APPLICATIONS MANUAL AM4:19T

SECURITY

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APPLICATIONS MANUAL

SECURITY
ENGINEERING

AM4:1991

R
&4

CIBSE
The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers
Delta House, 222 Balham High Road, LondonSW129BS
 The rights of publication or of translation are reserved.
No part of this publication maybe reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission of the
Institution.

@ 1991
THE CHARTERED INSTITUTION OF
BUILDING SERVICES ENGINEERS
LONDON

ISBN 0900953519

Printed in Greet Britain by Mayhew McCrimmon Printers Ltd, Great Wakering, Essex
Every year the number of crimes, including burglary and vandalism, rises. The annual Home
Office statistics testify to this. Consequently the security of a building, at all stages of its life,
will become increasingly important to its owner and occupier. It is therefore very necessary
that all designers, constructors and users understand the basics of security engineering in
order to provide the required security protection for buildings.

This Applicatimts Manual is intended as an introduction for building services engineers,

designers, architects, contractors, installers and building users to the many aspects of security
engineering both in and around buildings. It covers risk assessment, various forms of
protection and detection and general guidance on their use, as well.as the potential problems
presented by particular situations which require security measures.

The section on risk assessment contains a previously unpublished method of evaluating the
likelihood of burglary. Thh has been drafted with the co-operation of insurers, security
companies and experienced professional risk assessors and is designed to aid those involved in
commissioning security systems for buildings in assessing the necessary level of investment in
such systems.

D J Stokoe
Chairmanj Technical Publications Committee

Security Engineering Task Group

N G M Newton (Chairman)
M E Jay
P Lawson-Smith
S L Lyons
J J Peacock (Pasr Chairman)
J A Ratcliffe (Past Chairman)
C J Reid
D Utton

PubIiiations Secretary

K J Butcher

Editor

R Yarham

The voluntary input of personnel and assistance from the following organisations is gratefully acknowledged:
Association of British Insurers, Building Research Establishment, Kkldees Metropolitan Council, Metropolitan
Police Crime Prevention Service, Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd, Philips Lighting Ltd, Racal-Chubb Security
Systems Ltd, Safeguard Security Serviees.

Cover illustratiotx Upper left Security Control room (courtesy Secun”ty Industry magazine>lmruer raght Closed circuit
television camera and spotlights (courtesy Security Indusny magazine); Lower left Card reader (courtesy Sabre Access
Control Systems Ltd/.Securiry Industry magazine)
Contents

Page
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Scope
1.2 Objectives of security engineering i
1.3 Basic concepts of security engineering 1

2 Risk assessment 2
2.1 Introduction 2
2.2 Application of tables 2
2.3 Riskassessmenttables 2

3 Methods of physical protection 7

3.1 General 7
3.2 How the building plan affects security 8
3.3 Construction for protection
3.4 Security furniture for doors and windows ;
3.5 Securitylighting 12

4 Detection and alarm systems 19

4.1
4.2
4.3
General guide to detection equi ment
Protectiveswitchesfor doors an1 windows E
22
Continuous wiring to detect damage to hysical protection
4.4 Continuous wiring in tubes for doors an J’ windows 22
4.5 Knock-out bars 23
4.6 Vibration detectors 23
4.7 Breaking glass detectors 24
4.8 Beam detectors 25
4.9 Space detectors 26
4.10 Pressure mats 29
4.11 Underground pressure detectors 29
4.12 Fibre optic signallin 29
4.13 Wire-free intruder a7arm systems 29
4.14 Warning devices 30
4.15 Telephone warning devices 31
4.16 Access control 32
4.17 Closed circuit television 34
4.18 Uninterruptible power supplies 38
4.19 Alarm system control panels 38

5 Control rooms 40
5.1 General 40
5.2 Control room functions 40
5.3 Control room design 41
5.4 External considerations 43
5.5 Commercial central stations 43

6 Specialist applications 44
6.1 Retail outlets 44
6.2 Computer rooms 45
6.3 Museums and art galleries 46
Ammunition and explosives 47
:: Industrial espionage 47
6.6 Drugs storage 48
6.7 Isolated premises 48
6.8 Civil installations 49
6.9 Defence establishments 50
6.10 Financial organisations 51
6.11 Schools and colleges 52
6.12 Churches 52
7 Vandalism 53
7.1 Introduction 53
7.2 Preventativemeasures 53
7.3 Alarm systems 53

Appendices
Al Sources of advice and information 54
A2 Identification of reputable security companies 57

Bibliography 58

Index 59
 Security engineering
1 Mroductk
1.1 Scope
The objective of this Manual is to assist the reader in
— gaining an appreciation of the problems of premises
security
— influencing decisions on architectural design, building
detail and services installation relating to the secure
environment
— assessing the level of security required
. devising performance specifications for security systems
and equipment.
This document provides general information on the many
aspects of security. Section 2, on assessment of risk, provides
evaluation factors which offer guidance on the level of
security required. Section 3, on methods of physical
protection, contains advice on crime prevention through the
design of the building and premises, and descriptions of
security furniture for doors and windows. An overview of
electric releases and locks is included. Detection and alarm
systems, section 4, reviews those items of equipment in most
common use. Section 5, on control rooms, refers to both
private and commercial central stations. Section 6 summarises
aspects to be considered for certain specialist applications.
Section 7 offers advice on possible ways to combat
vandalism. Finally, sources of advice and information and a
guide to identifying reputable security companies are
included as appendices.
1.2 Objectives of securify engineering
Crime prevention should be considered at all stages of the
building design. A little forethought can prevent many
problems later on. The design should aim to minimise, in and
around the building, risks of theft, criminal damage,
vandaksm, personal attack and sabotage, both during the
construction of the building and throughout its life. Only
fully co-ordinated design can achieve the objective of a secure
environment.
In recognition of this and in order to promote greater interest
in security, the Home Offict offers, in collaboration with the
Association of Chief Police Ofilcers, a ‘Secured by Design’
award. This award is given to builders whose developments
meet required standards relating to design (landscaping,
buildlng inter-relationships, access), physical security (doors
and windows), installation of alarms, and security lighting.
In addition to the design of physical protection, it is worth
noting that a building is only secure when all personnel
follow the security procedure.
1.3 6+ concepts of security
engineering
1.3.1 Evaluating the risk
Assess all possible risks such as damage by fire, water,
vandalism, burglary, even terrorism, and the inconvenience
suffered as a result.
Section 2 sets out a method of evaluating the risk of burglary,
the principal threat encountered by the security engineer.
From this the engineer can estimate the required level of
investment in security measures,
Any evaluation must take into account the property value,
degree of effort required to perpetrate the theft, the ease of
subsequent conversion of misappropriated goods into cash,
and other factors, Consider all related aspects, For instance,
is the property easy to replace? Is it essential to the business
of the owner, displayer or keeper?
1.3.2 Physical protection
The type of physical protection is the form of fencing or
building elements (for instance walls, partitions, doors,
windows, barriers, screens, bolts, locks, safes, and so on)
which discourage and delay unauthorised entry.
1.3.3 Detection
The detection method selected should take into consideration
the assessed risk and physical protection provided. The
engineer should consider the time needed to penetrate any
physical protection and the speed of response necessary to
prevent the successful completion of the criminal act. A
detection system must deter. If it also helps to apprehend the
criminal then this may be a bonus but not the prime
objective.
1.3.4 Alarms
The individual circumstances will dictate the choice of alarm
device and operational arrangement, whether manual,
automatic, audible, visual, local, remote, broadcast or
discrete. The alarm should disturb the perpetrator andlor
inform the personnel responsible for security (such as the
police or a private security service) that an unauthorised act is
either imminent or taking place.
1.3.5 Response
The response to an alarm is the action to be taken by the
persomel responsible for security, If apprehension of the
intruder(s) is important, the alarm must be undetected by
any intruder, and an organised response must be made as
quickly as possible.
1.3.6 Maintenance and reviaw
Frequent testing and competent maintenance minimise the
possibility of system failure. Periodic reviews are necessary to
determine the changes, if any, to the building’s structure,
usage, personnel, or to the items being protected. Such
changes may have significantly altered the original concepts
of protection and risk evaluation. Maintenance and review
must be undertaken on a regular basis to meet the
requirements of British Standards.
1
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
2 Risk assessment
2.1 Introduction
One of the most difficult tasks when considering a security
system is determining the broad magnitude of the threat and
the extent of measures and financial investment appropriate
to the circumstances. Insurers wishing to limit their risk,
suppliers and manpower agencies looking for market
opportunities, and contractors keen upon installation and
maintenance business naturally emphasise the benefits of
protection and detection.
If financial resources are to be allocated to security measures
then a rational and analytical examination of the aspects
influencing the threat must be undertaken. The principal
threat concerning the security engineer is burglary. Unfortu-
nately, burglary and theft are frequently perpetrated in an
apparently random reamer so any guidelines can only
provide a crude method for evaluation. However, even a
crude method of analysis is better than making a completely
uninformed decision.
Those responsible for evaluating the necessary security
measures should:
kidnap of employees, extortion or terrorism. Neither can
they be applied to the risk of theft by staff or other persons
inside the building.
Local circumstances or other factors not listed in the tables
must take precedence when applying the factors, As the
occupier’s use of a building and its conilguration will differ in
each case, the tables can only address the most common
aspects influencing risk.
It is the responsibility of the risk assessor to take into account
all relevant aspects, and this may require the assessor to
generate further tables to allow for new factors.
Those involved in the recommendations for levels of security
and the techniques employed can be held accountable for
their actions. With this in mind the co-operation and advice
of insurance surveyors, the client’s insurers and local police
Crime Prevention Offkers should be sought in the application
and adjustment of these factors.
Where the calculations for a building with security measures
still produce a high or very high level of risk then an
experienced security surveyor should always be commissioned
to determine which aspects of the protection andior
deterrence should be improved.

— study the building in consultation with the occupier to

ascertain the intended uses for the building
2.3 Risk assessment tables
— undertake a survey of the building, taking into account
the immediately adjacent properties and surroundings 2.3.1 Buiidmg location and surroundings:
— address the individual elements listed in Tables 2.1-2.7 Tabie 2.1
together with any other relevant details.
Table 21 Building location and surroundings
Using Table 2.8 a general assessment can then be made
regarding the level of the risk of burglary and the security Circumstances nffecring risk Factor
measures required to reduce that risk. Examples of risk
assessment using the tables are illustrated in section 2.3.9, Gmeral location of building
Remote isolated premises 0.75
Village 1.0
The decision to protect against burglary should consider the
Rural community 1.5
statistical evaluation of the likelihood of burglary together small town 2.0
with the consequences of any loss. The consequence of loss Edge of large town or city 5.0
does not relate exclusively to the financial value of the loss. Irmer city 6.0
Many other factors are involved, and their level of
importance will only become evident during detailed Character of neighborhood
consultation with the building occupier. In some instances Well appointed 0.5
the level of risk could be of much less importance than the Average 1.0
‘peace of mind’ given to the occupier by a security system. Run-down 2.0

Level o-foccupation oj a~acent prmises

during risk ~riods
Fully occupied -0.5
2.2 Application of tables Partially occupied I .0
Unoccupied 2.0
The principal categories influencing the risk of burglary have
View offered to passers-by
been formulated into tables. They have been graded All elevations open to full view -1,0
numerically according to the level of risk in each category. Vulnerable elevations open to full view -0.5
Negative numbers indicate factors which aid security One or more vulnerable elevations obscured 1.0
measures. from view
Distant view or few passers-by 1.5
When all aspects have been taken into account the total value Building fully obscured from view 2.0
is then applied to the final table which recommends the
required level of protection. The higher the value, the greater Level of l~hting pmoi&d
is the perceived risk from burglary. Building and adjacent areas well lit -1.0
Building well lit but adjacent areas 0.5
poorly lit
The tables are not applicable to situations of recognised high Building and adjacent areas poorly lit 1.5
risk (e.g. banks, military establishments) or to the risk of
2
 .——. .. — — —

SECURITY ENGINEERING

General location of building risk. Locations where goods are stored in a finished state, for
instance, are at greater risk than those where the goods stored
The statistical incidence of crime is related to the size of town are components. However, account must be taken of the
or city. Criminals feel more likely to be recognised as scrap value of materials stored,
strangers in a small community and are therefore less likely to
attempt suspicious activity. Disposability of building contents

Character of neighborhood A thief needs to convert the goods into cash quickly, and the
disposability of items depends on whether there is a ready
Generally, a greater incidence of crime occurs in run-down market for them. For instance, alcohol, cigarettes, or
or inner city areas. domestic electrical goods are easily saleable and very difficult
to trace individually. Such items are therefore more
Occupation of adjacent premises during risk periods attractive to a thief and at greater risk.

This table takes into account the relationship between the Transpotiability of building contents
high risk hours when a building is unoccupied and whether
neighboring buildings are occupied during that time. The size, weight and location of goods may make them
attractive to potential burglars. The need for lifting
Kew offered to passers-by equipment, teams of assistants and commercial vehicles
decreases the risk of burglary, whereas easily transportable,
Criminals prefer to be hidden from general view when high value goods are at greater risk.
undertaking unauthorised aetivit y. The table takes account Table 2.2 Building access and structural strength
of the frequency of passers-by.
Circumstances affecting risk Factor
Level of lighting provided Ease of access and movement
Difficult -1.0
Criminals prefer to undertake unauthorised activity under Moderately difilculr o
the cover of darkness. The provision of night-time illumination Easy 2.0
has been proven to have a direct influenee in reducing crime. Type of building structure
The table recognises that the source of illumination could be Stone, brick or concrete 0.5
the building itself, adjacent premises or public street T]mbm or lightweight 1.0
lighting. Mobile or temporary 1.5
None (e.g. open yard) 2.0

2.3.2 ~ahM$2~2wess and structural strength: Type oj door and windoru frames
Strong metal 0.5
Hardwood 1.0
Softwood or aluminium 1.5
Ease of access and movement Plastic 2.0
Quality of door and windowsecun”tyfiuings
The speed of entry to the building and removal of goods is
Strong, high quality -1.0
related to the convenience of outside access to the building. Average, economy or domestic quality o
The table can be applied to pedestrian or vehicular access Average, standard quality 1.5
depending on what is required to remove the goods at risk, Weak, economy or low quality 2.0
The table takes into account the ease with which the goods
can be moved out of the building. Table 2.3 Building contents
Type of building structure Circumstances afFectingrisk Factor

Value of buila%sgconsmts
The structural strength of the building can influence the Low perceived value 0.5
susceptibility to attack. Low value (e.g. cheap raw materials and 1.0
finished goods, petty cash etc.)
Type of door and window frames Good resale value (e.g. cash, alcohol, 1.5
electrical goods etc.)
The physical strength of the door and window frames High value (e.g. drugs) 2.0
influences the ease of forced entry. Disposability of building conrenn
Very limited market 0.1
Quality of door and window security fittings Limited market 0,5
Saleable given rime 1.0
The quality and strength of the door and window security Eady and quickly saleable 2.0
fittings (catches and locks) directly affeet the ease of forced Currency is main item being protected 3.0
entry. Transportability of contents
Difficult to handle; mechanical lifting -1.0
equipment needed
2.3.3 Building contentst Table 2.3 Team of people and heavy transport needed -0.5
Long time to load and medium-sized 0
transport needed
Value of building contents
Easy to handle but light transport needed 1.0
Carsbe carried by one person 2.0
The value of a building’s contents directly affects the level of

