Conservatism as an Ideology

Author(s): Samuel P. Huntington

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun., 1957), pp. 454-473
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
Harvard University

Does conservativepolitical thoughthave a place in America today? The

answerto this questiondependsupon the generalnatureof conservatismas an
ideology: its distinguishingcharacteristics,its substance, and the conditions
underwhichit arises.By ideologyI mean a systemofideas concernedwiththe
distributionofpoliticaland social values and acquiesced in by a significant
social
group.'Interpretationsofthe roleand relevanceofconservativethoughton the
contemporaryscene vary greatly.Underlyingthe debate, however,are three
broad and conflictingconceptionsofthe natureof conservatismas an ideology.
This essay deals with the relativemeritsof these concepts.

I. THEORIES OF CONSERVATISM
First,the aristocratic
theorydefinesconservatismas the ideologyof a single
specificand unique historicalmovement:the reactionofthe feudal-aristocratic-
agrarian classes to the French Revolution, liberalism,and the rise of the
bourgeoisieat the end of the eighteenthcenturyand duringthe firsthalf of
the nineteenthcentury.In Mannheim's words, modern conservatismis "a
functionof one particularhistoricaland sociologicalsituation."' Liberalismis
the ideology of the bourgeoisie,socialism and Marxism the ideologies of the
proletariat,and conservatismthe ideology of the aristocracy.Conservatism
thus becomesindissolublyassociated withfeudalism,status,the ancienregime,
landed interests,medievalism,and nobility;it becomesirreconcilablyopposed
to the middleclass, labor,commercialism,industrialism,democracy,liberalism,
and individualism.This conceptofconservatismis popular among criticsofthe
"New Conservatism."For, as Louis Hartz has brilliantlydemonstrated,the
United States lacks a feudal tradition.Hence, the effortsof intellectualsand
publiciststo propagate conservativeideas in middle-classAmerica must be
doomed to failure.
Second,the autonomousdefinitionof conservatismholds that conservatismis
1 This essay deals only with conservative theory. It is not concerned with conservative
instincts, attitudes, political parties, or governmental policies. For contrasting views on
the meaning of ideology, see Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York, 1949), pp.
49 ff.and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Au-
tocracy(Cambridge, 1956), pp. 71 ff.
2 Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology,

ed. Paul Kecskemeti (New York, 1953), pp. 98-99. For contemporary use of the aristocratic
definitionwith respect to the "New Conservatism," see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The
New Conservatism in America: A Liberal Comment," Confluence, Vol. 2, pp. 61-71
(December, 1953), and "The New Conservatism: Politics of Nostalgia," Reporter,Vol. 12,
pp. 9-12 (June 16, 1955); Bernard Crick, "The Strange Quest for an American Con-
servatism," Review of Politics, Vol. 17, pp. 361-63 (July, 1955); Gordon K. Lewis, "The
Metaphysics of Conservatism," WesternPolitical Quarterly,Vol. 6, pp. 731-32 (December,
1953).

454

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 455

not necessarilyconnectedwiththeinterestsofany particulargroup,nor,indeed,

is its appearance dependentupon any specifichistoricalconfiguration of social
forces. Conservatismis an autonomous system of ideas which are generally
valid. It is definedin termsof universalvalues such as justice, order,balance,
moderation.Whetheror not a particularindividual holds these values high
dependsnot on his social affiliationsbut upon his personalcapacity to see their
inherenttruthand desirability.Conservatism,in this sense,is, as Russell Kirk
says, simplya matterof "will and intelligence";the principlesof conservatism
''are not confinedto the interestsofa singleclass"; conservativesmay be drawn
from"all classes and occupations... ."3 This theoryof conservatismis obvi-
ously popular among the "New Conservatives."It impliesnot only that con-
servatismis relevantand desirablein contemporaryAmerica,but that it is the
preferablepolitical philosophyunder any historicalcircumstances.
Third,the situational definitionviews conservatismas the ideology arising
out of a distinctbut recurringtype of historicalsituationin which a funda-
mental challengeis directedat establishedinstitutionsand in which the sup-
portersofthoseinstitutionsemploythe conservativeideologyin theirdefense.4
Thus, conservatismis that systemofideas employedto justifyany established
social order,no matterwhereor whenit exists,against any fundamentalchal-
lenge to its natureor being,no matterfromwhat quarter.The essence of con-
servatismis the passionateaffirmation ofthe value ofexistinginstitutions.This
does not mean that conservatismopposes all change. Indeed, in orderto pre-
serve the fundamentalelementsof society,it may be necessaryto acquiesce in
change on secondaryissues. No personcan espouse the conservativeideology,
however,unless he is fundamentallyhappy with the established order and
committedto its defenseagainst any serious challenge. Conservatismin this
sense is possiblein the United States today onlyif thereis a basic challengeto
existingAmericaninstitutionswhichimpels theirdefendersto articulatecon-
servativevalues.
Now, the questionmay be legitimatelyraised: What is gainedby arguingover
definitions?Are not all definitionsessentiallyarbitrary?How is it possible to
demonstratethe superiorityof one to another?This argumentis valid if no
common assumptionsexist among the conflictingtheories.Such, however,is
not the case with the threedefinitionsof conservatism.They differonly with
respectto the relationof conservativeideology to the historicalprocess. The
aristocraticdefinitionlimitsconservatismto a particularsocial class in a par-
ticularsociety.The autonomousdefinitionpermitsthe appearance of conserva-
tismat any stage in history.The situationaldefinitionholds that conservatism

3 Russell Kirk, A Program for Conservatives (Chicago, 1954), pp. 22, 38-39; Peter
Viereck, ConservatismRevisited (New York, 1949), p. 9.
4 See Clinton Rossiter, Conservatismin America (New York, 1955), p. 9; Francis G.

Wilson, "A Theory of Conservatism," this REvIEw, Vol. 35, pp. 39-40 (February, 1941);
Raymond English, "Conservatism: The Forbidden Faith," American Scholar, Vol. 21,
pp. 399-401 (October, 1952); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Conservative vs. Liberal-
A Debate," New York Times Magazine, March 4, 1956, pp. 11 ff.

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456 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

appears whenchallengingand defendingsocial groupsstandin a particularrela-

tion to each other. Yet all three approaches agree fundamentallyas to the
contentof conservatismas an ideology:the substance of the values and ideas
in which conservativesbelieve. Russell Kirk, for instance, criticizesArthur
Schlesinger,Jr., for identifyingconservatismwith feudalism,but he agrees
substantiallywithSchlesinger'sstatementof the essentialsof the conservative
ideology.,
All the analysts of conservatism,moreover,unite in identifyingEdmund
Burke as the conservativearchetypeand in assumingthat the basic elementsof
his thoughtare the basic elementsof conservatism.These areas of consensus
permita rationalevaluation of the threedefinitions.The historicalfunctionof
conservatismmustbe derivedfromits substance.That theoryof conservatism
is to be preferred
whichmost adequately and completelyexplainsthe manifes-
tations in historyof the Burkeian ideology. The thesis of this article is that
the situationaltheorymost closelymeets these criteria.

II. IDEATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IDEOLOGIES: THE ABSENCE OF

A CONSERVATIVE IDEAL

Among writersespousing all three definitionsof conservatismsubstantial

agreementexiststhat at least the followingare major componentsof the con-
servativecreed-the essentialelementsof Burke's theory.
(1) Man is basically a religiousanimal, and religionis the foundationof
civil society. A divine sanction infusesthe legitimate,existing,social order.
(2) Societyis the natural,organicproductofslow historicalgrowth.Existing
institutionsembody the wisdom of previous generations.Right is a function
oftime."Prescription,"in thewordsofBurke,"is themostsolidofall titles....
(3) Man is a creatureof instinctand emotionas well as reason. Prudence,
prejudice,experience,and habit are betterguides than reason,logic, abstrac-
tions,and metaphysics.Truth exists not in universalpropositionsbut in con-
crete experiences.
(4) The communityis superiorto the individual. The rightsof men derive
fromtheirduties. Evil is rootedin human nature,not in any particularsocial
institutions.
(5) Except in an ultimatemoralsense,men are unequal. Social organization
is complex and always includes a variety of classes, orders,and groups. Dif-
ferentiation,hierarchy,and leadershipare the inevitablecharacteristicsof any
civil society.
(6) A presumptionexists "in favour of any settled scheme of government
against any untried project. . .." Man's hopes are high, but his vision is
short.Effortsto remedyexistingevils usually resultin even greaterones.
Assumingthesepropositionsto be a fairsummaryofrepresentativeconserva-

5 See Kirk, op. cit., p. 37, and compare Schlesinger's summary of conservative concepts

Confluence, Vol. 2, pp. 64-65, with Kirk's summary, The ConservativeMind (Chicago,
1953), pp. 3-10. See also below, note 27.

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 457

tive ideas, what do they suggest as to the relative merit of the aristocratic,
autonomous,and situationaltheories?Nothingin these conservativeprinciples
limits them exclusivelyto the feudal-aristocraticreaction. To be sure, the
ideology stressesthe inevitabilityof classes and leadershipin society,but it
does not particularizeany specificform of social organizationor source of
leadership.Nor is thereanythingin the ideologywhichpresumesa partiality
towards an agrarian society,the feudal systemof land tenure,monarchy,or
a titledaristocracy.Similarly,the autonomoustheoryis inadequate because the
conservativeideologylacks the broad sweep and catholicappeal of an ideology
of universaland permanentrelevance.Indeed, conservatismitselfstressesthe
particularnature of truthand warns of the danger of overarchingprinciples.
Manifestly,the ideology has little appeal to any one discontentedwith the
status quo. In short,the aristocraticdefinitionfails because no necessarycon-
nectionexistsbetweenaristocracyor feudalism,on the one hand,and conserva-
tism on the other: nonaristocratscan expound conservativeideology; aristo-
crats can expoundnonconservativeideologies.
The autonomousdefinitionfails because the appearance of conservatismin
historyis not a matterof random chance. The aristocraticdefinitionrestricts
conservatismto too small a segmentofthe social process.The autonomousdefi-
nitionfreesit too completelyfromany connectionwiththe social process.The
characteristic elementsofconservativethought-the "divine tactic" in history;
prescriptionand tradition;the dislikeof abstractionand metaphysics;the dis-
trustof individualhuman reason; the organicconceptionof society;the stress
on the evil in man; the acceptance of social differentiation-allservethe over-
ridingpurposeof justifyingthe establishedorder.The essence of conservatism
is the rationalizationof existinginstitutionsin termsof history,God, nature,
and man.
The usefulnessofthe conservativeideologyin justifyingany existingorderis
manifestfromthe above summaryof Burkeian principles.Nowhere in that
summaryis thereany indicationofthe characterofthe institutionswhichthese
ideas mightbe used to defend. In this respect conservatismdiffersfromall
otherideologiesexceptradicalism:it lacks what mightbe termeda substantive
ideal. Most ideologies posit some vision as to how political societyshould be
organized. The words "liberalism," "democracy," "communism,""fascism,"
all convey an intimationas to what should be the distributionof power and
othervalues in society,the relativeimportanceof the state and othersocial
institutions,the relationsamong economic,political, and militarystructures,
the generalsystemof governmentand representation, the formsof executive
and legislativeinstitutions.But what is the politicalvision of conservatism?Is
it possible to describea conservativesociety?On the contrary,the essence of
conservatismis that it is literally,in Mfthlenfeld'sphrase, "Politik ohne
Wunschbilder."
It may be argued,forinstance,that the Portuguesepoliticalsystemis closer
to the authoritarianideal than the British and American systems,that the
Britishsystemis closerto the socialistideal than the Portugueseand American

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458 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

systems,that the Americansystemis closer to the democraticideal than the

British and Portuguesesystems,and that all three systemsare far fromthe
communistideal. But which of the threeis closest to the conservativeideal?
Portugal? Great Britain? The United States? It is impossibleto say because
no conservativeideal existsto serve as the standardof judgment.No political
philosopherhas ever describeda conservativeutopia. In any society,theremay
be institutionsto be conserved,but thereare never conservativeinstitutions.
The lack of a conservativeideal necessarilyvitiatesthe autonomousdefinition
of conservatism.
The ideals of nonconservativeideologieschangefromthinkerto thinkerand
generationto generation,but their fundamentalcharacteristicremains the
same: the ascriptionof value to theoretically-defined formulationsand the
appraisal of existingrealityin termsof those formulations.Non-conservative
ideologiesare thus ideationalor transcendentin nature,while conservatismis
institutionalor immanent.All the common ideational ideologies of modern
westernsociety approach existinginstitutionswith an "ought demand" that
the institutionsbe reshapedto embodythe values ofthe ideology.In thissense
all ideationaltheoriesinvolve some degreeof radicalism,i.e., criticismofexist-
ing institutions.The greaterthe gap betweenexistinginstitutionalrealityand
the ideal ofthe nonconservativeideology,the moreradical is the ideologywith
respectto that reality.Radicalism is thus the opposite of conservatism,and,
like conservatism,it denotes an attitude toward institutionsrather than a
beliefin any particularideals. Conservatismand radicalismderivefromorienta-
tions towardthe processof change ratherthan towardthe purposeand direc-
tion of change.
The conservativeideology is the product of intense ideological and social
conflict.It appears only when the challengersto the establishedinstitutions
rejectthefundamentalsofthe ideationaltheoryin termsofwhichthoseinstitu-
tionshave been moldedand created.If the challengersdo not questionthe basic
values of the prevailingphilosophy,the controversybetween those for and
against institutionalchange is carriedon with referenceto the commonlyac-
cepted ideational philosophy.Each group attemptsto show that its policies
are morein accordwiththe commonideals than those ofthe othergroup.After
the Civil War in America,forinstance,the conflictbetweenAmericanWhigand
American Democrat was fought,as Hartz has pointed out, within a shared
frameworkof Lockean values. Consensus precludedconservatism.
When the challengersfundamentallydisagreewiththe ideologyof the exist-
ing society,however,and affirm a basically different
set ofvalues, the common
frameworkof discussionis destroyed.The rejectionof the prevailingideology
by the challengerscompelsit to be abandoned by the defendersalso. No idea-
tional theorycan be used to defendestablishedinstitutionssatisfactorily, even
whenthose institutionsin generalreflectthe values of that ideology.The per-
fect nature of the ideology's ideal and the imperfectnature and inevitable
mutationoftheinstitutionscreate a gap betweenthe two. The ideal becomesa
standard by which to criticizethe institutions,much to the embarrassment

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 459

of those who believe in the ideal and yet still wish to defendthe institutions.6
Eventually the defendersare faced with an unavoidable choice: eitherthey
mustabandon theirideologyin orderto defendtheirinstitutionsand substitute
a conservativephilosophyfortheirold ideational theory,or they must adhere
to theirideational theoryat the risk of furthercontributingto the downfall
of those institutionswhich largely embody their ideals. The defenseof any
set of institutionsagainst a fundamentalchallenge, consequently,must be
phrasedin termsofthe conservativelogic,sanctity,and necessityoftheinstitu-
tionsqua institutionsirrespectiveofthe degreeto whichtheycorrespondto the
prescriptionsof this or that ideationalphilosophy.7
The challengingsocial forcemust presenta clear and presentdangerto the
institutions.The mere articulationof a dissidentideology does not produce
conservatismuntil that ideologyis embracedby significantsocial groups.The
philosophesof the mid-eighteenth centurygeneratedno conservativeideology;
the eventsof 1789 and the subsequentyearsdid. Conservatism,in Mannheim's
words, "firstbecomes conscious and reflectivewhen other ways of life and
thoughtappear on the scene, against whichit is compelledto take up armsin
the ideologicalstruggle."8If the defendersofthe establishedorderare success-
ful,in due coursetheygraduallycease to articulatetheirconservativeideology
and substituteforit a new versionoftheirold ideationaltheory.If theirdefense
is unsuccessful,they abandon eithertheirold ideational premisesor theirnew

