Philosophia

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00389-5

Empirical Conceptual Analysis: An Exposition

Hristo Valchev1

Received: 17 February 2020 / Revised: 20 September 2020 / Accepted: 20 May 2021

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021

Abstract
Conceptual analysis as traditionally understood can be improved by allowing the use
of a certain kind of empirical investigation. The conceptual analysis in which the
kind of empirical investigation in question is used can be called “empirical concep-
tual analysis”. In the present inquiry, I provide a systematic exposition of empirical
conceptual analysis, so understood, considering what exactly empirical conceptual
analysis is, the different kinds of empirical conceptual analysis, and the main appli-
cation of the method within philosophy. It can be defined as a method that consists
in drawing a conclusion about the semantic application conditions of a predicate
on the basis of observation of the manifestations of semantic intuitions. The differ-
ent kinds of empirical conceptual analysis are distinguished according to the way
the manifestations of semantic intuitions are observed. The main application of the
method is solving conceptual disputes – situations in which different competent
speakers of a language disagree about the semantic application conditions of a pred-
icate from that language, and their disagreement is caused by the fact that they have
different semantic intuitions about that predicate.

Keywords  Conceptual analysis · Empirical studies · Semantic intuitions ·

Conceptual disputes · Armchair

1 Introduction

The method of conceptual analysis gained prominence around the middle of the
twentieth century as the method used by the Oxford school of ordinary language
philosophy (it was formulated as such by Grice, 1958). During the second half of
the century, enthusiasm for the method started to temper (though, it was still widely
used in relation to some questions, such as that of the analysis of the concept of

* Hristo Valchev
hristo_valchev@yahoo.com
1
Department of Philosophy, Institute of Logic and Cognition, Sun Yat-Sen University,
Guangzhou, China

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 Philosophia

knowledge1), but over the last twenty years, there has been a resurgence of interest
in it. This resurgence of interest was initiated by Jackson with his 1998 book “From
Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis” (Jackson, 1998), but
many others began to employ, and defend the method as well, including Chalmers
(Chalmers & Jackson, 2001); Henderson and Horgan (2011); Kipper (2012); Finlay
(2014), etc. Currently, the method is also playing a central role in the philosophical
movement known as “the Canberra plan” (Braddon-Mitchell & Nola, 2009).
Conceptual analysis as traditionally understood can be improved by allowing the
use of a certain kind of empirical investigation. The conceptual analysis in which the
kind of empirical investigation in question is used can be called “empirical conceptual
analysis”. The idea of empirical conceptual analysis is not new, but as far as I know,
the method has not yet been formulated as such and given a systematic exposition.
Providing such a formulation and exposition is the aim of the present inquiry. The text
is divided into five sections. The first section is introductory. In the second section I
provide a detailed answer to the question of what empirical conceptual analysis is, and
explain its relationship with experimental philosophy; in the third section I distinguish
between different kinds of empirical conceptual analysis; and in the fourth section I
consider the application of empirical conceptual analysis in philosophy. Finally, in the
fifth section I provide some concluding remarks. It must be noted that the text contains
neither any defense of empirical conceptual analysis from the criticisms that might be
raised against it, nor any justification of the method’s theoretical premises, the most
notable of which include the definitional theory of concepts, and semantic internalism.

2 What Is Empirical Conceptual Analysis?

The term “conceptual analysis” in the ordinary meaning it has in analytic philoso-
phy can be defined as follows (Valchev, 2018)2.
Definition of “conceptual analysis” in the ordinary meaning of the expression:
Conceptual analysis is a method that consists in drawing a conclusion about
what the definition of a predicate is on the basis of an armchair investigation
into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different possible cases.
The concept of semantic application is used in order for strictly conceptual mat-
ters to be distinguished from pragmatic matters such as whether it is appropriate

1
  An extensive debate about the analysis of the concept of knowledge was sparked by Gettier (1963),
who described two possible cases that can be used as counterexamples to the “traditional” definition of
knowledge, according to which knowledge is justified true belief. This debate is often given as an exam-
ple of the way conceptual analysis can be used in philosophy.
2
 If the term “conceptual analysis” is considered in the meaning it has in everyday discourse, it just
means “analysis of concepts”. However, in analytic philosophy it also has a technical meaning, intro-
duced by Grice (1958), in which conceptual analysis is not every analysis of concepts, but a special kind
of analysis of concepts, which is closely related to, though not the same as linguistic analysis. In the pre-
sent paper, I consider the term in this technical meaning. Conceptual analysis in the technical meaning
considers concepts from the viewpoint of the definitional theory of concepts. Thus, I will not take into
account approaches that investigate concepts from the viewpoint of other theories, such as the prototype
theory, exemplar theory, or theory-theory.

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Philosophia

to say something in a given situation. It can be defined as follows. A predicate is

semantically applicable to an object, if and only if the object falls under the concept
the predicate expresses. The conditions that are necessary and sufficient for an object
to satisfy in order for a predicate to be semantically applicable to it are the semantic
application conditions of the predicate. It might be said that to know the semantic
application conditions of a predicate is the same as to know its meaning. In this
sense, the meaning of a predicate is the set of its semantic application conditions.3
Conceptual analysis in the ordinary sense of the expression, i.e. “traditional” con-
ceptual analysis is normally done in the following way. The philosopher conducting
the analysis formulates different hypotheses about the definition of the predicate under
consideration and tests each of them by trying to think of a possible case in which either
the conditions provided in the proposed definition obtain but the predicate is not seman-
tically applicable, or the predicate is semantically applicable but the conditions don’t
obtain. If no such possible case can be found, the hypothesis passes the test; otherwise,
it does not. If the philosopher manages to formulate a hypothesis that passes the test,
they can assume that the hypothesis is correct and the analysis is complete. Classic
examples of conducting traditional conceptual analysis include Plato’s analysis of the
concept of beauty (Plato, 1997), Grice’s original analysis of the concept of meaning
(Grice, 1950), Ayer’s analysis of the concept of knowledge (Ayer, 1956), etc.
Traditional conceptual analysis is itself sometimes described as an “experimen-
tal”, “observational” or even “empirical” method. Because of the fact that it involves
putting forward hypotheses and testing them, Austin and Stuart call it an “experi-
mental” method (Austin himself does not use the term “conceptual analysis”, but
describes practically the same method), Balaguer calls it an “empirical” method,
and Prinz calls it an “observational” method (Austin, 1966, p. 429; Balaguer, 2016,
p. 2383; Stuart, 2015, p. 267; Prinz, 2008, p. 191). Levering, on the other hand,
argues that it is an “empirical” method, because it provides knowledge not only of
language, but also of reality (Levering, 2002). When I speak of “empirical concep-
tual analysis”, however, I use the term “empirical” in a sense in which it is not appli-
cable to traditional conceptual analysis.
I believe that traditional conceptual analysis itself is a viable method that can be used
for solving different philosophical problems and defending different philosophical the-
ses. However, it can be improved by adopting two changes to it (Valchev, 2018)4.