3
 — .— .. ———- .—— ——-— -—- —

CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL

2.3.4 Occupational pattern: Table 2.4 high influx of visitors occur, such as in a hospital, then
control becomes almost impossible and the risks multiply.
Hours of occupation

Burglary generally takes place while buildings are unoccupied: 2.3.6 History of loss: Table 2.6
during the day for domestic dwellings or during the night for
industrial or commercial premises. The risk of burglary is far Level of previous loss for building
less when the building is continuously occupied than it is
when the building is left unattended for long periods. The Insurance premiums generally take into account the loss
risk increases if the thief can identify the periods when the history of a building. A history of break-ins or loss, if no
building is unoccupied and plan accordingly. remedial measures have been taken, indicates that further
incidents are probable.
Numbers and level of supervision of visitors
Level of previous loss for occupier
The integrity of visitors to a building cannot always be
guaranteed. The table assesses the risk according to the Some companies may be more susceptible to loss than others.
numbers of visitors and the level of supervision. Where a This will need investigation into attitudes to security, public
image and so on.
Table 2.4 Occupational pattern
Circumstances affecting risk Factor Table 2.6 History of loss
Hours of occupation Circumstances affecting risk Factor
Permanent occupation -1.5
Level of previous loss for building
Short periods of no occupation -0.5
Low 0.5
Irregular, lengthy periods of no 1.5
Medium 1.0
occupation
High 2.0
Regular, dehed periods of no occupation 1.75
Long, defined periods of no occupation 2.0 Le-uel of prsvious loss for occupier
Low 0.5
Numbers and level of supervision of visitors
Medium 1.0
Supervised, with access control -1.0
High 2.0
installed
Few, unsupewised o
Significant number, unsuWrvised I.0
Many, unsupervised 1.5
2.3.7 Existing security measures: Table 2.7

2.3.5 Consequences of Iosst Table 2.5 Level of intruder alarm provision

Sensitivity of loss
Consideration needs to be given to the political consequence
of loss. For instance, a security company would be ridiculed
if its own premises were burgled, In such cases, protection
becomes essential irrespective of the financial value of the
building’s contents. The table also takes account of cotildential
information, the loss of which would be damaging.
The existence of intruder alarms will not prevent unauthorised
activity but will discourage and hopefully reduce the incident
level. The more comprehensive the system, the greater is the
probability of detecting and preventing burglary.
Tetble2.7 Existing security measures
Circumstances affecting risk Factor

Inconvenience of loss Level ojiniruder alarm provision

Extensive, including access control -2.0
Extensive -1.0
The table accounts for the ‘importance’ value of the property Basic 0
to the owner or occupier of the building. For example, an None 2.0
item of relatively small financial value may so be important to
the operation of an organisation that its loss would result in Level of security guard prorision
losses of revenue. 24-hour attendance -2.0
Daytime attendance and part-time night -1.5
patrol
Table 2.5 Consequences
of loss
Daytime attendance at aUentrances 4.5
C]rcummasscesaffecting risk Factor Limited attendance ar entrances 0.5
None 2.0
.&rssitivriy of [0s3
Level ofCCTV prouisiors and observation
Low 0.5
AUexternal elevations and entrances with -1.5
Medium 1.0
full-time observer
High 2.0
All external elevations and entrances with -1.0
Unacceptable 4.0
part-rime observer
Inconvenienceof 10ss Strategic elevations and entrances with full- -0.5
Low 0.5 time observer
Medium 1.0 Strategic elevations and entrances wirh part- 0.5
High 2.0 time observer
Criricat 4.0 None 2.0

4
 SECURITY ENGINEERING

Level of secunly guard provkion Table 2.9 Risk calculation Example 1

Circumstances affecting risk Factor
‘IIte numbers and operational arrangements of security
guards discourage unauthorised activity. The factors listed Building locarion and surroundings
General location of building 1.5
refer to the hours of occupation of the security guards,
Charaerer of neighborhood 0.5
However, the guards’ deployment, training and motivation -0.5
Level of occupation of adjacent premises
must also be considered. durrng risk periods
View offered to passers-by 1.0
Level of closed circuit television provision and Level of lighting provided 0
obsemation
Building access and srrucntraf strength
Ease of access and movernem 2.0
Closed circuit television (CCTV) will not prevent crime, but Type of building strucrure 0.5
should act as a deterrent. The use of videotape for recognition Type of door and window frames 1.5
is only effective when the criminal is known to the occupier or Quality of door and window security -1.0
the police. fittings
Building contents
2.3.8 ~~m2~ded level d prete--on: Value of building contents 1.0
● Disposability of building conrents 1.0
Transportability of building contents 1.0
It is well recognised by specialists in risk analysis that Occuparibnalpattern
security is probably the most diftlcult risk to assess because of Hours of occupation 1.5
the large number of unquantifiable factors involved. The Number and level of supervision of 0
recommendations in Table 2.8 are therefore only indicative visitors
and not authoritative. Care must always be exercised in their Consequencesof loss
application. Sensitivity of loss 0.5
Inconvenience of loss 1.0
Table 2.8 Recommended level of protection History Of 10SS

TotaI Level of risk Recommended level of Level of previous loss for building 0.5
factor protection Level of previous loss for occupier 0.5
Existing secun”ry measures
Below 14 Very low No special measures
Level of intruder alsrrrnprovision 2.0
14-19 Low Physical measures
Level of provision of security guards 2.0
19-23 Average Physiesl and limited
Level of CCTVprovision and observation 2.0
electronic measures
23-27 High Physical and medium Total risk factor 18.5
electronic measures+
Above 27 Very high Physical and extensive
electronic measures$

+ Insurance surveyor’s report recommended

$ Insurance surveyor’s report essemid

2.3.9 Examples d risk calculaiien

2.3.9.1 Example 1: Table 2.9

Property description A corner grocer’s shop in a small

village in South Yorkshire, of brick construction, with
softwood windows and doors, and security fittings. Staff live
at the rear of the shop. There is adjacent street lighting and
the rear of the building is not overlooked by other buildings.
There have been no previous losses from burglary, and there
are no deterrent measures installed. The items being
protected are low value consumer goods.

Recommendations: Refernng to Table 2.8, the total value of

18.5 amounts to a low level of risk so further physical
measures are required. As this is a borderline case, it would
be prudent to advise the owner/occupier also to provide a
basic level of electronic measures.

5
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL

2.3.9.2 Example 2: Table 2.10 2.3.9.3 Example 3: Table 2. ? 7

Property description: A builders’ merchant offke and store
rooms in Dorset, on a main road corner site, open to view.
Doors and windows are hardwood, with standard security
fittings. There are no electronic systems installed. Items
being protected are worth about ~8 000.
Recommendations: Referring to Table 2.8, the total vahe of
19.0 amounts to an average level of risk so further physical
measures and electronic measures are recommended.
Property description: An offke in the City of London, with
metal window and door frames and strong security fittings.
24-hour security gwuds and access control are provided, as
are CCTVsurveillance of all entrances and intruder alarms
(monitored continuously). The main contents of the building
are desk-top computers containing vital information.
Recommendations: Referring to Table 2.8, the existing
security measures have reduced the risk from high to very
low. No further measures are required.

Table 2.10 Riskcalculation: Example 2 Table 2.11 Risk calculatiorx Example 3

Circumstances affecting risk Factor Ckcumstances affecting risk Factor

Building locationandsurroundings Building location and surroundings

General location of building 2.0 General location of building 6.0
Character of neighborhood 0.5 Character of neighborhood 0.5
Level of occupsstion of adjacent premises 2.0 Level of occupation of adjacent premises 2.0
during risk periods duringrisk periods
View offered to passers-by -1.0 View offered to passers-by 1.0
Level of fighting provided -1.0 Level of lighting provided 0.5
Building access and structural strength Building access and strucuuaf strength
Ease of access and movement 2.0 Ease of access and movement o
Type of building stsucturc 2.0 Type of building structure 0.5
Type of door and window frames 1.0 Type of door and window frames 0.5
Quality of door and window security 1.5 Quality of door and window security -1.0
fittings fittings
Building cements Buila%g contents
Value of building contents 0.5 Value of building contents 1.0
Disposability of building contents 0.5 Disposability of building contents 0.5
Transportability of building contents -1.0 Translatability of building contents 1.0
Cb3spatianal patkms Occupational patzerrt
Hours of occupation 2.0 Hours of occupation -1.5
Number and level of supervision of o Number and level of supervision of -1.0
visitors visitors
Consequences
of {0ss Consequences of 10ss
Sensitivity of 10ss 0.5 Sensitivity of loss 1.0
Inconvenience of loss 0.5 Inconvenience of loss 4,0
Hirmry Oj tOSS Hisro~ of loss
Level of previous loss for building 0.5 Level of previous loss for building 0.5
Level of previous loss for occupier 0.5 Level of previous loss for occupier 0.5
Existing sem”ty measures Existing securisy measures
Level of intruder akm prevision 2.0 Level of intruder alarm provision -2.0
Level of provision of security guards 2.0 Level of provision of aeeurity guards -2.0
Level of CCTVprovision and observation 2.0 Level of CCTVprovision and observation -1.5

Total risk factor 19.0 Total risk factor 10.5

6
 SECURITY ENGINEERING

Before approaching the problems of designing security

3 Methods of physical
systems, it is important to understand the nature of the crime
projection and the criminal. Government statistics (available from
HMSO) provide an indication of trends in how much time
k committed and by whom. Figures 3.1-3.3 are based on
3.1 General statistics published in 1989(1).However, as illustrated by the
1988 British Crime Survey(z), the statistics only record
reported crime.
This section outlines various types of equipment and methods
for protecting premises. Any investment in physical protection Figure 3.1 provides an overall perspective, showing that
should relate to the evaluation of the risk and consequences of burglary amounts to about 22% of total crime. It is worth
loss, as indicated in section 2. noting that this percentage has altered by only *5% in the last

Vblenee SwWl Robbety Buqkq Burgla~ in a building

against the affences 0.8% in a other than a dwelling Figure 3.1 Reported crime by
0.7% dwelling 10.1% category, England and Watts 1988’‘)
Theftof
4.3% 11.w~ rmni.1

\
Criminal
darnqx valued Theftfrom
f20.00 and under vehicles
4.5% 16.7%

:F’di//Y\
Criminal

3
v’
Theft

shops
Freud and 5.8%
*
Theft or unauthorised
takingof
other theft motor
and handling vehicles
stolen goods 9.9%
16.7%
Aged
*
14-17 14-17

Aged
10-1
9%

Ad Aged
over 21 m 21
36% 47%
Figure 3.2 Offendersin burglary category by sge group, England snd Figure 3.3 Offendersin theft snd stolen goods category by age group,
wales 1988’‘) England and Wales 19881”

7
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
six years. Although burglary is the main crime the security
engineer has to consider, threats may also include criminal
damage (iicluding vandalism), fraud and violence against the
person.
Figure 3.2 shows that, of offenders in the burglary category, 2
out of 3 are under 21 and 1 out of 3 are under 17. In addition
to this the statistics indicate that only 1 out of 25 are female.
From Figure 3.3 it can be seen that, of offenders in the theft
and handling stolen goods category, 3 out of 5 are under21.
Overall, therefore, property crimes are often committed by
adolescents, particularly young men. Generally, such crime
is neither carried out by professionals nor carefully planned.
Property crimes thrive on the easy opportunity.
Simple measures to prevent opportunity go a long way to
prevent crime. Making unauthorised entry as diff3cult and as
time-consuming as possible deters intruders as it increases
their chances of being caught. This principle provides the
basis for physical protection. For example, it takes a few
seconds to remove an article from an unguarded room with
an open door, whilst the simple measure of closing and
locking the door extends the seconds to several minutes, thus
discouraging the opportunist crime. Furthermore, a robust
door in a secure frame, fitted with security-grade locks and
hinges further discourages a potential criminal.
3.2 How the building plan affects
security
Careful design of rhe architectural structure is vital in
restricting unauthorised entry. No part of the building
should offer. an intruder the chance to operate unseen.
To this end, external doors or windows should be in fuIl view
of passers-by or security guards. Protrusions from the
building should be limited, and any potential routes of entry
or escape (such as corridors or alleys) should be as straight
and open as possible. Densely planted trees and shrubs
should be avoided in front of external elevations as they mask
any activity.
Any design must meet the conflicting requirements of the
fue officer (for ease of escape) and the security officer (for
restricted access or exit). (lmsideration should be given to
surveillance of fire doors and escape routes leading to points
of assembly where personnel can be checked.
Interior layouts should be planned to group together secure
areas and therefore offer greater efllciency in the allocation of
resources. Security arrangements should not impede permitted
circulation as this could lead to the by-passing of security
routines.
Modification work on existing buildings presents the
possibility of unauthorised entry by people posing as
contractors. Builders’ scaffolding or ladders also present
intruders with opportunities for access.
The execution of new works must take account of existing
security practice. Also, the person responsible for security
must check that the revised building configuration does not
compromise or undermine any alarm systems already in
place, and must authorise changes or additions to maintain
integrity.
8
MANUAL
3.3 Censtruchn fer protection
3.3.1 WaUs
A wall’s construction determines how effectively it restricts
forced entry. Standard glass is the easiest to penetrate, and
resistance increases through the range: hardboard on
studding, brickwork, engineering brickwork, to reinforced
concrete. A vault-standard wall comprises high-density
reinforced concrete with additional security reinforcement to
impede penetration.
Ideally, the whole exterior of the protected premises should
have equal resistance to penetration. Internal partitioning
should be anchored to floors and ceilings. Any reinforcement
must be continuous throughout.
On the outside, window sills should be narrow and slope
steeply to discourage climbing. Wherever possible soil, vent
and rain-water pipes should be contained in ducts within the
structure.
3.3.2 Floors, ceiings and rods
Floors, ceilings and roofs must be as resistant to penetration
as the walls. Plasterboard ceilings offer little resistance and
tiled roofs are particularly vulnerable. Single-storey, flat
roofs and skylights also provide opportunities for easy,
unauthorised access. Secure areas over underground car
parks need special consideration as a person might be able to
gain entry by drilling through the floor from the top of a
parked vehicle. Underground car parks are also particularly
vulnerable to bomb attack. Plant rooms above or below
secure rooms and adjacent service ducts offer possible routes
for undetected, forced entry,
3.3.3 Doors
Doors have ratings for fire resistance, and generally the
higher the door’s rating the greater its resistance to forced
penetration. The door and frame should have the same level
of structural strength, as should locks, hinges and fixings,
Service cabling to alarm points should be carefi.dly planned
so that installation does not weaken the door or frame.
Hollow steel frames with built-in connection boxes and
tamper switches often overcome the problem.
3.3*4 Gldng
The provision of glazing can range from one-way mirrors for
hidden observation to anti-bandit laminated glass. Security
glazing and methods of mounting are covered by British
Standards[ 3’4’s)
which identify two categories of glazing: anti-
bandit which resists shattering by hammer attack; and bullet-
resistant, which is graded according to its resistance to
different types of fwearm at various distances. The glazing
bars must have the same resistance to attack as the glass,
counter-top and any in-fill below.
One of the dangers of attacks by ballistic missiles is that the
inside layer of the laminate shards and causes sharp splinters
of glass to endanger the people the screen should protect.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING

Some laminated panes offer greater bullet and impact — It is lightweight.

resistance by incorporating air gaps between the layers. Also,
— It can be shaped into curved forms.
films are available which reduce sharding to a minimum but
they are soft and invariably scratch during use or cleaning.
Disadvantage:
Laminated glass screens and windows are very heavy, — It is susceptible to blow-torch attack.
inflicting strain on the supporting structure. Laminated
plastic screens, which meet the same British Standards in 3.3.4.6 Laminated annealed glass
terms of resistance to attack, overcome this weight problem.
However, a blow-torch can easily penetrate them. Advantage:
— It is highly resistant to impact.
Listed below are the various specific available options for
@z~ and their corresponding advantages and disadvantages. Disadvantage:
The performance of the glazing in individual cases depends
on the pane thickness, overall size and installed support — It is very heavy, requiring structural support and limiting
arrangements. the size of pane.

