International Journal of Managing Projects in Business

Ethics in project management: some Aristotelian insights

Christophe Bredillet
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Christophe Bredillet , (2014),"Ethics in project management: some Aristotelian insights", International
Journal of Managing Projects in Business, Vol. 7 Iss 4 pp. 548 - 565
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IJMPB
7,4
Ethics in project management:
some Aristotelian insights
Christophe Bredillet
Project Management Academy, Queensland University of Technology,
548 Brisbane, Australia

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to introduce, in the project management field, an Aristotelian
ethics lens moving beyond the classical deontological and consequentialism approaches underlying
the current ethical practices and codes of ethics and professional conducts. In doing so, the author
wishes to pose the premises of a debate on the implications of a conscious ethical perspective for the
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structure and agency relationship within the project management field.

Design/methodology/approach – Project management is a knowledge field on its own right.
However, the current perspectives applied to make sense and develop the field (modernism vs
postmodernism) leads to dichotomous thinking rather than recognizing the merits and contextual
validity of both sides. The author calls for Aristotelian ethics as a way of moving beyond this
dichotomous thinking. The author introduces briefly Aristotelian ethics and its consequences in term
of relation theory – practice, means and ends, facts and values and finally politics (i.e. being part of
a community of practitioners). Then the author illustrates some consequences for the field taking PMI Code
of Ethics and Professional Conduct and APM Code of Professional Conduct as supports for discussion.
Findings – The author suggests a need for revisiting and/or redesigning the codes of ethics and
professional conducts for project management according to an Aristotelian perspective, in order to
move beyond the normative limitations of classical deontological (conflict between competing duties,
exemplified by PMI Code) or consequentialism (focusing on the “right” outcome to the detriment of
duties, exemplified by APM Code) approaches (both, in fact, leading to a disconnection means and
ends, and facts and values). This implicates shifting the view from the question “what is my duty”? to
the questions “why should I undertake my duty”? and “how ought I act in this situation”?
Practical implications – Raising professional bodies, industry and education institutions
awareness and consciousness and leading them to rethink about codes of ethics and the implications
for the way they conceive practice and research, bodies of knowledge, credentialing, education, etc.
Originality/value – To the best of the author’s knowledge, this kind of discussion has not yet been
conducted within the project management field, and considering the implication of project management
in the life and for the well-being of the society, an ethical debate may present some value(s).
Keywords Aristotle, Ethics, Project management, Consequentialism, Deontology, Aristotelian ethics
Paper type Research paper

