Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Elke Heckner
1. The ship Die Gustloff was named for the Swiss party leader Wilhelm Gustloff, who was
assassinated in 1936. It first served as a Strength through Joy cruise ship and was later recommis-
sioned as a navy ship. In 1945 it was used to evacuate German civilians along with military person-
nel from Gotenhafen.
2. What I call the “guilt-and-shame paradigm” is the prescriptive ethical demand first put in place
by the Allies that Germans must atone for their war crimes. As Donald Bloxham argues, this moral
imperative was reinforced by initial American principles of occupation and JCS 1067, a directive
issued in April 1945 to the commander in chief of the U.S. Occupation Forces. The directive outlined
the basic policies of occupation in the U.S. zone, including denazification and the treatment of Ger-
many as an “enemy nation.” In the postwar years the paradigm took on the shape of a “formula of
collective guilt” (Genocide on Trial: War Crimes and the Formation of Holocaust History and Mem-
ory [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], 139). The majority of the population rejected this formu-
lation, and the disavowal of German war guilt expressed itself in numerous exculpatory narratives
about Nazi organizations and individuals. These exculpatory narratives, circulated as Nazi propaganda
at the end of the war, had specifically evoked notions of German victimhood to offset Nazi war crimes.
New German Critique 112, Vol. 38, No. 1, Winter 2011
DOI 10.1215/0094033X-2010-023 © 2011 by New German Critique, Inc.
65
66 Televising Tainted History
Frank Wisbar’s antiwar film Darkness Fell over Gotenhafen (Die Nacht fiel
über Gotenhafen, 1959)—has been mostly about expiating German war guilt.
In stark contrast, Dresden, March of Millions, and Die Gustloff move far
beyond rituals of atonement. They have gone so far as to restore cinematic
pleasure by savoring the drama intrinsic to these tainted histories, channeling
it into the genre of event TV. They can afford to do so, it seems, because their
directors, especially Roland Suso Richter and Kai Wessel, explicitly pledged
to scrutinize this controversial history through a nonrevisionist, even antirevi-
sionist lens.3 What is more, Dresden, March of Millions, and Die Gustloff put
forth a populist reckoning with the civilian experience during the last years of
the Third Reich that amounts to its own kind of televisual coming to terms
with the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung).
Initiated by Dresden and quickly thereafter March of Millions, produced
for the public television stations ZDF and ARD, respectively, the docudra-
matic approach to the unsavory pasts of bombardment and displacement has
presented audiences with an easily accessible medium for a broad-based, col-
lective catharsis delivered in the unthreatening mode of histotainment. As
the directors of these docudramas sought to wrest the tainted history of Ger-
man civilians from the exculpatory narratives of the right while reimagining
these histories for the present within a postunification framework, they put
in place framing narratives and strategies of disidentification intended to
thwart appropriation by the right wing. Specific examples of this defiant tele-
visuality include Richter’s multiperspectival narration of the bombardment
of Dresden, which features British and German Jewish points of view; Joseph
Vilsmaier’s slapstick parody of the Nazis; and Wessel’s contention that Hit-
ler’s war on Europe finally caught up with German populations in the East.
This message, incidentally, resonates with the DVD commentary on Dresden:
that the German trauma of bombardment was preceded by Joseph Goebbels’s
declaration of total war on Europe.
With the expulsion of the ethnic Germans from the Eastern territories, the myth of German vic-
timhood reemerged in the postwar years and was deployed to counter claims of Nazi atrocities. Only
later did the 68 generation adopt the guilt-and-shame paradigm as an appropriate framework for
working through the wartime experience, especially the complicity, of their parents’ generation.
Within leftist circles the ethical claims of guilt and shame were reinterpreted as ideologically correct
imperatives that prescribed how the German wartime experience could be represented.
