Relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan

When speaking of Pak-Afghan relations, many often ignore the fact that the history of Pakistan
and Afghanistan did not start in 1979 when Pakistan armed the Mujahideen to counter the
Russian invasion in Afghanistan but dates back to the years before that too. Pakistan and
Afghanistan have a history from 1947, since the former’s inception, until 1979 as well. In fact,
the long proxy war of 26 years perpetrated by Afghanistan in Pakistan
promoting Pashtunistan (1947-73) is one that many do not know about. Intentionally not
acknowledging the pre-1979 history of Pakistan and Afghanistan may be intellectual dishonesty
on our part. For the sake of awareness, following is a timeline of actions taken by the Kabul
regime from 1947 to 1979:

 September 1947: Afghanistan became the ONLY country to vote against Pakistan’s

membership of United Nations. Keep in mind how fragile the gov of Pakistan was at that
moment while considering this extremely hostile beginning by Afghanistan.
 September 1947: Pashtunistan flag was raised alongside Afghan national flag in Kabul.
Afg started arming and funding proxies in the border areas (Afridi Sarishtas & Ipi Faqir)
for the ‘Liberation of Pashtunistan’. This led to skirmishes between Pak forces and
Afghan proxies.
 June 1949: While pursuing miscreants who attacked Pakistani border posts from
Afghanistan, a PAF warplane inadvertently bombed the Afghan village of Moghulgai on
the Waziristan border.
 July 1949: A Loya Jirga held by Afghan govt at Kabul unilaterally denounced all treaties
related to Pak-Afghan international border and announced full support for Pashtunistan.
31st August was declared as ‘Pashtunistan Day’ which was regularly commemorated by
Afghan Govt every year.
 1948-1949: Afghan-supported proxies announced the formation of ‘Pashtunistan’ in
Tirah (Khyber) and Razmak (Waziristan), with Ipi Faqir as President.
 1950: Afghan airforce planes dropped leaflets in support of Pashtunistan, inside
Pakistan’s tribal areas.
 Sep-Oct 1950: Afghan army with artillery support attacked Dobandi area of Balochistan
and occupied a strategic pass with the aim to cut off Chaman-Quetta Railway link.
Pakistan army send reinforcements to the area and retook the pass after a week’s fighting.
 1950-51: Three Afghan-led Lashkars attacked Pakistani areas across Durand Line in
Khyber Agency.
 Afghanistan declared the miscreants as ‘Freedom Fighters’ and used its official Radio
and Press for non-stop Pashtunistan propaganda.
 Pakistan responded by using ‘go slow’ approach on Afghanistan’s trade transit routes.
 16 October 1951: Pakistani PM Liaquat Ali Khan was shot dead in Rawalpindi by an
Afghan national Said Akbar Babrak. Afghanistan’s govt disowned his act.
 Afghanistan’s material+propaganda support for Pashtunistan miscreants continued
unabated throughout the 1950s.
 30 March 1955: Pakistan’s diplomatic missions in Kabul, Qandahar, Jalalabad were
attacked at the behest of Afghan govt and Pashtunistan flag was hoisted on the chancery
of Pakistan Embassy in Kabul.
 September 1959: Afghan King Zahir Shah and PM Sardar Daud reaffirmed their support
for Pashtunistan.
 September 1960: Afghan army troops and militias attacked Bajaur. The attack was
repulsed by Bajauri tribesmen with help of SSG forces from Cherat. An account of the
battle is shown in the declassified US Embassy document in the reply secion of my
comment.
 March 1961: Afghanistan supplied arms and ammunition to proxies led by Pacha Gul in
Bajaur’s Batmalai area for an uprising. The ammunition dump was destroyed by PAF
aerial bombing.
 May 1961: Thousands of Afghan troops disguised as militias attacked Bajaur, Jandul and
Khyber. The attacks were repulsed by tribesmen with support of Frontier Corps and aerial
bombing by PAF warplanes. President Ayub warned the Afghan side against unprovoked
escalations.
 6 September 1961: Diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were cut off
after Pakistan decided to restrict Afghan transit trade due to its continuous support for
Pashtunistan proxies.
 The relations were resumed two years later, in 1963, when Sardar Doud (the main engine
behind Pashtunistan) resigned as PM.
 September 1964: Afghan Loya Jirga again reiterated support for Pashtunistan (though
much mildly than in past).
 1964-1972: Relative calm in relations due to Afghanistan’s domestic power struggle
issues and democracy experiments. The Pashtunistan issue went on backburner and Pak-
Afghan relations normalized to such extent that Afghanistan remained neutral in 1965
and 1971 Indo-Pak wars.
 1972-73: Afghanistan restarted support for Pashtunistan; intensified Radio Kabul
propaganda and sheltered NAP activists led by Ajmal Khattak.
 July 1973: Sardar Doud led a bloodless military coup to overthrow King Zahir Shah and
declared himself President. One of the reasons he quoted for the coup was Zahir Shah’s
supposedly soft approach on Pashtunistan.
 Afghan official gazette published the Pashtunistan flag and also ran inflammatory reports
about terrorist activities of Pashtunistan miscreants. Radio Kabul’s propaganda reached a
peak.
 1973: In response to renewed Pashtunistan focus by Afghanistan, Pakistani PM
Z.A.Bhutto authorized a tit-for-tat response to Afghanistan. IGFC Naseerullah Babar was
tasked to train dissident Afghans for proxy purposes inside Afghanistan.
 This was Pakistan’s first act to use proxies against Afghanistan, after 26 year long proxy
war perpetrated by Afghanistan in the name of Pashtunistan (1947-73).
 Feb 1974: Afghan animosity to Pakistan was so great that Afghan President Doud didn’t 
 participate in the ‘OIC Leaders Summit’ held in Lahore.
 Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, the Afghan delegate at the summit, tried to raise Pashtunistan
issue on this Unity forum too but got snubbed as no Muslim country’s leader paid any
heed.
 1973-78: Soon after Doud assumed power, Afghan govt started supporting the Baloch
insurgents fighting against Pakistan. Afghanistan sheltered thousands of Marri tribesmen
and gave them training+weapons for militant activities inside Pakistan.
 1973-78: Afghan govt under Doud continued to support the Pashtunistan proxies. NAP’s
militant wing ‘Pakhtun Zalmay’ was funded / trained / armed by Kabul for terrorist
attacks in Pakistan.
 These facts have been confirmed by Jumma Khan Sufi, a close aide of Ajmal Khattak, in
his memoirs ‘Faraib e Na Tamam’. Sufi remained in exile for 20 years in Afghanistan
and was involved in the Afghan proxy activities in Pakistan.
 1973-onwards: Not only was Afghanistan supporting NAP terrorism in Pakistan itself, it
also became a hub for Indian interference into Pakistan via Pashtunistan and Balochistan
proxies.
 NAP leaders were paid monthly stipends and other funds by Indian govt as admitted by
Jumma Khan Sufi in his memoirs.
 February 1975: Hayat Khan Sherpao, Senior PPP minister and ex-Governor NWFP, was
killed in a bomb blast. The assassination was carried out by NAP militant wing operating
out of Afghanistan (as confirmed by Jumma Khan Sufi some three decades later).
 April 1978: Afghan President Doud and his whole family were massacred in the Soviet-
sponsored ‘Saur Revolution’. The new pro-Communist regime announced all-out support
for Pashtunistan.
 December 1979: Soviet secret service KGB assassinated Afghanistan’s President
Hafizullah Amin and nearly 100,000 Soviet forces entered Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal
was installed as President by Soviets who pledged to free the ‘holy land of Pashtunistan’
(from Pakistan).
 PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN
INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
Overview
Terrain 
 

