Broadcasting To Afghanistan: A History of The BBC Pashto Service

MEJCC
Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 3 (2010) 192–215 brill.nl/mjcc
Broadcasting to Afghanistan:
A history of the BBC Pashto Service
Massoumeh Torfeh and Annabelle Sreberny

School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK
Email: massoumehtorfeh@hotmail.com; a.sreberny@soas.ac.uk
Abstract
This paper traces the history of BBC World Service (BBCWS) broadcasts to Afghanistan and the
political struggles that led to the establishment of a Pashto language service to complement BBC
broadcasting in Persian. The complex linguistic, ethnic, and tribal diversity of Afghanistan makes
providing appropriate and relevant news, and an information service in the right language,
accent, and idiom for Afghanistan, a daunting task. The paper analyzes the relationship between
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the BBC, and the impetus behind the launch of a
Pashto service for Afghans. It also explores the tensions between providing impartial news and
engaging in communications for development purposes.
Keywords
BBC World Service (BBCWS), Afghanistan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO),
Dari/Persian and Pashto
In the winter of 2009-10, as Britain counted the human cost of increasing

numbers of soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan, the realization that a
purely military ‘hard power’ offensive would not win the struggle against the
Taliban took on an urgent tone. Discussions about ‘soft power’, and the poten-
tial of cultural and public diplomacy to win ‘hearts and minds’, came into
focus. At the same time, there was a growing awareness on the part of the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the BBC World Service
(BBCWS) of the serious limitations of the media environment inside
Afghanistan and the need to address the gaps in news and information provi-
sion for the Afghan people. The newly established BBC Persian Television
(2009) and the entertainment programs supported by the BBC World Service
Trust (the charitable arm of the BBCWS) went some way to providing basic
news and information via its edu-tainment programs. But for most Afghans in
the past and today, radio has been by far the most powerful medium of infor-
mation and influence. This paper explores the history of BBC radio provision
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/187398610X510010
Downloaded from Brill.com06/21/2022 07:16:38AM

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M. Torfeh, A. Sreberny /
Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 3 (2010) 192–215 193
in the region and the rationale for the establishment of BBC services in Pashto
and the ongoing arguments about maintaining and developing BBC provision
for Afghanistan.
BBC broadcasts in the Pashto language for Afghanistan and the North
West Frontier Province in Pakistan began soon after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979. These broadcasts have played a key role in providing
news and information at major political conjunctures – especially when it was
in the interests of the British government to communicate more effectively
and widely with the people of Afghanistan. Historically, the majority of the
population in Afghanistan have listened to the BBC’s Persian Service since
Persian - known as Dari in Afghanistan and spoken predominantly by the
Tajik ethnic group - has always been one of the two main official languages of
the country. Moreover, for much of Afghan history, Persian (Dari) was consid-
ered to be the formal language (and the lingua franca) spoken by most of the
six ethnic groups forming the mosaic of Afghanistan’s population. However,
significant pockets of the population in the influential southern Pashtune
provinces had long made requests to the BBC and the British government for
broadcasts in the Pashto language. For over a decade this was seen by the
FCO, which funds the foreign language services of the BBC through a Grant-
in-Aid, as an unnecessary addition of services. However, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the Mujahideen period of the 1980s provided potent politi-
cal reasons for establishing a Pashto Service, while the civil war of the 1990s
that culminated in the rule of the Pashto-speaking Taliban, the 9/11 attacks,
and the subsequent war in Afghanistan have provided further impetus for its
maintenance and expansion. Pashtunes in Afghanistan form 42 percent of the
population, estimated to be around 25 million. They also form some 13 per-
cent of the population of Pakistan and many also live in India and Iran (http://
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/445546/Pashtun). They have always
played a significant role in the politics of both Afghanistan and Pakistan
although they suffer from chronic inter-tribal feuds. Since the BBC histori-
cally broadcasts in Persian and Urdu, the view in the FCO traditionally was
that there was no need for an additional Pashto service.
Pashto broadcasts began on August 15 1981. The combined broadcasts in
Persian and Pashto meant that an overwhelming majority of the population in
Afghanistan listened to the BBC. In periods of crisis, war, or political change
BBC popularity would suddenly rise to staggering figures. During the years of
civil war in the 1990s, for instance, and especially so after the Taliban rule
after 1996, BBC statistics show that almost 90 percent of the adult population
listened. Moreover, the BBC Persian and Pashto broadcasts had a large, loyal
audience among the 6 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan, Iran, and

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194 Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 3 (2010) 192–215
the Persian Gulf states (Adam, 2005). Even by 2003, the BBC still claimed 82
percent weekly audiences in Kabul (BBC WS Annual Review, 2002-2003):
‘BBC World Service is the leading broadcaster in Kabul with an unprece-
dented 82 percent of adults in the capital listening to BBC broadcasts in
Persian and Pashto every week.’
In 2009 the BBC still claims some 60 percent listenership, but despite
closer political ties between the UK and Afghanistan and despite the fact that
the BBC has several powerful FM stations across the country, the percentage
of listeners has dropped, mainly due to the multiplicity of local media now
available. Pashto broadcasts of the BBC have become a potent tool of com-
munication in three important political conjunctures, namely the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan in 1980; the early 1990s when the Western-backed
Mujaheddin came to power and civil war ensued both amongst the Mujaheddin
and with the Taliban; and post-9/11 when the US-led international forces
ousted the Taliban and a new chapter was opened in Western relations with
Afghanistan.
The Pashto language broadcasts are also significant in that they represent
the first involvement of the BBC World Service in the rather controversial use
of radio as an aid to development. The highly popular drama series New Home
New Life, produced by the BBC World Service Trust (the charitable wing of
BBCWS that broadcasts for development purposes) with the Afghan Education
Project, has been broadcasting for 14 years and in that time has covered a
whole range of subjects from women’s issues to the preservation of oral tradi-
tions and historical monuments, income generating activities, conflict resolu-
tion, mine awareness, community participation in development, and
community health. Yet there were many inside the BBC World Service man-
agement who regarded this form of ‘broadcasting for development’ as being
outside the mandate of the BBC, which required them to provide objective
news and information. Creating a BBC Pashto Section alongside the already
well established Persian Service also provides an interesting case study into
intra-diaspora relations. The shorter half-hour Pashto broadcasts which fol-
lowed the main one-hour flagship Persian broadcasts created strong rivalries
between the two dominant Pashtune/Tajik ethnic groups of Afghanistan. This
caused political tensions not only at home but also between the two diasporic
groups working side by side at Bush House in London. This division has often
been perceived as a political divide - such that, during the Taliban era, the
Pashto broadcasts were regularly criticized as being pro-Taliban, while the
Persian broadcasts were seen as being pro-Mujaheddin since they had a strong
Tajik component. This tension was felt even more intensely after the two

