RPC-BOOK II LESSON 4

Title Two

CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

Chapter One

ARBITRARY DETENTION OR EXPULSION, VIOLATION OF DWELLING,

PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL MEETINGS
AND CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP

What are the crimes against the fundamental laws of the State?
They are:
1. Arbitrary detention. (Art. 124)
2. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. (Art. 125)
3. Delaying release. (Art. 126)
4. Expulsion. (Art. 127)
5. Violation of domicile. (Art. 128)
6. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained. (Art. 129)
7. Searching domicile without witnesses. (Art. 130)
8. Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings. (Art. 131)
9. Interruption of religious worship. (Art. 132)
10. Offending the religious feelings. (Art. 133)

They are called crimes against the fundamental laws of the State, because they violate
certain provisions of the Bill of Rights (Article III) of the 1987 Constitution.

(Ang mga krimin na nabanggit ay tinatawag na “CRIMES AGAINST THE

FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE STATE” sapagkat it ay paglabag sa ilang probisyon ng
Bill of Rights ng ating Saligang Batas)

1. Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, provides that "no person shall be
deprived of x x x, liberty, x x x without due process of law, x x x."

(SEKSYON 1. Hindi dapat alisan ng buhay, kalayaan, or ariarian ang sino mang tao
nang hindi kaparaanan ng batas, ni pagkaitan ang sino mang tao ng pantay na
pangangalaga ng batas.)

Arts. 124,125 and 126 of the Code punish any public officer or employee in those cases
where an individual is unlawfully deprived of liberty.

2. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the liberty of abode
and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law."
(SEKSYON 6. Hindi dapat bawalan ang kalayaan sa paninirahan at ang pagbabago ng
tirahan sa saklaw ng mga katakdaang itinatadhana ng batas maliban sa legal na utos
ng hukuman. Ni hindi dapat bawalan ang karapatan sa paglalakbay maliban kun gpara
sa kapakanan ng kapanatagan ng bansa, kaligtasang pambayan, o kalusugang
pambayan ayon sa maaaring itadhana ng batas.)

Art. 127 of the Code punishes any public officer or employee who shall unlawfully expel
a person from the Philippines or compel a person to change his residence.

3. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized."

SEKSYON 2. Ang karapatan ng mga taong-bayan na magkaroon ng kapanatagan sa

kanilang sarili, pamamahay, papeles, at mga bagay-bagay laban sa hindi makatwirang
paghahalughog at pagsamsam sa ano mang layunin ay hindi dapat labagin, at hindi
dapat maglagda ng warrant sa paghalughog o warrant sa pagdakip maliban kung may
malinaw na dahilan na personal na pagpapasyahan ng hukom matapos masiyasat ang
mayhabla at ang mga testigong maihaharap niya sa ilalim ng panunumpa o patotoo, at
tiyakang tinutukoy ang lugar na hahalughugin, at mga taong darakpin o mga bagay na
sasamsamin.

Arts. 128, 129 and 130 of the Code punish any public officer or employee who violates
such rights.

4. Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, provides that "no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances."

SEKSYON 4. Hindi dapat magpatibay ng batas na nagbabawas sa kalayaan sa

pananalita, pagpapahayag, o ng pamamahayagan, o sa karapatan ng mga taong-bayan
na mapayabang magkatipon at magpetisyon sa pamahalaan upang ilahad ang kanilang
mga karaingan.

Art. 131 of the Code punishes any public officer or employee who violates the right
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.

5. Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, provides that "no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
 discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

SEKSYON 5. Hindi dapat magbalangkas ng batas para sa pagtatatag ng

relihiyon, o nagbabawal sa malayang pagsasagamit nito. Dapat ipahintulot
magpakailanman ang malayang pagsasagamit at pagtatamasa ng
pagpapahayag ng relihiyon at pagsamba nang walang pagtatangi o pamimili.
Hindi dapat kailanganin ang pagsusulit pangrelihiyon sa pagsasagamit ng
karapatang sibil o pampulitika.

Arts. 132 and 133 punish violations of the right to free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship.

Section One. — Arbitrary detention and expulsion

(Hindi makatuwirang pag-antala o pagkukulong at pag-papaalis)

Classes of arbitrary detention:

Mga klase ng hindi makatuwirang pag-antala o pagkukulong)

(1) Arbitrary detention by detaining a person without legal ground. (Art. 124) (Hindi
makatuwirang pag-aantala o pag-kukulong ng isang tao ng walang legal na basehan)

(2) Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. (Art. 125)
(Pagka-antala sa pagdadala ng isang hinuling tao sa tamang hukuman)

(3) Delaying release. (Art. 126) (Pagka-antala sap ag-papalaya)

The penalties for the three classes of arbitrary detention are the same, as provided in
Article 124. Articles 125 and 126 do not provide penalties for their violation. They make
reference to the penalties provided for in Article 124.