Pakistan and Afghanistan share an immense border stretching 1510 miles (2430 km) along the
southern and eastern edges of Afghanistan.1 The Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Nurestan,
Konar, Nangarhar, Paktiya, Khost, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimruz are all
adjacent to the Pakistani border.  Ethnic Pashtuns populate the area along the border. The frontier
passes through varying terrain, with sandy deserts in the south and rugged mountains in the east. 
Major border crossings between the two countries are in Torkham, between Peshawar and
Jalalabad and in Spinboldak between Kandahar and Quetta. The border between the two
countries was determined in 1893 in an agreement between the Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman
Khan and the British Government of India.  Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, however,
subsequent Afghan governments have not accepted the so-called “Durand Line” as the boundary
between the two countries. While Kabul considers the dispute unresolved, the Durand Line has
functioned as a de-facto border.  
 Several factors have coalesced to make the border hard to guard: A) Geography, as the area is
too large to police properly; B) Some Pakistani authorities on the official border crossings, and
along the line, have long aided or closed their eyes to problematic cross-border traffic; C) Since
the Jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, many have mastered the art of crossing the
border without detection by authorities on at least the Afghan side; D) At many areas along the
Durrand Line, people from the same qaums (referred to as tribes in popular literature) live on
both sides of the line and move back and forth without much regard for the boundary.
 

