Canon 6: CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY
TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not
use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
A.C. No. 3056               August 16, 1991
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative
case which complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes,
house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V &
G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron,
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular
actuations with regard to the application of V & G for
registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present complaint
charges the respondent with the following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and
without sufficient justification, to act within reasonable time
(sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with
Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of the
corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS,
for the purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material
benefit from the person or persons interested therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself
in connection with pending official transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the
respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of
sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V &
G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action
from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to
approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute
sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G
to submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify
certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements,
respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the
documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain
"special arrangement" between them, which was that V & G
should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from
Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip,
or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house
and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that
he would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V
& G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and
send money for a round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money
of P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in
addition to plane fare, respondent imposed additional
registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's
extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May
20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for
registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of
the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the
uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with
assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter.
On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a
reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a
period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more
than 2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly
and uniformly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo
Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty.
Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same documents of the
same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15,
Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en
consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land
Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July
27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the
questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the
NLTDRA's opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs
163 deeds of sale with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed
with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges
(docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent
Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro
G. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no
administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his
case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal
investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the
charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or
material benefit for himself in connection with the official
transactions awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA
Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges
against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal
investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution
based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended
dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue
injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of
the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting
or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on the registration
of the documents involved, in order to extort some pecuniary
or material benefit from the interested party, absorbed the
charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion,
and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for
himself in connection with pending official transactions before
him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988,
recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that
the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty:
(2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents
presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a
repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely.
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez
found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate
that ample evidence supports the Investigating Officer's
findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents
presented to him for registration and, notwithstanding
representations by the parties interested for expeditious action
on the said documents, he continued with his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally
denied the registration of the documents involved; that he
himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said
documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he formally
denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then
resolved in favor of the registrability of the said documents in
question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator
notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration
thereof but demanded from the parties interested the
submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his
previous denial.
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the
respondent claims that he neither touched nor received the
money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the
circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from
him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare,
not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00
bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to
countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September
1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in
office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. His being so
should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable
laws, rules and regulations and should have prompted him to
do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C.
Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in the government service,
effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of
the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990,
dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp.
1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against
Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in
this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against
said respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the
respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be
disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public
official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public
official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court;
People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every
lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is
a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-
67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is
designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby
becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the
grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair,
speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of
the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in
his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice
triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its
nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those
qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have
been compendiously described as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to
public service of the highest order.1âwphi1 A lawyer is an
oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and
whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth
and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.
(Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790;
emphasis supplied.)

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in

government service in the discharge of their official tasks
(Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to
process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars.
[c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly
having a financial or material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them
from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the
course of any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code
of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01,
Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause
"for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent,
honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law
(Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must A.C. No. 4018             March 8, 2005
pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his
calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269,
OMAR P. ALI, Complainant,
278).
vs.
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney
Renomeron committed as a public official have demonstrated
This is a verified petition for disbarment 1 filed against Atty.
his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law
Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave
(Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court
misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of
Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He
Marawi City.
should therefore be disbarred.

It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C.
Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the
Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys
SO ORDERED.
the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against
respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by
the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged
respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of
Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli
Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and
Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal
complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the
records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.3

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of

respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved
respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant

not only failed to prove his case but that he has no
 case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong.
Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that the complaint against respondent
be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. 4
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for
review and in a report dated 08 September 1992, then
Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of
the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of
documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821
and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and
the latter's co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary
Drilon recommended respondent's dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion
reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's
dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently
questioned said administrative order before this Court through
a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition5 claiming
that the Office of the President did not have the authority and
jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that
respondents6 in that petition violated the laws on security of
tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service
Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the
administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the
petition "for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently
show that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned order." 7 Respondent
thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case,
complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of
respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious
that respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further
entrusted with the duties of an attorney" 8 and that he poses a
"serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession."9
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing
irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of
the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law 10 and
jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial
duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on
applications for land registration on the basis only of the
documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the
Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his
office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue
TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the
dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah
and the latter's co-defendants. Respondent explains that his
participation in said case was a result of the two
subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor
who required him to produce the various land titles involved in
said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said
criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on
the evidence presented by the parties. Complainant's
allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the
case is totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,11 this Court referred
this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this
resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this
disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor
C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer
of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order
provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and
respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing
to have the reception of evidence vis-à-vis this case be done in
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local
IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the
records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for
appropriate action.12
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution approving Commissioner Fernandez's
recommendation for the transfer of venue of this
administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao
Region governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned
to conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.13 The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue
of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao
Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP
Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and
recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino,
Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October
1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of
IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the
evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and
recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors.14
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato
Chapter15 informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) that the investigating panel 16 had sent notices to both
complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but
respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP
Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five
years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June
1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this case to
the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to
Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner
Fernandez's Order dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating
panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondent's
motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel expressed
no opposition to respondent's motion for the transmittal of the
records of this case to IBP Marawi City. 18 On 25 September
1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this
case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondent's
evidence.19 This order of referral, however, was set aside by
the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268
issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor
C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of the
above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-
evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter
and report the same to the Board of Governors.20
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268,
respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that the
recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from
the records.21 Respondent insists that the investigating panel
constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to
conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution
XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23
February 1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power
to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never
notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due
process.
Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is
guilty of laches. According to complainant, the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter
expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the
hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite
these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also
claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his
position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as
respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter,
complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of
respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to
refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a
duplication of the process which had already been completed
by IBP Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner
Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs
that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating
panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were
duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty.
Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating
panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the
panel's order dated 4 August 1997.24 Attached to said order
was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office.
On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten
notation reading "Atty. Mosib A. Bubong."
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty.
Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar
Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This
directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors
through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June
2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director
Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-
entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an
investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice.25
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the
death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case.
According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and
that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was
requesting the withdrawal of this case.26
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time,
asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission
on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the
IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an
investigation of this case. 27 This motion was effectively denied
by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July
2002.28 According to Atty. Castillo –
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with
special attention made on the report of the IBP Cotabato City
Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of
respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further
investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and
recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato
City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of
Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The
undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date
hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in
toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter
ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the
Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative Case
No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent
was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the
anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of
Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by respondent in
the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in
the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge
of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the
anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed against
respondent's relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office
of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the
undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into
account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was
rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on
the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully
supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight
in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in
the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason
for amending or disturbing the Report and Recommendation
of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.29
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the
afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo.
The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension
from the practice of law which should be imposed on
respondent – whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier
recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year
suspension, the IBP Board of Governors found a two-year
suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by
that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.30
The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether
respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed
while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve
this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to
apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon
6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers "shall
apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then
he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who
holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the bar for infractions he committed as a government
official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his
misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the
legal profession.32
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C.
Renomeron,33 we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the
ground of his dismissal from government service because of
grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, we declared –
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which
is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He
thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders
rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the
proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As
an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that
truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the
law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From
a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected
those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full
candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility – all of which, throughout the
centuries, have been compendiously described as moral
character.34
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina
Dasig,35 this Court found sufficient basis to disbar respondent
therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on
Higher Education. As we had explained in that case –
… [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust
and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public
faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as
established by the Office of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer.
By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of
Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives,
respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to
perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his
membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's
confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast
doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-
conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law
calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to
practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's
daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot
possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this
nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of
the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same."37 As we have previously explained in the case of Irene
Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:38
… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of
the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer
is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely
for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administrative of justice.39
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001.]
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. ATTY. MISAEL M.
LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 133, Makati City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael
M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator,
Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro
bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in
Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled "People v. Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga" for Falsification of Public Document pending before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. 1
While respondent’s letter-request was pending action, Lisa
Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated
September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard
to respondent’s authority to appear as counsel for the accused
in the said criminal case. 2 On September 7, 1998, the Office
of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent
for comment. 3
In his Comment, 4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent
admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885
without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual
circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to
handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough
resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on
the other hand, private complainant was a member of a
powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin.
Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the
criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the
public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any
case, his appearances in court were covered by leave
applications approved by the presiding judge.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying
respondent’s request for authorization to appear as counsel and
directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal
charges against him for appearing in court without the
required authorization from the Court. 5 On January 25, 1999,
the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees," which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition
to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. —
Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required
respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga
are "close blood cousins" who belong to a "powerless family"
from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte.
From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga
had always supported and guided him while he looked up to
her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close
relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent’s help and advice
when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for
falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres,
whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to
"seek vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his
cousin’s discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter’s
husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to
cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit
affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children.
The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the
falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated
that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be
his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga’s plea to be her counsel since
she did not have enough funds to pay for the services of a
lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years
of untainted government service, initially with the
Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he
had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it
was only in this particular case that he had been
administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a
close relative by giving a free legal assistance for
"humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his
position as branch clerk of court since the questioned
appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He
stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was
on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached
to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent’s
comment and referred the administrative matter to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge
Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made
the following findings and recommendation:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as
counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for
"Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of
Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the previous permission
of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions
that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the
METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence.
Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was
aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent
appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His
cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that
the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her.
Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in
the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion
and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that
respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family
who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the
purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his
Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for
his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been
in government service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent
appeared as counsel for his cousin without first securing
permission from the Court, and considering that this is his first
time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance was not
for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it
is hereby respectfully recommended that he be
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of
such act would be dealt with more severely. 6
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the
private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is
found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private
practice of their profession. The said section reads:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
SECTION 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge
or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice
as a member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a
profession, specifically the law profession in this case, which
is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In the case of People v. Villanueva, 7 we explained the
meaning of the term "private practice" prohibited by the said
section, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule
did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S. E.
522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his — livelihood or in consideration of his said
services."cralaw virtua1aw library

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney
Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at
bar, who is a relative. 8

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances

when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin
in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private
practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondent’s isolated court appearances

did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain
a written permission therefor from the head of the Department,
which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of
the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

SECTION 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in

any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in
the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal
of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency
to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of
the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an
officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in
any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he
shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer of the board of directors. 9

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court

proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998,
June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out
by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he
failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department. The presiding judge of the court to which
respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.

Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with.
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4517             September 11, 2006
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. VITALIANO C. FABROS and PACIFICO S.
PAAS, respondents.
A complaint for disbarment was filed against Attys. Vitaliano
C. Fabros and Pacifico S. Paas by Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel Jr. for "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct" in relation to the discharge of their duties as
chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the provincial
board of canvassers, Province of Isabela (PBC-Isabela) in the
1995 elections.
Complainant alleged that:
8. Among the duties of the [PBC-Isabela] was to canvass the
results of the elections from the various municipalities and
component cities of the Province of Isabela and submit the
Provincial Certificate of Canvass to the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). This Provincial Certificate of Canvass
was to be submitted to the COMELEC together with its
supporting Statement of Votes per Municipality for the
Province of Isabela, and as required by law, these documents
were prepared under the control and supervision of the [PBC-
Isabela] of which herein respondents are officials.
9. In fact, with respect to the Provincial Certificate of Canvass
of Isabela, respondents were required to certify under oath that
they duly canvassed the votes cast for each candidate for
Senator in the election held on May 8, 1995. And with respect
to the Statement of Votes per Municipality, they were required
to certify that each entry made is true and correct.
11. It would appear, however, that the Statement of Votes per
Municipality (annex "B") prepared and certified to be true and
correct by herein respondents was actually a fraudulent
statement which had been altered and which contain false and
untrue entries. By comparing the said statements with the
Municipal/City Certificates of Canvass of some of the
municipalities and component cities for the Province of
Isabela, it is clearly apparent that in nine (9) municipalities
and one (1) city of the said province, the votes of candidates
Enrile, Honasan and Mitra were padded and increased by
some 27,755, 10,000 and 7,000, respectively….
13. The anomalous, irregular and illegal padding of the votes
in the Provincial Certificate of Canvass for the Province of
Isabela cannot be attributed [to] mere computation or
recording error, but was ostensibly the result of a premeditated
scheme knowingly implemented by herein respondents.
14. The respondents, chairman and vice chairman of the
[PBC-Isabela], willfully, feloniously, unethically and in
wanton and reckless regard of the duties and
responsibilities reposed upon them by virtue of their
official positions, signed the Provincial Certificate of
Canvass (annex "A") and the Statement of Votes per
Municipality (annex "B") for the Province of Isabela, well
aware that the same contained false statements which has
altered the results of the senatorial elections in said
province. Their submission of these falsified documents to
the COMELEC is an act constituting a gross violation of
the Omnibus Election Code and existing penal laws, and a
serious breach of public trust and of their oaths as duly
licensed members of the Philippine Bar.
15. For under section 27 of R.A. 6646 it is provided that any
member of the board of canvasser who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election
shall be guilty of [an] election offense.
16. And, under provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxx xxx
xxx.1 (Emphasis ours)
In his comment, respondent Fabros reproduced the counter-
affidavit he filed with the COMELEC-Manila since the issues
raised in the complaint were identical to those brought before
the Commission. He denied committing any act which
violated his oath as a lawyer. Specifically, he stated that: (1)
he neither consented nor allowed any member of PBC-Isabela
to increase the votes of Senators Enrile, Honasan and Mitra;
(2) the canvassing was done in public view; (3) he faithfully
read the votes as reflected in the municipal/city certificates of
canvass, repeating the same twice or thrice and (4) the
canvassing proceeded in an orderly manner after counsels and
watchers were given the chance to examine the certificates of
canvass.2
Aside from substantially echoing the statements of Fabros,
respondent Paas alleged that he was in no position to
manipulate the figures since Fabros did the reading throughout
the canvass, while he attended to maintaining the integrity of
the envelopes containing the statement of votes. Both
attributed to human fatigue or simple negligence any error in
the figures since the board and its staff allegedly worked
continuously to finish the canvassing within 72 hours as
directed.3 Paas claimed that if there were figures in the
certificates of canvass which did not match the statement of
votes prepared by the PBC, he honestly believed that this was
due to human fatigue.4 He alleged that, if at all, he could only
be faulted for failing to see for himself if the reading by
Fabros of the number of votes and the tabulation thereof
faithfully reflected the figures in the PBC's copy of the
election returns.
Both respondents do not, however, deny that they
authenticated the provincial certificate of canvass and signed
the statement of votes as "true and correct." Their only excuse
for any discrepancy was their alleged reliance on the
documents prepared by the secretary of PBC-Isabela, Olympia
Marquez.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner George Briones heard the case on January 20,
1997.5 By agreement of the parties, the Investigating
Commissioner ordered the parties to submit simultaneous
verified position papers with the affidavits of their
witnesses.6 On June 21, 2003, the IBP board of governors
issued a resolution adopting the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner. Respondents were found
guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and were penalized with a fine of P10,000
each, with a warning that a violation on similar grounds will
be dealt with more severely.
Based on the evidence presented, we find respondents guilty
of misconduct. The records reflect, and respondents admit, the
discrepancy between the questioned certificate of canvass and
the statement of votes of the Province of Isabela in the 1995
elections. While there was no question that the municipal/city
certificates of canvass were not tampered with, the tabulation
of the figures on the statement of votes was anomalous. For
this, respondents were responsible.7
required of them.16 As lawyers, they were found to have
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct.17 They also violated their oath as officers of the court
to foist no falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express
provision of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is demanded of
them as lawyers in the government service:
CANON 6 – These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under
an even greater obligation to observe the basic tenets of the
legal profession because public office is a public trust.18
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Atty. Vitaliano
C. Fabros and Atty. Pacifico S. Paas GUILTY of misconduct
and imposes on them a FINE in the amount of P10,000 each,
with a WARNING that the commission in the future of a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