3.3.4.1 Annealed (floaf) glass 3.3.4,7 Laminated acrylic and toughened glass

Advantages: Advantages:
— The glass breaks with sharp edges which hamper — This type of glazing is highly resistant to impact or
intruders. breakage.
— The noise of shattering can deter intruders. — It limits flying fragments.

Disadvantage: 3.3.4.8 Laminated polycarbonate, actylic and

toughened glass
— Intruders prefer to force the window frame rather than
break the glass. Advantage

3.3.4.2 Wed glass — This is used in high-risk situations, and combines the
advantages of the separate types of glazing.
Disadvantage:
— Designed for reasons of safety, this cannot be considered
3.3.5 Air conditioning
as a security barrier as once the glass is broken the
exposed wires can be pulled apart to enlarge the hole. All air conditioning and ventilation systems must reflect in
their construction the level of securit y of the areas they serve,
3.3.4.3 Toughened (tempered) glass: and should not offer a route of entry, Internal compartmentation
of the ventilation ducting prohibits a person crawling
Disadvantages: through. Standard air control louvres can be reinforced by
— Again, designed for the purposes of safety rather than rear bracing securely f~ed to the structure. The grill
security, this glass breaks into small pieces. construction should delay attack by a hacksaw or flame
cutting tool. The minimum distance between parallel
— It is resilient only to blunt objects. security bars through which a person can pass is 150 mm.
3.3.4.4 Double glazing
3.3.6 Shuwers
Advantage:
— This acts as a deterrent in a similar manner to Shutters offer a cheap option where protection is only
permanently sealed windows. required at the end of the working day or trading period.
Shutters are static devices with physical locking which often
3.3.4.5 Acrylic offer greater resistance to attack than that provided by
upgrading doors or windows. They have the disadvantage
Advantages: that once penetrated they mask the activities of the intruder
within, so consideration should be given to providing
— It is highly resistant to impact. associated intruder alarm systems, Shutters which affect the
— It is lightweight. outward appearance of the building may require local
authority planning consent.
— It shatters safely.

Disadvantage:
— It is susceptible to blow-torch attack.

3.3.4.6 Polycarbonate
3.4.1 General
Advantages:
Security furniture for doors and windows comprises bolts,
— It is highly resistant to impact. hinges and locks. So as not to undermine resistance to attack,
9
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
all such fittings must be equally strong. A door closure
mechanism is essential, as it ensures that the door always
pulls to after behg opened, keeping the entrance secure at all
times.
Locks vary in grades of strength and complexity of defence
against unauthorised opening. From the outset of the
planning, the grades of security locks for the various levels in
the ‘master’ key suite must be taken into account. These
access levels must reconcile the requirements of the security
department, maintenance department and the cleaners with
the needs of the individual key holders. Essentially, the fewer
keys involved, the greater the building’s security. Remember
to replace locks after the construction of a new building
during the hand-over stage, as recommended by BS 8220~
Part 3(6).
The more sophisticated and higher grades of access control
tend to employ electronic systems controlling electromagnetic
locks or strikes. These are described in sections 3.4.6 and
3.4.7. Access control systems are covered in section 4.16.
3.4a Bolts
Bolts are manufactured in a variety of forms to suit different
applications. Where the bolt slides into a hole in the door or
window frame the strength of the frame must not be
weakened. To strengthen a wooden frame, metal reinforcing
can be applied using ftings through the frame, or at right
angles to the direction of the opening force. Bolts should be a
good fit to limit the penetration of any jemmy device behind
the stops.
The normal fastening devices on windows can be enhanced
with a bolt which resists forced entry. The conflicting
requirements of secure closure and free opening for
ventilation must be recognised.
Bolts can be incorporated into monitored systems to signal
whether openings are secured or not, When fitting such
contacts it is essential to arrange the switches so that an
intruder cannot wedge them together, when the window is
open, to give a false indication of the bolt being in the closed
position.
3.4.3 Hinges
Hinges for security applications need to be strong and
require anon-removable pin, generally of hardened steel so it
cannot easily be drawn out or cut through with a hacksaw.
Some security hinges are used to convey signal currents. This
is done in two ways: by spring-loaded contacts in each leaf of
the hinge so that when the door or window is closed the
circuits complete; or using a ‘wire-through’ hinge, in which
conductors enter one leaf, pass through the pin and come out
of the other leaf and are therefore completely unseen. Spring
contacts can be tampered with whenever the door or window
is open, therefore ensure that any interference with them
would either activate the alarm or prevent the hinge closing.
The ‘wire-through’ type of hinge is less easily circumvented.
Where these hinges are used on a number of doors and/or
windows their position should be randomly chosen.
10
MANUAL
3.4.4 Locks
Discussion of this subject is limited to those locks which are
designed for the protection of premises: key locks and
combination locks. Before considering these types in detail, it
must be stressed that the security of any locking system.
relates directly to the care of keys, or, in the case of a keyless
combination lock, to the secrecy of the operating numbers.
However good a lock is, it will respond to the right key or the
right numbers, but it does not have the ability to decide
whether the person using the key or numbers is entitled to do
so. It is essential therefore that the authorised keyholders
take care of their keys.
3.4.4.7 Key locks
A key lock consists of two major parts. The first consists of
the bolt which actually keeps the door shut and the key which
provides the motive power to move the bolt so that the door
may be opened. The second part of the lock is the selection
mechanism, here the key has to satisfy certain criteria to
prove it is the right key before it can move the bolt. There arc
several types of selection mechanism
— Ward~ These are f=ed, shaped obstructions in the box of
the lock over which the key can only pass if it is cut to a
corresponding shape.
— Pins: The pin tumbler lock has a central cylinder which
revolves to operate the bolt. The key has to move pins,
which inhibit its movement, out of the way in order to
turn the cylinder. A lock which requires key action to
move the bolt is termed ‘deadlock’. The bolt is general] y
spring-loaded (of ‘latch’ type) which enables key operation
from one side and ‘handle override’ from the opposite
side. The spring permits door closure when the bolt is
extended. The basic forms of this type of lock are not
suitable for security applications. However, a ‘double
lock’ action offers more security as it prevents ‘handle
override’ when the lock is in the advanced position.
— Levers: The lever lock. which is extensively used in hizh
. .
security locks like safe locks, consists of a number of
pivoted pieces of metal which have to be moved by an
appropriately shaped key to predetermined positions
before the bolt is free to be moved by the key. This type of
mechanism is found in many variations, using detainers,
discs or sliders.
The term ‘differing’ is used to indicate the number of
possible selection mechanisms which can be provided by a
manufacturer from a single basic design before having to
repeat the selector criteria. With certain lock types this
number may be as low as 1000. However, with high securit y
locks incorporating pin or disc mechanisms the number can
exceed 1000000, or 25000 with detainer mechanisms.
However, a large number of differences does not necessarily
produce better security. The resistance to ‘picking’, the
creation of ‘masters’ and the physical strength of the Jock and
key are also of great importance.
The requirements for key locks must take account of the
nature of possible attack. Methods of attack may take the
following forms.
— Forcing: For locks that mortice into the woodwork of the
door it is recommended that the door must be at least 45
mm thick for effective morticing, For rim locks particular
consideration must be given to the method of fixing the
striking plate to the door frame.

SECURITY ENGINEERING
— Forcing with a jemmy: This is countered by having a box
striking plate mounted into the door frame to enclose the
protruding bolt.
— Using a hacksaw: The bolt of a lock can sometimes be
seen through glass doors which often do not have rebates.
It is therefore vulnerable to a padsaw. However, if the
bolt is equipped with hardened steel rollers which are free
to revolve, this type of attack is defeated.
— Drilling: The British Standard lock specification’-’ calls
for protection against a hand drill for five minutes, but
most locks could be completely removed from the door
structure with a brace and bit m considerably less time
than this. The only counter to this type of attack is to
strengthen the door.
— Lockpicking: This is not a common form of attack on
modem locks, but better quality locks contain anti-
picking devices.
— Trviruz various tvDes of kev: Select a lock which has
re&o~able differi~g, in addifion to all the qualities listed
above.
Spare keys for securiry locks
Most safemakers exercise the strictest control on spare keys
for safes and will cut spares only on receipt of adequate
authority. With door locks, however, duplicate keys are
generally easily obtainable.
Masrering
A lock can be opened only by its individual ‘change’ key. This
lock could also be opened, with other locks, by a ‘master’ key.
This principle cars be usedto control access to different parts
of a building. Theoretically, mastering can reduce the level of
security as it may introduce several keys which can open any
one lock. Keys to high security areas, therefore, should not be
included in the master suite.
Three forms of mastering are listed below. Figure 3.4 shows
the hierarchy of a simple grandmaster key suite.
Geneml or
T
Gmndmastar
security kay
manager
I 1 i
--- L---
I I
Junior
staff
Changa key
L_!
II~
Change key
H~
Change key
Figure 3A Hierarchy of a simple grandmaswr key suite
— A one level or change key suite: All locks are operated
individually by a change key only and are keyed
differently or alike as required. Applications include
homes or shops.
— A two level or master key suite: All locks are operated
individually by change keys and by a single master key.
Applications include small schools and hotels.
— A three level or mmdmaster kev suite: All locks are
operated individually by change keys. Selected locks can
—
then be grouped and operated by master keys. The grand
master key will then operate all locks within any group.
Applications include office blocks and large schools.
The complexity and number of levels can increase according
to the situation. However, the security of the keys themselves
is of utmost importance to maintain the integrity of the
overaIl system. To this end it must be impossible to convert
an ordinary key into any master key. This can be assisted by
ensuring that the master key design always contains more
metal than any of the individual change keys.
3.4.4.2 Combination locks
Combination locks designed for secur~~ applications are
usually operated by three or four two-dlgn numbers, giving
up to 100000000 possible combinations, and have a bolt
which is withdrawn when the correct numbers have been
dialled. The lock can normally be set to respond to the
owner’s own numbers. This lock is particularly suitable for
safes and strongroom doors, since its-number c~n be changed
easily when, for example, staff leave or go on holiday, or when
it is suspected that’ some unauthorised person has gained
access to the number.
The development of keyless combination locks is directed
towards ‘manipulation resistance’. Although such manipulation
is possible, it is by no means as simple and rapid an operation
as maybe supposed. Lock manipulation is normally so time-
consuming as to be a highly improbable form of attack.
Nevertheless, there are various wraysof achieving a higher
level of manipulation resistance. These include keeping the
bolt drawing mechanism clear of the driving wheels until
they are in their final position, thereby destroying any sense
of ‘feel’ between the bolt and the dial,
Ultimately the security of the combination lock system relies
on the secrecy of the combination.
3.4s Monitoring lacks
In order to monitor the operation or position of a lock,
microswitches or reed switches have to be fitted to the
ltilng mechanism. Care must be taken in their location to
ensure that the required signal is being given. For example,
to monitor for the use of the lock, a switch can be triggered by
the bolt. To signal authorised operation with a key, the
movement of the key barrel must be monitored. Also, to
ensure that the lock is fully home when the door is closed, a
switch is needed in the strike, i.e. the part of the locking
f system into which the bolt or latch enters. Wiring to the lock,
either for monitoring or for operational purposes, threads
I
through the middle of the door to a conductor hinge, or an
external loop, fitted in the frame of the doorway or window.
3.4.6 Eloctrkally opemtd reloasos
The electrically operated release or strike is the most
common form of electrical control for door lock override.
The release is installed in the door frame to permit the
opening of the door wi~h the lock retained in the closed
position. There are two basic models, one for use in
conjunction with mortice latches and one for rim locks, with a
varietv of f~injt otxions to suit the t)articular mounting
arrangement. O; f~ilure of the electric-d supply the releas~
11
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
can fail in the locked position for security or, as in the
instance of fire exit routes, fail in the unlocked position.
Manual overrides are available for fitting to the secure side of
the door.
Electric releases are generally easy to install with wiring
contained in the door post. Standard units can have weak
pivot action. The better qualky devices generally have a
lower voltage and current format, and are relatively stronger
and more reliable than the cheaper versions. Heavy duty
specialised releases are available for use with deadbolt locks
and situations applicable to higher security applications.
Care must be taken to ensure that flush f~ing of the release
does not reduce the overall frame strength. Anti-thrust plates
protect the strike on outward opening door installations.
Manufacturers’ fitting tolerances between door and frame
must be met to ensure satisfactory operation. Note that
electric releases are not currently available for swing-through
doors.
When specifying electric releases it is necessary to identify
the construction of the door and frame and whether the lock
is on the left or right hand side of the door; the door is inward
or outward opening; AC or DC power supply is used; 12 V or
24 V operation is required.
3.4.7 ElectTk Iecke
3.4.7.1 Semi-active
Available in a type that fails in the locked position, or for fire
exits a type that fails in the unlocked position, these use
electricity to unlock a deadlatch or engage a handle to permit
manual withdrawal of the bolt.
Advantages:
— These locks are small.
— They have a low level of power consumption.
— They are silent in operation.
Disadvantages:
— They require an electrical cable lii to the door.
— Accurate installation is necessary to ensure correct
alignment.
— They are vulnerable to forcing as with mechanical locks.
3.4.7.2 Active
Active locks are available in types which fail locked or
unlocked. They use electrichy to throw or withdraw the bolt.
Advantages:
— They enable remote control.
— They are versatile in terms of mounting locations.
— Their size can be chosen to suit a particular application.
— They are suitable for any type of door swing or
eontlguration.
Disadvantages:
— They require an electrical power link to the door.
12
MANUAL
— Accurate installation is necessary to ensure correct
alignment.
— They have a relatively high level of power consumption.
— They are generally unsuitable for escape routes.
3.4.7.3 Hybrid
This is a spring-mechanism lock loaded by the motion of
closing the door and deactivated by an electric pulse.
Advantages:
— A mechanical push-button can be incorporated on escape
routes.
— A mechanical key interlock can be incorporated.
— The electric pulse only requires a low energy connection.
— It is relatively small.
3.4.7.4 Electromagnetic
These are integrated into a section of the door frame. Coils
generate an electromagnetic field which holds the door-
mounted armature plate.
Advantages:
— These locks provide a high level of holding torque.
— They require little power (about 200 mV at 12 V DC).
— They have no moving parts, resulting in high reliability
and low maintenance.
— They fail in the unlocked position.
— They are easy to install.
— They are suitable for most door configurations.
— They are relatively cheap.
Disadvantages:
— They are unsuitable for swing-through doors.
— Accurate alignment is required for the door-stop to
prevent damage to the unit.
— A voltage drop will reduce holding torque.
3.5 kUr~ lighting
Most criminals, from the petty thief or senseless vandal to the
highly skilled professional, prefer to work under the cover of
darkness. Security lighting therefore substantially reduces
the risk of crime. It acts psychologically, as a powerful
deterrent, as well as functionally, allowing security ofilcers or
passers-by to see what is happening.
Security lighting requires the consideration of such factors as
lighting levels, lamp types and possible risk areas for each
different application, These will be discussed for residential,
commercial and industrial areas.
3.5.1 U@Sing level
Recommended illuminances for security lighting are given in
Table 3.1. Each building or property has its own unique
characteristics. Its sb shape, colour, location and aurmundmgs
will have a definite bearing on the level of security lighting
 — ———