Demographics
 Top
 

At least two major ethnic groups—the Pashtuns and the Baluchs—live on both sides of the
Durand Line. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, comprising 42 percent of the
population or 13.8 million people.2 (Credible and up to date numbers about the demographics in
Afghanistan are hard to find. The last national census was conducted in the 1970s.)  On the
Pakistan side, Pashtuns make up 15.4 percent of the population, roughly 26.6 million people.3  
In Afghanistan, the Pashtun live mainly in a belt extending across the south of the country from
Pakistan in the east to Iran in the west, but they are also present in other areas as well.  Afghan
cities with significant Pashtun populations include Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. While in
Pakistan, the Pashtuns live in the North West Frontier Province, the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas, and sizeable communities of Pashtuns are also present in Baluchistan and Karachi.
Pashtun’s on both sides of the border share the same origin and other commonalities, including a
language. But they have experienced widely different political conditions and divergent national
trajectories for at least over a century.
Baluchs are another ethnic group that lives in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even parts of
Iran. The group constitutes 3.6 percent of the Pakistani population or roughly 6.2 million
people.4   In neighboring Afghanistan, Baluchs account for two percent of the population, or
about 0.7 million people5 and  live mainly in the southwest of the country, along its borders
with Iran and Pakistan.
 
The majority of people in Pakistan (75 percent) and Afghanistan (80 percent) are Sunni Muslims
of the Hanafi school.  However, both countries have sizeable Shia minorities.  In Afghanistan,
the Shia community makes up nineteen percent of the population or 6.2 million people, while in
Pakistan, it accounts for twenty percent of the population or 34.6 million people.6

Ever since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, large numbers of Afghans have sought
refuge in Pakistan. At one time, it was estimated that five million Afghans lived in Pakistan.
Since 2001, many have returned to Afghanistan. But the number and presence of Afghan
refugees in Pakistani cities such as Quetta and Peshawar remains considerable.
 
 
History
 Top
 

After Pakistan’s creation in 1947, Afghanistan objected to its admission to the United Nations.
The Afghan government of the time decided not to recognize Pakistan as the legitimate inheritor
of the territorial agreements reached with the British India. There were several ambiguous and
often changing demands from Kabul centered around the aspirations—as Kabul saw it—of the
Pashtun and Baluch ethnicities inside Pakistan. For intermittent periods between 1947 and 1973,
Kabul extended support to Baluch and Pashtun nationalists inside Pakistan and even called for
the creation of a new state called “Pashtunistan.” In 1973, Pakistan, grappling with territorial
insecurities, resorted to extending support to Islamists dissidents that opposed Afghanistan’s
Republican government of Sardar Daud. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s government created the “Afghan
Cell” within Pakistan’s foreign office and assigned it a policy that included strengthening ties
with and empowering Islamists in exile in Pakistan, and improving Pakistan’s influence over
governments in Kabul.

Sardar Daud made friendly gestures to Pakistan in the late 1970s, but his overtures were cut short
by a Communist coup in 1978. The new regime in Kabul returned to the support—at least
rhetorical—for Pashtun and Baluch nationalists in Pakistan. The 1979 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan was seen by Pakistan as a grave threat to its national security. It also presented
Pakistan with a major avenue to build on its 1973 policy of empowering dissident Islamists
against the governments in Kabul. Furthermore, Pakistan had been a partner of the United States
in the Cold War since the 1950s, and this cooperation had provoked numerous Soviet threats
over the years.  The new leader of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who seized power
in a 1977 military coup, was a fervent anti-communist and Islamist.  General Zia approached the
United States for help with organizing a religious resistance against the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also began funding the Afghan resistance in 1979. 
Accepted doctrine was that America would not overtly reveal its hand in a proxy war with the
Soviets, and therefore the CIA worked through its ally Pakistan.  Zia insisted that Islamabad
would decide who in Afghanistan received American aid, and the arbiters of this policy
ultimately became Pakistan’s spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
and the Pakistani Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, which supported Zia’s dictatorship.  As the war
progressed and as US and the Saudi Arabia led Arab funding for the mujahideen skyrocketed, the
Pakistani government and the ISI gained enormous influence in Afghan affairs.
 