As chairman and vice-chairman of PBC-Isabela, respectively,

respondents were mandated to receive the municipal/city
certificates of canvass, and to canvass them for the votes of the
members of the Senate, among others.8 They were also
required to determine the provisional total votes of each
candidate as of each adjournment. On final adjournment, they
were tasked to prepare a statement of votes with a certification
of the same as official.9 In addition, they prepared the
provincial certificate of canvass (in which the padded figures
were discovered) with the certification under oath as public
officers that the entries were true and correct.10

More than simply affixing their signatures for the purpose of

identifying the documents, respondents signed the documents
certifying (and vouching) for the correctness and accuracy of
their contents. Even if they allegedly had no participation in
the misdeed, they nevertheless remained responsible for it as
officials of PBC-Isabela. Respondents must bear the
consequences of any misstatement or falsehood arising from
such certification.11 They cannot evade responsibility by
pointing to other persons who supposedly prepared the
documents in question.12 They had the opportunity to check, as A.C. No. 5119               April 17, 2013
they should have checked, the accuracy of the figures they
were certifying to.13 By certifying to false figures, they ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO
committed misconduct subject to disciplinary action.14 In fact, BERENGUER, Complainants,
by invoking the defenses of honest mistake, oversight due to vs.
fatigue, even simple negligence, respondents virtually ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO
admitted the existence of the discrepancies in the number of JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, Respondents.
votes reflected in the questioned documents.15
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario
As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (complainants)
degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill
against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin), Marcelino
Jomales (Jomales) and Pedro Vega (Vega).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda
Berenguer-Aguirre, Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo
Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered owners of a
58.0649-hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Sometime in April 1998, a notice of coverage was issued by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding the
acquisition of their landholding pursuant to Republic Act No.
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). The Berenguers protested and applied for the
exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice to lift
coverage based on the ground that their landholdings have
been used exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 09.2
On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without
acting on the application for exclusion, cancelled the
Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land and issued
Certificates of Land Ownership Award 3 (CLOAs) in favor of
the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Development Cooperative (BARIBAG).
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug
(Dalugdug) denied their application for exclusion from the
CARP’s coverage in the Order4 dated February 15, 1999 based
on the Investigation Report dated February 9, 1999 submitted
by the DAR Region V Investigation that said area sought to be
excluded is principally devoted to coconuts and not the raising
of livestock.5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal 6 with the
Secretary of DAR.
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a
petition7 for the implementation of the Order dated February
15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD). This was granted by Florin, as RARAD, in an
Order8 dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin directed the
issuance and implementation of the Writ of Possession.9
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for
reconsideration,10 claiming that they were denied due process
as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAG’s
petition for implementation. Florin denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit in an Order11 dated March 22,
1999.
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed 12 to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB). BARIBAG, on other hand,
filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession. 13 The
Berenguers opposed14 the motion saying that the execution
would be premature in view of their pending appeal before the
DARAB. Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the
Appointment of a Special Sheriff.15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary
Conrado S. Navarro denied the Berenguers’ appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution, 17 which granted
BARIBAG’s Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff
and ordered the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set
aside18 the Resolution dated April 8, 1999, arguing that: the
DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when they
seasonably filed an appeal before it; and that Florin should
have waited until the DARAB has decided the appeal. In an
Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the said motion
prompting the Berenguers to move for her inhibition20 on
ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari
to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
51858, which was denied outright on procedural grounds, to
wit: (1) copy of the assailed order bears the words "certified
true copy" but the name and authority of the person certifying
is not indicated as required in SC Circular No. 3-96, and the
signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of the petitioners
signed the certification on non-forum shopping which is an
insufficient compliance of Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court; and (3) there is non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the assailed order of the Regional
Director is not directly reviewable by the CA.21
Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for
certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,
which questioned the Orders dated March 15, 1999 and March
22, 1999 issued by Florin. The petition was also denied on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal.22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession 23 in
favor of BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the
writ of possession pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court in
spite of the Berenguers’ protestations.24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash 25 the Writ of
Possession, to no avail.
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant
Complaint26 for the disbarment of respondents Florin, Jornales,
in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR, and
Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly
conspiring and confederating in the commission of the
following acts:
A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL
ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY RENDERING AN
UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND
RESOLUTIONS ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL
TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF
EXECUTION EX-PARTE AND SUBSEQUENTLY
ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION
WITHOUT CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY
THE PROPER OFFICER FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE
HAS NO AUTHORITY AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING
THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN CONTRAVENTION
WITH THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD; FURTHER, HIDING THE
WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS INSPITE
OF REQUEST FOR A COPY;
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED
BY PETITIONERS THRU COUNSEL AND FAILING AND
REFUSING TO CONDUCT A HEARING AS PRAYED
FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND REFUSING TO
FORWARD THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER APPELLATE
BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO THE PREJUDICE OF
PETITIONERS AND LAWYER; ABUSE OF AUTHORITY
TO CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT
AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF ARREST WITHOUT
HEARING CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO
VEGA, INSPITE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION,
PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION TO
THE PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND
PETITIONERS.27
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the
writ of possession is anchored on the CLOAs issued by the
Register of Deeds, and not on a final and executory decision
that would require a certification of finality as prescribed by
the DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De Jesus), as
Berenguers’ counsel, was not furnished with a copy of the writ
because it was not yet issued at the time when it was
requested; (3) there was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when
the writ of possession was finally signed, it was delivered to
the sheriff for service and enforcement; (4) it was unfair to
impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as DAR lawyers
in view of the DAR’s denial of the motion for a cease and
desist order and because of the legal presumption of regularity
in the performance of their duty; (5) the petitions for certiorari
filed with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the findings of
DAR and the issuance of the CLOAs remain undisturbed.
Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who wants her
disbarred and not the Berenguers.
In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against
him arguing that: (1) the writ of possession is not illegal in the
absence of a court order stating its invalidity; (2) he did not
participate in the issuance of the writ of possession because he
did not appear as the farmers’ counsel; (3) the Legal Division
he heads has no control or influence over the DARAB; and (4)
his presence in the execution of the writ of possession was to
ascertain that no violations against any law are committed by
the person/s executing the writ.30
Jornales’ Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has
no prima facie infirmity; (2) he is not privy to the issuance
thereof; (3) he has no supervision and control over the DAR
which issued the writ; and (4) he has no authority to determine
the writ’s validity or invalidity. Jornales admitted, however,
that he was in the meeting presided by the PNP Provincial
Director of Sorsogon prior to the writ’s implementation in his
capacity as Regional Assistant Director for Operations of
DAR Region V and not as a lawyer. He added that the
disbarment complaint against him is not only malicious for
lack of legal basis but is also meant to harass and intimidate
DAR employees in implementing the CARP.32
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply,33 the
case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San
Juan) Recommended34 that Florin be "suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, Orders and Resolutions adverse and
prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."
Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the
charges against Jornales and Vega be dismissed for failure of
the complainants to substantiate the charges against them.35
Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation against Florin is
based on the findings36 of the CA in its Decision dated
December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,37 which reads:
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the
Court of Appeals was treated as a petition for review and the
court found the following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the
subject properties being devoted to pasture and livestock and
already classified as residential and industrial land, hence,
outside the coverage of Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law) The generation and issuance of
Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) was therefore
void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657),
respondent Hon. Isabel E. Florin who is exercising delegated
jurisdiction from the DARAB has no jurisdiction over
Petitioners’ Properties as held in Krus na Ligas Farmer’s Coop
vs. University of the Philippines; G.R. No. 107022, 8
December 1992, which is squarely in point with the case at
bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the
subject land, the Court ruled thus – "Assuming that the lands
are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand why the DAR
awarded them to members of respondent Baribag and not to
the farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the CARL x
x x."
The court further stated – "We cannot xxx close this
discussion without mentioning our observation on the
actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel
Florin. Just why she issued a writ of execution and eventually
a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us
no end. She knew that Baribag is not a party in petitioners’
application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR
Regional Director Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she never
acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also knew that
petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the Order of
Regional Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners’
application for exclusion. Clearly, such order was not yet final
and executory when she issued the assailed writs of execution
and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would be set
aside."38
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
Resolution No. XVII-2006-282 modifying the recommended
penalty, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and for knowingly rendering an unjust Judgment, Orders and
Resolutions, adverse and prejudicial to the interest of the
complainants, Atty. Isabel F. Florin is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year. The charges against
Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Peter Vega are
DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to substantiate the
charges against Respondents.39
In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was
acquired over BARIBAG at the time it filed a petition for the
implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999; (2) the
DARAB has jurisdiction to issue the CLOAs; (3) as RARAD,
she has concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the
Berenguers were not denied due process; and (5) the
Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the DAR’s
acquisition of their landholding nor did they file a petition for
the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to BARIBAG.
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors but modifies the penalty to be imposed.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefore.—A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority so to do.
x x x.
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any
inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part
of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e.,
conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is
generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.42 (Citations omitted)
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose
disciplinary sanction against the three (3) respondents as
members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the complainants
in support of the charges against the respondents, however, are
intrinsically connected with the discharge of their quasi-
judicial functions. Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty.
Dasig,43 the Court already ruled that if a misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer, then a lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
However, if said misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed
his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant
to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear
from Canon 644 of said Code. Lawyers in government are
public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the
performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct
is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she
must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice. 45 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., 46 the Court ruled that an
administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed in his
capacity as provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may be
likened to administrative cases against judges considering that
he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.47
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial
system of our government, performs official functions of a
RARAD that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the
present controversy may be likened that of a judge whose
decision, including the manner of rendition, is made subject of
an administrative complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR
Administrative Order No. 06-00 provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.—Appeal to the Secretary, the
Office of the President, or the Court of Appeals shall have the
following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to
the Secretary.—The appeal shall stay the order appealed from
unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal, as he
may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of
the case (Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Book VII, Chapter
4, Sec. 21).
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the
Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly stayed the
implementation of Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated
February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary who has
jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. Records reveal
that there was no order by the DAR Secretary directing
execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the
pendency of the Berenguers’ appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for
the instances when execution may be had, namely: (1) after a
decision or order has become final and executory; 48 (2)
pending appeal, only upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing; 49 and (3) execution of several,
separate or partial judgments.50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.—Execution
shall issue upon an order, resolution or decision that finally
disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall
issue as a matter of course and upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the
proper officer that a resolution, order or decision has been
served to the counsel or representative on record and to the
party himself, and has become final and executory, and, upon
motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution ordering the
DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to enforce the same. In
appropriate cases, the Board or any of its Members or its
Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the Philippine National
Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of their
component units or other law enforcement agencies in the
enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. — Any motion for
execution of the decision of the Adjudicator pending appeal
shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same upon
meritorious grounds, upon the posting of a sufficient bond in
the amount conditioned for the payment of damages which the
aggrieved party may suffer, in the event that the final order or
decision is reversed on appeal, provided that the bond
requirement shall not apply if the movant is a farmer-
beneficiary/pauper litigant. (Emphasis ours)
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR
Regional Director Dalugdug denying the Berenguers’
application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final
and executory as it was seasonably appealed to the DAR
Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show
whether BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules.
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment
absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and
deliberate intent to cause an injustice, 51 the facts on hand prove
otherwise. Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ
of possession in order to fully implement Regional Director
Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes
ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued
only after the subject judgment or order has already become
final and executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner
San Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of such writs despite the
pendency of the appeal with the DARAB.53 Consequently, the
Court finds merit in the recommendation of suspension.
As to the penalty –
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance,
bad faith or deliberate intent to do injustice will be
administratively sanctioned.54 In this case, it appears, however,
that this is the first time that Florin has been made
administratively liable. Although there is no showing that
malice or bad faith attended the commission of the acts
complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin
executed an act that would cause an injustice to the
Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ of
execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error
in judgment but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws
and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the
penalty recommended and instead impose the penalty of
suspension for three (3) months55 without pay. As also held in
Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension
without pay was imposed against a judge after finding out that
the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with
bad faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the
Court agrees and adopts the finding of the IBP that no
sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate the charges
against them. Hence, the complaint against them should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY.
ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is penalized
with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for three (3)
months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against
Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is
DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney
and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976

JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.

It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro

Manila Police Force and a member of the bar, respondent
Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal
representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by
Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing
an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the
charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of
New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage
Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter
was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would
seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant.
That could very well be the explanation for the non-
appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled
hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the
bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under the
circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be
expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that
there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for
malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the
complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances
then where this Court is left with hardly any choice.
Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.

Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General,

"admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's
Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held
office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However,
he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such
isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his
appearance as counsel, while holding a government position,
is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for
the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also
denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's
attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the
complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid
his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving
illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in
Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1

Then came a detailed account in such Report of the

proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this Honorable
Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the
case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for
the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was
reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the same counsel
for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said counsel
did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent
the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When
the case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975,
counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The
complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was
busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila." When asked if he was willing to proceed with the
hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant
declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his
complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the
present action in an outburst of anger believing that the
respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of
his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that
after reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be
without fault and a truly good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account
respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his
being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the
grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The
respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding
notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the
City of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National
Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." 3 
public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal
knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could
assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the
beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated
but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant
called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed.
Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar.
should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and
misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied
by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of
membership in an honorable profession who does not even
take care that his honor remains unsullied
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against
respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having
been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
his record.

As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have

been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the
Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission." As for
the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's
counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received
his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it
is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General
recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.

The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the

complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law.
As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the
authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this
wise:

"The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should

follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence
against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty
as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The
Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6

This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration

whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service
Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while
holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police
force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative
proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-
General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed,
still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of
the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety.

Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that

far from living true to the concept of a public office being a
A.C. No. 4984            April 1, 2003

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J.

HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ,
DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ,
CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE
RABALO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against

Atty. Felina S. Dasig,1 an official of the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross
misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath
for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to
the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.

Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking

officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants
allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:

a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of

Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal
Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C.
Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational
Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00
and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED...

b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the

effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge
of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie
B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of
name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED…

c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the

effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge
of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella
G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of
her application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even
suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full
knowledge of the existence of a prior registration…

d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and

during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-
in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded
from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount
which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and
initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent
even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen
by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction
of name.3
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath
as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless,
and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.4
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing
subparagraph b (22), Section 365 of Presidential Decree No.
807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela
Tire Supply" and "Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch" as
evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, 6 the complaint
sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.7
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the
commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R.
Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she
encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun
and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997.
As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats
against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 36.8
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent
to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report,
which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than
eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill
motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end
view of securing an appointment for herself.9
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent
to file a Comment on the charges. 10 A copy of said resolution
was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12,
Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be
returned to this Court with the notation "Unclaimed."11
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of
February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail to respondent
at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the
Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the said
mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for
by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on
August 27, 1999.12
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainant’s motion to
refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her Answer to
the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in
default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed
said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed
her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply
with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she
had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the
Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of
the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded
that respondent in violation of her oath as a government
official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful
demands or attempted to extort money from certain people
who had pending applications/requests before her office in
exchange for her promise to act favorably on said
applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her
public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment
of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher
Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period
allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar
action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of
respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that
respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation
of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years.13
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-
at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED,
may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance,
considering that her position, at the time of filing of the
complaint, was "Chief Education Program Specialist,
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards, CHED."
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government
official.14 However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then
he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.15
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various
occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED,
attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela
Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office. The evidence
remains unrefuted, given the respondent’s failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges.
We find that respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a
member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known
that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand
sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties
of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for
disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The
Attorney’s Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the
duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further
stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.16 Respondent’s demands for sums of money to
facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests
before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath
she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run
contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps
higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule
1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 20 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts
of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the
penalty of three years’ suspension from membership in the Bar
as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall
be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this
decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found
liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the
Attorney’s Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant
to be spread on the records of the respondent, as well as to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its
chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed
his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant
to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear
from Canon 617 of said Code. Lawyers in government are
public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the
performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct
is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with

applications or requests pending before her office are violative
of Rule 1.0118 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or
participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 19 of the
Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interests. Promotion of private
interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or
which may be affected by the functions of his office.
Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from
one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public
office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is