SECURITY ENGINEERING
recommended. Well-sited lighting of the right intensity is Table 3.2 Recommcndcd
lamptypesfor security lighting
therefore essential to provide an effective and energy Lamptype Colour (Mour Maximum
conscious level of security. It is important to ensure that both rendering Iuminous
walls and adjacent grounds are adequately lit so that dark efficsey
areas are avoided. Use top-up lighting, if necessary, to (lrn/w)
illuminate escape routes, access ways or routes used by
security persomel. Compact white Good 80
fluorescent
Highpressure White Good 63
mercury
Table 3.1 Resmnrnended ilhsrninances for seeurity lighting applications Tungsten White Good 22
Application Illumirsance level on wall halogent
and surrounds (lx) Parabolic White Good 18
refleetort
Average risk sreas (e.g. residential) 3 Highpressure Yellow/white Reasonable 125
Higherriskareas(e.g.schools,small 5 sodium
shops, business premises) Low presSW Yellow None 200
sodium
+Onlyfor use with intermittent switching
3.5.2 Cenirel and cenneelien

Most security lighting should be continuous during the 3.5.4 Luminakes

hours of darkness. To provide convenient switching, some
1uminaires incorporate a light sensitive cell which automatically
switches the lamps on at dusk and off at dawn. Where only a
limited number of luminaires are to be installed, each can
incorporate a light sensitive cell. Where a large number of
luminaires are involved, it may be more economical to install
a system which connects them by through-wiring to one
central light-sensitive cell
There are two types of security lighting: either intermittent
or continuous during the hours of darkness. Intermittent
switching must use a light source capable of an immediate
response on switching, such as halogen or parabolic reflector
lamps. They are generally activated by a presence detector,
such as an infra-red detector fitted with an electronic timer to
switch off the lurninaire after a predetermined time, Such a
detector may bean integral part of the luminaire. Intermittent
switching is ideal for sensitive locations, but should not be
used where accidental or malicious rnggering is likely;
frequent triggering of the luminaires will result in a fall in the
level of security.
3.5.3 Lamp types
The luminaires play a crucial role. They must provide
suitable light distribution in accordance with the recommended
lighting levels. Moreover, they should be of sturdy construction
which makes them resistant to the effects of adverse weather
conditions and vandals.
3.5.5 Mwnting height and spacing
Although vulnerable parts of the premises are obviously the
first places to protect, take care to avoid very dark zones on
associated walls and surroundings by ensuring that luminaires
are mounted at the right height and at the right distance from
each other.
In residential areas an average value of 3 lux is recommended
on the wall and ad]acent areas. For commercial areas, 5 lux is
recommended. These figures are based on average walI
reflectance. In the case of lighter or darker walls, it is
appropriate to use lower or higher ilhtminance values
respectively. This will also have consequences for the
mounting height and spacing of the luminaires.

The type of lamp influences the colour appearance, colour
rendering and running costs of a security lighting installation.
Since security lighting has to operate throughout the night
energy-effective light sources are preferred. Such light
sources include compact fluorescent lamps which give a
white light. The warm atmosphere they provide makes them
an excellent choice for domestic areas. Other gas discharge
lamps include high pressure mercury and high or low
pressure sodium lamps which provide light varying from
white to yellow in colour.
Very L,. -m, the most suitable light source is the familiar low
pressure sodium lamp, the most efficient and economic of all
lamps. These lamps have a high intensity yellow coloured
light output and low energy consumption, and are ideal for
schools, small offices or factories. For greater mounting
heights or where a greater light output is required, lamps
such as high pressure sodium and mercury should also come
into consideration. Table 3.2 provides a guide to these lamp
types, showing their colour appearance, colour rendering,
light output and power consumption.
3.5.6 Residential areaa
The lamps recommended for use in residential areas are
tungsten halogen and parabolic reflector lamps for intermittent
use, compact fluorescent and low pressure sodium lamps for
continuous use, Of these the low pressure sodium lamps are
yellow, whereas the rest are white. The minimum mounting
height for these lamps is 2 m, and their average illuminance is
3 lUX.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show typical examples of such
applications. Luminaires are located adjacent to the possible
points of access on the ground floor to illuminate the
surroundings 3-4 m from the property.
Another measure worth considering is extending the use of a
‘door viewer’ from daylight to night-time. Correctly placed
near the front door, a huninaire should illuminate c-ders
while allowing the householder to keep back out of the light.
It should be mounted on the wall but not so high that the
caller is actually standing in a shadow.
13
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL

Figure 3.5 SccuritYlightingfor

a residentialbuilding: detached
house

F@urc 3.6 Security lighting for

residential buildin~ maisonettcs

A luminaire mounted inside a front porch should be
positioned immediately above the front door or on the side
wall and preferably should be vandal-resistant. Decorative
luminaires generally cast a pool of light directly beneath
without actually illuminating the surrounding area. A
bulkhead-type unit will direct light outwards.
After the householder has retired to bed it may be beneficial
to have the exterior lighting operated by a presence detector,
14
for example a passive infra-red detector, possibly connected
to an alarm.
When the house is vacated during the night, simple plug
timers or more complicated switching controls can be used to
give the impression that the house is occupied. Such timers
can provide a natural switching sequence of the main house
lights in the living room, hall and bedrooms.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
3.5.7 CommWdd areas
Lamps recommended for these areas include: tungsten
halogen and parabolic reflector for intermittent switching,
compact fluorescent, high pressure mercury, and high and
low pressure sodium lamps for continuous use. The
minimum mounting height is 2.5 m (3 m in high risk, areas),
and average illuminance should measure 5 lux. For normal
mounting heights luminaires with compact fluorescent or
low wattage, low pressure sodium lamps are preferred.
Figure 3,7 Security lighting for
a commercial building: oftlce and
warehouse unit
Figure 3.8 Security Iighring for
a commercial building: school
For greater mounting heights htminaires are used with lamps
which have a higher lumen output, such as high pressure
sodium (70 W) and high pressure mercury (80 W or 125 W)
lamps. The choice of the luminaires will depend on the
desired mounting heightispacing combination and the
choice of the lamp on the importance of cohmr rendition. The
colour varies from white (compact fluorescent lamps), golden
white (high pressure sodium lamps) to yellow (low pressure
sodium lamps).
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
The primary objective must be to prevent an intruder gaining
access and therefore any system of lighting must ensure that
all access and exit points are illuminated. It maybe of benefit
to the overall scheme to identify the likely target areas (for
example: drug storerooms and pharmacy buildings in a
hospital, duty free stores in an airport or hotel, sales areas and
storerooms in retail premises) and then to ensure that
windows, doorways and any emergency escape routes which
connect or are adjacent to the high risk areas axe protected by
all-night lighting.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show examples of illuminating all areas
and exit points. Smoke vents and roof-lights present security
problems and are difficult to protect. Consideration should
be giverI to providing lighting across the roof from
appropriate locations.
For large offke complexes, hospitals, colleges and universities,
which are multi-building sites, the exterior security lighting
should be carefully planned.
These points are worth addressing:
— The perimeten whether it is a boundary fence, hedge, or
wall.
— The landscaping.
— The access points, entrances, exits, windows, and roof-
lights.
These mattersare discussed in more detail in the subsequent
section on industrial security lighting.
3.5.8 Industdal -s
The lighting of industrial areas is covered more fully in the
CIBSE Lighkg Guiul, The industrtid environmen$8).
3.5.8.1 Perimeter lighting
Perimeter lighting should illuminate areas beyond the site
constraints to enable security guards or police to detect
anybody loitering or attempting to gain entry. Figure 3.9
illustrates a typical layout for the security lighting of a
boundary and the correct spacing of lamps, where H is the
height of the luminaire and the spacing is 3 H to 4 H.
Street lighting lanterns, as shown, floodlights or lanterns can
be used. Gmsider using proximity detectors if intermittent
lighting is required.
Figure 3.9 Perimeter lighting using street lighting lanterns placed just
in8idc the boundary fen=
16
MANUAL
Figure 3.10 Lightinglayoutfora checkpointandroadwayentrance
3.5.8.2 Checkpoints
The perimeter fence should follow the line of an entrance
roadway and the road between the two fences should be
brightly illuminated. Figure 3.10 illustrates a typical layout
showing a channel through which it is impossible to pass
without being seen. This arrangement will often stop
unauthorised people even if there is no gate.
A gatehouse or vehicle checkpoint may require local
floodlights, a fence or Iight-coloured wall extending for at
least two vehicle lengths from the observation point, and
local lighting at a lower level to enable security guards to
check vehicles and papers. Sufficient light should penetrate
horizontally to enable the inside of the vehicle to be checked
adequately. Colour discrimination is important. Recessed,
enclosed spotlights may be required for checking the
undersides of vehicles.
3.5.8.3 Gatehouses
It should be impossible to tell from outside whether a
gatehouse or security hut is occupied or not but the view from
inside should be unhampered by bright reflections. The
interior lighting of a gatehouse should be restricted to desk
lighting, shielded and subdued, and fitted with a dimmer.
This also maintains a guard’s dark adaptation. The principles
are illustrated in Figure 3.11.
If the windows of the gatehouse are covered with wire mesh
painted white outside, or are made of very small glass panes
with white painted glazing bars in-between, or if half-
silvered glass is used, it will make it ahnost impossible for
anyone to see in from outside, especially if the interior of the
gatehouse is painted in dark colours. If there are windows on
both sides of the gatehouse care should be taken that the
occupant is not illuminated or silhouetted by other outside
lighting.
3.S.9 FieOdiighiing buildings
Floodlighting a building or wall creates a bright background
against which an intruder may be readily seen. If the local
brighmess is low, intruders standing in the space between the
building and the floodlights would fmd themselves in a
dilemma: moving towards the building would increase the
 .---—
SECURITY ENGINEERING

Wim mesh

Gloing tilted
* reduce refieciiorss

Figure 3.11 Gatehousc lighting

likelihood of their being seen, yet to retreat towards the

floodlights would also be dangerous for them m there maybe
police or security guards behind the glare of the lights. Figure
3.12 illustrates this approach to lighting. In theory intruders
might decrease their chances of being seen at night if they
camouflaged themselves suitably, for example, by wearing
dark clothes and blacking their faces. This might work if the
building’s surfaces and the grounds were of the same
reflectance, but if the building and the area around it had a
number of different reflectance such attempts at camouflage
would be unsuccessful.
Closed circuit television (CCTVIsurveillance is a common
security facility. The main role of lighting in this case is to
allow the camera to produce a good quality picture. To do
thk it is essential to determine:
— the sensitivity of the camera to the wavelengths produced
by the light source
— the minimum illuminance required to produce good
quality pictures, especially of moving objects
— the location of the camera

ml Floodlighting
— the area to be surveyed.

The spectral sensitivity of a CCTVcamera can exceed that of

on o
the human visual system. Certain types are sensitive to infra-

no ‘“iMw &
L
%CUtitY hut

, 1
red radiation as well as visible radiation. The choice of light
source should take the spectral sensitivity of the camera into
account. Most manufacturers of cameras will indicate a
I c [ minimum illuminance to be provided for the camera to
u Wire fence
operate successfully. However, if moving objects are to be
successfully shown an illuminance above the minimum
Figure 3.12 Floodlighting a building should be provided, Care should be taken to provide the
required illuminance evenly on all of the relevant surfaces. It
must also be possible for anyone responding to the ccTv
The floodlighting of buildings is described more full in the surveillance to see what is happening. A well designed
CIBSE Lighting Guide, Tb outdoor mironsnen?’, For security lighting system should be capable of meeting the
floodlighting occupied buildings consider using close-offset requirements of both people and CCTV cameras. ccTv
floodlights but beware of unwanted light spilling into surveillance is detailed in section 4.17.
adjacent property.

In the context of security it should be noted that floodlights

mounted low or on the ground may be subject to damage or
deliberate interference unless protected. In some situations, References for section 3
better revealment of unauthorised movement and lower cost
will result from lighting the sides of the building rather than
1 Criminal statirsics: England and Wales 1988 (London: Home Office/
using area lighting. There may be publicity value in the
HMSO) (1989)
floodlighting as well.
17
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL

The1988i3rIMJCrime Stmrey Home Office Research Study No. 111 6 BS 8220: Guide for security of buildings against crime: Part 3:1990
(London: Home Oflicc/HMSO) (1989) Ware)toujes and dimibufion units (Milton Keynes; British Standards
Institution) (1990)
BS 5357: 1976(1985) Code of pruclice. Insta[hstion oj security glazing
(,Wllton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1985) 7 BS 5872:1980Spectjicationfor lockt and latches for doors in buildings
(Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1980)
BS 5544: 1978(198S)SpecVication for wsti-bandir glazing (g[mrittg
resisrant zo munual attack) (Milton Keynes British Standards 8 ?’he indmrrial environment CIBSE Lighting Guide LG1 (London
Institution) (1985) Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers) (1989)

BS 5051: Bullet-resistant glazing: Part I: 1988 Spec~icationjor glazing 9 The ourdoor enr,,ironment Lighting Guide (London: Illuminating
for interior use (,Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1988) Engineering Swiety) (1975)
 SECURITY ENGINEERING

4 Detection and alarm systems

4.1 Geneml

Table 4.1 is a general guide to the detection equipment

recommended for certain applications. The table also lists the
seetions outlining each device.

