challenge includes disentangling central factors and by-products.
Approaches such as social cognitive neuroscience of human intentionality (Brass
et  al., 2013; Prinz, 2012) emphasize the role of neuronal processes that are
interconnected with the subjective experience of intentional regulation. These
approaches address the difficult question of how and which brain-activating systems
lead to psychological states that are accompanied by phenomenal experiences
(Stewart & Panksepp, 2013). What we recognize with the help of activated brain
regions is the subjective experience of will and consciousness. An important
challenge of neuroscience is to explain the relation between introspective data and
objective measurements in detail via brain imaging techniques such as
electroencephalography (EEG) or functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
(Brass et al., 2013). To date, research has identified a network of interconnected
brain regions in the medial and lateral frontal cortex that is involved in motivational
and volitional processes. Generally, the terms ‘systems’ or ‘modules’ are used. A
‘module’ can be defined as a set of neuronal circuits that carry certain types of
information (e.g. sensory module and the processing of visual input) (Siegel, 2012).

Volition and involved brain regions

The experimental investigations on consciousness and initiation of action by
Benjamin Libet, a pioneering scientist in the field of human consciousness, have
received considerable attention. According to Libet’s results (see Haggard, 2008),
participants who were asked to report the position of a clock before they felt the
urge to move their hand to press a button reported the conscious intention to act
200 ms before the onset of movement (muscle activity). It was noted that brain
activity primarily centred in the secondary motor cortex (the ‘readiness potential’,
a neural signal or measure of brain activity that precedes motor activity) occurred,
on average, approximately 500 ms to 1 s before the trial ended with the pushing
of the button. Libet’s results have been intensely discussed and sometimes used as
an indicator to disprove the concept of ‘free will’ (by arguing that unconscious
processes in the brain are the true initiator of volitional acts). Readiness potential
has been presumed to represent a hallmark of voluntary action and the planning
of movement, but this interpretation has been challenged, as the notion that
readiness potentials might simply reflect random fluctuations has also gained
40  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

plausibility (Fried et  al., 2017). According to the results of neuroscientific

research, decision-making consists of a complex interplay between the frontal
and parietal regions of the brain. Motor plans are relayed to the frontal region for
execution, and activation of this region may be crucial for awareness of intentions
(Roskies, 2010).
The common distinction between internally or externally guided behaviour
hints at the question of the relative importance of two different forms of action
resources. This distinction is based on the broad assumption that actions that are
strongly guided by external cues are experienced as less volitional. Internally
driven actions, on the other hand, are assumed to be free from the constraints of
immediate input. Several studies have compared brain activity with self-initiated
and externally cued actions. Cued responses involve activity in the parietal
cortex, prefrontal cortex, and lateral premotor cortices. The primary motor
cortex is involved in the processing of stimulus-driven actions and voluntary
actions (Brass et al., 2013). Voluntary action is preceded by progressive recruitment
of neurons in the anterior insula and the medial prefrontal cortex.
Research on intention and volition has provided evidence that involved brain
circuits do not converge in a unitary faculty (Roskies, 2010, p. 124) but can be
described as a collection of largely separable processes that, together and in social
interaction, make action possible. Several neuroscientific studies have indicated
that brain regions such as the prefrontal cortex, the parietal cortex, and the pre-
supplementary motor area play an important role in voluntary actions and short-
term intentions (Fried et al., 2017; Haggard, 2008; Ng, 2018). With regard to
intended movements such as pressing a button and the generation of simple
motor actions, several regions (e.g. parietal and frontal circuits, primary motor
cortex, dorsolateral cortex, regions in the anterior cingulate, and basal ganglia)
appear to be involved. Activation of these regions may be crucial; however, the
question arises regarding how subcortical structures can possibly coordinate the
activity among several cortical areas and, by doing so, mediate actions (Andersen
& Cui, 2009). Neurophysiological research has suggested that these changes in
volitional states are mediated by dopaminergic neuromodulation (Ashby, Isen, &
Turken, 1999). Low catecholamine levels have been related to defocused
attention, decreased ‘reward expectancies’, and less intense wanting or goal-
striving tendencies.
From the perspective of an acting individual, it is interesting to consider the
question of correspondence between the subjective experience of volition (the
first-person perspective) and neuronal activities. Are the same areas that have
been identified as being activated in the control of intentional behaviour also
related to the subjective experience of intentionality? As Brass and colleagues
(2013) illustrated, this subjective experience can be related to different stages of
intentional choice: the what component (the choice between several response
options), the when component (the experience of urges), and the whether
component (the experience of the choice not to act and to stop ongoing
behaviour). The authors summarized the results from studies suggesting that
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  41

regions in the posterior parietal cortex and the medial frontal cortex are associated
with the subjective experience of intentionality. They concluded that the few
existing findings support the idea that similar brain regions are involved in the
subjective experience and control of intentional action.

Affective neuroscience and emotional brain circuits

Since actions include emotional episodes that are assumed to regulate the course
of intentions, it makes sense to take a closer look at the emotional factors as well.
According to several neuroscientific theories, emotions and motivational states
prepare the brain and the body for action (Lang & Bradley, 2010; Salamone &
Correa, 2002), and they are central to the internal and interpersonal processes
that regulate our subjective experience (Siegel, 2012). Emotions are
interconnected with the sensory system, augmented vigilance, and information
gathering, which in turn are accompanied by increasing mobilization and
readiness for action. A range of biological and psychological resources have been
shown to correlate or increase with enhanced positive emotions. For example,
there is evidence that positive emotions broaden people’s repertoire of action
urges (Fredrickson, 2013).
Several studies have investigated the role of the neurotransmitter dopamine in
energizing the emotional and motivational command system (Ng, 2018).
Dopamine promotes behavioural engagement and attentiveness via the limbic
system and the hypothalamus, and it is assumed to be predominant in controlling
the reward and pleasure system of the brain. Dopamine is critical for cognitive
control and intrinsic motivation (the engagement in behaviour for one’s own
sake). Studies investigating the neural substrate of intrinsic motivation during
task performance have shown activity in limbic-related cortex regions (i.e.
anterior insular cortex) and feedback processing in the striatum. Some studies
have found correlations between social interaction, emotional experience, and
neuroendocrine activity. Conflicts in social interaction are associated with a
variety of changes, such as physiological arousal, high blood pressure, and adrenal
hormones. For instance, it has been shown that social behaviour is correlated
with HPA (hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal) axis activity (Ryff, Singer, &
Seltzer, 2002). Negative social interactions induce HPA axis activity, whereas
positive social interactions predict lower levels of physiological activity. In search
of the role of dopamine in the reward system, several questions and explanations
have been proposed: Does dopamine mediate the hedonic impact of a reward
(‘liking’)? Does dopamine motivate the pursuit of rewards (‘wanting’)? And, is
dopamine needed for learning (Berridge, 2007)? According to Berridge, the role
of dopamine appears to be mainly to cause desire for hedonic rewards. Liking,
the situated experience of positive affect, precedes and produces ‘wanting’, which
in turn motivates decisions to repeat that activity. With regard to the regulation
of emotional well-being, vagal tone (the activity of the vagus nerve) has been
identified as a marker of physical and mental health (Park & Thayer, 2014).
42  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

People with high vagal tone have been shown to be better able to regulate their
attention and emotions.
Although the studies quoted here represent only a small part of the available
findings, it is clear that many brain areas are activated when people act and feel.
Before I turn to the question of what these findings mean for the subject of this
book, that is, ISD, I concentrate on the age-related changes in some brain
functions.

Age-related changes in brain functions

Age-related changes in the peripheral and central nervous system show a similar
pattern to that of physical and motor performance; namely, they rise to a peak of
maturity in the third decade of life. The decline accelerates at older ages. Ageing
is associated with loss of brain physiology (e.g. myelinated and unmyelinated
nerve fibres and connectivity of neurons), which causes, for instance, impaired
sensory discrimination and decline in nerve conduction velocity. Brain areas that
are involved in planning and encoding information into long-term memory (the
hippocampus and lateral prefrontal cortex) become smaller (Hedden & Gabriely,
2004). The age-related decline in brain function is also reflected in decreased
performance, such as information-processing speed. Although the capacity for
neurogenesis and synaptogenesis declines with age, neuronal loss has comparatively
few functional consequences since the resulting denervation is compensated by
parallel reinnervation. There is evidence that central brain functions remain
adaptive and provide means for compensation by forging alternative neural
circuitry (Reuter-Lorenz & Park, 2010). This compensatory mechanism becomes
less effective but permits individuals to maintain a high level of cognitive
functioning at advanced ages. Neuroscientific research has provided evidence
supporting the assumption that investments made earlier in life may increase
neural reserve capacity. Considering the neuroscientific evidence, questions arise
regarding how physical, cognitive, and social enrichment can be used to influence
and maintain the brain’s ability to change across the lifespan.

Implications and open questions

How can these numerous findings be summarized with regard to their relevance
for ISD? First, research has demonstrated that intervention and training can
enhance neuroplasticity. The extent to which these efforts succeed is not least a
question of willingness and motivation. This is remarkable because the
relationship between brain activity and behaviour is often discussed from the
perspective of biological determinism of behaviour and mind. Baltes and
colleagues described this notion as follows: ‘What is overlooked in this debate is
that the brain itself is a dependent variable, something that is co-shaped by
experience and culture’ (Baltes, Rösler, & Reuter-Lorenz, 2006, p. 4). There is
empirical support for the notion that brain functioning can be influenced.
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  43

Age-related neuronal degradation cannot be prevented, but it can be modified.

A certain amount of endurance and training is needed to effect change.
In addition, it should not be overlooked that action is a complex process that
involves many mental processes. For example, if one makes a career decision or
plans an excursion, that decision is based on previous experience and is associated
with more or less pronounced expectations for success and emotional reactions.
This concept raises the question of the extent to which these facets can be
translated into a language or into units consisting of activated brain regions with
temporally clocked patterns. Neuroscientific evidence has revealed that many
regions are involved and are linked to complex processes in the brain when people
act and evaluate the consequences of their actions. The identified regions do not
operate in isolation, and no single neural mechanism will suffice to explain
cognitive and emotional ageing. One open question relates to the concrete
interaction between brain regions. The methods of neuroscience make it possible
to capture short-term snapshots of neuronal activity (e.g. responses to a stimulus),
and many studies have concentrated on single point-in-time measures. In fact,
neuronal processes are constantly in flux. The investigation of the temporal course
of neuronal activity (neuronal sequences) would be helpful to analyse the temporal
dimensions of action. Action sequences have been interpreted as long-term issues,
including a hierarchy of goals and a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant intentions.
Some theorists have concluded that the more we learn about physiology and
brain circuits in relation to experiences (feelings, intentional consciousness), the
less we will need to rely on these mental states to explain human behaviour (see
Stewart & Panksepp, 2013). However, we are used to thinking in terms of goals
and intentions. Box 2.2 cites neuroscience-oriented researchers and explores in

BOX 2.2  NEUROBIOLOGICAL EVENTS AND

MENTAL STATES

Stewart and Panksepp argued that ‘… emotional processes and subjectively

experienced feelings do play a fundamental role in the unfolding of neural
events – large-scale brain network functions – that organize the actions of
humans and animals alike. Various basic emotional systems provide a variety
of internal values upon which complex behavioural choices are based.
However, such internally experienced states are not simply mental events
derived from higher cognitive appraisals; rather they are generated through
neurobiological events that directly shape instinctual emotional behaviors’
(Stewart & Panksepp, 2013, p. 112). This argument clarifies that views that
internally experienced states should be extended and supplemented by the
consideration of neuronal events. Some would even argue that internally
experienced states should be replaced with a language and analytic methods
common in physics.
44  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

greater depth the question of what it would mean to think more mechanistically
about internally experienced states such as emotions, cognitive appraisals, and
volitions.
According to several psychological theories and the ISD perspective,
intentional states (goals, volitions) constitute plans for future actions and are
involved when people make decisions. Goals are a mental representation of a
final state, and individuals want to achieve them. We call such anticipating
representations ‘guiding projections’, and they are assumed to shape future
outcomes despite the possibility of defeat. In a later section, I argue that it is
important to keep personal goals flexible and be willing to adjust standards.
From a neuroscientific perspective, momentary consciousness (cognitive set) is
interconnected with many neural processes that elude our perception; however,
it is obvious that the change from one neuronal state to another is not the focus
of our usual mental representation. In the cool light of brain science, mental
states lose their content and their orienting function. An open question remains
regarding the extent to which (developmental) goals can be replaced with
neuronal terms (i.e. patterns of the brain circuits being activated) and causal
mechanisms. There is also an open question regarding what we can or will do
without concepts such as subjective experiences, mental representations, and
expectations, even if we assume that they are mediated by neuronal changes.
Apart from physical changes, social relationships are another field that
influences intentions and contributes to human development in adulthood. In
the following section, the role of social relations in ISD will be examined in
greater detail. Both branches show how intentions are shaped and influenced. I
use the concept of developmental tasks and some basic assumptions of life course
models as a starting point to illustrate the interconnectedness of physical and
social factors before I introduce contemporary models of developmental
regulation, which make assumptions about the development of goals and self-
regulating processes across the lifespan.

Developmental tasks and life plans

In the early models of life-course research, psychologists (e.g. Bühler, 1933;
Erikson, 1959) and educational researchers (e.g. Havighurst, 1948) were interested
in how the life course of the individual and of human beings in general can be
divided into time-ordered and age-related phases. Several theories and models
address patterns of change and share the basic assumption of an interactionist
perspective; that is, that biological changes and the personality characteristics of
a person (e.g. motives, aspirations) interact with and unfold in a social life context.
It has been argued that personality changes arise from individuals’ transactions
with the environment.
The theories developed by Erikson and Havighurst illustrate how social
influence is interconnected with developmental outcomes. These authors use life
phases to order the sequential pattern of life challenges. Developmental tasks are
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  45

defined as age-related normative tasks based on societal expectations about the

developmental milestones that should be reached in specific life phases (Hutteman
et al., 2014). According to Havighurst’s (1948) concept of developmental tasks,
successful development depends on the successful management of age-related
challenges. Sources of challenges are biological changes, social norms, and
psychological factors. Major life events (e.g. entering school, marrying, starting
a career, retiring) are correlated with age, biological maturity and decline. At the
same time, socio-structural constraints (e.g. controlled processes in the education
system) and social expectations regarding the age-appropriateness of managing
specific tasks affect the value and goal systems of individuals, which can deviate
more or less from societal norms. The concept of the social clock describes the
culturally preferred timing of important transitions (Neugarten & Hagestad,
1976). Such normative expectations refer to the time aspect of all the crucial
stages in an individual’s life. They can significantly influence the choice of
specific developmental goals, but they also serve as a source of rejection.
Inspired by psychoanalytical assumptions about coping with crises, Erikson’s
(1959) model suggests that developmental change occurs throughout people’s lives
in eight distinct stages, starting in infancy. Each stage is characterized by a
psychosocial crisis between two conflicting forces (e.g. intimacy vs. isolation in
early adulthood, generativity vs. stagnation in middle adulthood, and ego integrity
vs. despair in late adulthood). Mastery of a stage is not required to advance to the
next stage; however, if individuals successfully reconcile the opposing forces, they
are better prepared to cope with the tasks that lie ahead. The stage theories of
Erikson and Havighurst are comprehensive and have been influential, but not
everyone passes through the stages in the sequences laid out by the models.
Relationships in which couples are childless by choice and other relationships that
differ from the norm are regarded as less than satisfactory. In the following, the
example of the midlife transition (midlife crisis) is employed to illustrate that some
psychological concepts have become anchored in lay psychological thinking,
although the indications of their universality are not convincing.

Midlife transitions
According to Levinson’s (1986) model of adult development, people are susceptible
to a midlife transition (from roughly 40 to 45 years of age). ‘One developmental
task of this transition is to begin a new step in individuation. To the extent that
this occurs, we can become more compassionate, more reflective and judicious,
less tyrannized by inner conflicts and external demands, and more genuinely
loving of ourselves and others. Without it, our lives become increasingly trivial or
stagnant’ (Levinson, 1986, p. 5). Middle adulthood has been assumed to be a time
of significant transitions, and the phenomenon of a midlife crisis is often mentioned.
Why? Some people change the way they view their career. Grown children leave
home (empty-nest syndrome). Health problems become increasingly important,
and individuals experience the first signs of ageing. The term midlife crisis denotes
46  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

a time of questioning and uncertainty in the face of perceived loss of both physical
health and social opportunities. The idea that this crisis is universal is well
entrenched in ‘common wisdom’. However, the notion of a universal midlife
crisis has received criticism. Chiriboga (1989, p. 117) strikes at the heart of the
problem: ‘to equate “change” with “crisis” seems to either inflate the importance
of the former or weaken the latter’. He assumed that midlife crisis and empty-nest
syndrome remain popular topics; however, the research support for these problems
is surprisingly slight. Several studies have shown that a serious crisis is not a typical
midlife phenomenon (Freund & Ritter, 2009; Lachman et al., 2015). For most
people, midlife is a period of health, and the passage into middle age is relatively
tranquil. Freund and Ritter (2009) acknowledged that people are confronted with
age-associated challenges and provided reasons why a lenient definition of the
midlife crisis might still be fruitful. The lenient conceptualization of the ‘midlife
crisis’ does not regard the occurrence of a crisis in middle adulthood as normative.
One reason for this generalization might be that problems are easily remembered
by observers. We are more likely to notice difficulties than the lack of them. Even
if the midlife crisis is not a normative crisis, the subjective conviction that
something is normative can affect emotional reactions and further action. The
concept of the midlife crisis has a meaningful function in everyday life: it can be
used to explain, in an understandable way, why people behave one way or another
(he bought an expensive car because he is in crisis). Such an explanation makes
sense in everyday life; we can leave open exactly what it means. Chiriboga
concluded that the midlife crisis might be an overestimated phenomenon among
members of helping professions that serve a large number of persons suffering
from emotional problems. According to the author, ‘middle age is not a crisis but
a challenge and a relief ’ (Chiriboga, 1989, p. 141).
Stage theories have been criticized because they tend to overestimate the
generality and consistency of patterns. Sociologists and lifespan theorists have
questioned assumptions about ideal timing that are experienced as too restrictive.
During adulthood, many sequences are possible. Stage theories focus on general
courses but risk overlooking the peculiarities of everyday life. Within modern
societies, developmental settings are characterized by increasing pluralisation of
life forms, and normative timetables for organizing one’s life tend to blur and lose
their regulative force (e.g. the tendency to postpone marriage and parenthood)
(Brandtstädter, 2010). On the other hand, the ideas underlying stage theories
have been influential in the study of mental health while recognizing that the
actual tasks arise from more or less unique combinations of social, biological, and
psychological forces. Stage theories reflect that development-related actions are
culturally formed and at the same time constitutive of culture (Brandtstädter,
2006). Although the specific tasks may vary across different cohorts and the lists
have been updated and modified several times, developmental tasks have been
shown to be associated with personality development (Hutteman et al., 2014).
Regarding the order of human life, sequenced phases have often been and are
still being proposed to characterize the abilities and tasks of ageing man, e.g. the
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  47

age phases in the Roman Empire (Eyben, 1973); the homilies of St. John
Chrysostom in the fourth century, and Shakespeare’s As You Like It, act 2, scene
7, to give just a few examples. Despite the universality of such classifications,
from an ISD perspective, it is interesting to question the degree to which social
norms are internalized by the acting individual. On the basis of developmental
theories, I argue that closing developmental windows and the experience of no
longer being able to achieve something contribute to the shift of priorities.

Life tasks and developmental deadlines

The concepts of life tasks (Cantor et  al., 1987) and developmental deadlines
(Heckhausen et al., 2019; Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2005) link life transitions with
personal values. Life tasks denote a set of tasks that a person sees himself or herself
working on and devoting energy to solving during a specified period of life.
They represent the individual’s version of culturally prescribed, age-graded
tasks, and they give meaning to people’s everyday activities. People integrate
personal self-development with maintaining social connections across the
lifespan. Life tasks are especially salient during phases of life transitions (e.g.
graduation from college, marriage, retirement), unfold over substantial periods
of time, and sometimes encompass many projects or activities. Life tasks are
interconnected with personal goals (strivings, concerns) and with opportunities
for participation in social groups.
According to Cantor, ‘being able to read the social context and to find ways to
take part that are personally fulfilling’ (Cantor et al., 2002, p. 177) are prerequisites
for personal well-being and resilience.
Developmental deadlines (Heckhausen et al., 2019) highlight that fading goal-
related opportunities (e.g. biological clock for childbearing) cannot be ignored.
Deadlines for different developmental tasks may vary in terms of age and
abruptness. Heckhausen and colleagues assumed that the adaptive processes of
developmental regulation are at work when people approach a deadline. When
developmental deadlines are approaching, enhanced goal engagement, including
strategies for self-mobilization, is required. When developmental deadlines have
passed, individuals need to disengage from further pursuit of a specific goal that
can no longer be achieved.
One common feature of the present concepts (i.e. developmental tasks,
transitions, and deadlines) is that they consider the role of temporal change in
developmental determinants. Physical-biological and social factors are
interconnected and present people with the challenge of selecting and adapting
their goals in accordance with these changes.

Chance encounters and non-normative life events

In contrast to developmental tasks, non-normative events (e.g. chance encounters,
chance meetings; Bandura, 1982) cannot be anticipated as a function of age.
48  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

Non-normative life events are those that occur unexpectedly. They can affect
individuals of all ages and can be differentiated according to whether they
concern many people (e.g. specific influences of historical events, natural
disasters, war) or individual persons (e.g. unexpected loss of a family member).
Research on life events and their characteristics, such as magnitude, severity, or
frequency, has drawn attention to the role of contextual factors. Life events have
been investigated as risk factors for psychopathology and with regard to their
function in the stress-adaptation process (Dohrenwend, 2006). From the
perspective of ISD, the impact that chance encounters can have on human lives
is of particular interest, and one should not discount their influence on people’s
life history. Some degree of control may be involved because people may pursue
a risky or active life that increases the probability of experiencing specific
encounters. Although, or precisely because, they come as a surprise, they can
have a decisive influence on goals and life plans. I now concentrate on intentional
processes, which are assumed to regulate and shape development when losses are
recognized, and return to the role of non-intentional events.

Developmental regulation theories

Human development is characterized by a great diversity of developmental
pathways. This variability in alternatives implies that individuals have to be
selective and must compensate when they fail to reach their goals. Contemporary
models of developmental regulation (e.g. the dual-process model, Brandtstädter,
2009; the model of selection, optimization, and compensation (SOC), Freund &
Baltes, 2002; Freund, 2008; the motivational theory of lifespan development,
Heckhausen et al., 2019) make assumptions about the structure of intentions and
goals that are assumed to influence development together with emotions,
valuations, or expectations. I briefly introduce the three models. Although they
share basic assumptions, they use different lenses and language to illustrate
developmental regulation across adulthood. What do they tell us about how
development works?

The SOC model

The SOC model (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Freund & Baltes, 2002) provides a
general theory for conceptualizing processes of successful development, generally,
and ageing, in particular. The model distinguishes among three strategies
(selection, optimization, and compensation) that enable individuals to manage
their lives successfully. Selection of personal goals and life projects gives direction
to development; the primary focus is on setting goals. From a large number of
options, individuals select a subset on which to focus their resources. Freund and
Baltes (2002) distinguished between two kinds of selection: Elective selection is
primarily the result of motivation-driven selection from a number of possible
pathways. Loss-based selection entails reconstructing one’s goal system and is a
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  49

consequence of experiencing a loss of goal-relevant resources that threatens the

maintenance of a specific level of functioning. Optimization involves goal-
directed actions, for instance, the acquisition of goal-relevant means to achieve
higher levels of functioning (studying harder to improve one’s ability or
knowledge). The focus is on refinement and maintenance of resources that are
effective in achieving desirable outcomes and avoiding undesirable outcomes.
Such efforts (e.g. choosing the most appropriate strategy) require the coordination
of physical, mental, and social resources to be effective. Compensation is related to
the anticipated loss of goal-relevant means and denotes the use of alternative
means to maintain a given level of functioning. Compensatory strategies have
received particular attention in research on ageing and focus on times when
specific goal-relevant means are no longer available. Substitution for loss refers to
the acquisition of new internal or external means; hearing aids and glasses or
activating the help of others are typical examples of compensation.
The SOC model was introduced as a metatheory. The adaptive processes need
to be embedded in a specific theoretical framework that can be applied to various
domains of functioning (e.g. social relations, academic achievement, athletic
performance) and to different levels of analysis (e.g. individual level, group,
society). The SOC model was developed to illustrate the mechanisms underlying
positive ageing, that is, how efficacious functioning and successful mastery of
developmental tasks can be achieved. Similar to the motivational theory of
lifespan development, adaptive processes are discussed as strategies or
competencies.

The motivational theory of lifespan development

The motivational theory of lifespan development (Heckhausen et  al., 2010)
distinguishes between the processes of primary and secondary control. Primary
control denotes the attempt to gain control by bringing circumstances into line
with one’s wishes. The motivational theory of lifespan development proposes
that successful ageing is based on maximizing the extent to which people have
influence, for instance, through selective primary control (e.g. the selective
investment of resources into the attainment of a specific goal). Compensatory
primary control involves compensatory means (e.g. technical aids, social support)
that gain importance when goal pursuit becomes more difficult. Secondary control
is defined as attempts to gain control by bringing the self into line with external
constraints. When efforts cannot successfully align the environment with
personal wishes, individuals can use selective secondary control (e.g. internal
strategies for re-energizing their efforts to pursue the blocked goal) or
compensatory secondary control (disengagement from further pursuit of a now
obsolete goal). Both strategies are adaptive insofar as they optimize the individual’s
long-term potential for primary control.
Heckhausen and colleagues (2019) referred to the interplay between age-
related constraints and individuals’ control efforts (goal setting and control
50  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

striving) from the perspective of transitions (e.g. school transitions, retirement).

With regard to health problems, research has found differential effectiveness of
self-regulating strategies (goal engagement and disengagement) among older
individuals dealing with serious health problems (Hall et al., 2010). Moreover,
goal engagement predicted better benefits for older adults suffering from acute,
temporary, and reversible health problems, while goal disengagement predicted
better health for individuals with irreversible chronic diseases.
It is obvious that Heckhausen and colleagues use concepts and terms that are
similar to those used in the SOC model. However, these authors relied more
heavily on control theory to establish the processes of selection, optimization,
and compensation (Rothbaum et  al., 1982; Rotter, 1966). One tenet of
motivational theory is ‘that individuals, throughout their lives, strive to maximize
primary control of their environment and developmental outcomes’ (Heckhausen
et al., 2019, p. 193). Optimizing refers to exercising control.

The dual-process model of assimilation and accommodation

According to the dual-process model (Brandtstädter, 2009; Brandtstädter &
Rothermund, 2002), two basic modes of goal regulation are assumed to reduce
is–ought discrepancies (e.g. between desired and factual situations or
developmental outcomes). Assimilative processes reflect intentional, persistent
efforts to actively modify the actual situation in accordance with personal goals
and preferences. This tenacious means of goal pursuit can include activities such
as using optimizing strategies or compensatory means as elaborated in the SOC
model and the motivational theory of developmental regulation. Assimilation
partly converges with the concept of current concern, the ‘state of an individual
between the time point of becoming committed to pursuing a particular goal
and the time point of attaining the goal or giving up the pursuit’ (Klinger &
Cox, 2004, p. 9). The accommodative mode consists of mechanisms of flexible goal
adjustment. Processes of re-evaluation and disengagement (e.g. downward
comparison, positive reinterpretation, acceptance) protect one’s self against
depression and help one retain a sense of self-esteem and control. According to
developmental regulation models, accommodation or secondary control is
increasingly used in middle adulthood and old age. As they grow older, individuals
face many age-related losses (e.g. declines in physical health, the loss of social
roles, widowhood) that can threaten their goals and render those goals
unattainable. The age-related increase and protective role of many accommodative
processes has been demonstrated in experiments, including cross-sectional and
longitudinal studies (Greve et  al., 2005; Greve, Leipold, & Kappes, 2018;
Heckhausen et al., 2019). The dual-process model places particular emphasis on
the role that the flexible adjustment of goals plays in maintaining a positive view
of the self: although letting go of valued goals that are no longer tenable may be
associated with negative emotions, focusing on new goals can increase positive
affect and help to motivate goal pursuit (see also Wrosch et al., 2003).
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  51

The developmental regulation models share basic assumptions, and some of

the proposed concepts seem to capture similar processes but use different labels.
These similarities and differences were elaborated by Boerner and Jopp (2007). I
now highlight a point that is gaining importance with regard to the ISD
perspective and that questions the extent to which these processes can be applied
or trained.

Limits of intentional control

Brandtstädter and Rothermund drew attention to a difference between
assimilative and accommodative processes that is not elaborated in detail in the
SOC model or the motivational theory of developmental regulation. ‘Assimilative
activities involve intentional agency and are integral to the lifelong process of
intentional self-development; all goal-directed activity involves a tendency to
assimilate actual life circumstances to normative self-representations and
projections of a desired life course. Accommodative processes, in contrast, cannot
be originated intentionally, but shape the selection of goals and thus are basic to
the regulation of action as well as to the allocation of assimilative efforts’
(Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002, p. 121).
Brandtstädter (2000) demonstrated the subpersonal or unintentional processes
of accommodation and distinguished them with great precision from intentional
efforts. ‘Accommodation of goals and preferences is … supported by the increased
accessibility of cognitive contents that reduce the attractiveness of the blocked
goal states or the aversive valence of the actual situation; the tendency to generate
such palliative cognitions may be enhanced precisely by their potential to provide
comfort and relief ’ (Brandtstädter, 2000, p. 11). The SOC model and the
motivational theory of developmental regulation place the successful development
or efficacious functioning of the individual more strongly in the arena of strategic
will (i.e. the control-optimizing function of developmental regulation processes),
but they pay less attention to the differentiation between intentional efforts and
non-intentional changes. Why is this issue important? With regard to the extent
to which individuals can intentionally plan and shape their development, one
interesting question (among others) is, do individuals use accommodative coping
more as a reaction to something that happens or more as a strategy? In many
situations, we wish to improve strategic skills, but we know too little about the
probability with which certain events will occur. Box 2.3 provides additional
detail on these considerations.
Several studies have investigated accommodation as a function of reduced
goal attainability due to physical limits. For instance, research on patient
populations with incurable diseases (e.g. multiple sclerosis, Neter, Litvak, &
Miller, 2009) or depressive inpatients working on more or less solvable tasks
(Koppe & Rothermund, 2017) has provided evidence regarding the protective
function of goal detachment (e.g. through abandoning personal goals and
re-orientation).
52  Developmental prerequisites and challenges

BOX 2.3  INTENTIONAL SELF-REGULATION AND

DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTIES

In some situations (e.g. career planning, social conflicts of interest, or other

long-term goals), we do not know whether it is worth pursuing our original
plans despite obvious setbacks or whether it is better to let those plans go. Gains
or losses are often not clear but have room for interpretation. We can accept a
failure for strategic reasons, but we do not know enough about the consequences
(for example, the ‘side effects’ of a treatment). Even in the case of irreversible
losses when it would be reasonable to make accommodations, this is sometimes
difficult. We can try to distract ourselves, but whether accommodation is
successful (that it works, that I experience relief) is not certain but depends on
our preferences and values, which we do not develop by conscious decision.
In the contexts of psychological interventions or practical situations, it
may be useful to distinguish between intentionally controlled actions and
contextually mediated effects. We can acquire some degree of technical
control over mental states, but the point at issue (Brandtstädter, 2000) is the
extent to which the mental states themselves can be explained by intentional
effort. Brandtstädter argued that the aspect of control separates actions from
mental states or physiological events that occur without intentional
involvement. Many mental processes (e.g. classical conditioning, changes in
cognitive set) cannot be intentionally controlled but rather mediated by the
purposeful arrangement of specific stimulus conditions. When circumstances
are unfavourable for goal-directed behaviour, the response remains purely
mental (e.g. mind-wandering or dreaming; Klinger, 2013).