The Afghan resistance coalescing in Pakistan was a combination of nationalist and religious
parties. At the outset, they were divided into over a hundred groups. In 1980, the ISI reorganized
them into bigger units and it officially recognized seven of these Peshawar-based parties.
Anyone wishing to receive aid from Pakistan, the US, the Arabs, and others, had to join one of
these groups.  The largest of these factions were the ethnic Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e Islami, led
by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e
Islami.  Hezb-e Islami was favored by ISI and had close ties to Zia’s backers in Jamaat-e-Islami.
It was also one the most radical of the groups. Gulbuddin’s Hizb ultimately received the bulk of
the foreign aid (mostly American and Saudi) during the Afghan resistance.  Pakistan provided
the mujahideen with weapons, supplies, training, and bases from which to operate; and Pakistani
units, disguised as mujahideen, also participated directly in the fighting.
After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, international interest in Afghanistan and
the mujahideen began to wane.  Zia died in a plane crash in 1988, and was succeeded by Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the man he had overthrown and hanged a decade
earlier.  However, even though Hezb-e Islami was closely affiliated with Bhutto’s political
enemy, Jamaat-e-Islami, the ISI continued to support Hekmatyar’s faction and the other
mujahedeen parties against the communist regime of Dr. Najibullah in Kabul.  After Kabul fell
in 1992, attempts were made to bring Hekmatyar into a unity government with Rabbani and
Massoud, but the Hezb-e Islami commander continued to attack his rivals.  Afghanistan spiraled
into a brutal civil conflict between competing mujahideen warlords, none of whom were capable
of unifying or stabilizing the entire country. Kabul remained in Massoud’s control.

Benazir Bhutto briefly lost the office of Prime Minister in 1990, but returned to power three
years later.  Hekmatyar’s failure to advance against Jamiat and other forces around Kabul led to
the decline of Islamabad’s support for his group. Bhutto’s interior minister, General Nasirullah
Babur discovered and empowered a group of former Mujahideen from the Kandahar area as
Pakistan’s new strategic card in the Afghan conflict. Working through Jamaat-e-Islami’s rival
Pakistani Islamist party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Islamabad began supporting the students the
party trained in its madrassas in the Afghan refugee camps, who came to be known as the
Taliban.  Bhutto was determined to deal a blow to Jamaat-e-Islami, which she believed had aided
and abetted her father’s executioner and was partly responsible for her losing power.  She also
wanted to weaken the ISI. But in 1996, as Bhutto’s second government was dissolved by
Pakistan’s president, and as the Taliban grew into a formidable force, the ISI regained control of
Pakistan’s Afghan policy.

During the 1990s, at the center of Pakistan’s Afghan policy was the military’s pursuit of
“strategic depth” in Afghanistan that could be useful in the event of any military conflict with
India. Bhutto’s second government also sought a stability that will allow it access to the newly
independent Central Asian republics.  Pakistan was also seeking a government in Kabul that did
not indulge ethno-nationalists issues inside Pakistan, and question the Duran Line as the
boundary between the two countries.  The Taliban, with Pakistani and Saudi backing, proved
very capable, conquering Kandahar in 1994, Kabul in 1996, and most of the rest of the country
by 1998.  Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, extended diplomatic
recognition to the Taliban regime—the only countries to do so.  Rabbani, Massoud, and other
factional leaders retreated to corners in the north of the country and later formed the United
Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (also known as the Northern Alliance). 
Hekmatyar sought refuge in Iran in 1997.

In the late 1990s, Pakistan continued to support the Taliban regime in its war against the
Northern Alliance, while Russia, all the Central Asian Republics minus Turkmenistan, Iran, and
India backed the opposition.  However, after the attacks of 11 September 2001, General Pervez
Musharraf—who had seized power in a military coup in 1999—was forced to reverse Pakistani
policy and reluctantly joined the US in its “War on Terror.”  Musharraf feared US action against
Pakistan and the prospect of a US-Indian alliance.  In return for supporting the US war effort,
providing bases, and facilitating the transport of supplies, Pakistan would receive billions of
dollars in US aid over the coming years.  Less than two months into the military operations in
Afghanistan the US-led coalition, working with the Northern Alliance, toppled the Taliban
regime, which fled across the Pakistani border with its al-Qaeda allies.
In Pakistan, the Taliban and al-Qaeda regrouped along the border in the North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP), Baluchistan province, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
In 2002, the Pakistani military moved into parts of the FATA in search of Al Qaeda
operatives. (The FATA is a largely neglected part of Pakistan that is still ruled by colonial era
laws. Pakistan’s constitutional order and liberties does not extend to the region, and political
parties are barred from operating there.)  In retrospect, Pakistan’s efforts in the region have been
dubbed as half-hearted since Islamabad has pursued a double policy towards Afghanistan. The
Musharraf regime declared support for the government of Hamid Karzai in Kabul but retained
involvement with the Taliban who were mounting an insurgency against Karzai’s government
and its international backers.