3
  The term “semantic application” was introduced in Valchev (2018), but philosophers had long before
that considered the distinction between application based on meaning, and application based on prag-
matic considerations. It might be said that the whole of Grice’s “Logic and Conversation” (1989) is con-
centrated on this distinction. More recently, the distinction was a subject of philosophical investigation,
for example, in Glock (2011).
4
 I have argued elsewhere that in order for a given change in the traditional concept of conceptual
analysis to constitute an improvement of this concept, it is necessary and sufficient that it satisfies two
conditions: 1) Utility Condition – the new concept of conceptual analysis has more potential for solving
philosophical problems or defending philosophical theses than the old one; 2) Proximity Condition
– a possible world where the expression “conceptual analysis” expresses only the old concept is near
in relation to this expression a possible world where the expression expresses only the new concept
(Valchev,  2018). I have also argued that the two changes listed here satisfy both the utility, and the
proximity condition (Valchev, 2018).

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/1/ the investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in

different possible cases is not to serve as a basis for a conclusion about what
the definition of the predicate is, but as a basis for a conclusion about whether
this-and-this is 1) an only necessary, 2) only sufficient, 3) both necessary and
sufficient, or 4) neither necessary nor sufficient condition for the predicate’s
semantic application;
/2/ the investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in
different possible cases is done not only from the armchair, i.e. through a
purely mental process, but also empirically.
If these two changes are adopted, the new definition of “conceptual analysis”
(CA) can be formulated as follows (Valchev, 2018).
CA: Conceptual analysis is a method that consists in drawing a conclusion
about the semantic application conditions of a predicate on the basis of an
investigation into whether the predicate is semantically applicable in different
possible cases.
I call the conceptual analysis in which the investigation into whether the predi-
cate is semantically applicable in different possible cases is done from the armchair
“armchair conceptual analysis”, and the conceptual analysis in which the said inves-
tigation is done empirically – “empirical conceptual analysis”5. By “empirical inves-
tigation” I mean every investigation that is not conducted from the armchair. For
clarity’s sake, however, I will elaborate further on this.
Both conceptual analysis in the ordinary meaning of the expression and the
improved version of it described above presuppose semantic internalism – the view
that linguistic meaning depends solely on factors that are “internal” to the speakers
of the given language6. Semantic internalists often assume that the internal factors
that the semantic applicability of a predicate in a possible case depends on are cer-
tain “intuitions”, which are acquired as the person is learning the given language.
In the literature, these intuitions are referred to as “linguistic intuitions”, “semantic
intuitions”, “conceptual intuitions”, etc. In the present inquiry, I will use the term
“semantic intuitions”. There are different accounts of these intuitions, which, for my
present purposes, I will not discuss in detail. One important characteristic of the
way I understand these intuitions, however, must be noted. In my view, a judge-
ment based on such an intuition does not need to be preceded by an act of reflection.
Thus, such judgements are constantly made in regular everyday conversations, etc.

5
  Note that I am not using “armchair conceptual analysis” as a synonym of “traditional conceptual analy-
sis”. Traditional conceptual analysis is improved by adopting the two changes, and this improved version
is then divided into armchair conceptual analysis, and empirical conceptual analysis. The terms “arm-
chair” and “empirical” will be further clarified in what follows.
6
 Some authors believe that semantic internalism is false, and thus advocate “semantic externalism”.
Semantic externalism has its roots in the writings of Kripke and Putnam (Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1975),
who argued against the theories of meaning that were popular amongst analytic philosophers at that time –
most prominently, the “descriptivist” theories, put forward by Frege and Russell (see Frege, 1982; Russell,
1905). Generally speaking, semantic externalists believe that an object falls under a concept that a predi-
cate expresses, if and only if it is of the same kind as the object that the predicate was first used to refer to.
If this is true, then in order to investigate the meaning of a predicate, one needs to investigate the object

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Assuming that the internal factors in question are indeed semantic intuitions, it
might be said that conceptual analysis consists in investigating semantic intuitions.
If semantic intuitions are investigated from the armchair, the conducted conceptual
analysis is “armchair”, and if this is done empirically, the conducted conceptual
analysis is “empirical”.
Generally speaking, an investigation is conducted from the armchair, if and only
if conducting it is a purely mental process, or in other words, it is conducted “men-
tally”.7 Normally, a philosopher investigates semantic intuitions mentally by asking
herself whether the predicate under consideration is semantically applicable in a
possible case and basing their answer on their intuition. This process can be called
“reflection on semantic intuitions”. However, there is, also, another way in which
a philosopher can investigate semantic intuitions mentally – by trying to remem-
ber instances in which they or other people have used the predicate and drawing a
conclusion on the basis of these instances. For example, if they remember instances
in which a friend of theirs has called a stool “a chair”, this gives them a reason
to believe that the predicate “chair” is semantically applicable to stools. In such