In sum, goals may be any desired endpoint of a behaviour sequence, and it

seems to be valuable to understand the underlying processes of goal selection,
pursuit, and detachment. From a developmental point of view, to reach a goal
successfully does not mean that we are also successful in other life domains: it is
part of life that resources become scarce or threatened, and this requires flexibility.
Development means that we (always) strive for new goals. A common assumption
of developmental regulation theories is that goals are part of the factors that can
influence development. On the one hand, goals provide an important basis for
organizing one’s thoughts: the state of having a goal gives processing priority in
the individual’s cognitive systems to cues associated with that goal (Klinger,
2013). On the other hand, goals are assumed to be preceded by emotional arousal.
They are associated with many processes that can rarely be intentionally controlled.

Summary
The present chapter focused on the action-regulating prerequisites of intentional
development: age-related biological changes (e.g. physical diseases, organ
 Developmental prerequisites and challenges  53

functioning) and social factors (e.g. mediated through age norms, social
expectation, and social support). Both factors are involved when people act,
modify their life plans, and turn to new goals. From the perspective of ISD,
biological and social factors have at least three functions. First, they can serve as
a coping resource: we can use physical and social resources to reach a specific
goal. Second, they can be the object of compensatory efforts (if there is a need to
cope with health-related losses or social conflicts). Third, they can be the object
of goal adjustments (in the case of personal standards, for instance, previous
health status can no longer be maintained). Based on developmental regulation
models, I examined which strategies adults use when coping with changes and
age-related losses. The dual-process model (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002)
suggests two general approaches: (a) improve one’s coping strategies or enhance
one’s abilities and efforts to control the situation (assimilation) and (b) flexibly
adjust one’s goal hierarchy and preferences (accommodation through processes
such as positive reinterpretation, acceptance, and downward comparisons). From
an intentional point of view, the question arises regarding the extent to which
mental processes can be trained or induced by intention. To better understand
this problem, in the following chapter, I concentrate on the mental processes that
are involved when people pursue goals.
3
THE ROLE OF NON-INTENTIONAL
PROCESSES, AFFECT, AND
EVALUATION

It is a characteristic of human action and ISD that individuals plan what they do
and evaluate the consequences of their actions. Difficult life situations or long-
term goals, however, typically require decision-making without complete
certainty about the result and, as we know, beliefs in the face of uncertainty are
often distorted. We try, make errors, and then (have to) learn how to adjust
probed strategies (Popper, 1972). We pursue life plans and strive for personal
ideals that may become an important part of our self-definition. Nonetheless,
identity or self-definition consists of several self-defining elements we have not
intentionally planned. Of course, they could have been unintentional
by-products of our expectations and wishes. Many of them have developed as
products of chance encounters (Bandura, 1982) that were beyond planned
calculation but influenced our situation. The aim of Chapter 3 is to become
acquainted with some of the manifold mental processes involved when
individuals build and disengage from intentions, and thus contribute to their
own development. In the following, I focus on the short-term perspective of
ISD and draw attention to the fleetingness of the moment, non-intentional
processes, and affect.

A short-term perspective on ISD: Mental processes in

social context
We cannot illustrate long-term dimensions of ISD without a careful examination
of the moment. But even when we concentrate on the short-term, at closer
inspection it remains difficult to describe the process of how attitudes result in
intentions and actual behaviour. In the following introduction, I will (a) illustrate
the complex interconnection between intentions and (non-intentional) events in
everyday life situations. This complex pattern leads (b) to the important, but
56  The role of affect and evaluation

difficult question about basic determinants of behaviour and development (i.e.

the role of person and environment, nature–nurture interactions).

The interconnection of events and intentions

First, I would like to illustrate the rich and complex phenomenon of intentional
states (e.g. expectations, planning, goals) and their relations to events by means
of an example from everyday life. We start with action episodes within a limited
and containable period of time (see Box 3.1). Perhaps one might think that
predictions (anticipations, expectations) are more likely to come true in a short-
term period because one can maintain a better overview as compared to long-
term plans with less predictable ends. This is not necessarily true.
What can we learn from this digression about intentions? (You can replace
soccer with a scene in a supermarket or concert hall.) First, it demonstrates (though
admittedly oversimplified) how different action episodes are connected with one
another and with events (e.g. physical movements). Intentions or expectations are
concerned about how to best kick a goal. The physical event consists of a specific
movement of the ball (ballistic curve of a projectile) that has been speeded up and
passed a defined marking line. The ball is continuously kept in motion but not

BOX 3.1  A SNAPSHOT: CURRENT INTENTIONS AND

PREDICTION OF THE MOMENT

Think about an event, e.g. activities or action units that will take about 90
minutes (e.g. a soccer match, a shopping tour, a concert, seminar/school
lessons). We assume your interest in this activity. For example, you plan to visit
a live soccer match with friends, an event at which you hope something could
happen that fits your current interests. Please think about some of the possible
subsequent moments: which details of the match you will recognize will
depend on your previous experience and interest. Perhaps you follow the first
minutes attentively, before you get distracted. You receive an SMS and think
about responding immediately, but the match is still exciting and you wait for
a good moment. Because a player of the rival team fouls and the referee does
not recognize it (or ignores it?), you get worked up. During the half-time
break, you need to do two tasks: you remember the SMS and your mates
remind you that it is your turn to get drinks. The first minutes of the second
half are boring, and you have enough time to become curious about the
arising discussion in front of you. At last, the game gets more exciting, but
unfortunately, it is the rival team that scores a goal. Maybe you begin to notice
that your shoes are pinching your feet and you try to stretch them by moving
them. Your own team is playing rather poorly – and you imagine taking over
the game and shooting the equalizing goal. The game ends in a tie.
 The role of affect and evaluation  57

every movement is relevant for the result. Participative perception, which is

characterized by expectations, evaluations, or emotions, is based on neuronal
activity. The momentary intentions (SMS, getting drinks) disperse the attentive
processes that are directed towards the match. One can try to avoid being
distracted from one’s intentions; however, whether we remain attentive to the
game is beyond personal control (e.g. how exciting the game proves to be).
Another example of limits to our intentional control is how well a task can be
performed. Especially when new skills are in demand, one can often not predict
reliably how successful one may be. We sometimes wish to control the
circumstances around events we plan (e.g. the weather outlook when we plan a
trip in the afternoon) or how well we will perform in critical situations when
outstanding athletic achievement is being expected. Perhaps we can speculate
about the specific feeling we will have after the ‘ta-ta-ta-daa’ of Beethoven’s fifth
symphony, but we cannot predict how impressed we will be in a live concert.
In short, the soccer-match scene illustrated a manifold, complex picture of
physical energy and neuronal activity, both of which are involved when
individuals follow intentions in concrete situations. Intentions depend on the
cognitive and volitional orientations of the acting person (beliefs, values,
expectations) and the rules (e.g. soccer rules) one knows or accepts. On the basis
of prior knowledge, individuals are selective in the events (e.g. movements) they
value as important or unimportant. The time span of a soccer match was used as
an example, and attention was drawn to processes (changes over the time) that
occur – in part without intentional control of the agent. When this is true, it is
likely that we would fail to succeed or be unable to recognize many details (e.g.
automatic processes, Rothermund, 2011) if we were to attempt to explain or
predict the next moment vividly or depict life as it occurs – especially under
demanding conditions. Given this complex dynamic, the prediction of specific
intentions (as well as emotions and other mental processes) proves to be
complicated at the least.
Finally, one should be aware that identifying general regularities and the
primary causes of intentional striving is an ongoing challenge. From the
perspective of ISD, connections between (a) events (e.g. physical movements,
neuronal states) and (b) intentional states related to events are of primary interest;
however, the correspondence between current specific intentions and the ability
to induce the necessary prerequisites varies to a high degree and depends on the
individual’s competencies and situational factors. We have to return to the critical
question of what we mean when we state that intentions (and related concepts
like expectations and evaluations) can actually predict or ‘explain’ behaviour or
human action (e.g. Brandtstädter, 2006; Greve, 2001).

Sources of behaviour and development

The central determinants (causes) of behaviour and development constitute a
general and frequently repeated question in psychology. We can merely
58  The role of affect and evaluation

approximate an answer to the question because we must assume that many factors
contribute to the prediction of the moment. Precision or certainty is not distinct
enough to judge decidedly (Popper, 1972). In accordance with contemporary
models of lifespan development (Baltes et  al., 2006; Overton, 2015), we can
tentatively use the concept of interaction as a heuristic to describe the complex
interplay of several determinants that regulate human behaviour.
Kurt Lewin’s (1935) ‘basic formula’ is still often used to formalize the general
problem of explaining behaviour (exemplified in the formula ‘B = f * (P, E)’). In
introductory lessons in motivational psychology, some readers may have learned
this intuitively convincing but simplified illustration of the basic interaction of
determinants of human behaviour (i.e. factors of persons and their surroundings).
Environment is understood to mean the momentary situation as well as the
milieu in the sense of chief characteristics of the permanent situation. According
to Lewin (1935, p. 71), behaviour depends on both, upon individual characteristics
and upon the momentary structure of the existing situation, and it is not possible
to single out one part to be attributed to the environment and another to the
individual. A specific environment is indispensable to the concept of predisposition
(i.e. hereditary disposition). Lewin draws attention to the point that individuals
usually deal with dynamic problems, a view that is also appropriate for the
dynamic nature of intentions. Important questions to which basic and applied
(e.g. intervention and training studies on coping skills) empirical research
contribute refer to details of how the interactive basis of human behaviour and
development function in detail.
This brings us to the fascinating issue of whether or not and how it is possible
to trigger or develop intentions that can help one use one’s potential to shape or
improve one’s situation. This issue is closely related to the individual and thus, to
his or her biography – and one has to make clear or specify, which of the many
possible interactions is worthy of investigation. Contemporary psychology has a
rich inheritance of constructs and assumptions that can be applied to the
prediction of intentions and actions. More than 40 years ago, Lee Cronbach
reviewed the, at that point already abundant, body of research (empirical results)
on interaction factors in the branch of aptitude-treatment interaction (ATI; i.e.
whether persons with specific characteristics profit more from specific treatments).
He summarized some of the problems that arose as follows: ‘Once we attend to
interactions, we enter a hall of mirrors that extends to infinity’ (Cronbach, 1975,
p. 119). Insofar, one can rejoice or be dismayed that Lewin’s dualism of person
and situation disintegrates into many antitheses. In concrete situations, one can
find countless interactions between personal characteristics and environmental
changes, but interaction effects are difficult to replicate. Cronbach’s conclusions
about ATI are valuable for research on intentions (and related action-theoretical
constructs such as volitions, attitudes, values, preferences, and expectations)
because they illustrate that there are too many factors that probably contribute to
ISD as well; for instance, personal goals are related to attitudes and values (see
below), which in turn are prone to be sensitive to contemporary changes in social
 The role of affect and evaluation  59

and moral values. Age differences in values that have been found in several
lifespan studies (e.g. Borg, Hertel, & Hermann, 2017; Gouveia et al., 2015; Mayr
et al., 2012) may reflect cohort differences or age-related changes. Furthermore,
intentional constructs can vary idiosyncratically from person to person
(biographical relevance), and what individuals want in one moment may change
within a short time span, depending on situational factors that become salient.

Intentions between conscious and unconscious processes:

A pendulum
There are many possible ways to explain why some of our intentions are non-
durable, but others are durable. Despite the possibility that our intentions may
exceed our abilities and, in that sense might become meaningless to us, we do
not recognize some of the mediating processes due to limits to our sensory-
perception system (e.g. defence mechanisms, Freud, 1936; Vaillant, 1992; data-
and concept-oriented immunization, Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; context
effects in adaptation, Helson, 1971; classical conditioning; automatic self-
regulation, Papies & Aarts, 2016). In order to understand the success of specific
plans, one should also consider that there are processes other than conscious
mental representations involved that we have not planned and that seem to be
outside of intentional control. For instance, we might regard as a matter of course
that the advance planning of specific action responses for specific future states
can be intentionally initiated. The result of such deliberative processes consists of
a cognitive representation of action-outcome links (see Rothermund, 2011).
Unfortunately, we still know too little about the relationship between more
general long-term life goals and situation-specific changes, although considerable
work has been done during the last years on how goals are related to cognition,
given that people age (Freund, 2006; West, Ebner, & Hastings, 2013). As will be
argued in the following, however, action tendencies (e.g. preferences and
inclinations) are partly automatic in nature, and one cannot be sure which of the
many possible outcomes will become salient, given the many factors available in
situations that probably influence our intentions (e.g. through visual perception;
see, for example, Garner’s effort to distinguish between qualitative features and
quantitative dimensions of a stimulus; Garner, 1978).
The linkage between attitudes, intentions, and concrete behaviour is not only
automatic in part, due to routines in responses (e.g. repeated application of
stereotypes or particular skills), but sometimes inconsistently executed. In many
situations, we get distracted from intentions and thus need to learn more about
the passing (unconscious) mental processes in their complex functioning. These
are perhaps a central element of the riddle of how pursuing goals can contribute
to future states. There are some encouraging results from the research on
cognitive processing (Rothermund, 2011) or the protective function of
mindfulness and meditation (Remmers, Topolinski, & Michalak, 2015). There
are still questions about how mindfulness works and which kind of thinking
60  The role of affect and evaluation

(e.g.  intuitive, automatic, affective information processing, or deliberate,

rational-analytic thought) is associated with the current cognitive state.
Both identity goals (e.g. personal life projects; Little, 1983), as well as less
important goals that sometimes come to mind incidentally in daily life, have the
potential to activate our memory for a long time. We have evidence and theories
that explain why individuals sometimes – even after or especially because of
failure – continue to pursue their goals, but it remains an intriguing question why
some of these specific efforts remain stable for a considerable period of time in
life or reoccur, whereas others are scattered to the four winds. The present
chapter describes the cognitive, motivational, and affective-evaluative processes
which are important when individuals pursue intentions. Figure 3.1 includes
some of the mental processes that are linked and alternately activated when
people choose, act, and get distracted. Sometimes we do notice or remember that
we wished to do something important, but it is again fair to say that many things
happen that we cannot perceive or cannot ignore.
Admittedly, the mental processes are depicted in a more ordered structure
than they occur in real life. I focus in the following on the rational-calculating
(rationalizing) and affective-evaluative processes (e.g. attitudes, preferences) which
are involved when individuals decide to do something or choose between several
alternatives. The purpose of Figure 3.1 is to illustrate some of the short-term

FIGURE 3.1  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD.

 The role of affect and evaluation  61

processes that possibly throw current or momentary light on a part of the motor
of ISD across the lifespan.
Similar to the assumptions of previous psychological models, the (dis-)
equilibrium in the centre of the figure should illustrate, for example, the
regulation of cognitive contradictions (Heider, 1958; Piaget, 1977), or the
regulation of perceived loss (Brandtstädter, 2016), and pays tribute to the
assumption that we, as long as we continue to grow older – from childhood and
across lifespan – are confronted with challenges throughout life. It is almost
unnecessary to say that every day we have to cope with several losses (e.g. solving
problems that others transmitted to us, or striving towards ideals that we cannot
fulfil). Nonetheless, the concept of equilibrium is well suited to illustrate that we
are better able to recognize volitions in situations when confronted with obstacles
(‘To observe the will with its essential characteristics there need to be certain real
emotional conditions – such as, for example, internal or external obstacles’; Ach,
1935, p. 40).
In the following, I begin with those processes closely related to planning and
carrying out a behaviour (e.g. volitions, action plans, action control; Gollwitzer,
2012; Schwarzer, 2016) before I address the not less important moderating and
mediating prerequisites of intentions (e.g. emotions, attitudes, values,
expectations, attributions). It should become evident that prospective sketches
(i.e. intentions, personal goals) under no circumstances can be seen as tabula rasa
(or opportunistic reflections of bare future-oriented visions without history), but
are rather related to and based on significant memories (see biographical research;
Bühler, 1933; Butler, 1963) and processes of self-regulated learning (Panadero,
2017). Intentions have a history. I start with some of the mental processes that
have been viewed as key characteristics of intentions, and thus ISD.

From intentions to actions

Self-efficacy and control beliefs (see Chapter 1) are key components of many
contemporary psychological theories of intentional self-regulation (e.g. Ajzen,
2001; Schwarzer, 2016) or development (Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994;
Heckhausen, 1999). According to the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1988,
2001), individuals act in accordance with and due to intentions, which in turn
are influenced by (a) attitudes towards actions, (b) subjective norms (how would
significant others evaluate the relevant behaviour? what would one be expected
to do in situations?), and (c) perceived behaviour control (individuals who believe
that they do possess the resources to perform a behaviour are more likely to
develop an intention to engage it). Because behaviours could not be predicted
well by attitudes (‘attitude-behaviour gap’), the concepts have been refined. The
construct of intention (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) was used as an important factor
in explaining behaviour change. Intention is still regarded as crucial connection
between goal setting and goal pursuit phases, but its predictive value is limited
(‘intention-behaviour gap’) (Schwarzer, 2016).
62  The role of affect and evaluation

Plans and volitions

Several psychological theories distinguish between a motivational and a volitional
phase of action (Gollwitzer, 2012; Heckhausen, 1991; Schwarzer, 2016). For
instance, in health psychology, many studies support this distinction, referring to
the observation that individuals do not change their lifestyles despite being motivated
and aware of the risks of their behaviours. Schwarzer (2016) argued that individuals
are faced with various hindrances (e.g. distractions, forgetting, or conflicting bad
habits) that can impede health-related action, and suggested examining further
constructs that operate in conjunction with intention. The distinction between a
motivational and a volitional action phase (e.g. Heckhausen, 1991) served as a useful
way to separate mental processes between goal setting and goal pursuit.
In the motivational phase, individuals are in a deliberative mindset while setting
a goal (intention). The deliberative mindset tunes cognition towards information
relevant to making goal decisions. Cognition is oriented towards desirability-
related and feasibility-related thoughts. Psychological constructs that are more or
less important for goal setting are, for instance, outcome expectancies and
perceived action resources. When individuals have become committed to a goal,
they need to prepare action and, later, maintain the change in the face of barriers
and setbacks.
In the volitional phase, individuals are already in an implementation mindset.
Cognition is tuned towards implemental thoughts (e.g. planning how to
implement a chosen goal). A tendency towards optimistic inferences that
overestimate the feasibility of chosen goals has been observed (Gollwitzer, 2012).
During the goal pursuit phase, self-efficacy and control beliefs are used to plan
the next steps (action planning, coping planning, action control). Additional
components of volitional competence (e.g. control of intention) enable individuals
to maintain a sense of control (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998).

Mental control strategies

Volitional competence is limited under conditions that require persons to
overcome difficulties of enactment (e.g. strong habitual tendencies, competing
motivations, and paralyzing moods may interfere with goal-directed actions).
Under conditions of stress (e.g. frustration or aversive changes of goal-relevant
aspects), access to volitional competences and their efficiency is reduced.
According to the volition theory (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994), coping with aversive
situations requires the volitional system to choose among alternatives: the modes
of action orientation and of state orientation, the latter being associated with inhibition
of volitional function.

• Action orientation denotes the competence to initiate and maintain intentions.

It reflects the ability to commit to a course of action and to handle multiple
competing demands, to persist despite setbacks. According to Kuhl’s theory,
 The role of affect and evaluation  63

individuals who are more action oriented are characterized by abilities to

control mental states (e.g. motivation, arousals, emotions, decisions) and
enhanced performance efficacy.
• Individuals in state orientation tend to have intrusive thoughts (e.g. constantly
asking myself how I could have done better) and negative motivation or
rigidity (finding it difficult to abandon old habits or to adjust to changes).
They are more prone to external control and tend to postpone matters. In
short, the path from plans to behaviour is inhibited.

In demanding situations, Kuhl’s volition theory suggests strategies to enhance

intentional self-control, competencies, and action resources (see also the processes
of selection, optimization, and compensation; Baltes et  al., 2006; Heckhausen
et al., 2010; or assimilative coping efforts; Brandtstädter, 2016). These deliberate
decisions and efforts are the tip of the iceberg. Mental states and instrumental
behaviour complement each other and, as long as things are going well,
individuals can use resources to realize their plans. There is no lack of handbooks
providing advice and strategies to be used to enhance self-control abilities (e.g.
intention control, planning, impulse control, initiating a goal). For instance,
health-related intervention programs to reduce smoking and alcohol consumption
prompt participants to facilitate actions (action plans) and to plan how to cope
with anticipated barriers to behaviour change (coping plans). In several studies,
participants were asked or prompted with help sheets to formulate coping plans
meant to inhibit distractions and manage barriers (for an overview, see Kwasnicka
et al., 2013). The results suggested that forming action plans and coping plans are
more efficacious in promoting health-related behaviour change. Some of the
difficulties individuals have to cope with in continuing goal pursuit were seen in
the limited flexibility to shift between different appraisals or mindsets. Molden
and colleagues describe self-regulation failure as a consequence of motivational
deficits and illustrate some of the challenges that have to be overcome: ‘… how
experiences of fatigue and effort shift motivations away from (a) exploiting known
incentives to exploring new incentives, (b) laborious pursuits that demand effort to
leisure pursuits that are free from effort, and (c) what people feel they have to do
to what they feel they want to do’ (Molden, Hui, & Scholer, 2016, p. 446).
Baumeister and colleagues proposed the concept of ‘ego depletion’ to provide
an explanation for failure or disruption of intentional processes (Maranges &
Baumeister, 2016). It denotes the limitations of our mental strength or ‘will’ and
is based on a muscle metaphor. Muscles get tired after prolonged use and need
rest to sustain physical performance. For instance, when people do manage to
become active, this frequently does not ease their future efforts. Indeed, initiating
plans sometimes reduces subsequent regulation. From the perspective of many
volition theories and ISD, it is an important human function to set goals and to
enhance or control mental abilities: pursuing personal important goals is a need
for all individuals. Theories differ in the degree to which they spread control
optimism and suggest control-enhancing strategies as an absolute goal of life.
64  The role of affect and evaluation

Sometimes efforts to gain control over mental processes are described so positively
or are supported with so many results of empirical studies that one can get the
impression that we can or should be able to intentionally control our surroundings
and ourselves to a large degree. One needs to impose the restriction that we do
not know which of our intentions we may regret. In addition, although controlled
behaviour change seems to be desirable in many situations, we cannot be sure
how far mental processes actually can be influenced intentionally. As mentioned
above, we have to deal with the problem of whether actions and behaviour can
be influenced by intentions and volitions (Greve, 2001). In this chapter, I will
present several mental processes that are related to intentions and provide a
challenge for volitional control.

Goals and everyday problem solving

One problem that we have neglected refers to the question of how to evaluate
how successful individuals have been in pursuing specific goals. Goals and plans
are pursued in social contexts and often involve close others such as spouses and
friends. How adequately or successfully are goals pursued? Research on everyday
problem solving (Blanchard-Fields, 2007; Blanchard-Fields, Mienaltowski, &
Baldi Seay, 2007; Strough & Keener, 2014) concerned with this problem has
explored the competence factors in everyday goals and life tasks (Cantor, 1994).
One avenue to everyday problem solving is grounded in traditional intelligence
research and focuses on so-called well-defined problems, those that require
primary mental abilities and include one ‘correct answer’ or ‘best solution’ (for
instance, that 2 + 7 equals 9 is correct; calculating the correct medicine dosage;
see also Piaget’s tasks in his studies of cognitive development in childhood).
Interpersonal everyday problems, however, are multidimensional in the way that
they often can be solved in more than one way. For instance, consider someone
who needs your help to plan a party, or Shakespeare’s King Lear, an ageing man
struggling with the problem of how to divide his estate among his relatives. In
ill-defined everyday problems, problem-solving strategies are debatable, and
evaluation of results are often characterized as open to interpretation (see also
research on postformal thought and wisdom-related knowledge; Staudinger &
Glück, 2011). In well-defined problems (e.g. memory span, mathematical
problems), success is strictly defined by the number of valid statements. But what
about adaptation? Successful results to everyday problems are relative to the
context and general accurateness and speed cannot be applied; good answers are
defined in light of social consensus and values. In contrast to research showing a
strong age-related decline in cognitive abilities such as fluid intelligence and
speed measures (Baltes et al., 2006), strategies for everyday problem solving do
not show such a decline in adulthood. They depend on personal interests, social
pressure, and life experience.
What constitutes strategy use in everyday problems when no simple answer
can be given? Some research (Blanchard-Fields et al., 2007; Strough & Keener,
 The role of affect and evaluation  65

2014) has demonstrated that problem-solving strategies in adulthood differ

depending on contextual factors (e.g. domains of everyday functioning –
interpersonal or instrumental) and age. Older adults select more passive, emotion-
focused problem-solving strategies (e.g. deescalating, avoidant-denial strategies)
than young adults when solving interpersonal conflicts. Thus, they are more
likely to avoid interpersonal conflicts for the sake of maintaining social harmony.
In instrumental domains, when one is trying to improve in something, they use
more instrumental strategies (i.e. planful problem solving, cognitive analysis)
than younger adults. Less surprising are results that autonomy goals are associated
with self-focused goals. That older adults are better able to match strategies to
goals (Hoppmann & Blanchard-Fields, 2010) is more surprising, and it has been
suggested that older adults have more experience in managing their emotions. As
to the effectiveness of the problem-solving strategies used, older adults’ strategies,
as compared with those of younger adults, have sometimes been found to be
closely aligned with experts’ effectiveness ratings (Strough & Keener, 2014).
In everyday life, individuals pursue their own plans. Within and through
social contexts and relations, goals gain in contour and individuals shape their
surroundings. In the following, I introduce mental processes that, in part, work
automatically and thus make intentional control more difficult. Within the
framework of ISD, I refer to broad motivational orientations (e.g. developmental
tasks and concrete actions). From an ISD point of view, we can assume an
adaptation of standards such that older adults switch to more feasible goals, that
is, adjust standards due to limited time perspective and restricted physical
resources (Brandtstädter, 2016).

Limits of intentional control: The role of affect

Emotions provide valuable information in everyday communication. They can
signal satisfaction with life or anger and sometimes are predictive of specific
intentional behaviour (you can think of strategies, e.g. suppression of sadness or
a poker face). Regulating one’s emotions and affective states is a critical part of
life – for psychologists and in popular consciousness. In itself, the field of affective
or emotional development in adulthood has led to an unwieldy number of studies
(see, for instance, domains like affective well-being and positivity effect, affect
regulation, socio-emotional development). In the following section, we have to
be highly selective. From the perspective of ISD, we deal with developmental
aspects and the question of how emotions and affective processes are related to
intentions (e.g. emotion regulation and processes of selecting and pursuing goals,
planning, acting).
Many functions have been attributed to emotions. They provide information
about enjoying life or deficiency states (feelings of regret). A positive affect
balance (having more positive than negative emotions) serves as a criterion of
human development (see Chapter 6). The protective function of affective states
has also been emphasized. According to action theories of human development
66  The role of affect and evaluation

(Brandtstädter, 2006; Heckhausen et  al., 2010), emotions provide information

about how well goals have been reached. Negative emotions signal a need to
eliminate a threat or to invest more resources for reaching a desired goal. For
example, people sometimes interrupt what they have been doing and give specific
thoughts higher priority than they had before. The role of positive emotional
states is seen in their support of the development of action resources. According
to the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2013), positive emotions broaden
an accessible repertoire of thoughts and lead to activities that in turn build
personal resources (e.g. social support, skills, knowledge). In short, emotions
contribute to action regulation: they provide valuable information to the self and
others and, on the other hand, are linked to expectations about future events
(Sjöberg, 2007), intentions, and goals in many ways.

Socio-emotional development
According to the empirically well-supported socio-emotional selectivity theory
(Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), changes in time perspective lead to a
shift in goals. Because advanced age is associated with limited lifetime, older
adults prefer social and emotional goals that can optimize their affective well-
being immediately. Such goals imply the appreciation of close relationships.
Young adults do perceive their time as open-ended and prioritize informational,
future-oriented goals. Across the lifespan, the closing time window is associated
with a shift from informational to emotional goals.
A central finding in the field of emotional ageing is that affective well-being
does not decline during the adult lifespan (Kunzmann, Kappes, & Wrosch, 2014;
Riediger & Rauers, 2014). There is also evidence for age differences in affective
information processing. Compared with younger adults, older adults often
appear to be more sensitive to positive information and less sensitive to negative
information (Isaacowitz, 2012). A general positivity has not been consistently
found (Bluck & Alea, 2009). Theories of developmental regulation explain the
maintenance of affective well-being with processes of accommodation or
secondary control (Brandtstädter, 2016; Heckhausen et al., 2010; see also Chapter
2). Age-related differences in physiological and cognitive resources serve as
explanatory factors for this pattern of findings (Labouvie-Vief et al., 2009, 2014).
According to Labouvie-Vief and colleagues, increasing age and loss of fluid
cognitive functioning (e.g. information processing speed) seem to impair the
capacity to cope with high tension and negative emotions (susceptibility to
problems of overactivation). The inability to handle intense negative emotions
leads to passive forms of regulation such as conflict avoidance and acceptance. In
contrast, young adults have ample physiological and cognitive resources to
mobilize efforts and to tolerate tension.
Many studies have used global measures and retrospective techniques to assess
affective well-being. Recent studies have investigated the variability of affective
experiences in everyday life (Riediger & Rauers, 2014). Ambulatory assessment
 The role of affect and evaluation  67

refers to research techniques such as diary or experience sampling methods that

repeatedly capture everyday experiences as they naturally occur in daily life –
during short, successive time intervals. Affect balance is the average difference
between momentary positive and negative affect. Older adults report
comparatively more positively toned and more stable affective experiences. A
possible explanation could lie in older adults’ everyday lives being more
predictable. Older adults could also be better at regulating their affective responses
to everyday problems.
Because age-related stability was mainly supported by studies examining
comparatively broad dimensions of positive or negative emotions, a perspective
examining discrete emotions (Kunzmann et  al., 2014) was proposed. This
perspective considers the development of specific emotions. For instance,
differing age trajectories were found in the experiencing of anger and sadness,
feelings that have typically been subsumed under the concept of negative affect
(Kunzmann, Richter, & Schmukle, 2013). Frequency of anger increases during
young adulthood and then decreases into old age. The frequency of sadness,
however, remains stable in adulthood, but begins to increase in old age. Why?
According to Kunzmann and colleagues, this pattern could be expected when
one considers that anger promotes goal persistence, which is more typical for
young adults pursuing many future-related goals. Older adults are increasingly
faced with losses of resources. Sadness, the appraisal of a situation as an irreversible
loss, might help older adults to cope with losses by facilitating processes of
disengagement and flexible goal adjustment.