Table 4.1 General guide to detection equipment

Type of Aspects to be Level of Suggested Sec~ion
detection considered risk equipmem

For doort cued

windows (10
de~ecl opening)

— all Low Single pole 4.2

magnetic or
mechanical
protective switch

Medium Double pole 4.2

magne[ic
protective switch

High Double pole 4.2

magnet ic
protective switch
and security ring
For doors (to
derect breuking
through)

— solid portions With timber fixing Medium Gmtinuous 4.4,4.6

wiring, covered
with hardboard or
sheet metal; or
vibration detector

Others Medium Continuous 4A

wiring in tubes

— glazed portions Neatness required Low Foil 4.7

Medium Self-contained 4.7

breaking glass
detector

Removable bars Low Knock-out bars 4.5

contacted one
end only

Medium Knock-out bars 4,5,4.4

contacted both
ends; or con-
tinuous wiring
in tubes with
removable frame

Freed bars Medium Continuous 4.4

wiring in tubes

— stron~ room doors High Vibration 4.6

detector
For windows (10
detect, breaking
giu.rs)

– all Unobstructed glass Medium Ultrasonic 4.7

breaking gtass
detector
Nearness required Low Foil 4.7
Medium Self-contained 4.7
breaking glass
detector
 . . .. r? -,..+!.’; ‘ -:: . “ :’:
CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL

Table 4.1 General guide to dmeetion equipment — continued

Type of &Xcts to be Levelof Suggested Seetion
detection considered risk, equipment

High Foil and 4.7

breaking glass
detector
For windows (to
detect entry
rhrough (r@@)

—au Removable bars Low Knock-out bars 4.5

contacted one
end only

Medium Knock-out bars 4.5,4.3,4.4

contacted both
ends; or
continuous wiring
in tubes with
removable frame

Fixed bars Medium Continuous 4.4

wiring in tubes

H]gh Continuous 4.4

wiring in tubes
For roalls,
firers and
ca”lings (20
detect breaking
rhrough)

— all (under Subjeet to Medium Passive infra- 4.9

114 mmrhick) environmental red space
cheek deteetor in
room being
protected

— all (over Subject to High Vibration 4.6

114 mm thick environmental
or of robust check
construction
e,g. eonerere,
steel)

— all Sound resistant High Movement 4.9

room (e.g. detector
strongroom),
subjeet to
environmental
cheek

— walls and Avoid damp areas, Low Openspan 4.3

ceilings access required for continuous
maintenance wiring fmd to
banens and
covered with
hardboard

Medium Continuous 4.3

wiring fixed to
bloekboard and
covered with
hardboard

High Transverse 4.3

continuous
wiring freed to
bloekboard and
covered with
hardboard

.
20
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
Table 4.1 General guide to dereaion equipment — continued

Type of Aspeets to be Level of Suggested Section

deteetion considered risk tquipmcnt

For internal
areas (10
&tecr intruak
within prenri>es)

— all internal Low Protective 4.2

areas switches on
internal doors
Carpeted area, Low Pressure mats 4.10,4.2
free of regular and protective
movement switches on
internal doors

Area free of regular Low Passive infra- 4.9

movement, not subject red detectors
to sudden changes in
temperature
Regular movement in Medium Infra-red 4.8
area but not across detectors
line of beam

Area free of regular Low Infra-red 4.8,4.2

movement, subjeet to deteerors and
environmental check protective
switches on
internal doors
Medium Microwave 4.9
deteetors
Movement-free and, Medium Ultrasonic 4.9
air movemenr-free deteetors
area, subjeet to
environmental cheek
For item at
nik (todezecl
proxirniry of
intru&rs)

—areas Carpeted area Low Pressure mat 4.10

ad]aeent to
item
— cupboards To provide timber Medium Continuous 4.3
(e.g. mntaining fixing over 13 mm wiring covered
guns, silverware thick, cupboards with hardboard
or control can be lined with
equipment) bloekboard
— safes Without space Me&um Vibration 4.6,4.3
restriction dewetoq or
transverse
continuous
wired cupboard
High Vibration 4.6,4,3
deteetor and
transverse
continuous
wired cupboard
With space Medium Vibration 4.6
restriction deteetor
High Vibration and 4.6,4.9
movement
deteerors
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
4.2 Protective switches for doors
and windows
4.2.1 General
Magnetic protective switches contain reed contacts which are
held in the closed position by a permanent magnet fitted to
the top of the door or window. Opening the door or window
moves the magnet, the reed contacts (fitted to the frame)
open and this creates an alarm condition.
Mechanical protective switches contain plungers which
operate microswitches to complete the circuit when the door
is closed. Opening the door breaks the circuit.
Protective switches provide a cheap and effective means of
detecting intruders. However, to detect the professional
intruder their existence should remain unknown or they
should be used together with devices to detect the breaking of
glass or solid materials. A wide range of switches are available
to suit a variety of door arrangements and it is important to
select the appropriate type. The use of magnetic switches is
recommended whenever possible,
Good quality switches create an alarm condition in the event
of a reed failing and are difficult to overcome using an
external magnet. These switches are impossible to overcome
when fitted with a security ring.
4.2,2 Magnetic contacts
4.2.2. ? C/ass1:stondardmagnetic contact(.singie reed)
A standard magnetic contact consists of one reed switch and
one magnet. It may be defeated with the use of second
magnet.
4.2,2.2 Class 11:biased magnetic contact
A biased magnetic contact consists of one reed switch with a
bias magnet which changes the state of the reed switch. The
actuator magnet is then placed at the correct distance to offset
the bias magnet, creating a ‘balanced’ condition. The switch
can be defeated with the use of a single magnet, but the
magnet must be of the correct size and polarity, as well as not
being too close to the switch, Correct installation of the
actuator magnet is therefore essential.
4.2.2.3 Class 111:balanced magnetic contact (double
reed)
A balanced magnetic contact consists of one biased reed
switch and one unbiased reed switch. The second reed must
be of the correct sensitivity and in a position so as to avoid
operating with the actuator magnet. Also, it must operate
with the addition of a second magnet. This type of switch
requires an adjustment of the actuator magnet at the time of
installation and should be checked for adjustment from time
to time. It could be defeated by an expert using a single
magnet that is moved into place as the door is opened, This
requires a co-ordinated movement of the door and magnet
from inside the protected area.
22
MANUAL
4.2.2.4 ClassW: pre-adjusted balanced magnetic
confact (inple reed)
A pre-adjusted balanced magnetic contact consists of three
biased reed switches and may have an optional fourth tamper
reed. Two reeds are polarised in one direction and the third is
polarised in the opposite direction, The magnet housing
consists of three magnets (with corresponding polarities to
the switches) and is steel backed, The unit is preadjusted to
have a freed space between the switch and magnet. No field
adjustments are possible or necessary: This provides the
highest degree of security.
A unit with three reeds could be defeated with one of its own
magnets, but not a bar magnet. The unit with four reeds
cannot be defeated with a bar magnet or another actuator
magnet since the tamper or fourth reed will activate the
alarm.
4.3 Contkeuswiring to detect damage
to physical protection
The units are embedded in a wall, ceiling, floor or any surface
to be protected, The continuous wiring carries an electric
current; when a wire is broken, or when two wires of opposite
polarity touch, the closed circuit is broken and an alarm
condition is created,
Disadvantages:
— Alarms are not created until the barrier is broken
through.
Continuous wiring must not be installed on damp
surfaces,
The wiring can be looped out, so it is important to specify
a good quality unit.
Different methods of installation areas follows:
— Open span continuous wiring f~ed to battens and
covered with hardboard: With this form of wiring there is
a gap between the wall or ceiling surface and the wiring,
giving the thief some chance of locating and attacking the
wiring.
— Continuous wiring fixed to blackboard and covered with
hardboard: The wiring is sandwiched between the
blackboard and hardboard without a gap, making it
difficult for the thief to locate and attack the wiring.
Transverse wiring fixed to blackboard and covered with
hardboard: Instiled as above, but with the wiring
running both horizontally and vertically making it more
difficult for the thief to locate and attack it.
4.4 Continuous wiring in tubes for
doors and windows
Continuous wiring in tubes operates in the same way as
ordinary continuous wiring. The tubes are to protect the
wiring from accidental damage and are not intended to
prevent entry by a thief. Figure 4.1 shows a typical
installation.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING

Tubes fitted into

batten home

Continuous wiring —
threoded through
tubas

Figure 4.1 Continuouswiringin

tubes (fixed in a batten frame) for
~1” “’i”””——————+ 1111 doors or windows

Advantages:
— This detects entry through an opening, not just brealdng
glass.
— This type of detector is free from false alarms.
— The continuous wiring can be supplied in frames so that
they may be removed from the window when alarm is not
set. A vibration device can signal attempts to ‘loop out’
continuous wiring.
Disadvantages:
— It is unsightly.
— It can be defeated given time.
I detectors. Both types interconnect to electronic analysers
4.5 Knock-out bars
( whereas a seismic sensor can be mounted anywhere.
Installed 100 mm apart across doors and windows, knock-out
bars can be removed to leave glass completely unobstructed
when the alarm system is not set. When in position each
knock-out bar holds a microswirch in the closed position to
complete the circuit. Displacement of a bar creates an alarm
condition, The bars can be installed with microswitches at
one end of the bar, or at both ends for maximum security,
Advantage:
— The glassis unobstructed when bars are removed.
Disadvantages:
— The maximum height of bars is restricted to about 2 m.
— Knock-out bars are not as secure as continuous wiring in
tubes.
4.6 Vibration detectors
4.6.1 GenOMl
There are several types of device which use either an electro-
mechanical or an electronic transducer to detect vibration.
Electro-mechanical sensors are known as inertia detectors,
and electronic transducer units are known as seismic
which can be selected to process the signals as required. A
gravity-sensitive inertia detector requires careful siting,
A microphonics cable detects mechanical vibrations. Wlien
interwoven with chain-link fencing, it can sense the cutting
or climbing of the fence. A controller can be tuned to ignore
normal vibrations such as those caused by the wind.
Advantages:
— A vibration detector is an early warning device designed
to create alarm condition before penetration of the
defences or as the attack commences.
23
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL

— It is simple to install and service, and often cheaper than
continuous wiring.
— It occupies only a small part of the surface.
Disadvantages:
— Not all devices are closed circuit in design.
— Certain detectors do not detect frequencies of vibration
such as those created by electric drills or the scratching
out of mortar.
— False alarms are created if the environment is unsuitable.
(d) Illuminate the area using separate, secure circuits.
(e) Locate against substantially constructed waUs. ~
(/) Ensure that the ceiling and floor are as strong as the walls.
(g) Protect the building using intruder alarm systems.
(h) Protect the safe using acoustic detectors.
(z] Ensure maximum key security.
(I] Limit the value of safe contents.
(k) Make no modifications to the structure of the safe.

It must never be presumed a particular device will operate 4.7 Breaking glass detectors
satisfactorily on all types of surface. An ‘environmental’, or
on-site test should be undertaken. Where a unit fails such a
test continuous wiring or space detectors should be considered. 4.7.1 Foil detectors

The surface area covered by a vibration detector’s range
varies with the design, as well as the vibration transmission
characteristics of the surface concerned. It is therefore
important to specify the area to be covered and not the
number of detectors to be used.
Special facilities can include:
— geophones designed to detect all frequencies of vibration
created by all known methods of attack against solid walls
— a closed circuit design: a circuit failure creates an alarm
condition
— minimisation of false alarms by incorporating advanced
A lead foil strip, freed to the glass surface, acts as part of a
closed circuit and is designed to break and create an alarm
condition when the supporting glass is broken. The foil is
fitted over the entire surface in a pattern similar to the one in
Figure 4.2. On plate glass the foil is fitted at least 75 mm from
the edge of the window. A typical installation is shown in
Figure 4.3.
l--
/ ,.
- Foilstrip

electronics which exclude most common vibrations

— increased sensitivity to cover a greater surface area
1“
/, ‘, /

,
.

,/ /
— a ‘double knock’ facility to minimise false alarms: the
/
I
detector must sense a vibration twice in succession before r
the alarm is activated. 1
I1 . ..’, ,
,/ ‘:/ j ‘

L
2CX)mm
maximum

/
~> #
,/
4.6.2 Vibration detectors for safes and $’.
,, /;
strongroom doors /

/[’ // /’
/
These devices are closed circuit in design: the circuit has m ,< /’ J - Glass
break to create an alarm condition. They contain a transducer
designed to detect all frequencies of vibration created by all
I /,.
/./ I/
known methods of attack against safes.The control circuitry ;/’
contains an analyser unit which disregards irrelevant
frequencies but amplifies weak signals of the correct
frequencies, thus fully monitoring all surfaces. Tampering
81
1-l
.<
with the wires from a unit is guarded against by a balanced
75mm minimum
circuifi a change in state creates an alarm condition. A
contacted flap can protect the keyhole to produce an alarm Figure 4.2 Foil breaking glass detector
when attempts are made to insert keys or explosives.
Advantage:
It is important that the wires leading from vibration units on
— Foil detectors provide a cheap means of detecting
the safe are specially protected. The size of safe Khat a
breaking glass.
detector can protect and the number of detectors required
depends on the design of both the detector and the safe.
Disadvantages:
Certain safes will require more than one vibration detector.
— Operation depends on glass at least cracking at the point
The list below provides general recommendations to ensure where foil is fitted to create an alarm.
the security of a safe. — They are not recommended for laminated or wired glass.
(a) Seek the advice of insurers and security specialists. — The foil offers little resistance to accidental damage in
(b) Select a safe which is neither more nor less secure than the installation or by window cleaners.
situation requires. — It can onlv. be installed in one continuous leruzth.
w,

(c) Place the safe in full view of passers-by. requtilng the strip to be folded at the corners.
24
 ,/. ‘//
/
;/‘
‘/
,//.,’”
,.
/4
/

/’
/“””””~’

/
—

//
/
. . —..— ..

SECURITY ENGINEERING

instance. If a neat appearance is required then only the

detector head need show through the display base. Ensure
curtains or wall drapes do not obscure the sensor’s effective
field of view.

4.7.3.2 Glass-mounted

I
- Foil drip
/ /,’ ‘/
/

,,
/
/“ ‘ ‘“ ,
The second type of unit creates an alarm condition only when
the glass is broken. It discriminates between normal glass
/ ,, /, / ‘.”’ vibrations and actual glass breakage. Each pane of glass
/ //
/’ requiring protection must have its own independent unit
/’
/“ 1
glued to it by the recommended adhesive. It can be used on a
/
flat surface of silicon, armoured or flat wired glass. These
devices cannot be used on laminated glass. One unit can
/ ‘Plate glass
cover an area of glass of approximately 10 mz.
/,..-’
,./’
/
4.8 Beam detectors
,,. ,, ,, / ‘ /’/ /
L’

F- 40.1 Mm-rd detectm%

75mm mi num
Figure 4.3 Foil breaking glass detector installation on plate glass The equipment comprises a transmitter and a receiver. The
transmitter sends a modulated infm-red light beam to the
receiver, thus maintaining a closed circuit. The unit creates
4.7.2 V&ra9ion ~ an alarm when the light beam is interrupted. This type of
detector is best suited to indoor situations. External detectors
A springy metal strip, which completes a circuit under require low-power heaters to prevent condensation forming
normal conditions, opens to create an alarm condition when on them and reducing sensitivity.
vibrations of suffkient intensity are received from the
window. Advantage:
— These detectors can be operated over distances too great
Advantages:
to be covered economically in any other way (such as
— They are easily fitted. warehouse gangways, corridors, long windows, roof
. They provide a cheap means of detecting breaking glass. areas).