6 Hence any theory of natural law as a set of transcendent and universal moral prin-

ciples is inherentlynonconservative. Mannheim, consequently, is quite right in identify-

ing opposition to natural law as a distinguishing characteristic of conservatism, op. cit.,
pp. 116-19. On Burke's denial of natural law, see Alfred Cobban, Edmund Burke and the
Revolt against the Eighteenth Century (London, 1929), pp. 40 ff., 75, and Leo Strauss,
Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), pp. 13-14 and 318-19, who makes the point
that Burke differedfrom previous thinkers precisely in that he did not judge the British
constitution by a standard transcending it. The effortsof contemporary publicists such
as Russell Kirk to appear conservative and yet at the same time to espouse a universal
natural law are manifestly inconsistent.
7 Since conservatism is the ideological justification of established social and political
institutions, a conservative defense of sheer chaos or of a society in a continuing state of
rapid revolutionary change would be impossible except for an individual so nimble, so
cunning, so strong as to be confidentof his talent for flourishingas an outlaw. This raises
the question as to the chances of conservatism in a modern totalitarian state. If totali-
tarian society is, as Franz Neumann described Nazi Germany, "a non-state, a chaos, a
rule of lawlessness and anarchy," a conservative defense of such a society is impossible.
On the other hand, if a totalitarian regime under attack did articulate a theory charac-
terized by a number of conservative elements, this in itself would be supporting evidence
that it had "settled down" and was no longer in a state of permanent revolution. The
answer to this general question obviously depends upon the nature of totalitarianism
rather than on the nature of conservatism. See Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Totalitarianism
(Cambridge, 1954); Hannah Arendt, "Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Govern-
ment," Review of Politics, Vol. 15, pp. 303-27 (July, 1953); Franz Neumann, Behemoth:
The Structureand Practice of National Socialism (New York, 1942); Zbigniew K. Brzezin-
ski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," this REVIEW, Vol. 50, p. 751 (Sept., 1956).
8 Op. cit., p. 115.

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460 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

conservativeideology.If theyare inclinedto be congenitalconservatives,they

will accept the new orderas the inevitableworkofdestiny.Burke,Bonald, and
de Maistre, forinstance,all in part believed that the triumphof the French
Revolutionmightbe decreedby Providenceand that once thisbecame obvious,
it would "not be resoluteand firm,but perverseand obstinate" to oppose it.9
On the otherhand, the unsuccessfulconservativewho remainsattached to
the ideals of his old ideational philosophybecomes a reactionary,i.e., a critic
of existingsocietywho wishes to recreatein the futurean ideal which he as-
sumes to have existedin the past. He is a radical. No valid distinctionexists
between"change backward" and "change forward."Change is change; history
neitherretreatsnor repeats; and all change is away fromthe status quo. As
time passes, the ideal of the reactionarybecomes less and less related to any
actual societyof the past. The past is romanticized,and, in the end, the reac-
tionarycomesto supporta returnto an idealized "Golden Age" whichneverin
fact existed. He becomes indistinguishablefromother radicals, and he nor-
mally displaysall the distinctivecharacteristicsof the radical psychology.
The nature of conservatismas an institutionalideologyprecludesany per-
manent and inherentaffiliationor oppositionbetween it and any particular
ideational ideology. No necessarydichotomyexists, therefore,between con-
servatismand liberalism.The assumptionthat such an oppositiondoes exist
derives, of course, fromthe aristocratictheoryof conservatismand reflects
an overconcernwith a singlephase of westernhistoryat the end of the 18th
and the beginningofthe 19thcenturies.The effort to erectthisephemeralrela-
tionshipinto a continuingphenomenonof political historyonly serves to ob-
scure the fact that in the properhistoricalcircumstancesconservatismmay
well be necessaryforthe defenseof liberalinstitutions.The true enemyof the
conservativeis not the liberal but the extremeradical no matterwhat idea-
tional theoryhe may espouse. Differentradicals advance different panaceas,
but they all have the same psychologywhich conservativethinkershave not
been slow to identify.Hooker's sixteenth-century Puritan,Metternich's"pre-
sumptuous man," Burke's "metaphysical scribbler,"Hawthorne's Hollings-
worth,Cort&s'"self-worshipping man," Hoffer'stwentiethcentury"true be-
liever," are all one and the same.
The distinctionbetween conservatismand the ideational ideologieshas led
some nonconservativesto deny any intellectualcontentto conservatismand
has led some conservativesto attack all ideologies. Both the criticsand the
defendersof conservatismare wrong,however,when they minimizeits intel-
lectual significance.Conservatismis the intellectualrationaleofthe permanent
institutionalprerequisitesof human existence. It has a high and necessary
function.It is the rationaldefenseofbeingagainstmind,oforderagainstchaos.
When the foundationsof societyare threatened,the conservativeideologyre-
I See Bonald's famous comment: "Quand Dieu a voulu punir la France, il a fait retirer

les Bourbons." "Pens6es sur Divers Sujets," Oeuvres (Paris, 1817), Vol. 6, 172. Also:
Joseph de Maistre, "Considerations sur la France," Oeuvres (Bruxelles, 1838), Vol. 7, Ch.
1, 2; and Strauss's discussion of Burke, op. cit., pp. 317-19.

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 461

minds men of the necessityof some institutionsand the desirabilityof the

existingones. All ideologies need not be ideational ideologies. The theoryof
conservatismis of a different orderand purpose than othercommonpolitical
theories,but it is still theory.Conservatismis not just the absence of change.
It is the articulate,systematic,theoreticalresistanceto change.
III. INHERENT AND POSITIONAL IDEOLOGIES: THE ABSENCE
OF A CONSERVATIVE TRADITION

Most writersagree, and it is assumed here,that Burke is properlycalled a

conservative.The question,consequently,is: can Burke best be understoodas
the spokesmanforthe feudal aristocraticorder,the expounderof values and
ideals universallyvalid, or as the defenderof establishedinstitutions?The
aristocraticdefinitionfails to explain Burke because: (1) the English society
Burke defendedwas neitherprimarilyfeudal nor exclusivelyaristocratic;(2)
Burke was concernedwith the defenseof otherestablishedsocieties,notably
in India and America; and (3) insofaras Burke had views on the desirable
organizationof society,he was a liberal,a Whig,and a freetrader.The autono-
mous conceptsimilarlydoes not offera completeexplanationofBurke because:
(1) Burke's politicalwritingsand speecheswereall directedto immediateprob-
lems and needs; (2) he rejectedthe desirabilityand the possibilityof a moral
or politicalphilosophyofuniversalapplicability;and (3) the principalelements
of his politicalthoughtare relevantchiefly to the limitedpurposeof justifying
establishedinstitutions.
On the Continentat the beginningof the nineteenthcenturyBurke's ideas
were used to defendaristocracyand feudalismagainst the risingmiddle class.
The English societyand constitutionwith which Burke was concerned,how-
ever,werequite different fromthose existingacrossthe Channel. The factthat
his ideas could be used to justifythe establishedorderin both places demon-
stratesnot the similarityofthe two ordersbut the transferability ofhis philoso-
phy. In a penetratingepigram,Louis Hartz has declared that "In America
Burkeequalled Locke." This is trueenough,but it was equally truein England.
Burke defendedthe English constitutionof his day firstagainst the efforts of
George III to reassertthe influenceof the Crown over Parliamentand then
against the effortsof the democratsto broaden the controlof the people over
Parliament.He was a conservativebecause one hundredyears afterLocke he
was still attemptingto preservethe institutionsof 1689. A devotee of mixed
government, he was resolved,he said, "to keep an establishedchurch,an estab-
lished monarchy,an established aristocracy,and an established democracy,
each in the degree it exists,and in no greater."'0Burke recognizedthat the
people had an important,althoughlimited,roleto play in the Englishsystem."
Acceptingaristocracyas an inherentand necessaryelementof the Britishcon-
10 "Reflections on the Revolution in France," Works (Boston, 1865), Vol. 3, p. 352

(hereafter cited as Works).