Footnote 6 (continued)
that the predicate was first used to refer to. As far as this would be an investigation into linguistic meaning,
it might, in a sense, be said to be a kind of “linguistic analysis”, but it would not be “conceptual analysis”
as defined here. Thus, conceptual analysis can be criticized from the viewpoint of semantic externalism,
and such a criticism is indeed raised – for example, by Haslanger (2012, 304). The usual response by the
proponents of conceptual analysis is adopting epistemic two-dimensionalism (for a detailed exposition of
the relationship between conceptual analysis, and epistemic two-dimensionalism see Kipper, 2012). It is
worth noting that many proponents of semantic externalism would actually agree that the practice I refer
to when using the term ‘conceptual analysis’ has a place in philosophy, but would disagree with the way
this practice is described or conceptualized here. Thus, Williamson agrees that the debate in epistemology
that was sparked by Gettier (1963) is philosophically significant, but does not agree that the participants
in this debate aim to reach the correct analysis of the concept of knowledge, or that we apply the predicate
“knows” on the basis of intuitions. (Williamson, 2007, Chapter  6). In his view, the method used in the
debate in question is “deduction”. A similar position is also held by Cappelen (2012, Chapter 10). I will
not discuss these metaphilosophical questions in detail, but I will make a brief comment about the burden
of proof. Cappelen suggests that Williamson’s critique of conceptual truth, and accordingly, of conceptual
analysis is widely accepted amongst philosophers, and thus the burden of proof lies on the shoulders of
the proponents of conceptual analysis (Cappelen, 2012, 211). The results from a metaphilosophical sur-
vey conducted by Bourget and Chalmers amongst professional philosophers (Bourget & Chalmers, 2014),
however, make this suggestion seem highly dubious, since nearly 65% of the participants in the study gave
a positive answer to the question “Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?”, whereas only 27% answered
in the negative. It can be assumed that the acceptance of this distinction is positively correlated with
acceptance of the existence of analytic statements, and the concept of an analytic statement is roughly the
same as that of a conceptual truth.
7
  I ascribe to the expression “purely mental process” a philosophically specific meaning, in which, a
purely mental process is a process that does not involve usage of the senses. The concept of a purely
mental process is similar to that of an a priori process, but the two differ with respect to memory. Rea-
soning on the basis of recollections of past experience does not involve usage of the senses, and is there-
fore a purely mental process, but it is not an a priori process. If a philosopher of biology is investigating
the concept of organism by reading relevant empirical literature, the investigation is not a purely men-
tal process, because reading involves usage of the eyes, but if the philosopher is reasoning on the basis
of recollections of what they have previously read, no senses are involved, and therefore the conducted
investigation is a purely mental process – though an empirically informed one. When working on a paper
or a book, philosophers usually read some relevant literature, and therefore the work that goes into writ-

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instances, the predicate is generally used in actual cases, but every actual case is also
a possible case. An actual stool is also a possible stool.
This second way of investigating semantic intuitions mentally, however, is, gener-
ally, not used. This may be due to the fact that it is much less efficient, and can be
used merely as an aid to the reflection on semantic intuitions, or due to an ambiguity
in the concept of an armchair investigation. In any case, for convenience’s sake, I
will restrict the armchair investigation into semantic intuitions to the use of reflec-
tion on these intuitions. Thus, assuming that an empirical investigation is every
investigation that is not done from the armchair, an empirical investigation into
semantic intuitions would be every investigation into semantic intuitions that does
not consist in reflection on these intuitions.
A further refinement of the distinction can be achieved if we take into account
the fact that reflection on semantic intuitions is the only kind of investigation into
semantic intuitions that consists in a kind of introspection. Thus, an empirical inves-
tigation into semantic intuitions is every investigation into semantic intuitions that
does not consist in a kind of introspection. If introspection is “looking in” oneself,
an investigation that does not consist in introspection should consist in “looking out”
in the world. This “looking out” might be called “observation”. Thus, the empirical
investigation into semantic intuitions is a kind of observation. There are two things
that one might observe, in order to gather information about a person’s semantic
intuitions – the person’s linguistic behavior, and the person’s brain activity.
In order to gather information about a person’s semantic intuitions by observing
their linguistic behavior, one needs to observe instances in which the person applies
or refrains from applying the predicate to an object. However, not all such instances
provide us with such information. In order for such an instance to provide us with
such information, it is necessary and sufficient that two conditions obtain.
/1/ The person wants to express their semantic intuitions (and is not forced to
do otherwise).
/2/ The person is aware of whether the object satisfies the semantic application
conditions they ascribe to the predicate.
The first condition may not obtain, for example, if the person is lying, or is driven by
some pragmatic considerations, whereas the second condition may not obtain, for exam-
ple, if the person has not considered the object carefully enough, or is under the influence
of a certain “cognitive bias”8. If, however, the two conditions obtain, then the following
two implications are true. If the person applies the predicate to the object, then the object
satisfies the semantic application conditions the person ascribes to the predicate; if the

Footnote 7 (continued)
ing a philosophical paper or book usually contains a part that does not consist in a purely mental process.
However, in most cases there is also a part that does consist in such a process. It must also be noted that
if an empirical investigation is defined as an investigation that is not done from the armchair, and an arm-
chair investigation is defined as a purely mental process, then the resulting concept of empirical investi-
gation, and accordingly, the concept of empirical conceptual analysis are rather broad. Towards the end
of the present section I introduce the narrower concept of “scientific conceptual analysis”.
8
  Such cognitive biases have been identified, and ways of avoiding them have been suggested – see, for
example, Wright (2010).

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Philosophia

person refrains from applying the predicate to the object, then the object does not satisfy
the semantic application conditions the person ascribes to the predicate.
On the other hand, in order to gather information about a person’s semantic intuitions
by observing their brain activity, one needs to know that a certain part of a person’s brain is
or is not activated under certain circumstances, only if the person possesses certain seman-
tic intuitions. Observing instances in which such a part of the brain is or is not activated
under the corresponding circumstances would provide us with information about the per-
son’s semantic intuitions. The identification of such a part of the brain is an empirical ques-
tion that can be answered by conducting or interpreting empirical studies. The question of
whether and under what conditions such a research program would be a sensible pursuit,
however, lies beyond the scope of the present inquiry, and will not be discussed.
Thus, more particularly, in order to gather information about a person’s semantic
intuitions, one might observe two types of instances:
/1/ instances of applying or refrainment from applying a predicate to an object
by a person who wants to express their semantic intuitions (and is not forced to
do otherwise), and is aware of whether the object satisfies the semantic appli-
cation conditions they ascribe to the predicate;
/2/ instances in which certain circumstances are present, and there is an activa-
tion or a lack of activation of a part of a person’s brain, which is or is not activated
under these circumstances, only if the person possesses certain semantic intuitions.
The linguistic behavior in the first type of instances, and the brain activity in the
second type might be collectively called “manifestations” of semantic intuitions. In this
sense, an empirical investigation into semantic intuitions is an investigation into seman-
tic intuitions that consists in observation of the manifestations of semantic intuitions9.
Therefore, “armchair conceptual analysis” (ACA) and “empirical conceptual
analysis” (ECA) can be defined as follows.
ACA: Armchair conceptual analysis is a method that consists in drawing a con-
clusion about the semantic application conditions of a predicate on the basis of
reflection on semantic intuitions.
ECA: Empirical conceptual analysis is a method that consists in drawing a
conclusion about the semantic application conditions of a predicate on the
basis of observation of the manifestations of semantic intuitions10.