Emotion regulation
Emotion regulation denotes in a broad sense how people direct their behaviour
in emotion-arousing contexts (e.g. try to regulate their mood or cope with
stress). Some forms of emotion regulation are aimed at decreasing the intensity
of negative emotion, for instance, through listening to pleasant music or running
an hour each morning to take one’s mind off daily stress. Other forms might aim
at keeping the intensity stable, or increasing the emotional reactions (Koole &
Aldao, 2016). Individuals try to produce emotions towards, or try to evoke them
from, others. Several studies provide evidence that people’s competencies at
emotion regulation can be enhanced through training. Table 3.1 includes
processes of emotion regulation (Gross, 2014; Mallory & Rupp, 2016) and
examples of how they can be realized.
Emotion regulation occurs when an emotional reaction is valued as good or
bad, and this evaluation leads to an intention to change this particular emotion
(e.g. Gross, 2014). In this sense, emotion regulation is understood as an effort to
control, which seems to be important for many people. Books giving advice or
self-help are in great demand and demonstrate that there is an interest or need.
Actually, they show that some difficulties do exist. Indeed, we have to deal with
the problem of what exactly can be controlled through intentions (e.g. the
68  The role of affect and evaluation

TABLE 3.1  Processes of emotion regulation

Moderating factors Description

Situation selection Selection and modification of situations to change emotional
and modification impact (e.g. avoiding unpleasant situations).
Attention Strategies to selectively direct attention to a given object (e.g.
deployment distraction and concentration, trying to think about positive
thoughts, doing something enjoyable).
Cognitive change Changing the way one perceives the situation, cognitive
reappraisal (e.g. seeing a challenge instead of a threat).
Response Strategies that strengthen or diminish emotional components
modulation (experiential, behavioural, physiological), for instance, through
deep-breathing relaxation, physical exercises.

Source: Gross, J. J. 2014. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 3–20). New York:
The Guilford Press.

emotions or situational stimuli that will be emotionally evaluated?). The will

does appear to have limitations, for instance, when the controlled self-regulation
process is disrupted by non-intended events.

Affective processing in action regulation: Counter-regulation

and control-dependency
Emotional experiences cannot be planned in the same way we are used to
preparing a meal or planning a Sunday afternoon. Suppose you decide to visit an
exhibition and perhaps have the privilege of making a choice between
Impressionism, Art déco, and Fluxus, in accordance with your preference (or if
you prefer funfair or TV, just go there). You can avoid unpleasant feelings (i.e. if
you know that you do not like a particular style of art), but you can hardly plan
how satisfied or surprised you will be. Plans for actions can be intentionally
initiated, the following evaluative processes (e.g. cognitive consistency theories;
see below) depending on highly routinized judgements made outside of conscious
control (Kruglanski & Shteynberg, 2012). There is ample evidence that rational
or conscious decisions alone cannot explain the adaptive responses to goal
pursuit, because in concrete situations there are many outcomes that could
become salient. In general, goal pursuit is characterized by affective states, which
become evident, for example, when current goals are blocked. Affective
processing includes states of being sensitive to positive as well as negative
outcomes. The concept of ‘balanced processing’ (Rothermund, 2011) emphasizes
that affective processing is flexible in nature, not rigid or stable. Rothermund
distinguished two basic principles regulating the automatic affective processing:

1. The counter-regulation principle: According to this principle, attention is

automatically allocated to information that is opposite in valence to the
current motivational state. This mechanism seems at first glance surprising,
 The role of affect and evaluation  69

but becomes comprehensible, given the finding that intense affective states
(e.g. in winners of a lottery) do not last a long time before returning to the
baseline. The automatic counter-regulation prevents specific affective states
from becoming paralyzed by threats or resting on one’s laurels.
2. The control-dependency principle: The mechanism in this principle is activated
during processes of goal pursuit, depending on whether problems occur or
goal pursuit is experienced as controllable. Affective processing is focused on
potential difficulties (‘negativity bias’), if individuals have a sense of control
over the situation. A lack of control over important outcomes, however, is
accompanied by enhancement (‘positivity bias’). The control-dependency
principle of affective processing helps prevent wasteful perseverance or
premature resignation. Thus, it contributes to the adaptive processes of goal
pursuit and flexible goal adjustment (Brandtstädter, 2016; Brandtstädter &
Rothermund, 2002) and broadens the understanding of the micro-level
processing of affect. The tension between positively and negatively valenced
outcomes seems to be an important dynamic of action regulation and ISD.

Although we have experimental studies which demonstrate that emotional

experience can be changed or manipulated, I would not say that we could induce
specific emotions through intentional effort immediately (see emotional
experience of the moment; Box 3.1). Emotional reactions are not actions, although
they are closely related to processes of action regulation. The unconscious and
automatic nature of emotional processing makes it difficult to regulate affective
states intentionally. I do not deny that we can enhance the probability of avoiding
stress, but it seems to me that we are more optimistic in being able to expect or
simulate specific emotions than in being able to induce/experience them. We
cannot order a specific valence (Lewin, 1935) on demand or by pushing a button
– emotions overcome one (I am overcome by grief, honour is presented to me).
Actions, consequences, and developmental states are polyvalent; they can be
interpreted by the individual to be a burden or as something to be proud of.
Perhaps it is this openness or polyvalence that makes it difficult to regulate
emotions specifically. Whichever it is, I turn now to mental processes that are
more or less similar to emotions, but interesting, because they are characteristics
of human action and contribute to our understanding of ISD (and because we
should be able to control them if we wish strategic control over actions).

From attitudes to intentions

At a basic level, attitudes can be defined as an evaluation of an object (e.g.
stimulus, social group, and mental construct) reflected in cognitive, affective, and
behavioural responses to it. To illustrate briefly the scope of attitudes, we refer to
one, admittedly pragmatic definition (Thurstone, 1928, p. 531): ‘The concept
‘attitude’ will be used here to denote the sum of a man’s inclinations and feelings,
prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions
70  The role of affect and evaluation

about any specific topic. Thus, a man’s attitude about pacifism means here all that
he feels or thinks about peace and war. It is admittedly a subjective and personal
affair’. This early and extensive definition suggests that attitudes are linked to
goals and intentional development. Thus, attitudes consist of favourable or
unfavourable evaluations of objects or persons (i.e. predispositions to respond),
exhibited in one’s belief or intended behaviour. They might be linked to feelings
of pride, fear, or moral emotions. They may be stable for some time, but they are
not restricted to unchangeable or rigid states.
Since the early years of attitude research (Thurstone, 1928; Wegener & Petty,
2013), attitudes have been used to explain specific behaviour. Research on
attitudes provided evidence that they can influence the accessibility of palliative
thoughts or action resources; for example, they can impede or enhance the
construction of specific attributes. Because human acts are to a certain degree
motivated by attitudes or preferences, we focus in a first step on some of the
underlying processes at work when individuals acquire skills and change their
attitudes (e.g. towards objects, persons, or specific end goals). Social-psychological
research, in particular, has stressed the motivating role of attitudes (Ajzen, 2001;
Maio & Haddock, 2015; Stone, 2012) and concentrated on the question of how
attitudes or preferences mediate planning competencies and contribute to
concrete actions.

Attitude-behaviour relations: Moderating processes

Closer inspection has been devoted to the problem of the extent to which specific
attitudes actually can evoke specific behaviour. An intriguing, but still
preliminary and unsatisfactorily answered question applies to the mutual
relationship between attitudes, intentions, and actions (Ajzen, 2001; Maio &
Haddock, 2015). Some attitudes more or less explicitly contain an intentional
orientation towards specific activities and can be uncovered by asking persons
directly. Such answers, for example, would be ‘one should engage in societal or
political issues’ or ‘one should not miss the new smartphone’. Given that attitudes
are personally important and that there is no inner conflict or external barriers,
one could expect that individuals would try to realize their intentions. In
concrete situations, however, many factors can, in principle, be responsible that
attitudes are not linked to intentions. For example, when shopping, one’s
preference for cauliflower might not be decisive, if competing components such
as freshness, ecological cultivation, country of origin, or price gain in importance.
The more positive the preference for an attitude object is, the more likely it is
that an option will be chosen; however, perceived difficulties or the effort
required to achieve it might reduce the probability of the basic intention being
realized. As becomes evident from these examples, in real life situations, one can
be distracted by several occurrences, which in turn could be seen as reasons or
excuses that preliminary intentions are not fulfilled. Although there is empirical
evidence supporting the hypothesis that attitudes can predict behaviour in real
 The role of affect and evaluation  71

TABLE 3.2  Moderating factors in the attitude-behaviour relation

Moderating factors Description

Attitude Number of free associations individuals produce in relation to an
embeddedness attitude object). Highly embedded attitudes are more strongly
related to behavioural intentions than are less embedded ones
(Prislin & Ouelette, 1996).
Accessibility of Alternative behavioural options that become salient in a specific
alternative options situation can reduce the probability of acting in a specific way
according to one’s attitude.
Prior experience According to learn theory, frequent performance of a behaviour
and its accompanying experience lead to the formation of a
habit.
Attitude domain Attitude-behaviour correspondence in specific domains (e.g.
political attitude and voting for a specific party) may be stronger
than in others.
Attitude-behaviour Attitudes will be more likely to predict behaviour when the
correspondence attitude is specifically relevant to the observed behaviour. When
the measured attitude is general and the behaviour is very
specific, one should not expect close correspondence between
the two (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
Social influence Attitudes do not predict behaviour perfectly because both are
subjected to social influences (e.g. group influence, conformity)
Importance of Strong or potent attitudes will be more likely to predict behaviour.
attitudes
Interindividual Tendency towards self-monitoring, self-consciousness; personal
differences in preference for consistency. The desire for consistency (e.g. to be
personality consistent and to be perceived as consistent; Guadagno &
Cialdini, 2010) is correlated with consistency in behaviour.

situations, one needs to provide reasons why they do not in many cases. Several
studies describe moderating factors of attitude-behaviour consistency, and these
are summarized in Table 3.2 (for an overview, see Ajzen, 2001; Haddock &
Maio, 2015; Maio & Haddock, 2015).
These examples illustrate different, but not mutually exclusive, origins and
moderating factors involved in attitude formation. These include learned history
(e.g. previous experiences, domain-specific expertise), social factors, and the
degree of attitude-behaviour correspondence according to general versus specific
dimensions. From these examples, it is understandable why attitudes do not
automatically lead to specific behaviours, or may be ineffective due to other
factors that reduce their impact on behaviour.

Changeability of attitudes and preferences

In addition to moderating effects, a second, relevant aspect of the attitude-
behaviour consistency is how attitudes can change. Which factors mediate the
72  The role of affect and evaluation

formation of attitudes formed or do they remain stable for a certain time? Several
aspects of attitude strength (Bizer & Krosnick, 2001; Dohmen, Doll, & Feger,
1989; Eaton et al., 2009) have been discussed which are insofar central for ISD,
if we ask whether or not we can improve action skills through changing our
attitudes. The following list contains moderating factors which are introduced
and discussed by Visser and colleagues in more detail (Visser, Bizer, & Krosnick
2006). Strong attitudes make plausible that some attitudes remain stable over
long spans of time, whereas lower degrees indicate malleable attitudes that
fluctuate greatly over time.

• Importance: Attitude importance refers to subjective significance that

individuals attach to attitude objects or to an attitude.
• Accessibility: Accessibility refers to the strength of the object-evaluation link
in memory and how quickly an attitude can be retrieved from memory.
• Knowledge: Knowledge about an attitude object refers to the result of learning
and experience (the information that is stored in memory).
• Elaboration: Some attitudes are formed as a result of highly elaborative
thought processes, while others are more superficial.
• Extremity: Extremity refers to the degree and valence of the attitudes
(attitudes can and are valued as very negative to very positive).
• Certainty: Attitude certainty denotes the amount of confidence individuals
attach to an attitude, e.g. how sure they are that their attitudes are correct.
• Ambivalence: Ambivalence refers to the degree to which a person has both
favourable and unfavourable reactions to an object (internal conflicting
feelings).
• Structural consistency: Structural consistency consists of three aspects
(evaluative, cognitive, affective aspects) and refers to a person’s overall
evaluation of an object, the evaluative implications of their beliefs about
the object’s qualities, and the evaluative valence of their emotional
reactions to the object. Evaluative-affective, evaluative-cognitive, and
affective-cognitive consistency are the three possible manifestations of
consistency.

I have presented these factors because they are important prerequisites

involved whenever we consider certain action strategies at all, when we plan our
future or pursue specific goals. They gain in importance if one considers the
mechanisms and strategies individuals use when they immunize against
manipulations, which aim at changing their attitudes. With regard to attitudes
towards old age, similar activators and moderators have been reported (for an
overview, see Hess, 2006).
In these moderating factors, a heterogeneity of attitude patterns can exist
between persons. Correlations between probabilities (e.g. how likely possible
effects of drinking alcohol are) and evaluations of these effects can vary from
person to person (Sjöberg, 1982). People with a positive attitude towards an
 The role of affect and evaluation  73

attitude object have different beliefs and values concerning that object than
people with negative attitudes towards the same object. To improve our
understanding for situations that lead to attitude change, we have to study
characteristics of the person (his or her interests, habits, anxieties) in the social
context carefully; that is, which factors (e.g. persuasion strategies, communicator
skills) contribute to individuals changing their attitudes. For instance,
Tannenbaum, Macaulay, and Norris (1966) investigated the vulnerability of
individuals to persuasive manipulations (an attack on health-related practices).
Having a personally valued source (e.g. an authority or person we like) make a
negative assertion against a personally preferred concept results in incongruity or
pressure or need to change. Tannenbaum and colleagues’ study showed that
refuting the attack (invalidating an assertion), derogating the credibility of a
source, or bolstering the concept reduced the amount of persuasion significantly.
In social contexts, trust, credibility, and persuasive strategies of interacting
partners are important factors in attitude change. In similar automatic processes
that possibly ‘sneak in’ when we think about others using simplified stereotypes
(see processes of prejudice formation), studies have indicated that both relevant
and irrelevant aspects of communicator credibility serve as important predictors
of attitude change (Aronson & Golden, 1962).
Because these results are characteristic of many people and still valid today,
how to predict individuals’ behaviour in their surroundings remains an important
question. Several developmentalists (e.g. Rogoff et  al., 2011; Vygotsky, 1978)
have emphasized the social and cultural origins of development and the idea that
human action is first made possible through social life, involving other people
(e.g. families, communities, peer groups). Concepts such as zone of proximal
development (i.e. the difference between what a learner can do without help and
what he or she can’t do; Vygotsky, 1978) and scaffolding (when an expert helps
somebody who is less adult or less expert; Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976)
emphasize the supportive role and the responsibility of significant others in
shaping developmental paths. Since individuals usually attribute attitudes, values,
or responsibility to themselves and to others in everyday life, and on the basis of
social supportive dynamics, ISD emerges as an interpersonal and socio-cultural
collaborative process. From this theoretical point of view, one would probably
expect influence from ‘concrete’ social collaboration, but not from ‘abstract’
mental representations.
Clarifying the structure of attitude strength and the factors influencing it has
important practical implications too. For instance, the development of a positive
lifestyle and health-related behaviour depend to a large degree on attitudes.
Given that preventable behaviours such as inactivity, poor diet, smoking, and
alcohol consumption often require a shift to a more positive attitude towards
healthy behaviour, the strength-related attributes illustrate perhaps not only
subtle mechanisms that are at work when humans act, but perhaps show, together
with the moderating factors of the attitude-behaviour relation, possible links or
74  The role of affect and evaluation

processes that we should be able to influence if we wish to shape the direction of

development through intentions.

Values and intentions

Values are principles or criteria for selecting what is good or desirable, and
sometimes serve as a means for justifying specific actions. Rokeach (1973), for
instance, presented an influential psychological theory of universal values and
argued that values are underlying dispositions for individuals’ attitudes, beliefs,
and behaviour. In research on lifespan development, they were neglected for a
long time, possibly due to some difficulties of value-oriented research (e.g.
subjectivity and relativism of values: ‘good for’). Presently, a growing interest in
their function as action regulators can be observed (Borg et al., 2017; Ritter &
Freund, 2014). Ritter and Freund (2014) described the possible influence of
values on thoughts and actions from a developmental perspective. They argued
that values are involved in life planning and life review and provide meaning for
the individual life. Values are guiding principles in the selection of life goals and
provide rules that enable people to shortcut decisions. Rokeach turned away
from attitudes and went on to the concept of values. Despite several arguments
that have been made to distinguish between the two (see also Graumann &
Willig, 1983) or to stress their interconnection (Sjöberg, 1982), it suffices here to
describe the intention-forming and action-regulating function that is common
to both concepts.
We prefer to emphasize a distinction between two forms of values which have
been used to illustrate a hierarchy: Rockeach (1973) attempted to distinguish
between instrumental and terminal values. Terminal values refer to end states or
ideal modes of living (e.g. freedom, equality, happiness, wisdom, self-respect,
inner harmony). Instrumental values (e.g. courageous, polite, loyal, obedient)
pertain to modes of conduct (to carry out terminal values). This distinction has
been criticized, for example, because of its assumed valence or hierarchy;
however, it draws attention to two basic functions (or perhaps, rather, two types
of arguments) values have for individuals who select goals and act.

1. Values can serve as end goals: Intentions can strive to realize certain values
as ultimate criteria. In this sense, human goals carry an inherent value
regardless of their potential personal benefit.
2. Values can serve as a means to fulfil or justify other (final) values. This
becomes evident in situations in which individuals try to explain why they
did something in a specific way and use higher-order, divergent goals to
justify their actions.

Sjöberg (1980) proposed one of numerous classifications of values. Sjöberg

emphasizes the interconnection of values with human action. He distinguishes
 The role of affect and evaluation  75

between (a) values that emphasize the consequences of success or failure and (b)
values that emphasize restrictions put on behaviour by oneself or by others (e.g.
social institutions). From a developmental point of view, there is evidence that
time perspective might act as a central factor determining the value-behaviour
congruence. According to the construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010),
a distal time perspective seems to enhance value-behaviour congruence. The
greater the distance to an event, the more people rate the likelihood of engaging
in certain behaviours in the distant future on the basis of their attitudes and
values (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). The cognitive representations of distal
events are abstract. In a proximal time perspective, more detailed information is
available and mental construals include concrete details.
In sum, psychological research has identified several moderating factors that
contribute to the relation between behaviour and attitudes and values (see also
expectation-value models in this chapter). As to these many interacting processes,
it is not astonishing that attitudes and values, although they espy from afar their
goal of providing a basis for concrete actions, sometimes cannot reach it. I turn
now to developmental factors and age differences that also should be considered
in the discussion of ways in which attitudes and values are central for intention
formation.

Age differences of attitudes and values in adulthood

In the field of lifespan development, some research has focused on the degree to
which attitudes (e.g. attitudes regarding the ageing process) can be used to
understand the social-psychological basis of adult functioning. By now, there are
many studies showing that attitudes, stereotypes, and values vary across the
lifespan and are linked to behaviour, personal goals, and well-being (e.g. Hess,
2006; Ritter & Freund, 2014). What age differences in attitudes have been found?
Brandtstädter and colleagues investigated an age-related shift from
instrumental to value-oriented goals in adulthood (Brandtstädter et al., 2010).
They argue that the attainment of future benefits becomes more and more
unlikely with a fading future time perspective. As a consequence, older adults
might derive more satisfaction from goals or values which they consider to be
important in themselves. Indeed, the authors provided some evidence for an age-
related shift in value orientation, for instance, that instrumental or informational
motivations become less important when future time is limited. In a cross-
sectional study, Borg and colleagues (2017) found that age is positively correlated
with self-transcendence (benevolence, universalism), preservation of values
(tradition, conformity), and more distant from self-enhancement values (power,
achievement). Some research indicated that preference for consistency (Brown,
Asher, & Cialdini, 2005) or normative values (religiosity, obedience; Alonso
et  al., 2013; Gouveia et  al., 2015) is higher in older people. Excitement and
affective values (pleasure, emotion, love) were found to stronger degrees among
younger adults (Alonso et al., 2013; Gouveia et al., 2015).
76  The role of affect and evaluation

When empirical studies on adulthood include a representative age range (e.g.

from late adolescence to senility), one can better show growth and decline of
development across the lifespan. Some studies (Eaton et  al., 2009; Visser &
Krosnick, 1998) have investigated the relation between susceptibility to attitude
change and age (for an overview, see Maio & Haddock, 2015). They found that
attitude strength was lower in early or late adulthood compared with middle
adulthood. Possible reasons for this result are that in the middle-aged group,
people attach more importance to, and think more frequently about, their
attitudes with more certainty and more perceived knowledge. Both studies
provided evidence that attitudes related to social power (e.g. the possession of
social power, the belief that it is better to have definite opinions than to remain
neutral on most issues) also serve as possible reasons. Perceived social power
increased from early adulthood (age 18) to middle adulthood, and then decreased
through late adulthood (up to age 80 and older). A similar curvilinear age-related
pattern has been found for competitive preferences (Mayr et al., 2012). Midlife is
a time when people are most likely to occupy powerful social roles. Social roles
that individuals adopt may affect the strength with which they hold their
attitudes.

Implicit attitude measurement

In contrast to explicit attitudes (i.e. evaluative cognitions to which one has
conscious access), implicit attitudes denote automatic evaluative associations one
makes outside of conscious awareness. The IAT (Implicit Association Test, e.g.
Baron & Banaji, 2006) is a reaction-time task used to measure the strength of
associations between pairs of concepts. Participants respond to pairings of face
stimuli (e.g. young and old faces) with positively or negatively valenced words
and are instructed to press a specific key depending on the respective instruction
(when you see an old face or a good word, press the key ‘E’, when you see a
young face or a bad word, press the key ‘I’). The underlying assumption is that
the more closely related a concept (e.g. young face) with a valenced word (e.g.
‘happy’), the faster participants are to press the required key. A study of Chopik
and Giasson (2017) tested the hypothesis that as persons became older, they
would change their negative stereotypes about old age because they meet
counter-stereotyped examples that lead to a change of negative attitudes about
age. Results showed that explicit preferences for younger people compared to
older people are highest among young adults. For the implicit measures,
however, a small but significant negative age trend has been observed showing
that implicit attitudes towards older people become more negative the older the
respondents are.
Some studies investigating the correspondence between implicit and explicit
measures provided evidence for an asymmetry in the development of race
evaluations of middle-class European Americans (Baron & Banaji, 2006).
Compared with kindergartners and 10-year-old children, young adults
 The role of affect and evaluation  77

self-reported on equal preference for white or black photographic images. The

children, however, reported a stronger preference for white targets. In most
cases, research using IAT has found consistent negative evaluations of older adults
compared with younger ones (e.g. Hess, 2006). The (often found) low degree of
correspondence between implicit and explicit measures indicates that different
facets of attitudes have been measured. Several factors such as the degree of
cognitive and conscious representation or social desirability can be used to
explain the differences between both methods.

The adaptive function of attitudes in adulthood

Some lifespan research has focused on the extent to which attitudes (age-related
stereotypes) can be used to understand the adaptive capacity (e.g. subjective and
physical health, well-being) of older adults. Longitudinal research has provided
some evidence that subjective ageing is related to physical functioning (health
and longevity, e.g. Mock & Eibach, 2011; Westerhof & Wurm, 2015). For
instance, Mock and Eibach (2011) investigated how attitudes towards one’s own
ageing moderate the relationship between subjective age (i.e. feeling older) and
well-being. Results of this longitudinal study with more than 1000 participants
showed older subjective age predicted lower life satisfaction and higher negative
affect when ageing attitudes were less favourable, but not when ageing attitudes
were more favourable. Recently, the impact of attitudes towards age on
preparative behaviour has been investigated in three adult age groups (Kornadt,
Voss, & Rothermund, 2015). More positive future self-views of one’s own ageing
(‘when I am older …’) predicted subsequent increases in preparation for age-
related changes in several domains. Influences were strongest in those domains
in which age-related changes were to be expected to occur for the respective age
groups.
In sum, research on attitudes and values across the lifespan is a complex field,
given the multitude of domains and interindividual differences within specific
domains. Regarding age, it seems important to note that people in general do not
view old age as a homogenous category. Besides interindividual variance in age
stereotypes, experience-related factors (e.g. increasing age and familiarity with
older adults) are associated with more positive and differentiated attitudes towards
ageing. On the other hand, some studies show that negative stereotypes about
ageing are present (Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989) and that stereotypes can
be affected by implicit activation (priming) of stereotype-related information
(Hess, 2006). Results of different studies are difficult to compare because attitudes
can refer to different life domains and can be measured with different methods
(implicit or explicit measures). Implicit attitudes tend to be weakly associated
with explicit attitudes. In general, age differences were found but depend on
domain and method. Implicit measures of attitudes about ageing seem to be more
strongly negative than explicit ones in general.
78  The role of affect and evaluation

Summary
My intent was to demonstrate that (a) intentions and goals are closely related to
emotions, attitudes, and values and that (b) this relationship is mediated by several
factors that need to be considered to better understand intentional self-regulation.
What can we conclude? First, some control-oriented research focused on ways to
minimize the low predictability of behaviour (intention-behaviour gap) and to
maximize personal control (Schwarzer, 2016). For instance, through planning
(Kwasnicka et al., 2013) or emotion-regulation strategies, it should be easier to
execute intentional control. Second, evaluation processes or valences (see
emotions, attitudes, and values) are essential for the regulation of intentions and
actions. Emotions can serve as signals that show whether specific actions are
necessary. Although making plans can prove to be successful in many situations
(e.g. being better able to realize one’s intentions), some resistance or reservations
remain persistent and therefore hinder the necessary efforts to reach goals.
Sometimes the realization of one’s plans is limited due to a conflict with other
personal values. Third, intentional control is limited because there are (too)
many processes and relevant factors that work outside of human consciousness
(e.g. Rothermund, 2011). These processes are relevant for ISD because they
present challenges to intentional effort. One should bring them under one’s
personal control, but they are dependent on many situational factors.
4
COGNITIVE-MOTIVATIONAL
PROCESSES OF INTENTIONAL
SELF-DEVELOPMENT

In Chapter 4, I address the mental processes that are closely related to intentions
and actions at a conceptual level (e.g. expectations, attributions). These are
discussed in theories on motivation and social psychology (e.g. attitudes, Maio &
Haddock, 2015; attribution and attributional theories; Horhota et  al., 2014;
Kelley & Michela, 1980; expectation-value models, Wigfield & Cambria, 2010;
social cognition approach, Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Wegener & Petty, 2013).
Other processes such as perception, learning, and memory refer to basic
information processing and will be used to illustrate the short-term perspective
of ISD. It should become evident that many of these processes are in part sub-
intentional and automatically regulated and therefore cannot be trained with
intentional effort. Nonetheless, they are involved when individuals pursue goals
and solve problems. The final part of the chapter concludes with some caveats or
difficulties that arise when one tries to disentangle the processes that are
characteristic of the concept of human action. The concepts of action, intention,
and attitude denote, in part, quite similar processes, but it is not quite clear
whether they describe distinct events or indicate different descriptions of the
same psychic phenomena.

Expectation and attribution

We turn now to processes that are important when people must make an effort
but are not sure about how well they will perform (e.g. hopes and fear of failure).
The concepts of expectation, attribution, and calculation (e.g. to estimate
probabilities) are presented because they relate to anticipated success (e.g. in
demanding or achievement-related situations). They pertain to how people
rationalize events. Asking what are significant predictors of achievement and
related concepts is neither new nor limited to educational psychology. There are
80  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

many contexts in which research on achievement motivation have been

conducted. Effort, discipline, and perseverance have been identified as
prerequisites in several cultures (Triandis, 1972). For instance, the anthropologist
Herskovits’ statement that people have ‘wants that exceed their technological
competence’ should be true for all people. Herskovits speculated that ‘In every
society, the maximization of resources is at least implicit in the desires of a
people’. Thus, striving for maximization is anchored in the history of civilization
(Herskovits, 1948, p. 267). These considerations are valuable for individuals
planning their life in order to maximize their chances and striving for positive
developmental ends.

Expectation-value models
Conceptually close to intentions are expectation-value models (Atkinson, 1970;
Wigfield & Cambria, 2010; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). Motivation theorists in
this tradition attempt to explain people’s choice behaviour (e.g. choice of
achievement tasks) mainly on the basis of two factors: their beliefs about how
well they will do on a specific task (expectation) and the extent to which they
value the task performance. According to Wigfield & Eccles (2000), achievement-
related choices, as well as effort, persistence, and performance, are a function of
individuals’ expectations and values, which in turn are assumed to be influenced
by individuals’ perceptions of previous experiences, goals, and affective memories.
If the value of an end attains a certain degree, expectancies and self-efficacy
beliefs (how well do you expect to …?) mediate achievement-related choices and
action plans. A low degree of hope in one’s abilities or a general belief that
specific means are not efficient in changing a situation lead to less effort. One
intriguing question in the complex interplay between evaluations and
expectancies is the degree to which we can improve achievement through will
and personal effort. Expectancies are based on individuals’ previous experiences
of success (and failure) and can be improved through learning and experiencing
success (e.g. Bandura, 1992). They depend on a more or less complex pattern of
beliefs people have about which factors are powerful enough to serve as causes of
specific effects.

Attributions
Attributions constitute a person’s understanding of the world; the study of the
identification of perceived causation is known as ‘attribution theory’ (Kelley &
Michela, 1980). By connecting specific events with assumed sources, attributions
mediate attitude formation and are conceived of as important sources of
expectancies and behaviour. How individuals make attributions or not seems to
be more important for the development of humans’ specific attitudes or
preferences than whether or not their attributions are correct.
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  81

Attribution theory is preoccupied with the question of how individuals

analyze, deduce, or explain people’s behaviour. For instance, Paul can be
perceived as a helpful person endorsing a positive attitude, but only for Lisa. Or,
sometimes we are inclined to attribute interests in music to an inspiring teacher,
but we overlook that it was per chance that we had been enrolled for a specific
course. Thus, attributions deal with the information people use in making causal
inferences. But how do persons ‘know’ that their perceptions and judgements are
correct? According to Kelley (1973), individuals use information revolving
around several principles:

• Temporal consistency (Do persons usually behave this way in this situation?)
• Distinctiveness (Do persons behave differently in different situations?)
• Consensus (Do others behave similarly in this situation?)