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sections were combined as the BBC Persian and Pashto Service in 1994 under
the management of an Iranian national, Baqer Moin. The advent of the new
service coincided with the invasion of Afghanistan by the overwhelmingly
Pashtune Taliban.
The Changing Priorities of the FCO
Pashto was not considered one of the language sections to be necessary

to the wider wartime expansion of foreign language service during the
1940s by the Foreign Office (which had reached 44 by 1945). The main
focus at the time was to counteract German war propaganda. Sir Reader
Bullard, the British Minister in Iran, had drawn attention to the large number
of Germans in Iranian territory and had been invited in by the Iranian
government, but in Afghanistan the number of Germans was seen to be
much smaller (The Times Archives, July 30 1941, report from ‘Our Own
Correspondent’).
Despite repeated requests from Afghanistan for transmission in the
Pashto language, this was rejected by the Foreign Office. Even the first
documented suggestion - made by Mr. Roshan, the Afghan deputy minister
of information - was for the inclusion of Dari speakers from Afghanistan in
the Persian broadcasts. Then the FCO wrote to BBC’s director of External
Broadcasting, Oliver Whitley, in February 1969 (BBC WAC, E58/30/1,
February 18 1969):
Mr. Roshan claims that those who speak the sort of Persian used at the moment
on the Persian Service numbered no more than 15 million, whereas those who
would be happier with the sort of Persian spoken in Afghanistan were perhaps
40 million. Although of course he may be assumed to be overstating the case, we
are, nevertheless, very interested in his contention that the injection of Afghan
Persian into the service would bring dividends outside the territory of Afghanistan,
particularly in the USSR. [This is a reference to Tajikistan, an independent
republic since 1991, where the language is also Persian.]
The BBC was also keen to have larger Persian-speaking audiences, but dis-
puted Roshan’s figures. ‘Dari could reach some 7 million in Afghanistan,’ the
head of the Eastern Service, Mark Dodd, said in a letter to Charles Thompson
of the Guidance and Information Policy Department at the FCO, ‘and we
understand some further 2 million or so Tajiks in the USSR’ but there was no
evidence of ‘a potential mass audience for Dari’ (BBC WAC, E58/25/1, April
7 1971). Dodd further argued that in mixing the different styles of Persian

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‘there could be a danger of reducing our effectiveness to Iran’; the Persian

Service was ‘prescribed to serve Iran’ and that if they tried to ‘blend the trans-
mission’ to be suited to both countries then the BBC could ‘fall between two
stools’. He brushed off complaints that ‘traditionalist elements’ in Afghanistan
might find some of the programs offensive by saying that listeners’ letters and
field surveys had shown ‘young people are among our most ardent listeners’
and that our service is ‘Iranian orientated’ (ibid.).
In a separate note Dodd suggested that a ‘Pashto transmission from London
would have potentially the wider audience and its spill over in Pakistan …
could bring in a potential audience of around 13 million’. He argued that in
Afghanistan Pashto is the language of ‘the people and the aristocracy’ while
Dari, or ‘Afghan Farsi’ as he puts it, is the language of the upper middle classes
who are ‘of course an important target’. He says that those who want to listen
in Dari have the opportunity to hear the Persian news and current affairs, but
the Pashto speakers have no such opportunity. He thus concluded that a brief
separate transmission for Afghanistan in Pashto would be ‘well worth consid-
ering’ (BBC WAC, E40/656/1, Persian Complaints, 1971). Eight months
later, in December 1971, the State visit of the Afghan King, Zahir Shah, pro-
vided the chance for a one-off test of what later became known as the ‘Kabul
tapes’. These were recorded in London and made especially for Afghanistan.
The head of the Persian Section, John Dunn, reported to Dodd on December
14 about how well the recorded programs had gone (BBC WAC, E58/30/1,
December 14 1971, Pashto 1971-79). Six months later, in a report to Dodd,
Dunn made a fresh proposal. He suggested re-scheduling the Persian dawn
transmission and getting extra time from the African broadcasts. Dunn sug-
gested that these programs would only be transmitted in short-wave and that
the cost was relatively low for the Foreign Office. He argued that all ministers
and officials in Afghanistan are known to listen to the BBC Persian Service
and there was ‘clearly considerable listening among the people of influ-
ence’. Letters from listeners were included with the report to encourage the
FCO’s decision (ibid.).
But despite all Dunn’s efforts, the FCO showed little interest in funding a
Pashto service. Partly, it had evidence that the Persian Service was adequate. In
1971 the British Ambassador reportedly had a meeting with one of those
‘influential men’ in the high Pamir region near the USSR border:
He (Rahman Kol) is a man in late middle age, of considerable stature and
commanding presence, who has a lively interest in the great world from which his
people are so remote, listens regularly to the BBC Persian Service and is remarkably
well informed about international affairs. (National Archives, FCO8/2762, 1976,
BBC Vernacular Service to Afghanistan, p. 64, visitors to Afghanistan)

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In July 1973, after 40 years of monarchy, Zahir Shah was toppled from
his throne while on a trip to Italy and his cousin, Mohammed Daud,
seized power in a coup. Daud declared a republic and tried to set the Soviets
off against Western powers. But his style alienated the left-wing factions
who joined forces against him and he also alienated Pakistan in disagree-
ments over the ‘Pakhtunistan’ question (Report by Andrew Whitley, BBC
Persian, Teheran, January 30 1974). And still the FCO felt there was no need
for a separate service, since existing services were seen to be providing a good
enough service, even informing Afghans about the coup. As one Afghan spe-
cialist wrote to the FCO:
In Afghanistan I heard the BBC whilst I was living with a tribe of nomads, the
Quchis. They lived in the remote Central and Eastern areas of Afghanistan. Their
chief, a Khan of some importance in the area, used to listen regularly to the BBC
Farsi broadcasts. He was extremely well informed and pro-British. The BBC had
been his first informant about the 1973 coup (ibid.).
‘We do not think that audience surveys in Afghanistan would identify further
potential listeners’, says a report on ‘BBC Vernacular Services to Afghanistan’. In
July 1974 the British embassy Information Policy Report on Afghanistan
concluded:
The greatest impact made by the British Information effort is that of the BBC.
The Persian Service is widely listened to. If the BBC succeeds in introducing even
a short service in Dari, the audiences may be further increased. BBC news bulletins
are also regularly monitored and used by Radio Afghanistan. (PRO FCO8 2762,
Information Policy Report, July 1974)
An FCO report suggested that the Persian Service ‘is understood by Dari-
speaking Afghans’ and since there was no additional expense involved in trans-
mitting this service to Afghanistan as well as Iran, that should suffice (PRO
FCO 2762). It was argued that, despite its ‘Tehran accent’, the Persian service
attracted ‘substantial audience’ including the ‘educated Afghan elite both in
Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan’. Moreover, the attitude of the service
towards Afghanistan was ‘favorable’ and thus it served British ‘national inter-
ests’. Complaints were not seen to be important enough since ‘BBC objectiv-
ity more than compensates for any occasional slight differences between the
editorial attitudes of the BBC and the policy of HMG [Her Majesty’s
Government]’. The main criticism that an audience survey would reveal
was that the Persian Service included ‘too few items specifically related to
Afghanistan’ (ibid.).
Thus the idea of a separate Pashto Service did not receive due attention
until Radio Iran introduced one hour of Pashto transmission on May 7

