CHAOS AND TRENDS IN CURRENT BRAZILIAN SOCIETY

Nildo Viana

Brazilian society is experiencing a chaotic situation and marches into the crisis
and allows for different trends for the future. The chaos emerged embryonic in 2012 and
deepened in the following years. The most visible moment was in 2013, when student
demonstrations generated popular demonstrations that brought together thousands of
people, sparking disputes within the dominant bloc and an institutional crisis that, in
turn, was reinforced and reinforced by the financial crisis. The slowdown in the pace of
capital accumulation led to even greater problems. The impeachment of Dilma
Roussef's neoliberal and neopopulist government heralded a recomposition of the
dominant bloc and a stronger, more defined position of the ruling class. The new
government would adopt the necessary policies (labor reform, etc.) to resume the pace
of capital accumulation, allowing a higher rate of exploitation and other changes that
would put the country back on track.
This, however, did not occur. This did not occur due to several determinations.
One is that the process of decelerating the pace of capital accumulation could not be
resumed overnight, and this would require strong and competent government. The
economic measures were modest and the reforms that would be necessary to collaborate
with this process took time to be addressed and were quite unpopular. The Temer
Government also sinned to have formed a government of "allies", that is to say,
composed of the political forces that united to overthrow Dilma Roussef and for that
reason many ministries and the governmental team lacked more firmness and
competence. In addition, the government was born with problems of legitimacy and this
reinforced its weakness. The slowness in taking the necessary measures, including
waiting for the definitive impeachment, led to another obstacle to recovering the pace of
capitalist accumulation and also discrediting the government.
Thus, the Temer government was slow and lacked the competence to take more
rapid and effective measures. After the definitive impeachment, it advanced faster in the
reforms and found the resistance not only of the representatives and sympathizers of the
ex-government, but also of sectors of the youth. However, it continued with its action,
but the judiciary, which has become very autonomous in recent years, continued the
investigation of corruption and legal actions that ended up involving several sectors,
reaching the current government and neighborhood. This situation created new political
instability with the denunciations involving President Michel Temer. In this context, the
former governors try to revive themselves, without much popular support. Brazil has an
institutional situation in which it has neither a stable government nor strong opposition.
At the level of civil society, there is no great reaction and the apathy of the workers'
movement and workers in general is the biggest problem of the moment and that makes
the situation of the country chaotic. The demonstrations that have been taking place are
depleted and even when there is some form of broader participation, such as the national
stoppage on April 28, it occurs only defensively, against the reforms proposed by the
government and without any alternative political project.
Chaos ensues when the state apparatus and representative democracy face a
crisis of legitimacy, internal disputes within the dominant bloc dilacerate the
government and further reduce its effectiveness and legitimacy, the institutional
opposition is fragile, incompetent and powerless, and the process Of struggle, self-
organization, self-training, of workers is absent. The chaos installed allows the most
diverse solutions, as the tendencies and possibilities expand in this context. The
dominant bloc is disjointed, because if it had a minimum of competence and
articulation, it would have avoided this post-impeachment situation even more, because
the reforms were being directed to the benefit of the capitalist class and responsibility
was being played only for the Temer government. In this context, a drastic solution can
be made and already has sectors that share with this possibility, the so-called "military
intervention" to end the reigning tumult. This possibility exists and since 2014 there are
sectors of the population defending this solution in street demonstrations. The more the
situation deteriorates and the longer it becomes, the more that possibility becomes a
trend.
This possibility coexists with another, which is an institutional solution. The
removal of the current government and new elections (direct or indirect) could install a
new government. This would give a certain amount of breath and could proceed with
actions towards a resumption of the pace of capital accumulation ("economic growth").
For this to happen, however, some struggles would be fought within the dominant bloc
and with the slowness that accompanies this in institutional politics, including resistance
from the Temer Government. An additional problem is the judiciary and the so-called
"Operation Lava Jet", because no one escapes corruption, unless the investigation is
limited. The judiciary and repressive apparatus have become enthusiastic about their
autonomization and are going too far, so far that illegitimate governance and democracy
are increasingly discredited. That would be another obstacle to such a solution. Not all
agents of the historical process are aware of what they are doing and of the problems
they can create. Even on the same side, ignorance generates divisions and problems,
which is reinforced by more particular interests within the ruling class. Some deluded
point to a third possibility. The glorious return of Lula, the former president of the
Workers' Party. However, in addition to being involved in corruption and accusations
and trials are rising, as well as in several others of his party, such as Dilma Roussef, his
party no longer has any significant support from the population. The Workers' CUT
(CUT) and all civil society organizations equipped by PT, even the MST (Landless
Workers Movement) disintegrate in the eyes of the population. The emptied
demonstrations show their total lack of legitimacy and popular support. The
denunciations and problems in all these organizations only reinforce the critical
situation and terminal stage of the PT. Even the attempt to unite the progressive bloc
(seeking support from the other leftist parties) did not produce any results, not only
because these are small parties and without great force, but also because of their
inoperability and resistance from the most extremist sectors. The PT's bet and similar in
identity politics (gender, etc.) show the emptiness and distance of the progressive bloc
from the majority of the population, both from the privileged classes, increasingly
antipetist1, when from the underprivileged classes, more and more Institutional politics.