Project management has been acknowledged as an important knowledge field of

International Journal of Managing
Projects in Business
Vol. 7 No. 4, 2014
pp. 548-565
r Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1753-8378
DOI 10.1108/IJMPB-08-2013-0041
study considering the huge socio-economic impact of projects on our lives and on
society. Through projects we create our future (Bredillet, 2010). The project activities,
situations and contexts are managed and lead by project managers, making decisions,
using professional and/or industry standards practice, complying with all kind of
regulatory rules and regulations, managing pluralistic or conflicting interests amongst
various stakeholders, and committed to deliver the “best possible” outcome. Competent
project managers are acknowledged as important actors leading to successful projects,
and successful organizations (Crawford, 2005, p. 8). In our current way of apprehending
the field, we face tensions between decision making based on facts, i.e. what “is” and
also on values, i.e. “what ought be”, doing “right”, i.e. using “the right means” in
practice, finding the “right” balance of duty towards stakeholders with pluralistic or
 conflicting interests, delivering the “right” outcome, i.e. the best possible “end”. These Ethics in project
tensions are all deeply rooted in ethics[1]. management
From dichotomous thinking to ethics
Therefore, the underlying ethical approaches supporting the field, and consequently
the practice, have immense impact.
In order to specify what I mean by “field”, I use Audet’s definition of a knowledge 549
field (Audet, 1986):
[y] the space occupied by the whole of the people who claim to produce knowledge in this
field, and this space is also a system of relationships between these people competing to gain
control over the definition of the conditions and the rules of production of knowledge (p. 42).
Projects and their management are still failing to deliver the expected value(s). Therefore,
the field has been facing for years, since its inception I should write, number of
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questioning such as: Is this a profession (Hodgson, 2002)?, Do the professional bodies reify
the “discipline” (Hodgson, 2002)?, Are projects “objects”, contexts, or a name of a category
of what people “do” (Blomquist et al., 2010; Bredillet, 2013; Hällgren and Söderholm, 2011;
Hällgren and Lindahl, 2012)?, Is the body of knowledge built on too rationalist grounds
and do we need more critical foundations (Bredillet, 2010; Cicmil, 2006; Cicmil and
Hodgson, 2006)?, Is there any theory of project management (Bredillet, 2004, Bredillet,
2010)?, What is the value brought by standards and credentials (Bredillet, 2003; Hodgson
and Cicmil, 2007)?, How to train or educate project managers (Bourgault et al., 2006;
Lalonde et al., 2012)?, Do we need to rethink project management (Cicmil et al., 2006;
Winter et al., 2006)? or To reconstruct project management (Morris, 2013)?, etc. This list is
far from exhaustive, and raise ultimately the following question: what could offer research
in order to fill the theory-practice gap and lead projects practice be to more successful and
deliver better benefits? Authors, modernists and post-modernists, have partially
addressed these questions at the expense of holistic thinking (Bredillet et al., 2013a).
In fact, I argue that the fundamental dichotomy between theory and rigor vs
practice and relevance – and its related derivatives, with a focus of “practice”, such as
scholar external to situations vs practitioner natives of the situations, practice-turn
anchored in social unconscious habitus vs phronetic proposal emphasizing individual
consciousness (Bredillet, 2013, Bredillet et al., 2013b), individual lines of actions,
i.e. performative vs shared participants’ schemata, i.e. ostensive routines, central
prototypical vs peripheral non-prototypical patterns of actions in routines (Dionysiou
and Tsoukas, 2013) – as seen in our modern and postmodern time, one focusing on
facts and the other on values, precludes project management to unveil its full socio-
economical potential. On the one hand we face the assumptions underlying modern
time, grounded in “unity-of-science dream of transforming and reducing all kinds of
knowledge to one basic form and level” and cause-effects relationships (Eikeland, 2012,
p. 20), and on the other, the postmodern time interpretivist proposal, and its “tendency
to make all kinds of knowing equivalent” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20). Van Staveren rightly
points that the problem of this dichotomy between facts and values (Putnam, 2003)
“is that one excludes the other and is also favoured over the other, often without
any ground other than that the favoured notion is not the unflavoured notion”
(van Staveren, 2007, p. 22). Few authors have attempted to move beyond this
dichotomy modern vs postmodern: e.g. as Gauthier and Ika (2012) have focused on
the importance to consider different ontological facets, and Boisot and McKelvey
(2010) have suggested possible way to integrate the modernist and postmodernist
 IJMPB perspectives, taking a complexity science lens. However, we are missing a fundamental
7,4 underlying point having a profound impact on the field: “when the wise man points at
the moon, the fool looks at his finger”.
This fundamental underlying point is ethics. The purpose of this paper is to
discuss philosophically and illustrate through brief practical examples how an
ethics perspective can lead to new balanced insights contrasting the above-mentioned
550 limiting dichotomous thinking and eventually lead to an improvement of socio-economical
impact made by the field.
In order to do so, I call for Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy. In this,
I follow in this many authors building on pre-modern philosophies such as the
Aristotelian one (e.g. Gadamer, 1975; Habermas, 1971; MacIntyre, 1985, 1981/2007;
Toulmin, 1990; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Blomquist et al., 2010; Lalonde et al., 2012; Nussbaum,
1978). Tsoukas and Cummings (1997) note:
The past decade has witnessed a number of interesting shifts in the way people think about
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organizations. One of the most curious is the way in which much of the “new thinking” is
antithetical to mechanistic and rationalistic theories that have historically dominated
organization and management studies. This paper investigates this shift, and argues that this
new antithetical thinking can be interpreted as the re-surfacing, or recovery, of certain strands
of Aristotelian philosophy, strands that were marginalized with the rise of scientific
rationalism in the 17th century, before management and organization studies, as we tend to
conceive of them, began. The discussion presented here demonstrates the traditional
dominance of a disciplinary, mechanistic self-image in management studies, whereby the
field drew its boundaries in such a way as to exclude anything “other” than this (Tsoukas and
Cummings, 1997, p. 655).

Ethical and intellectual virtues

Eikeland suggests that the Aristotelian “gnoseology[2] allows for reconsidering and
reintegrating ways of knowing: “traditional, practical, tacit, emotional, experiential,
intuitive, etc., marginalised and considered insufficient by modernist [and post-
modernist] thinking” (Eikeland, 2012, pp. 20-21).

Ethics and ethical virtues

For the purpose of this discussion I refer to the main Aristotelian treaty on ethics, i.e.
the Nicomachean Ethics (1926) (I do not consider two other treatises, the Eudemian
Ethics and the Magna Moralia as the coverage is quite similar considering the purpose
of this paper). Many excellent sources are available and in the following highly
summarized introduction to ethics I mostly refer to Kraut (2014). For Aristotle, ethics
(and ethical virtues such as courage, temperance, friendship, justice, fairness, etc., and
prudence (phroneˆsis)) is intimately linked to the ultimate “end” of man, that is
improving our lives and achieving happiness and well-being (eudaimonia) both for
individuals and for the society. Ethics is the condition for making righteous actions
possible which in turn enable the development of right habits and, in turn, enable the
development of good character (arete#) (disposition (hexis) involving conscious choice)
leading to achieve happiness.
Ethics is thus practical knowledge rooted on experience and “good action”
oriented rather than just theoretical knowledge. Practical wisdom (phroneˆsis), being
both an ethical virtue and an intellectual virtue (Eikeland, 2008, p. 53), must be
acquire through practice and is not just about applying general understanding
to particular occasions – in his description of different types of virtuous persons
 Aristotle mention good leaders showing phroneˆsis (Aristotle, 1926, p. 1144b). Two Ethics in project
aspects should be emphasized: management
(1) every ethical virtue is a balanced condition to both excess and deficiency
(Aristotle, 1926, pp. 1106a26-b28); and
(2) ethical theory does not offer a decision procedure as ethics cannot be reduced to
a system of rules although some rules are uninfringeable. 551
Ethical theory illuminates the nature of virtue but what a virtuous agent must do in
particular occasion depends on the circumstances.