9
  It can be noted that someone may investigate their own semantic intuitions by observing their manifes-
tations. For example, I might have been using the predicate “intuition” unreflectingly up to now, that is,
without being aware of what my semantic intuitions about it are, and I might investigate these intuitions
by looking at the instances in which I have used the predicate in my writings. Thus, if a philosopher is
conducting conceptual analysis by investigating their own semantic intuitions, the investigation is not
necessarily from the armchair, and therefore armchair conceptual analysis is not the same as conceptual
analysis that takes into account only the philosopher’s own semantic intuitions.
10
  In the beginning, I said that empirical conceptual analysis was an improved version of traditional con-
ceptual analysis that incorporates a certain kind of empirical investigation. The kind of empirical investi-
gation in question can be defined as consisting in observing the manifestations of semantic intuitions, i.e.
the type of linguistic behavior and the type of brain activity that I delimited above.

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Thus, what I mean by “empirical” when speaking of “empirical conceptual analysis”

is similar to what Sytsma means by “empirical” when speaking of “non-empirical” and
“anti-empirical” conceptual analysis (Sytsma, 2010, p. 427), and to what Machery means
by “experimental” when speaking of “experimental conceptual analysis” (Machery, 2014,
p. 479)11. As I noted earlier, the idea of empirical conceptual analysis is not new. As early
as 1938, Naess conducted a questionnaire survey that could count as empirical concep-
tual analysis of the predicate “truth” (Naess, 1938). Another interesting historical example
can be found in Carnap’s “Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages” (1955). There
Carnap proposed a method of empirically confirming and disconfirming statements about
synonymy that might be said to fall under the concept of empirical conceptual analysis as
defined above (Carnap, 1955, pp. 35–38). In more recent times, there have been a num-
ber of other authors – including Glasgow (2008); Laskowski, and Finlay (2017); Overton
(2013), and others – who argue that empirical investigation can be used in a similar way
as an aid to traditional conceptual analysis.
Some of the authors listed above speak of conceptual analysis in the context
of experimental philosophy, and indeed, empirical conceptual analysis is closely
related to experimental philosophy. The work done within experimental philoso-
phy has been classified in different ways, the most exhaustive of which seems to
be the one suggested by Sytsma and Livengood (Sytsma & Livengood, 2016, p.
36). First, Sytsma and Livengood make a distinction between ‘non-intuitional’, and
‘intuitional’ experimental philosophy, and then divide the latter into two approaches
– “the neutral approach”, and the “evidential approach”. The evidential approach
is concerned with the evidential value of intuitions, and is itself divided into two
programs – “the negative program”, and “the positive program”. The advocates of
the negative program believe that intuitions are not reliable evidence, whereas the
advocates of the positive program believe that intuitions can be used as evidence in
philosophical investigation12.
Semantic intuitions can only be used as evidence for a conclusion about the
semantic application conditions of a predicate. Thus, if the intuitions investigated
in an empirical study used as a basis for an argument from the positive program
are semantic intuitions, then this argument counts as empirical conceptual analysis.
Actually, many of the arguments the positive program count as empirical conceptual
analysis. A less obvious fact, however, is that a number of arguments from the nega-
tive program count as empirical conceptual analysis, as well. Often times, the advo-
cates of the negative program aim to show that intuitions are not reliable evidence

11
  I prefer the term “empirical” instead of “experimental” for two reasons. First, some of the ways to
observe the manifestations of semantic intuitions can’t properly be called “experiments”. Second, there
are thought experiments and “conducting” such an experiment is something done from the armchair.
12
  The distinction Sytsma and Livengood make between a positive, and a negative program is loosely
equivalent to the distinction Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007) make between “experimental analysis”,
and “experimental restrictionism”, the distinction Kauppinen (2007) makes between “optimistic experi-
mentalism”, and “pessimistic experimentalism”, and the distinction Alexander, and Weinberg (2006)
make between “the proper foundations view”, and “the restrictionist view”. Some examples of studies
within the positive program include Nahmias et  al. (2005), and Sytsma (2010), whereas examples of
studies within the negative program include Weinberg et al. (2001), and Machery et al. (2004).

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Philosophia

by presenting studies that suggest the existence of a lack of uniformity amongst the
intuitions of the people from different groups (defined by culture, gender, philosoph-
ical training, etc.). If the intuitions investigated in such a study, however, are seman-
tic intuitions, then it might be said that the conclusion that is drawn is that it is not
clear what the semantic application conditions of the given predicate are. This is still
a conclusion about the semantic application conditions of a predicate, and thus the
arguments based on the studies in question count as empirical conceptual analysis,
as well.
Experimental philosophers usually aim to provide arguments that meet the stand-
ards of justification and falsification in science. Not every argument that consists in
usage of empirical conceptual analysis, however, meets these standards. According
to the definition provided here, even polling a class of students or asking a few col-
leagues about their semantic intuitions can serve as a basis for empirical concep-
tual analysis. In order to distinguish the empirical conceptual analysis based on such
informal techniques from the empirical conceptual analysis that meets the standards
of justification in science, we can call the latter “scientific conceptual analysis”.
Furthermore, we can say that empirical conceptual analysis in general is based on
“empirical investigation”, whereas scientific conceptual analysis is based on “empir-
ical studies”. Just as scientific conceptual analysis is a kind of empirical conceptual
analysis, empirical studies are a kind of empirical investigation. The informal tech-
niques mentioned above would be another kind of empirical investigation.13