11See e.g., "Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents," Works, Vol. 1, pp.
436, 440-41, 469, 472-74, 491-93, 508.

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462 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

stitution,he showed,however,littlepartialitytowardsit. A commonerhimself,

he sufferedon morethan one occasionfromthe aristocraticdisdain ofthe great
lords who tended to view him as an "Irish adventurer."Like Jefferson and
Adams, Burke was a supporterof a natural aristocracy,not an artificialaris-
tocracy.'2
The social orderwhich Burke defendedwas to a large extent commercial,
and it was becomingincreasinglyindustrial.The eighteenthcenturyhad seen
the rise of the Bank of England, the South Sea Bubble, joint stock companies,
expandingshippingand trade, the accumulationof commercialfortunesand
industrialcapital, a rash of industrialinventions,and the steady growthof
manufacturing.Commercewas "the dominantfactor" in eighteenth-century
England.'3Voltaire's astonishmentthat the great gentlemenof England were
not ashamed of trade was but one indicationof the difference betweenEnglish
and continentalsociety. For thirtyyears beforeBurke arrivedin London in
1750 the promotionof industryhad been a primaryobjective of the English
government.By 1790, when accordingto the aristocratictheoryof conserva-
tism Burke was defendingthe feudal corporateorder,the Industrial Revolu-
tion in England was already a generationold. Was Burke repelled by the
growthof commerceand industry?Did he seek to returnto the feudalagrarian
order of a previousage? Far fromit. For Burke, as Namier declares, "trade
was the soul ofempire."As earlyas 1770 Burke stated his positionin no uncer-
tain terms: "There is no such thingas the landed interestseparate fromthe
tradinginterest.... Turn yourland intotrade."'4Is this the advice of a feudal
apologist?Six yearslater Burke praisedto the skies "forsagacityand penetra-
tion of mind,extentof views, accurate distinction,just and natural connexion
and dependenceof parts" a book whichaccuratelyreflectedhis own views on
12 For Burke's views on aristocracy, see ibid., Vol. 1, p. 458; "An Appeal from the
New to the Old Whigs," ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 174-75; "Reflections on the Revolution in
France," ibid., Vol. 3, p. 297; "Speech on the Second Reading of a Bill for the Repeal of
the Marriage Act," The Works of Edmund Burke (London, World's Classics), Vol. 3, p.
385; John MacCunn, The Political Philosophy of Burke (London, 1913), pp. 157-60,
173 ff.,258-68. On Burke's difficultieswith the aristocracy, see John Viscount Morley,
Burke (London, 1923), pp. 198-208.
13 L. B. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution (London, 1930), pp.

15, 38, 40: "Trade was not despised in eighteenth-centuryEngland-it was acknowledged
to be the great concern of the nation. . . ." See also W. E. H. Lecky, A History of England
in theEighteenthCentury(New York, 1878), Vol. 1, p. 433: "In very few periods in English
political historywas the commercial element more conspicuous in administration.... The
questions which excited most interest were chieflyfinancial and commercial ones." And
J. L. and Barbara Hammond, The Rise of Modern Industry (New York, 1926), pp. 64-65:
"In eighteenth-centuryEngland, industry seemed the most important thing in the world.
All classes put industrial expansion high among the objects of public policy.. . ." On the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution in England and the prestige of commerce and
industry, see also: W. Cunningham, The Industrial Revolution (Cambridge, 1908), p. 494;
W. T. Selley, England in theEighteenthCentury(London, 1934), pp. 218-19; Witt Bowden,
The Rise of the Great Manufacturers in England, 1760-1790 (Allentown, 1919), passim.
14 Cavendish Debates, Vol. 1, p. 476, quoted in Robert H. Murray, Edmund Burke: A
Biography (Oxford, 1931), p. 192 (italics added).

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 463

economics: The Wealthof Nations.'5In ParliamentBurke was consistentlyfor

laisser faire; the state should stay out of economicmatters;the laws of com-
mercewere the laws of nature; labor itselfwas an "article of trade." Is it any
wonder that Adam Smith, after discussing political economy with Burke,
should declare that Burke "was the only man, who, withoutcommunication,
thoughton these topics exactly as he did"?16 If Burke is an apologistforthe
feudal corporateorder,what becomes of Adam Smith? The plain fact of the
matteris that,insofaras he had views on the desirableorganizationof society,
in politicsBurke was a liberaland a Whig,the defenderofthe Lockean consti-
tution;in economics,he was a liberalfreetrader,his ideas at one withthose of
Adam Smith.Therewas littleor nothingthat was corporate,orfeudal,or aristo-
cratic about him at all.
While Burke preferreda balanced constitutionand a commercialeconomy,
his preferencederivednot so much fromtheirpeculiarvirtuesas fromthe fact
of their existence. Montesquieu and Adam Smith developed the ideational
rationaleforthe institutionswhich Burke accepted. Burke's contributionwas
different.He was concernednot withthe substanceofinstitutionsbut withtheir
preservation.Impartially he defended Whig institutionsin England, demo-
cratic institutionsin America, autocratic institutionsin France, and Hindu
institutionsin India. Indian institutions,he warned,forexample,mustbe based
"upon theirownprinciplesnotupon ours,"denouncingthoseBritishersin India
who subverted "the most established rightsand the most ancient and most
reveredinstitutionsof ages and nations."'17"He changedhis front,"as Morley
remarkedin a classicphrase,"but he neverchangedhis ground."Since Morley,
scholarshave unitedin clearingBurke ofchargesofinconsistency.But ifBurke
was consistent,how can he have been an aristocrat?If his primaryconcern
had been the preservationof the feudal corporateorderin Europe, whywould
he have any concernforAmericaor India? Most conservativesadopt conserva-
tive ideas in orderto defendone particularestablishedorder.In this respect
theirconservatismis instrumentalratherthan primary.Burke, however,was
the conservativearchetypebecause hisimpulsewas to defendall existinginstitu-
tions whereverlocated and howeverchallenged.
Supporters of the aristocratictheory of conservatismargue that modern
conservatismoriginatedwith the reaction to the French Revolution. They
are mistaken.It is possible to identifyat least fourmajor manifestationsof
conservatismin westernpolitical history.The firstwas the responsein the
sixteenthand seventeenthcenturiesto the challenge of centralizednational
authorityto medieval politicalinstitutionsand the challengeof the Reforma-
tion to establishedchurch-staterelationships.On the Continent,forinstance,
Francis Hotman in his Franco-Galliaand Juan de Mariana in his De Rege et
I5 Annual Register,1776, Vol. 19, p. 241.
16 RobertBisset, The Life of Edmund Burke, 2 vols. 2d ed. (London, 1800), Vol. 2, p.
429.
1" Quoted in Morley, Burke, pp. 190-91, 245, and George H. Sabine, A History of
PoliticalTheory(New York, 1950,rev.ed)., p. 616.