3. By revisionism I mean interpretations of the Nazi period that exculpate Germans from the
crimes of the Third Reich. Nonrevisionist accounts of history do not adopt this viewpoint, nor do
they critically examine its basic assumptions. Antirevisionist reinterpretations explicitly take on
exculpatory narratives, seeking to contest and undermine them.
Elke Heckner 67
4. Christian Buß, “Tut-tut, hier kommt der Opfer-Dampfer,” Der Spiegel, March 1, 2008, www
.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,538627,00.html.
5. By analogizing German civilian suffering to the suffering caused by the Holocaust, this logic
suggests that German civilians are exonerated from charges of war crimes to the degree that they
themselves suffered.
6. Bill Niven, “The Good Captain and the Bad Captain: Joseph Vilsmaier’s Die Gustloff and
the Erosion of Complexity,” German Politics and Society 26, no. 4 (2008): 82–98. Hereafter cited
as “Good Captain.”
68 Televising Tainted History
bear out his assertions or contest them. In discussing Niven’s choice of a cine-
matic countermodel to the revisionist docudramas—namely, Darkness Fell
over Gotenhafen—I show that the parameters the film offers for a critical com-
ing to terms with the past are historically contingent at best and thus cannot be
transposed to the specific geopolitical and cultural location of Germany in the
first decade of the twenty-first century. The second part of this article proposes
a rethinking of the narrow parameters in which the revisionist label has been
used in favor of a larger consideration of how Dresden, March of Millions, and
Die Gustloff contribute to the project of a coming to terms with the past, popu-
list or otherwise. Drawing on Aleida Assmann’s nuanced deconstruction of the
seemingly irreconcilable opposition between invocations of German wartime
suffering and expiation of war guilt—which leads her to conclude that the invo-
cation of German trauma cannot be necessarily reinscribed into a narrative of
exoneration in all instances7—I argue that much of the debate around the revival
of the myth of German victimhood in the TV docudramas stems from the pre-
carious tension between the docudramas’ affective re-presenting (Vergegen-
wärtigung) of the historical experiences of bombardment and displacement,
on the one hand, and the televisual coming to terms with the past supposedly
enabled by it, on the other.8 As I show, this tension engenders its own founda-
tional myths of a distinctly postunification imaginary, for instance, the inher-
ently democratic instincts of untainted characters who represent not only the
“good Germans” but also the new humanitarians of a coming age.
7. Aleida Assmann, “On the (In)Compatibility of Guilt and Suffering in German Memory,”
German Life and Letters 59 (2006): 187–200. Hereafter cited as “(In)Compatibility.”
8. Re-presenting in this case designates the visualizing and staging of episodes of tainted his-
tory in the present.
9. Peter Schneider, “Deutsche als Opfer? Über ein Tabu der Nachkriegsgeneration,” in Ein Volk
von Opfern? Die neue Debatte um den Bombenkrieg 1940–45, ed. Lothar Kettenacker (Berlin:
Rowohlt, 2003), 163.
Elke Heckner 69
Niven’s implication that the films reproduce exculpating victim narratives rep-
resents a troubling automated response to the restaging of the tainted hi/stories
of the end of World War II. By automated response I mean the application
of a ready-made set of claims consistent with the guilt-and-shame paradigm.
Rhetorically, it works to indict the docudramas and obviates the possibility of
critical inquiry and with it novel ways of reimagining history. Deployed like
an indictment, the term victim assumes a seemingly self-explanatory moral
force that renders superfluous any broader consideration of the cultural con-
ditions that shaped these media productions, including the emergence of TV
docudrama and reality TV.10
Niven’s characterization of the films conveys the impression that the
docudramas represent the most recent incarnation of a particularly insidious
revisionism that affirms and valorizes German victimhood status. In particular,
10. For a discussion of the genre of docudrama, see Tobias Ebbrecht, “History, Public Memory,
and Media Event,” in Reconstructing the Past: History in the Mass Media, 1890–2005, ed. Sian
Nicholas, Tom O’Malley, and Kevin Williams (London: Routledge, 2008), 101–14.