Inside Pakistan, newly organized groups known as the “Pakistani Taliban” have gradually
emerged on the scene. In 2007, different “Pakistani Taliban” groups coalesced as the Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan or TTP), lead by Baitullah Mehsud.  The TTP
and its affiliate organizations are blamed for dozens of terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan. 
Islamabad has shown a willingness to negotiate with the Taliban and has effectively ceded large
areas of FATA to their control.  However, by the end of 2007, fighting had spread to the so-
called “settled” areas of Pakistan. 
Thousands of fighters from Maulana Fazlullah’s Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
(TNSM) effectively took control of the Swat Valley in the NWFP, less than a hundred miles
from Islamabad.  Fazlullah and TNSM worked with Mehsud’s TTP, and although they were
briefly beaten back by the Pakistani military, they seized Swat again by the end of 2008.  In
February 2009, the Pakistani military agreed to a ceasefire and allowed TNSM, under the
direction of Sufi Mohammed, to implement Sharia law.7 But militant continued their expansion,
reaching areas such as Buner which is only a few dozen kilometers from the capital. In the
meantime, local media broadcasted enraging statements from militants such as Sufi Mohammad
and videos surfaced showing the gruesome treatment of the population in areas under the control
of the Pakistani Taliban. Public outrage, international pressure, and the proximity of the threat to
Pakistan’s strategic centers such as Rawalpindi and Islamabad appears to have compelled the
military to push back TNSM and other militant advances in areas such as Swat.
 

Political Interests
Top
 

India
 

The driving force behind much of Islamabad’s foreign and defense policy is its concern with
neighboring India.  Throughout its history, Pakistan has feared either direct war with India or
encirclement by its allies, and this has had a tremendous impact on its relations with neighboring
Afghanistan.  In order to prevent encirclement by India, Pakistan requires a friendly government
in Kabul.  This objective also serves Pakistan’s planning for a future war with India: in the event
of an Indian invasion, the Pakistani Army would need to fall back to positions in and along the
border with Afghanistan, and a friendly government in Kabul would provide this much-needed
“strategic depth.”

In terms of its Afghan policy, this has meant that Islamabad has generally supported Pashtun
Islamist parties, like Hezb-e Islami and the Taliban, as a counterweight to Indian-backed Tajik
groups like the former Northern Alliance. 

Since 2001, India’s influence in Afghanistan is growing. This has alarmed Islamabad.
Afghanistan and India have enjoyed a historically cordial relationship. Recently, India has sought
to develop increasingly close ties with Kabul, particularly with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. 
With its stronger economy, India has been able to pledge far more development and
reconstruction aid to Afghanistan (above US$1 billion since 2001) than Pakistan (US$ 150
million).  Pakistan has attempted to block India from making economic inroads in Afghanistan
by preventing Indian goods from travelling through Pakistan. The new Afghan Transit Trade
Agreement promises to solve the issue of transit of Indian goods through Pakistani territory. The
terms of this access are being negotiated.  India even volunteered to provide security assistance
and training to the Afghan National Army, but that is deemed as inflammatory by both the Kabul
government and the U.S. as Islamabad will be provoked.  Furthermore, Pakistan reacted harshly
to India’s reopening of its consulates in Herat, Kandahar, Mezar-e Sharif, and Jalalabad in 2002,
claiming that they would provide cover for Indian espionage against Pakistan.
 
 
Ethnic Nationalism and Separatism
 

The 1893 Durand Line effectively divided the Pashtun population in half.  Numerous Afghan-
Pashtun leaders over the years have argued that Afghanistan is the “original home” of the
Pashtun, and therefore the Pashtun regions of Pakistan should be part of Afghanistan.  Others
have tried to incite nationalist sentiments in Pakistan by calling for the creation of an
independent “Pashtunistan.” Such rhetoric and policies tied to it has contributed to Pakistan’s
fears that its neighbors to the east and west—Afghanistan and India—are bent at breaking it
down to several parts. It has also led Pakistan to calculate that any stable and strong government
in Kabul will involve itself with causes that threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity. 