Intellectual virtues
Eikeland (2007, 2008, 2012) and Eikeland and Nicolini (2011) aptly discuss Aristotle
“gnoseology” (Eikeland, 2007) and emphasize that the limitations of the modern
and post-modern appropriation of Aristotle philosophy[3], especially with regards
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to the lack of understanding of nuances between the various concepts (virtues, ways
of knowing and knowledge forms) and the willingness to categorize these concepts
as being independent and therefore miss a fundamental point: for Aristotle, and
for the move beyond dichotomous thinking, here theory vs practice, “Theôrı́a was
not just speculation and calculation from a separate and insulated observatory”.
While meaning “something like studying for the purpose of understanding and
truth, without intervening, and without the study being subordinated to or
serving to promote any immediate plans for specific actions of any kind, [y]
acquired, practical, participant experience (Empeirı́a) was necessary” (Eikeland, 2008,
pp. 46-47).
Drawing on Eikeland (2007, 2012) we can summarize some key aspects of Aristotle
gnoseology.
Relational ways of knowing. Aristotle’s thinking about knowledge is fundamentally
and explicitly relational. The knower and the known always relate to each other in a
specific way. Relationships between means and ends are also specific to the different
ways of knowing. The ethico-political consequences of the different ways of knowing
are also explicitly considered.
Two forms of “theory” and episte#me#
[y] epistêmê, that is, for knowledge that was stabilised and pretty secure, about subjects that
were for the most part or always stable and regular themselves (Eikeland, 2007, p. 350).
The first form, called epistêmê1 or theôrı́a, where like in grammar there is no physical
distance between the knower and the known. “This means that the subjects studied –
our own forms of practice – must be ‘reified’ reflectively in order to be grasped, since
they are not really outside us or outside our practices at all” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 351,
2012, p. 24). Furthermore, “Theôrı́a [y] is about proceeding from within an activity,
making its ‘grammar’ explicit, opening new possibilities for action, and informing
mindful, caring, and wise conduct. [y] When conceived and formulated after a
grammatical model, theory as ‘Theôrı́a’ thus becomes a resource to be used in action
and for action to produce emancipatory visibilisation and expansive articulation”
(Eikeland and Nicolini, 2011, p. 169).
The second form, called theôrêsis or epistêmê2 is “based on observation at a distance.
Theôrêsis relates to external objects without intervening. The relation implied between
the knower and the known, is difference, distance, separation, non-interaction, and
non-interference (ex. astronomy)” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 349, 2012, p. 21).
 IJMPB Forms of “practice”
7,4 For Aristotle, praxis knowledge represents a relationship between colleagues sharing
common standards for how to go about their professional activities (Eikeland, 2007, p. 351,
2012, p. 26).
Praxis1, dialogue and dialectics: “the way of learning or research, moving ‘up’ from
how things appear to us phenomenologically to an articulated insight in basic
552 principles [y] searching patterns, similarities and differences in our accumulated
practical experience [y]” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 352, 2012, p. 27). However, “critical
dialogue needs relief from immediate pressure to act” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 29), and
“a permanent skholê (leisure – open, free space – school) embedded in practical settings
is needed, making it possible to develop, unfold, and articulate the ‘grammars’ of
different social settings” (Eikeland, 2006, p. 18).
Praxis2, phro nêsis: “the way down from ‘theory’ to ‘practice’ [y] the practical enactment is
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often immediate and spontaneous [y] but in other fields where the practice is not equally
standardised and ‘automated’, for example in ethics, the ‘application’ of general competence
or of the knowledge of principles provided by ethical virtues like justice, courage, friendliness,
honesty, etc., needs deliberation or phro nêsis, trying to find out how to act in the most just
or fair way towards someone right here and now” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 352, 2012, p. 31; text
emphasized by us).
While not discussed here, other forms of knowledge and ways of knowing
(i.e. pathos, khrêsis, poı́êsis) are fully part of Aristotle gnoseology. The reader can refer,
e.g. to Eikeland, (2007, p. 348, 2008, p. 526, 2012, p. 20) for further development
on the matter.
In the current project management context of practice and research, practitioners
tend to emphasize mostly epistêmê1 and praxis2, and poı́êsis (use of technical
knowledge), these knowledge forms being supported by professional bodies codes of
ethics and conducts. Scholars tend to focus on epistêmê2 and praxis1. This dichotomy
between the two must be overcome. Aristotle makes clear that, in order to fully acquire
practical wisdom, prudence (phroneˆsis) one must become both ethically virtuous and
practically wise through the development of proper habits (ethical virtues, not part of
the reasoning soul but following reason) and when aptitude to reasoning (intellectual
virtues) is fully developed. But this development is not sequential, and Aristotle states
that ethical virtue is fully developed only when integrated with phroneˆsis (Aristotle,
1926, pp. 1144b14-17).