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 464 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Regis Institutioneattempteda conservativedefenseof the medieval pluralistic

orderagainst the growingpower of the national monarchs.That Hotman was
a Frenchmanand a Protestantand Mariana a Spaniard and a Jesuitmade little
difference.They had similarpurposes and similararguments.Unfortunately
forboth, however,the historicalfacts did not entirelysupportthe uses which
theymade ofthem,and the trendtowardroyalpowerhad already undermined
most of the significantinstitutionsof the old order.As a result,the argument
of the monarchomachswas shiftedfroma conservativebase to an ideational
one. It was restatedin termsof principleratherthan precedent.Franco-Gallia
was eclipsed by the Vindiciae, and Mariana was overshadowedby Suarez.'8
In England, on the otherhand, the existenceof a strongnational monarchy
and of a national churchpermitteda conservativedefenseof both. The ideas
whichon the Continenthad been used to defendthe estates against royal au-
thoritywere used in England to defendroyal authorityagainst political dis-
sidentsand theologicalradicals. The politicalthinkingof the Tudor apologists
-Tyndale, Gardiner,Hooper, and numerousothers-was suffusedwith con-
servativeappeals to orderand obedience."9Rebellion and anarchy were held
out as theworstofevils; disobediencewas an effort to breaka divinelyordained
chain ofbeing.Restated again and again in Tudor literaturewas Shakespeare's
warning:"Take but degreeaway, untunethat string,And, Hark! what discord
follows.... "
Toward the end of the sixteenthcenturyas the Puritan attack gathered
strengthand became more extreme-the episcopacy came under sustained
criticismin 1570-the need arose fora morethoroughconservativedefenseof
the national civil and religiousestablishment.This need was met by Richard
Hooker in his Laws ofEcclesiasticalPolitypublishedin 1594. This multivolume
workstandsas a toweringand eloquentstatementofthe conservativeideology.
Here, two hundredyears beforeBurke,was delineatedeverysignificant strand
ofBurkeanthought.20 The substanceoftheirconservatismis virtuallyidentical.
18 Some conservative elements persisted in the Vindiciae, but they were obscured by

the appeal to the social contract and natural law. Cf. J. N. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius
(Cambridge, 1916), pp. 174-79 and Sabine, A History of Political Theory, pp. 375-77.
19See Charles Nevinson (ed.), Latter Writings of Bishop Hooper (Cambridge, 1852),
esp. "Annotations on Romans XIII,'" pp. 93-116; Pierre Janelle (ed.), Obediencein Church
and State: Three Political Tracts by Stephen Gardiner (Cambridge, 1930); Henry Walter
(ed.), Doctrinal Treatises by William Tyndale (Cambridge, 1848), esp. pp. 173 ff.,195-97,
240 if.; Christopher Morris, Political Thought in England, Tyndale to Hooker (London,
1953), pp. 15, 17, 57, 68-77. One hundred years later Bramhall duplicated those arguments
in his controversies with Hobbes. See John Bramhall, Works (Oxford, 1844), Vol. 3, "A
Fair Warning to take Heed of the Scotch Discipline," and "The Serpent-Salve, or, the
Observator's Grounds Discussed," esp. pp. 236, 241, 272, 298, 309, 318; John Bowle,
Hobbes and His Critics (New York, 1952), pp. 114 ff.; T. S. Eliot, For Lancelot Andrewes
(Garden City, 1929), pp. 27-46.
20 For typical conservative expressions in the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, see: Pref.,

i, 2, iii, 7, iv, 4, vi, 5-6; I, v, 1, x, 4; IV, i, e, iv, 2, xii, 2, xiv, 1-2; V, vii, 3, lxxi, 4; VII,
i, 1-2; VIII, ii, 2, 17. On Hooker's conservatism generally, see Sheldon Wolin, "Richard
Hooker and English Conservatism," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. VI, pp. 28-47

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 465

Yet the institutionstheyweredefendingand the challengesto whichtheywere

reacting were dissimilar.The Tudor constitutionof 1590 differedfromthe
Whig constitutionof 1790. The threat to Hooker's institutionscame from
Puritan sects advocating the complete separation of Church and State, the
supremacy of faith over reason, and the authorityof scriptureagainst the
authorityof the church.The Puritans viewed man as depraved and evil; they
were spiritualistic,deterministic,anti-intellectual,fundamentalistand pessi-
mistic. The challengeto Burke's institutions,on the other hand, came from
democraticgroups assured of the efficacyof reason and possessed of an un-
bounded confidencein human nature and man's capacity for progress.They
wereeverythingwhichthe Puritanswere not: materialistic,rationalistic,anti-
religious,optimistic,and libertarian.Yet despite the differences,the similar
situationsin whichHooker and Burke foundthemselvesled them to expound
similar political ideas.
The second great manifestationof conservatismwas the response to the
French Revolution.That social upheaval, the ideologiesit advanced, and the
classes it propelled towards power were undoubtedlythe greatestthreat to
existinginstitutionsin the historyof westerncivilization up to that time.
Consequently,theyproduced the greatestoutpouringof conservativethought
in westernhistory.The conservativeresponseto the Revolution was largely
but not exclusivelya defenseofthe feudal,agrarian,aristocraticorderagainst a
rising,urban,enlightenedmiddleclass. Nonetheless,the Revolutionendangered
not only feudal aristocraticinstitutionsbut all established institutions.In
England Burke made a conservativedefenseof a commercialsociety and a
moderate,liberalconstitution.In America,the Federalists-fromJohnAdams
throughHamilton to Fisher Ames-expounded conservativeideas to defenda
liberalconstitutionagainstwhat theythoughtto be the threatof a democratic
revolution.On the Continent,too, the initial conservativereaction came not
fromthe feudal aristocratsbut fromthinkersassociated with more liberal,
commercial,and bureaucraticelements.In Germany,for instance, Brandes,
Rehberg, and M6ser, representativesof the north German cities where the
middle class was strongest,made the firstattacks on the Revolution.2'A few
ofthe continentalconservatives,such as Gentz,wereliberalin theireconomics.
Even amongthe spokesmenforthe aristocracy,differences existedin the socie-
ties whichthey defended:the France of Bonald and de Maistre, the Prussia
of von der Marwitz and Haller, and the Austria of Gentz, Metternich,and

(March, 1953). On the nature of the Puritan challenge and the origins of Hooker's work,
see C. J. Sisson, The Judicious Marriage of Mr. Hooker and the Birth of the Laws of Ec-
clesiastical Polity (Cambridge, 1940), passim, and E. T. Davies, The Political Ideas of
Richard Hooker (London, 1946), Ch. 1, 2.
21 See Reinhold Aris, History of Political Thought in Germany (London, 1936), pp.

54-58, 256. Brandes and Rehberg wrote their conservative works before reading Burke.
Moser was closer to feudalism, but even he, as Mannheim points out, "Conservative
Thought," pp. 144-45, had little use for the nobility, and was primarily concerned with
the preservation of the medieval social system as a whole.