Art. 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE who, without
legal grounds, detains a person, shall suffer:

(Ang sinuman na opisyal ng pamahalaan o empleyado na, walang legal na basehan,

ang aantala o magkukulong sa isang tao ay mananagot:)

1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the detention has not exceeded three days;

(Pagkakabilanggo na arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its

minimum period kung ang pagka-antala o pagkakakulong ay hindi lumampas ng tatlong
araw)

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
detention has continued more than three but not more than fifteen days;
(Pagkakabilanggo na prision correctional in its medium and maximum period kung ang
pagka-aantala o pagkakulong ay nagpatuloy ng higit sa tatlong araw subalit hindi
naman umabot sa labinlimang araw)

3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen
days but not more than six months; and

(Pagkakabilanggo na prision ayor, kung ang pagkakaantala o pagkakakulong ay humigit

sa labinlimang araw subalit hindi naman humigit sa anim na buwan)

4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.

(Pagkakabilanggo ng reclusion temporal, kung ang pagka-antala o pagkakakulong ay

lumampas ng tatlong araw)

The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the
compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds
for the detention of any person.

(Ang pagkakagawa ng krimin o ang pagiging marahas sa kadahilan ng pagka baliw o

iba pang karamdaman na nangangailangan ng sapilitang pagkukulong ng pasyente sa
isang ospital ay itinuturing na NAAAYON SA BATAS na pagkukulog ng isang tao.)

Elements:

1. That the offender if a public officer or employee.

(Na ang nagkasala ay isang opisyal o empleyado ng pamahalaan)
2. That he detains a person.
(Na kanyang ipiniit o inantala ang isang tao)
3. That the detention is without legal grounds. (Na ang pagkakapiit o
pagkakakulong ay hindi makatuwiran) (U.S. vs. Braganza, et al., 10 Phil. 79; Milo
vs. Salonga, 152 SCRA 113; Astorga vs. People, G.R. No. 154130, October 1,
2003)

The offender in arbitrary detention is a public officer or employee.

The public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain
or order the detention of persons accused of a crime, but when they detain a person
they have no legal grounds therefor.

(Ang opisyal o empleyado ng pamahalaan na mananagot sa kasong arbitrary detention

ay dapat na nabigyan ng kapangyarihan na magkulong o mag-antala o mag-utos na
ikulung ang isang tao na inaakusahan na gumawa ng isang krimin, at ng ito ay kanilang
gawin walang siyang legal na basehan)

Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or
mayors. A barangay captain and a municipal councilor are public officers.
(ang ilan sa mga opisayal ng pamahalaan ay ang mga pulis o iba pang alagad ng batas,
ang huwes at ang mayor. Ang barangay captain o ang konsehal ng bayan ay mga
opisyal din ng pamahalaan)

If the detention is perpetrated by other public officers, the crime committed may be
illegal detention, because they are acting in their private capacity.

If the offender is a private individual, the act of detaining another is illegal detention
under Article 267 or Article 268. But private individuals who conspired with public
officers in detaining certain policemen are guilty of arbitrary detention. (People vs.
Camerino, CA-G.R. No. 14207-R, Dec. 14, 1956)

(Kung ang gumawa nito ay isang pribadong tao, ang kanyang ginawa na pagkukulong
ay illegay detention at hindi arbitrary detention. Subalit kung ang isang pribadong tao ay
nakipagsabwatan sa isaing opisyal ng pamahalaan sa pgakukulong ng isang police
officer siya ay mapapanagot sa kasong arbitrary detention.)

When is there a detention?

Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any

manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty. (People vs. Gungon, G.R. No.
119574, March 19 1998, citing People vs. Domasian, G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993;
People vs. Flores, G.R. No. 116488, May 31, 2001)

(Ang ibig sabihin ng salitang detention ay ang aktuwal na pagkukulong ng isang tao sa
isang kulong na lugar o sa isang pamamaraan na mawawalan siya ng kalayaan)
A person is detained when he is placed in confinement or there is a restraint on his
person. (U.S. vs. Cabanag, 8 Phil. 64)

(Ang isang tao ay ikinukulong kung siya ay inilagay sa isang lugar na pagpipigil sa
kanyang kilos)
Even if the persons detained could move freely in and out of their prison cell and could
take their meals outside the prison, nevertheless, if they were under the surveillance of
the guards and they could not escape for fear of being apprehended again, there would
still be arbitrary detention. (People vs. Camerino, supra)

(Kahit na ang isang tao na pinipigil ay malayang nakakakilos, labas pasok sa kanyang
kulungan upang makabili ng kanyang pagkain, subalit kung siya ay sumasailalaim sa
isang pagmamanman ng mga guwarya at hindi siya makaalis sa takot na muling mahuli,
ito ay nangangahulugan ng arbitrary detention)

Restraint resulting from fear.