The mediating role of praxis and phronêsis

Theory and practice. At the heart of the mediation between ethical and intellectual
virtues is phro nêsis (and praxis), practical wisdom being both an ethical and a
intellectual virtue (Eikeland, 2008, p. 53). But as briefly shown in the above section
introducing the intellectual virtue, praxis (as a way of knowing activity including an
ethical commitment to eudaimonia) and phro nêsis (as a knowledge form) have also a
mediating and integrative role in the relation theory and practice.
For Aristotle (1926), the possession of three intellectual virtues (tékhnê (artistic or
technical knowledge, craft), epistêmê (as theoretike) (“theoretical” knowledge) and
phro nêsis (practical wisdom, prudence, but includes both intellectual excellence and
excellence of character), along with the possession of ethical virtues, enable an
individual to achieve eudaimonia (well-being, happiness). Eudaimonia actually
requires activity, action, exhibiting virtue (good character) and excellence in reason
 (rational activity). Theoretical or philosophical wisdom (sophia) and intuitive reason or Ethics in project
intelligent intuition (nous) do not consider the means to human happiness at all, management
for it does not ask how anything comes into existence. Practical wisdom (phro nêsis)
does this (Aristotle, 1926, 1143b). Phro nêsis, as knowledge form, is developed through
a specific type of empeiria (practical acquired experience), a “way of knowing as
activity” named praxis (Eikeland, 2008, p. 526). Vazquez offers a clear and simple
definition of the term when he wrote: 553
Praxis [y] is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of
the world, but is also a guide to its transformation [y] (Vazquez, 1977, p. 149).
Praxis is a particular form of activity, a reflexive activity underlying rational action.
It is concerned with change, is present and future oriented, requires anticipation
of the effect of action, rather than the interpretation of past or prior event
(Vazquez, 1977, p. 169; Warry, 1992, p. 156). Praxis is “a specific form of activity
based on knowledge informed by theory and performed according to certain ethical
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and moral principles for political ends” (Warry, 1992, p. 157). Praxis offers an
important focus for practitioners and researchers in social science, one in which
theory is integrated with practice at the point of intervention. Simply stated, praxis
can serve as a common ground for those interested in basic and applied research by
providing knowledge of the reality in which action, informed by theory, takes
place (Warry, 1992, p. 156).
We can now see the full quality of praxis. It is not simply action based on reflection.
It is action that embodies certain qualities. These include a commitment to eudaimonia
(well-being, happiness) and the search for truth, and respect for others. It is the action
of people who are free, who are able to act for themselves. Moreover, praxis is always
risky. It requires that a person “makes a wise and prudent practical judgement about
how to act in this situation” (Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 190 quoted in Smith, 1999,
2011). Praxis as such aims at the liberation of individuals or communities from the
alienating aspects of everyday practice subject to the hegemony of the rationalist
forces constraining every day actions or activities (Warry, 1992, p. 157; Frankenberg,
1988, pp. 326-327). As Warry puts it:
Praxis research requires the development of non-alienating methodologies that are dialogic
and participatory in nature. [y]. Praxis, then, is not simply activity, but a specific form of
activity-activity based on knowledge informed by theory and performed according to ethical
and moral principles for political ends. Habermas and Gadamer both point to ‘emancipatory
praxis’, which appeals to communicative practice aimed at overcoming incommensurable
beliefs. Emancipatory praxis is a specific type of moral and political activity aimed at the
liberation of individuals or communities from alienating aspects of everyday practices
(Warry, 1992, p. 157, underlined by us).
With regards to knowledge, competence and ways of knowing as activities (i.e.
practice), Eikeland (2008) explains that “knowledge and competence is increasingly
developed from within practical contexts [y] making organisational learning in work
places and all cooperative endeavours – i.e. collective efforts, experiential learning and
improvement – increasingly important in general” (pp. 21-22). This relation between
knowing and practicing is also acknowledged by Weisinger and Salipante (2000): “The
knowing is bound with the practicing of seemingly mundane actions [y] knowing
as situated learning and practicing” (p. 387). The logic of “Knowing-in-Practice” is fully
realized through “Knowing-as-Practicing” following recursive logic between
“theorizing practice and practicing theory” and the fact that “theorizing practice is
 IJMPB itself a practice” (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1250). Van de Ven and Johnson in
7,4 their plea in favour of engaged scholarship argue that:
To bridge the gap between theory and practice, we need a mode of inquiry that converts the
information provided by both scholars and practitioners into actions that address problems
of what to do in a given domain (Van de Ven and Johnson, 2006, p. 803).
As Eikeland (2008, p. 87) puts it, “Only in praxis, not in the study of external nature, the
554 student and the studied, the knower and the known, coincide.”