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1974. The BBC Eastern Service then put in a bid to the FCO for a Dari/
Pashto service based on recruiting six programme assistants, arguing that it
must be able to compete. But even a reduced version, recruiting only three
program assistants, was rejected. Finally Mark Dodd, the head of BBC Eastern
Service, decided to go for the cheapest option of replacing a 10-minute music
slot at the end of Persian broadcasts with Dari news. Writing to the Persian
Program Organizer on August 27 1974, he revealed that the Foreign Office
still refused to pay so the money - which had been put aside for Dari tapes
for Kabul - should be used instead for Dari broadcasts (BBC WAC E58/30/1,
August 27 1974, Pashto 1971-79). He also asked his deputy, David Stride, to
find out what the effect of this might be in Afghanistan. Stride met with the
first Secretary at the Afghan embassy in London, Yussuf Samad, and wrote
back on October 1 1974:
Mr. Samad started by reminding me that Afghanistan has two national languages,
Dari and Pashto, and he said that for the BBC to broadcast in one and not
the other would create ‘much criticism’ in the country and lead to charges
of discrimination and this… would ‘kill the main programme for Afghanistan.’
(I took this to mean people would stop listening to World Service) ‘Pashto people
would say this is something against us’, and ‘it will be dangerous for the good
will between our two countries.’ I asked him if it would be better for the BBC
to broadcast nothing rather than just Dari and he said ‘absolutely’. (BBC WAC,
E58/30/1, October 1 1974, Pashto 1971-79)
Subsequently, Greeson Smeeton of the FCO also wrote to the BBC Controller
Overseas Services warning that the inclusion of Dari without Pashto in the
Persian Service transmission would offend listeners and authorities. Dodd’s
response made it clear where the responsibility lay: ‘In case the matter should
come up when you meet the Afghans,” he wrote, that his line of argu-
ment would be as follows:
For some years it has been represented to us by Afghan officials, journalists and
others that our programmes in Farsi have an Iranian slant both in favour of
language and content. We have been aware of this problem though we have had
to take account of the fact that our instructions from the FCO are that the existing
Farsi programmes should be designed primarily for Iran. Financial stringencies
have meant that plans discussed from time to time over the past five years for
separate Dari and Pashto services have had to be abandoned.’ (BBC WAC,
E58/30/1, October 1 1974, Pashto 1971-79).
The flurry of activity between 1970-79 that includes numerous meetings,

surveys, discussions, and exchanges of letters reveals FCO funding to be the
key issue. Neither the professional opinions of the program makers nor
demands from inside the countries for broadcasts in a specific language seem

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to matter enough to convince the FCO to make funds available. In the end, it
was Afghanistan’s changing political fortunes that altered the FCO view. In
1978 the pro-Communist Democratic Party overthrew Mohammad Daud in
a coup. Two separate leftist leaders, Hafizulah Amin and Normohammad
Taraki from rival factions of the Party, fought for power but eventually in
1980 a third member of the same party, Babrak Karmal, backed by Soviet
troops was installed as leader.
Setting up the Pashto Service 1981-83
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan happened soon after the Islamic Revolution
of 1979 in Iran when the Persian service was deeply involved in reporting on
Iran. So Dodd asked David Page, the head of the Urdu Service of the BBC, to
set up a Pashto Service. Thirty years on, Page reported in an interview (2008)
that he firmly believes that it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that in the
end ‘persuaded the Foreign Office to begin Pashto language broadcasts to
communicate with the people of Afghanistan’. However he stresses that there
was never any suggestion of editorial interference.
The first task, according to Page, was to find out what the most suit-
able Pashto accent would be. Both the people of southern Afghanistan and
northern Pakistan speak Pashto. Thus the choice of items and the accent for
broadcasting was crucially important since this was to be a service for Pashto
speakers, not for Pakistan or Afghanistan as such. Page went to Peshawar
to investigate what would be the most suitable accent and identified three
main types. He also sought advice from the Pashtune Academy that was work-
ing on precisely the same subject. Thus in the first recruitment of broad-
casters three different accents were chosen.1 By paying so much attention
to the crucial aspect of accents, the BBC managed to gain credibility from
all Pashto speakers. Page (2008) claims that ‘we in fact created a lingua franca
for all Pashto speakers,’ an interesting unanticipated consequence of BBC
broadcasting. The policy of recruitment was for half of the staff to originate
from Pakistan and half from Afghanistan, according to William Crawley
(2008), who in 1983 became the head of the Eastern Service. He also recalls
how sensitive the use of language was in the broadcasts because the version
1
Nabi Messdaq, Kamal Behzadi, and Yakub Kakar all spoke excellent Pashto but with vary-
ing accents. One of the other original recruits was Jafar Ali Khan who was seconded from
Pakistan Radio.

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spoken by Pashtunes of Pakistan was far more tainted with English words.
This affected attitudes and caused tension and criticism from both sides
(Crawley, 2008).
The BBC was not allowed inside Afghanistan during the years of Soviet
occupation and this explains why all research and recruitment was initially
done from Pakistan. David Page – head of the Urdu Service at the time – also
had better contacts inside Pakistan and most of his advisors were Pakistanis so
most of the newsgathering was done from Pakistan. Previously, news about
Afghanistan was only available either from the BBC correspondent in
Islamabad or Delhi. In fact it was Mark Tully, the BBC’s correspondent in
India, who had reported the 1978 coup against General Dauod. After the
Soviet invasion, not only Afghanistan but also Pakistan as the other frontline
state became globally far more important and that was why equal attention
needed to be paid to both (Page, 2008).
Pakistan was also the home of most of the Mujaheddin groups that fought
the pro-communist governments in Kabul. Pakistan’s government, and its
military intelligence Service, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), as well as
Pakistani influential Pashtune tribes, especially the Yousofzais, became even
more active than before in trying to influence the politics of Afghanistan.
With the exception of Ahmad Shah Massoud, almost all the Mujaheddin lead-
ers were based in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan bordering the
federally administered tribal areas of Wazirestan. The fight against commu-
nism was organized from this area, often led by the Pakistani Inter-Services
intelligence (ISI) and the CIA.
In 1983 Page traveled to Peshawar and interviewed all six Mujaheddin
heads. Asked if this had been initiated by the FCO, Page (2008) said:
‘Absolutely not… It was my very own idea as a journalist. I just wanted to
understand these people better.’ However, during 1981-83 the Pashto Section
became increasingly important in the eyes of the FCO but it didn’t interfere
in program content. Page (2008) suggested that ‘the head of Eastern Service,
Mark Dodd, was not keen for us to be too close to the Foreign Office.
He wanted the BBC to remain independent.’
BBC Pashto broadcasts were initially for 15 minutes a day, comprising
a seven minute news bulletin and seven minutes of features, reviews of the
British press and some analysis. The World Service newsroom remained the
main provider of all items which were translated from English to Pashto for
broadcasts. By the time Page left the Pashto Section in 1985 the programs had
been extended to 30 minutes a day, although the BBC was still not allowed to
send reporters to cover inside Afghanistan.