To dilute the force of Pashtun nationalism and other centrifugal tendencies, several governments
in Islamabad over the years have sought to foster an Islam-centered nationalism that would cut
across ethnic boundaries. 
Pakistan has tended to back Sunni Islamist parties in Afghanistan which are predominately
Pashtun, such as Hezb-e Islami and the Quetta Shura Taliban.  While Pakistan does not want to
see a strong Pashtun leader emerge in Kabul who can provoke nationalist sentiments across the
border, it would like to see a pliable, Pashtun-led Afghanistan that is situated firmly in its camp
and accepts the legitimacy of the Durand Line.  Such a policy is driven partly by regional
concerns over India and, to a lesser extent, Iran.  India and Iran have tended to support non-
Pashtun minorities in Afghanistan, such as the Tajiks and Hazara, and Pakistan fears that if these
groups came to power in Kabul, it would mean encirclement by India and its allies. 
Furthermore, the Pakistani military has long held the view that it needs a friendly Government in
Afghanistan that would give it the “strategic depth” in any future war with India.
Like the Pashtuns, the Baluch populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan were divided by the
Durand Line.  Since Independence in 1947, the Pakistani military has fought a war almost every
decade with various Baluch separatist groups in the Baluchistan province.  The Baluch rebels
have often sought refuge in neighboring Afghanistan and Iran, and Islamabad has often accused
Afghanistan, Iran, and India of supporting the insurgents.
 
 

The Taliban
 
Islamabad has strongly supported the Quetta Shura Taliban from its inception in the early 1990s
until the attacks of September 11, 2001. Reports indicate that elements within the Pakistani
security apparatus continue to consider the Taliban as a strategic asset for Pakistan’s regional
policies.  After 2001, Pakistan changed its official policy towards its ally and nominally joined
the US-led “War on Terror.” In practice, Pakistan’s sincere participation in that effort has come
under severe questioning by Afghanistan, the U.S. and allies. Current Afghan President Hamid
Karzai contends that Pakistan—particularly under the Musharraf regime—has used its military
and the ISI to destabilize Afghanistan and support the insurgency. The relationship between
Afghanistan and Pakistan improved when Musharraf stepped down in 2008, but the new
Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari (Benazir Bhutto’s widower) admits that there are rogue
elements within the ISI and the Pakistani military that may be supporting the Taliban on both
sides of the border.  According to U.S. officials, the ISI continues to support the Afghan
Taliban’s Quetta Shura, led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, as well as the Haqqani network and
Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin.8  Kabul has continually pressed Islamabad to do more to stem the flow
of Taliban insurgents from Pakistan, and in 2008, Karzai threatened to send Afghan troops across
the Pakistani border to fight insurgents. Pakistan has negotiated ceasefires with the insurgents
and effectively ceded them territory—allowing them a safe haven from which to operate in both
countries and causing a spike in violent attacks in Afghanistan.9  In April 2004, the Pakistani
military negotiated a peace deal with militants led by Nek Muhammad Wazir in South
Waziristan (part of the FATA).  However, the ceasefire quickly fell apart after Nek Muhammad
was killed in an airstrike a few months later.  In February 2005, Islamabad negotiated another
ceasefire in South Waziristan with the new militant commander there, Baitullah Mehsud, who
would later go on to form the TTP in 2007.  Under the terms of the ceasefire, Mehsud agreed to
end his organization’s anti-government activities, stop supporting foreign fighters and
international terrorists, and end cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.  In return, the Pakistani
military would end its air and ground operations in South Waziristan and reduce the number of
troops stationed there.  This agreement was mimicked in North Waziristan in September 2006.10  
However, peace between Islamabad and the pro-Taliban militants in Waziristan did not last
long.11  In March 2007, the Pakistani government copied the Waziristan agreements in the Bajaur
Agency (also in the FATA) and struck a deal with the TNSM commander there, Faqir
Muhammad.12  In April 2008, Baitullah Mehsud called for a truce with the Pakistani government,
and TNSM founder Maulana Sufi Muhammad was released from prison in exchange for his
cooperation in facilitating negotiations between the militants and Islamabad.13  In May 2008, the
government of the NWFP reached a peace agreement in Swat with TNSM commander Maulana
Fazlullah (Sufi Muhammad’s son-in-law).14  Once again, however, peace between Islamabad and
the militants along the border with Afghanistan proved to be fleeting.  In August 2008, the
Pakistani military launched a major offensive against the TTP and TNSM in the Bajaur Agency,
declaring “victory” in March 2009.15  Meanwhile, TNSM commander Maulana Fazlullah agreed
to a ceasefire with Islamabad negotiated by Sufi Muhammad.  In return, Islamabad allowed for
the implementation of Sharia law in the Malakand Division of the NWFP, which includes the
Swat Valley.16
 
Pakistan does not allow coalition forces to cross the border in pursuit of insurgents.  In late 2008,
the US began launching strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan using unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs).  Islamabad has vociferously criticized these attacks, even after it became
apparent in March 2009 that the UAVs were operating with Pakistani consent (it was revealed
that they were taking off from bases in Pakistan).  Some analysts argue that the Pakistani
government or elements within it see the US and NATO as having limited staying power, and
that once they leave Afghanistan, Pakistan wants to have its Taliban proxy ready to prevent
Indian or Iranian-allied forces from taking control of the country.  If this is the case, then it is
likely that Pakistan’s support of Afghan insurgent groups will continue.
 