Praxis, phroneˆsis and ethics

For Aristotle, praxis, phro nêsis and ethics are inseparable. The aspects of values,
ethics are fully embedded in the teleological perspective, the quest for eudaimonia.
As Aristotle (1926, p. 1140b 6) put it: “while making has an end other than itself, action
cannot; for good action itself is its end”. Tsoukas and Cummings (1997) explain: “there
is an internal relationship between acting and the standards in terms of which acting is
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judged, which is not there when producing artifacts” (Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997,
p. 666). For Aristotle (1926), the central role is played by phro nêsis because, in human
actions, the moral virtues and practical knowledge go together: “it is impossible to be
practically wise without being good” (p. 1144a 18). Prudence (phro nêsis, practical
wisdom) involves “knowing the right values and being able to put them into practice in
concrete situations” (Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997, p. 666). As phro nêsis (practical
wisdom, prudence) is both intellectual excellence and excellence of character, we
cannot be intellectuality prudent (phronimoi) without being ethically good (Eikeland,
2008, p. 59). Phro nêsis cannot be acquired alone independently from other ethical
virtues. Thus it is impossible to separate phro nêsis from other ethical virtues: “we
cannot be prudent without being good and we cannot be fully good without being
prudent, taking the particulars of the situation into account” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 64).
The focus of the particulars of the situation leads Tsoukas and Cummings (1997,
p. 666) to ask the question “Apart from being inherently value-laden, what is it about
practical matters that requires human agents to have practical wisdom instead of
merely scientific or craft knowledge?” Referring to Aristotle, Nussbaum (1990, pp. 70-75)
indicates three reasons:
(1) practical matters change over time, and new problems call for new responses;
(2) practical matters are inherently ambiguous; and
(3) he observes that “Aristotle suggests that the concrete ethical case may simply
contain some ultimately particular and non-repeatable elements” (p. 74).
Kondrat further says:
Praxis is the form of reasoning appropriate to social, political, or other interactive contexts in
which the individual, drawing on experience to provide a grasp of the immediate situation,
reasons how to act prudently and correctly in a given set of circumstances. Prudence
supersedes effectiveness as the relevant virtue in such cases. Indeed, the prudent person may
be called on to make choices among several potentially effective (or equally ineffective)
courses of action (Kondrat, 1992, p. 239).
Another question immediately comes to mind concerning the kind of rationality
mobilized by human agents in the course of action: are they differentiating or
reconciling formal abstract rationality (Kondrat, 1992; Toulmin, 1990) and substantive
rationality (Kondrat, 1992), situated reasoning, espoused theory and theory-in-use
 (Argyris and Schön, 1974), macro and micro level of organizational routines and Ethics in project
capabilities (Salvato and Rerup, 2011), performative and ostensive dimensions of management
routines (Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013), with regards to uncertainty about the mode of
action they adopt in specific situations? Warry offers an authoritative answer with
regards to the mediating role of praxis and phro nêsis (both rooted on empeirı́a –
practical acquired experience), between past and future, between poeisis and tékhnê
and theôrı́a and epistêmê, as well as between two kind of activities (aı́sthêsis – 555
perception) and (enérgeia – perfecting actualization):
Gadamer’s observation that understanding and interpretation must be integrated into the
“moment” of application is critical (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 273-274; see also Bernstein, 1983,
p. 159). Praxis, as a particular form of activity, can serve as a focal point through which the
discursive testing of theory is grounded through decision making and experience (Habermas,
1973, p. 20). Simply stated, praxis can serve as a common ground for those interested in basic
and applied research by providing knowledge of the reality in which action, informed by
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theory takes place (Warry, 1992, p. 156).

Thus, praxis and phro nêsis, in their mediating role serve as focal point through which
dichotomies (ethical and intellectual virtues, theory and practice, etc.) are integrated,
and have been recognized as “emancipatory” (Habermas, 1971, p. 314; Gadamer, 1975),
and offering “a way of reflecting on disjuncture between the formal rationality and the
substantive rationality” (Kondrat, 1992, p. 253). Project management authors such as
Cicmil & Hodgson (quoting Balck, 1994, p. 2 in Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006, p. 13),
Blomquist et al. (2010, p. 9) and Lalonde et al. (2012, p. 428) have acknowledged
a similar view. As Eikeland (2008, p. 87) puts it, “Only in praxis, not in the study
of external nature, the student and the studied, the knower and the known, coincide”.

Reconciling means and ends, facts and values

An important aspect connected to the mediating role of praxis and phro nêsis and to
what Taylor (1993, p. 57) calls closing “the pronetic gap”, is that the Aristotelian tradition
enables us to specify how to “reconnect Means and Ends, Facts and Values” and to move
beyond “a dualistic way of thinking” involved by the modern dualism[4] (Tsoukas and
Cummings, 1997, p. 668) about doing (practice) and thinking (theory, knowledge and
competence development), factual statements and evaluative judgements.
We need to start from Aristotle’s teleological view of the world. For him, human agents
and natural things are defined for the sake of some functions or ends (purposes and
ultimately eudaimonia). For instance, from a factual statement such as “He/She (i.e. project
manager (PM)) meets recurrently and successfully the project objectives” we can infer the
evaluative judgement “s(he) is a good PM”. Teleologically, classifying someone as a PM is
to think about the purposes, the ends, s(he) pursues with regards to the functions or roles
s(he) fulfils or the way s(he) is expected to behave, “not conceiving [him/her] as ahistorical
selves or abstract individuals” (Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997, p. 670). Thus calling a PM
“good” is to make a factual statement about what an acknowledged “good” PM does, and
not referring to a list of attributes he/she should meet. A concept such as “good” is not an
abstract entity or category in a classification system, but is embedded in the activity
(including the related necessary “means” to perform the activity and to achieve the ends,
with the underlying idea of doing (praxis) and doing well (eupraxia)[5]), particular context
and situation (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 113). Calling a particular action “good” means what a
“good” PM would (is expected) do in the situation (i.e. connecting “appropriate” means to
ends) and is therefore making a factual statement (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 59; Tsoukas and
Cummings, 1997, p. 670) reconciling facts and values.
 IJMPB Ethics is politics
7,4 Developing ethical and intellectual virtues, and practice and theory, is done by entering
the tradition of a community of practitioners[6] (MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987; Brown
and Duguid, 1991) sharing common goals, i.e. ends, will, wish or want and opinion
(Eikeland, 2008, pp. 87, 121) and way of achieving them (means). Being part of the
community (i.e. polis) does not involve blind acceptance of standards, conventions,
556 norms (nomos – laws) but at the same time the acceptance of historically developed
laws and collective dialogues, debates, deliberations about them leading to possibly
changing them (Solomon, 1992; Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997, p. 670). As Castoriadis
points out for ancient Greek conception of politics:
If the human world were fully ordered, either externally or through its own “spontaneous
operation”, if human laws were given by God or by nature or by the “nature of society”; or by
the “laws of history”, then there would be no room for political thinking and no sense in
asking what the proper law is or what justice is. [y] If a full and certain knowledge
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(episteme) of the human domain were possible, politics would immediately come to an end
[y] (Castoriadis, 1991, p. 104).
Tsoukas and Cummings (1997, p. 671) rightly enhances: “[y] in the social domain in
general, and in organizations in particular, uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must
go together”. Thus, through praxis and phro nêsis, “Ethics is politics inasmuch as the
achievement of human happiness” (Strang, 1998, p. 1).