Where the accused-mayor refused to allow a DENR team to go home despite their
pleas, and the refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen
"reinforcements," all armed with military issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the
team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses, and the team was
instead brought to a house where after dinner, some of the members were allowed to
go down from the house but not to leave the barangay, and the rest just sat in the house
until 2:00 a.m. when they were finally allowed to leave, it was held that the restraint
resulting from fear is evident.

It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen
had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds
of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in the barangay. The
intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is
clear. (Astorga vs. People, G.R. No. 154130, October 1, 2003)

"Without legal grounds."

The detention of a person is without legal ground:

(1) when he has not committed any crime or, at least, there is no reasonable ground for
suspicion that he has committed a crime, or

(2) when he is not suffering from violent insanity or any other ailment requiring
compulsory confinement in a hospital.

(Ang pagkukulong ng isang tao ay walang sapat na dahilan kung:

1. Hindi naman siay nakakagwa ng isang krimin o wala namang sapat na dahilan
upang siya ay pag hinalaan na gumawa ng isang krimin;

2. Kung hindi naman siya nagdaranas ng isang marahas na pagka baliw o iba pang
karamdaman na nangangailangan ng sapilitang pagkukulong)

Thus, in the following cases, the detention was without legal ground:

1. A barrio lieutenant, seeing his servant quarreling with his daughter, seized the
servant and an hour later sent him to the Justice of the Peace. The servant was
kept in detention from 5 p.m. to 9 a.m. the next day when he was released by the
Justice of the Peace.

Held: The barrio lieutenant was guilty of arbitrary detention, because he detained the
offended party without any reason therefor, such as the commission of the crime, and
without having the authority to do so. (U.S. vs. Gellaga, 15 Phil. 120)

Note: Merely quarreling is not a crime,

1. A Manila detective sergeant arrested Aquilino Taruc because of the suspicion

that he might be implicated in the plot to assassinate the President and that he
was related to Luis Taruc, a Huh Supremo.

Held: Mere suspicion of his connection with any murderous plot is no ground recognized
by law for restraining the freedom of any individual. Lawlessness from above can only
lead to chaos and anarchy. (Taruc vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 876)
 1. In overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not
actually committed a crime in the presence of respondent-judge. Such being the
case, the warrantless arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were
illegal. (Cayao vs. del Mundo, A.M. No. MTJ-93-813, September 15,1993)

Legal grounds for the detention of any person.

The following are legal grounds for the detention of any person:

(a) The commission of a crime;

(b) Violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the
patient in a hospital. (Art. 124, par. 2)

(Ang mga sumusunod ay legal na kadahilanan upang ang isang tao ay makatuwirang
ikulong:

1. Kung siya ay nakagawa ng isang krimin;

2. Kung siya ay nagdaranas marahas na pagka baliw o iba pang karamdaman na

nangangailangan ng sapilitang pagkukulong sa isang tao)

Arrest without warrant is the usual cause of arbitrary detention.

(Ang pag aresto ng walang warrant of arrest ang pinakamalimit na dahilan ng arbitrary
detention)

A peace officer must have a warrant of arrest properly issued by the court in order to
justify an arrest. If there is no such warrant of arrest, the arrest of a person by a public
officer may constitute arbitrary detention.

(Ang alagad ng batas ay dapat na merong warrant of arrest na maayos na ipinag-uutos

ng hukuman upang maging makatarungan ang pag-aaresto. Kung walang warrant of
arrest ang pag-aresto ito ay maaring magingg dahilan upang ang opisyal ng
pamahalaan na gumawa ng pag-aresto ay makasuhan ng arbitrary detention)

Arrest without warrant — When lawful.