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466 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Miller did not have identical social structures.Nevertheless,the common

strandsof conservatismran throughthe politicalideas ofthe Reaction thinkers
irrespectiveof the immediatesocial orderwhichtheydesiredto preserve.
The conservatismof the feudal-aristocratic thinkersof the Reaction was the
product of their temporarydefensiveposition ratherthan of the permanent
and inherentnatureoftheirclass interests.The fundamentalcharacterofthose
interestsdid not change in 1789. Yet priorto that year the aristocracypro-
duced no significantconservativethinking.They had no need forit. On the
other hand, afterthe aristocratswere driven frompower, they ceased to be
conservative without surrenderingtheir aristocratic ideals. In France, in
particular,aristocraticthought,once conservative,rapidlybecame reactionary
and eventuallybecame radical. De Maistre had exalted order and stability.
In the bourgeoisdemocracyofthe Third Republic L'Action Francaisepreached
violence and the "coup de force." The revolutionarieswere on the Right.22
The thirdmanifestationof conservatismwas the responseof the governing
classes to the popularlowerclass demandsfora sharein the directionofsociety
in the middle years of the nineteenthcentury.The single most important
symbolof this challengewas the cryforthe extensionof the suffrage.It was a
challenge, however,that involved only a partial divergencefrom accepted
values and, consequently,occasioneda weak conservativeresponse.In France,
in particular,wherethe middleclasses had to face in two directions,the typical
exponents of their viewpoint-Royer-Collard and Guizot, for instance-
expoundedliberalideas against the aristocratsand conservativeideas against
the masses. In Germany,wherea major upheaval had not destroyedthe struc-
ture of society,Stahl, Ranke, Savigny,and Ludwig von Gerlach articulateda
more broadly conceived conservatismemphasizing the organic growth of
society.In England, Coleridgeand, subsequently,Newman,Maine, and Lecky
warnedof the dangersof substitutingpopular ruleforclass rule. In the United
States, the neo-Federalists,Story, Choate, Kent, made a briefconservative
defenseof a restrictedgoverningclass beforethey were overwhelmedby the
Jacksoniantidal wave.
A fourthmanifestationof conservatismwas the outpouringof political
thoughtproducedin the southernUnited States by the challengeofindustrial-
ism, freelabor, and abolitionin the middle of the nineteenthcentury.Priorto
1830 southernpolitical thoughtwas shaped largelyin the Jeffersonian image.
After1830 southernthinkingbecame increasinglyconservativeas a result of
the increasinglyarticulatetheoriesof abolitionand the rise of northernindus-
try and population. William Lloyd Garrison-the epitome of the radical re-
former-foundedThe Liberatorin 1931 and in the same year Nat Turnerled
his slave insurrection.The combinationof forces which these events sym-
bolized forcedthe South on the defensiveand led it to abandon its Jeffersonian
heritageand develop a conservativeapologia in the language of Burke. It was
22 Joseph C. Murray, "The Political Thought of Joseph de Maistre," Review of Politics,

Vol. 11, p. 86 (January, 1949); Charles A. Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany,
1933-1939 (Durham, 1943), pp. 1-15.

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 467

possible to be at once a Jeffersonianand a slaveowneronly so long as no one

set the Declaration of Independenceagainst slavery.When this happened,the
slaveownerhad to abandon eitherhis liberalismor his livelihood. Inevitably
the ideational philosophywas sacrificedand replaced by a far-reachingcon-
servatism.23 Just as the risingtide of Puritan radicalism against the Tudor
establishmenteventually produced Hooker, the rising tide of abolitionist
reformeventuallyproduced Calhoun and Fitzhugh. In theirwritingsand in
those of the othersof the "reactionaryenlightenment"-Holmes,Hammond,
Hughes, and Harper, in particular-there was "duplicated in every essential
aspect the argumentofEurope's feudalreaction."24 All the basic ideas of Burke
were reproducedin the treatisesand pamphletswith whichthey came to the
defenseof theirestablishedsocial orderagainst a threatwhich was concrete,
potent,and eventuallysuccessful.
Louis Hartz has suggested that southern conservatismwas a "fraud.""
Startingfromthe aristocraticconceptionof conservatism,Hartz argues that
therewas an inherentconflictin the effortof the southernersto use Burke to
defend slavery, on the one hand, and a political traditioncontainingmany
elementsof liberalism,on the other.Notwithstandingdefiniteinconsistencies
in the southernsystem,however,there was no inconsistencyin the South's
use of Burke to defendthat system.The conservativephilosophywas appro-
priate to the defenseof the institutionsof Jeff
erson,the "peculiar institution"
of slavery,or any combinationof the two. It was no more of a fraudforCal-
houn to combineBurke and slaverythan it was forBurke himselfto combine
Burke and laisser faire.Nor does the fact that southernconservativepolitical
thought ended with the Civil War prove that the southernerswere "false
Burkes, halfwayBurkes." When the southernsocial-politicalsystemwas de-
stroyed,the theoryelaborated in its defensenecessarilyhad to die with it.
Hartz himselfdescribessouthernconservatismas "one ofthe greatand creative
episodes in the historyof Americanthought." Could it be this, however,if it
weresimplya "fraud,"an artificialimportationwithoutrootsin the American
situation?Is it not possibleto avoid thisproblemby a moresimpleexplanation
of southernconservatism?The southernexperiencewas a clear example of a
society shiftingfroma liberal ideational theoryto an uncompromisingcon-
servatismas the resultof the rise of a fundamentalchallengeto its existence.
Given the changein the southernposition,the changein southernthoughtwas
both necessaryand natural.
The basic inadequacy of the aristocratictheoryof conservatismis that it
conceivesconservatismto be an-inherent ideologyratherthan a positionalide-
ology. An inherentideologyis the theoreticalexpressionof the interestsof a
continuingsocial group. It is derived fromthe fundamentalcommoncharac-
23 For the change in southern thinking about 1830, see William E. Dodd, The Cotton

Kingdom (New Haven, 1921), pp. 48 ff.,and Arthur Y. Lloyd, The Slavery Controversy
(Chapel Hill, 1939), pp. 119 ff.
24 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955), p. 146.

26 Ibid., pp. 147 ff.

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468 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

teristicswhich make the group a group. Consequently,an inherentideology

evolves and changesas the interestsand needs of the groupchange,but, at the
same time, it maintains certain essential characteristicsreflectingthe con-
tinuingand inherentidentityof the group. True to its essentialnature as the
ideology of the bourgeoismiddle class, the liberalismof one generationhas
differedfromand yet grownout of the liberalismof a previousgeneration.An
inherentphilosophymay also be differently interpretedand expressedby con-
flictingsubschools existingat the same time. American liberalismhas been
split between a Whig, "propertyrights,"version, on the one hand, and a
popular, "human rights,"version,on the other.None the less, AmericanWhig
and Americandemocratboth share the essentialsof Locke. Marxism,too, has
existedin a varietyof formsand evolved througha numberof phases, all of
which,however,have retainedthe same underlyingfundamentalswhich dis-
tinguishMarxismas a theory.It is thus possible to relate the various expres-
sionsof an inherenttheoryto each other,to trace patternsof developmentand
influence,and to identifyschismsand subvarietieswithinthe commonintel-
lectual tradition.In brief: the substance of an inherenttheoryevolves and
proliferates, and theexpressionsof thetheoryare interrelatedand interdepend-
ent. The theoryand its exponentsall constitutea schoolofthought.
Positional ideologiesare quite different. They do not reflectthe continuing
interestsand needs of a particularsocial group. Rather theydepend upon the
relationsexistingamong groups.A groupmay espouse one positionalideology
when its relationswith othergroups assume one formand anotherpositional
ideology when those relations assume a different form.Positional ideologies
reflectthe changingexternalenvironmentofa groupratherthan its permanent
internalcharacteristics. Inherentideologiesare functionsof groupsno matter
what theirpositions;positionalideologiesare functionsof situationsno matter
what groupsoccupy those situations.26 With positionalideologies,it is a ques-
tion not of "who" but of "where." Thus, the theoryof "states' rights"in the
United States has been primarilya positionalideologyespoused by a succes-
sion of different groupswhenevertheirpowerin the centralgovernmentvis-&-
vis theiropponentgroupshas been less than theirpowerin the states.
If the situational definitionof conservatismis correct,conservatismis a
positionalideology. Conservatismdevelops to meet a specifichistoricalneed.
Whenthe need disappears,the conservativephilosophysubsides.In each case,
thearticulationof conservatismis a responseto a specificsocial situation.The
manifestationof conservatismat any one time and place has little connection
withits manifestationat any othertime and place. Conservatismthus reflects
no permanentgroup interest.Depending upon the existence of a particular
relationamonggroupsratherthan upon the existenceofthe groupsthemselves,
it lasts only so long as the relationlasts, not so long as the groupslast. And
28 The significance of positional ideologies has been obscured by the assumption,

deriving from Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, that every ideology has a "carrier"
in the form of a specific social group or class. The argument here is that ideologies may
also have "carriers" in the form of recurring patterns of relations among groups.