Only the sectors linked to the PT and other forces of the progressive bloc and sectors of
the civil bureaucracy, intellectuals and members of social movements co-opted by the
old government that have not yet perceived defeat remain supportive and fail to promote
real opposition, (Parliamentary, state, etc.) and civil society (pressure, demonstrations,
etc.).
One last possibility would be the initiation of a revolutionary struggle, which
refers to the revolutionary bloc and the labor movement. The revolutionary bloc could
have developed from the demonstrations of 2013, but eventually stagnated, partly
because of the identity policies encouraged by the PT and the like, partly because of the
lack of political formation and influence of poststructuralist ideologies ( Irrationalist and
anti-intellectualist) and the refusal of the organization of vast sectors of youth from such
influence. The apathy of the labor movement also reinforces this process and facilitates
this stagnation, with honorable exceptions, but there is no point in casting fertile seeds
1
Petism is the name given to PT (Workers' Party) supporters.
on infertile grounds. The great absence of the underprivileged classes and the fragility
of the revolutionary bloc put this possibility as remote.
However, just as no one predicted the emergence of the workers' movement in
various attempts at proletarian revolutions (from the Paris Commune through various
revolutionary experiences, not to mention less radical but surprising struggles such as
the June 2013 demonstrations in Brazil itself), It may be that the unexpected manifests
itself again. Historical prediction fails because analysts generally observe latent and
visible trends rather than the dissatisfaction and discontent of broad sectors of the
population that can spontaneously explode into action at any moment. The February
Revolution in Russia, as well as the May 1968 in Paris, show these processes and how,
in times of hopelessness, hope rises concretely through social struggles, especially
proletarian struggles.
Nonetheless, this brings greater responsibility to the revolutionary bloc, since it
must contribute to the process of self-organization and self-formation right now, so that
the attempt, if it occurs, has a better chance of being realized and overcoming the
incompleteness of proletarian revolutions. The revolutionary bloc is fragile for several
reasons. Although the demonstrations in 2013 pointed to its strengthening, the policies
of the Dilma Government, as well as the polarization created between government
supporters and oppositionists, which manifested itself electorally in 2014 and
strengthened in the following two years with the opposition between governors and
supporters of impeachment , Ended up impeding this process. Polarization excluded the
underprivileged classes from the debate, especially the labor movement. The
government's electoral contest, which almost ended in a tie, was almost one-third
absentee, which can be seen by the number of abstentions, null votes and blank votes
added. The polarization between governmentists and institutional oppositionists took
place politically as well as morally. Conservative moralism and progressive moralism
were at odds with each other and within the various social movements had the effect,
alongside the main polarization, to divert much of the population from the class struggle
to questions of impeachment and corruption on the one hand, and questions Morals
(sexuality, etc.) on the other.
Another obstacle that the revolutionary bloc encounters is, beyond the hegemony
and cultural polarization derived from the previous situation, the force of ideologies and
conceptions, which generate a real realm of subjectivism. The denial of reason - which
manifests itself through irrationalism, pragmatism and practicalism - together with the
denial of organization, drastically weaken the revolutionary bloc (especially youth
sectors, intellectuals, militants in general). Autonomism and anarchism show their limits
by expressing the influence of subjectivist ideologies and others that do not contribute
to a theoretical and organizational advance, as well as the party left end up reproducing
several of these ideological elements, especially PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) and
PSOL ( Party Socialism and Freedom).
The revolutionary bloc can win with the reemergence of the labor movement,
but it should, before that, anticipate and strengthen itself. In order for the revolutionary
bloc to collaborate with the self-organization and self-formation of the underprivileged
classes and the proletariat in particular, it would be necessary to strengthen, broaden
political articulation, increase the number of supporters and militants, and overcome the
ambiguities of some sectors (Including pulling away from other political forces and
getting caught up in hegemonic ideologies). In addition, it would have to intensify and
expand the cultural struggle (from theoretical production, through artistic production, to
the process of socialization of knowledge and dissemination, especially generalized
propaganda), revolutionary intervention in civil society (social movements, ,
Universities, neighborhoods, factories and companies, etc.) and to present a
revolutionary strategy and a political project of radical and total transformation of
society as a whole. The current situation creates some favorable conditions for this
process, but overcoming hegemony and certain ambiguities is necessary for this to
occur. The self-managed project should be the main banner of the revolutionary bloc's
struggle, not the simple refusal of government reforms.
If the revolutionary bloc fails to advance in this direction, spontaneous struggles
can advance and create a revolutionary situation, not only would it not have contributed
to this in favorable conditions for victory, would have little capacity for intervention
and prevent counterrevolution, Either through state repression or through
bureaucratization or its weakening through a mere exchange of government. For this
reason, it is essential to encourage self-organization (commissions, associations,
workers' councils, neighborhood councils, etc.) and intellectual self-training (through
struggle and access to critical thinking and anticapitalist cultural production). The
possibility of a successful and finished proletarian revolution has as one of its
determinations the question of hegemony and the strength of the social blocs, especially
of the revolutionary bloc. So it needs to go beyond and exceed its limits.
 The future of Brazilian society is, in concrete terms, uncertain, and, on the plane
of consciousness, a box of surprises. That is why it is fundamental to raise awareness to
avoid surprises and to deepen the action to reinforce the tendency that we want it to
materialize.