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The Second Stage 1983-1994
In 1983 Gordon Adam became the head of the Pashto Service. Adam, who
was originally an analyst in the Eastern Topical Unit of the BBCWS, says that
as a reporter he was desperate to get accurate information from inside
Afghanistan. Finally, a senior member of the Foreign Office ‘agreed to send
me the FCO’s Situation Reports from Kabul’ and he also managed to get
transcriptions of the US embassy weekly press conferences in Islamabad.2
This seemed a practical way of creating a balance between what was reported
from inside Afghanistan and Pakistan.
William Crawley (2008) suggests the BBC and FCO always thought very
differently about the way they should treat each country and its news and
current affairs. Crawley argues that the FCO ‘always had short-term con-
siderations’ when it comes to language services. For instance, with the con-
tinued fighting in Afghanistan, the FCO appeared to be on the side of
Mujaheddin and they may have wanted us to follow suit (Crawley, 2008).
Gordon Adam makes the point even more forcefully, noting the pressure to
put more news about the war in broadcasts.3 At the same time, there seems to
have been pressure from the central news room at Bush House not to rely
too much on what the Mujaheddin leaders would tell the BBC. ‘How do we
know we can trust them?’, the newsroom editors would ask when Gordon
Adam proposed a series on Mujaheddin commanders called ‘Stories of Jihad’
(Adam, 2008).
Adam (2008) reports that FCO officials were very keen on the BBC cover-
ing the war in Afghanistan and also keen for stories about the Mujaheddin
standing up to the Soviets. He believes the UK ‘was generally following US
policy on the war in Afghanistan’ and wanted the Mujaheddin to be portrayed
in a good light since the US was using the Afghan anger against
the Soviets for its own political motives. So the dilemma was that while the
Mujaheddin were fighting to rid their country of Soviet troops, journalists
were being pressured into taking sides, which made broadcasting a very chal-
lenging job. Finally in 1987, Adam together with George Arney of the BBC
WS and a reporter from the Guardian managed to get permission to report
from inside Afghanistan and, in 1988, Adam managed to employ the first
local stringer in Peshawar:
2
Interview with M. Torfeh, 2008.
3
Interview with M. Torfeh, as above.

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Our new reporter on Afghanistan, Hamed Elmi, became a fantastic source of

news and operations for all BBC activity. And this basic initiative was slowly built
up as an infrastructure for getting news and information from Kabul and
Islamabad. We then managed to have the Afghan President’s approval for Lyce
Doucet to be resident correspondent in Kabul. She stayed during 1987-88 and it
meant our reporting from the capital was transformed (Adam, 2008).
Lyce Doucet’s placement as BBC correspondent in Kabul became possible
through another diplomatic contact: the intervention of President Najibullah’s
brother, Ahmad Sarvar, posted to London as chargé d’affaires of Afghanistan
helped the BBCWS to get into Afghanistan (Adam 2008).
Pashto broadcasts soon developed a huge following. Now not only was
there reporting from a journalist based in Kabul but there were direct inter-
views with warring factions. ‘Even the 15 minute programme had 82 percent
listenership in Afghanistan,’ says Gordon Adam. In 1988 more than ‘50,000
letters were received from listeners’ and the BBC became an important part of
people’s lives. This, according to Adam, was testimony to the careful use of
language, taking into consideration the delicate differences between the differ-
ing Pashto accents in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
From 1986 the relationship between the BBC and the FCO changed. Prior
to that, the BBC was at the beck and call of the FCO as far as language selec-
tion was concerned. However, afterwards the BBC was allowed more discre-
tion in languages they broadcast. In fact the preferred style by which the FCO
managed the BBC changed so that the BBC directors were given specific bud-
gets, and heads of services and regions took on more responsibility for the way
they spent budgets. In 1989 John Tusa became the Director General of the
BBC World Service. He was keen to modernize the style of journalism in the
various language services with more direct interviewing and fewer reports pre-
pared by the Central Talks and Features department. He also wanted far more
involvement by broadcasters and producers from the region. Erstwhile ‘pro-
gram organizers’ became heads of Services and ‘program assistants’ became
producers, new titles chosen to suit the new duties. The responsibility was
brought down to the level of production. Whereas program organizers had
always been English nationals, now they could be recruited from amongst the
LOTE (Languages Other Than English) experts. John Tusa’s era encouraged
professional journalism. Interviewing officials as well as political opposition
made for interesting radio debates in the early 1990s. New training methods
encouraged the new style of journalism and taught producers how to make
good use of all sources of information and how to balance claims and counter-
claims. Creating impartial vet balanced programming became a technique
that all producers had to master through BBC training courses.

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Another important change was the technological advances in broadcasting.

Digital recording meant much lighter equipment and much more mobility in
the field for reporters. In 1983 there were no mobile phones in use. By 1993
almost all Mujaheddin, even in the remotest mountains of Afghanistan, pos-
sessed either a satellite phone or a mobile. Producers could phone the warring
sides in the middle of a battle and have them debate and argue with each other
on air. In the intervening ten years much also had changed in the style of
journalism of the language services of the BBC and the Pashto Service was
benefiting from these developments. The same editorial and production tech-
niques were teaching producers how to make sensitive use of the LOTE lan-
guages of broadcasting.
During the 1990s the Persian Service also greatly increased its programs
about Afghanistan. Many of its reporters, including Baqer Moin, Behrouz
Afagh, and Massoumeh Torfeh, were amongst the first to travel to Afghanistan
and to secure interviews with intellectuals, journalists, and politicians.
Dr. Najibullah, the last of the pro-Communist rulers of Afghanistan gave one
of his last interviews with Massoumeh Torfeh in November 1991. While
Mujaheddin ruled Afghanistan, the Persian Section became more prominent
since most of their top commanders would give interviews to the Persian
rather than the Pashto Service. This changed once the Taliban, who were from
Pashtune tribes of the porous Pakistan/Afghanistan border regions, took the
upper hand in the Afghan war.
However, the most important single factor that made BBC Persian and
Pashto broadcasts indispensable for people in Afghanistan was the fact that the
international community forgot about them. With the departure of Soviet
troops in 1989, and the collapse two years later of the Soviet Union, the US
and much of the Western world lost interest in Afghanistan. So the BBC could
take advantage of weaker involvement of the FCO to focus more on reporting
events that were changing people’s lives. President Najibullah, the last remain-
ing communist leader, hung on to power for a further two years, finally losing
to the Mujaheddin and forced to step down in 1992. The two years of
Mujaheddin government that followed meant war and bickering amongst
the ethnic groups. Pashtune forces of Gulbodin Hekmatyar (supported by
Pakistan) fought fiercely to take power away from the Tajik forces of
Burhanoddin Rabbani whose military commander was Ahmad Shah Massoud.
The combination of better journalism, more independence and improved
technology meant that BBC Persian and Pashto services became the dominant
sources of information and the only source of international attention on
Afghanistan, so people listened intently.