If we can specify some reasons behind how a person might have been guided
in a situation, we may discount or ignore other possibilities. Causal attribution is
an important action-guiding principle in everyday life because it mediates
emotional responses and behavioural tendencies. We know from attribution
theory that it makes a difference in prosocial behaviour whether one is inclined
to say it is the person’s own fault or whether one attributes a social inequity to
external factors outside the responsibility of the victims. On the other hand,
coping strategies that victims of accidents use vary according to whether they
attribute the accident to harmful motives or external situational factors that
happened by chance.
Which categories of attributions are important? Heider (1958) was one of the
first to develop an attribution theory. He distinguished between people who
tended to attribute someone’s behaviour to internal (e.g. personal, dispositional)
or external causes (e.g. social or physical circumstances). Weiner (1986), on the
other hand, distinguished attributions on the basis of three dimensions: locus of
control (perceived internal or external causes), stability, and control. Stability
refers to consistency across time, that is, whether the cause of the event is stable
or unstable across time and situations. Control denotes whether causes are
perceived as controllable or uncontrollable. Table 4.1 depicts the three dimensions
of attribution and orders the manifold combinations that can occur in everyday
life. Additional differentiations such as globality, consensus, responsibility, and
intentionality are not included.
In his attributional theory of motivation and emotion, Weiner (1986) presented
a well-known conceptual system linking specific attributions with specific
expectations and action tendencies. Particularly interesting are the ways
interindividual differences in perceptions of causality are related to emotions and
action tendencies. Especially optimistic people are better able to attribute their
own successes internally (‘my own skill’) and that of rivals externally (‘luck’).
When one fails or makes mistakes, one is more likely to use external attribution,
82  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

TABLE 4.1  Different combinations of attributional dimensions

Locus of control: Internal Locus of control: External

Stable Variable Stable Variable

Controllability Controllable
Uncontrollable

Note: Attributional theories describe the behavioural or emotional consequences of attributions. For
instance, they classify emotions and link them to types of attributions. Kelley and Michela (1980) distin-
guished between ‘attribution’ and ‘attributional’ research. The former involves the antecedents, the latter
the consequences of attributions. Here I have used the terms interchangeably. Cells can be completed
with specific emotions or behavioural components (see text for additional explanations).

attributing causes to situational factors rather than blaming oneself. According to

the attribution theory, this pattern is associated with greater motivation and
more frequent success. Poorer subsequent performance can be expected when
the attribution of failure follows certain patterns: uncontrollability (‘there was
nothing I could do’) together with stability (‘and this will never change’) or
personal (‘my fault’) attribution.
Attribution theory examines in detail the relationship between perceived
causes and emotions. If one attributes poor performance to a lack of preparedness,
which is an internal cause, this would result in a feeling of disappointment or
shame because effort is a controllable factor. External causes, however, are
correlated with frustration or luck. Empirical research on attribution theory has
led to certain caveats. If emotions (e.g. shame) imply per definition specific
perceptions (e.g. perception of failure or improper behaviour), the empirical
value is limited because empirical studies merely, or at best, support semantic
necessities (Brandtstädter, 2006; Greve, 2001). I return to this issue at the end of
Chapter 4 and ask to what extent attribution theory can contribute to an
understanding of ISD.
How does attribution theory/do attributions contribute to ISD? To start with,
it is fascinating to see that people (scientists, experts, laypersons) try to explain
everyday events, for example, someone’s behaviour or the outcome of an event
(common sense psychology; Heider, 1958). Causal attributions are a central part of
human thinking and an attempt to provide reasons for actions: people rationalize
their own actions and those of others. The extent to which some of the results in
attribution research actually do provide empirical results or only indicate
semantic analytical similarities is still an open question. Nonetheless, they
illustrate the meaning structure of actions in that they unfold the ways in which
actions are related to past events. Attribution theory delineates concepts and
classifications towards which human thinking and acting is oriented. Attributions
draw attention to our experience (e.g. autobiographical memory, biography) and
demonstrate that goals are not only creative, but also have a history that should
be mentioned when we try to explain development. From an ISD perspective, it
would be interesting to know when and how individuals infer that other person’s
intentions do correspond to their actions, e.g. whether they conclude that stable
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  83

dispositions (e.g. personality traits) or rather situational factors are responsible for
specific results. Theoretically and empirically intriguing is also how individuals
use their experience, how they perceive their surroundings, and how they give
meaning to information they process.

Decision-making between rational choice, uncertainty,

and randomness
The degree to which individuals use reflexive deliberations (e.g. carefully
selecting between several action alternatives and estimating the subjective
probability of each consequence), when they make decisions varies from person
to person as well in different situations. Indeed, we often act habitually or
routinely without having the impression that we have made a decision. Sometimes
difficult questions of life planning demand serious decisions from us. We
recognize the volitional conflict between ‘shoulds’ and ‘wants’ when action
possibilities are compelling to different degrees. Particularly in emotionally
arousing situations, we become aware the difficulties in making and pursuing a
decision. In areas such as economics, advertisement, or health, ‘rational’ decisions
are recommended in order to optimize the consequences. Decision-making is
closely related to concepts such as preferences, judgements, or classification.
Before I discuss processes of decision-making, it seems useful to make a
distinction between the terms ‘rational’ and ‘nonrational’ as used in theories on
decision-making. According to Gigerenzer (2001), ‘nonrational’ and ‘rational’
refer to a type of theory and not a type of outcome. Nonrational theories
postulate agents with limited knowledge and little time. He or she chooses the
first alternative that meets an aspiration level (good enough). Rational theories
rest on the ideal of optimization, for instance, by calculating the maximum or
minimum profit from alternatives. This does not imply that agents using
nonrational approaches fare badly in real life. Thus, we should distinguish
optimizing strategies from optimal outcomes. Both components are
interconnected and might support each other at best, but they are not identical.
From an intentional perspective, it is valuable to understand how decisions and
more or less optimal outcomes contribute to the optimizing strategies.

Decisions and heuristics

At first glance, astonishing is what it makes possible that individuals have luck
and make a choice between alternatives and the outcome is not bad, especially
when their knowledge is limited. There is ample evidence that people sometimes
have severe cognitive limitations when they perform judgements and make
decisions (Gigerenzer, 2016; Sjöberg, 2007; Tversky, 1972). When faced with a
choice among several alternatives, people are often not sure which alternative
they should select. Tversky (1972) introduced a theory of choice, based on a
covert elimination process. According to this theory, the selection between
84  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

alternatives depends on the selection of specific aspects (e.g. colour, price,

comfort of a car) and this selection eliminates all the alternatives that do not
include the selected aspects. If a selected aspect is included in all the available
alternatives, a new aspect is selected. One chooses then the alternative that is best
relative to the first aspects. The process continues until a single alternative
remains. Although this theory describes one possible, but sometimes correct way
of decision-making, Tversky calls attention to the flaw in this elimination
sequence: One cannot be sure that the alternatives retained are superior to those
which are eliminated. In everyday life we usually have no certainty, but merely
beliefs or assumptions at best. Development will show whether expectations
become true and how individuals will evaluate their situation.
Judgement errors are very common, and phenomena like superstition and
self-fulfilling prophecies show that specific decisions guide actions even though
a rational basis would lead to other suggestions. Heuristics denote thinking
routines that help us to organize information by ignoring available information.
They are common and demonstrate that adults do not behave like natural
scientists who make problem-solving decisions from the high plateau of cognitive
development (e.g. stage of formal operations, abstract thinking; Piaget, 1970).
Rather, our thought often seems to be pragmatic, parsimonious, and based on
useless information. Some research reminds us that many people do not
understand or use rules of probability appropriately. A few examples should
illustrate this phenomenon: Kahneman and Tversky did basic work on heuristics
and found that many people make substantial errors in judging probabilities as
compared with the correct answer from probability calculations. The following
examples of heuristics are from Tversky and Kahneman (1974).

• Availability heuristic: The likelihood of things is judged by their availability in

memory, that is, when a person makes a judgement about the probability of
an event based on the ease with which it comes to mind. This might be
useful; however, availability is also affected by other factors besides
probability and frequency.
• Misconception of chance: Estimating the probabilities of tosses of a coin, people
regard the sequence HTHTTH as being more likely than the sequence
HHHTTT.
• Illusion of validity: The prediction of an outcome (e.g. an occupation) depends
on the degree of representativeness of the input (e.g. a description of a
person). People rely on attributes they assume to be representative and tend
to ignore factors that limit predictive accuracy.

Research on heuristics is concerned with the question of how logically or

intuitively individuals choose between alternatives or estimate outcomes. One
result: we tend to overestimate information that we ‘know’ or that is similar to
our knowledge or stereotypes. In everyday life, decisions usually prove to be
mixed processes, which are similar to beliefs, preferences, and calculating
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  85

tendencies. Several psychological models have tried to break down the complex
process of decision-making into fine-tuned components. Image theory (Beach,
1992; Falzer & Garman, 2012), for instance, proposes that decision-making has
two steps: screening and choice. Screening determines the choice set from which
an option will be chosen. At this phase, decision makers narrow the range of
alternatives by comparing specific action possibilities with their beliefs, goals,
and ethical standards (Beach, 1992). Three sets of images have been distinguished:

• Value images (i.e. criteria for the rightness or wrongness of any particular
decision)
• Trajectory images (what decision-makers hope they will achieve)
• Strategic images (plans that could be used for achieving the goals).

The simple counting rule describes how possible courses of action are pre-
screened for compatibility with values and standards.
The extent to which cognitive-rational problem analysis is successful depends
on whether or not the problem has a well-defined correct solution. Despite that,
it has been demonstrated that we often not able or willing to judge likelihood
when choosing between alternatives. The American economist Herbert Simon
(1978) proposed that agents making decisions are finite-capacity information
processors (i.e. possess only bounded rationality) and make decisions by
‘satisficing’ (i.e. ‘search terminates when the best offer exceeds an aspiration level
that itself adjusts gradually to the value of the offers received so far’; Simon, 1978,
p. 10). Simon argued that alternatives and consequences may only be partly
known and end imperfectly differentiated or poorly detailed. In real life, making
decisions becomes difficult since mindful judgement depends on situational
factors and automatic mental processes (e.g. encoding of information) that can
hardly be controlled (Weber & Johnson, 2009). In addition, as I already have
argued above, outcomes can be evaluated by using several and differing criteria.

Uncertainty and randomness

In everyday life, several factors make a challenge out of intentional and planning
efforts. Not only do we have limited influence on inner processes of intentions,
but we also should not discount the influence of accidental events. As Bandura
(1982) illustrated, it is not difficult to find continuity in the lives of most people
(e.g. linkages between specific interests of adolescents and professional careers in
adulthood). But what do we mean by truly random events? I assume that one is
usually inclined to think that there was no cause for the event, or that events are
rare, not repeatable, or not at all significant. On the basis of the following
examples, I will show the relevance of non-predictable events for ISD.
The first is from Sjöberg (2007, p. 2): ‘On a recent trip from Spain, I happened
to be seated next to a lady who had a severe flu. I caught the same illness (I
think)’. Sjöberg discussed this as an example of coincidence. ‘Ms. X plan has
86  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

nothing to do with my plan to travel to Spain. The airline personnel did not
know that they exposed me to a risk. Nonetheless I caught the same flu she had
which in turn has influenced my planned activities.’ We are used to talking about
such coincidences as chance events, but on closer examination, we have no
random events such as throwing a die. Or take the earthquake in Lisbon (1755),
which was relevant for more than one person: roughly 60,000 inhabitants died
and many people had to make drastic adjustments in their life. Sometimes, risks
are known, but security precautions are limited. The Phlegraean Fields (Campi
Flegrei) are a large volcanic area situated to the west of Naples, Italy. This area is
under observation because the ground raised, but the experts cannot anticipate a
date of eruption. Except for a move, prevention is not possible.
From a naturalistic point of view, these events are more or less probable; many
times we cannot possibly use the relevant information adequately. For instance,
assuming you throw a die and it lands on a six (example that is used in discussions
of probability), Sjöberg (2007) conceded that the outcome would in principle be
perfectly predictable (given full knowledge of pertinent parameters of a throw),
but in practice, we are unable to measure all of these factors. Many things happen
without our being able to prevent them, although they have causes (determining
factors). For the present purpose, it is important to note that events occur without
being anticipated by agents. We cannot see a Grand Plan behind events in all that
happens. Individuals use the terms of randomness and probability when providing
explanations why specific or common events happen in this or that way (Kelley
& Michela, 1980). By doing so, the question of meaning arises on the horizon of
many people and probably leads to a bias when we infer from valued events. As
Sjöberg (2007) emphasized, we refuse to believe that important events have
trivial causes. There is sometimes a need for finding a meaning in unlikely events.
The point I wish to make from an action-theoretical point of view is that what is
important is what individuals conclude from this probability calculus.
When we intentionally seek reasonable explanations of behaviour, it seems to
be important to recognize that chance encounters and perceptions of uncertainty
shape the course for later outcomes. The impact of chance encounters on life
paths depends on the evaluative system and the degree to which individuals
attach importance to specific events. In psychology, attribution theory (Heider,
1958; Kelley & Michela, 1980) is a well-known example of theories in which
chance plays an important role. Sjöberg (2007) investigated action-related
functions of uncertainty. The results showed that uncertainty is associated with
negative expectations and the perception of restrictions to actions.
In sum, people make many decisions – on the basis of medical research or
probability calculations or none of these. It is well known that many smokers
state that they have tried to give up smoking, but failed. One avenue to support
health-related behaviour might be to try to improve relevant knowledge (e.g.
why it is important or useful to pursue a goal – e.g. giving up smoking). However,
because of the imperfect relation between natural facts on the one hand and
personal importance on the other, the increased probability to suffer from cancer
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  87

might lead some, but not all, to follow with an effort to change their lifestyle.
However, people can try to consider probability calculus to minimize risks. Here
it is not important whether things are truly random (e.g. repeatedly throwing a
coin), but rather whether they become part of an action plan. Some everyday
problems can be solved more effectively if one considers probability laws;
sometimes we fare well by using heuristics.
In the puzzling interplay of cognitive and affective influences, basic processes
of information processing (e.g. attention regulation, learning, and memory) are
relevant in ISD and contribute to our understanding of how people pursue goals.
I turn now to a problem that has to do with concentration or the mental ability
to bundle one’s mental energy in the face of distraction or emotional stress in
daily life.

Conscious control and automatic information processing

Basic cognitive processes such as attention (the ability to concentrate) or memory
are resources that are positively valued by many people. We do need these
resources when we solve difficult problems, because they enable us to switch
from one task to another and to continue with activities. Conscious attention is
involved when we make plans, pursue goals, and try to concentrate on specific
activities (Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Weber & Johnson, 2009). We recognize this
when our strategies are less successful than we wish. In situations in which we
fail to sustain motivation, we ask for possible explanations. Many theories on
perception recognize the selective function of attention, for instance, that we do
not perceive all of the acoustic or visual stimuli in our surroundings. It is normally
assumed that we have limited access to attention regulation (e.g. monitoring
mental processes or concentrating continuously on a task). Since pursuing short-
term and long-term goals requires the inhibition of immediate impulses or
distractions, attention serves as a resource that regulates the direction and process
of our incentives and disengagement (Klinger, 1975). In the following, I illustrate
the interconnection between attention and intentions by showing some of the
relevant processes that are involved when people switch from relevant to less
important activities.

Attention and cognitive control

Norman and Shallice (1986) described the role of attention in action, considering
both automatic performance and deliberate conscious control. They draw
attention to several phenomena in the control of actions by showing possible
starting points that could be used to improve our skills in implementing and
pursuing intentions. According to Norman and Shallice, attentional resources
are primarily relevant when we select specific actions. Routine actions and
expertise are not assumed to be attention-consuming to the same degree: If we
have learned to apply rules and action scripts, automatic information processing
88  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

can carry out the required activities without the need for conscious control.
Nonetheless, the initiation of routine actions, for example, does require conscious
attention to action steps, however, to a less degree than novel tasks do. Driving a
car in a less-demanding traffic situation might be used as an example to illustrate
a situation in which we can apply schematic processes and deliberately control
unwanted actions without feeling that it is strenuous. Norman and Shallice
(1986, p. 3) distinguished between four types of action sequences that can be
classified as automatic:

• Action sequences that are normally performed automatically can be carried

out under deliberate control when desired.
• Deliberate control can be used to suppress unwanted actions and to enhance
wanted ones.
• Being that accurate, precise timing is often required for skilled performance;
it is a common belief that conscious attention to this aspect of performance
can disrupt the action.
• Activities often overlap one another in normal life so that preventing
conflicts between incompatible actions can be required.

These processes refer to well-learned, habitual tasks. Once selected, a schema

continues to operate until it is blocked – due to lack of resources or because it has
satisfied its purpose. The scheduling is rather simple and direct. In contrast,
deliberate conscious control is involved in planning or decision-making – when
tasks are ill-learned, contain novel action sequences, or require resisting a
temptation. The uncontrolled application of action schemas is not desired when
people fear that it might lead to error. A supervisory attentional system (Norman &
Shallice, 1986) is required when the task is complex or novel and several tasks
have to be coordinated. Because attention is used to control details of our
awareness, it is closely related to intention and volition: involved are representations
of the environment (past and present states), goals, and a repertoire of schemas.

Exogenous and endogenous influences

The distinction between exogenous and endogenous influences (e.g. Weber &
Johnson, 2009) is useful to order the variety of factors contributing to action
regulation. Novel situations and unexpected changes in the environment can
make us curious, and as such, be motivating, but they can also introduce the
possibility of threat. As a result of involuntary orientation responses to stimuli
(e.g. fast emotional reactions), things that vary can maintain attention. In
addition to external factors, internal states such as activated goals, values, or
interests determine whether the rules for deciding that follow orientation
attention are self-protecting, hedonic (what feels good), or deontological
(moral). I have already described the relevance of changing affect or valence.
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  89

Activated positive emotions can support effective goal pursuit and problem
solving and, in that, result in an improved self-efficiency (Fredrickson, 2013).
On the other hand, depressive mood is associated with a tendency to focus on
negative information. Dysphoric mood (e.g. depressivity, melancholy, intrusive
affect) has been found to interfere with concentration and to impair persistence
and performance in cognitive tasks. Negativity biases cognitions in a variety of
domains, including memory and perception. When all circumstances seem to
emanate apathy, ill-humour, and numbness, intentional efforts (with) which one
tries to escape might remain fruitless, or even serve to intensify ruminative
circuits. The desire to gain control over unwanted thoughts can lead to thought
suppression, but can also result in ruminating about negative thoughts and
reinforcing the wish that rumination should facilitate insight and problem
solving (Wenzlaff, 2004).
According to the dual-process model of assimilation and accommodation
(Brandtstädter, 2016; Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; see also Chapter 2),
ruminative thoughts indicate that individuals are involved in a dilemmatic
tension between tenacious goal pursuit (assimilative mode) and flexible goal
adjustment (accommodative mode): the loss of control over personally valued
goals and the inability to dissolve unrealistic aspirations. In terms of cognitive
mechanisms, the attentional field in the assimilative mode is geared towards
effective goal pursuit. Attractive valences of the goal and its attainability
become salient. In the accommodative mode, the attentional field widens and
the cognitive system becomes responsive to stimuli that have been warded off
in the assimilative phase. The dual-process model does not assume that the
transition from assimilative to accommodative information processing mode is
intentionally activated, rather ‘… it critically depends on the erosion of
attainability beliefs, which generally proceeds more slowly in people who
harbour strong self-beliefs of control’ (Brandtstädter, 2010, p. 58). Thus,
changes in valence or priority shifts occur when blocked goals cannot be
reached, but losses can be replaced with alternatives and the value of life
(Frankfurt, 1982) still can be kept alive. Conditions which moderate this are a
self-structure that consists of many self-defining projects (Linville, 1987),
attentional resources, and divergent thinking (Leipold et al., 2014; Leipold &
Loepthien, 2015).
The interplay between internal and external factors show how attention and
intention work. Although intentions and actions require conscious concentration
on specific options, automatic intentional processes of attention set limits to an
intentional regulation (e.g. when we are distracted by something and try to
concentrate on a task). What we often do not recognize are action schemas, our
mental and behavioural routines. They are interconnected with volitional
processes because they are an essential part of action performance and guarantee
that specific volitions can be maintained until one recognizes that routinized task
processing is not possible anymore.
90  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

Cognitive routines and mental sets

In psychology, the term mental set describes a basic form of selective attention
– the (sometimes unconscious) tendency to approach situations in a certain way
(Luchins, 1942), possibly because that was a method that worked well in the past.
Mental sets denote a form of perceptual or behavioural tuning that is described
in ordinary parlance as ‘I have an instinct for something’ or the difference
between listening and hearing or looking and seeing, – as Gombrich described
the transition from bare routines over conscious thoughts to volition (Gombrich,
2002, p. xviii). This transitional phase is interesting because it distinguishes
between mere behaviour and a current goal-directed state, and both states are
central characteristics of the stream of action. Keeping this transition in mind, I
illustrate the mediating role of several mental processes (e.g. preferences,
attention, attributions, expectations, or emotions) that are involved when humans
build intentions, which in turn are constitutive elements of human actions.
The important question is how intentions are related to reactions that are not
intentional (i.e. ‘pure’ behaviour), so that one could hopefully learn how to
control the relevant factors that mediate how well we master the challenges of
everyday life.
As I have already argued in this chapter, attitudes and related concepts such as
preferences, prejudices, and values are closely related to intention formation and
thus important for a comprehensive understanding of how humans act in a social
context. I focus here on a few mental phenomena to illustrate how deeply
intentions (e.g. pursuing plans or goals) are interwoven with non-intended
mental processes that denote things that happen, responses that become salient,
or slips. Psychologists can list numerous examples: Pavlovian reflexes, Freudian
slips, placebo responses, self-fulfilling prophecies, stereotypical thinking/
prejudices, cognitive routines and biases, and habits.
The interconnection between conscious and non-conscious processes and
their contribution to actions seems to be one of the central questions of
psychological research. Several researchers have been concerned with automatic
mental processes on the basis of physical preconditions and experimental
manipulation. Many experiments have varied treatments using control groups
and have shown systematic changes in outcomes, but we have limited access to
control over mental states such as emotional reactions. Freud’s often-quoted
sentence ‘Where id was, the ego shall be.’ (Freud, 1933, p. 86) not only emphasizes
the effort to strengthen the person’s creative potential to act with control, but
also demonstrates a contemporary problem. Although some psychological studies
provided interesting results and contributed to a deeper understanding of mental
functioning, we are still not able to induce them reliably and to use them in daily
life when we act. Because they define the limits of intentional control, they
deserve attention. When we make efforts to solve a problem and are not aware of
the best solution, our intentions are fixed on probed schemas as long as we do not
have insight into the structure of the problem or do not recognize the appropriate
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  91

strategies to solve the problem successfully. One hundred years ago, Gestalt
psychology became concerned about the goodness of a figure, simplicity, and
provided some evidence that there is such a thing as insight into a problem and a
state of less-efficient problem-solving efforts:

• Functional fixedness: Functional fixedness denotes the mental limit that the
intended purpose of an object hinders a person’s ability to see its other
potential uses. In the candle problem, a classic test of creative insight,
individuals are presented with three objects (a candle, a pack of matches, and
a box of tacks) on a table placed next to a cardboard wall (Duncker, 1945).
The task was to attach the candle to the wall so that the candle burns properly
and does not drip wax on the table or the floor. The correct solution involves
using the box as a candleholder. One should empty the box of tacks and then
tack it to the wall placing the candle inside.
• Mental set: Mental set (Öllinger et  al., 2008) denotes the unconscious
tendency to solve a problem in a particular way. In the water jar problem
(Luchins, 1942), individuals had to solve a problem by using three water jars.
The task was to figure out how to measure a certain amount of water using
these jars, each with the capacity to hold a different, fixed amount of water.
The majority of the subjects adopted a mechanized state of mind and relied
on mental sets formed through previous experience.

When routines become highly automated, the underlying information

processing becomes covert and contracted. In both cases, the attentional field is
focused on routinized processes. More effective problem solving requires a
mental shift: Cognitive schemas are replaced with new problem-solving skills.
When individuals pursue goals and try to overcome obstacles, their success
depends on cognitive shifts (e.g. the moment of insight, Öllinger et al., 2008),
which in turn, however, are not under intentional control.

Congruity and dissonance

As explained above, attitudes, stereotypes, and values contribute to intentions
and actions throughout life. Although individuals, in principle, can draw
attention to their prejudices and sometimes change their opinions, attitudes and
values are based on automatic information processing to a large degree. In the
following, I use the principles of consistency and congruence (e.g. Festinger,
1957; Gawronski & Strack, 2012; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955) to show that
changes in attitudes are based on classification rules (e.g. similarity judgements)
and that comparisons between attitude objects (e.g. preferred coping strategies)
are based on similarity perceptions (Dohmen et al., 1989; Sjöberg & Thorslund,
1979). I devote attention to consistence theories because they elaborate mental
phenomena that contribute to our understanding of how we pursue goals and
cope with discrepancies (e.g. stress, critical life events).
92  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

How are evaluations and similarity perceptions interconnected when

individuals intentionally pursue goals? As a rule, individuals have unfavourable,
neutral, or favourable attitudes towards objects (e.g. assertions, prejudices,
preferences). Simple assertions regarding attitude objects are, for example, ‘Asian
painting is good’, ‘I don’t like alcohol or cigarettes’, ‘I don’t mind horoscopes’.
Given the heterogeneous views individuals have towards attitude objects, it is not
important for the next step whether the specific content is appropriate or
desirable. Rather, I would like to highlight here the dynamics of expressed
objections, the incongruity that we feel when, for example, self-defining attitudes
are insulted. Research on cognitive consistence has a long tradition in psychology.
I focus on a few aspects that contribute to the understanding of how regulation
of aspiration levels works.
According to Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, affective states
are strongly tied to cognitive representations. Inconsistent cognitions (e.g.
somebody contradicts important subjective beliefs) produce aversive feelings of
dissonance. Cognitive consistency is a fundamental principle of information
processing linked to our motivation to change cognitions and behaviour.
Festinger (1957, p. 7) stated illustratively: ‘If a person were standing in the rain
and yet could see no evidence of getting wet, these two cognitions would be
dissonant with one another because the person knows from experience that
getting wet follows from being out in the rain.’ What would you say after that?
This example is possibly convincing because the experience of getting wet in
rain is so common or well-accepted that we feel that everybody would approve.
According to cognitive dissonance theory, tension arises when one is
simultaneously aware of two inconsistent cognitions: we feel pressure for change.
Dissonance theory pertains mostly to discrepancies between attitudes and
behaviour.
Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) investigated basic assumptions about human
thinking. The principle of congruity denotes a thinking tendency according to
which changes in evaluation are in the direction of increased congruity with the
existing frame of reference. As the authors explain, it is possible to have logically
incompatible attitudes towards objects without any stress, as long as the
incompatibles are not brought into association. The issue of congruity arises
whenever individuals receive a message which relates objects via an assertion. To
the extent that the evaluative location of a particular qualifier differs from that of
the thing qualified, some pressure towards congruity exists. The nature of an
assertion and the existing attitude towards an object prior to reception of the
message should be taken into account. In a ‘simplest of states in which human
thinking operates, sources we like should always sponsor ideas we like and
denounce ideas we are against, and vice versa’ (p. 44).
A prerequisite for (mis)trust, persuasion, and social interaction is that cognitive
objects can be brought into association with one another, and that the cognitive
arguments and the source can be derogated (Tannenbaum et  al., 1966). In
everyday life, we do not usually notice the degree to which we act on the basis
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  93

of similarity judgements and tend to first recognize discrepancies when they are
expressed in pointed or polarized form. Extreme judgements are simpler to
identify than finely discriminated judgements of degree (see polarization and
pressure towards all-or-nothing judgements along the evaluative dimension;
Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). Simplicity and polarity are components of
attitude formation that can be better observed in evaluations of others than in
evaluations of ourselves. According to the authors, judgemental frames of
reference tend towards simplicity, and less polarized attitudes change more than
more polarized attitudes.

Preference and similarity judgements

What do we do when we entertain opinions and are convinced of our attitudes?
We compare and classify attributes which are associated with our attitudes within
a frame of reference. Perception and, as we will argue, preferences and intentions
are interconnected with similarity judgements (Estes et al., 2012; Simmons &
Estes, 2008; Tversky, 1977). At a closer look, it is astonishing how often we
compare and evaluate ordinary things using categories of similarity or difference.
We classify figures, cars, countries, friends, musical pieces, etc. according to
categories of similarity and evaluate them (see the Gestalt principle of proximity,
but also elections, or situations such as ‘likes’ on Facebook that ask for or provoke
our approval). In the following, I attempt to illustrate these tendencies as well as,
hopefully, some of the underlying mechanisms.
The component theory of attitude objects (Dohmen et al., 1989; Feger, 1979)
attempts to account for global preferences for attitude objects and describes how
individuals relate attitude objects (e.g. preferences for political parties, professional
orientations, eating habits) to their components (associated properties, qualities,
categories evaluated by the individual). In accordance with the consistency
principle, the component theory assumes that global preferences for attitude
objects can be predicted by their components, which in turn can be attributed to
global attitude objects to a greater or lesser degree and evaluated more or less
positively by the individual.
Does the principle of consistency hold true for individuals’ preferences? In the
following study, I was interested in whether global preferences for attitude objects
can be predicted by the evaluated components attributed to them. A total of 280
individuals were asked about their attitudes in one specific domain (e.g. musical
genres, life themes, eating habits, vocational preferences). Specifically, I examined

1. Global preferences for attitude objects (in the case of musical preferences): ‘How
much do you like classical music, jazz, rock music, …)?
2. Components: I presented a number of components (e.g. rhythm, improvisation,
creativity, good performance, distraction, formal structure, etc…).
Participants were asked to what degree they liked each of the components
and to what degree they believed that the components were characteristic of
94  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

jazz music, classical music, etc. … The hypothesis assumes a correspondence

(similarity) between the global preferences towards the objects and a measure
derived from the components. This implies that individuals regard those
components which they evaluate very positively as being very characteristic
of the ideal objects. Those components which are evaluated very negatively
are not seen as characteristic of the ideal objects. I computed derived similarity
measures of the degree to which individuals like the components and attribute
them to a specific musical genre (strength of attribution). To prove the
assumption, the correlation between general preferences for attitude objects
and attributions of components to the ideal object were computed. The first
part of Figure 4.1 depicts the values from two subjects to illustrate the
correlation between component structure and global evaluation. Subject A’s
global evaluation of musical genres can be predicted by the component
structure. The preferences for those components attributed to rock and pop
music are strong, whereas the components attributed to jazz and classical
music are less preferred. In contrast to subject A, subject B’s global preferences
for musical genres cannot be predicted by the component structure (see
Figure 4.1a). Figure 4.1b displays the correlation between the valued
component structure and global preferences for attitude objects for 280
subjects, each of whom had been presented with one of five attitude domains.
The average correlation across subjects and attitude domains was r = 0.41***.

FIGURE 4.1  Global preferences of attitude objects as a function of component

structure. Each line represents one individual. Strength of attribution: Preference for
components attributed to ideal attitude objects.
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  95

  A second assumption of the component model is that the attribution of the

same components influences the global similarity judgements. The theory
assumes a strong relationship. As expected, on average, the similarity profile
significantly predicted the global judgements of similarity (r = 0.45***; see
Figure 4.1c).