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(Ang isang opisyal ng pamahalaan o ang isang pribadong tao ay maaring umaresto ng
isang tao kahit na walang warrant of arret kung:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(Sa kanyang harapan, ang taong aarestohin ay gumawa, gumagawa o nagtatangkang

gumawa ng isang krimin)
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(Kung ang isang krimin ay kagagawa pa lamang at siya ay may sapat na kadahilanan
upang maniwala base sa kanyang personal na kaalaman sa mga pangyayari na ang
taong kanyang huhulihin ang siyang gumawa ng krimin)

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure)

(Kung ang taong huhilihin ay isang bilanggo na tumakas sa kulungan kung saan siya
naka kulong o kaya naman ay ito ay tumakas habang inililipat ng kulungan)

Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or
immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. (Ilagan vs.
Enrile, 139 SCRA 349)

"In his presence".

The phrase "In his presence" in paragraph (a), construed - When the officer sees the
offense being committed, although at a distance, or hears the disturbance created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, or when the offense is continuing or
has not been consummated at the time the arrest is made, the offense is said to be
committed in his presence. (U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516)

It has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run — an offense
committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest
petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the
arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene." (U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516, 519, citing
3 Cyc , 886; Ramsey v. State, 17 S. E., 613; Dilger v. Com., 11 S. W., 651; State v.
McAfee, 12 S. E., 435; State v. Williams, 15 S. E., 554; and Hawkins v. Lutton, 70 N.
W., 483) As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a
thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to
apprehend its driver After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance,
Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SP0
2 Borja and SP0 2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual
arrest of petitioner. (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 12197, March 12, 1997)

Personal knowledge is required.

Under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an officer arresting
a person who has just committed an offense must have probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it.

"Personal knowledge of facts" in arrests without a warrant must be based upon

probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. (U.S.
vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 851.)

The court indicated in the case of People vs. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990)
that police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime
when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it stated:

"When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would take
place and while positioned at a street corner, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and
Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from them (the
public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter handed a
wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants
infront of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his
pocket, (p. 2) XXX XXX XXX . . .

Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their testimonies
were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events that took place
leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing distance, specially
since conversation would expectedly be carried on hushed tones, but they were
certainly near enough to observe the movements of the appellant and the buyer.
(People vs. Bati, supra, citing People vs. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, October 12, 1987)

Probable cause.

Probable cause can be defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. (Pendon vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 429 [1990]; Quintero vs. NBI, 162
SCRA 467 [1988]; Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 815 [1984].

It must be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may
produce and not based on mere hearsay. (Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69
[1989]; Quintero vs. NBI, supra)

Probable cause was found to be present in the following instances:

(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the
accused (People vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646; 1988)

(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be acting
suspiciously (People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220; 1990)
(c) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would
transport a quantity of marijuana (People vs. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751; 1990).

A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.

In arrests without a warrant under Sec. 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed, x x x (People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA

When the person to be arrested is attempting to commit an offense.

Illustration:

A policeman, acting under orders of his chief who desired to put a stop to pilfering in a
certain locality, patrolled his district, and about midnight, seeing two persons in front of
an uninhabited house who afterward entered an uninhabited camarin, arrested them
without warrant, although no crime had been committed. The policeman took them to
the municipal presidencia where they were detained in jail for six or seven hours before
they were released.

Held: Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely

the officer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other felony. The
rule is supported by the necessities of life. The applicable principles rest upon the same
foundation of reason and common sense. (U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 853)

When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it.

Illustration:

A Constabulary officer was engaged to marry a girl, but later the engagement was
broken. Thereafter, while the officer was passing in front of the girl's house, he was
assaulted by the girl's two brothers, after the girl had approached him in a friendly
manner, which she never did before. He suspected the girl had conspired with his
assailants and so he ordered her arrest and detention. The officer filed a complaint
against her and her brothers. For the arrest and detention of the girl, he was charged
with arbitrary detention.

Held: The Constabulary officer was not guilty of arbitrary detention. (People vs.
Ancheta, 68 Phil. 415)

Note: The Constabulary officer, in ordering the arrest and detention of the girl, had
probable cause to believe that the girl participated in the assault as one of the
conspirators.
In arbitrary detention, the legality of the detention does not depend upon the juridical
and much less the judicial fact of a crime (the elements of the felony are present and
they were so found by the court), which at the time of the commission, is not and can
not definitely be determined for lack of necessary data and of jurisdiction, but upon the
nature of the deed. It is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest
has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist for him to believe that the
person sought to be detained participated therein. The obligation to make an arrest by
reason of crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment
thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. (People vs. Ancheta, 68 Phil. 415)

Under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the actual
commission of a crime by the person detained is not necessary to justify his detention.