3 Types of Empirical Conceptual Analysis

The manifestations of semantic intuitions can be observed in different ways and each
of them can be said to correspond to a different type of empirical conceptual analy-
sis. In the present section, I will distinguish between several such types and provide
an example of employing each of them. Each example will be based on an empirical
study. Thus these will be examples of scientific conceptual analysis.
In the studies within experimental philosophy, the most common way in which
the manifestations of semantic intuitions are observed is through questionnaire
surveys where instead of asking themselves whether a predicate is semantically
applicable in a given possible case, the philosopher asks other people about it. Take

13
  It must be noted that the usage of empirical conceptual analysis might be much more prevalent than
suggested by the academic literature. Some authors might not mention in their writings that when con-
ducting conceptual analysis, they have taken into account memories of people using the predicate under
consideration, opinions of colleagues, etc, and thus have conducted empirical conceptual analysis. On
the other hand, if someone has conducted an empirical study, they would surely mention it in their writ-
ings. From this point of view, the concept of scientific conceptual analysis seems more important to aca-
demic philosophers than the broader concept of empirical conceptual analysis. The concept of empirical
conceptual analysis, however, is important from a purely conceptual point of view, since it covers all
instances of conceptual analysis that do not fall under the concept of armchair conceptual analysis. If
armchair conceptual analysis and scientific conceptual analysis are the only kinds of conceptual analysis
that we distinguish, then our classification scheme of kinds of conceptual analysis would not be com-
plete, since there would be instances of conceptual analysis that belong to neither of the kinds we have
distinguished.

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 Philosophia

for example the studies regarding free will and moral responsibility conducted by
Nahmias et al. (2005). As a part of one of these studies, participants were presented
with the following scenario.
“Scenario: Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature,
and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and
from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happen-
ing in the world at any future time. It can look at everything about the way the
world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Sup-
pose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe
at a certain time on March 25, 2150 AD, 20 years before Jeremy Hall is born.
The computer then deduces from this information and the laws of nature that
Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195. As
always, the supercomputer’s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank
at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195.” (Nahmias et al., 2005, p. 566)
After becoming acquainted with the scenario, the participants were asked several
questions related to it. One of them was formulated as follows.
“[I]magine such a supercomputer actually did exist and actually could predict
the future, including Jeremy’s robbing the bank (and assume Jeremy does not
know about the prediction):
Do you think that, when Jeremy robs the bank, he acts of his own free will?”
(Nahmias et al., 2005, p. 566)
It turned out that a significant majority of the participants (76%) judged that Jeremy
robs the bank of his own free will (Nahmias et al., 2005, p. 566). Nahmias et al. con-
sidered this to be some evidence that ordinary people’s pre-theoretical intuitions about
free will do not support incompatibilism – the view that the existence of free will is
not compatible with the existence of determinism (Nahmias et al., 2005, p. 570).
The scenario the participants were presented with can be viewed as a possible
case, and the question cited above can be understood as a question about whether
the predicate “free will” is semantically applicable in that possible case. Assum-
ing the participants were willing to cooperate, and aware of whether the semantic
application conditions they ascribe to the predicate obtain, it might be said that their
answers were manifestations of their semantic intuitions, and accordingly, the sur-
vey was an observation of the manifestations of semantic intuitions. On the other
hand, to say that ordinary people’s pre-theoretical intuitions about free will do not
support incompatibilism is the same as to say that the meaning of the predicate “free
will” in ordinary discourse is such that the absence of determinism is not a neces-
sary condition for its semantic application. Thus, the conclusion Nahmias et al. draw
on the basis of the survey, and, therefore, on the basis of observation of manifesta-
tions of semantic intuitions is a conclusion about the semantic application condi-
tions of a predicate. Therefore, conducting the survey and drawing the conclusion
is something that falls under the concept of empirical conceptual analysis as defined
above.

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Philosophia

Such questionnaires consist of closed-ended questions, which means that they are
a quantitative method of gathering information about the semantic intuitions of the
participants. Such information, however, can be gathered using qualitative methods,
as well – open-ended questions, face-to-face interviews, open discussions, “think
aloud” studies, etc (for a general overview of the role qualitative research might play
in experimental philosophy see Andow, 2016). Kauppinen endorses the use of dia-
logue in particular (Kauppinen, 2007, p. 6). A qualitative method that seems par-
ticularly relevant to empirical conceptual analysis is that of paraphrase questions
(used, for example, by Sytsma, 2010). If someone paraphrases a sentence in which a
predicate is applied to an object, then the paraphrase might be said to be a descrip-
tion of the semantic application conditions the person ascribes to the predicate.
In order to illustrate how qualitative methodology can be used in conducting
empirical conceptual analysis, however, I have chosen a study related to personal
identity that makes use of open-ended questions. The study was conducted by
Strohminger and Nichols (2014) and consisted in the following.
“148 American participants (Mdn age = 30.5, 58% female) participated in an
online study. In a between-subjects design, subjects were presented with one of
five versions of the partial brain transplant story (see Appendix A). After read-
ing the story, subjects were asked to what extent they agreed with the state-
ment ‘‘The transplant recipient is still Jim.’’ They responded on a 1–7 Likert
scale, where 1 was ‘‘Completely agree’’, 7 was ‘‘Completely disagree’’, and 4
was ‘‘Neutral’’. Afterwards, participants were asked to explain their answer.”
(Strohminger & Nichols, 2014, p. 161)
The “partial brain transplant” story Strohminger and Nichols are referring to
is about some person, Jim who undergoes a brain transplantation (Strohminger &
Nichols, 2014, p. 160). The five versions of the story correspond to five ways in
which the transplantation affects Jim’s mental faculties – no cognitive change, ina-
bility to recognize objects, loss of autobiographical memories, loss of desires, and
loss of moral conscience (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014, p. 160).
The method used in the first part of the study – where participants were asked to
rate the extent to which they agree with the statement in a scale from 1 to 7 – is quan-
titative. The method used in the second part, however – where participants were asked
to explain their answers – is qualitative. The qualitative data that was gathered was
analyzed with the purpose of finding out whether the given participant believed that
the identity change was a function of the deficit itself or it was due to something else
(Stohminger & Nichols, 2014, p. 161). Strohminger and Nichols use the results from
this and four other studies they have conducted to determine the importance of dif-
ferent mental faculties as regards personal identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014, p.
160). They conclude that moral traits are the most important faculty, memory is also
important, and lower-level cognition and perception are less important (Strohminger
& Nichols, 2014, pp. 168–169).
The five versions of the story can be viewed as five different possible cases, and
the information Strohminger and Nichols aimed to gather from each participant
might be viewed as information about whether the semantic intuitions of the given
participant are such that the predicate “personal identity” is semantically applicable