As would be expected from the component model, there is a strong relationship

between the strength of attribution and evaluation. Dohmen et  al. (1989)
provided evidence that a change in the judged similarity of objects was
accompanied by a change in the component-derived structure. Although
individuals differ in what they value, similarity comparisons and valences
interact. Attitude change is associated with both, judged similarities and
component structure. The component model draws attention to the cognitive-
perceptual structure of attitude regulation and demonstrates how discrepancies
and valences are regulated, that is, that we make comparisons and change the
attribution and valence of the associated components. As Dohmen and colleagues
argue, some components contain an explicitly more or less intentional orientation.
Since adults face many age-related losses which can threaten their goals and
render them unattainable, processes of reorientation become important, but
these presuppose that valences can be redirected towards alternatives. These
accommodative shifts are sometimes not easy to achieve or execute, but would
be useful in situations where we cannot attain what we want and need to change
priorities (elective and loss-based selection; Freund & Baltes, 2002).
The component model illustrates the processes involved in dynamic shifts and
difficulties that arise when we try to change goals and life projects intentionally.
Normally there are many facets that we can acknowledge and that contribute to
a goal or life project. Given that our attention is directed towards a diversity of
components, the principle of congruity or the need for consistency becomes
visible. Similar results have been used as an empirical basis to illustrate
immunization tendencies of the self (Greve & Wentura, 2003). Individuals are able
to protect their self-concept when faced with failure or loss. They can reduce
self-esteem problems and identity threats and adapt action strategies to
accommodate on the level of self-evaluation and self-representation:

• On the level of self-evaluation by adjusting the valence of components

associated with self-defining attitudes. One can change the preference for a
political party or the value of components (e.g. downgrade the importance
of parts of a manifesto that is opposed to one’s opinion).
• On the level of self-representation by changing the semantic structure of
attitudes. This can be done by attributing new components or by denying
their critical relevance for specific attitude objects.

The present results are in line with studies showing that when information
does not fit, individuals tend to select options which are consistent with their
96  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

established beliefs. Despite the assumption of immunizing self-concept protection

(Brandtstädter & Greve, 1994; Greve & Wentura, 2003), associated components
might contribute to our understanding of how intentions develop. For instance,
global preferences consisting of many attributed components probably remain
stable if one component is negatively valued, compared with less complex
attitudes. The multidimensionality of the component structure of attitude objects
brings us to the issue of perception differentiation. Using research on human
perception I will illustrate how similarity comparisons are influenced by
situational factors.

Perception and context effects

During the last 50 years, several studies in experimental psychology have
demonstrated that decisions, comparisons between components (aspects of
attitude objects), or similarity judgements are dependent on situational changes
and context effects (de-Wit & Wagemans, 2015; Estes et al., 2012). In my view,
these studies help to understand some of the principles of intentional processes in
that choices and decision behaviour also depend on changes in context. I focus in
the following on processes of perception, with the possibility in mind that we
possibly can use them to learn about ISD and to differentiate between schemas of
perception.
Harry Helson investigated processes of adaptation to visual stimuli and
provided evidence on how context affects influence judgements (Helson, 1971).
According to the adaptation-level theory, subjective judgements are necessarily
relative to the prevailing norm or adaptation level. Exposure to earlier stimuli
serves as a frame of reference by which later stimuli are judged. Helson described
a study in which participants were asked to estimate the number of dots. Prior
to estimating the dots, participants were shown an anchor of four dots, an
anchor of 13 dots, or an anchor of 32 dots. The estimates of the target dots were
influenced by the number in the anchor. A small anchor resulted in an increase
in the number of dots perceived, whereas the large anchor resulted in a decrease.
Adaptation-level theory has been applied to phenomena of motivation, affect,
and well-being regulation. There is also some research on adaptation to stress
that emphasized that there is a large variation in satisfaction. For instance,
studies on the impact of critical life events provided evidence that critical events
do not affect the level of well-being for more than a few weeks or months
(Luhmann et  al., 2012). A widely known study by Brickman et  al. (1978)
demonstrated that the average well-being of recent lottery winners was
comparable to the well-being level of a control group. Phenomena such as these
can be explained by the ability to adjust personal standards such as norms and
evaluation criteria.
Sjöberg and Thorslund (1979) have applied the idea of context adjustments to
the cognitive dynamics of similarity judgements. If we compare nationalities
(each nationality defines one class), the set of all nationalities defines the universe.
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  97

For example, similarity judgements of two nationalities are influenced by the

following principles:

1. The larger the universe (the number of classes, e.g. nationalities) is, the larger
is the judged similarity of two individuals from different nationalities.
2. The second principle holds that similarity judgements depend on the number
of objects or components contained in the class (defined by two comparison
stimuli): The larger the common class (e.g. the class of Northern Europeans),
the smaller the similarity is (see Sjöberg and Thorslund, 1979 for further
explanation). The common class is defined as the class of objects formed to
contain both of the two objects to be judged in terms of similarity (e.g.
similar languages, culture, etc.).

Suppose your task is to judge the similarity between two Chinese people in
two different places. According to Sjöberg and Thorslund, on a street in Peking,
a smaller similarity rating would be expected than on a street in Sweden. The
authors provided evidence for their assumptions by manipulating context factors.
The estimated similarity in homogeneous pairs (i.e. pairs of string instruments,
e.g. banjo, violin, harp, electric guitar) was increased when a heterogeneous
stimulus (clarinet) was introduced into the comparison list and decreased when a
homogeneous stimulus (double bass) was added. Thus, if we are able to broaden
or limit the associative context, then the similarity judgements (a basic mechanism
of attitudes and related intentions) should change as a consequence.
From a short-term perspective on intentional development, it seems useful to
highlight the role of perception, because we believe that these processes are
relevant in concrete decision situations. Indeed, there is evidence that intention
and perception of objects in the surrounding are basically interconnected (see
concepts such as salience, valence, or importance). Wendell Garner’s studies (e.g.
Garner, 1966, 1978) are not only important for perception of visual stimuli, but
also provide useful guidelines for research on motivation and goal-related
behaviour. In his article ‘To perceive is to know’, Garner (1966) describes visual
and auditory perception of patterns as a cognitive process involving
comprehending, organizing, and knowing – as ‘an active process in which the
perceiver participates fully’ (p. 11). His study showed that individuals differ in
preferences for stimuli attributes at a basic level of perception (i.e. liking the
simplest patterns; stimuli were cards on which two dots had been placed).
How well we discriminate between stimuli attributes is related to the interface
between interests and ability, and thus remains a challenging question (Meumann,
1908). Of course, we can learn to discriminate to a certain degree, but it is not
necessarily exactness that determines this degree: Categories can be more or less
unambiguous and can pertain to problems such as whether or not the cathedral
of Milano actually consists of gothic elements from the north. Nonetheless, we
can learn to differentiate between elements of gothic style and others. Given such
an interest, perception is closely related to intentional striving and to sensory
98  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

processes. Perceivers, however, do not only intentionally select the structure (e.g.
values, specific goals, desired states) to which they will attend or react. The
important point is that goals are products of automatic processes of classification
as well, and it seems that we can learn about goals if we learn more about the
processes of similarity perception.
Interindividual differences in processing contextual information have been
found in perceptual styles (Milne & Szczerbinski, 2009). The tendency to group
figures was identified as a basic law of perception by Gestalt psychology. Studies
demonstrated that individuals have schemata which they use to organize their
surroundings. Some of them tend to be highly influenced by the context of the
visual scene, whereas others are more able to perceive elements independently
from context (e.g. field dependence; Witkin & Goodenough, 1977). Such
tendencies are not limited to visual patterns or stimuli. People differ in their
tendencies to process self-relevant information autonomously or as related to
other people. Independent self-definitions involve the tendency to process
stimuli unaffected by the context, whereas interdependent self-definitions imply
attention to the given context (Hannover & Kühnen, 2003).
What can we learn from this section about ISD? I have focused on the interplay
between processes of classification and perception because I want to show their
role as a prerequisite when individuals act, interpret, and give meaning to their
lives. Although people can draw attention to attitudes and goals, the difficulty for
intentional self-regulation is that processes of categorizing and similarity
comparisons are basic and, in part, automatic processes with limited potential for
control. Nonetheless, they are interconnected with preferences and, in this
function, relevant for the development of intentions because they contribute to
the regulation of valence. This touches upon our challenge to understand the
rules with which individuals perceive and order aspects of their surroundings and
how they categorize and build dimensions and regulate standards or achievement
norms. Since individuals are not simply machines that all respond to stimuli in
the same way, but instead react to stimuli on the basis of prior experiences, we
turn to the mediating role of memory. Processes of learning and memory are
important for the understanding of attitudes, preferences, and personally
important goals.

Lifelong learning and memory

We are far from having a satisfactory answer to why and how the importance of
specific (developmental) goals becomes significant. People are in principle able to
redefine what they have previously considered to be boring or distracting into
being means or goals that are valued. On the other hand, they can be motivated
to learn and improve their skills through goals (e.g. to cope with a chronic
disease). Learning in adulthood has many faces and there are many reasons for
doing so. It is not per chance that the term lifelong learning is used to contrast with
learning at school, which can be associated with negative emotions and seen as a
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  99

burden. Similar constructs such as self-regulated or self-determined learning

(Panadero, 2017) focus on self-efficacy or metacognitive competences (volition,
strategies, setting a goal) and demonstrate a similarity with self-efficiency:
Motivation and willingness are taken for granted or serve as the aim of
interventions. Lifelong learning in this sense pertains to the capacity of adults to
learn despite age-related limitations, and education serves as a developmental
goal per se. When learning is reduced to the school requirements, its importance
is overlooked and consequences that contribute to quality of life are ignored.
With this in mind, we address the issue of the by-products learning could have,
and which in turn could shape the development of will or preferences, without
directly being wished by ourselves or dictated by others.

Learning and differentiation

We concentrate on some cognitive-motivational aspects that are of relevance for
the development of intentions. From the perspective of classical and operant
conditioning, learners are conceptualized as passive organisms that respond with
specific behaviours through the process of association. Both forms of conditioning
involve behaviours controlled by environmental stimuli. The strength of a
behaviour is modified when an aversive or positively valued stimulus is paired with
a previously neutral stimulus, or with reinforcement or punishment when the
specific behaviour occurred. One should not underestimate the creative power of
these rather mechanical processes for the development of specific life goals, given
that useful social contacts or contexts are preferred as a consequence of previous
learning history (see also negative reinforcement and avoidance learning).
The mere-exposure effect denotes the tendency for individuals to develop
preferences for objects with which they have repeated experience (Zajonc &
Markus, 1982). Contrary to the proverb about familiarity breeding contempt,
there is evidence that familiarity breeds fondness. A frequently cited study by
Robert Zajonc (1968) has shown, for example, that the more times American
students had seen unknown Turkish words or Chinese-like characters, the more
likely they were to say it meant something good. Telling the story such that the
mere exposure is capable of making the attitudes towards objects more positive
would be too simple. Although the experimental literature has shown that a
repeatedly presented stimulus pattern becomes increasingly familiar and that
ratings indicative of hedonic tone might steadily rise, we should consider the
mediating role of other factors involved. Cicero described the phenomenon of
satiation. In de oratore, he noted that it is difficult to explain for what reasons those
objects which most strongly strike our senses with pleasure, or occasion the most
violent emotions at their first appearance, we soonest turn away with a certain
loathing and satiety (Cicero, 1977, p. 78). Novelty and complexity have been
used to link arousal and affect with personal preferences (Berlyne, 1974).
Depending on prior experience or level of differentiation, everyday tasks that
are highly satisfying for some people might be evaluated as being too simple or
100  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

complex by others. Differences in learning motives or investment among adults

depend on education, openness to experience, professional or personal
requirements, and expectations about the potential profit. Critical life events
such as an unintentional unemployment or living with a chronic disease can
make further education in a specific domain necessary.
As to ISD, two general functions of learning can be distinguished. One is to
improve and mobilize action resources. These in turn can be used to reach
higher-order goals. We can learn a new language in order to spend our retirement
in a country we like. Having paramount interests makes it easier to recover from
setbacks such as demotivating early language barriers.
The second function pertains to personality development in a broader sense.
Education in this regard broadens and differentiates the self. The ability to
integrate the inevitable into the self or to value facets of life can be construed as
process of differentiation. Leisure time and personal projects are executed and
become mixed with the acquisition of expertise, sometimes without intentional
effort (implicit learning). An active and engaged lifestyle (time spent engaged in
attending cultural events, visiting people, work) can alleviate cognitive decline
in old age (Lövdén et al., 2005). The cultural market can meet diverse interests,
but sometimes presupposes interest and a degree of expertise. For instance,
listening to classical music might be experienced as being too demanding (‘They
started to play flutes and violins! That was beyond me. I changed the channel.’).
Emotions can be evoked by different stimuli for different people, but they can
also be cultivated. We like to refer to the emotional experience when we evaluate
our cultural favourites: ‘verse is made by being touched emotionally, and not by
counted sounds’ (von Haller, The Alps); however, one cannot expect cultural
artefacts to meet everyone’s needs.
According to the model proposed by Leder and colleagues, complex
preferences such as aesthetical judgements consist of a series of processes involving
an interaction between previous experience and cognitive-evaluative processes.
These include automatic processes such as perception (perception and implicit
classification of a stimulus), as well as a more explicit categorization (explicit
categorization and cognitive mastering) and evaluation (Leder et al., 2004). One
difficulty is that people’s preferences and aesthetic responses differ so greatly, and
that experience factors are interconnected with personal and social preconditions.
It seems to me that one of the tasks in the lifelong learning of intentions/goals
is to find the balance between two poles: how can we best make an effort to win
the garland or how we can we find a significance in the less-is-more attitude?
The process of learning involves several motives, in short: the intentional striving
for the improvement of competencies and the differentiation of taste. Both
contribute to the development of the self.
The well-known experience of setbacks makes it plausible that some authors
stress the trial-and-error principle as a central factor of knowledge acquisition.
Meumann (1908) states that the success (exactness) of human perception
presupposes that we have a clear intention about a specific goal which we wish to
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  101

pursue. But we should be ready to correct preconceived intentions or expectations

through that what we actually do find, in order to expand knowledge (see
Meumann, 1908, p. 80). The late Sir Karl Popper (e.g. 1972) has stressed many
times the close links between the activities of the mind and the methods of
science. We cannot simply ‘transcribe’ what we see, we have to resort to methods
of trial and error. Science is based on conjectures that are open to falsification.
Popper reminds us that individuals’ claims are not based on secure knowledge,
but on hypotheses. The process of schema and correction can be used not only
for the knowledge domain, but is also applicable to concepts of intentional goal
pursuit and goal adjustment.

Autobiographical memory
The interplay between the acquisition of new information and prior beliefs
presupposes sequential processes in which prior structures both affect the acquisition
of information and are affected by it. Research on human memory, especially on
autobiographic memories or similar concepts such as reminiscence or life review
(Staudinger, 2001), has elaborated the function of past experience for intentional
states and goals. Traditionally, remembering is conceived of as a dynamic process.
As Frederic Bartlett (1932) already noted, remembering is ‘a reconstruction, or
construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole active mass
of organised past reactions or experience, …’ (p. 213). He used the term schema to
denote ‘an active organisation of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must
always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted response’. More recently,
several studies have elaborated details of the interaction between autobiographical
memory and intentional states and provided evidence of a self-regulating function
of previous experiences (e.g. Conway & Williams, 2008; Fivush, 2011; Vranić
et al., 2018; Waters et al., 2014). Autobiographical memory denotes memory for
past events of our life or personally relevant past events. It serves directive, social,
and self-related functions in our everyday lives (Bluck & Alea, 2002).
The directive function pertains to the role of autobiographical memory in
guiding future behaviour and solving current problems. Knowledge of the self in
the past can be used to prepare for an upcoming engagement or to avoid making
a mistake.
Social functions include the regulation of social bonding and conversation.
Autobiographical memories within narratives can help to define oneself in
relation to others. Sharing experiences can foster social relationships and create
intimacy.
The third category includes the constructive role of memories in personality
development. They are linked to the self-concept and contribute to feelings such
as continuity, identity, and self-worth. The personal history defines who one is
across contexts and times.
These three broad functions have different labels, but they do not necessarily
represent different categories in everyday life. From an action-theoretical
102  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

perspective, it is important to note that all three functions are interconnected

with intentions and goal pursuit. Within the SMS (self-memory system) model,
Conway and Williams (2008) focus on the interaction between fluid aspects of
the self, for example currently active goals, with more permanent representations
of the self. It is assumed that the working self regulates the construction by
controlling the cues that are used to activate self-knowledge. On the other hand,
the self consists of knowledge structures and anticipated states that are interlinked
with episodic memories and autobiographical knowledge.
Several studies document the adaptive role of autobiographical memories.
Important characteristics are that they can be recalled vividly and with perceptual
detail. Some of them pertain to single, some to recurring, events. Some of them
are associated with strong emotional experience including arousal and personal
importance. As I have already discussed, evaluative or emotional qualities are
assumed to be important factors in intentional self-regulation. For instance,
individuals select to recall particular memories to achieve emotion regulation. As
Holland and Kensinger (2010) argued, the emotional content of an experience
can influence the way in which events are remembered, and emotional goals
experienced at the time of autobiographical retrieval can lead to biases in how
well we recall emotional details. Memories are often organized into coherent
stories. Sometimes retellings are not identical and differ depending on goals and
motivation. Research on narratives has shown that events that persons have
experienced multiple times in their lifetime are associated with the social
functions, whereas single events serve more of a self and directive function
(Waters et  al., 2014). Rathbone et  al. (2015) demonstrated that the valence of
semantic self-images (i.e. autobiographical knowledge about the self, traits,
family roles) was highly correlated with well-being. Lewin reminds us of a well-
known intentional phenomenon that puts the interconnected time perspectives
in a nutshell: ‘If a purpose or intention responds dynamically to a tense system, it
is to be expected that Zeigarnik finds that memory for uncompleted activities is
much better.’ (Lewin, 1935, p. 243).
Empirical results have found age differences depending on the degree of
differentiation in the measurements. Webster (2002) differentiated between eight
forms or functions of reminiscence: There were significant age differences on
most of the single function scales. For instance, young adults tend to use
autobiographical memory more for boredom reduction, clarifying who they are,
and problem solving (or directing future behaviour; see also Vranić et al., 2018).
Older adults scored higher on factors of death preparation and teaching/informing.
When using the total score, no age differences were found. This results contradict
the stereotype that reminiscence is mainly a matter of old age. In terms of
cognitive-emotional qualities, young adults expressed more positive affect, more
cognitive characteristics (as to underlying causation or tentativeness), but less
sensory imagery in their narratives than older adults did (Bluck & Alea, 2009).
Life themes and life stories of individuals are based on memories and contain
factual and evaluative knowledge. They contribute to the development of
 Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD  103

expectations about and subjective evaluations of age-related changes as well as

changes in control beliefs. The ability to link the past self to the present self has
often been acknowledged as a prerequisite of conducting one’s life successfully
(Conway & Williams, 2008; Fivush, 2011). Critical-evaluative processes in life
reflection include both life review and life planning (Staudinger, 2001). Without
experience, there would be little in the way of expertise in dealing with difficult
life problems, personality, individuality, and culture (Staudinger & Glück, 2011).
Concepts of ideal developmental states, such as wisdom, mature thought, or
identity, suggest that humans can apply an ample perspective when they attempt
to solve current life tasks by using currently available experience they have
learned through social interactions or, broadly defined, from ancestors and the
history of human culture. Old Greek drawings differ from physical reality, but
serve as a basis for our cultural-historical understanding through the ages. They
provide views of animals’ heads, everyday objects, or action scenes and result in
visual impressions that remain fixed in our minds – a memory-picture (Loewy,
1907). From Homer’s Iliad, we know something about Nestors (i.e. experienced
oldest members of a group of Greek kings) who contributed to the preservation
of knowledge and were valued as political advisors (Greve & Bjorklund, 2009).

The structure of the concept of action: The difficulties

I now return to some difficulties that are inherent in the concept of human
action. Although several psychological models stress the link between attitudes,
intentions, and behaviour, one cannot be sure whether this link denotes a causal
sequence of events (in contrast to a mere series of concepts). Thus, although it
does not seem possible to interpret between intervening actions and developmental
phenomena causally, actions can be explained by the actor’s argumentative
orientation base. Causal contingencies require that effects be verifiable
independent of the causes (Brandtstädter, 2006; Greve, 2001). It is obvious that
not every intention is executed, but if they are and individuals act according to
their intentions, there are still doubts that this relationship means that intentions
are the causes of a specific action. In other words, it is difficult to prove that
specific behaviour is the product of intentions and volitions (see also Chapter 1).
The logical-connection argument claims that intentions and actions are logically
related. Such developmental sequences do not represent empirical laws, but
rather structural implications (e.g. conceptual overlap of constructs, truth by
definition).
According to common definitions, behaviour is called ‘action’ if criteria are
fulfilled.
Brandtstädter (1984, 2006) stresses the double role of rules:

• Regulative rules: Action is regulated by formal and informal cultural

restrictions (e.g. by laws, norms, expectations). We do not use motor oil in
making a salad.
104  Cognitive-motivational processes of ISD

• Constitutive rules: Actions are constituted by rules. The significance of

constitutive rules for the analysis of ontogenetic consequences is particularly
evident in connection with questions of competence development (e.g.
social competence, moral judgement, coping competencies).

The concept of action is often brought into close relationship with the criteria
of intentions, rules, control, or choice. I have used these concepts and referred to
empirical studies, and I have accepted that empirical relations and conceptual
similarities are confounded.
Greve (2001) suggested that the logical-connection argument can be
circumvented if the existing findings are reinterpreted as a part of a psychology
of intention. By doing so, we can avoid some problems, but we have to try to rule
out structural implications and conceptual overlap of intentions too. Nonetheless,
even if not in a causal sense, the ISD approach assumes that we can substantially
contribute to our development through intentions. Given these constraints,
developmental sequences involve an ‘actional’ nexus that cannot be nomologically
universalized.

Summary
I have shown mental processes (e.g. attributions, preferences, and decisions) that
are involved when individuals execute intentions. Using a short-term perspective,
I discussed intentionally controllable processes and automatic, unconscious
processes that are interconnected with human action. On the whole, sequences
of short-term segments constitute the course of how individuals develop.
Development across the life span is mediated by causal constraints, as well as
intentional orientations. Actions are conceptualized as interpretative constructs.
They are not causally determined by expectations, values, or control beliefs, but
consist of them conceptually.
Action is mediated by belief-value interactions. In the process of ISD,
knowledge and abilities are utilized to attain goals. Plans are formed and carried
out. People often cannot account for the causes of their behaviour, but this does
not mean that their reasons are without validity. We use automatic processes that
depend on previous experiences (personal preference and value structure) as well
as processes of perception.
5
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT
AND RESILIENCE

Chapter 5 moves from cognitive-motivational processes of adaptation to the

difficult and differently answered question of what positive ageing means. The
desire for a successful life is a general one, and concrete ideas regarding how this
should be achieved vary across individuals. There is no cut-and-dried answer to
this problem. Several subjective criteria offer standards for positive developmental
outcomes, whereas other views of life success focus on developmental tasks or
objective criteria (e.g. physical and cognitive functioning). Positive development
denotes a value judgement that I introduce with reference to resilience, that is, in
the context of loss and adversity. Many things gain value because they are not
secure or because we can lose them when we grow older. Chapter 5 introduces
the resilience concept and shows that adaptive processes can result in manifold
ways of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being (Klinger, 2012). Against this
background of multiple facets of positive ageing or successful development, the
concepts of decline and growth must be clarified to understand what positive
ageing and mental health in adulthood means.

Positive development in the face of adversity: The process

of resilience
Resilience denotes the idea that individuals can avoid negative consequences
despite significant risk factors. An intriguing question is how some people apply
their resources (and which ones) compared with others who do not. The concept
of resilience was frequently used in child development (as a counterpoint to
psychopathological development in the face of threatening factors, such as
poverty or abuse) before its application was extended across the lifespan
(Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1995). Currently, the concept is used in quite
different ways, denoting, for instance, a positive outcome, protective stabilizing
106  Positive development and resilience

processes, or positively valued traits such as optimism or hardiness. Some

approaches link resilience to coping, social interaction, and affective processing
(Greve et al., 2018; Leipold, Munz, & Michéle-Malkowsky, 2019) or to physical
and neuroendocrine functioning, just to name a few. The remaining questions
are whether there is a general resilience mechanism that coordinates positive
functioning in different domains (Kalisch, Müller, & Tüscher, 2015) or, if no
such single orchestrating process is assumed, how exactly do neuronal processes
interact with emotional processing in a social context? These questions are still a
focus of contemporary research on resilience (Masten, 2014).

Resilience from a developmental perspective

The inflationary use of the term resilience has not led to conceptual clarity but
rather illustrates the need for a term that describes the complex process of positive
adaptation in the face of adversity. In the following section, I concentrate on the
developmental perspective of resilience. I refer to an approach in which it has been
argued that it is useful to define resilience as a relational construct rather than a
personality characteristic, that is, a constellation of risk factors, on the one hand,
and available protective factors, on the other (Greve & Staudinger 2006; Staudinger
& Greve, 2017). Physical or social resources (e.g. physical fitness, money, social
support) and mental resources (e.g. coping and self-regulation processes) contribute
to the maintenance or recovery of developmental outcomes such as well-being,
life satisfaction, or a given level of performance. This model of resilience
emphasizes the ongoing process of adaptation and development (see Figure 5.1).

FIGURE 5.1  Resilience as a constellation of adaptive processes and nonpsychological

resources across the lifespan.
 Positive development and resilience  107

Werner Greve and I used Karl Popper’s famous formulation ‘all life is problem
solving’ (the title of a collection of essays and one of his latest speeches; Popper,
1999) to illustrate the interdependent relationship between coping (problem
solving) and development (Leipold & Greve, 2009). On the one hand,
development consists of many problems that have or had to be solved. On the
other hand, the quality (e.g. how successfully) with which one solves a problem
will shape further problem solving and the individual’s further development.
Thus, all life is problem solving, which in turn makes development possible. We
call it resilience when people who are subjected to adversity do not develop
lasting (mental) health problems. Recovery from loss can take weeks or months,
and setbacks are absolutely possible. This means that certain characteristics
(instrumental coping, optimism) cannot once and for all be considered positive
or protective resources. A developmental perspective takes the dynamic interplay
of experiencing gains and losses across the lifespan into consideration.
One difficulty of the resilience concept is that it is defined by success, that is,
being successful in the face of difficulties. This juxtaposition is fascinating; who
doesn’t like to be resilient? The literature adds to this confusion by applying the
term resilience to two different aspects. One is the result that needs to be
explained (resilience as a positive outcome); the other refers to the shaping
processes (causes). If one uses resilience as a concept with explanatory power, as
is often the case in the confusing research, one risks a tautological argument
(‘Why did some people overcome adverse situations? Because of their resiliency.’).
Recently, Kalisch, Müller, and Tüscher (2015) made an effort to explain how
several factors (external factors, e.g. socioeconomic status, social support;
personal factors, e.g. coping styles, optimism; biological factors, e.g. brain
functioning, hormonal factors) contribute to resilience. The authors called their
theory ‘positive appraisal style theory’. One of their central assumptions was that
the way an individual interprets, appraises, and analyzes potential threatening
stimuli mediates positive outcomes. The authors consider a positive appraisal style
(p. 9) to be the key mechanism that protects against the negative effects of stress.
This focus has led to misunderstandings and questions, for instance, regarding
whether or not positive (re)appraisal is always good. Kalisch and colleagues
explain in their response to critical comments that they acknowledge the adaptive
nature of stress responses and discuss the protective function of unrealistic
appraisals. In their application of the term ‘positive’ to the regulating mechanisms,
the positive connotation implies success and suggests to a certain degree that the
fact that regulating processes can also lead to negative consequences can be
ignored. The comments on Kalisch et al.’s (2015) theory and the authors’ response
to critics are valuable because they demonstrate central difficulties that the
concept of resilience still has.
I do not like to give the impression that coping resources that are sometimes
designated as ‘positive’ coping strategies (e.g. positive appraisals, self-efficacy,
internal control, social relationships) are not protective. Several studies show
that they are. However, the picture is more complex: Too much self-efficacy
108  Positive development and resilience

can lead to an overestimation of one’s strengths and result in self-damaging

actions. Rather, I wish to make the point that people have to make an effort to
stabilize their situation and resources. Positive development is not a simple
consequence of protective factors one does or does not have. Life is neither a
constant nor a certainty, and resilience is a process that needs to be constantly
renewed.
From a developmental point of view, the role of age-related changes in
physical, neuronal, or cognitive domains should be considered. During adulthood
and especially in advanced age, several declines become evident (e.g. age-related
declines in organ capacity; in brain functioning, such as the number of neurons
and information-processing speed; and in several memory domains). The decline
in these domains, which begins at approximately age 30, is not easy to notice and
does not negatively influence everyday performance in the first half of life. A
basic characteristic of adult development is that human ageing is modifiable with
and without external intervention. Through expertise and the application of
regulation strategies (e.g. selection, optimization, and compensation; Baltes,
Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006; see Chapter 2), people are able to cope with
physical changes under normal conditions. Research on cognitive training has
shown that it is possible to regain earlier levels of intellectual functioning. For
instance, long-term intervention studies that investigated the effects of aerobic
training on cognitive performance in middle and old age found that cognitive
functioning improved across a wide range of tasks (e.g. Jonasson et al., 2017).
There is also work that examines how an active and social lifestyle may also help
to attenuate cognitive decline in perceptual speed (e.g. Lövdén, Ghisletta, &
Lindenberger, 2005). Thus, it seems that there is cognitive resilience that is based
on physical and cognitive reactivation.
Depending on their severity and number, such declines can serve as a source
of stress or can enhance the success of coping with other stressors or threats. The
ability to apply specific coping strategies that seem promising might depend on
physical or cognitive functioning. Although research on training interventions
has demonstrated that certain types of training make it possible to recover earlier
levels of performance in several domains of physical and cognitive functioning,
phenomena such as physical decline and dependency in old age (Baltes, 1996)
demonstrate the limits of such efforts. Thus, despite the positive findings in
physical and cognitive training studies, age-related decline in health domains
becomes a challenge for all adults in older age. It has been argued within the
conservation of resource theory (Hobfoll et al., 2017) that stress occurs when key
resources are threatened with loss, are lost, or when there is a failure to gain
central resources after significant effort. According to this theory, individuals
strive to retain, foster, and protect the things they value. There are studies that
show that growing old alone (i.e. in terms of calendric age) is strongly correlated
with the number of physical diseases or correctly solved memory tasks but not
(strongly) correlated with general well-being (Baltes & Mayer, 1999). The well-
replicated finding that indicators of well-being and mental health do not decrease
 Positive development and resilience  109

until very old age demonstrates, however, that older adults are obviously able to
cope with these adversities.