70 Televising Tainted History
thousand deaths, was due to military negligence and arrogance, Niven seeks to
show that the civilian and military branches in charge of the ship had a “col-
laborative” relationship; here Niven is citing Schön and the military transport
officer, navy captain Wilhelm Zahn (“Good Captain,” 87). Following Schön’s
version of events, Niven also acknowledges that there were objections by two
merchant navy officers: one protested taking the deepwater route; the other
one objected to turning on the navigation lights. Yet these objections are side-
lined by the narrative of collaboration asserted in both Schön’s and Zahn’s
reconstruction of events.
The status of these objections is crucial to any conclusion about the final
authoritative version of events. To clarify: I am interested not in evaluating
historical accuracy—that is, the question of whether the docudrama faithfully
represents what happened (a matter of significant debate)—but in the possi-
bility of different narratives based on available sources. From this perspec-
tive Niven’s article does not mention that Die Gustloff roughly follows Guido
Knopp’s 2001 version of events, which relies on eyewitness accounts that pro-
vide other perspectives than just Schön’s. These accounts also criticize the
military captains for securing lifeboats for themselves first, leaving evacuees
behind to fend for themselves.11 As I discuss in the second part of the article,
source material from the historical archive, especially the visual archive of
photography, is central to the docudramas’ filmic strategy of re-presenting.
The DVD commentaries to Dresden and March of Millions underscore the
directors’ commitment to minutely reconstructing historical settings to bolster
their fictionalized rendition of history—thus not only creating an authenticity
effect but also endowing the mise-en-scène with a claim to “truth in fiction.”
When considering Niven’s argument that foremost Die Gustloff, but also
Dresden and March of Millions, exonerates civilians of Nazi war crimes, it is
important to note that he creates the category of an ideologically “innocent”
civilian by deploying a questionable notion of identification—only later taking
issue with the notion of an untainted civilian experience. In seeking to distin-
guish civilians from Nazis identified with the military agenda, Niven writes:
“To be fair, Dresden and Die Flucht also depict the susceptibility of civilians
to the corrosion of moral standards. . . . Nevertheless, susceptibility, egoism
and weakness do not imply ideological identification. Civilians in Die Flucht
and Dresden are in no way identified with the savagery of the Nazis, the SS or
the Wehrmacht” (“Good Captain,” 94). In claiming that civilians are led to
compliance with the Nazi regime by base motives rather than by adherence to
11. Guido Knopp and Friederike Dreykluft, “Der Untergang der ‘Gustloff,’” in Guido Knopp,
Die grosse Flucht: Das Schicksal der Vertriebenen (Munich: Econ, 2002), 122.
72 Televising Tainted History
ideology, Niven releases civilians from culpability—a move that the docu
dramas in general do not perform. In Dresden the hospital director Mauth,
who stashes away piles of morphine intended for his patients so that he can
start a new professional life in Switzerland, is clearly shown as morally cor-
rupted, but this does not render him any less culpable in the eyes of his daugh-
ter, whose critical point of view the film adopts. His subsequent death in
the firestorm further seems to underscore his complicity with the Nazi system.
In other words, while the docudramas distinguish between civilians and the
military, this distinction does not necessarily rehabilitate civilians from culpa-
bility or suggest that they are to a lesser degree complicit with the system.
Moreover, the distinction itself is shown to be unstable, as civilians are repre-
sented as embedded in the social and political practices of Nazism in visual
spaces coded throughout the films as saturated by Nazi ideology. The tight
imbrication of both civilian and military lives inside the Nazi regime is rep-
resented, especially in Dresden, where—except for Anna Mauth, Simon, and
Maria Goldberg—most characters are implicated in a Darwinian struggle for
survival and presented as complicit with the system to varying degrees. Simi-
larly, the fratricidal conflicts in March of Millions and Die Gustloff demon-
strate that the militarization of families renders difficult a clear distinction
between civilians and military folk. In March of Millions the conflict between
the brothers Ferdinand and Heinrich von Gernstorff, the former marked by
pacifist and the latter by legalist leanings, though both serve in the military,
reveals that the simple division of military versus civilian has been turned
inside out.