13
 Philosophia

in the given possible case. Thus, assuming the participants were willing to cooper-
ate, and aware of whether the semantic application conditions they ascribe to the
predicate obtain, it might be said that answering the questions from the study was a
manifestation of the semantic intuitions of the given person, and, accordingly, con-
ducting the study was an observation of the manifestations of semantic intuitions.
On the other hand, the conclusion Strohminger and Nichols reach might be inter-
preted as a conclusion about the semantic application conditions of the predicate
“personal identity”. If the resources of fuzzy logic are used, this conclusion might
be formulated in the following way. The truth value of the statement that the per-
sistence of moral traits is a necessary condition for the semantic application of the
predicate is in the range of 0.8-0.9; the truth value of the statement that the persis-
tence of memories is a necessary condition for the semantic application of the predi-
cate is in the range of 0.6-0.7; and that the truth value of the statement that the per-
sistence of moral traits is a necessary condition for the semantic application of the
predicate is in the range of 0.3-0.414. In this sense, Strohminger and Nichols draw
a conclusion about the semantic application conditions of a predicate on the basis
of observation of the manifestations of semantic intuitions, and therefore, conduct
empirical conceptual analysis.
All the methods listed above involve some kind of interaction with the speak-
ers. The manifestations of semantic intuitions of the speakers, however, can also be
observed without interacting with them. This can be done by using corpus analy-
sis, i.e. by analyzing a collection of texts in which the predicate under considera-
tion is used.15 How corpus analysis can be used in conducting empirical conceptual
analysis can be illustrated with a part of Bluhm’s analysis of the concept of hope16.
Bluhm writes the following.
“One of my descriptive hypotheses regarding hope was that there are opposite
affective experiences of hoping. Traditionally, if hope has been construed as
some sort of emotion, it has always been construed as a positive one. To me
that seemed to be an inadequate simplification. In order to test my hypoth-
esis, I searched for the lemma ‘hope’ (this time in English) qualified by an
adjective or adverb. The results showed that on the one hand there are uses of
word combinations like ‘confident’, ‘ecstatic’, ‘enraptured’, ‘excited’, ‘glow-
ing’ and ‘patient’ hope that point to a positive affective experience; but on the

14
  In fuzzy logic the truth value of a statement is not “true” or “false”, but varies between 0 and 1, where
0 means “completely false”, 1 means “completely true”, and the values between 0 and 1 refer to some
“partial” truth (Cintula et al.,  2017). The conclusion Strohminger and Nichols reach can be expressed in
other ways, as well – for example, by using the original 1-7 Likert scale itself.
15
  Machery suggests using bibliometric, cliometric, and ethnographic methods when studying the con-
cepts of science (Machery, 2014), and such methods can be used when studying other concepts, as well.
For an exposition of corpus analysis and its role in philosophy see Bluhm, 2013, 2016. Corpus analysis
itself can be conducted in both a qualitative and a quantitative manner (the latter allowing the usage of
certain computational methods). For a philosophically-oriented discussion of these two types of corpus
analysis, the way they can complement each other, and the way they can be used as an aid to the concep-
tual analysis that involves interaction with the speakers, see Sytsma et al. (2019).
16
  For the whole analysis see (Bluhm, 2012).

13
Philosophia

other hand, the corpora yielded uses of word combinations that suggest a quite
different affective experience of hoping: ‘wistful’, ‘tense’, ‘uneasy’, ‘nervous’,
‘worried’, ‘anxious’, and ‘desperate’ hope. […] I took the factual use of such
word combinations to be one piece of evidence in favour of my view that hope
may not only be a positive and pleasant, but also a negative and unpleasant
affective experience.” (Bluhm, 2016, p. 98)
The conclusion Bluhm reaches might be interpreted as saying that there is some
evidence in favor of the view that being a pleasant emotion is not a necessary con-
dition for the semantic application of the predicate “hope”, which is a conclusion
about the semantic application conditions of the predicate. He draws this conclu-
sion on the basis of a corpora search, and a corpora search is a kind of observa-
tion of language use. In order to draw the said conclusion on the basis of observa-
tion of language use, this observation of language use has to be observation of the
manifestations of semantic intuitions. Therefore, Bluhm draws a conclusion about
the semantic application conditions of the predicate on the basis of observation of
the manifestations of semantic intuitions, which means that he conducts empirical
conceptual analysis.
All the ways to observe the manifestations of semantic intuitions listed above are
ways to observe linguistic behavior. As far as I am aware, there haven’t been any
studies in which semantic intuitions are investigated by observing their manifesta-
tions in brain activity, but if such studies existed, they could be said to belong to
another separate type of empirical conceptual analysis. All types listed above are
shown in Fig. 1. These different types do not contradict but complement each other.
Each has different strengths and weaknesses, and each has its place in philosophical
investigation.

4 Application of Empirical Conceptual Analysis

In the present section, I will discuss the application of empirical conceptual anal-
ysis in philosophy, or in other words, the role it can play, and is suited to play in
philosophical investigation. When assessing a method in such a way, it is a good
idea to compare and contrast it to other methods that can be used for achieving
similar goals. As regards empirical conceptual analysis, such other methods are
traditional conceptual analysis, and the improved version of it that in the first sec-
tion I called ‘armchair conceptual analysis’. I have already argued for the inferior-
ity of traditional conceptual analysis (Valchev, 2018), so in the present section, I
will concentrate on the comparison between empirical conceptual analysis, and
armchair conceptual analysis. My aim will not be to defend empirical conceptual
analysis from critics who insist that conceptual analysis should be done only from
the armchair, though such critics do exist (e.g. Bennett & Hacker, 2003). Instead,
I will explain the main advantage I believe empirical conceptual analysis has over
armchair conceptual analysis, and the application of the method that this advan-
tage entails.