Tenets of a general theory of “standards”

A direct implication of the above discussion about the mediating role of praxis and
phro nêsis with regards to their inseparability with ethics, to theory and practice, to
means and ends, facts and values, ethics and politics is that the development of
intellectual virtues should be made through individual and collective practical
acquired experience (empeirı́a) and perfecting actualization (enérgeia) and not just
through perception (aı́sthêsis), abstract, distant and external observation. On this
basis, the way of conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” has to be made clear.
According to Eikeland (2008, p. 25), three kind of traditions can be considered:
(1) covering laws (deductive nomological or hypothetico-deductive model);
(2) statistical generalizations; and
(3) standards.
Here standards can be defined as “fixed points or ‘ideals’ for practitioners within
certain areas, saying something about what it means to perform a certain kind of
activity competently or, according to a, saying something about what it means to
perform a certain kind of activity competently or, according to certain quality” (p. 26).
The meaning does not include standards understood as just average norms, arbitrary
or imposed by external bodies (e.g. Brunsson et al., 2000). Here, such standards are
neither qualitatively nor quantitatively influenced by any counter facts. Standards are
made by the success of virtuoso practitioners, and they “change when someone finds a
better way of doing, making or using something”. The key characteristics of such
standards are that “not everybody should or could realize them equally or fully [y]
their non-arbitrary character, their immanence as patterns to practice, and ‘ways-of-
doing-things’, and their practical inevitability in human life as either implicit or
explicit, vague or more exact standards of measurement, as standards of validity
of excellence” (p. 26). Contrary to arbitrary standards, which can be conventional,
 unnecessary or enforced, non-arbitrary standards are necessary as they express an Ethics in project
existential necessity that is what it means to be or to do something. Such standards are management
to be observed practically from within the practice and they are impossible to be
observed just from outside, by perception. The position of the “observer” is thus quite
different between these three traditions. In the case of “standards”, the observer is the
practitioner, the native, dealing with things and theorizing his/her own practice, and
there is no dichotomy between practice and theory (Eikeland, 2008, p. 27). 557
Three keys points can be enlightened briefly here. First, being a competent project
manager is not just about having some theoretical knowledge, experience and being
able to demonstrate practical skills and past performance. It is about being able
to articulate in specific project situations and contexts, both theory and practice,
ethical and intellectual virtues, through praxis1 and praxis2, phro nêsis and deliberation
and dialogue. Being recognized as “good” project manager, by peers and by the
broader “stakeholders” is the result of above way-of-doing-things. This raises
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questions about the way we currently assess the competence of project managers
through the credentialing systems. Second, becoming a competent project manager is
done through the practice, and experience (not short-cut) and by the participation to
community of practitioners. This points to the educational and training system in place
and its relevance. Third, the field does exist beyond Audet’s above definition. The field
encompasses the community of practitioners (polis), the standards (as defined above,
and in relation to both general theory and practice) and ethics, this in relation to its
contribution to eudaimonia. And this introduces questions about the relationship
research and practice. I leave these questions open to debate and deliberation for now.

Illustration and discussion

I would like now to succinctly illustrate some insights we can gain from the Aristotelian’s
ethics in studying the current state of ethical affairs of the project management field. An
appropriate ground is to consider the representative codes of ethics and professional
conduct offered by two professional bodies i.e. Project Management Institute (PMI, 2006),
and Association for Project Management (APM, 2011).