When the distinction between civilians and military is invoked, the
question arises whether it is indeed instrumentalized in the service of a logic
of exoneration or whether its deployment serves different purposes, such as
viewers’ disidentification with Nazi ideology. The didactic representation of
vicious cycles of brutal Nazi violence speaks to a different kind of ethical
demand the films make—one in which the reckoning with this tainted past
is part of a larger educational mission. In showing that the Nazi war front not
only has come home but manifests itself in senseless killing sprees against
assumed deserters, slave laborers, and civilians, March of Millions models
for viewers a position of disidentification and abjection that makes it diffi-
cult to empathize with the killers. The reign of Nazi terror is shown to be
alive and well in the deportation orders for Jews in Dresden, thus offsetting
the impression that only Germans are “victims”; Ferdinand, the rebellious
pacifist in the military family of the Gernstorffs, shares at the dinner table
how he has witnessed the killing of Poles and Jews. The docudramas com-
Elke Heckner 73
H.: I have never ever transgressed the prescribed, valid law, never.
L.: But that is exactly how you have granted absolution to this regime. You
don’t understand.
H.: Lena, don’t you see? We are tiny little cogs. We couldn’t stop it. What
should I have done?
L.: You are turning into one of them. You’re not any better.
H.: Lena, you expect too much of me. The hero you always wanted, that’s
not me. If I were to become a judge, in the highest court, then you will
understand.
In rejecting Heinrich’s legalist approach and along with it the abuse of law in
justifying atrocities, Lena anticipates a post-Nuremberg trial position. It is not
by chance that Heinrich’s father, Rüdiger, the most die-hard proponent of mili-
tarism, declares Lena the symbolic heir to the East Prussian noble lineage that
can be integrated into a Western democracy. After his symbolic act Rüdiger is
shown to hang himself, as he cannot adapt to the new order of existential insta-
bility in the wake of the displacement from the Eastern territories. Characters
like Lena, Anna Mauth in Dresden, and Hellmut Kehding in Die Gustloff
come to embody the democratic spirit of a new age about to begin. These char-
acters anticipate popular aspects of social and political attempts to come to
terms with Nazi history, for example, Helmut’s demand for accountability and
investigation into the fatal failure of Die Gustloff’s evacuation mission. At the
same time, these figures mark a stark departure from the Germans-as-victims
paradigm, as they are cast as resilient survivors performing unsolicited acts of
humanitarian intervention. Clearly, these new democratic TV role models for
the coming age instantiate a new kind of victim-turned-survivor mythology,
which necessitates a closer look but is not served by invoking old categories of
revisionism.
These instances of an anticipatory coming to terms with the past through
the development of characters reach beyond the antirevisionist framing devices
74 Televising Tainted History
Once more I would like to emphasise that we should not underestimate the
Germans’ readiness to use the role of victim in order to veil or dismiss their
historical responsibility. At the same time, it would be wrong to interpret any
reference to suffering as a strategy to avoid, or even to deny, guilt. The logic
12. Hannes Heer, Vom Verschwinden der Täter: Der Vernichtungskrieg fand statt, aber keiner
war dabei (Berlin: Aufbau, 2004), 195–96. See Jörg Friedrich, Der Brand: Deutschland im Bomben-
krieg, 1940–1945 (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002); The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945, trans.