13
 Philosophia

Fig. 1  Types of empirical conceptual analysis

Compared to armchair conceptual analysis, empirical conceptual analysis gener-

ally requires more time and resources, but also has certain advantages. One such
an advantage is that empirical conceptual analysis allows the philosopher to con-
duct conceptual analysis of predicates they are not competent with. Thus, they might
wish to analyze the predicate “absolute spirit” in the meaning Hegel ascribes to it
without previously being familiar with Hegel’s philosophy. In such a case, the phi-
losopher could not reflect on their semantic intuitions about the predicate, simply
because they do not have any such intuitions, and therefore, they could not con-
duct armchair conceptual analysis. What they could do is, for example, investigate
Hegel’s writings and base their conclusion on them, which would count as empirical
conceptual analysis (involving investigation of linguistic behavior without interac-
tion with the speakers).
The main advantage of empirical conceptual analysis, however, is that it allows
for the semantic intuitions of multiple speakers to be taken into account. In order
to see why this is an advantage, we have to consider certain facts about linguistic
meaning in general, and the semantic application conditions of predicates in par-
ticular. One such fact is that linguistic meaning is relative. First, as far as linguis-
tic expressions can change their meaning over time (Hudson, 2000, 392), linguistic
meaning is relative to time. For example, the English word “awful” used to mean
“inspiring awe” (Johnson, 1755), whereas today it means “very bad”. Thus, when
somebody claims that the meaning of a linguistic expression is such-and-such, the
claim is implicitly or explicitly, consciously or subconsciously made about some
point in time – nowadays, in the 17th century, etc17.

17
  This is not to say that polysemy (the phenomenon in languages of words coming to have over time
multiple meanings that are related) does not exist. My point is that it is possible for a linguistic expres-
sion to change its meaning over time, which possibility itself makes linguistic meaning relative to time.

13
Philosophia

Apart from time, linguistic meaning is also relative to the language. For example,
the word “gift” has different meanings in English and German (in German it means
“poison”), and it might be said that what its meaning is is relative to which of the
two languages we have in mind18. Furthermore, relativity of linguistic meaning is
present not only between languages, but also within the same language. For exam-
ple, it is possible that there are different dialects within the same language, and a
linguistic expression has different meanings in different dialects. If we assume that
British English and American English are two dialects of English, we can take for
example the word “trolley”, which in American English refers to an electric vehicle
that transports people, and in British English refers to a small vehicle that people
push or pull to transport large or heavy objects on (Cambridge Dictionary). Also,
linguistic meaning is relative to the discourse. For example, in everyday discourse
the word “field” has one meaning, and in the discourse of physics, where we speak
of magnetic fields, etc. – another19. Finally, linguistic meaning is relative to the idi-
olect – it is possible that two competent speakers of the same language ascribe to a
linguistic expression two slightly different meanings.
Sometimes we speak of “the language of physics”, “the language of philosophy”,
etc. Idiolects are also called languages – for example, we might speak of “the lan-
guage of Hegel”. Probably, it would be also acceptable to call a dialect “a language”.
In order to distinguish this kind of languages from languages like English and Ger-
man, we can call the former “language in the broad sense”, and the latter – “lan-
guage in the narrow sense”. Thus, apart from time, linguistic meaning is relative to
both language in the broad sense and language in the narrow sense.
Another fact about linguistic meaning that must be taken into account is that the
meaning a given expression has in a given language at a given time is the meaning it
“ordinarily” has in that language and at that time. This “ordinary” meaning, in turn,
is the meaning that the vast majority of competent speakers of the language ascribe to
that expression at that time20. In order to determine what part of the speakers would
constitute a vast majority, we can conduct a conceptual analysis of the term “vast
majority”. It seems to me (i.e. my semantic intuitions tell me) that if almost all speak-
ers agree, we would say that there undoubtedly is a vast majority, and if slightly more
than half of them agree, we would say that there is a majority, but it is not a vast one.

18
  Sometimes what is meant by “word” is a certain string of sounds that has a certain meaning. In this
sense it is impossible for the same word to have different meanings in different languages – ‘gift’ would
simply be a different word in German. In the present text, however, I use “word” to refer to only the
string of sounds – without the meaning attached to it.
19
  It can be noted that, generally speaking, specialized languages are intertwined with the language used
in everyday speech. For this reason Machery suggests that in philosophy of science depending on the
situation, we can investigate the semantic intuitions of both scientists, or laypeople (Machery, 2014, p.
480).
20
 Sytsma and Livengood make a similar point by saying that when a statement about linguistic
meaning is made, it is implicitly or explicitly assumed that the vast majority of speakers would agree
with it (Sytsma & Livengood, 2011, p. 318). They also argue that one more assumption is made – that
“agreement persists if one conditions on membership in theoretically interesting groups” (Sytsma
& Livengood, 2011, p. 318) – calling the two assumptions taken together “the uniformity conjecture”
(Sytsma & Livengood, 2011, p. 318).

13
 Philosophia

When the number of speakers who agree is somewhere in between, however, things
become more unclear. It seems to me that in this case the greater the number of
speakers who agree, the more likely we would be to say that there is a vast majority.
Thus, linguistic meaning is relative to time and language (in both the broad and
the narrow sense), and the meaning a given expression has in a given language at a
given time is the meaning that the vast majority of speakers of that language ascribe
to that expression at that time. Since the meaning of a predicate is the set of its
semantic application conditions, the same is true for the semantic application condi-
tions of predicates. The semantic application conditions of a predicate are also rela-
tive to time and language (in both the broad and the narrow sense), and the semantic
application conditions of a predicate in a given language at a given time are the
semantic application conditions that the vast majority of speakers of that language
ascribe to that predicate at that time. Considering these facts about the semantic
application conditions of predicates, the advantage of empirical conceptual analysis
that consists in the possibility of taking into account the semantic intuitions of mul-
tiple speakers can be explained in the following way.
Armchair conceptual analysis and empirical conceptual analysis can be seen as
two distinct methods of justifying statements about the semantic application con-
ditions of a predicate. Since the semantic application conditions of a predicate are
the semantic application conditions that the vast majority of speakers ascribe to that
predicate, a statement about the semantic application conditions of a predicate is a
statement about the semantic application conditions the vast majority of speakers
ascribe to that predicate. On the other hand, a statement about the semantic appli-
cation conditions a speaker ascribes to a predicate is a statement about the seman-
tic intuitions of that speaker. Therefore, a statement about the semantic application
conditions of a predicate is a statement about the semantic intuitions of the vast
majority of speakers. The greater the number of speakers whose semantic intuitions
are taken into account when justifying a statement about the semantic intuitions of
the vast majority of speakers, the better the justification. Therefore, if we consider
two methods of justifying statements about the semantic application conditions of a
predicate, M1 and M2, such that M1 allows for the semantic intuitions of x speakers
to be taken into account, whereas M2 allows for the semantic intuitions of y speak-
ers to be taken into account, then the following conditional is true. If x>y, then the
fact that x>y provides M1 with an advantage over M2. Thus, the fact that empiri-
cal conceptual analysis allows for the semantic intuitions of multiple speakers to be
taken into account provides it with an advantage over armchair conceptual analysis.
The main application of empirical conceptual analysis this advantage entails
is solving conceptual disputes. The term “conceptual dispute” was introduced by
Sytsma (Sytsma, 2010, p. 430), and can be defined by saying that a conceptual dis-
pute is a situation in which different competent speakers of a language disagree
about the semantic application conditions of a predicate from that language, and
their disagreement is caused by the fact that they have different semantic intuitions
about that predicate21. Empirical conceptual analysis can be used for solving con-
ceptual disputes in the following way.