The role of intentions

With regard to adversity and stress, maintenance of one’s self-worth or subjective
control can be achieved by intentionally planned reactions and by automatic
processes of which the individual is not aware. Strategies of self-regulation
encompass efforts to receive support or to enhance the efficacy of action radius
through competence training. In advanced age, it becomes increasingly difficult
to compensate for deficits, and I have already introduced accommodative coping
forms (goal disengagement, re-engagement, re-evaluation, downward
comparison) that enable individuals to accept their situation (Brandtstädter,
2016; see also Heckhausen et al., 2010). However, what do the different functions
of assimilative and accommodative coping (i.e. maintaining action competencies
and stabilizing subjective well-being) mean in terms of positive development or
successful ageing? Many people who are faced with (e.g. age-related) adversities
are confronted with the following questions: How can we live in accordance
with our usual standards, or what can we do to avoid negative consequences? A
general answer that is appropriate for every single case is not possible. According
to the dual-process model (e.g. Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002), intentional
efforts are dysfunctional and should be accommodated flexibly when action
resources are no longer available. Individuals are often quite different in what
they value as success or failure and what they see or choose as an appropriate
option for reaching their goals (Klinger & Cox, 2011). Whether people evaluate
a concrete situation, for instance, a consequence of their effort, as success or
failure, depends on their momentary causal attributions (e.g. whether they feel
responsible) and predominant evaluation criteria. Human development and the
process of growing older has been described in terms of gains and losses or
growth and decline (Brandtstädter, 2006; Heckhausen et  al., 1989). I give
attention to this pair of opposites because it seems important for a more
comprehensive understanding of what positive development means.

Evaluation criteria for development: Equilibrium and

structural characteristics
The study of development from a lifespan perspective has been linked with the
assumption that development comprises gains and losses at any time during the
life course. Similar to the problem of effective coping or problem solving, I will
consider the question of what it means to speak about growth in the context of
positive development. Before I come to the criteria of positive development, we
first must address the difficult problem of briefly describing the components that
characterize processes of human development. I can only focus on a few of these
components. Several theories of psychological development refer to concepts
110  Positive development and resilience

such as discrepancy or balance (Brandtstädter, 2006; Labouvie-Vief, Grühn, &

Studer, 2010; Piaget, 1977; Sternberg, 1998), gains and losses, or growth and
decline (Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 2006; Staudinger et  al., 1995). I
refer to these concepts because they characterize how development functions
across the lifespan. They can also be applied as a possible basis for evaluating how
healthy individuals are developed at any given time.

Equilibrium and disequilibrium

Based on Piaget’s (1977) developmental theory, Labouvie-Vief et al. (2010) used
the term equilibrium zone to describe the range of the system under which an
organism is able to function with sufficient efficacy and integrity. Increasing
discrepancies from the ideal lead to increasing degradation of functioning. To
illustrate the dynamic laws of equilibrium and homeostasis, the authors used the
example of body temperature, with a normal degree as a reference point:
dangerous high or low temperature levels (i.e. strong disequilibrium) threaten
the capacity for integrated or well-structured functioning of an organism.
Regarding the scope of Labouvie-Vief ’s model (i.e. the development of
cognitive-emotional processing across the lifespan), deviation and tension (e.g.
through changes in the complexity of one’s demands or novelty) can change
some of the parameters of the equilibrium system. The cognitive-emotional
system may show growth (in the sense that the ageing individual develops
adaptive or mature coping strategies or wisdom; Labouvie-Vief & Diehl, 1999;
Loevinger, 1976). How it develops and integrates several demands and tensions
across the lifespan is a key aspect of the considerations of the theory. The ideal
end state serves as a reference point. The current state of a system being regulated
depends on the degree of deviation from the ideal end state. The functioning of
an organism is optimal at close to its end state but decreases as the discrepancy
deviates in either direction.
According to Labouvie-Vief (2015), human development can be regarded as
an equilibrium pathway (see also Piaget, 1977). The idealized form of
developmental equilibrium describes the possible state from which an individual
deviates more or less. The concrete life of individuals becomes the realized
content of developmental states. In phases of (not too high) tension, simple
structures are reorganized into complex representations. Integration at higher
levels of complexity implies changes in the organization and hierarchical
embedding of the components and processes elaborated at an earlier time of
development. Such internal adjustments are elaborated through processes of
differentiating existing knowledge through selective facilitation and inhibition.
States of development are characterized by a (particular) balance of reactivity and
proactivity. Reactivity means that ‘the individual acquires the structure of the
environment without him- or herself actively changing its structure. In this
process of primary reactive formation, many dimensions of the environment are
adopted automatically and form a secure base of reality from which further
 Positive development and resilience  111

secondary and proactive processes of differentiation start. Proactivity increases to

the degree that the individual acquires preformed structure, differentiates the self
from those preformed structures, and eventually transcends them in a further
step of free autonomous and self-constructive integration’ (Labouvie-Vief, 1984,
p. 179). The assumed high level of automatization implies that the threshold of
comfortable complexity has been raised and that new cycles of differentiation,
disequilibration, and reintegration can commence at yet higher levels. Such
cognitive reorganizations can result in complex representations of emotions in
the self and others, as well as moral understanding.
Despite the realm of cognitive-emotional integration, the terms equilibrium
and complexity can be applied to other domains. Csikszentmihalyi, for instance,
described the state of flow in which people are optimally engaged with what they
are doing (Moneta & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Flow states require a delicate
balance between the challenges of a task and the person’s skill at meeting these
challenges. Similar to the assumptions of Labouvie-Vief ’s theory, an activity
should not be too easy or too difficult. The degree of challenge should be slightly
above the person’s current skills. Flow states involve higher levels of engagement
than nonflow states but are not always accompanied by higher levels of positive
feelings.

Equilibrium and structural features of the self

Structural features of the self (e.g. self-complexity, Linville, 1987; goal-structure
features, Austin & Vancouver, 1996) concern the dimensions, properties (e.g.
importance, difficulty level), and organization (e.g. connectedness, complexity)
of goals. With regard to the intentional character of goals and given that individuals
can strive towards multiple goals, it is of interest how a rather static snapshot of
the self-concept or goal system (as structural self-concept features are) is related
to the dynamics of the system. A flexible goal structure of medium complexity
(e.g. not too few or too many goals; pursuing goals of medium difficulty level,
that is, goals that the individual has a realistic chance of achieving) and the ability
to adjust priorities, for instance, can be regarded as an equilibrating state between
the extreme poles of general loss of interest and overzealousness. Concepts of
goal setting, reorganization, reorientation, and palliative reinterpretation have
been used to describe the regulation of intentions and goals (Wrosch, Scheier, &
Miller, 2013). They can contribute to the success of adaptation, but they can lead
to disappointment, too (i.e. sometimes we valuate: ‘the tasks were too simple or
too complex’ or ‘what I have achieved is not important’).
Having multiple interests and goals that do not completely exceed one’s
competences can be experienced as variety and satisfaction, especially if we
suspect that some of our chosen life tasks have been solved through intentional
effort. There is empirical evidence regarding the structural features of the self
and the criteria for positive adaptations, but the results of many studies do not
show simple main effects; instead, they show a moderated or indirect relationship
112  Positive development and resilience

between challenges and the criteria for positive adaptation. Because goals are
interconnected to a certain degree and differ in several qualifying aspects (e.g.
importance and valence, concreteness, difficulty, time perspective), it is not easy
to measure their complexity. Indeed, differences in complexity can be expected
between individuals. Some people acknowledge that they do not want too much.
Taking this into consideration, it is not astonishing that complexity measures do
not, or only weakly, correlate with indicators of subjective well-being.
If one demands too much from life, these high standards can lead to the
feeling of being torn between alternatives, whereas demanding too little might
induce sadness (‘what shall I do?’). The ability to recognize the beauty as well as
the load of life and the willingness to relate one’s goals to both poles (the beauty
and the load of life) can be achieved at different levels of complexity. From an
equilibrium perspective, such integrations resolve existing tensions through
more complex representations. From the perspective of intentional self-
development (ISD), a lasting challenge of each individual is to find a balance
between adjusting one’s goals flexibly and pursuing them tenaciously (see
Brandtstädter, 2006). A complex thinking style (and insight into problem-solving
strategies) can be useful to avoid some mistakes but does not prevent choosing
too-difficult tasks. Feelings of contentment seem to presuppose that one does not
get stuck on unreachable life projects. Intentional efforts (e.g. to create the
surroundings one wishes to have), however, presuppose mental strength to some
degree. Thus, finding the medium level of complexity through which one can
improve one’s action resources (despite physical and cognitive limits or declines)
by pursuing and letting go – how can we act efficiently and how can we accept
our limits – remains a lasting challenge across the lifespan.

Stability, growth, and decline

Lifespan psychology has emphasized the multidimensionality of developmental
facets as well as their different age-related trajectories (Baltes, Lindenberger, &
Staudinger, 2006). As can be noticed in everyday life, development across the
lifespan does not necessarily result in age-related growth. In several domains of
life function, studies have found substantial age-related declines (e.g. the reserve
capacity of the inner organs, speed-based cognition). In contrast, in domains of
personality development (e.g. conscientiousness, neuroticism) or subjective well-
being, rather weak or nonsignificant age-related differences or changes were
observed. Given the age-related declines in many physical and cognitive domains,
Staudinger et  al. (1995) proposed drawing more specific attention to the
phenomenon of stability. From a traditional, growth-oriented perspective of
(child) development, stable characteristics might be regarded as uninteresting
indicators showing, at best, that development or change is absent. With increasing
age, however, stability can be important in several domains. For instance, when
age-related losses can be expected and remarkable growth effects are unlikely,
the stabilizing effects of cognitive training or interventions can be valuable
 Positive development and resilience  113

because they illustrate that cognitive decline can be attenuated – at least for a
limited time.
Apart from these rather neutral (descriptive) concepts of stability, growth, and
decline, which can be used as the standard in basic research, applied developmental
research sometimes regards the lifespan from a desirable perspective: How can
we avoid negative outcomes and support quality? Lifespan psychology also
emphasizes that lifelong development comprises gains and losses at any time
during the life course (Baltes et  al., 2006; Staudinger & Kunzmann, 2005).
Several empirical studies have provided evidence of how different age groups
evaluate stages in the life cycle. Some of the evaluations and gain-loss attributions
are significantly associated with age. Ebner, Riediger, and Lindenberger (2009)
investigated schemas (schematic knowledge) regarding goal orientations in early
and late adulthood. They found that growth-related developmental goals (general
expectations) are associated with young adults and that loss-prevention goals are
associated with older adults. In a classical study, people attributed negative and
loss-valued characteristics (adjectives) to older age (Heckhausen et  al., 1989).
However, such evaluations lead to questions regarding how the criteria that
constitute gains and losses can be defined. The concepts are manifold, and
opinions diverge. One can discuss contentiously and in great detail what gains
and losses mean. What is better or worse in life is subject to contextual conditions
or the evaluative standards of individuals.
In the following section, I present criteria for well-being that are pursued by
many people and discussed as outcomes in developmental theories. Occasionally,
it is claimed that we can intentionally pursue such ideal states, for instance,
through techniques such as realistic goal setting or meditation. One should
consider, however, that states of well-being happen to us to a certain degree.
Whether or not they happen is at best indirectly linked to personal wishes. It
should become evident that intentional striving and the ability to change one’s
level of satisfaction are different processes that are only slightly and partially
interconnected and mediated by the automatic processes that I introduced in
Chapters 3 and 4. In any case, the heterogeneity of well-being and adaptation
criteria illustrate the spectrum that individuals associate with their preferences
and developmental ideals.

Dimensions of well-being and developmental maturity

Generic terms such as successful ageing (Baltes & Baltes, 1990), positive
development (Brandtstädter, 2015), positive psychology (Seligman &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), or the meaning of life (Wong, 2012) denote research
approaches (e.g. paradigms) or are used as book or chapter titles to comprise and
order a multitude of concepts. Comparatively nonspecific, their vagueness opens
the door to speculation or personal searches for meaning. Sometimes these terms
are suspected to merely provide normative prescriptions or superficial recipes for
happiness (who already knows what a good life truly is?). Due to the vagueness
114  Positive development and resilience

of the concept of happiness, it is not surprising that individuals are inspired to

speculate about ideal ways of life and mental health. Indeed, there are several
proposals on these topics from and within different disciplines (e.g. psychology,
public health, medicine, philosophy, theology).
From the perspective of ISD, such considerations represent comparatively
abstract goal constructions that are also suitable as long-term ideals. If ideal
constructions include more or less positively valued contents that individuals
strive to reach or avoid and prescribe no specific time window (deadline) within
which they must be realized, they allow many concrete ways in which they can
be achieved. There are many possibilities for giving meaning to goals (see below).
‘We cannot predict what any given individual’s successful ageing will look like
until we know the domains of functioning and goals that that individual considers
important, personally meaningful and in which he or she feels competent.’
(Baltes & Carstensen, 1996, p. 399). This quotation gives prominence to goals
and personal competences and leads to the question of to what extent the
realization of one’s goals completes the ideal of successful development. From the
perspective of old age, when the boundaries of action competence are evident in
physical and mental life domains (e.g. dependency in old age, physical restrictions,
Alzheimer’s disease), Baltes and Carstensen draw attention to the age-related
limits of what we strive for or take for granted.
To date, I have presented several developmental categories that have been
used to characterize or formalize the process of growing older in adulthood.
According to lifespan psychology, development does not have one specific
endpoint but consists of many different domains (e.g. physical attractiveness,
stamina, virtue, or character strength). Each of these domains can be chosen as a
developmental goal by the individual, who can try to improve his or her qualities
across the lifespan. Each of these facets can contribute to well-being, to which I
now draw attention.
Although the topos of positive life conduct has its roots as far back as we can
trace the history of human ideas, interest in this topic within disciplines has
waxed and waned over time. In psychological research, the approach of positive
psychology demonstrates this interest. Positive psychology (Seligman &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) is a contemporary branch of psychology that focuses on
human strengths and virtues and the factors that contribute to a full and
meaningful life. Several studies prepared the way for this interest; for instance,
Charlotte Bühler (1933) wrote about life tendencies that work towards fulfilment
in life. She viewed humans as organisms open to the world. Abraham Maslow
(1954, p. 354) noted, ‘The science of psychology has been far more successful on
the negative than on the positive side. It has revealed to us much about man’s
shortcomings, his illness, his sins, but little about his potentialities, his virtues,
his achievable aspirations, or his full psychological height.’ The final chapter of
his book Motivation and Personality was titled ‘Towards a positive psychology’; in
it, he called for greater attention to both the positive and negative sides of human
 Positive development and resilience  115

experience. Since approximately the year 2000, a couple of psychologists have

devoted their attention to human strengths under the umbrella of ‘positive
psychology’ (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). This approach is a reaction
against a psychological tendency to concentrate on maladaptive behaviour,
negative thinking, and mental illness. Positive psychologists have investigated
concepts such as optimism, humour, and ‘mental strengths’. They have suggested
a number of ways in which individual happiness may be fostered. I now
concentrate on some of the criteria that have been valued as indicators of positive,
successful, or mature development in a broad sense in the psychological literature.

Quality of life: Subjective and objective criteria

Quality of life is a general concept that includes quite different components. I
focus on one model that illustrates the multidimensionality of the concept.
Powell Lawton (1991), for instance, defines quality of life as a collection of
objective and subjective dimensions interacting together. It includes
multidimensional evaluations of both intrapersonal and socioeconomic criteria
of an individual’s person-environment system. Lawton considered behavioural
competence (social-normative assessment of an individual’s health, cognition, and
social relationships), environmental quality (external conditions), psychological well-
being (e.g. emotional well-being), and perceived quality of life (subjective evaluation
of life circumstances in different life domains). Lawton developed his model of
quality of life while considering the situation of frail elders. Health-related
factors that are not limited in young or middle adulthood increase in importance
among elderly adults. Objective outcomes such as income, number of critical life
events, or functional organ capacity can be assessed independently and more
precisely than an individual’s subjective experiences because they are not based
on limited memory abilities and introspection. They are, however, not necessarily
good indicators of how good people feel.
Subjective evaluations and emotions have important motivational functions.
Negative emotions are characteristic of disequilibrium and signal a need for
action. In that way, they contribute to the stability of an organism if they lead
to compensatory efforts in health-related behaviour. Subjective evaluations,
however, can evoke dysfunctional side effects and jeopardize the success of
one’s efforts. On the one hand, an individual may be satisfied with a preliminary
success and thus abandon his or her standards too early. On the other hand, an
individual can become worried about outcomes too early in his or her efforts.
Both can be regretted later. Discrepancy between is-ought states can result
from one’s feelings because one valuates external conditions and lulls oneself
into a false sense of security; additionally, a ‘false alarm’ is also possible. In
psychological research and lifespan research, the subjective evaluations by
individuals that are usually subsumed under the concept of well-being are the
focus of attention.
116  Positive development and resilience

Hedonic and eudaimonic well-being

Well-being is a multifaceted construct that encompasses the ways in which
individuals positively evaluate and experience their lives. Two major approaches
are often used to categorize well-being: hedonic and eudaimonic well-being
(Tov, 2018; Waterman, 1993; see also the distinction between a happy life and a
meaningful life, Baumeister et al., 2013).
Hedonic well-being: According to Diener (1984), subjective well-being consists
of an overall positive satisfaction with life, frequent positive emotions, and
infrequent negative emotions. Without being specific regarding the contents and
goals of life leading to general subjective well-being, this tradition defines
happiness by maximizing positive affect and avoiding subjective burden. In
addition to valence, frequency, and intensity, both positive and negative emotions
can be distinguished by their level of arousal. Well-being denotes both feelings
of positive excitement and inner peace and joy. Despite these differences, hedonic
well-being is a concept that is comparatively consistently defined because
researchers usually draw on experiences of life satisfaction and affect to
operationalize it. In contrast, there is no well-accepted (operational) definition of
eudaimonic well-being.
Eudaimonic conceptions of happiness are associated with notions of the true
self and encompass a multifaceted range of subjective experiences and meaningful
goal pursuits (Huta & Waterman, 2014; Ryan & Deci, 2001; Waterman, 1993).
Carol Ryff’s concept of psychological well-being is a widely used example of the
eudaimonic well-being tradition in psychological research (Ryff, 1989, 2014).
She proposed a model of successful ageing based on humanistic, developmental,
clinical, and mental health perspectives. According to this model, multiple
aspects of well-being should be considered when assessing successful ageing.
Drawing on theories on personality (e.g. Bühler, Erikson, Jung, Maslow), Ryff
argued that six partly overlapping components are characteristic for people who
are functioning well in life:

• Environmental mastery: Being able to manage life situations and external

stressors; being able to choose or create contexts suitable to personal needs
and values
• Autonomy: Being guided by internal standards; living in accord with their
own personal convictions
• Positive relations: Being capable of trusting and loving others; being concerned
about the welfare of others
• Self-acceptance: Having a positive attitude towards oneself, including
awareness of personal limitations
• Personal growth: Experiencing challenge and development in life; making use
of one’s potential and personal talents
• Purpose in life: Feeling that life has meaning, purpose, and direction; having
important goals and aims
 Positive development and resilience  117

There are additional concepts that are not consistently attributed to either
hedonic or eudaimonic conceptions of well-being. Self-esteem, an individual’s
subjective evaluation of his or her worth as a person, reflects hedonic qualities
but might also encompass sense- and growth-related aspects. General expectations
that one will experience more positive than negative outcomes in life (optimism)
or states in which one is optimally engaged with what one is doing (flow) can be
related to both domains.
Eudaimonic well-being dimensions are sometimes held in contrast with
hedonic conceptions, which mainly reflect a life characterized by the attainment
of pleasure. Waterman (2008) discusses some central criticisms of the eudaimonic
well-being concept, for instance, that it is overly abstract; lacks clarity regarding
operationalization and measurement; is overly complex, thus preventing
meaningful scientific inquiry; and is potentially elitist. In general, there is
empirical evidence that measures of eudaimonic and hedonic well-being are
highly intercorrelated. This has led to the assumption that positive functioning
and feeling tend to go hand in hand (see Tov, 2018, for a further discussion).
Positive correlations among several well-being indicators may exist for several
reasons. Apart from the conceptual similarity (they are both positively valued)
and common causes (e.g. both could be mediated by social desirability) of
eudaimonic and hedonic well-being, questions regarding growth, meaning,
harmony, and transcendence target experiences that are difficult to communicate.
There may be considerable differences in how individuals interpret some of the
items that well-being scales include, especially the vague ones.
In sum, the concepts of hedonic and eudaimonic well-being are characterized
by a highly multidimensional consideration through which situations in life can
be valued. It is an open and empirical question which of these components (e.g.
happiness or meaning-centred dimensions) an individual might prefer or
experience. The stabilization of well-being and the increase in the selective
forgetting of negative information in old age (Isaacowitz, 2012) – despite age-
related losses – have been explained by the regulation of personal standards
(Brandtstädter, 2016) or emotional processing in the face of cognitive decline
(Labouvie-Vief et  al., 2010). There are lifespan theories that claim that
developmental success is not primarily a matter of the stabilization of subjective
happiness. They use other criteria that are similar to the concept of eudaimonic
well-being, but they do not assume that individuals have to approve of or
experience a high degree of emotional well-being or sense in life, as is common
in well-being research. In the following section, I draw attention to growth
theories of personality.

Wisdom and personality growth

In addition to, and in contrast to, the adaptive criterion of well-being, several
theories (e.g. on cognitive-affective complexity, Labouvie-Vief, 2015; ego
development, Loevinger, 1976; and wisdom, Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Zacher
118  Positive development and resilience

& Staudinger, 2018) emphasize changes such as maturity and growth as

characteristic of adult development. Especially in the domain of personality
development, evaluative notions such as ‘healthy’, ‘integrated’, or ‘mature’ have
been used as ideal or positive examples of developmental states. Charlotte Bühler,
for instance, described the healthy personality as motivated to maintain an
optimal arousal level for the performance of acts and the realization of their
unique potentials for growth and development (Bühler & Allen, 1972). One
should be aware that personality development in adulthood encompasses a broad
range of facets. It is not automatically directed towards higher levels of
functioning, as a biological view of growth or motives of self-actualization
(Maslow, 1950) might suggest.
A differentiation between two general forms of personality development, i.e.
adjustment and growth, has been proposed. According to Staudinger and
Kunzmann (2005), one form of positive development is based on evaluating
developmental changes with regard to their adaptive value and functionality for
the individual as well as effective functioning in the society (adjustment). This
form of positive development is correlated with higher levels of subjective well-
being and life satisfaction. There is another tradition that holds that adjustment is
unrelated or even negatively related to growth (e.g. Labouvie-Vief, 2015;
Loevinger, 1976). In these models, personality growth is not defined via positive
adjustment (e.g. the integration of social structures, the maintenance of subjective
well-being) but rather by increases in admittedly difficult conditions such as
insight, integration, virtue, or self-transcendence. Labouvie-Vief et  al. (2010)
argued that affect optimization, the ability to maintain and enhance levels of
subjective well-being, fails to provide a complete picture of personality
development. Therefore, they proposed a second process that plays a critical role
in personality development: affect complexity. Complexity means a language that
‘is complex, nonstereotypical, and nondualistic; that tolerates intra- and
interindividual conflict; and that appreciates the uniqueness of individual
experiences’. (Labouvie-Vief et  al., 2010, p. 82). Affect complexity denotes a
person’s ability to understand, differentiate, and integrate emotional experiences,
including their dynamics, causes, and consequences. Several studies have
provided cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence that from adolescence to
middle adulthood, richness of emotional understanding increases significantly.
In the second half of life, no age-related increase is observed on average.
There is some research that focuses on the relationship between personality
growth (ego development, Loevinger, 1976) and psychopathological symptoms.
It has been demonstrated that a complex and integrated thinking structure does
not prevent mental disorders but can even be connected with psychological
maladaptation. Some findings are consistent with the assumption that ego
development is sometimes related to a specific type, rather than an overall level,
of psychopathology. Among young adults, for instance, ego development has
been correlated with unstable mood and identity, internalizing defence
preferences, and anxiety-related disorders; however, it has been negatively
 Positive development and resilience  119

correlated with externalizing defence preferences and alcohol problems and with
aggression in males (Duffy, Ruegger, Tiegreen, & Kurtz, 2017). Insight and
growth in this sense does not necessarily make people happy because it can make
them sensitive to negative aspects of life (Noam, Young, & Jilnina, 2006). In
studies with nonclinical populations, associations between ego development and
subjective well-being and positive or negative affect are rather small.
Another research branch that addresses growth-related aspects of development
is wisdom research (Grossmann, 2017; Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Sternberg,
1998). Wisdom includes knowledge about the limits of knowledge and the
uncertainties of life. It has been argued (Staudinger & Kessler, 2009) that wisdom
denotes an increase in insight and judgement but also includes personality growth
(in contrast to increases in personality adjustment). Psychological definitions
typically refer to wisdom as knowledge about the human condition at its frontier,
the most difficult questions regarding the meaning and conduct of life, and the
uncertainties of life and what cannot be known. Dealing with that limited
knowledge encompasses the recognition of others’ perspectives, integration of
different opinions, and compromise (Grossmann, 2017).
Although wisdom has been described for millennia as the ideal integration of
mind and virtue, only since the 1970s has it been investigated empirically. One
reason for this dearth of empirical conceptualization may reflect serious doubts
regarding whether a concept as rich in ideational history and connotations as
wisdom is even amenable to scientific study. The current operationalizations of
wisdom have demonstrated that it can be studied empirically and reliably
(Staudinger & Leipold, 2019), but these attempts only capture parts of this highly
complex phenomenon. In its full sense, wisdom is considered more a utopian
ideal than a realistic goal for average individual development. Nonetheless,
wisdom has been viewed as the ideal endpoint of human development. Within
its various definitions and theoretical conceptualizations are attributes or
descriptors that have been used in several domains (e.g. developmental theories
on cognition, emotion, motivation, personality) to describe the adaptive function
of human development and its regulative processes. These attributes of regulation
processes characterize whether development is still possible, regardless of how
much we like or dislike our situation. Which attributes are relevant here? I
concentrate on several concepts that sound good at first glance but that upon
further consideration can hardly be explained and measured.
Within their interesting discussion about positive development, Staudinger
and Kunzmann (2005) refer to several dichotomies (e.g. hedonic vs. eudaimonic
well-being, Waterman, 1993; the integration of emotional and cognitive
processes sensu Labouvie-Vief ) and add their own to illustrate principles or basic
processes as well as criteria for evaluating human development. They propose
that balancing one’s own good with that of others is the cornerstone of positive
development, and reflection on this leads to growth: ‘Our notion of growth is
based on the definition of wisdom as the prototype of human growth. Therefore,
growth is defined by the orientation toward balancing one’s own good with that
120  Positive development and resilience

of others.’ (see Staudinger & Kunzmann, 2005, p. 322). Based on the philosophical
separation between the ontology of the first and the third person (Searle, 1992),
Staudinger names two poles or perspectives that are balanced through mature
thinking. Regarding psychological research, the two wisdom perspectives stem
from different traditions: theories on expertise research (wisdom as expertise
knowledge; see general psychology) and personality development (wisdom as the
endpoint of personality growth). Within the Berlin (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000)
and Bremen wisdom research, Staudinger and colleagues developed interview
techniques, criteria, and measures of wisdom that concern both general and
personal wisdom. General wisdom is concerned with insights into life in general,
that is, knowledge about life from an observer’s perspective. Personal wisdom
refers to a person’s insight into his/her own life: What does a person know about
himself/herself, his/her life? Expert knowledge about fundamental life problems
and personal wisdom can be described and measured according to five criteria:
rich factual and procedural knowledge about human nature and the life course
(or about one’s own life), lifespan contextualism, value relativism/tolerance, and
awareness, and management of uncertainty (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000;
Staudinger & Glück, 2011). Within these approaches, individuals’ reflections are
assessed via performance-based measures derived from interviews regarding
difficult problems of life. Growth is reflected in high scores, which are assumed
to reflect the degree of balance; for instance, inasmuch as the individual has
balanced his or her own good with that of others.
One might be intuitively tempted to assume that wisdom could be positively
correlated with subjective well-being. However, a review of empirical studies
showed that performance-based measures of wisdom show no or only small
associations with well-being (Zacher & Staudinger, 2018). Wisdom-related
knowledge (performance) was associated with education/profession and with
measures of intelligence and personality (openness to new experience) and their
interface (creativity measures) (Sternberg, 2015). Self-reported measures of
wisdom, however, show a substantial positive relationship with well-being.
Staudinger and colleagues (e.g. Staudinger & Kunzmann, 2005; Zacher &
Staudinger, 2018) differentiate explicitly between both of these empirical avenues
to wisdom and argue that individuals who score high on self-reported wisdom
may be those who respond in a socially desirable way that is consistent with
personality adjustment. This interpretation (positive adjustment) explains why
positive relationships between self-reported wisdom and subjective well-being
have been found in many studies.

Summary
In sum, I have illustrated that there is no single answer to the question of what
‘positive’ development means, and I have noted that resilience is not simply a
stable state but a process that needs to be renewed. Psychological models have
distinguished between objective and subjective criteria and revealed the
 Positive development and resilience  121

dimensions of happiness. Research on wisdom and personality growth has

elaborated that personality development across the lifespan is not automatically
directed towards higher levels of functioning. Wisdom, for instance, denotes
insight and judgement competence regarding fundamental questions of life, but
it also includes awareness of the limits and uncertainties of life. Such insights do
not immediately make a person happy; indeed, they can also be associated with
negative feelings. The concept of balance has already been mentioned in several
places. In the Chapter 6, I pay particular attention to the concept of balance
because it has been used in many significant psychological theories to characterize
human development and adaptation.
6
BALANCE AND DIMENSIONS
OF MEANING

In Chapter 5, the concept of equilibrium and criteria for positive development

were presented. In the present chapter, I first refer to models that I have
discussed in part already to point out similarities in assumptions regarding
processes that should be balanced (or should work well). I use the term balance,
which is similar to that of ‘equilibrium’ or related terms such as integration
(e.g. Karelitz et  al., 2010; Labouvie-Vief et  al., 2010; Piaget, 1977) and has
been applied in several developmental models more or less explicitly to
describe a state of optimal functioning within a specific domain. Second, I
return to the issue of making mistakes. Avoiding mistakes or accepting
mistakes that have been made is an intrinsic part of positive development.
Human goals can, to a certain degree, be based on mistakes (although we are
often convinced that we are acting correctly or sincerely). Third and finally, I
draw attention to the interconnectedness of developmental goals with areas of
human action and culture. I concentrate on a few dimensions of meaning and
areas of human action that seem basically representative for many people. Of
course, examples of central human concerns are not equally important to all
people. While some prefer to contemplate the shortness of life, others
recommend living it to the fullest (‘You only live once!’). As a whole, it seems
to me, these attitudes reflect a spectrum of dimensions of meaning or human
culture that touches on concerns that are, in part, several thousand years old,
but are nonetheless relevant for intentional self-development (ISD). These
fields of action are not truly psychological research topics; rather, they are
dimensions that have a long tradition in other disciplines, such as cultural
history, art history, and philosophy. They are intended to clarify themes that
people have been dealing with for centuries and have been viewed as subject
to their will.
124  Balance and dimensions of meaning

Balance as a challenge
Positive experiences, such as feeling satisfied with one’s situation and what one
has achieved, are temporary in nature and have to be renewed. Thus, positive
development entails a lively evaluation process that can change as a consequence
of mood and daily experiences. I concentrate on the concepts of balance
(balancing), action errors, and evaluation biases in more detail to illustrate the
‘positive’ aspect of development with regard to its characteristic processes.
According to several psychological theories, balance and other terms, such as
integration and equilibrium, denote a state in which regulation processes seem to
reveal their optimal effects in several domains (see social relationships, Heider,
1958; cognitive development, Piaget, 1977; wisdom, Karelitz et al., 2010).