Inside PMI and APM codes of ethics and professional conducts: deontology and
consequentialism
PMI Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (PMI, 2006) is a “standard”[7] and
followed the American National Standard Institute processes for its development (PMI,
2006, appendix A2, p. 7). This standard provides the vision of what practitioners are
committed “to doing what is right and honorable” (y1.1, p. 1). The purpose of the
standard is to “instill confidence in the project management profession and to help
an individual to become a better practitioner” (y1.1, p. 1). The standard applies to any
practitioners related in a way or another to PMI: members, holders of certification(s),
practitioners applying to a certification or non-members volunteering to serve on
a PMI project/activity. Four core values are emphasized as being the most important
for the project management community: responsibility, respect, fairness and honesty.
The standard describes for each of these values aspirational (expectation of conduct
that we have of ourselves and fellow practitioners as professionals) and mandatory
conduct (firm requirements). Each value is related to “our duty as practitioners”.
Decisions have to be made and actions have to be taken in the best interest of “society,
public safety and environment” (y2.2.1). Competence (i.e. “background, experience,
skills and qualifications”) to carry an assignment is mentioned briefly in y2.2.2.
 IJMPB The way the document is written, we may understand that the following three values
7,4 “respect, fairness and honesty” support the value “responsibility” in decision making
and action taken. I must highlight that the word “practitioner” as defined in the
glossary in appendix B1: “A person engaged in an activity that contributes to
the management of a project, portfolio, or program, as part of the project management
profession”, conveys a broad meaning (i.e. “the native”) including what we use to name
558 “practitioners”, “consultants”, “scholars” and so on.
APM Code of Professional Conduct (APM, 2011) states, in its introductory
paragraph, that “ (APM has) a code of conduct to set standards, guide the member and
raise the level of trust and confidence of the public in the profession”. The code
is aimed at APM members (y1.2). The importance of public benefits is highlighted
(y1.1). APM members are deemed to apply their competence (knowledge, skills
and experience) “commensurate” with their grade of membership” (y1.3) (assuming
here that APM grade of membership system mirror the members’ level competence).
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The purpose of the code (y2) is to set standards of professional conduct (y4)
(relevant (i.e. what can reasonably expected) competence according to APM Body of
Knowledge and APM Competence Framework), and ethical behaviour (doing things
“right”, compliant to the norms of ethical behaviours) (y7). Members must fulfil
personal responsibilities (e.g. honesty, confidentiality, sound judgement, professional
development, adequate expertise) (y5) as well as responsibility to the profession and to
the association (e.g. promote the association and the profession, development of staff
and colleagues) (y6).
As aptly noted by Harrison (2004), we usually consider two main approaches of
normative/prescriptive ethics: deontology and consequentialism. Deontological ethics
(from Greek deon, “obligation, duty”), while linked to antique codes of conducts such
as Ten Commandments, takes its modern root in Kant moral theory and the two
principles of “universalisability” (sic) (A principle has universalisability if everyone can
act on it” (Schick and Vaughn, 1999, p. 344), and “reversability” (sic) (A principle has
reversability if the person acting on it would be willing to have everyone act on it)
(Schick and Vaughn, 1999). We can recognize here the principles underlying PMI Code
of Ethics and Professional Conduct, aiming at “universalisability” i.e. willing to have
everyone act the way “PMI practitioners” are deemed to act (e.g. use of “global project
management community” in the document) and “reversability” i.e. willing to have
everyone acting the way “PMI practitioners” are acting towards themselves (e.g. the
“Persons to Whom the Code Applies”, y1.2, p. 1; “Respect”, y3.2.4, p. 4). Furthermore,
PMI Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct fall in the middle of a spectrum between
prescriptive and aspirational (Farrell and Cobbin, 2000) (e.g. “Aspirational and
Mandatory Conduct”, y1.5, p. 2). Consequentialism “also sometimes termed teleology, is
directed towards securing the right outcome” (Harrison, 2004, p. 2). Consequentialist
ethics is seen as utilitarianism, i.e. “the philosophy of the greatest good for the greatest
number” (Harrison, 2004, p. 2). APM Code of Professional Conduct has, to some extent,
this vision (e.g. “doing things ‘right’” (y7)).

Moving beyond the conflicts between “competing duties” and “duty vs outcomes”: the
Aristotelian perspective
However, despite their usefulness, and while “both deontological approaches and
consequentialist approaches are regularly construed as opposite sides of the same coin;
duty versus outcomes” (Harrison, 2004, p. 2), the APM and PMI codes are, to some
extent, focusing of the practitioner’s question “what is my duty?” (Harrison, 2004, p. 2).
 Referring to the previous section, we see that the focus is on means and facts, despite Ethics in project
mentioning some ends and values. As mentioned by Harrison, “Aristotle was not management
concerned with resolving conflicts between competing duties, such as duty to society
versus duty to client” (Harrison, 2004, p. 1) (e.g. APM y5.1.3 “act in the best interests of
their employer and clients in all business and professional matters, taking account of
the wider public interest concerns and those of any employee or colleague”, and PMI
“[y] decisions [y] actions based on the best interests of society [y]” y2.2.1, p. 2 vs 559
comment “duty of loyalty to our employer” y4.3.2, p. 5). Aristotelian ethics goes beyond
the two normative ethics, and we can easily see that the missing part is related to
the development of “good character”, i.e. ethical virtues, of the project management
practitioner (as well as the development of intellectual virtues as presented earlier).
The development of “good character” is linked to experience and is done in relation
to a community of practitioners (something not directly mentioned in PMI code apart
from the use of “fellow practitioners” throughout the document, but stated more
specifically in APM code (keeping his/her own skills up-to-date, y5.1.5, and “encourage
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and assist the professional development of staff and colleagues”, y6.1.5). As explained
above, being “good” is related to reconciling means and ends (and quest for eudaimonia)
and facts and values. The “good” practitioner (factual statement, evaluative judgement),
in Aristotelian’s ethics, asks the questions “why should I undertake my duty?” (ends,
contributing to eudaimonia) and “how ought I act in this situation?” (“good” action,
means, values), rather than “what is my duty?”.
Taking this deeper Aristotelian lens leads to suggest a new perspective for our
project management codes of ethics, designing them shorter and focusing on values
rather than on means, facts, regulations, violations, sanctions or prohibitions (e.g. the
wording in y3 of the APM code; see comment in y1.5, p. 2; and e.g. y2.3.3 to y2.3.5, p. 3,
PMI code) and probably more inspirational, more in line with the ends. An excellent
example is provided by the Advertising Federation of Australia Agency Code of Ethics.
There is not much to change to embrace it in the project management field:
WHY DO ADVERTISING AGENCIES NEED A CODE OF ETHICS?
We are fortunate to occupy a role in society where business, creativity and the media overlap.
This role brings with it both opportunities and responsibilities. Our industry relies on trust.
We need to act with integrity to gain trust – from our clients, colleagues, suppliers, consumers
and our critics. Following this guide will help you avoid conflict or the possibility of bringing
yourself and your agency into disrepute.
HOW TO BEHAVE?
Every day we can be faced with ethical dilemmas. These guidelines will help you to do the
right thing. Ethics can’t be imposed. They have to grow from within each of us. And be
understood by all of us.
THE CODE: WHAT WE BELIEVE
01 Stand up for what you believe is right.
02 Honour all agreements.
03 Don’t break the law. Don’t bend the law.
04 Respect all people.
05 Strive for excellence in everything you do.
06 Give clients your best advice, without fear or favour.
 IJMPB 07 Look after your colleagues.
7,4 08 Compete fairly.
09 Think before you act.
10 Be honest (Advertising Federation of Australia, 2000, quoted by Harrison, 2004, p. 3)