21
  See also Sytsma and Livengood (2012).

13
Philosophia

All conceptual disputes can be reduced to situations of the following kind.

Because of their semantic intuitions, speaker S1 believes that C is a necessary/suf-
ficient condition for the semantic application of the predicate P, whereas speaker S2
believes it is not. S1 and S2 could not use armchair conceptual analysis to solve their
disagreement, since it would just lead them to conclusions that match their original
conflicting beliefs. What they could do is conduct empirical conceptual analysis in
which the semantic intuitions of multiple speakers are taken into account. If C is
a necessary/sufficient condition for the semantic application of P according to the
semantic intuitions of the vast majority of subjects, then S1 and S2 would have rea-
sons to believe that the same is true according to the semantic intuitions of the vast
majority of all speakers of the language. This, in turn, would provide S1 and S2 with
reasons to believe that C is a necessary/sufficient condition for the semantic applica-
tion of P, i.e. that S1 is right. Accordingly, if C is not a necessary/sufficient condi-
tion for the semantic application of P according to the semantic intuitions of the vast
majority of subjects, then S1 and S2 would have reasons to believe that S2 is right.
How empirical conceptual analysis can be used for solving conceptual disputes is
demonstrated by Sytsma in his debate with Bennett and Hacker about the semantic
application conditions of mental predicates. Apparently on the basis of their seman-
tic intuitions, Bennett and Hacker claim that mental predicates such as “calculate”
are semantically applicable only to whole living animals (Bennett & Hacker, 2003,
p. 71), i.e. that being a whole living animal is a necessary condition for the semantic
application of those predicates, whereas Sytsma’s semantic intuitions are that this
is not true (Sytsma, 2010, p. 437). In order to see whose intuitions are “correct”,
Sytsma conducted three empirical studies that fall under the concept of empirical
conceptual analysis as defined above (Sytsma, 2010, p. 444). The studies suggested
that the predicate “calculate” is semantically applicable to computers, and therefore,
supported Sytsma’s semantic intuitions.

5 Conclusion

To sum up, empirical conceptual analysis can be defined as a method that consists
in drawing a conclusion about the semantic application conditions of a predicate
on the basis of observation of the manifestations of semantic intuitions. Accord-
ing to the way semantic intuitions are observed, empirical conceptual analysis
can be divided into different types. At the most general level, one can distinguish
between conducting empirical conceptual analysis by investigating brain activity
and conducting empirical conceptual analysis by investigating linguistic behavior.
The investigation of linguistic behavior, in turn, can be divided into one in which
the researcher interacts with speakers of the given language, and one in which the
researcher does not interact with speakers of the given language. In the latter case
the researcher can use corpus analysis, whereas in the former case they can use
both quantitative methods such as closed-ended questions, and qualitative meth-
ods such as open-ended questions.
Furthermore, the main application empirical conceptual analysis has within phi-
losophy is solving conceptual disputes – situations in which different competent

13
 Philosophia

speakers of a language disagree about the semantic application conditions of a

predicate from that language, and their disagreement is caused by the fact that they
have different semantic intuitions about that predicate. In short, empirical concep-
tual analysis can help us solve such disputes by allowing us to take into account
the semantic intuitions of multiple speakers of the given language. If we take into
account the semantic intuitions of multiple speakers of the given language, then
we can draw some conclusion about the semantic intuitions of the vast majority
of speakers of that language, and the semantic intuitions of the vast majority of
speakers of a language is what determines the semantic application conditions of a
predicate in that language.
Since the main application of conceptual analysis within philosophy is solving
conceptual disputes, the more common conceptual disputes are within philoso-
phy, the more philosophically significant the method is. However, since philoso-
phers do not usually state whether a statement they make is or is not based on
their semantic intuitions, it is difficult to say how common conceptual disputes
are within philosophy. If all or almost all philosophical statements are made on
the basis of semantic intuitions, then empirical conceptual analysis would be the
most important philosophical method, and if the number of philosophical state-
ments made on the basis of semantic intuitions is insignificant, then the method
would also be insignificant, at least with respect to philosophy. The question of
how common statements made on the basis of semantic intuitions are within phi-
losophy, however, lies beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
It must also be noted that in the literature there are some arguments that can be
seen as criticisms of empirical conceptual analysis. First of all, these are the argu-
ments against traditional conceptual analysis, which include Quine’s doctrine of
indeterminacy of translation (Quine, 1960, p. 24), the arguments that stem from
the semantic externalism of Kripke and Putnam (e.g. Haslanger, 2012, p. 304),
the criticism raised by the negative program within experimental philosophy men-
tioned above, the criticisms raised by Laurence and Margolis (2003); Williamson
(2000, p. 31; 2006), etc. Besides that, there are also arguments raised by Bennett
and Hacker (2003, p. 2, 2007, pp. 146–147); Kauppinen (2007, p. 95) and others
that constitute criticisms of at least some aspects or kinds of empirical conceptual
analysis in particular. As I noted at the beginning, however, the reply to those criti-
cisms also lies beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

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