A.C. No. 6788               August 23, 2007
(Formerly, CBD 382)
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension 1 against Atty.
Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Complaint
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance
of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal
actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.2 She
gave respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued
a receipt for ₱5,000 only.3
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her
cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never
allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait
outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform
her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.4 This
happened six times and for each "appearance" in court,
respondent charged her ₱350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became
suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her
cases in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She
was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case
against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in
the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).5
Respondent's Defense
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in
the government service from the very start. In fact, he first met
the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of
Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the
complainant's daughter.6
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an
action for damages against the Jovellanoses. 7 Because he was
with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an
indigent, he declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the
complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was
a private practitioner.9 Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept
the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the
acceptance fee agreed upon.10 Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's
refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She
insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might
spend" the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to
keep the ₱5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's
acceptance fee.11
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an
antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to
account for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the
respondent for safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a
friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.13
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. 14 A
few months later or in September 1994, the complainant again
asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses.
Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent
agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to
finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.15
Recommendation of the IBP
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the
complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On
November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and
recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.16
The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992
when respondent was still with the PAO.18 It also noted that
respondent described the complainant as a shrewd
businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial
lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have
accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued
one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the
receipt to accommodate a friend's request. 19 It found
respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government
lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's
fees other than their salaries. 20 The CBD concluded that
respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from a client.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service
which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for three years and ordered him to immediately
return to the complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was
substantiated by the receipt.21
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01,
16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It,
however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to
the restitution of ₱5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate,
reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to
return the total amount, an additional suspension of six
months.22
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity.23 More specifically, lawyers in government service
are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as
they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members
of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to
public service.24
Government employees are expected to devote themselves
completely to public service. For this reason, the private
practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto,
public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict with their official function.25
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private
cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to
the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the
complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he
was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from
a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.26 Respondent's admission that he accepted money
from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence
of an attorney-client relationship between him and the
complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted
the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer.
Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice
of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of
attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of
providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.27 Section
14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. xxx
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government
in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in
criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial
cases.28
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted
attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent
with the office's mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition
against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This
undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned
prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he
accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees
in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the
prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified
him from acting as the complainant's counsel.
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling
private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also
surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail
to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first
place he should not have done), respondent also led the
complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were
being tried and asked the complainant to pay his "appearance
fees" for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted
dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any
falsehood.31

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and

good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one
occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are
expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession
at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher
than his brethren in private practice.321avvphi1

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty

of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the
benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's
fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant
(such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a
judgment obligation in favor of the client) 33 nor was it given to
him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing
fees and bail bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return
the ₱5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to
attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of

violating the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18,
Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the
amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from
1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal

records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11069, June 08, 2016
RONALDO C.
FACTURAN, Complainant, v. PROSECUTOR ALFREDO
L. BARCELONA, JR., Respondent.
The instant administrative case arose from an Affidavit-
Complaint1 for disbarment anchored on gross misconduct or
serious gross misconduct in office, dishonesty, and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer or prosecutor filed by complainant
Ronaldo C. Facturan (complainant) against respondent
Prosecutor Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. (respondent) before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on June 4, 2004, he filed a complaint
for qualified theft against Pilar Mendoza (Mendoza), Jose
Sarcon @ Jo (Sarcon), Elezar Barcelona (Elezar), Rodrigo
Arro (Arro), and Joseph Montero (Montero; collectively,
Mendoza, et al.) before the Provincial Prosecution Office of
Alabel, Sarangani Province. The case was docketed as I.S. No.
04-211 and assigned for preliminary investigation to
Prosecutor Faisal D. Amerkhan (Prosecutor Amerkhan). 2
Thereafter, or on October 26, 2004, Prosecutor Amerkhan
forwarded the records of the case, together with his Resolution
recommending the prosecution of Mendoza, et al. and the
corresponding Information, to respondent for his approval and
signature. However, respondent neither approved nor signed
the resolution. Instead, he removed the case records from the
office of the Provincial Prosecutor and brought them to his
residence, where they were kept in his custody. It appears that
the respondents in I.S. No. 04-211 were personally known to
respondent, as Elezar is his cousin, while Mendoza, Sarcon,
Arro, and Montero are his close friends.3
Aggrieved, complainant sought4 the intervention of then
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales
(Secretary Gonzales), who, through then Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño (Chief State Prosecutor Zuño),
endorsed5 complainant's concerns to State Prosecutor Ringcar
B. Pinote (State Prosecutor Pinote). Unfortunately, State
Prosecutor Pinote could not take appropriate action on I.S. No.
04-211 as the case records were still in the possession of
respondent who failed to turn them over despite the directive
to do so.6
On July 20, 2005, complainant learned that the case records
had been turned over to the Provincial Prosecution Office but
without Prosecutor Amerkhan's Resolution and Information.
Neither did respondent approve nor act upon the same,
prompting complainant to file the present complaint for
disbarment against him.7
In his defense,8 respondent claimed that the "alleged malicious
'delaying' or the perceived concealment of the case record[s]
was neither intentional nor due to favoritism," 9 as he had
inhibited himself from I.S. No. 04-211, which was the reason
why this case was assigned to Prosecutor
Amerkhan.10 Respondent averred that as early as October
2004, complainant already knew that he was predisposed to
disapprove the resolution prepared by Prosecutor Amerkhan,
as the controversy merely involved a boundary
dispute.11 Thus, he advised Prosecutor Amerkhan to conduct a
clarificatory hearing instead of prematurely concluding the
preliminary investigation.12 However, Prosecutor Amerkhan
failed to do so, resulting in the delay in the resolution of I.S.
No. 04-211,13
Furthermore, respondent asseverated that, except for the fact
that a criminal information had been filed on September 8,
2006, he was no longer aware of any development in I.S. No.
04-211, having been subsequently detailed to the DOJ in
Manila and recently, to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Marikina City.14 He asserted that complainant and Prosecutor
Amerkhan manipulated the filing in court of I.S. No. 04-211
through the original resolution prepared by the latter. 15
The OCA indorsed16 complainant's Affidavit-Complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which then set17 the
case for mandatory conference on June 26, 2007. However,
only the respondent appeared, prompting the IBP to terminate
the mandatory conference and ordered the submission of the
parties' position papers. 18 Unfortunately, the parties did not
submit the required position papers.19
The IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report20 dated March 20, 2014, the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP, through Commissioner Leland
R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid), found respondent
to have violated Canons 1821 and 18.0322 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that he
be suspended from the practice of law for a period ranging
from six (6) months to two (2) years upon the discretion of the
IBP Governing Board.23
The IBP found that the case records of I.S. No. 04-211 were
removed by respondent from the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor and kept in his possession. 24 Records also show
that he failed to timely turn over the said case records upon
order of State Prosecutor Pinote. 25 In fact, the case records
remained in his possession even after he had been detailed to
the DOJ in Manila in February 2005. From the foregoing,
respondent's neglect to perform his duty was apparent. 26
Furthermore, respondent failed to perform his duty of
approving or disapproving Prosecutor Amerkhan's
recommendation pertaining to I.S. No. 04-211.27 As such, he is
also guilty of violating Canon 6.0128 of the CPR for his
failure the case records in his possession. 29
In a Resolution30 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the foregoing
recommendation and suspended respondent from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP's factual findings and
recommendation to hold respondent administratively liable,
but not for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, but
instead, of Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the same Code. The
pertinent rules provide:
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO
LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when
his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.31 In this regard, Rule 6.02 above-quoted is particularly
directed to lawyers in the government service, enjoining them
from using one's public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private
interests to interfere with public duties. 32
In Ali v. Bubong,33 the Court recognized that private interest is
not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the
interest of relatives.
In this case, respondent's accountability regarding I.S. No. 04-
211 has been duly established. When Prosecutor Amerkhan
forwarded to respondent the case records of I.S. No. 04-211,
together with the resolution recommending the filing of the
appropriate information in court, respondent failed to take
action thereon, as records are bereft of evidence showing that
he either approved or disapproved it. As the IBP had correctly
opined,34 if respondent did not concur with the findings and
recommendation of Prosecutor Amerkhan, who conducted the
preliminary investigation of the case, respondent should have
timely disapproved his recommendation to enable complainant
to take the appropriate remedy to challenge the disapproval.
Moreover, the Court notes respondent's defense 35 that
complainant was already aware beforehand that he
(respondent) was inclined to disapprove the resolution
prepared by Prosecutor Amerkhan, whom he ordered to
conduct a clarificatory hearing on the case. However, if such
was the case, then nothing could have prevented respondent
from proceeding to disapprove the resolution. Yet, as the
records bear out, he absolutely took no action thereon.
Worse, respondent removed the case records from the office of
the Provincial Prosecutor and, when directed to turn them
over, failed to do so notwithstanding his assignment to the
DOJ in Manila in February 2005. As a result, no further action
had been taken on I.S. No. 04-211 in the meantime. In fact, as
of June 30, 2005, respondent still had not complied with State
Prosecutor Pinote's directive to return not only the case
records of I.S. No. 04-211, but all the cases previously
assigned to him as well.36 Needless to state, respondent ought
to have known that without the case records, no further action
could be taken on any of those cases. His assignment to the
DOJ in Manila in February 2005 should have even prompted
him to turn over the case records of I.S. No. 04-211 for
appropriate action, but he still failed to do so, without any
plausible reason.
Absent any intelligent explanation as regards his lapses in the
handling of I.S. No. 04-211 and his failure to timely return the
case records thereof for further action, despite the directive to
do so, it can only be inferred that respondent not merely
failed, but obstinately and deliberately refused to perform his
duties as a prosecutor. Such refusal, under the circumstances,
evidently worked to the advantage of the respondents in I.S.
No. 04-21.1 - which included respondent's cousin, Elezar - as
the absence of the case records in the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor resulted in the delay in the filing of the appropriate
criminal information in court against them. Hence, it is
apparent that respondent used his public position as a
prosecutor to advance and protect the private interest of his
relative, which is clearly proscribed in the CPR.
Indeed, respondent's actions and omissions in this case, i.e.,
his failure to resolve I.S. No. 04-211 and to turn over the case
records thereof despite orders to do so, appear to have been
committed for the benefit of and to safeguard private interests.
As a lawyer who is also a public officer, respondent miserably
failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of
the legal profession.37 It bears stressing that a lawyer in public
office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, he must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps
higher than her brethren in private practice. 38 Accordingly, the
Court finds that suspension for a period of one (1) year, 39 as
recommended by the IBP, should be meted upon
respondent.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Prosecutor Alfredo L. Barcelona,
Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's
personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.