 

Coalition Supply Routes

 

In 2008, 90 percent of military supplies bound for ISAF forces in Afghanistan arrived at the

Pakistani port of Karachi, where they are unloaded and transported by truck to Afghanistan.17  
Two routes are used:  The first route passes through Baluchistan province and the city of Quetta,
before traveling through the Khojak Pass and the border towns of Chaman (Pakistan) and Spin
Boldak (Afghanistan), en route to Kandahar.  The second route, through which 75 percent
coalition supplies travel, goes from Karachi to Peshawar in the NWFP.18  From Peshawar, supply
convoys then pass through the Khyber Agency in the FATA onto the Afghan border town of
Torkham, before reaching Jalalabad and Kabul.  Recently, these supplies are “mostly non-
combat materials, such as food, water, fuel and construction supplies, are delivered by ground,
while military weapons and other ‘sensitive’ equipment are flown in by cargo plane.”19
Since the end of 2008, supply convoys and depots in northwest Pakistan—even in Peshawar city
itself—have increasingly come under attack by elements from or sympathetic to the Pakistani
Taliban.  In early February 2009, Taliban insurgents successfully cut off the Khyber Pass
temporarily by blowing up a key bridge.  Recognizing the increasingly unstable situation in
northwest Pakistan, the US and NATO actively sought to broaden supply routes, particularly
through Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan).  At the same time, however,
the Kyrgyz government announced that it had decided to close the US airbase at Manas. The
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has appealed to his Kyrgyz counterpart to allow the base to be
open. Reports indicate that some NATO countries even considered supplying their contingents
through the Iranian port of Chabahar.
 

Narcotics
 

Afghanistan is responsible for more than 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium production, and
33 percent of that product is smuggled across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.20  Pakistani cities
of Quetta and Karachi and the ports associated with them have significant importance in the drug
trade out of Afghanistan. But Pakistan is not just a transit point for drug smugglers; it also has a
significant drug problem itself, with around 700,000 opiate abusers (including almost 500,000
heroin abusers) in the country, making up 0.7 percent of the population ages fifteen to 64—
almost twice the world average.21
Southern Afghanistan has become the primary region of opium poppy cultivation. 
Consequently, the proportion of opiates and heroin smuggled across the Pakistani border has
increased in relation to that trafficked through Iran or the Central Asian Republics.  From
Afghanistan, narcotics are smuggled into Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, where they are then
trafficked to Iran and later the Middle East and Europe.  Drug traffickers also operate routes
from Pakistan to China, India, and the rest of Asia; and recently Afghan heroin has begun
arriving in North America via Pakistan.  This drug trade has had a significant toll on the country. 
For example, Baluchistan province has an opiate abuse rate of 1.1 percent of the population ages
fifteen to 64 and is home to labs that refine Afghan morphine into heroin.22   In fact, large-scale
heroin production—from Afghan products—has occurred in Pakistan since 1979.  Furthermore,
opium poppy cultivation along the border regions with Afghanistan is on the rise.  The revenue
from the drug trade also funds the Taliban insurgency, organized crime, and other destabilizing
elements in the country.
Islamabad, along with the UN, has undertaken many efforts to curb the drug trade in Pakistan. 
The Pakistani government has successfully limited opium poppy cultivation to small areas of the
NWFP, and has continued to close down drug labs and interdict shipments from Afghanistan. 
Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan have agreed to coordinate border security in order to stop drug
traffickers, and they have also agreed to block the transport of chemicals used to produce heroin. 
Islamabad also recognized that in order to solve Pakistan’s drug problem, it must tackle the
demand side of the equation and has therefore introduced programs to decrease drug abuse
among its citizens.
 