560 Concluding comments

The consequences of the Aristotelian ethics lens are important as highlighted above.
For instance, as matter of short illustration, and even if not fully consciously
articulated by the professional bodies, the relation between PMI Code (deontological,
focusing on duty) and the way the “PMI” knowledge is structured (standards centred
on processes to comply with in order to do the job articulating the knowledge areas),
and between APM Code (consequentialism, focusing on the outcome) and the way
APM mainly focuses on topics describing characteristics such as contextual, skills,
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tools and techniques and some general management aspects one should rely on in
order to deliver the “right” outcome is all but neutral. This leaves open the deliberation
about what could be an “Aristotelian” project management body of knowledge!
With the limited space allotted for this work, I provide, as way of concluding
comments, an overview outlining avenues for further researches and works to be done.
As noticed earlier, ethics is inseparable of the development of the practitioners (i.e. ethical
and intellectual virtues development and the role of experience) and of the existence of
communities of practice (ethics is politics). Therefore revisiting and/or redesigning
according to an Aristotelian way the codes of ethics and professional conducts for
project management, in order to move beyond the normative limitations of classical
deontological (conflict between competing duties, means) or consequentialism (focusing
on the “right” outcome to the detriment of duties, means) approaches (both, in fact,
leading to a disconnection means – ends, and to confuse project outcome for an “end”
while it is just a mean to possibly reach higher end such eudaimonia), implicates
revisiting and/or redesigning, on the basis of the “why?” and “how?” questions, the whole
articulation between ethics, competency frameworks, bodies of knowledge, the role of
research and dialogical integration of theory and practice (scholars, consultants and
practitioners are all considered as being part of the “practice” – as already suggested in
the PMI Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct), education programmes, project
management credentials and ultimately (or first and foremost!) the role of the professional
bodies in project management.
Thus, not unexpectedly, investigating the very nature and philosophical foundations of
our practice leads to suggestions for building on, revisiting and redesigning the existing
field structures and agencies (Giddens, 1979), and to a multitude of possible researches and
works. Each of the above aspect may potentially keep busy, within the community,
number of “good” practitioners, in the broad sense of the word, i.e. the phronimoi.

Notes
1. I focus in “ethics” in this paper. As stated by van Staveren (2007) “There is a subtle but
important difference between the concepts of ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’, which will be adhered to
in this contribution. Morality is about the actual beliefs or specific actions of individuals in
terms of good and bad, whereas ethics is more general and concerns a reflection on the
reasons for or against certain moral beliefs or actions” (p. 21, note 1).
2. For Eikeland (2007, p. 347) gnoseology, by contrast to epistemology, involves broader notion
of knowledge. Epistêmê is just one form of gnôsis.
 3. See Eikeland (2007, p. 347). And e.g. “Scientific methods are usually specialised techniques Ethics in project
quite different from and extraneous to the ways of producing knowledge prevalent in our
everyday lives. This goes even for the ‘post-modernist’, relativist, and constructivist alternatives management
gradually becoming mainstream, which often seem to move to the opposite extreme of making
all forms of knowledge epistemologically equivalent. But these modernist, or post-modernist,
ways of thinking are insufficient for understanding both knowledge and ethics” (Eikeland,
2007, p. 348).
4. Dualistic refers here to dualism, and not to duality. “In contrast to dualism, duality implies
561
that we regard an entity as being both constitutive and constituting, such as takes place in
the case of recursivity (Giddens, 1979)” (Hernes and Bakken, 2003, p. 1525).
5. The distinction between ends and means in Aristotle is not an easy topic, and is linked to the
four Aristotelian causes (material, formal, efficient (the near only one considered by moderns
and post-moderns) and final (e.g. Mann, 2009). For an in-depth discussion see, e.g. Eikeland,
2008, pp. 194-196).
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6. For Aristotle, “praxis is not only individual, however. Collective praxis is possible when we
follow common standards, and adjust to each other communicatively, i.e. through establishing
mutual and common understandings of how things should be done in ‘concord’ (homonoia in
EN1167a22-b16, EE1241a16–34), as e.g. in grammatical regulations of language use, or when
musicians and dancers play according to a common score, or improvise, tuning in on each
other knowing the basic principles of the music and the dance” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87).
7. What is a standard? “A standard is a document, established by consensus and approved
by a recognized body, which provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or
characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum
degree of order in a given context. Developed under a process based on the concepts of
consensus, openness, due process, and balance, PMI standards provide guidelines
for achieving specific project, program and portfolio management results.” (Source: PMI,
http://www.pmi.org/PMBOK-Guide-and-Standards/Standards-Overview.aspx, accessed 27
August 2013).

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Further reading 565

Hällgren, M. and Wilson, T. (2007), “Mini muddling: learning from project plan deviations”,
Journal of Workplace Learning, Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 92-107.

Corresponding author
Professor Christophe Bredillet can be contacted at: christophe.bredillet@qut.edu.au
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