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 469

the relationis necessarilyephemeral,seldom continuingmore than one gen-

eration. Consequently,the conservativeideologyis not developed and trans-
mitted with alterations,elaboration,and revisionfromone age to the next.
Nor does it have a set ofbasic writingsto be annotated,interpreted,and argued
over by contendingsets of disciples. The manifestationsof conservatismare
simplyparallelideologicalreactionsto similarsocial situations.The substance
of conservatismis essentiallystatic. Conservativethoughtis repetitive,not
evolutionary.Its manifestationsare historicallyisolated and discrete.Thus,
paradoxical though it may seem, conservatism,the defenderof tradition,is
itselfwithouttradition;conservatism,the appeal to history,is withouthistory.
The static and repetitiouscharacterof conservativethoughtis reflectedin
the extentto whichconservatismlends itselfto itemization.More so than any
otherpoliticalideology,conservatismcan be condensedinto a briefcatalog of
principlesor concepts which constitutethe conservativecatechism common
to all conservativethinkers.Both the proponentsand criticsof conservatism
agree that the essenceof conservatismcan be summedup in a small numberof
basic ideas. The numberof theseideas may vary in the different formulations,
but theircontentis universallythe same. Hearnshaw,forinstance,lists "twelve
principlesof conservatism,"Kirk "six canons of conservativethought,"and
Rossiter "'twenty-onepoints' of the Conservativetradition."27
In part, these briefand similarcatalogs of conservativeideas simplyreflect
the general consensuson the substance of conservatismas an ideology. But,
in addition,they reflectthe static and limitednature of that ideology. Other
ideologieshave basic ideas which recurin various manifestations.But these
ideas are the startingpoint, not the sum and substance of the ideology. In-
dividualismis basic to liberalismbut the individualismof Locke is quite dif-
ferentfromthat of Bentham. Class conflictis basic to Marxism,but the class
strugglein Kautsky is different fromthe class strugglein Lenin. Conservatives,
however,do not subdivideinto schools,nor do they,like liberalsand Marxists,
engage in fieryargumentsover the meaning of their faith. Individual con-
servativethinkers,of course,may phrase theirideas in slightlydifferent ways
and may modifythem in the lightof theirparticularideational leanings.But
in general they simplyrepeat theircatechism,and once they have said their
catechism,theyhave said all thereis to be said ofthe substanceofconservative
thought.A historyof liberal or Marxist thoughtreveals the transmutationof
the ideologythroughdifferent times and circumstances.A historyofconserva-
tive thinkers,such as Kirk's Conservative Mind, necessarilyinvolves the rep-
etitionover and over again of the same ideas.
This peculiar character of conservativethought explains one frequently
27 F. J. C. Hearnshaw, Conservatism in England (London, 1933),
pp. 22 ff.; Kirk,
ConservativeMind, pp. 7-8; Rossiter, Conservatism in America, pp. 61-62; Mannheim,
"Conservative Thought," p. 114; Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism (London, 1937), p. 48;
William 0. Shanahan, "The Social Outlook of Prussian Conservatism," Review of Politics,
Vol. 15, pp. 222-25 (April, 1953); R. J. White (ed.), The ConservativeTradition (London,
1950), pp. 1-10.

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470 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

commentedupon aspect of conservatismcited by Mannheim: "The careers

of most conservativesand reactionariesshow revolutionaryperiods in their
youth."28Many ofthe earlynineteenthcenturyconservatives-Gorres,Gentz,
MUller in Germany; Coleridge, Wordsworth,Southey in England-were
initiallyenthusiastsforthe French Revolution. The Federalistsbegan as suc-
cessfulrevolutionaries, and America'spremierconservative,JohnC. Calhoun,
startedhis careeras a fire-eating Jeffersonian nationalist.Why does this pat-
ternexist?Is it not simplybecause conservatismis not the permanentideolog-
ical expressionof the needs of any social group?No one is bornto conservatism
in the way in whicha Mill is born to utilitarianism.The impulseto conserva-
tism comes fromthe social challengebeforethe theorist,not the intellectual
traditionbehindhim. Men are drivento conservatismby the shock of events,
by the horriblefeelingthat a societyor institutionwhichtheyhave approvedor
taken forgrantedand with which they have been intimatelyconnectedmay
suddenly cease to exist. The conservativethinkersof one age, consequently,
have littleinfluenceon those of the next. There are fewsecond generationcon-
servatives.Hooker,forinstance,anticipatedBurke in all the essentialsof con-
servativephilosophy;but Burke's conservatismwas derivednot froma study
of Hooker but fromthe impact of events about him. Similarly,in France,
"Maistre neverhad a school,so to speak." In the United States, Fitzhugh,the
apologist for the South, gained little inspirationfrom earlier conservative
thinkers.29 Each individual statementof the conservativeposition,in itself,
moreover,tends to be generated by some immediate intellectualchallenge.
ChristopherMorris describesthe Laws of EcclesiasticalPolity as a "livre de
circonstance."The same phrase could apply equally well to the Elementeder
Staatskunst,the Reflections on theRevolutionin France, and A Disquisitionon
Government.80
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF CONSERVATISM

In the light of the above analysis, what role has the conservativeideology
in Americatoday? Is the "New Conservatism"reallyconservative?Does room
28 "Conservative Thought," p. 120.
29 Murray, Review of Politics, Vol. 11, p. 86; Arnaud B. Leavelle and Thomas I. Cook,
"George Fitzhugh and the Theory of American Conservatism," Journal of Politics, Vol.
7, pp. 146-47 (May, 1945).
30 Its lack of both an intellectual tradition and a substantive ideal account for another

peculiar aspect of conservatism: the extent to which it has been ignored by political
scientists writing on political theory. In the political theory textbooks conservatism
rarely, if ever, appears, and when it does it is treated, on the whole, in a very skimpy
manner. Similarly, there are no decent histories of conservative thought. The reason for
this lies partly in the nature of conservatism and partly in the training of political scien-
tists. The latter learn to analyze historical schools of thoughts, to trace the development
of ideas, to identifythe influence of one man on another, and to search out the ideological
schisms and doctrinal divergencies in a school of thought. They are also taught to dissect
the substantive ideals of ideologies in terms of their inherent logic and consistency, the
theories of man and nature which they reflect,and the group interests which they ration-
alize and project. Lacking an intellectual tradition and a substantive ideal, conservatism

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 471

exist for a more profoundand far-reachingexpositionof conservativeideas?