The concept of balance in psychological models

Sternberg (1998) proposed a theory of wisdom entitled the ‘balance theory of
wisdom’. He specified the processes, that is, the balancing of interests and of
responses to environmental contexts in relation to the general goal of wisdom,
that is, using one’s skills and knowledge to serve a common good. Wisdom is
related to practical intelligence and is defined as the application of tacit knowledge,
as mediated by values, towards the goal of achieving a common good through
the balance of multiple and competing interests and balance among responses to
environmental contexts (i.e. adaptation to existing environmental contexts, the
shaping of existing environmental contexts, and the selection of new
environmental contexts). According to Sternberg (1998), ‘Wisdom is involved
when practical intelligence is applied to maximizing not just one’s own or
someone else’s self-interest, but rather a balance of various self-interests
(intrapersonal) with the interests of others (interpersonal) and of other aspects of
the context in which one lives (extrapersonal), such as one’s city or country or
environment or even God.’ (p. 354).
How can balanced judgement be attained, and which thinking processes are
involved? Several forms of thinking (thinking styles) have been distinguished
and are based on social interaction, learning, and practise. These forms of
cognitive development have been associated with wisdom-related thought but
are also important when individuals interpret their affairs, cope with difficulties,
and act. I focus on a few thinking styles that are used in everyday problem-
solving situations and that are assumed to lead to balance and possibly to wise
solutions (for a detailed discussion, see Fischer & Pruyne, 2003; Labouvie-Vief,
2015; Sinnott, 2014).

• Dialectical and relativistic thinking: Through conceptual juxtapositions,

complex problems or scientific terms can sometimes be illustrated vividly.
Dialectical thinking (Basseches, 1984; Eckensberger, 2012) is associated
with interest in debate (through arguments and counterarguments) and
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  125

refers to the ability to view issues from multiple perspectives. Although

people may not able be to find the best solution for many life problems, they
can share their alternative views and come to acceptable compromises.
Similar to dialectical thought, relativistic thinking is based on the view that
standards of right and wrong and procedures of justification are products of
differing conventions. Sternberg (1998) assumes that wisdom is probably
best developed through dialectical thinking (see, for example, Hegel’s
dialectic of thesis, antithesis followed by a synthesis). ‘When dialectical
thinking occurs with respect to place (or space), it involves the recognition
that at a given point in time, people may have diverging viewpoints on
problems that seem uniquely valid or at least reasonable to them.’ (Sternberg,
1998, p. 353). Relativistic and dialectical thought illustrates the complexity
of argumentation structure but leads to additional questions (e.g. How much
relativism is adaptive (effective) without allowing the individual to get lost
in details? How much tolerance is necessary or adaptive?).
• Thinking integratively: The integration of new experience with what we
already know is known as integrative thought. Integrative thought is
characterized by subjective interpretation or intuition that influences
communication, problem solving, and human action. Interesting age
differences have been found when participants were asked to recall and
summarize stories (Labouvie-Vief & Hakim-Larson, 1989). Mature adults
interpret stories in terms of their meaning for them. The summaries
produced by older adults tend to be shorter and more to the point. Their
thinking is more flexible than that of younger adults, who summarize in a
more step-by-step manner.
• Reflective thinking: Reflective thought includes careful consideration
regarding, for instance, the use of evidence and reasoning, the questioning
of knowledge and beliefs, and the active pursuit of justifiable conclusions. It
has been defined by John Dewey as ‘active, persistent, and careful
consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the
grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends.’
(Dewey, 1910/1991, p. 6). Reflective thinkers question supposed facts, draw
inferences, make connections between arguments, and create a cognitive
system that reconciles apparently conflicting ideas by putting various theories
together into an overarching theory (Fischer & Pruyne, 2003).
• Postformal thought: The concepts introduced above have been discussed as a
continuation of Piaget’s cognitive development theory. According to Piaget
(1950), cognitive structures are characterized in terms of universal, logical
forms that emerge according to a developmental sequence. Children’s
behaviour is predetermined by the logical structure associated with a specific
time in their development. The last of Piaget’s four stages of cognitive
development refers to cognitive problems (mathematical-physical tasks) that
can be solved through formal operations; that is, the ability of adolescents and
adults to act logically and to use abstract and logical symbols to arrive at
126  Balance and dimensions of meaning

solutions to right–wrong problems. A common critique of his theory claims

that there is little in his model to improve our understanding of how logical
structure helps guide everyday tasks. Postformal thought (Commons et  al.,
1984; Labouvie-Vief & Hakim-Larson, 1989; Sinnott, 2014) refers to
everyday problems in social context with emotional and social implications,
a realm that was not in the closer focus of the Swiss epistemologist.

Piaget did not completely ignore the dynamics of emotions and social relations.
In some of his works, he explicitly acknowledges the value of such relationships
for cognitive development (Piaget, 1950; 1973). He was aware of the
interconnection between social, unconscious, emotional, cognitive, and
biological structures, but he devoted his central interest to intelligence. Why is
his theory important for the criteria of positive development and for ISD? Well,
Piaget provides an example of developmental growth that does not necessarily
increase during the transition from adolescence to adulthood or later. However,
cognitive development is also relevant for ISD. Piaget (1977) proposed that
cognitive development involves a balance (equilibrium) between the adaptive
processes of assimilation (modifying the way one understands an object in order
to fit it into an existing cognitive schemata) and accommodation (modifying
one’s cognitive schemata in order to fit the way one understands an object or
concept). Thus, a cognitive discrepancy stimulates adaptive processes, and
development can occur as long as the adaptive processes work (and remain
changeable). The dual-process model of assimilation and accommodation
(Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; see also Chapter 2 in this volume) refers to
the regulation of goals. If logical tasks are the content of interest or are involved
when individuals experience a goal blockage, the ability to solve these problems
canalizes the tasks they will choose at a later time. The SOC model (Baltes et al.,
2006; see also Chapter 2 in this volume) describes the interaction of three
developmental regulation processes. Following concepts such as balance and
integration, it has been argued that the orchestration of selective, optimizing,
and compensating processes provides the basis for positive development.
Some authors stress the experience of a difference between the self, on the one
hand, and others, the world, objects, on the other, that is, the problem of
individuals feeling that they are different (e.g. specific, unique) entities from the
collective mass and the material world. Mental processes mediate between these
poles. Individuation, a key concept of Jung’s theory on personality development,
refers to the process of becoming aware of oneself (Samuels et al., 1986). The
individual self develops out of an undifferentiated unconscious by transforming
the personal and collective unconscious into conscious. This process can be more
or less successful and integrated over time and includes the unity of opposites
(e.g. the conscious – the unconscious, extraversion – introversion) and the
connection between collectivism and individuality. Insofar as individuation
describes a middle position – that is, a process of integration between unconscious
and conscious processing – it can be regarded as an example of equilibration.
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  127

TABLE 6.1  Structuring processes and dimensions of equilibrium, balance, and

orchestration

Balance and equilibrium: Adaptive processes and content

Cognitive development through assimilation and Piaget (1977)
accommodation
ISD and self-regulation through assimilation and Brandtstädter and Greve (1994);
accommodation Brandtstädter and
Rothermund (2002)
Wisdom and self-other balance through life reflection Staudinger and Kunzmann
(personal vs. general wisdom) (2005), Staudinger and Glück,
(2011)
Balance among interests (intrapersonal, interpersonal, Sternberg (1998)
and extrapersonal); balance among the selection of,
shaping of, and adaptation to environments
Individuation: unconscious – conscious transformation Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut
according to C.G. Jung (1986)
Cognition – emotion (affect optimization and affect Labouvie-Vief et al. (2010)
complexity)
The orchestration of selection, optimization, and Baltes, Lindenberger, and
compensation Staudinger (2006)

Similarly, personality growth concepts that conceive of self-other reflection as a

developmental task (Staudinger & Kunzmann, 2005) but pay less attention to and
speculate about the unconscious can also be an example of an ongoing balancing
process. Table 6.1 summarizes several theories in which terms such as balance
and equilibrium have been used to describe human development.
A common feature of these otherwise quite different mental processes arises
from the developmental nature of man: development implies continuous
adaptation, and every state of balance is only momentary and preliminary. These
selected approaches provide interesting explanations of the basic characteristics
of mental development and its structure. They revolve around a fundamental
problem of psychology in general from different perspectives and try to shed
more light on our insufficient knowledge about the interaction processes that
shape the course of psychological development across the lifespan. Table 6.1
shows that development is a process of adaptation (Brandtstädter, 2006; Staudinger
et al., 1995) that in turn consists of a bundle of mental processes (e.g. intentional,
cognitive, socio-emotional). Social and biological factors are also involved but
are not described in detail in the table. The concept of balance can be used to
illustrate the structure of developmental adaptation. The basic processes are
interconnected. How much each process contributes to developmental outcomes
cannot be isolated. We are used to making inferences about regularities through
observation and experiments, but we cannot simply observe the underlying
regulating factors the way we observe a goose with goslings. From a developmental
point of view, life is in flux; its challenges and crises cannot be stopped. At best,
128  Balance and dimensions of meaning

life includes temporary phases of subjective breaks, but that imbalance never
comes to a standstill. Within this flux, however, we tend to see and appreciate
many dimensions that can be used to evaluate human actions with their
discrepancies.

Balance from an intentional point of view

Given that balancing is a lifelong process of adaptation that refers to many,
partially unconscious mental processes, successful balancing is a utopian
preliminary end state rather than a concrete life task that can be intentionally
pursued. Several concepts of balance have been discussed, for instance, the
balanced dialogue between logical and more subjective forms of information
processing; the integration of affect, cognition, motivation, and life experience;
and the integration of affect with cognition. From an intentional point of view
(ISD), human action and areas of action mark the point of reference for balance:
‘…action is not simply behaviour, but rather self-planned behaviour that can be
interpreted as a means to achieve certain goals, to express certain values and to
solve certain problems and that is – within certain boundaries – freely (or at least
subjectively freely) chosen on the basis of certain beliefs and values.’ (Brandtstädter,
1984, p. 10). From an ISD viewpoint, one can argue that the concept of balance
refers to the interplay of goal dynamics, that is, pursuing and adjusting one’s goals
(see the processes of assimilation and accommodation in the dual-process model;
Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002).
A closer look reveals that intentions (e.g. developmental goals) are closely
linked to socio-cultural artefacts. Goals and actions refer to the material world
and to mental artefacts (e.g. social norms, laws, symbols) and give value to them.
Boesch’s concept of action field is based on this assumption and illustrates how
environmental factors and human affairs can become meaningful through rituals,
ceremonies, and symbols (Boesch, 1991). From this viewpoint, balance refers to
man in his or her cultural area of action, which includes material/physical, as
well as social, factors. The term of action field denotes the centre/field in which
individuals are faced with cultural diversity. Culture influences people and shapes
their life paths within biological constraints and biographical experience. The
concept of balance or adaptation (through integration and differentiation) refers
to intentions in terms of creative possibilities and limits. It is important to note,
however, that although we make mistakes, we can still retain intentional freedom.

Mistakes and freedom of interpretation

As a consequence of our limited insight into the nature of a good balance at the
level of mental processes, we are prone to several ‘action’ mistakes and evaluation
biases. Sometimes we overestimate our action competence or underestimate our
responsibility for a failure. In many situations, people do not know the optimal
strategy for solving a problem. The acceptance of mistakes and their potential to
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  129

trigger efforts to compensate for unpleasant consequences are part of positive

development. On the one hand, mistakes can have the consequence of making us
feel annoyed about or regretful of previous actions and consequently can motivate
behaviour. On the other hand, it seems to be important to differentiate between
outcomes and evaluations. Because human action consists of making mistakes to
a remarkable degree, a closer look at their nature can be interesting. In the
following, I argue that errors are important for understanding what positive
development means.

1. Levels of meaning of the concept ‘mistake’. Spaemann (2000, p. 7) differentiates

among three categories of mistakes and illustrates their interconnectedness
with action goals.
• Objective, socio-culturally preformed action goals: Objects denote, for
instance, an imperfect car that does not, or only suboptimally, fulfils its
purpose. The manufacturer did not do a good job.
• Subjective action goals: An individual who commits an ‘objective’
mistake does so either unintentionally or intentionally. If the individual
does not attain his or her action goal because of a poor understanding of
his or her ‘art’, his product is not limited because of this limited
intention. One who intentionally makes a mistake (e.g. a deficient
product) achieves a subjective goal while missing the objective goal.
• Objective-subjective action goals: Mistakes allow one to judge the
intention of those who do something intentionally right or wrong. An
engineer can intentionally construct an imperfect bomb, and a medicine
can intentionally contribute to a patient’s illness. Thus, the individual
can plan to have good or poor performance according to his or her
wishes.
  These distinctions make it clear that human action is prone to error in a
variety of ways. Facets of failure or success in life can be evaluated on the
basis of the accomplishment of purpose (e.g. the suitability of a product), the
accomplishment of goals, and the good or bad intentions of an acting person
(lack of wisdom). Within a concrete action context, all of these mistakes can
occur. The criterion of positive development is limited if one considers that
we make many mistakes. It is possible to assess the results of an action
positively, even if those results are based on mistakes.
2. Interconnected goals and goal hierarchies. It should be mentioned that actions can
be identified in different ways and that identifications can vary in their level
of abstraction (Carver & Scheier, 2000). High-level identifications (e.g.
becoming a cultivated man) are abstract and tend to convey a sense of ‘why’
an activity is done. Lower-level identifications become increasingly concrete
(e.g. attending a ballet) and tend to convey a sense of ‘how’ the activity will
be accomplished. Specific goals are associated with more distant goals, for
the sake of which the act is completed (Aristotle, 1987; De Anima, II, 4).
If we differentiate between levels of abstraction, it is possible that we can fail
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at a concrete (lower) level (e.g. failing an exam) but continue to pursue a

general career goal. The decisive factor for further action is how the errors
are interpreted. We can also accept failures to achieve more distant (or
higher) goals. We can reinterpret our mistakes positively: I accept sacrifices
to achieve higher goals (the end justifies the means!). It is not predetermined
whether we will regret certain decisions. Notably, the same events can be
appreciated and rejected. Action mistakes (e.g. nonintended effects) can be
revalued as gains and can lead to positive results even though they are based
on wrong assumptions. The mediating mental processes reveal a dynamic
that influences development through a mixture of intentional efforts and
causal processes that are still poorly understood.
3. Non-unambiguity of events. Both mistakes and actions, or events in general,
include an openness of interpretation that makes a positive life a many-sided
and somewhat ambivalent construction. Such openness was illustrated by
the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt (1943), who reminds us that humans
are wont to regard historical events, their personal fate, and that of their
ancestors under two categories: ‘fortunate’ or ‘unfortunate’. He conceded
that judgement may change radically with age and experience but claimed
that we have pronounced historical judgements of good or evil fortune for
isolated events and for whole epochs and life conditions:

We, however, judge as follows:

It was fortunate that the Greeks conquered Persia and Rome Carthage;
unfortunate that Athens was defeated by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War,
unfortunate that Caesar was murdered before he had time to consolidate
the Roman Empire in an adequate political form;
unfortunate that in the migrations of the Germanic tribes so many of
the highest creations of the human spirit perished, but fortunate that
they refreshed the world with new and healthy stock;
fortunate that Europe, in the eighth century, on the whole held Islam at bay;
unfortunate that German Emperors were defeated in their struggle with
the Papacy and that the Church was able to develop its terrible tyranny;
unfortunate that the Reformation triumphed in only half Europe and
that the Protestantism was divided into two sects;
fortunate that first Spain, then Louis XIV were eventually defeated in
their plans for world dominion, etc.
Burckhardt, 1943, p. 350

For the moment, it is not important how much one approves of these claims.
Rather, this historical example demonstrates that our opinions diverge. The human
quest for happiness can be observed in several epochs and is still relevant. Sometimes,
and not only in heroic epics, we are inclined to decorate personally relevant events
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  131

in life stories with self-enhancing metaphors to give meaning and value to life and
perhaps to build our resilience. In the last part of this chapter, I introduce contents
of meaning that are used as reference points for many people when they act and
evaluate the consequences of their own behaviours and those of other people.

Dimensions of meaning and areas of action

In recent decades, remarkable scientific evolution and technical advances have
influenced how people grow older. The average lifespan has increased (and
continues to increase), many diseases can be treated successfully, and social media
has made it possible to communicate across long distances within a short time. To
a certain degree, we are successful if we take medical or technical progress (e.g. in
transportation) into account. Scientific progress and success in making correct
predictions has revealed new technical, financial, and social challenges. These
aspects of growth cannot be used to characterize positive development more
precisely without limits. As scientists, we want to understand what constitutes
successful development, but there are a number of ways to give meaning to life.
Not everything that is possible is important or meaningful for the individual (e.g.
factors that contribute to an unhealthy lifestyle), and not everything that is wished
for is feasible. Within the short history of psychological research, some of the
underlying processes of meaning have been investigated on the basis of personal
reports or, more recently, by using biomedical imaging procedures. Previous to
the positive psychology movement (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), some
efforts were taken to make meaning one of the central constructs of psychology
(e.g. Bruner, 1990; Frankl, 1985; Wong & Fry, 1998).
In the following, I would like to elaborate on what the concept of meaning
entails before I introduce examples of its cultural embeddedness. Meaning, in
general, is a mental representation that refers to several domains. One is the
semantic interpretation (e.g. the meaning of a word that is fixed by convention
and the rules of language). The interpretation of discourse and ambiguous
sentences depends on a mental model that reflects rules, which are determined by
knowledge of the language, for instance, through lexical analysis or semantic
network analysis ( Johnson-Laird, 1983). The vagueness of language, such as the
fuzziness of terms (i.e. the fact that we can attach different meanings to every
term) is not only a source of misunderstandings but also allows us to consider
problems from different points of view. This mental flexibility or openness could
be a useful means of finding palliative interpretations in difficult life situations.
The concept of meaning (see Box 6.1) is not exclusively related to semantic
categories; it also relates to affairs of human life and the development of intentions
(the quest for meaning). In this case, we talk about the sense of actions. The
construction of sense in the context of action is affect-loaded and related to
values. At least three functions of creating meaning can be differentiated. (a) A
motivational, action-regulating function reflects that people are willing to invest
resources to reach meaningful goals. Many people wish to be able to act without
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BOX 6.1  WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT MEANING

IN LIFE?

Perhaps you are willing to ask yourself what comprises the core of meaning
or wisdom. What are your standards, and who meets them (other than
yourself)?
It is possible that you agree with some of the previous approaches or that
you thought they were missing domains from other cultures. There are many
ways to describe the content of meaning in life. Your reflections probably
refer to ethical, political issues – or the wish to understand the nature of the
human condition. However, there is no consensus regarding whether or not
and to what degree the best things should be a standard for more than a
single person.

pressure. Activities and goals we pursue with a feeling of intrinsic commitment

are experienced as meaningful. (b) Another, emotional-regulative function becomes
evident in times of loss and bereavement. When bad things happen, meaning is
useful to make sense of suffering and make it more bearable. Life situations can
be analyzed, and answers to the Why me? question can contribute to a sense of
purpose in life and positive adaptation (Filipp, 1999). (c) From an evolutionary
perspective, it has been argued that motile organisms are equipped to actively
seek out life’s necessities because their survival depends on it: ‘The human brain
cannot sustain purposeless living.’ (Klinger, 1998, p. 33). A lack of meaning
signals psychological deprivation or disorder.
Despite the general relevance of meaning, it is not easy to define the
characteristic components of such a broad concept, which contains several aspects
that have been discussed in ethical, theological, and psychological works.
Nonetheless, there is an interconnection between meaning and intentions –
meaning is searched for, felt, or attributed to significant events. A study by Steger
et al. (2008) demonstrated that it is useful to differentiate between the search for
meaning and its presence. People vary in the degree to which they intentionally
search for meaning. Those who feel a lack of meaning in life search for it. The
search for meaning has been correlated with ruminative thoughts, a negative
time perspective, less subjective control over the environment, and less self-
acceptance. People who felt a greater presence of meaning reported greater
psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989), extraversion, and agreeableness and less
neuroticism. There have been some classification efforts to make the structure of
basic mental processes evident. In the PURE model, Wong proposes four
essential components of meaning (Wong, 2012):

1. Purpose denotes the motivational process: A key function of purpose is to

provide direction in life through goals.
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  133

2. Understanding is the cognitive component. It encompasses cognitive processes

and making sense of situations one finds oneself in.
3. Responsible action is the behavioural component. It refers to the social–moral
aspect of situations.
4. Evaluation: The emotional or evaluative component encompasses feelings
about decisions or about the way one’s life is going.

This model provides an integrative framework that allows individuals to

reflect on whether or not they have found something worth living for. Similar to
the concepts of wisdom (Staudinger & Glück, 2011) and identity (Fadjukoff &
Pulkkinen, 2006), the concept of meaning is related to fundamental questions of
life (Who am I? What can I do to find happiness and life satisfaction?). Based on
studies that directly asked people what they wanted to live an ideal meaningful
life, Wong distinguished eight components (happiness, relationship, intimacy,
achievement, religion, altruism, self-acceptance, and fair treatment). These
meaning dimensions are similar to the concepts of psychological well-being
(Ryff, 2014) and to human values or virtues that have been described as indicators
of positive development.
I have already noted that there are interindividual differences in the degree to
which people value specific contents. There is a wide range of areas of interest.
Why some people internalize specific standards (that are rejected by others) is not
yet well understood in detail; it is probably the result of a mixture of social
conventions and cultural development on the one hand and information
processing, by which the individual develops his or her preferences, compares,
and makes decisions (based on previous experience, attention, and expectations),
on the other. The diverging viewpoints, e.g. how deeply an individual should
become involved in a society, can lead to subjective discrepancies and pressure – a
starting point that makes evident why people change or defend their priorities.
Through the ages, the significance of several life themes has waxed and waned.
In the following final section, I would like to emphasize that meaning dimensions
follow a long tradition. They are anchored in human cultural history and may be
learned from our ancestors, who have tried to solve similar life problems within
their cultural-historical context.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to the interconnectedness of
developmental goals with areas of human action and culture. The following
dimensions of meaning and areas of human action are representative for all
people, although these human concerns are not equally important to all
individuals. These dimensions relate to basic questions or topics that are still
valid today and illustrate where people invest their resources and how they justify
whether their development has been positive. The fact that people have been
occupied with these concerns for several thousand years shows that there are no
conclusive answers; rather, the core of positive development is that we repeatedly
evaluate and affirm the tasks that evolve from the fields of actions. Fields of action
serve to illustrate the previously mentioned mutual relationship between actors
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and their socio-cultural surroundings (see Chapter 1) and to include at least the
basic features of the historical dimension, which should also be taken into
consideration when ISD is the focus of interest. Some aspects of ISD, which were
addressed in earlier sections, will be discussed again. However, new aspects of a
positive life will also emerge. If one orders the criteria of positive development
according to contents of different life themes (and not according to psychological
areas of function) and if one emphasizes their long tradition, one can recognize
some regularities in human concerns among generations in different centuries.
Perhaps it is worth taking a final, somewhat historical look at the subject to avoid
getting lost in the wealth of psychological processes, some of which are very
abstract.

Zo-on politikon
Intention and action have a genuinely social and practical perspective. In practical
life, for instance, approaches to the world that consider what is important and
meaningful are characterized by interindividual different priorities. According
to Aristotle’s practical philosophy, a major element in an individual’s best life is
seen in the realization of his or her social potential. An individual’s task or need
to recognize him- or herself as playing a central role as ‘political animal’ is
reflected in the term zōon politikon (Aristotle, 1984; Book 1). Based on Plato’s
Statesman, Aristotle describes the ancient Greek city-states, and he claims that
humanity is designated to build states or communities. Both the city-state and
political rule belong to human nature. Polis, a body of citizens as a basis for
society, has many implications. Humanity is not simply an individual. The
welfare of the polis is the welfare of its citizens, as part of the polis, and citizens
of a free polis identify themselves with the polis. Everybody has been appointed
to play his or her part and shares responsibility according to his or her possibilities.
Powerful characters (persons in high positions) take responsibility for many
people and carry the load of the common good. The laws that we currently
establish or adapt to current requirements are based on previous experience and
provide a basis for social organization.
Long before the age of globalization, economic affairs and trade were
conceived as domestic affairs. Economics (oikonomia), understood as the doctrine
(nomos) of the house (oikos), denotes the everyday affairs among family members,
masters, and servants in the household. The household secures an individual’s
material existence, but successful existence also comprises family, clan, village,
and participation in societal life. Politics (the doctrine of the polis) and related
concepts, such as the regulation of trade and commerce, refer to social rules,
contracts, and fair play among several partners. Political ideologies, religions,
ethical orientations, and just-world motives (Maes, 1998) have been negotiated
for centuries. In Chapters 3 and 4, I made an attempt to explain the complicated
connections among emotions, attention processes, intentions, and decisions. The
desire for a just world (also as a global development goal) is widespread, but its
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  135

implementation is difficult. We know that justice motives can be used to justify

taking the law into one’s own hands and can lead to aggression and violence to
defend against a threat. Conversely, however, justice motives can also serve as a
source of calmness. Impatient urges to change the fundamental conditions of
existence or efforts to contemplate existence from a lofty vantage point open a
large spectrum of options that can be chosen in concrete situations. In socio-
psychological arrangements, specific conditions can be experimentally varied to
induce concrete decisions. The development of specific intentions (from
education to adjustment of aspirations) is characterized by many sub-processes
that we cannot measure in psychological experiments.

Love and work

In addition to social responsibility, ISD encompasses the experience of intimate
relationships, which are among the most important facets of meaning for many.
‘Love and work, work and love… that is all there is.’ This quotation is ascribed
to Sigmund Freud and refers to a basic part of human life that becomes a challenge
for all adults. Both areas mark a large part of adult life and consist of many facets
that must be kept in balance in everyday life. Positively valued attributes such as
passion, selfless devotion, self-disclosure, or attempts to manage crises converge
with the experience of love. This complex mixture of qualities is sometimes
described as secret and mysterious (‘the magic of love’). Related emotions of
jealousy make it evident that we are dealing with a fluctuating magic. The belt
of charm that is used in Greek fable to portray the goddess of beauty can pass over
what is less or not beautiful. This belt possesses the power to endow the one who
wears it with grace and the ability to obtain love. Thus, grace is a changeable
beauty. Currently, we are not accustomed to contacting Venus for wish fulfilment.
The fluctuating nature of love is still obvious, but we find ourselves confronted
with alternative options for addressing the yearning to be loved. The multifaceted
scope of love and its emotional nuances illustrate different action tendencies.
Benevolence, desire, compassion, or love for oneself have similar meanings, but
they are not the same concepts. We can desire specific advantages, and somebody
can be loved according to a certain function inasmuch as he or she fulfils this
function. In terms of the right balance, several components must be tempered.
Love is vitalized through the free play of forces between intimacy and desire,
closeness and distance, excess and moderation. The double nature of love – being
loved and giving love – is characterized by mutual dependency. If one loves, one
does not want the Beloved to be offended. The limits of intentionality become
evident in that love is bestowed upon us, and the Beloved is free to give love. The
experience that love is not a constant feeling of happiness (‘Ay me! for aught that
I could ever read, Could ever hear by tale or history, The course of true love
never did run smooth’, Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream), demonstrates
its embeddedness into life challenges and shows that love is a process that unfolds
its meaning and value against the background of adversity and vulnerability.
136  Balance and dimensions of meaning

Long-term relationships are a developmental context that provides positive

consequences as well as limits. Not all relationships are close and intimate. The
quality of partner relationships is related to couples’ and to children’s well-being
(Kinnunen & Rantanan, 2006). Regarding the health-related problems that
become increasingly common with ageing, spouses may compensate for one
another and mutually benefit in terms of domestic tasks, health maintenance, and
emotional support (Hoppmann & Gerstorf, 2016). Partner regulation, that is,
individuals trying to change conflicting attributes in their partners, can improve
relationships and resolve problems. When such regulation attempts are not
sensitive to the partner’s feelings, they can also have some costs (Simpson et al.,
2016). Couple conflicts and divorce are among those events that are experienced
as comparatively demanding and stressful.
The development of close relationships is not isolated from other life domains.
The concept of work–life balance refers to difficulty balancing work and family or
leisure time. Ideally, both parts can stimulate each other. A positive work–life
balance consists of a minimum of role conflict, that is, satisfaction and good
functioning at work, at home, or anywhere else. The importance of work results
from its essential contribution to securing survival. Being in a position to earn
one’s livelihood is not only an individual need but is also necessary for family and
the stability of society. It is a luxury to be able to be idle. Sometimes human
dignity is measured on the basis of the ability to work. Given that many adults
spend a great deal of time working and that self-definition and living are highly
dependent on work for many people, job satisfaction and work-related quality of
life have become important goals for the individual as well as the organization.
Improving working conditions is a widespread societal matter.
The supply of and support for speedy and quality services has taken considerable
time from many workers, sometimes even after working hours. The many
sources of work-related stress (e.g. insecure forms of employment, the problem of
fair wages, competition in business and mobbing, shift work, inefficient time and
resource management, physical and mental demands) place strains on regulating
factors and organizational structures. Exaggerated expectations can be imposed
by personal standards (pursuing a career). Organizational policies that support
actions that appear to further social good, beyond what is required by law or the
interests of the firm, are sensitive to ecological aspects and interpersonal relations
(e.g. the concept of corporate social responsibility). Such policies provide an open
repertoire of action strategies that can be pursued other than, or in addition to,
the maximization of profit. The comparatively broad concept of human capital
refers to the set of knowledge and talents (i.e. individual talents and skills,
education, motivational factors) and acknowledges immaterial values that are
believed to contribute to the economic success of organizations. Between
commercial and ethical considerations arises the question of the role of ageing
employees. With regard to the phase of retirement, which is regarded as less
profitable in the economic sense, a change in perspective towards ideal goals such
as mental and emotional talents has been suggested. Such a mentality change is
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  137

assumed as a precondition for meaning finding when a decrease in physical

abilities becomes evident.
What does this mean in terms of positive development? These aspects alone
show that a specific development goal (e.g. living in a state of positive work–life
balance) depends on many sub-steps (e.g. how one lives an ideal partnership,
whether or not one produces more or higher quality). How positive individuals
evaluate their situation depends on the availability of action or meaning resources
(that we can use and evaluate). It is important to note that role conflicts that
challenge quality of life are not restricted to employed adults. Rearing a child
and caring for aged family members can also lead to physical and emotional
stress. Interestingly, sometimes it is especially the unwaged work and voluntary
commitment – the turn away from private consumption – that is valued as a
source of meaning and is used to determine the ethos of a society. Which specific
criteria individuals use to define positive development in the realms of work and
love (and intimate relationships) is an empirical question. This process includes
balancing between personal interests and decorum.