Economic Interests
Top
 

Trade
 

Afghanistan has long had a dependent economic relationship with neighboring Pakistan, and
Islamabad has done much to foster this dependency.  The Afghan Transit Trade Agreement
(ATTA), which allows Afghanistan to import goods duty free through the Pakistani port of
Karachi on the Arabian Sea is key to their trade.  It is recently being renegotiated and the United
States is facilitating the process of updating the agreement. Pakistan is the largest exporter to
Afghanistan, with around US$ 1.7 billion in exports annually, which accounts for 36.8 percent of
Afghan imports and 8.4 percent of Pakistan’s exports.23   Pakistan also represents a major export
market for Afghan products, with roughly about US$ 71 million exported to Pakistan every year
—equal to 21.8 percent of all Afghan exports.24   However, much of Afghanistan’s exports are
raw materials, which are processed or used in manufacturing in Pakistan. The finished goods are
frequently resold to Afghans at a higher price.
A stable and secure Afghanistan, developing economically, represents a boon to Pakistan’s ailing
economy, as it may provide a growing market for Pakistani products.  Pakistani workers and
companies might have access to lucrative reconstruction and development contracts.  A secure
environment in Afghanistan would allow for the building of the transportation links—road and
rail—Pakistan desperately needs to access untapped markets in Central Asia, which was part of
the rationale behind Islamabad’s support of the Taliban in the 1990s.  However, Pakistan finds
itself in economic competition with its regional rival Iran and India, which are also trying to
increase their economic influence in Central Asia and challenge Afghanistan’s economic
dependency on Pakistan. India’s growing economic foothold in Afghanistan has stoked
Pakistan’s fears. Pakistan’s monopoly over Afghanistan’s access to sea was recently challenged
with the opening of the Iranian port of Chabahar and the linking of it to the ring road in
Afghanistan.

Pipelines
 

Since early 1990s, Afghanistan and Pakistan have sought to build a pipeline that will transport
Central Asian—especially Turkmen—energy to markets in South Asia. The Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline vision is far from implementation for reasons including
insecurity, high prices demanded by the supplier and unreliability of Turkmen reserves, lack of
adequate outside financing and the on again off again tensions between India and Pakistan.

 
_____________________

Endnotes
1
  United States Central Intelligence Agency,  “Afghanistan,” The World Factbook, April 9,
2009.
2 
 United States Central Intelligence Agency,  “Afghanistan,” The World Factbook, April 9,
2009.
3
  United States Central Intelligence Agency,  “Pakistan,” The World Factbook, April 9, 2009.
4 
 United States Central Intelligence Agency,  “Pakistan,” The World Factbook, April 9, 2009.
5
  United States Central Intelligence Agency,  “Afghanistan,” The World Factbook, April 9,
2009.
6
  United States Central Intelligence Agency,  “Afghanistan,” The World Factbook, April 9,
2009; United States Central Intelligence Agency,  “Pakistan,” The World Factbook, April 9,
2009.
7
  Bill Roggio, “Pakistan to end military operation and implement sharia in Malakand Division,”
The Long War Journal, February 15, 2009.
8
  Mark Mazzetti and Eric Scmitt, “Afghan Strikes by Taliban Get Pakistan Help, U.S. Aides
Say,” The New York Times, March 25, 2009.
9
  “NATO: Pakistan's Deal With Militants Spurring Violence in Afghanistan,” Voice of America
News, May 14, 1008.
10
  Tarique Niazi, “Pakistan’s peace deal with Taliban militants,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor,
vol. 4, issue 19, October 5, 2006.
11
  “Pro-Taliban militants end peace deal with Pakistani government,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, July 15, 2007.
12
  Bill Roggio, “Pakistan signs the Bajaur Accord,” The Long War Journal, March 17, 2007.
13
  “Top Pakistan militant calls truce,” BBC News, April 24, 2008.
14
  “Pakistan in deal with militants,” BBC News, May 21, 2008.
15
 Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, “Pakistani Taliban repel government offensive,” The New
York Times, August 10, 2008; “Forces claim victory in Bajauar Agency,” The News
International, March 1, 2008.
16 
 Zein Basravi, “Pakistani government does deal with Taliban on sharia law,” CNN,  February
18, 2008.
17
  Ann Scott Tyson, “Afghan Supply Chain a Weak Point,” The Washington Post, March 6,
2009, A10.
18
  U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Michael J. Carden, “Afghanistan operations not vulnerable to supply line
dangers,” American Forces Press Service, February 27, 2009.
19
  U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Michael J. Carden, “Afghanistan operations not vulnerable to supply line
dangers,” American Forces Press Service, February 27, 2009.
20
  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “2008 World Drug Report,” 51.
21
  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Illicit Drug Trends in Pakistan,” April 2008.
22
  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Illicit Drug Trends in Pakistan,” April 2008.
23
  United States Central Intelligence Agency,  “Pakistan,” The World Factbook, April 9, 2009.
24
 United States Central Intelligence Agency,  “Pakistan,” The World Factbook, April 9, 2009.