Allison Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
Elke Heckner 77
If the very logic in which the debate on suffering, guilt, and representation
has been cast has reached its limits, then perhaps the time has come for a dif-
ferent kind of generational memory that would allow for a repositioning of the
terms of debate. The latest third-generation wave of artistic production that
seeks to excavate family memory dating back to the Nazis, however, holds
little promise for a change of terms, simply because this specific form of pri-
vate recuperation of memory is more often than not steeped in apologetic
and exculpatory rhetoric. Christian Graf von Krockow’s biographical narrative
of his sister’s trials and tribulations on her flight from the East, The Hour of
the Women (Die Stunde der Frauen, 1988), is no exception. It confirms that the
endorsement of femininity over a “one-sided masculine principle” perceived
as completely corrupt may speak to a new order of gender near the end of the
war, but it cannot reconfigure stereotypes of “Russians” as aliens quintes-
sentially violating the order of civility.13 March of Millions evokes this quasi-
emancipatory rhetoric of “the hour of the woman” when Lena’s father puts
her in charge of the trek of refugees as he stays behind.
Yet Assmann argues that private memories, even if politically incor-
rect, have their place in the heterogeneous fabric of social memory as long as
a hierarchy of national memory stays intact. As long as the Holocaust holds
an undisputed place in national memory, she contends, private memories of
suffering not only can be accommodated but ought to be articulated over and
against potential taboos and instances of censorship in the name of political
correctness. Thus Assmann’s pitch for freedom of expression concerning
private memories shifts the terms of the debate on suffering from “guilt” to
“political incorrectness”—a shift of terminology that speaks out against pub-
lic censorship of private memories but is rightly wary of the directions taken
by private discourse on World War II memory. Assmann sees little critical
potential in the artistic production of the third generation, which she calls
the “confessional generation” (Bekenntnisgeneration) (“(In)Compatibility,”
193). Her confessional generation, acting as the delegate of the parent gen-
eration that lived through World War II (Erfahrungsgeneration), is striving
13. Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Stunde der Frauen: Bericht aus Pommern, 1944 bis 1947
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1988), 9.
78 Televising Tainted History
14. Ralph Giordano, “Ein Volk von Opfern?” in Ein Volk von Opfern: Die neue Debatte um den
Bombenkrieg, 1940–1945, ed. Lothar Kettenacker (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2003), 168.
Elke Heckner 79
15. For an excellent discussion of the rhetorical equation of the Allies’ bombardment of Dres-
den with the 2003 bombing of Baghdad, see Andreas Huyssen, “Air War Legacies: From Dresden
to Baghdad,” in Germans as Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany, ed. Bill
Niven (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 181–93.
16. For a discussion of the Teamworx approach to film, especially concerning Dresden, see
Paul Cooke, “Dresden (2006), Teamworx, and Titanic (1997): German Wartime Suffering as Hol-
lywood Disaster Movie,” German Life and Letters 61 (2008): 279–94.
Elke Heckner 81
waiting to board are held back by barbed wire, and the sorting process invokes
the selection at the ramps of concentration camps. Clearly, being evacuated is
not the same as dying at Auschwitz, and it is mainly this troubling semantic
image transfer that moves Die Gustloff into revisionist territory. In this instance
Vilsmaier’s melodramatic re-presenting of the plight of refugees is not con-
tained or corrected by framing devices of an aspirational coming to terms with
the past. In fact, these scenes raise the question of whether this televisual hom-
age to the bombed-out and expellee generation can live up to the task of a
critical coming to terms with the past that its directors purport to perform.
For Richter and Wessel, the restaging of the tainted histories of Allied
aerial bombardment and civilian displacement from the Eastern territories
must occur within a decidedly antirevisionist and anti-exculpatory frame-
work. The DVD commentaries assert the necessity of breaking with the
right-wing appropriation of these topics, yet they remain leery of the ways in
which the debate into which the docudramas are making a critical interven-
tion might evade their control. The commentary on Dresden, for example,
contextualizes the Allied aerial bombardment as a response to Goebbels’s
concept of total war. A narrative voice introduces the “German trauma” of
the bombardment as follows: “With the bombing of the Royal Air Force, the
German population had to experience firsthand what the Nazis had inflicted
on the rest of Europe.” It is no small matter that the docudramas wrested the
historical legacy of German civilians at the end of World War II from the
clutches of the right wing, bringing it into the mainstream and thereby reduc-
ing the potential for further right-wing appropriation. In this respect both
directors differ from an uncritical recuperation of the notion of German vic-
timhood, which Assmann ascribes to much of the confessional generation. In
fact, both directors implicitly acknowledge Assmann’s demand for a norma-
tive framework of national memory built on the memory of the Holocaust,
which would then enable the narration of stories from what was hitherto con-
sidered ideologically tainted history.