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It was during this period that the sensitivities about the use of Dari/Persian/
Pashto increased. Listeners’ letters often reflected a widespread perception that
there was a difference between the reporting in the Persian and Pashto services
and they accused the BBC of playing a double game. This could sometimes be
explained by the linguistic map of the region. For instance during the war, the
Pashto section would tend to interview those who spoke Pashto while the
Persian Section had access to both. Whereas most Afghan nationals speak
Persian (Dari), many Dari speakers do not speak Pashto. Thus it was not so
much a political choice or bias but rather journalistic practices and linguistic
competencies that dictated such differences. Crawley, then the head of the
Eastern Service for over ten years, recalls how sensitive the use of language
was in the broadcasts and how this affected attitudes and caused tension and
criticism from both sides.
Another source of BBC popularity was that Adam began the pioneering
Afghan Education Programme, as it became known, funded by the United
Nations, which made efficient use of radio in wartime, repeating the pro-
grams twice a week to ensure their impact on audiences. Although there had
been many educational programs, New Home New Life, which was produced
in the form of a drama was the most significant BBC radio program aimed at
bringing social change in Afghanistan (Adam 2005). Modeled on the BBC
Radio 4’s serial drama The Archers, it was produced in the region, in Peshawar
in Pakistan, as the Afghan cities were mainly unsafe or too remote. This
allowed participatory audience research with listeners and the recruitment of
some of the best dramatic talents of Afghanistan who had become refugees in
Peshawar. Adam says that ‘the over-arching reason for New Home New Life’s
popularity was its mix of fast moving, well written topical story lines and fine
acting’. NGOs and aid organizations working inside Afghanistan provided
additional information and goods and services that formed the basis of the
drama’s educational content. ‘The absence of government was a mixed bless-
ing. There was a refreshing lack of bureaucracy and a can-do attitude
from Pakistani based NGOs involved in health, education, farming, de-
mining and other activities’ (Adam 2008).4
Despite its popularity and success, New Home New Life created much
debate inside the BBC Eastern Service as to whether it was the function of a
media organization like the BBC to be working so closely with the UN and
NGOs, and adopting their agendas. Crawley (2008) says there was ‘a narrow
4
Interview with M. Torfeh, as above.

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view of public service broadcasting’ and that the wartime conditions made
it useful to have a drama – like The Archers; however, ‘we did not like to gloss
things over, we wanted news and current affairs rather than publicity for
NGOs.’ Some 17 years later, New Home New life (now produced by the chari-
table wing of BBCWS, the BBC World Service Trust which arose from the
Afghan Education Project) is still popular with audiences. Interestingly, the
history of the drama serial and its representation of key political eras and
regimes echoes in many respects the research outlined in this article (see Skuse
and Gillespie 2010).
The Third Stage 1994-2001
The Mujaheddin, who had been funded mainly by the CIA and the ISI, soon
proved ineffective. According to Ahmad Rashid, it was at this stage that the
‘CIA handed over its Afghan policy to its main allies in the region, Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia’ (Rashid 2009: 11). As such, the Taliban were created by the
ISI to fill in the critical power vacuum that had been created by the in-fighting
amongst the Mujaheddin. The Taliban soon consolidated into a successful
military force, seizing Khandhar as their capital and then making deals with
Mujaheddin leaders across the country. The only leader who would not com-
promise was Ahmad Shah Massoud who continued to hang on to power in the
north Badakhshan region. He set up home in Tajikistan and received support
from those countries opposed to the Taliban, including Russia and Iran. The
Taliban, which increasingly strengthened their ties with al-Qaeda, used
Afghanistan as a training ground for making an army of terrorists.
Afghanistan again became a fighting ground between the Pashtune Taliban
and the Tajik Ahmad Shah Massoud who was the main leader of the Northern
Alliance. As such the BBC Persian and Pashto services continued to be indis-
pensable. Details of Taliban advances and the fighting between Massoud and
Taliban were of vital importance to people in dominantly Pashtune provinces
(south and northeast) or Tajik and Hazareh (northeast, northwest, and
central) Afghanistan. During the Taliban era the Pashto Service became far
more important since it had access to all Pashto-speaking (and Urdu-speaking)
Taliban. Few Taliban representatives would speak to the Persian Section, not
because they did not want to but simply because they did not speak Dari.
Thus the Persian broadcasts were mainly dominated by the voices of the
Mujaheddin who were mostly Tajik or Hazareh, both Dari-speaking. Taliban
statements would of course be written in but voices that were heard were
different on the two radios. So often the accusation was made that the BBC

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was toeing two lines. With the Taliban there was also some gender discrimi-
nation since they refused to speak to female broadcasters. The Taliban, drawn
mainly from the southern Pashtune tribes of Afghanistan that had previously
ruled for 300 years, ‘galvanised Pashtune nationalism and revived hopes that
once again the Pashtunes would dominate Afghanistan’ (Rashid 2001: 2).
It was thus surprising that in late 1994 the BBC head of the Eurasia region,
David Morton, decided to combine the two sections and create the BBC
Persian and Pashto Service, headed by Baqer Moin, an Iranian. Moin argues
that ‘in terms of news gathering and synergy of resources it made more sense
to have a single editorial approach to Afghanistan’ and that the Pashto Service
was ‘facing problems because it was not objective in its reporting. It was get-
ting too close up’ (Moin 2009). Gordon Adam refutes this. (Adam 2008)
Rivalry and tension between the Persian and Pashto broadcasters within the
BBC intensified. Pashto broadcasters did not feel happy with an Iranian as
their boss while the Persian staff was not too happy with mixed broadcasting
voices, with some from Iran and others from Afghanistan. They also felt the
coverage of Iran’s political developments was being overlooked and too much
time devoted to news about Afghanistan. Many listeners from Iran wrote
complaining about too many Afghan accents in the Persian broadcasts.
Could there have been a political reason for joining the two services, a
preferred line coming from the FCO? Baqer Moin refutes such a suggestion,
saying ‘there was no political reason whatsoever.’ Moin’s argument was that
the Persian-speaking peoples of Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan could benefit
equally from the broadcasts. After all, during the early 1990s, following the
break-up of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan had also joined the Persian-speaking
world and the Persian Section was also highly involved in reporting on crucial
developments in this Central Asia country. In 1990 the Communist-led gov-
ernment was toppled in Tajikistan and the opposition was keen to stress its
historical ties with the Persian language and Persian culture. Thus it could be
argued that the BBC Persian Service played a crucial role in bringing the
Persian-speaking nations closer to each other. Later, Tajiks also began insisting
on having their own ‘unique Tajiki’ accent distinguished from Persian. Experts,
however, insisted that the Persian language was one and the same and that the
BBC broadcasts by language, not by country.
It could also be argued that the rivalry between Persian and Pashto broad-
casters improved the content and that listeners were the real beneficiaries. This
was a most exciting time for reporting events in Afghanistan. All political play-
ers approached the BBC. Everyone wanted to be heard on the BBC including
the listeners, whose voice was by this time a regular feature of all news and
current affairs programs. This all made for good radio. Furthermore, the BBC’s