The legality of the detention of a person does not depend upon the actual commission
of a crime by him, but upon the nature of his deed when its characterization as a crime
may reasonably be inferred by the officer to whom the law at the moment leaves the
decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of that person. (U.S. vs.
Sanchez, 27 Phil. 442)

Illustration: Two Bureau of Internal Revenue secret service agents, strangers in the
municipality, were seen acting suspiciously near the market place. The accused, two
policemen, called upon them to give an account of themselves and explain their
suspicious conduct, and at the same time demanded that they produce their cedulas,
which the agents were unable to do. Believing that their conduct and inability to
satisfactorily account for themselves justified the suspicion that they were in some way
connected with the recent robberies in the place, or that they were about to commit theft
or robbery, the accused placed the two men under arrest and took them forthwith to the
house of the justice of the peace, accused Battalones, informing the latter of the arrest
of the two men with them and asking him to decide what was proper to do. The justice
of the peace, without verifying the truth of the claims of the agents that they were of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, ordered them taken to the municipal jail to be detained until
further orders.

Held: No charge of arbitrary detention can be maintained against the two policemen. In
the light of after events, the suspicion directed against the secret service agents was not
well founded, but viewing the facts as they must have presented themselves to the
policemen at the time of the arrest, they must be held to have had reasonable grounds
upon which to base their suspicions as to the arrested men.

But the justice of the peace who arbitrarily and without investigation directed the
detention of the agents was held guilty of the crime of "detention arbitraria" through
negligence. The justice of the peace was not actuated by any special malice or ill-will
toward the prisoners, but he was willfully negligent of their rights. (U.S. vs. Battalones,
et al., 23 Phil. 46)

No reasonable ground if officer only wants to know the commission of crime.

In a case where the accused was arrested and prosecuted for illegal possession of
opium, the witness testified that the only reason why he ordered the arrest of the
accused was that he was acting suspiciously. He did not say in what way the accused
was acting suspiciously or what was the particular act or circumstance which aroused
his suspicion. He caused the arrest because, as he said, "I wanted to see if he had
committed a crime." It was held that it was not a legal reason for making an arrest. (U.S.
vs. Hachaw, 21 Phil. 514)

Note: There is no reasonable ground of suspicion that the accused committed an

offense.

That a police officer can make an arrest on mere complaint of the offended party is a
debatable question.

U.S. vs. Sanchez (27 Phil. 442)

Facts: The municipal president and the acting chief of police of Caloocan, Rizal, had
information that two nights earlier, a robbery had occurred in a boat on the river.
Another robbery occurred in a billiard room. The acting chief of police acquired the
information that Benigno Aranzanso had been in that billiard room that night of the
robbery. The acting chief of police directed policeman Sanchez to look for Benigno
Aranzanso in order that he might be identified by the boatmen in connection with the
robbery committed in the boat. The description given of the person who had been in the
billiard room fitted Aranzanso. Policeman Sanchez proceeded to arrest him in the
cockpit on the next morning, took him to the town hall, and detained him in the
municipal jail until before nightfall of the same day, when he was set at liberty by order
of the municipal president. No warrant was previously issued for his detention.

Held: The arrest and detention of Benigno Aranzanso for the purpose of identifying his
person, were justified, since according to the acting chief of police reasonable grounds
existed for believing in the existence of a crime and suspicion pointed to that individual.

It is, therefore, beyond dispute that defendant Sanchez did not commit the crime
charged against him.

Sayo vs. Chief of Police (80 Phil. 859)

Facts: Upon complaint of one Bernardo Malinao, charging the petitioners with having
committed the crime of robbery, policeman Benjamin Dumlao arrested the petitioners.
When the petition for habeas corpus was heard, the petitioners were still detained and
the fiscal had not yet released them or filed against them an information with the proper
courts of justice.

Held: A police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an
offense upon complaint of the offended party even though, after investigation, he
becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
What the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal or
directly with the justice of the peace court.

The theory that police officers may arrest any person just for questioning or
investigation, without any warrant of arrest, represents an ideology incompatible with
human dignity. Reason revolts against it.

Dissenting opinion of Justice Tuason in the case of Sayo vs. Chief of Police.

Section 6 of Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and Section 2463 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as well as the authorities I have quoted, show the fallacy of the
idea that the arresting officer knows, or should know, all the facts about the offense for
the perpetration, or supposed perpetration, of which he has made the arrest.

A police officer can seldom make arrest with personal knowledge of the offense and of
the identity of the person arrested sufficient in itself to convict. To require him to make
an arrest only when the evidence he himself can furnish proves beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the accused, would "endanger the safety of society." It would cripple
the forces of the law to the point of enabling criminals, against whom there is only moral
conviction or prima facie proof of guilt, to escape.