For this reason, it seems appropriate to characterize the temporality
and location of these televisual productions of historiography as a specifi-
cally German variation of what Marianne Hirsch calls postmemory.17 On
17. I have argued elsewhere that Hirsch’s notion of postmemory is central to rethinking the loca-
tion and temporality of second- and third-generation memories of the Holocaust. See Elke Heck-
ner, “Whose Trauma Is It? Identification and Secondary Witnessing in the Age of Postmemory,” in
Visualizing the Holocaust: Documents, Aesthetics, Memory, ed. David Bathrick, Brad Prager, and
Michael D. Richardson (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2008), 62–85.
82 Televising Tainted History
the one hand, it signifies the specifically German postunification and post-
9/11 location of memory aspiring to mediate between generations and his-
tories of former East and West—evoking the shared trauma of World War II.
On the other hand, it acknowledges the transatlantic situatedness of this
memory as it has been enabled by the transnational Holocaust memorial cul-
ture of the 1990s. As the example of Vilsmaier’s semantic transfer of Holo-
caust imagery shows, the affective cinematography of re-presenting must be
accountable to the larger televisual coming to terms with the past that the
docudramas claim to perform. This involves a critical perspective on the new
mythologies (such as the rhetoric of reconciliation and the claims of emanci-
patory potential) engendered by the tension between re-presenting and com-
ing to terms with the past. Even if the docudramas’ goal is to facilitate the
ongoing process of mourning by conjuring up one last time the wartime expe-
riences of German civilians in order to lay to rest the ghosts of the past, this
very insistence on closure and the terms of closure necessitates continued
critical attention.
In many ways the docudramas attempt to be much more than mere rep-
resentation: there is a reverential deference to the category of experience, espe-
cially in reenacting the Dresden firestorm and the relentless icy conditions the
refugees encounter on their trek. The production team intentionally exposed
actors to fire and subfreezing temperatures—though they digitally created
other scenes, for instance, those involving aircraft and bombardment—thus
passing on the affect produced by these “real-life” reenactments to the viewer.
Saturated with an overwhelming abundance of historical markers taken from
biographical narratives and photo and film archives, the docudramas seek to
enhance viewers’ immersion and recognition of historical events with seem-
ingly comprehensive, almost encyclopedic zest. The reenactment of German
trauma in Dresden and March of Millions leaves no question that the disinte-
grating totalitarian system, which the films implicitly put on trial through
various critical strategies—through what I call a soft critique of Nazism—was
profoundly criminal and ought to perish. The screenwriter of March of Mil-
lions, Gabriela Sperl, describes in the DVD commentary the docudrama’s ret-
rospective view of history as one that already includes the inklings of a future
democratic order: “It returns a memory for reflection and mourning. And it
narrates an epic story of a world that no longer exists and the emergence of a
new democratic world.”
The temporality of a new democratic order is embodied by a set of mor-
ally and politically uncorrupted and incorruptible characters who heroically
challenge the rationale, arrogance, and brutal force of the existing order of
Elke Heckner 83
Elke Heckner
and bombardment toward the end of the Nazi period, the TV docudramas
Dresden (2006), March of Millions (2007), and Die Gustloff (2008) have
articulated a new set of rules of cinematic engagement for the tainted war
and expiation of war guilt, the article shows that these charges do not
this televisuality for critical approaches to history and film, the article argues
that the docudramas are engaged in rewriting the old generational contract,
which until recently was tacitly bound by the guilt-and-shame paradigm, and