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role was enhanced when the Taliban came to power since they began their own
abuse of media freedom. During 1995-2001, Taliban’s unstructured autocratic
form of government reduced Afghanistan’s media to four or five Taliban-run
newspapers, a Taliban radio station called Radio Sharia, with only a tiny
television and radio station run by the opposition Northern Alliance remain-
ing outside Taliban control. In areas run by Taliban - about 90 percent of
the country - television was banned entirely. Their radio station was the
leading domestic station among Afghan heads of household attracting a 50
percent regular audience in Dari and Pashto combined. Slightly more listened
to Pashto (44%) than to Dari (37%) (Inter-Media Survey 1999). It had
become almost compulsory to listen to Taliban radio, if only to be sure of hav-
ing information about their numerous Islamic restrictions and edicts.
However, BBC Persian and Pashto Service remained the only trusted source
of news, information, live discussion, entertainment as well as vital messages
on health and mine awareness. Afghans were very news hungry and they
trusted the BBC and ‘even the Taliban loved it’ (Brocks 2001 citing Skuse).
That contention gains support from a British Parliament memorandum on
the BBC World Service relationship with the Taliban:
There is evidence that the Taliban, including their leaders, were very keen listeners
to the BBC World Service [Pashto Service] themselves, despite the fact that they
disapproved of the Service. Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, gave his only
broadcast interview to the world Service after hearing the interview with Tony
Blair during the height of the crisis, proving that he was a regular listener (UK
Parliament, February 2001).
One then BBC manager, speaking under conditions of anonymity, even
suggested that the Pashto Service was seen as ‘having problems and not being
objective in its reporting’ because it was ‘getting too close’ to the political
personalities and group rivalries. The Pashto Service ‘knew what the Taliban
were going to do before it happened’. In fact the service became the only
channel with which Taliban would communicate and thus a very important
source of breaking news on the Taliban proclamations. Despite their frequent
interviews with the Pashto Service, the Taliban were at times angered by
BBC reports. The reporting of the destruction of the Bamyan statues of
Buddha was one such incident. The Pashto Service heard from the Taliban
that they were going ahead with the plan since the statues were ‘against Islamic
belief ’. The Service was inundated with telephone calls from listeners wanting
to condemn such an act. In order to balance the reporting, the Persian Service
tried to contact the Taliban. Although they did not have many Persian speak-
ers, finally the Taliban foreign minister agreed to speak in broken Persian and
confirmed the statues would be destroyed the next day. However the BBC

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office in Kabul was closed down and Kate Clark who had worked though the
Taliban era was expelled. The reason given by the Taliban information minis-
ter, Qudratuallh Jamal, for the closure of the BBC office was that the Pashto
Service had broadcast an interview with Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai – later
Finance Minister of Afghanistan – in which he called the Taliban ‘Jahel’ (stu-
pid) for destroying the Bamyan, saying it was ‘un-Islamic’ (Reporters Without
Borders, annual report on Afghanistan 2002 http://www.rsf.org/Afghanistan-
annual-report-2002.html). Nevertheless the BBC was not banned because all
the ‘soldiers were addicted to it’ (ibid.).
Incidents such as this - and the news of killing of the Mujaheddin’s iconic
leader, Ahamd Shah Massoud, by terrorists posing as cameramen just two days
before 9/11 - made the BBC a unique household brand for the people of
Afghanistan. The fact that the Persian and Pashto Service could focus on both
Tajiks and Pashtunes of Afghanistan meant that the coverage of news and
events, as well as the depth and breath of discussion and debates, were com-
prehensive. However, the report of the BBC Board of Governors Consultative
Group found that:
It is noted that the Persian service faces a structural problem in providing a
common service in a single language to audiences in different countries (Iran,
Afghanistan and Tajikistan) with very different outlooks. The Persian service has
explained its approach and the constraints on financial resources and local
reporting with which it has to contend (BBC Annual Reports and Accounts for
1997-98 for the Board of Governors.).
After 9/11
In 2000, the clear indication that the Taliban and al-Qaeda were partners in
creating an international army for terrorism based in Afghanistan was still
receiving little attention abroad. Ahmad Rashid says ‘there was no visible
change in US policy’ (Rashid 2009: 17). Yet by this time Afghanistan was not
just a security threat: it was the world’s worst humanitarian disaster zone.
It was only because of the al-Qaeda attacks, first on Ahmad Shah Massoud in
Afghanistan on September 9 2001, and then on the Twin Towers and Pentagon,
etc., on September 11, that international attention was revived.
Due to the total ban against television under the Taliban, it was assumed
that the majority of people living in Afghanistan had not seen pictures or
video of the devastation visited on New York and Washington by the hijacked
plane attacks of September 11. ‘How do you imagine a 110-storey building
collapsing if you haven’t seen it?’ asked Najiba Kasraee of the BBC

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Pashto Service. This was when radio came into its own. In the remote moun-
tainous regions of Afghanistan where people have no access to TV and
electricity, a small battery powered radio could do a lot. ‘What we did was
interview Afghans living in New York,’ Najiba explained. ‘One taxi driver we
interviewed was there when it happened.’ He told us what he saw and
how he dragged the injured away and ‘we also had him describe the scale of
things and how big the buildings were’ (Afghans Hooked on BBC, BBC Web
page South Asia, September 20 2001 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
south_asia/1555030.stm).
Najiba Kasraee celebrated another journalistic scoop when she interviewed
the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, after 9/11 for the Pashto Service, which
was becoming useful again for the British government in communicating with
Afghanistan. This was a revelation to many in the Persian and Pashto Service,
since previously the Prime Minister was always described as busy, rather than
‘available for interviewing’. Behrouz Afagh, who at the time was the editor of
the Eurasia region, says the British and US governments ‘understood suddenly
that the BBC had huge audiences and was a center for knowledge about
Afghanistan’ (Afagh 2008). He believes that at the time politicians’ detailed
knowledge of Afghanistan was limited and although government officials
made themselves available for interview, ‘we made the interview as tough as
possible’. Afagh stresses, however, ‘no one ever put any pressure on the BBC to
toe a particular line… my job was totally journalistic and I have never played
the diplomatic role.’ Conversely, the Service itself was ‘interested in getting
interviews from high ranking officials who were directly involved in the devel-
opments in Afghanistan’ (ibid).
Baqer Moin believes that the authority that the Persian and Pashto Service
had built in the 1990s ‘became useful’ after September 11. He managed to
get funding from the FCO for a special three-hour daily live program
focused only on Afghanistan. ‘The BBC Persian and Pashto Service was the
most established way to deliver the communication from the international
community to Afghanistan,’ says Moin, while reiterating that there was
‘no influence or directives from the Government.’ Moin later received the
2002 Elizabeth R award for ‘exceptional contribution to public service broad-
casting’ at the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association (CBA).
British political figures began to recognize the important work that BBC
Pashtu was doing. At Prime Minister’s questions in the House of Commons
on May 1 2002, Tony Blair said: ‘I would join the MP [Eric Illsley] in paying
tribute to the World Service which does a magnificent job. I saw for myself
in the interviews I did with Pashto radio how hugely important they were in
getting a message through to ordinary people in that country’ (BBC Press