Homo ludens, beauty, and the art of living

Another dimension of meaning refers to playing in the broad sense of the word.
Doing something for its own sake (‘I write poems just for fun’) and related
experiences such as joy or flow are considered characteristics of a fulfilled life.
Csikszentmihályi (1990) described flow as being completely involved in an
activity for its own sake – a state of concentration or complete absorption with
the activity at hand and the situation. The slogan ‘art for art’ is often conceived
to express that art is complete in itself. The art of thinking beautifully (aesthetic
experiences) refers to emotional reactions that occur when we experience a work
of art. This process denotes the interaction between a stimulus and cognitive-
emotional processing. One can use the term of beauty to refer to (aesthetic)
objects, occurrences, or activities (sunset, painting, a piece of music, a game).
Pleasure refers to the feeling a person experiences. Both denote the same
interaction. Psychological models have described aesthetic experiences in terms
of sensory, perceptual, and cognitive processing (Leder et  al., 2004; Palmer,
Schloss, & Sammartino, 2013). The model of aesthetic appreciation and
judgement (Leder et  al., 2004) comprises a sequence of five processing stages:
perceptual analysis, implicit memory, explicit classification, cognitive mastering,
and evaluation. Aesthetic judgements and aesthetic emotions are the two outputs
of the model. In the following section, I illustrate the role of meaning by using
concepts of aesthetic experience in the context of play. Playing encompasses the
components of intentionality and activity (one is doing something intentionally
and with attention) and the association with rules (conventions, social norms,
rules of playing cards). Both are involved in the process of aesthetic experience.
In the following, I would like to delineate some aspects that are characteristic of
or may contribute to this experience.
138  Balance and dimensions of meaning

Facets of play as action orientation and values: The Dutch historian Johan Huizinga
reminded us that homo faber (‘man the maker’) is associated with homo ludens
(‘man who enjoys playing’). Homo ludens is a term or anthropological model that
emphasizes the importance of the play element of culture and society. Play is a
basic element of human culture: ‘… play is a voluntary activity or occupation
executed within certain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely
accepted but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a
feeling of tension, joy and the consciousness that it is different from ordinary life’
(Huizinga, 1949, p. 28). According to Huizinga, play is a voluntary activity. It is
done at leisure, during ‘free time’. The examples he used to examine the contrast
between play and seriousness include ceremonies and masquerades, contests and
races, the romping of young dogs, exhibitions, performances, dancing, and
music. In choosing these examples, he carefully elaborates situations that
emphasize the joy and delight of life but also hints at the reasons for negative
symptoms.
I would like to note that the things someone likes can differ tremendously
from person to person. In naming some, there is a danger of overlooking others.
Completeness is not intended. The following examples illustrate the abundance
of life but also the relative nature of preferences that is characteristic of an
intentional perspective. Aesthetic responses are too variable to serve as putative
prototypes, and there may be some individuals who have negative experiences
with prototypes that are valued by others. The sneer ‘They look like they came
from a dollhouse’ could provoke somebody to defend his/her preferences for
decorative boxes or dishes. Squabbles about taste sometimes take on the character
of a lasting and embittered clash of opinion, but it seems that the related ambiguity
contributes to interindividual differences in preferences and aesthetical
orientations. Nonetheless, the art of thinking beautifully and the ability to look
at affairs in a playful way remains a criterion for positive development across the
lifespan. I concentrate on a few examples that illustrate the dynamic facets of
playing and its interconnection to intentions, actions, and meaning. In visual arts
and musical arts, a strong play element may be called essential. The manipulation
of musical instruments is called ‘playing’. The essential nature of all musical
activity is play – a component of music that is often admired due to the many
talents and skills involved (e.g. components of play such as virtuosity, the ability
to communicate with band members, superior ease).
Similar to all human actions, play is constituted by the application of rules.
Regardless of whether you play an instrument or listen to your favourite band,
regardless of whether your sportiness involves physical training or is limited to
watching world championships, the enjoyment of competitive impulses or just
passing the time require knowledge of the rules to a certain degree. To explain
the purpose and enjoyment of a move in a particular sport to an outsider, one
should initiate him or her into the rules of that game. The question of how
knowledge of rules can contribute to the differentiation of taste and pleasure in
a specific domain is tempting and remains open.
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  139

Flow and cognitive demand: Which factors predict whether we enjoy activities?
With regard to the role of cognitive demand, that is, the ease of cognitive
processing, psychological theories suggest an easy to medium level of processing.
The fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure (Reber, 2014) claims that people prefer visual
displays to the extent that they are processed more easily. If information about an
object is quickly processed, one feels positive affect that is experienced as beauty.
The effect of the complexity of information processing on preferences also
interacts with expertise. In terms of arousal theory (Berlyne, 1974), aesthetic
pleasure is a function of arousal, but it decreases as arousal becomes too great, for
instance, if one is not familiar with the rules. If arousal drops below the optimal
level, the organism will seek stimulation. Berlyne claims that arousal is best and
most effective at a moderate level. Moderating factors are novelty, complexity,
unexpectedness, and incongruity.
Imitation: Some types of pleasure can be evoked by repetition or imitation.
Examples include the execution of rule-based action, movements, or the
imitation of motoric skills. Successful motoric performance ( juggling) or the
creation of visual or acoustical effects are activities that are executed because they
affect flow experience or create a satisfying product. Repeated patterns on carpets
and shower curtains, Arabic arabesques on the front of a building, or a squiggly
script serve as adornments and can enhance the impression of something special.
Play with ornamentation has the function of drawing attention to an object and
enhancing its value – sometimes for the enjoyment of the beholder. Of course,
the artist’s livelihood will be secured if he or she is able to amaze the audience.
The idea of ‘mimesis’ has governed the creation of works of art that correspond
to the physical world and has been used to evaluate the quality of an art object.
The use of the concept of mimesis shifted from ‘imitation of nature’ to ‘imitation
of other examples or other authors’.
Imitation and breaking rules: Sometimes, we enjoy a game if we break the rules –
and we should not ignore that rule-breaking has several meanings. One refers to
creativity, particularly to the creation of something new or to giving up traditional
norms that sometimes are experienced as a restriction. The composition of a
fugue is based on a complex theory and rules that concern matters of texture.
Johann Sebastian Bach, a master of fugue techniques, extended the rules (‘Bach
shows the same shocking ignorance of the rules here [referring to his last work,
Die Kunst der Fuge] as he showed in fugues written at large’; Tovey, 1949, p. 43).
How far rules and deviations from existing rules are accompanied by pleasure,
approval, or outrage is a question of temperament and expectation (cf. preference,
subjective norms, level of tolerance) in the face of social expectations. Some
types of rule deviations are associated with the progressing emancipation of arts,
whereas in other contexts, they include a moral component. In a social context,
play actions and games with rules receive or gain meaning from the motivation
to cooperate and compete. Nonetheless, deviations from rules are accepted to
some degree in the context of fair play. It remains an intriguing question how
many tournaments have been held and won without violations of the rules.
140  Balance and dimensions of meaning

From a psychological point of view, the interconnection between play and

imitation has been elaborated by Jean Piaget. According to Piaget (1962), play
involves schemas that are susceptible to being purely for functional pleasure. Play
can also lead from activity to representations and mediate the transition from
sensory to mental adaptation. Ludic activities are maintained and repeated as a
function of assimilation. Imitation is a type of systematic accommodation to
spatial conditions and to models that are virtual but not actually usable. Imitation,
as well as the mental imitation of an absent model, lead to differentiation and
coordination between ‘signifier’ and ‘signified’. The transition from general
imitation to specific movements is a result of training. We become familiar
through imitation.
The pleasure of mastering ludic activities contributes to a feeling of virtuosity.
Differentiation and expertise serve as implicit or explicit criteria of taste inasmuch
the differentiation of rules or details develops the standards of evaluation. A
differentiated knowledge of rules or expertise in a specific domain is not sufficient
for enjoyment but nonetheless contributes to the development of aesthetic
judgement criteria.
L’art pour l’art and the art of living: The motivation or willingness to find meaning
in the playful and aesthetical facets of life is conceptually closely related to
Sternberg’s concept of cognitive style or thinking style (Zhang, Sternberg, &
Rayner, 2012). In contrast to performance constructs such as cognitive abilities
(intelligence), intellectual styles refer to people’s preferences or preferred manner
of dealing with tasks and processing information. Regarding goals, one can
speak of an orientation towards activities that make life beautiful. Interestingly,
emotional valence is often focused on activities that do not seem relevant for
survival or reproduction but, rather, are executed for their own sake. The slogan
‘art for art’ is often used to convey that art is divorced from any moral or utilitarian
function. I assume that the slogan ‘art completes itself ’ becomes an empty phrase
or exaggeration if one claims that the experience of art or art itself is without
limits or has no purposes or preconditions. The French philosopher Victor
Cousin (1845) placed demands on the open-mindedness of our power of
judgement. ‘Il faut comprendre et aimer la morale pour la morale, la religion
pour la religion, l’art pour l’art’ [One needs to comprehend and like morality for
morality’s sake, …] (Cousin, 1845, p. 799).
In ample philosophical concepts, such as ‘aesthetics of existence’ (Foucault,
1988) and ‘art of life’ (‘Lebenskunst’, Schmid, 1998), human life and self-
development are subject to the perspective of aesthetically differentiating
processes. The art of life or living refers to the conscious leading and continuous
formation of life. In the interplay of knowledge and powerful relationships, the
relation to oneself and one’s existence constitutes an important field in which
aesthetic values are to be applied. The art of aesthetic life conduct in this broad
sense also includes moral questions and action competence. Similar to conceptions
of wisdom, it can be understood as an ideal realization of the balance between
knowledge and virtue.
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  141

Transcendence, religious beliefs, and spiritual experience

Religions have lost their normative and moral functions for many people.
Auguste Comte’s influential law of three stages holds that, due to the natural law
of the human mind, all progress of knowledge develops through three mental
stages: from the theological and metaphysical stages to the positive stage. The
science of society represents the apex of this progression (see de Lubac, 1995).
Although economic questions and the man as maker are the current focus of
attention (‘Man makes religion’; Karl Marx), religious orientations and mythical
experiences are still represented in everyday life in different ways. Several studies
have provided evidence that religious belief can prevent depression and change
goal focuses. Participants reminded of God have demonstrated motivational
changes (e.g. decreased active goal pursuit and increased temptation resistance)
(for an overview, see Laurin & Kay, 2016). Correlations between religiosity and
subjective well-being can be partly explained by mediating factors such as
perceived control ( Jackson & Bergeman, 2011), social support in the community,
and charity activities. The meaningful role of social relations is acknowledged in
many religions, but for some denominations, it is not completely reducible to
interpersonal relations (see Martin Buber’s I-Thou relation; Buber, 1958).
Of course, not all spiritual branches are burdened with the question of whether
God exists. Mythical ecstasies or revelations (‘Then, suddenly dear friend, one
turned into two – and Zarathustra walked into my view’; Nietzsche, 1882/1954)
are comparatively rare experiences. For uninspired people, such experiences
might be disconcerting, but for some people, such experiences might be motivation
for meditative exercises. Meditative contemplation and mindfulness exercises
have been found to regulate anxiety, subjective well-being, and relaxation (see
mindfulness-based stress reduction). They might be suitable for those who wish
to bring order into daily life and to dampen the effects of everyday stress. Doctrines
of enlightenment that can be used as basic orientations are also available for the
interested user. How mental states such as those achieved during mindfulness
meditation are related to physical or neuronal changes is still a challenging
problem for research. Bringing attention to one’s breath, a sound, or a sensation or
enjoying the present are mental states that can be compared with the default mode
network of a neuronal activity. Consequently, determining the type of mental
training that can change the neuronal structure is an area of research interest that
has developed during recent years. As the branch of astrology demonstrates, a not-
marginal part of society believes that the movements and relative positions of
planets can influence human life (among other factors). In everyday life, intentions
are not closely tied to the results of natural-science research.

Summary and concluding remarks

In sum, positive ageing presupposes having goals and standards for evaluation,
but there is no single answer to the question of what ‘positive’ means. Social,
hedonic, and religious value systems are applied to define what ‘positive’
142  Balance and dimensions of meaning

development means and provide normative standards according to which

individuals can evaluate their own life and that of others. Concrete, binding
standards can vary from person to person. Similarly, Harry Frankfurt has
described such concerns from the perspective of human care: ‘… we are interested
in deciding what to do with ourselves … because we therefore need to understand
what is important or, rather, what is important to us’ (Frankfurt, 1982, p. 257).
From the ISD perspective, the priority is to illustrate and explain how intentions
are interconnected with consequences that are valued by individuals in their
social context (e.g., satisfaction with life, moral conflicts). Age-related experiences
of loss in the second half of life and a reduced remaining life-time perspective
have been used to explain why older adults turn their attention to meaning and
value resources. Age-related increases in accommodative coping (re-evaluation,
re-orientation, acceptance) explain why older adults can find fulfilment in
meaning dimensions despite physical decline.
The concept of resilience and the tendency to make mistakes illustrate that
positive development is a process in the face of adversity. From a developmental
view, resilience does not refer to stable, protective factors but to a process that
needs to be renewed. This means that adaptive resources can fail. We have a
permanent task of coping with and adapting to discrepancies. Jean de La
Fontaine’s (2000) fable Le Coq et la Perle reminds us that satisfaction with life
depends on personal standards: One day, a cockerel was scratching at the ground when
he found a pearl. He ran to a jeweller and said, ‘I believe it is precious, but a grain of corn
would have been more use’. The same thing happened to an ignorant man. He was left a
manuscript and hurriedly took it to a neighbouring bookseller. ‘I believe it is valuable, but
a coin would have been better’. Intentional development across the lifespan means
that we make an effort to regulate our demands. The standards of comparison
that we have in mind when we evaluate outcomes are beyond our personal
control. How to best cope with events that do not fit our expectations is a
permanent question. Goals and standards can change during adulthood, and it
seems that this mental flexibility contributes to the development of life satisfaction.
Happiness is not a permanent or stable affair anyway. Lifelong development
includes processes of adaptation and learning. The ability to remain flexible (e.g.
to learn, to recognize positive action alternatives) seems to be an important task;
however, it cannot be accomplished completely by wishes or intentional efforts.
Balance, growth, equilibrium, integration, or orchestration are challenging
concepts in developmental psychology. They have been used to characterize the
epitome of human development. Following psychological models of developmental
regulation (e.g. Labouvie-Vief, 2015; Piaget, 1977), I used the metaphor of balance
to illustrate that maintaining balance is a challenge across the whole lifespan.
However, what exactly should be balanced? I have focused on this book on mental
processes such as emotion, motivation, and cognition. From the ISD point of
view, balance refers to the range of action and the affairs we are concerned with
personal interests versus the common good or self-other relationships (Staudinger
& Kunzmann, 2005; Sternberg, 1998), pursuit and adjustment of goals
 Balance and dimensions of meaning  143

(Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Greve et al., 2005), cognition and emotion
(Labouvie-Vief, 1984), and cognitive structures (Piaget, 1977).
Intentions and action imply personal control (e.g. self-efficacy). Depending on
whether we attribute our situation to our own efforts or to chance encounters,
our preferences for specific coping strategies will differ. Strategic or ‘intelligent’
use of coping actions can be useful in problem situations that include more or less
suitable ways of problem solving. In many life situations, however, simple right
or wrong categories are not applicable. The radius of possible interpretations is
manifold. We differentiate between play and seriousness, and we can reach an
agreement about preferences. As a possible result, we evaluate our success in life
with mixed feelings. I have pointed out several times that balance is not
exclusively or primarily a matter of desire: We are not completely free to decide
which goals or outcomes we evaluate positively. Instead, such evaluation depends
on our biographical background (learning history), situational factors, and short-
term, automatic mental processes that are not under personal control.
Nevertheless, we make decisions about which options are worth pursuing and
protecting and thus evaluate the resulting consequences of (our) actions according
to personal standards and social norms. On this basis, positive development can
be defined as an ability to affirm one’s life and maintain a standard of ethos,
despite adversity and age-related losses.
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INDEX
Note: Bold page number denotes Table. Italic page number denotes Figure
accommodation, unintentional processes
of 51; see also developmental
regulation
accommodative coping forms 13
achievement-related choices 80
acting self 2; see also intentional
self-development
action 16, 103, 134; field 128; orientation
62–63; rules 103–104; sequences
88; structure of 103
adaptation-level theory 96
aerobic capacity 30
aesthetic; appreciation and judgement
model 137; pleasure, fluency theory
139; see also meaning
affect 55; balance 67; complexity 118;
optimization 118; role of 65; see also
intentional control
affective; -evaluative processes 60;
neuroscience 41–42; processing in
action regulation 68–69; see also
intentional control
ageing; Berlin Aging Study 28; changes in
adulthood 25, 26, 27; coping with
illness 30–33; decline of organ
functioning 29; and declines
26–29, 108; fountain of youth 26;
illness constellation model 31;
impairments and diseases 29–30;
interpretative processes 32; losses 36,
37, 142; positive 141; self-
regulating processes 28;
stereotypes 77; Type A behaviour
29; see also neurological system
ageing
‘all life is problem solving’ 107
aptitude-treatment interaction (ATI) 58
Aristotle’s practical philosophy 134
arousal theory 139
art; of life or living 140; of thinking
beautifully 137; see also meaning
ATI see aptitude-treatment interaction
attentional system, supervisory 88
attention and cognitive control 87–88
attitude 69; adaptive function 77; attitude
strength 72; -behaviour gap 61;
changeability of 71–74; explicit 76;
implicit 76–77; to intentions 69;
moderating processes 70–71; and
values 75–76
attitude objects; component theory of 93;
as function of component structure
94
attribution 79; causal 81; dimensions 81,
82; theory 80–83
attributional dimensions 81, 82
autobiographical memory 101–103
automatic; affective processing 68–69;
information processing 87;
see also intentional control
166 Index
balance 123, 124, 141; action field 128;
balanced judgement 124;
balanced processing 68;
dialectical thinking 124–125;
dual-process model 126; and
equilibrium 127; freedom of
interpretation 128–131;
individuation 126; integrative
thought 125; from intentional
point of view 128;
in psychological models 124–128;
reflective thinking 125;
relativistic thinking 125;
see also intentional control
balanced processing 68
beauty 137; see also meaning
behavioural competence 115
behaviour; human 19; Type A 29
Berlin Aging Study 28
biocultural co-construction 23; see also
intentional self-development
biographies, study of 14–15
biological and neural processes 38; human
intentionality 39; implications
42–44; intentional states 44; and
mental states 43; module 39;
see also brain
brain 23; activity 39–40, 42; emotional
circuits 41–42; imaging techniques
39; primary motor cortex 40;
readiness potential 39; volition and
brain regions 39–41
brain plasticity 34; cognitive mechanics
35; cognitive pragmatics 35–36;
see also neurological system ageing
calculation 79
cancer 30
causal attribution 81
chance encounters 25, 47
choices, achievement-related 80
chronic diseases 29
cognition 87; mechanics of 35; see also brain
plasticity
cognitive-motivational processes 79, 87,
90, 104; action 88, 103; adaptation-
level theory 96; attitude objects 93,
94; attributions 79, 80–83; choices
80; congruity and dissonance
91–93; expectation 79;
expectation-value models 80;
heuristics 83–85; human thinking
92; influences of 88–89; intentions
with non-intended mental
processes 90; judgements 93–96;
learning and differentiation
99–101; learning and memory
98–99; logical-connection argument
103; memory 101–103; of ISD 60;
perception and context effects
96–98; problem-solving efforts 91;
resource maximization 80; schema
101; supervisory attentional system 88;
uncertainty and randomness
85–87; valence of semantic
self-images 102
cognitive consistency 92
cognitive control 87–88
cognitive development theory 125
cognitive discrepancy 126
cognitive dissonance theory 92
cognitive pragmatics 35–36
cognitive routines and mental set 90–91
competence 8
concepts of turning point in life 13
congruity 91–93
conscious control 87
constitutive rules 104
constructivism 22; see also intentional
self-development
contemporary psychology 58
context effects 96–98
contextual models 21–22
contingence 11; see also intentional
self-development
control-dependency principle 68–69;
see also intentional control
control theories 8; see also intentional
self-development
coping 31; with loss and trauma 32
counter-regulation principle 68–69;
see also intentional control
deadlines, developmental 8, 25, 47
decision-making 83
decisions and heuristics 83–85
dementias 34
depressive mood 89
development 52; equilibrium and
disequilibrium 110; equilibrium
and self 111–112; equilibrium zone
110; evaluation criteria for 109;
Labouvie-Vief ’s model 110;
prerequisites and challenges 25,
52–53; sources of behaviour and
57–59; stability, growth, and
decline 112–113; see also intentional
self-development; positive
development; resilience; well-being
and developmental maturity

developmental deadlines 8, 25, 47
developmental growth 4
developmental plasticity 23
developmental regulation 48; dual-process
model of assimilation and
accommodation 50–51; intentional
self-regulation 52; limits of
intentional control 51; models of
48; motivational theory of lifespan
development 49–50; SOC model
48–49; unintentional processes of
accommodation 51
developmental states 103
developmental system theories 21–22
developmental tasks 13, 25, 44–45
dialectical thinking 124–125
differentiation, learning and 99–101
dissonance 91–93
dopamine 41
dual-process model 50–51, 89, 109, 126;
see also developmental regulation
dysphoric mood 89
ecological systems theory 21; see also
intentional self-development
economics 134
EEG see electroencephalography
ego; depletion 63; development 118
electroencephalography (EEG) 39
emotional content of experience 102
emotions 41, 65; brain circuits 41–42;
emotional ageing 66; negative 66,
115; regulation 67–68; see also
intentional control
empty-nest syndrome 45
encounters, chance 25, 47
eudaimonic well-being 116, 117
executive function 7
expectation 79
expectation-value models 80
experience-related factors 77
explicit attitudes 76
extreme judgements 93
feedback system 6
feelings 7
fixedness, functional 91
fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure 139
fluid intelligence 35
fMRI see functional magnetic resonance
imaging
fountain of youth 26; see also ageing
functional fixedness 91
functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) 39
Index  167
Gestalt psychology 91
goals 64
health-psychological models 37
healthy lifestyle 36
hedonic well-being 116–117
heuristics 84–85
homo ludens 138
HPA see hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
human; behaviour 19; capital 136;
intentionality 39; thinking 92
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) 41
IAT see Implicit Association Test
ideal developmental states 103
illness constellation model 31; see also ageing
illness experience 31
imitation 139; play and 140; see also
meaning
Implicit Association Test (IAT) 76
individual will 38
individuation 126
influential law of three stages 141
instrumental strategies 65
instrumental value 74
integrative thought 125
intelligence 12; fluid 35
intention 16, 40, 134; -behaviour gap 61;
between conscious and
unconscious processes 59–61;
interconnection of events and
56–57; with non-intended mental
processes 90; and non-intentional
events 55–56; and prediction of
moment 56
intentional control 65; affective processing
68–69; control-dependency
principle 69; counter-regulation
principle 68–69; emotion
regulation 67–68; limits 51, 65;
socio-emotional development
66–67; see also developmental
regulation
intentional self 17; as co-producer of
culture and development 16
intentional self-development (ISD) 1, 24;
acting self 2; biocultural
co-construction 23; constructivism
22; contextual models and
developmental system theories 21–22;
developmental plasticity 23;
ecological systems theory 21; examples
3; intraindividual change and
stability 15; mechanistic models
18–20; metaphor of roles in life
168 Index
intentional self-development (ISD)
(Continued)
2–4; prerequisites of 18;
psychological approaches to 4; self
and identity 5; self-cultivation
9–11; self-efficacy and control 8–9;
self-efficiency 9–11; self-regulation
5; steam-whistle hypothesis 18;
theoretical perspectives 17; time
perspective 2, 7
intentional self-regulation 52, 61
intentional self-regulation theories 61
intentional states 44
intentions to actions 61, 143; action
orientation 62–63; attitude-
behaviour gap 61; ego depletion
63; mental control strategies
62–64; problem solving 64; state
orientation 62; volition theory 62;
well-defined problems 64
interindividual differences 27, 38
interpersonal everyday problems 64
interpretative processes 32
ISD see intentional self-development
judgement; balanced 124; preference and
similarity 93–96; similarity
judgements of two nationalities 97
judgements, extreme 93
learning; and differentiation 99–101;
lifelong 98–99
life; events 45; finding meaning in 13;
management 12–13; perceived
quality of 115; plans 12–13, 44;
review 13–14; tasks 47;
-threatening diseases 30
lifespan psychology 112–113
lifestyle and physical exercise 36–38;
age-related losses 36;
compensation for age-related losses
37; health-psychological models
37; healthy lifestyle 36;
interindividual differences 38;
see also neurological system ageing
limbic-related cortex regions 41
logical-connection argument 103
love and work 135–137
maximization of resources 80
meaning 131; arousal theory 139; art of
life or living 140; art of thinking
beautifully 137; beauty 137;
dimensions of 131–141; economics
134; essential components of
132–133; fluency theory of aesthetic
pleasure 139; functions of creating
131; homo ludens 138; human capital
136; imitation 139; in life 132;
love and work 135–137; model of
aesthetic appreciation and
judgement 137; partner
relationships 136; play and
imitation 140; playing 138;
pleasure 137; politics 134; positive
development 137; PURE model
132–133; rule-breaking 139;
willingness to find meaning in life
140; work–life balance 136; work-
related stress 136
mechanics of cognition 35
memory 98–99, 102; autobiographical
101–103
mental processes 142
mental processes in social context 55;
basic formula 58; cognitive-
motivational processes of ISD 60;
contemporary psychology 58;
intentions and non-intentional
events 55–56; intentions and
prediction of moment 56;
intentions between conscious and
unconscious processes 59–61;
interconnection of events and
intentions 56–57; momentary
intentions 57; participative
perception 57; sources of
behaviour and development
57–59
mental set 90, 91
mental states 19; neurobiological events
and 43
mental time experiences 12
mere-exposure effect 99
midlife 76
midlife transition (midlife crisis) 45;
empty-nest syndrome 45; lenient
conceptualization of 46; stage
theories 46–47
mimesis 139
model of aesthetic appreciation and
judgement 137; see also meaning
momentary intentions 57
mood, depressive 89
motivational; phase 62; theory 49–50;
see also developmental regulation
motivation theorists 80
negative emotions 115
Nestors 103

neurological system ageing 33; cognitive
decline 33, 42; lifestyle and
physical exercise 36–38;
see also brain plasticity
neuroscience 38; emotional brain circuits
and affective 41–42; of human
intentionality 39
non-intentional processes 55
non-normative events 47–48
participative perception 57
partner relationships 136
perceived quality of life 115
perception, participative 57
personality growth 117–120
personal wisdom 120
play and imitation 140
playing 138; see also meaning
pleasure 137; see also meaning
pleasure, fluency theory of aesthetic 139
Polis 134
politics 134
positive; ageing 141; appraisal style theory
107; coping strategies 107;
psychology 114
positive development 105, 120, 124, 137;
in face of adversity 105–106; role
of intentions 109; see also
development; resilience; well-
being and developmental maturity
pragmatics 35; see also brain plasticity
problem-solving strategies 65
problems, well-defined 64
psychological models, balance in 124–128
psychological theories of intentional
self-regulation 61
psychological well-being 115
psychology; Gestalt 91; lifespan 112–113
PURE model 132–133
quality of life 115
randomness, uncertainty and 85–87
rational-calculating processes 60
readiness potential 39
reflective thinking 125
reflexive deliberations 83
regulative rules 103
relativistic thinking 125
religions 141
repertory grid interview 22
resilience 105–106, 120, 142; as adaptive
processes 106; age-related declines
108; from developmental
perspective 106–109; difficulty of
Index  169
107; positive coping strategies 107;
role of intentions 109; see also
development; well-being and
developmental maturity
resource maximization 80
rule-breaking 139; see also meaning
schema 101
secondary control strategies see
accommodative coping forms
selection, optimization, and compensation
model (SOC model) 48–49;
see also developmental regulation
‘self ’ 5; acting 2; -conceptions 5; -control
8–9; monitoring 7; structural
features of 111; see also intentional
self-development
self-cultivation 9, 10; motivational
orientations of 10–11; prerequisites
of 11–12; see also intentional
self-development
self-efficiency 9; contingence 11;
motivational orientations of
10–11; prerequisites of 11–12;
see also intentional
self-development
self-memory system (SMS) 102;
model 14
self-regulation 5, 28; basic schema 6; central
information processes 7; executive
function 7; feedback system 6;
feelings 7; processes of self-
monitoring 7; see also intentional
self-development
simple counting rule 85
SMS see self-memory system
social artefacts 19
social clock 45
social cognitive neuroscience of human
intentionality 39
socio-emotional development 66–67;
see also intentional control
socio-emotional selectivity theory 66;
see also intentional control
socio-structural constraints 45
SOC model see selection, optimization,
and compensation model
spiritual experience 141
stages of developmental change 45
stage theories 45, 46
state orientation 62
steam-whistle hypothesis 18
strategic will 51; see also developmental
regulation
structuring processes 127
170 Index
study of biographies 14–15
subpersonal or unintentional processes of
accommodation 51; see also
developmental regulation
supervisory attentional system 88
terminal values 74
Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) 6
theory of wisdom 124
thinking, reflective 125
thinking, relativistic 125
thought, integrative 125
time perspectives 2, 7; biography study
14–15; finding meaning in life 13;
intentional self 16, 17; ISD study
14, 16–17; life management 12–13;
life review 13–14; mental time
experiences 12; and role of culture
12; self-memory system model 14;
turning point in life 13; see also
intentional self-development
TOTE see Test-Operate-Test-Exit
turning point in life, concepts of 13
Type A behaviour 29
uncertainty and randomness 85–87
unintentional processes of
accommodation 51; see also
developmental regulation
valence of semantic self-images 102
values 74; adaptive function of attitudes
77; age differences of attitudes and
75–76; implicit attitude
measurement 76–77; and
intentions 74
volition 12, 38, 40; competence of 62; and
involved brain regions 39–41;
phase of 62; theory 62
voluntary action 40
well-being and developmental maturity
113; affect complexity 118; affect
optimization 118; ego development
118; hedonic and eudaimonic
well-being 116–117; negative
emotions 115; positive psychology
114; quality of life 115; wisdom
and personality growth 117–120;
see also development; positive
development; resilience
will, individual 38
wisdom 117–120, 124
work–life balance 136
work-related stress 136
youth, fountain of 26; see also ageing
zōon politikon 134