Disadvantage: Disadvantages:
— It is possible to penetrate the glass using a cutter without — They can be avoided if their positions are known to the
trigger&g an alarm. intruder.
— They cannot be installed in areas where there are animals

4.7.3 Uhrasmllicdetedws
or birds, or where there is likely to be legitimate
movement across the line of the beam.
There are two types of unifi remote- or glass-mounted. — They cannot be used outside buildings on police call
systems.
4.7.3.1 Remote-mounted
Special facilities can include:
The uluasound breaking glass detector is a purely passive — a lens cover to conceal the direction of the beam
detection device, only receiving and not transmitting
ultrasound. The sensor detects the ultrasonic pressure waves — extended ranges of up to 160 m
generated by breakiig glass. The concentration of sound is
— twin beam units to minimise false alarms caused by small
greatest directly in front of the glass. Detectors can be sited
animals and birds.
up to 4 m away from the front of glass or 2 m if mounted
above or to the side. To minimise false alarms care must be
taken to avoid: rattling windows and metal letter boxes;
4.8.2 Mlc rewave detecters
central heating boilers, or empty cans and drums which emit
frequencies when expanding or contracting; telephones or
These detectors are similar in principle to infra-red
door bells. Also, do not mount these detectors where outside
detectors. The electromagnetic energy is transmitted in a
noise is likely to penetrate the buildlng or near any type of
cylindrical beam covering a vertical distance of about 3 m and
ultrasonic transmitting device.
an horizontal distance of 30 to 40 m. The detector activates an
alarm when the received signal is changed by a physical
When protecting free-standing and wall-mounted display
barrier moving through the beam (see Figure 4.4).
cabinets the sensor must be mounted on a firm surface, free
from vibration. If 24-hour protection is required the sensor
Advantages:
should be mounted within the display cabinet which must be
sealed to avoid false alarms caused by jangling keys, for — These are ideal for external use,
25
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
Microwave Doppler sensors, which are most sensitive to objects moving
Transmitter .----;-------------- . . . . .. ~field towards or away from them.
,,, ,,. ., .+ ● , . . . ..
,., ,. \,. ,.-*: --.>----
/
1 ~ . +.
j’ /“ \ ,,. \ ,/’” , These detectors can be wall- or ceiling-mounted and are
available in a number of forms offering different patterns of
coverage. These patterns range from narrow bands suitable
~ ~1 “v- for corridors with ranges of up to 50 m, to circular areas of
‘:;a~~ifl~~=~ 360°, with ranges of up to 10 m. Figure 4.5 illustrates the
field of detection of a typical, wall-mounted infra-red
detector, The arrows in Figure 4.5 (a) demonstrate the
Figure 4.4 Microwave beam dcteetor directions of movement to which the detector is most
sensitive.
— Senshivhy levels can be adjusted.
Such a sensor is less prone to false alarms but, as this is a
— They are a relatively cheap first line of protection on passive system with no transmitter, it is diff:cult to make fail-
large, high risk areas.
safe. Radiation is only received from objects in view, the
detector can be easily masked, or moisture can prevent
Special facilities can include: operation if the protective seal on the crystal fails.
. reduced sensitivity to vertical movement (for instance,
ignoring falling leaves) Sudden temperature changes cart cause false alarms so avoid
locations of direct or reflected sunlight or where high air
— an internal heater to reduce condensation
turbulence can occur, as in areas near central heating
— digital processing to evaluate the size and speed of objects radiators,
passing through the beam (therefore ‘reducing the
incident of false alarms).
4.9.3 Aceustic detectors

The unit activates an alarm when it detects sound. This

4.9 Space detectors
4.9.i tineral
These detectors can be active (transmitting a signal) or
passive (responding to a signal generated by-the i~truder).
The space.is monitored for movement in a three-dimensional
field. Because of their non-selectivity they can in certain
installations be prone to false alarms and the range of some
devices fluctuates from day to day. Active detectors can be
microwave or ultrasonic. Passive detectors can be infra-red
or acoustic.
As with vibration detection devices it must never be
presumed that a particular device will operate satisfactorily
in a certain area. All such devices should be instaIled and put
on test before being connected to a police call system on the
understanding that if found to be unsatisfactory alternative
equipment can be supplied. A non-latching, walk-test facility
should be provided. This clearly indicates to the personnel
testing the unit, whilst walking around the edge of the area
covered, that their movement is continually detected. Where
a walk-test facility is used, some detectors can be linked to a
remote monitor which checks that a signal is being
transmitted. Note that this does not coniirm that the device
can create an alarm, only that it is transmitting a signal. The
ranges of these devices vary with the design of unit. It is
important to specify clearly what area must be covered as the
range and sensitivity can be adjusted on-site.
4.9.2 Passive ktftwred detedws
This unit measures infra-red radiation received in set narrow
beams. The level of radiation changes with temperature and
any unacceptable change activates the alarm. The detector is
at its most sensitive when the intruder crosses the fingers of
the infra-red energy pattern, at right angles to the sensor
position. This differs from microwave and ultrasonic
26
means that the detectors are highly susceptible to false
alarms, and they should not be directly connected to an alarm
call-out facility.
Advantage:
— The unit covers walls, door, ceiling and floor as well as the
entire space to be protected.
Disadvantages:
— External noise, such as thunder or passing emergency
vehicles’ sirens can affect the unit,
— Some devices do little signal processing and so are prone
to false alarms.
— A remote monitor is necessary to verify the nature of the
activating sound.
Special facilities can include:
— advanced electronics to make alarm-preventative checks
before creating an alarm
— a closed circuit design
— early warning for high security applications (for instance,
to give warning before a strongroom is penetrated).
4.9.4 Ultrasonic de~
Ultrasonic detectors rely on the presence of air to transmit a
sound signal at a f~ed frequency of between 25 to 35 kHz.
They monitor the signal reflected from the solid objects and
compare the frequency of the transmitted signal with that of
its reflection. Stationary objects return the signal at the
frequency transmitted. Objects moving towards the transmitter
return the signal at a higher frequency, whereas objects
moving away return it at a lower frequency. It is this
frequency change (known as the ‘Doppler effect’) that is used
to create an ahwtn condition.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING

Detector is most
(es)
sensitive10
movement in
these directions
s

Well

20m

.> \

—.
,: .,
..2’

I
‘“”~ Immhkh

(b)
Well - Detector
%’
L

--om~
The detector is most sensitive when the intruder moves
Figure 4.5 Typical, wall-mounted
passive infra-red detector: fields of
coverage (a) plan view and (b) side
elevation

Ultrasonic Doppler radar sensors can be sensitive to the

directly towards or away from the sensor. Therefore the
sensor should be positioned facing towards an entrance
where an inmuder is most likely to attempt access. Ultrasonic
energy camot penetrate solid matter, so stock and fittings
may limit the area of detection.
movement of air caused by the rotation of fan blades; even
those deep inside an open-ended ventilation duct can be
troublesome, A curtain or blind waving in a draught can also
be a source of nuisance alarms.

The ability to focus the energy into a beam makes it possible
to direct the energy into areas to be covered and away from
possible causes of nuisance alarms. When wall-mounted, the
range of a sensor is typically 5-10 m deep, 4-5 m high, and
5-7 m wide, forming an elliptical field of coverage.
An ultrasonic sensor cannot be used in an acoustically noisy
environment. A ringing telephone may cause the detector to
go into alarm and air lines and steam pipes can sometimes
produce frequencies which prove troublesome.

This is an active system and is therefore fail-safe, creating an
alarm ccdhion if it fails to function correctly. Soft surfaces
(carpets, curtains, cardboard cartons) absorb some of the
sound and reduce sensitivity.
An ultrasonic sensor is entirely suitable for protecting a risk
area containing glass. Ultrasonic energy does not penetrate
glass. The sound of breaking glass has an ultrasonic
component which will cause the sensor to trigger an alarm.
27
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL

To cover a large area without mutual wave interference,
ensure that all sensors are on different frequencies.
Special facilities available include:
— advanced electronics to make false alarm preventative
checks before creating an alarm
— a fail-safe circuit designed to create an alarm if either the
gun diode, mixer diode or the amplifier fail
— a range adjustable up to 30 m
4.9.5.2 Medium-sized areas
Medium-sized areas require only one sensor for full
coverage, with possibly a second to fiIl in a blind spot. The
choice of detector in such a situation is a personal one,
although the characteristics of the area may rule out one or
more methods depending upon the level of risk and
consequences of false alarms. In office areas with telephones,
for instance, ultrasonic sensors may be ruled out in favour of
microwave sensors.

— an advanced signal filtering system to permit installation 4.9.5.3 Small areas

with overlapping fields.
As the area becomes smaller and the security risk becomes
higher, the construction of the walls, ceilings, doors,
4.9.S Micrewave detectars windows and floors all grow in importance, because they arc
closer to the sensor and become a greater potential source of
Microwave sensors generate an electromagnetic wave (at false alarms.
10.687 kHz) using the Doppler effect, as described in section
4.9.4. Again, the detector is most sensitive when the intruder In small areas, ultrasonic sensors are generaily preferred to
moves directly towards or away from the sensor. Care must microwave sensors due to the potentially high false alarm
be taken in siting a microwave detector. Glazing is problem resulting from microwaves penetrating the boundaries
transparent to microwaves and therefore a detector might of the protected area.
sound an alarm in response to movement outside the
4.9.6 Duai techaoiegy detecters
window, Microwaves can also penetrate doors and structures
of lightweight construction, a property which can be used to
The introduction of dual technology sensors reduces the
advantage when hiding the unit from view.
incidence of false alarms to about 1 in 500. Table 4.2 shows
As with ultrasonic sensors, the energy can be focused into
particular areas to detect intruders and direct energy away Table 4.2 Probabilityof detector resp+mseto common sources of false
from possible sources of nuisance alarms. The range of these alarm
sensors varies but usually forms an elliptical field between Source of Cmrventional space detectors
10-30 m long and 6-20 m wide. It is also an active system and false alarm
therefore fail-safe in operation. Passive L’ltrasonic Microwave
infra-red {.MWD)

The major advantage of microwave sensors over ultrasonic (PIR)

sensors is their total insensitivity to air movement. Nuisance Air

alarms from microwave sensors are usually caused by Cold air turbulence Low H,gh Low
penetration of the microwaves outside the protected area. Hot air turbulence Low, High Low
Draughts Low High Low
The field of detection must not cover areas containing large Fans Low H~gh Low
surfaces of metal or mirror, which reflect the radio waves and Sounds
so mask areas from, or introduce unwanted areas to, the Whistles Low Low Low
detector’s field of coverage. The unit should not be mounted Ultrasonic ‘sounds’ Low High Low
within 1 m of a fluorescent luminaire as electronic ballasts Phone bells Low High Low
can emit frequencies within the unit’s operating range. Thunder Low Low Low
Additionally, the unit must not be subjected to extremes of Leaking steam Low High Low
temperature, vibration, certain mobile audio systems or Aircraft noise Low Low Low
aircraft navigation signals, all of which could cause false Vibraricm
alarms. Building vibration Low Low High
Detector vibration Low Low High
4.9.5.7 Large areas
Targers
Swinging targets Low High High
A microwave detector is ideal for a large area as it can cover a Through-window targets Low Low High
wider area than other sensors. It is possible to have several Through-wafl targets Low Low Low
sensors working together in the same open area without Through partition targets Low LOUS High
interference by selecting different frequencies for each Large animals High High High
sensor within the band. Smalt animats Medium Medium Medium
Insects on detector surface High High Medium
The benefits of microwaves are further improved by Fluorescent lamps Low Low High
Incandescent lamps High Low Low
mounting the sensor on the ceiling. Given the normal beam
Swinging incandescent Lamps High High Low
pattern of 120°-1500 in one direction and 60°-700 in the
other no energy need be directed at walls or windows or even CJrherejfects
doors which reduce false alarm risks, Sunlight High Low Low
Changing sunlight Medium Low Low
Microwaves have a longer wavelength than ultrasonic waves Headlamps of passing vehicles Fhgh Low Low
Temperature change — slow Low Low Low
so they have a lower sensitivity to vibration and in general Temperature change — rapid High Low Low
suffer less from environmental problems.

28
 SECURITY ENGINEERING

the degree of sensitivity to false alarm of three conventional
types of movement detectors. A dual technology sensor
incorporates infra-red and microwave sensors or infra-red
and ultrasonic sensors, one type compensating for the
environmental problems associated with the other. Such
devices are used in areas which are hazardous in terms of false
alarms. They operate on the following principle: if one type
of sensor triggers an alarm it may be false, but if both units
activate an alarm then they have detected an intruder. Thus,
both types of sensor can be set at higher degrees of sensitivity
without increasing the risk of false alarm.
4.9.7 Capacitive detectors
4.9.7.1 Volumetric defectors
— They cannot be installed on damp or uneven floors.
— The most basic units are open circuit in design and not
fail-safe.
4.11 Underground pressure detectors
These
consist of two hydraulic fluid tubes (see Figure 4.6)
lying parallel just beneath the soil surface, about one metre
apart. The pressure is at equilibrium in the two tubes until
weight is applied on the ground above. The change in
pressure is monitored to activate the alarm. High sensitivity
systems are available which display the order of weight
compression and indicate possible causes, distinguishing
between a person and a vehicle, for example.

Capacitance is an electrical property of insulators. Air acts as
an insulator and any change or movement in an enclosed
space will result in a change in the capacitance of the air.
Capacitive volumetric detectors sense this change and
activate an alarm. They have been superseded by advances in
other types of detectors which offer a greater degree of
sensitivity and accuracy.
4.9.7.2 Proximity detectors
The detector is connected to the object by a single wire. The
object must either be metallic or have a metal foii attached to
it. Any movement of the object or of people in its proximity
will change the ambient capacitance and activate an alarm.
Electronic processing is essential to differentiate between
natural environmental changes and an alarm situation.
4.10 Pressure mats
These are hidden under carpets in areas where an intruder is
likely to tread.Z3S4737 ]) requires an open circuit mat to be
fitted with cable loops to introduce a closed circuit for added
security.
4.12 Fibre optic signaling
This form of protection is difficult to detect as no external
radio frequency or electromagnetic emissions are generated.
Infra-red light signals are passed through a continuous fibre
optic cable. A fibre optic cable is non-ferrous and small in
diameter. If the cable is severed or damaged the control
elements sense a change in the signal and activate the alarm.
One form of cable available consists of two concentric cores.
Data are transmitted along the centre and the outer core is
monitored to detect any interference to the fibre.
The cable may be implanted within structures and safely
installed in hostile environments. Suggested locations include
culverts (see Figure 4.7(a)), storm drains, skylights, underground
ducts, service passages or sewers. Such cables can be used
safely in safety deposit vaults and security doors; marine
installations subject to motion, salt and extremes of
temperature; high radiation and nuclear environments; and
areas of high electromagnetic activity.
s.13 Wire-free intruder alarm systems

Advantage: Wire-free intruder alarm systems use the same detector

— A pressure mat provides a simple and inexpensive way of technology as conventional arrangements but they contain
radio transmitters to signal to a central receiver which
detecting an intruder. initiates the alarm procedure.
Disadvantages: Any such system should meet BS 6799(2).BS 6799 lists five
— Being installed underneath floor coverings, the mats are classes of system. For instance, systems meeting Class 5 must
subjected to wear. interface with the control receiver to report status and battery

‘“.’i::’~m-?fi
, .e. — a

‘<

.,.
t,

\ /-
.+–
\-d “ ““=’;; ’p:.-
—.—
. “-”.--/’,: :%> /
.e
\’
-

/ .-xi v””””
Yo-hicomp:d.
0 d

o,
-.
u
,

e
l --
,’-----
*.’-’.,. . .
-’.
‘
‘be=
/
-- . ..-
valve
Figure 4.6 Undergroundpres-
suredetector

29
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL

(cl)

Tubes containing —
fibre optic cable

- Frame

F@we 4.7 Fibre optic installa-

\ tion (a) typical installation in a
culvert and (b) detail of installation
(b)

the building. For example, dense concrete and steel reduce

the signal strength.

When designing a system, the engineer should note that it

will require batteries for power and this factor will place
restrictions on the detectors and radio transmitters. Radio
frequency transmissions must meet the specifications of the
Department of Trade and Industry Radio Regulatory Body.