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Release May 2 2002). Thus, with shifting international interest, the FCO was
prepared to pour in more funds into the Service. Apart from the three-hour
additional programming, plans were set to bring in the BBC World Service
Trust to train journalists in Afghanistan. With so much interest, Behrouz
Afagh opted successfully to enhance production for 24-hour FM broadcasts
to Afghanistan. BBC World Service Trust – a non-government organization
established by the BBC World Service to promote development through
innovative use of the media - set up shop inside Afghanistan’s state TV and
Radio station. Further, a team made up of personnel from the Pashto and
Persian services, the BBC World Service Trust and a wide range of experts
from BBC Technology, BBC Public Policy, and the Afghan Education Project
provided Radio Afghanistan with two fully equipped, self-operating studios,
digital-editing equipment, computers and mini discs, satellite phones, and
other essential production equipment. It also opened a Media Resource Centre
in Kabul. A string of other UN funded programs - ‘New Home New Life’ and
‘Village Voice’ and ‘Women’s program’ - were also all brought in and a huge
center in Kabul was set up led by Shirazudin Sediqi. BBC’s annual report for
2002-2003 puts it in these words:
The role of the World Service in Afghanistan shifted from being a lifeline
broadcaster to serving a more diverse set of audiences through a compelling
mix of bilingual rolling news, special programming and features. It secured a 24
hours FM relay for Kabul, the first of a set of national FM relays across
Afghanistan.
Expansion after 2003 – BBC for Afghanistan
In November 2003, the BBCWS launched a new dedicated schedule of

programming for Afghanistan. BBC for Afghanistan included three-hour
blocks of new programming in the key languages (Persian and Pashto; plus
some English and Uzbek) at breakfast, lunchtime, and evening every day.
During the program cycle, the blocks were repeated and supplemented by
local and international music programming. This coincided with the open-
ing of three new FM relays in Konduz, Faizabad, and Pol e Khomri, in addi-
tion to the established FM relays in Kabul, Mazar e Sharif, Bamyan, and
Jalalabad, which had opened in eastern Afghanistan over the previous 18
months. The transmitter in Bamyan was powered by solar power. The BBC
later launched further FM stations including Herat, Khost, Maimana, and
Kandahar, by 2003.

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Afagh argues that although the BBC had broadcast news to the region –
Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the Gulf – for 60 years in Persian
and 20 years in Pashto ‘this was the first time we had produced a dedicated
schedule for Afghanistan itself incorporating the key languages’. He referred
to the new schedule as ‘an exciting and historic development for the BBC and
Afghanistan’ (BBC Press Release November 17 2003).
In a separate initiative, the BBC Pashto language service launched a new
daily 30-minute program especially dedicated to Pashto language speakers liv-
ing in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan as well as
Karachi, where a large number of Pashtoons live. So it could be argued that a
complete restructuring and reshaping of programs took place after 9/11. The
BBC Persian and Pashto Service reverted to being the Persian Service and
BBC for Afghanistan replaced the Pashto Service expanding into Pakistan.
However, it could be argued that perhaps some of the focus was lost in all this
revamping.
The Future for BBC World Service in Afghanistan
In 2010, BBC broadcasting for Afghanistan is facing serious challenges from

local media outlets. There has been a rapid development of private TV and
FM stations in Kabul and new brands continue to enter the market. Radio
Arman - with a weekly reach in Kabul of over 72 percent and Tolo TV – with
weekly audiences in Kabul of over 80 percent – are seriously challenging
the BBC’s ability to maintain a mass audience in the long term (Parkinson
2008, p2). Their national reach is 25.9 percent and 32.3 percent respectively
(ibid). Television is now widespread in urban areas – 89 percent listen weekly
and 83 percent own a TV. Afagh has suggested that for the moment, the BBC’s
future strategy for Afghanistan is to stay with radio and he believes that,
despite their evident success, the local media do not have the freedom that the
BBC enjoys and cannot report as objectively.
The media scene in Afghanistan is now far more developed and the local
media seem to understand the needs of their audiences or at least cater to
their tastes. BBC Persian and Pashto Service, which once received almost
80 percent weekly audiences, is now reaching 59 percent of adults in
Afghanistan. Listening is higher in rural areas and in Persian (42.5%) than
Pashto (28.9%). There are also smaller audiences listening in Uzbek (2.2%)
and English (0.9%). Despite attempts to increase female listeners – such as
special women’s programs funded by the BBC World Service Trust – statistics

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provided by the BBC indicate listening is still higher amongst men (54%).
The Internet has not yet proved to be viable for Afghanistan, with only 0.06
percent weekly usage. Moreover, it is not clear from this latest research (2008)
whether the statistics provided relate to the Persian Service or to BBC for
Afghanistan since it speaks of the BBC’s reach in Afghanistan. The BBC’s own
research concludes: ‘as new brands continue to enter the market, it will be a
big challenge for the BBC to maintain such a mass audience in the long term’
(Parkinson 2008, p1) The relative loss of audiences could be due to the BBC
losing sight of its own niche – providing world news – in trying to compete to
become local. The BBC has been focused on developing partnerships and get-
ting better market deals and has moved much of the production to Afghanistan,
so losing contact with the BBC’s editorial scrutiny in London. It believes that
building on the foundation of the BBC’s journalism and program making,
‘marketing and business development are raising awareness of what the BBC
has to offer and securing the partnership deals upon which future audiences
depend’ (Reaching out to Listeners, A Year in Review, BBC World Service
Annual Review for 2006-2007).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/us/annual_review/2006/connecting
.shtml
The newly established (January 2009) BBC Persian Television (see Torfeh
and Sreberny, this issue) aims to speak to audiences in Iran, Afghanistan, and
Tajikistan, and employs presenters who are nationals of Afghanistan. It played
an important role during the Iranian summer of discontent in 2009. It is not
so clear how successful it is in garnering a regular audience in Afghanistan and
whether its programs sufficiently address the needs of people of Afghanistan as
opposed to satisfying Iranian informational and cultural needs. But it does
mean that the BBC is already inside Afghanistan as a television channel, per-
haps contradicting Afagh’s expressed focus on radio and auguring further
changes to come.
Conclusions
The Pashto Service contributed enormously to the news environment in