Much ofthe New Conservatismis characterizedby at least threedeficiencies
as a conservativemovement.First,manyNew Conservativesappear uncertain
as to what theywish to defend.Some simplycontinuethe old identification of
conservatismwithbusinessliberalism.Othersare radical aristocrats,ill at ease
in and disgustedwith Americansocietyas it existstoday. Desiring to import
European aristocracyto bourgeoisAmerica,theydreamofan age ofless demo-
cracy,less equality, less industrialism,an age in whichthe elite ruled and the
mass knew theirplace. Their rejectionof the existingAmericanpolitical and
social systemmakes it impossibleforthem to be trulyconservative.Russell
Kirk's view of contemporaryAmerica, for instance, could hardly be more
unflattering:"near to suicide," "cheap," "materialistic," "sterile," "stand-
ardized."'1 Is this the language of a conservative?Or is it the language of a
malignerof existingsociety? Instead of a vigorousdefenseof Americancon-
stitutionaldemocracy,Kirk's books are filledwith a strained,sentimental,
nostalgic,antiquarianlongingfora societywhichis past. He and his associates
are out oftune and out ofstep in modernAmerica.
Secondly,many New Conservativesare astonishinglyvague as to the nature
and source of the threatto what they wish to conserve.Historically,conser-
vatism has always been the responseto a directand immediatechallenge.Con-
servativeshave not usually been in doubt as to the identityoftheiropponents.
Amongthe New Conservatives,however,the enemyis seldom broughtclearly
intofocus.To some,the foeis Liberalism,althoughlittleagreementexistsas to
the meaningof this term. To others,it is modernism,totalitarianism,popu-
larism, secularism,or materialism.For some New Conservativesthe enemy
is irrationalismand to othersit is rationalism.This confusion,ofcourse,merely
reflectsthe fact that the economicprosperityand politicalconsensusof Amer-
ican society make any conservatismorientedtowards domestic enemies ab-
surdlysuperfluous.Hooker, Burke, and Calhoun foughtreal political battles
against real political enemies. Lacking any flesh and blood social-political
challenge,however,the New Conservativesfashionimaginarythreats out of
abstract "isms."
A thirddeficiencyof the New Conservatismis the effortto uncover a con-
servative intellectualtraditionin America. Apparentlydesiringthe security
ofidentification withan intellectualmovement,the New Conservativesscurry
throughAmerica's past, resurrectingpolitical and intellectual figureslong
since forgotten.Few enterprisescould be more futile or irrelevant.In The
Conservative Mind, for instance, Russell Kirk definesa conservativeas one

does not lend itselfto fruitful

analysisalong theselines. Not knowingwhat questionsto
ask about conservatism or how to evaluate its significance,
politicalscientistshave tended
to ignoreit.
Mind, pp. 10, 428, and ProgramforConservatives,
31 Conservative passim.It is essential
to distinguishbetweenthosesuch as Kirk who criticizethe institutions and the theoryof
modernliberaldemocracyand those such as ReinholdNiebuhrwho limittheircritique
to the theoryof liberalismwhilepraisingthe inherentwisdomof its institutions.

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472 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

who stands by establishedinstitutions.Yet in his efforts to finda conservative

traditionin America,Kirk classifiesas conservative: James Russell Lowell,who
was "frightened"by what he saw about him; Brooks Adams, who was "dis-
gusted with American society"; Henry Adams, who has become the classic
symbol of frustratedalienation;32Irving Babbitt, who fled fromAmerica to
Buddhism; and Santayana, who fledfromAmerica to his Roman cloister.All
these men were malcontents,and in many respects they were much more
fundamentallymalcontentthan Debs, HenryGeorge,de Leon, and LaFollette,
whompresumablyKirk would neverdreamof classifyingas conservatives.The
New Conservatives'searchforforebearsmerelyreflectstheirown uncertainty
of purpose,role, and identity.They seek to conservean intellectualtradition
which does not exist ratherthan institutionswhich do exist. Were they true
conservatives,immediatelyengaged in the defenseof an institutionor society
againsta real and imminentthreat,theywould have littleinterestin establish-
ing a conservativepedigree.
The dubious side of the New Conservatism,however,does not exhaust the
possibilitiesof conservatismin America today. Some New Conservatives
recognizethe essentiallysituationalcharacterof conservativeideology. They
realize the sterilityof a conservativedefense of one segment of American
societyagainst another segment.The only threat extensiveand deep enough
to elicit a conservativeresponsetoday is the challengeof communismand the
Soviet Union to Americansociety as a whole. In this respect,as Max Beloff
has pointedout, a markedparallel existsbetweenthe positionof the South in
the 1850s and the position of the United States in the 1950s: both societies
challenged by an expanding externalorder.33Just as the South produced a
conservativedefensein Fitzhughand Calhoun,it is not unreasonableto expect
that America too will have its conservativeapologists. The more profound
recentwritingsin a conservativevein, such as those of Niebuhr,werein many
respects a direct responseto the challenge of foreigntotalitarianism.As an
island ofplentyand freedomin a straitenedworld,Americahas muchto defend.
Americaninstitutions,however,are liberal,popular, and democratic.They
can best be defendedby those who believe in liberalism,popular control,and
democraticgovernment.Just as aristocratswere the conservativesin Prussia
in 1820 and slaveownerswere the conservativesin the South in 1850, so the
liberals must be the conservativesin America today. Historically,American
liberalshave been idealists,pressingforwardtoward the goals of greaterfree-
dom, social equality, and more meaningfuldemocracy.The articulateexposi-
tion of a liberal ideologywas necessaryto convertothersto liberal ideas and
to reformexistinginstitutionscontinuouslyalong liberallines.Today, however,
the greatestneed is not so much the creationof moreliberalinstitutionsas the
successfuldefenseofthose whichalreadyexist. This defenserequiresAmerican
liberals to lay aside theirliberal ideology and to accept the values of conser-
32 But see Henry S. Kariel's reinterpretation of him, "The Limits of Social Science:

Henry Adams' Quest for Order," in this REVIEW, Vol. 50, p. 1074 (December, 1956).
33 Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 5-7.

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 CONSERVATISM AS AN IDEOLOGY 473

vatism forthe durationof the threat. Only by surrendering theirliberalideas

forthe presentcan liberalssuccessfullydefendtheirliberalinstitutionsforthe
future.Liberals should not fearthis change. Is a liberalany less liberalbecause
he adjusts his thinkingso as to defendmost effectively the mostliberalinstitu-
tionsin the world?To continueto expoundthe philosophyofliberalismsimply
gives the enemya weapon withwhichto attack the societyofliberalism.34 The
defenseof Americaninstitutionsrequiresa conscious articulateconservatism
whichcan springonly fromliberalsdeeply concernedwiththe preservationof
those institutions.As Boorstin, Niebuhr, and others have pointed out, the
Americanpolitical genius is manifestnot in our ideas but in our institutions.
The stimulus to conservatismcomes not fromthe outworncreeds of third-
rate thinkersbut fromthe successfulperformanceof first-rateinstitutions.
Currentconflictratherthan ancient dogma will yield a "New Conservatism"
whichis trulyconservative.
Conservatismis not, as the aristocraticinterpretation argues,the monopoly
of one particularclass in history.Nor is it, as the autonomousschool contends,
appropriatein everyage and place. It is, instead,relevantin a particulartype
of historicalsituation.That is the situationin whichAmericanliberalismfinds
itselftoday. Until the challengeof communismand the Soviet Union is elimi-
nated or neutralized,a major aim of Americanliberals must be to preserve
what they have created. This is a limitedgoal but a necessaryone. Conserva-
tism does not ask ultimate questions and hence does not give finalanswers.
But it does remindmen of the institutionalprerequisitesof social order.And
whenthese prerequisitesare threatened,conservatismis not only appropriate,
it is essential.In preservingthe achievementsofAmericanliberalism,American
liberals have no recoursebut to turn to conservatism.For them especially,
conservativeideologyhas a place in Americatoday.

34 A good example is the commonexperienceof the Americanin Europe who extols

the United States as the land of freedom,equality,and democracy,and then is asked:
"What about the Negro in the South?" In reply,the Americaninevitablystressesthe
magnitudeof the social problemsinvolved,the inevitabilityof gradualness,the impossi-
bilityofalteringhabitsovernightby legislativefiat,and the tensionscaused by too rapid
social change.In short,he dropsthe liberallanguageof equalityand freedomand turns
to primarilyconservativeconceptsand arguments.

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