4.14 Warning devices

4.14.1 Audible alarms

I I
\\ E’: Self-actuating devices should be considered. When the
power link t; the control unit is cut a relav in the device
activates a warning sound which is powered by an internal
battery. An audible alarm should generally be placed at a
height of 3 m.

Advantages:
condition at intervals of no more than 1 h 12 min. They
should sound an alarm if no signal is received within 3 h — Audible alarms frighten away the casual thief.
36 min. A Class 4 system sends signals at intervals of up to 8 h — Neighbors can respond to the warning.
24 min and if no signal is received in this time then an alarm is
sounded. — The sight of such a device can deter a thief,

Wire-free systems should not be considered if conventional Disadvantages:

arrangements, offering a greater degree of integrity, can be — In industrial and high street situations the general public
incorporated. Transmitter ranges vary with the structure of tend to ignore such devices when they operate.
30
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
— They can encourage vandalism if left ringing for long
periods.
— In some situations they can cause thieves to act violently.
Special facilities can include:
— strong steel case to delay attempts to immobilise unit
— electrical power service from a float-charged battery
— an automatic cut-out to limit ringing of bell to 20 min (to
meet requirements of the Control of Pollution Act 1974(3]
and the Code of Practice on Noise from Audible Intruder
~=S 1982[d)
— anti-tamper devices to operate if the casing is removed or
if the unit is prised from the wall
— a double-skin case designed to create an alarm condition
on detecting attempts to drill the case
— a distinctive two-tone warning sound
— a high-volume output (conventional units should measure
in excess of 70 dBA at a distance of 3 m)
a strobe light.
4.1 4.2 Visuai alarms
Visual alarms produce a continuous, flashing or rotating light
to be clearly seen over as wide an area as possible. Lamps can
be conventional fdament, halogen or high intensity xenon
discharge tubes. The reflector medium can diffuse, colour
and shape the light beam as desired. For example, a fresnel
lens can concentrate the light into a flat, omni-directional
beam.
A stroboscopic light can attract attention during daylight
hours. Generally strobes rotate at speeds between 40 rev/rein
and 160 revlmin.
Wire guards are available to protect the device against
vandalism. Units also exist containing both audio and visual
alarms in a protective, alarmed casing.
4.15 Telephone warning devices
4.15.1 Tape dialier
This operates by automatically dialling 999, a central station
or any other designated telephone number. It transmits a
recorded message on a continuous tape-loop. In the event of
not obtaining a dialling tone or any other failure, it
immediately operates local audible warning devices. A timer
automatically discomects the call after a pre-determined
period.
Advantage:
— A tape dialler is a simple method of calling the police.
Disadvantages:
— A mechanical failure of the transmitter can prevent
transmission of the message.
— It should not be used where connected to an exposed
telephone line as the message will not be received if the
line is cut.
4.15.2 Digital dlaliing units
Theseoperate by obtaining a diailing tone, diaIling a required
number and passing a coded electronic digital message.
Advantages:
— These units are able to dial any number.
— Reliability: there are no mechanical parts to fail.
— The speed of message transmission: transmission is
completed within a few seconds giving the thief little time
to smash the transmitter.
— Most receivers can produce a print-out showing time and
date of operation.
Disadvantages:
— The units require a special receiver connected to an
exclusive telephone line.
— The failure of telephone equipment prevents receipt of
the message,
— The units should not be used where connected to an
exposed telephone line as the message will not be received
if the line is cut.
Special facilities can include:
— repeated transmission so that a message can be checked
— an indication of which individual system in a multiple
alarm installation is in alarm condition to allow staff to
take the required action. For instance:
(a) Intruder alarm: call police
(b) Fire alarm call fire brigade
(c) Water leak alarm: call maintenance engineer
(d) Machine process alarm: call works engineer
— a receiver unit print-out to show the transmitter number,
alarm state number, time and date
— repeated transmission until acknowledgement has been
received from the monitoring station
— activation of standby or delayed action audible warning
devices where no acknowledgement is received from the
monitoring station,
Note that for all telephone warning devices the transmitter
should be connected to an ex-directory, outgoing-calls-only
line for extra security.
4.15.3 Direct line
4.15.3.1 Individual linesto police or central station
These consist of individual private telephone lines linking the
premises to either a police or a central security station. A
continuous signal is sent along the line and monitoring
equipment detects any change or break in the signal.
Standard coa%dsz”~als
Certain systems operate to a standard coded signal. This
means that all alarms operating on that system send the same
coded signal, There have been several cases of thieves
overcoming such systems in high risk situations by duplicating
the signal.
31
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
Van-ed coded signals
These systems operate on a number of different coded signals
so that a thief cannot be sure which code a particular system
uses. Because it is not a standard code, the thief would find
difficulty in obtaining equipment to duplicate it.
Special facilities of both types of system can include:
— transmitter units specially produced to make identification
of a transmitted signal difficult even for the installer
— receiver units made with tuners so that they can be tuned-
into any transmitter, but even then the signal received is
not identilled.
4.75.3.2 Exchange connection
This consists of an individual private telephone line from the
premises connected at the nearest local telephone exchange
to a ‘shared’ private telephone line to a central station.
Multiplex signals are used throughout the system, as
described for satellite operation.
Advantages:
— Such a system results in reduced telephone line charges
including low exclusive line costs as the majority of
customers are near a telephone exchange.
— This is economically viable for a few connections,
— There is no vulnerable equipment between the customer
and the central station.
Disadvantage:
— No standby line is available from the telephone exchange
to the central station.
4.15.3,3 Satellite
A satellite is an electronic multiplexing unit which has to be
securely housed between the central station and the
customers it links. They are often unmanned, automatic, and
can be manned in an emergency.
There are two types of sateIlite. The first type has an
individual telephone company line between each subscriber
and the satelke, and a common line between the satellite and
main central station. The scanning of subscribers is
controlled by a receiver unit in the main central station. The
second type of satellite is a small automated central station,
which is capable of standing alone. All scanning of
subscribers is controlled at the satellite by a pair of
minicomputers with printers so that should communication
be lost with the central station, local operation can continue.
Both standard coded or varied coded signaling is available
between satellite and customer on either dedicated or
multiplexed lines. The signaling between the satellite and
central station uses high security encryption techniques.
Advantages:
— Such a system results in reduced telephone line costs as
satellites are located in most major towns, and local
signaling is on shared lines.
— The system enables previously expensive connections,
due to long distances from a manned central station, to be
practicable.
32
MANUAL
— A multiplex line from the satellite to the central station
can be duplicated or backed up on the public switched
telephone network.
4.15.3.4 Shared iine signaling
A technique has been developed where multiple signals from
an alarm system can be transmitted continuously and
simultaneously on a computer data network or private speech
line, with no interference to the quality of host data or speech.
The alarm data is extracted from the network and routed to a
central station or satellite for onward transmission to the
central station. Sophkticated encryption techniques are used
to ensure very high security.
Advantages:
— The use of existing data and speech networks means very
low outlay on telephone lines between the collection point
and the central station.
— This system ensures high security of sigrmlling due to use
of encryption techniques.
— Multiple signal channels are available.
Special facilities can include:
— a 30 km radius catchment area for the central station
— a high security varied coded signal
— detection of a substitution of the correct signal and an
alarm
— a system to accommodate different warnings given by
each customer transmitter, such as: system open;
intruder alarm, personal attack alarm; fire alarm; machine
process alarm
— multiple connection of transmitters to one telephone line.
4.16 Accesscentrol
4.16.1 Prindplos and OW-VOS
The control and movement of personnel is fundamental to a
good securi~ system. Basically, people should only be
allowed access to an area if there is a need for their presence.
An example is a computer or data processing department,
where no-one but the computer staff should be allowc{i
entry, and then only during their normal working hours. This
entry control can be achieved without the extensive use of
guards by simply installing an access control system.
The most basic arrangement uses ‘stand alone’ mechanical
key pads, where the lock incorporates a numeric plate. To
gain access to the protected area the correct number must be
entered in sequence. There is no electrical interface so it is
quick to install. Used for single door, low security applications,
13 buttons can achieve 5500 combinations in codes of
between 5 and 7 digits.
When introducing an electrical interface the combinations
can be extended to over 20700 sequences. The electrical
interface triggers an electrically operated release or strike
which is described in section 3.4,6 of this Applications
Manual.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
To further enhance the security measures individual encoded
cards can be employed which are fed into or through readers
adjacent to strategic entries. Cards and tags are available
which activate the door release when brought into the
proximity of the readers. This ‘hands free’ facility introduces
a signiikant increase in cost.
The decision-making process in an access control reader
checks:
(a) the card encoding and verifies current authorisation
(4) that the card number is allowed to enter the access point
(c) that the time for entry is valid
(d) that the day of the week is valid.
The reader only grants access if all conditions are met.
The security of an access control system can be increased by
fitting a keypad reader. In this case to gain entry an
individual has to posses a valid card and also has to know the
personal identification number (PINIwhich is unique for each
card. A further sophistication can be introduced using an
electronic keypad which alters the numeric display of entry
keys at random so that the location of the digits changes at
everyinstanceof request for access.Wkh3628 800 permutations
of display, distant unauthorised observers experience greater
difficulty in identification of the actual access code entered.
The accesscontrol market has developed along two main and
fundamentally different paths, these being distributive
intelligents ystems and centrally controlled systems.
4.16.2 O“tibutive intelligent systems
With these systems the individual reader decides whether to
allow entry and is effectively a ‘stand alone’ system. Readers
of this type, however, may be connected together and to a
central monitoring and control centre for management
purposes.
By connecting the readers to a control centre it is possible to
‘download’ to the individual card readers, changing their
databases and either adding or deleting individual cards held
in memory. It enables card readers to communicate with the
centre, informing it of all movements through each door.
With thk information the central management system can
keep a historical record of all movements and print reports
and when necessary.
Advantage%
— Individual doors are unaffected by breaks in communica-
tion.
— Door readers continue to offer full securhy even in the
event of the central system being faulty.
— Decision-making is quick and therefore allows for rapid
movement through doors.
Disadvantages:
— Such a system requires a more complex reader.
— A system requiring a large number of card readers is
expensive.
/
4.16.3 Centrally con~rolled systems
These systems consist of unintelligent readers which are
connected to a central computer system. The readers simply
read the card and send the information to the central
computer, The central computer makes the decision and
commands the reader to allow or deny access accordingly.
Advantage:
— This is a cost-effective solution where a large number of
individual cards are involved. These systems are able to
cope with up to 20000 individual card holders.
Disadvantages:
— In the event of a failure in either communication or the
central computer system the level of security is degraded
because the reader does not have access to the database.
— Access can take longer if the system is busy as a result of
having to refer decisions to the central computer.
— Smaller systems are not cost-effective because of the need
to purchase a central computer.
4.76.4 Accesscards
4.16.4.1 Passive
A Wiegand card uses a thin wire matrix sandwiched between
two plastic outer surfaces. It offers better security with less
chance of card duplication than other types of access cards.
In addition, Wiegand readers are not so susceptible to
electromagnetic interference.
In situations requiring a degree of economy, magnetic stripe
cards are used. For medium security applications a tougher
card using barium ferrite to contain the code can be
employed.
‘Watermark’ magnetic tape can offer greater security as the
tape stripe within the card is permanently coded during
manufacture with the purchasing company’s identification.
The stripe also includes a standard magnetic section for the
purchaser to add further reprogrammable codes relating to
the individual staff member and their allocated access level.
All cards can incorporate the company logo, photograph of
the holder and personal identification. They should not
indicate the address of the building for fear of misuse if they
become lost. Sealing machines are available on some systems
as
for company in-house preparation of cards. Employing an
outside agency incurs a cost penalty for small batch
production.
4.76.4.2 Active
The hands-free card or token is activated by a pulsating radio
frequency emitted by the proximity reader. Coils within the
card act as an aerial and relay the induced signal to an
electronic circuit which for an instant triggers a small
battery-driven radio emission identification to the proximity
reader.
Such a system incurs costs of two to three times that of
conventional readers. Up to 1000 cards can be addressed by a
single reader. The arrangement is not as quick in operation as
conventional card readers because it may be necessary to
33
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
bring the card to the reader more than once before the system
receives a recognizable signal, The cards are three times
thicker than others and are less flexible. The minute battery
has a life in excess of 10000 operations, and depending on
battery output the card can be read 75 mm to 250 mm from
the proximity device, Special readers are available, at greater
cost, which can identify cards at a distance of 1 m. It is not
strictly necessary for the activator to be a card; it can also take
the form of a key-ring fob. Hands-free security access
systems are only recommended for special situations.
Care must be taken as any metal adjacent to the readers can
weaken their signal strength. Therefore they should not be
mounted on metal partitioning.
4.16.5 Radio coded access
A radio access control system is similar in operation to a
personal paging bleeper. If personnel approach an area that is
‘out of bounds’ a microwave or similar detector will sound an
alarm. Staff who are allowed admittance carry a pocket-sized
transmitter that inhibits the system. No action is required by
the user, the transmitter being permanently ‘on’. In addition
to allowing access, the system can be used to release locks and
trigger automatic doors. This can be useful for areas where
hands-free access for only specified personnel is required,
Recharging facilities are required in much the same way as
pocket bleepers but as these units have a security function
care should be taken in positioning them to inhibit their use
by authorised persomel. In addition it is normal to
incorporate an automatic alarm if personnel leave the
building without returning their units for recharging.
4.1 6.6TV and intercom door entry system
In multi-tenant situations and tower block flats the requirement
for vetting callers at the ground floor entrance can be met
using a TV and intercom door entry system. The integration
of the TV camera in the entrance call panel, and the viewing
screen in the flat monitor, enables the occupant to see and
speak to the caller without being observed themselves.
Various features are available such as picture enhancement,
audio control, interconnections for parallel monitors, digital
signaling with a single wire accepting 9000 potential
subscribers. If the occupant wishes to accept the caller then
they can release the lock (e.g. an electromagnetic lock) on the
main entrance door using a button on the monitor. For
further guidance see section 3,4.7 on electric locks.
4.17 Closod circuit television
4.17.1 General
This section outlines the principles of closed circuit
television (CCTV).A basic system comprises a remote camera
to observe and transmit, together with a central monitor to
receive and display. With multiple cameras a form of switch
selection will limit the number of monitors. Similarly, to
move a camera, a form of control can be added.
When considering CCTV systems take account of these
factors
34
. the level of lighting provided: daytime or night-time,
shaded, natural or artificial
— the viewing field required: fixed or adjustable, close or
distant, wide or narrow angle
— the picture quality required: high or low resolution
— the environment in which the camera will be placed: clean
or dirty, wet or dry, subject to vibration
— the type of control required: manual or automatic
— the type of display required: constant, sequenced,
movement activated, split screen
— the type of recording equipment required: real-time or
time~kpse, alarm activated:
Various camera technologies are available which become
more expensive with the requirements for operating in lower
light levels. Figure 4.8 shows the operational light levels
applicable to each type of camera.
4.17.2 Cathode ray tube camera
The purpose of the camera is to convert an optical picture
into an electrical signal (1 V video) for transmission back to
the monitor. There are five basic cameras using either 2\3-
inch or 1-inch camera pick up tubes. 1-inch tubes are used
when high definition pictures are required. The effect may bc
compared with the difference obtained by using larger
photographic negatives in film cameras.
4.77.2.7 ‘Wdicon’ camera
This is the simplest and cheapest type of camera, usually of
2/3-inch format, and is generally classed as an indoor camera
as h is normally used where lighting conditions are fairly
constant. A light level of 50-100 lux is required for a full
video picture. Most CVldicon’ cameras do not provide for
automatic iris lenses, and have limited automatic light
control.
This type of camera will permanently retain an image on the
tube when covering a high contrast area. This gives a
ghosting effect on the display screen, usually referred to as
‘burn in’. This requires a fairly frequent tube replacement of
about every six to nine months. The camera is capable,
however, of producing a high definition picture.
4.17.2.2 ‘Newvicon’ camera
In a 2/3-inch format, this is the most widely used type of
camera. A 1-inch format camera is also available. ‘Newvicon’
cameras use an automatic iris lens to maintain full video
pictures in light levels down to approximately 5 lUX.They
have fairly long lives of around 18-24 months before ‘bum in’
occurs, and they give well defined pictures in conditions
ranging from daylight down to the lowest light levels, A
version allows the use of infra-red lamps to give full video
pictures during hours of darkness.
4,17.2.3 ‘Uhricon’ camera
This is a high definition camera capable of rendering a full
video picture in light levels down to 1 lUX.It gives a full video
picture under the infra-red spectrum, so fully discreet infra-
red lamps (using ‘black light’) can be employed. A long-life
 —
2
SECURITY ENGINEERING
Upper limit of
lUX vision tolerance
level
Range of ‘Vidicon’ of cameras
1: camera extended by