Afghanistan, especially during the long years of civil war when there was
little access to any other media. While Pashto was never a major language
service, it was a very useful means of informing the public during 20 years
of war. Together with the Persian Service of the BBC it was often the only
reliable means for people to learn about security and political issues on

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which their lives depended. For a people torn by war, Afghans were always
hungry for news. In remote areas they had no access to television, and
newspapers were rare. Moreover, after the abuse of media by various regimes,
BBC radio was trusted, and was the main source of news, entertainment, and
information. And indirectly it developed people’s taste for media.
However, this archival research suggests that the British government’s
interest in providing funding for a Pashto Service was guided neither by the
information needs of the people of Afghanistan nor by regional ethnic
sensitivities. The recommendations by BBC management to start a Pashto
Service were largely unheeded. What convinced the government to start
Pashto broadcasts was the chain of political developments occurring in
Afghanistan. Hence the Pashto Service has often been under close scrutiny for
playing a political role, especially in the early days when it was seen more as a
potent means of ‘broadcasting news about the war’ between the Mujaheddin
and the Soviet backed regimes.
After 9/11 and following extensive developments in the media market, the
Pashto Service lost its popularity and even the new program that replaced it -
BBC for Afghanistan - has not managed to reach the same number of listeners
despite high quality FM broadcasting across the country. It seems as if the
function for which the Pashto Service had been set up was lost. On the one
hand, there are numerous local news agencies and TV and radio stations now
reporting in Pashto. On the other hand, the media market had opened up and
there was little need for the Taliban to communicate only with one Pashto
language media. BBC for Afghanistan is facing a serious challenge at present
in trying to compete with the local media.
The Pashto Service of the BBC has been broadcasting to one of the most
strategically important countries in South Asia. For much of the 20th century,
Afghanistan was at the center of rivalries between the United States and Soviet
Union, and it remains a top political priority for the West due to its proximity
to China, India, Iran, and Russia. Both the United States and the European
Union have paid heavily for a decade of neglect when civil war pulled the
country apart and turned it into fertile ground for terrorist training.
The evident weakness of public diplomacy and political institution-
building, evidenced in the chaos over the September 2009 election pro-
cess, suggests yet again that military force without adequate attention to
civil engagement cannot win wars. A privatized media market that has
produced many millionaires has not and cannot adequately address the politi-
cal and cultural needs of a war-ravaged Afghanistan and build a national
project.

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Sadly for Afghanistan, the absence of a strong national broadcaster puts

the BBCWS in a potentially powerful position to provide the information,
debate, and analysis required for civic participation and rational engagement.
The development of BBC Persian Television means that a new strategy is
emerging, perhaps as a result of failed military objectives, ongoing political
dilemmas, a newly competitive media environment, and changing technolo-
gies. Perhaps a television service for Afghanistan may yet emerge as a separate
project. There are some lessons from history here and it remains to be seen
which ones are learned.
References
Adam, Gordon, ‘Radio in Afghanistan: socially useful communications in wartime’, in Hemer,

Oscar and Tufte, Thomas, eds. Media and Global Change, 2005 Clacso, Buenos Aires.,
2005.
‘Afghans Hooked on BBC’, BBC Web page South Asia, September 20 2001).
BBC Annual Review for 2002-2003.
BBC WAC, E40/656/1, Persian Complaints.
BBC WAC, E58/30/1, February 18 1969.
BBC WAC, E58/25/1, April 7 1971.
BBC WAC, E58/30/1, February 18 1969, FCO to Oliver Whitley, director of External
Broadcasting.
BBC WAC E58/30/1, August 27 1974, Pashto 1971-79.
BBC WAC, E58/30/1, October 1 1974, Pashto 1971-79.
BBC Press Release May 2 2002.
BBC Press Release November 17 2003.
BBC Persian Service, report by Andrew Whitley of the BBC in Teheran on January 30 1974.
Brocks, Emma, ‘A long way from Ambridge’, the Guardian, October 23 2001.
Inter-Media survey of 3,903 adult male heads of household conducted between November 29
1997 and February 27 1998.
National Archives, FCO8/2762, 1976, BBC Vernacular Service to Afghanistan, page 64, visitors
to Afghanistan.
Parkinson, Kelly, ‘Afghanistan at a Glance’, BBC Marketing, Communications and Audiences
2008.
PRO FCO8 2762, Information Policy Report, July 1974.
Rashid, Ahmad, Taliban, Pan Books 2001, page2.
Rashid, Ahmad, Descent into Chaos, Penguin Books, 2009.
Reporters Without Borders, March 14 2001.
Skuse, Andrew and Gillespie, Marie (2010) Broadcasting ‘the State’: Tribe, Citizenship and the
Politics of Radio Drama Production in Afghanistan in Skuse, Andrew, Gillespie, Marie and
Powers, Gerry (2010, forthcoming) Broadcasting Social Change: Drama, Development
and Cross-Cultural Development: New Delhi: Sage.
The Times Archives, July 30 1941, report from Our Own Correspondent.
The, UK Parliament, Minutes of Evidence for the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Supplementary Memorandum for BBC World Service, February 2001.

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Interviews
Behrouz Afagh, interview with M. Torfeh, December 22 2008, at BBC World Service.
William Crawley, interview with M. Torfeh, July 2 2008 at SOAS.
Baqer Moin interview with M. Torfeh, January 21 2009 at Sloan Square, London.
David Page, Interview with M. Torfeh, September 16 2008, at SOAS.
Gordon Adam, Interview with M. Torfeh, August 5, 2008.

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Broadcasting To Afghanistan: A History of The BBC Pashto Service

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MEJCC

Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 3 (2010) 192–215 brill.nl/mjcc

Massoumeh Torfeh and Annabelle Sreberny

In the winter of 2009-10, as Britain counted the human cost of increasing

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/187398610X510010

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The Changing Priorities of the FCO

Pashto was not considered one of the language sections to be necessary

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‘there could be a danger of reducing our eﬀectiveness to Iran’; the Persian

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The ﬂurry of activity between 1970-79 that includes numerous meetings,

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Setting up the Pashto Service 1981-83

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The Second Stage 1983-1994

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Our new reporter on Afghanistan, Hamed Elmi, became a fantastic source of

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Another important change was the technological advances in broadcasting.

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The Third Stage 1994-2001

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Expansion after 2003 – BBC for Afghanistan

In November 2003, the BBCWS launched a new dedicated schedule of

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The Future for BBC World Service in Afghanistan

In 2010, BBC broadcasting for Afghanistan is facing serious challenges from

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The Pashto Service contributed enormously to the news environment in

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Sadly for Afghanistan, the absence of a strong national broadcaster puts

Adam, Gordon, ‘Radio in Afghanistan: socially useful communications in wartime’, in Hemer,

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