11
Id
Unobscured
closing lens iris
sunlight

104 Heavily X Typical daylight

103
II overcast
day

Sunrise
+
Operating
Welt lit chart
theatre
Approximate

❑ “’’’”’’”””’
Sunset
Drawing office
range of ‘Newvicon’
camera, using
Approximate range auto iris lens
102 Offices, shops
of ‘Wdicon’ camera
Stairs, corridor
f

101

Iiiiiii
$j$
:; Twilight
..’
1

{0.41X]
“ Range of ‘tidicon’ and
‘Newviconi cameros
10-’ Moonlight extended by infrcs-red
+ lamps ‘

I
10-2

n
(5mlx)

I
SIT camera Approximate lower
(2mlx) }
1()-3 Clear night limits for intensified
[02mlx)
ISIT camera tube camera
[O08mlx) }

10-

10-5
I Overcast
night sky

Figure 4.8 Relative light level

chart showing operational ranges of
several types of camera

tube lasts UDto 36 months or more and is verv resistant to cameras, because of high cost, are only used for specialist
‘burn in’. Tkis is classed as a low light camera._ applications.

4.17.2.4 SiT (silicon intensified tube) camera 4. 17.3SeUd state cameras

This camera usually utilises a l-inch format, and is classed as
a ‘moonlight’ camera. It is employed in situations for which
infra-red is unsuitable (that is, when no heat source is
detectable). It requires at least the equivalent of moonlight to
produce pictures (between 0.2 and 0.5 lux).
Disadvantages:
— Its daylight pictures are not of a very high definition.
— The camera has a light intensifier welded to the pick-up
tube making periodic tube replacement very expensive.
With the advancement of chip technology, many manufacturers
have been producing solid state cameras which use 2\3-inch
and l\2-inch compact lenses. In these cameras the vacuum
pick-up tube is replaced by a solid state charge coupled
device (CCD)which acts as a light sensor. The advantages
arising from using a light sensor instead of a tube are:
. small size of camera
— low power and voltage (typically 12 V DC) 2-3 W
— no image ‘bum in’

— It is an expensive camera. — no geometric distortion

— The camera is quite large. — insensitive to vibration

— less easily damaged
4. 17.2.51Slr(intensi fiedsilicon intensified fube} camera
— insensitive to exterior magnetic fields
A variant of the SIT camera classed as a ‘starlight camera’, is — very long life (seven years, or more)
capable of producing pictures at light levels of only 0.08 to 0,2
lUX. — short warm-up time of about 0.5s
— no blurring when panning
Both SIT and ISIT cameras must have some light to produce
pictures; neither will work in complete darkness. The — requires little maintenance.

35
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
At present the resolution of these cameras does not equal that
of a good tube camera but this failing is rapidly being
overcome. The cameras are also relatively expensive, but as
the cost of producing these sensors is reduced the cameras
should become competitive. Colour versions are already
producing very high quality pictures.
This type of camera can also read light in the infra-red
spectrum. Indeed, infra-red falters are often necessary to
maintain good pictures in daylight.
4.1 7.4 Lenses
The lens is the most important part of any camera. The field
of view of any lens is governed by its focal length and can
range from around 5 mm (wide angle) to 150 mm or greater
(telephoto). The light-gathering capability of the lens is given
by its j-number (the ‘speed’ of the lens). The\-number of a
lens is its focal length divided by the maximum aperture of its
iris. The lower thej-number, the ‘faster’ the lens and the less
illumination required to obtain full pictures. In the case of
video cameras, the~-number is usually between 0.98 and 2.0.
Lenses are divided into two categories: fixed and zoom
lenses.
4.17.4.1 Fixed lenses
These are the simplest lenses and have focus and iris
adjustment only. Available for 2/3-inch or 1-inch format
cameras, the lenses are always referred to by their focal length
(50 mm, for example). Lenses for solid state cameras are
available in l/2-inch and 2\3-inch format.
4.17.4.2 Zoom lenses
These lenses have variable focal lengths. The lenses are
classified by minimum and maximum focal length (such as
16-160 mm). Zoom lenses may be manual or motorised, but
for security use only motorised lenses are used.
For use with ‘Newvicon’ or ‘Ultricon’ cameras, both fixed
and zoom lenses are fitted with automatic iris units. These
units maintain a constant light level on the picture tube
irrespective of ambient light levels. The amplitude of the
camera video signal is used to open or close the iris as it falls
or rises below or above 1 V peak-to-peak.
4.17.5 Monitors
Monitors are TV sets, without the tuning facilities, which
provide higher resolution, A colour monitor does not need
resolution as high as a black and white monitor, as the
addition of colour greatly increases the amount of information
on the screen. Indeed the method used at present to create
colour pictures on a monitor or TV set limit the resolution
possible.
Monitors are available in sizes from 3-inch to 26-inch
screens. The dimension quoted is always the screen diagonal.
The most common sues used are 9-inch (capable of giving
the sharpest picture) and 12-inch. Camera and monitor
resolution is also quoted in lines (such as 700 lines). This is
the number of vertical lines across the screen which a camera
or monitor is capable of clearly defining. This is always
36
MANUAL
clearest in the centre portion of the monitor screen due to
tube geometry. A high quality camera or monitor is one
which resolves 800-1000 lines.
4.17.6 Switching systems
Four monitors are the maximum that can be sensibly scanned
by one person. For greater accuracy of viewing this is
normally reduced to only one or two monitors. In order to
display multiple cameras on one or two monitors, some form
of switching system is required.
4.17.6.1 Video switchers
These are the simplest type and are known as passive
switchers. They consist of a set of interlocked switches which
allow the manual selection of pictures from a number
cameras for viewing on one monitor. The switchers do not
normally cater for more than 12 cameras. Looping versions
are available which allow the camera signals to be passed on
to further switchers in other positions.
4.77.6.2 Video sequential switchers
These units, usually referred to as sequencers, automatically
switch the camera signals in sequence to the monitor.
Switches for each camera signal allow manual selection of any
picture to override the sequence if it is necessary to hold a
picture for any reason. Similarly an alternative position of the
switch allows a picture to be deleted from the sequence. The
time a picture is on the screen during the sequence ranges
from 1-60s.
Sequencers are of four types:
— Homing sequencer: This sequencer uses one monitor
only as a sequencing or hold monitor.
— Looping homing sequencer: As above, but this allows the
camera signals to be passed on to further sequencers or
switchers.
— Bridging sequencer: This type of sequencer allows for
two monitors: one continuously displaying the picture
sequence, and the other only displaying a selected
picture.
— Looping bridging sequencer: As bridging sequencer but
allows the camera signals to pass on to other sequencers or
switchers.
4.17.6.3 Alarmed sequencers
All the above sequencers can be obtained with alarm inputs
for each camera channel. The alarm input can be from any
type of detector providing either a closing (or opening)
contact. For instance, a fence detector can trigger the picture
from a camera covering the fence to appear on the monitor.
The alarm input overrides the sequencing on the monitor and
holds the relevant picture until the alarm is cancelled.
4.1 7.7 Camera control systems
In order to extend the use of a camera, a movable mount (a
pan and tilt unit) can be added. The camera, zoom lens and
pan and tilt unit assembly is often referred to as a fully
functional camera. The use of a fully functional camera
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
allows a larger area to be covered by one camera but may
require an operator to move the camera. A continuous
automatic panning action can be used to give an overall view
of an axea if desired. Indoor and outdoor versions of pan and
tilt units are available. For outdoor use the camera and lens
are contained in a weatherproof housing which can be fitted
with wash and wipe units to keep the housing window clean.
In order to control fully functional cameras, signals or
voltages must be relayed from the monitor area. These fall
generally into two types: hard wired and telemetry control.
4.17.7.1 Hard wired control
This refers to a system whereby voltages to drive the pan and
tilt of the lens, for instance, are transmitted along a multi-
core cable from a control unit at the monitor end. Although
the cheapest system of control, it is limited to a maximum of
100 m of cable due to voltage drop along the cable. Usually, a
system of this type is installed with only one or two cameras.
4.77.7.2 Telemetry control
With this type of control, signals to operate the fully
functional cameras are coded in a manner which allows them
to be transmitted over greater distances than possible with a
hard wired system. In any telemetry system a receiver at the
camera decodes the control signals and supplies the power to
move, pan and tilt the lens, for example. Telemetry systems
can use the coaxial cable carrying the camera video signal or
can be relayed along a twisted pair cable or similar. One
method uses digital pulses, from a transmitter control unit,
inserted in the blanking period of the video signal and
transmitted in the opposite direction to the video signal.
Other telemetry systems convert the control signals into
analogue FM signals (usually around 12 MHz) which again
can be sent along the video coaxial cable or a separate cable.
There are several variations of both systems but the results
are all similar.
The advantage of all these systems is that greater distances
can be covered for control. Basically, the distance which can
be covered depends on the voltage losses of the coaxial cable.
This results in around 600 m using a low loss cable. To
increase this distance various forms of signal amplification
can be used, up to 2000 m being possible.
One transmitter can control any number of cameras but
beyond approximately twenty cameras more sophisticated
microprocessor-based units are used.
4.1 7.8 Additional video equipment
There are many units which can be incorporated into camera
systems to extend, add information, or simplify cabling. A
list of the more common items is given below.
4.17.8.1 Hdeo amplifier
A video atnplifler is inserted into a camera line to allow cable
runs of longer than 600 m between camera and monitor.
4.17.8.2 Distribution amplifier
This unit allows a camera video signal to be directed to
several different points. The units usually have one video
input and four video outputs, each output providing 1 V
peak-to-peak full video.
4.17.8.3 Camera identification generator
This unit inserts a camera number onto the monitor picture
used particularly where camera pictures around a site are
very similar.
4.17.8.4 Time and date generator
A time and date generator inserts the time and date onto the
monitor picture.
4.17.8.5 Screen splitter
This allows multiple imaging (of pictures from 2, 4 or 16
cameras) on a single screen. It can be particularly helpful
when combined with a second monitor which is programmed
to switch sequentially from one camera to another. An
operator can immediately refer to the split screen for a view of
an incident from another angle.
4.17.8.6 ~me lapse video recorder
Whilst standard video recorders can be used to record video
pictures, these units are limited by the length of the tape
cassette (up to four hours). To overcome this problem time-
Iapse recorders have been introduced. These machines allow
up to 480 hours of recording on a standard two-hour tape.
They are usually used in conjunction with an alarmed
sequencer, in such a way that on the receipt of an alarm the
machine reverts to two-hour playing time (real-time) for a set
period, and after recording the cause of the alarm reverts to
time-lapse speed.
4. 17.8.7 Movement detectors
These units allow the cameras to instigate an alarm. Although
of many types, they all work by a change of contrast over a
selected area of the camera picture. A change of contrast
causes an alarm to be raised and this can be used to trigger a
time-lapse video tape recorder (VTR) or similar recorder. The
units range from single channel, simple units basically for
indoor use, to 16-channel sophisticated outdoor units for
intruder detection.
4.77.8.8 Wdeo printers
These are relatively new devices which produce a photographic
type print of a video picture as required. The picture quality
is similar to a newspaper photograph.
In all video systems one very important point must be
observed. The impedance of the cable run from the camera to
the last unit in the chain must be 75 fl. Additionally, the
system must have a video input and a video output to permit
the connection of a printer.
4.17.8.9 Multiplexer
Multiplexer permit multi-channel recording on a single
video machine. When recording, each channel is encoded to
enable the viewer to identify each camera during play-back.
Sequential switching can be incorporated into the system as
well as split screen generation to allow simultaneous viewing
of the pictures from all cameras recording the incident.
37
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
4.17.9 Slow scan
Slow scan has become a general term to cover systems for
transmitting video pictures over telephone networks. Ml
systems of this type allow an unattended surveillance
capability of any site merely by using a telephone.
A transmitter at the camera site captures and stores frames of
video for transmission over the telephone network or private
wire. The transmission time is approximately 8 s for a low
definition picture or 32s for a high definition picture. By use
of a digital dialler connected to the ordinary telephone line, a
call to the transmitter opens a contact, which after a ‘hand-
shake’, transmits the necessary data to the receiver to
produce pictures on a monitor. The pictures can be in
sequence or in quad form with four simultaneous displays in
a split screen. It is also possible to control the cameras from
the receiver. However, movement can only be viewed in steps
due to the time required to produce the picture. Movement
detection can also be added to each camera whereby the
transmitter can raise an alarm and automatically contact the
receiver. The receiver can be installed in a central station or at
the customer’s security headquarters.
4.18 Uninterruptible power supplies
It is essential that security systems are operational at all
times, therefore the security system design must cater for a
loss in mains power. Additionally most modern security
systems make use of computers and microprocessors which
are susceptible to power interruptions of a few milliseconds,
and to corruptions of the supply voltage, frequency and
quality. An uninterruptible power supply (UPS)overcomes
these problems by providing a clean, constant source of AC
power. A static, on-line UPS consists of four basic modules:
— phase controlled rectifier
— set of batteries
— DC to ACinVertOr
— bypass or transfer switch.
The phase controlled rectifier draws power from the AC
mains, keeping the battery bank charged and holding the
batteries at float voltage level. A falter between the rectifier
and the batteries reduces ripple to maximise battery life. The
battery will invariably be of the lead-acid, sealed, low-
maintenance type. The invertor converts the DC power into
AC, controlling voltage, frequency, harmonic distortion and
power rating. This is normally achieved by pulse width
modulation (PWM).The regulated ACoutput is fed directly to
the power input terminals of the protected plant.
Should the mains power fail, the invertor draws DC power
from the battery and the load will operate without
interruption until the battery discharges to a level defined by
the battery characteristics and efficient operating parameters
of the protected load. This time period must be carefully
specified, together with the output load, as the control will
automatically switch the UPS into bypass when the battery
reaches the critical discharge level, even though the supply
has not been restored. On mains restoration the electrical
supply to the UPS must meet both the connected load and
battery recharge current. During recharge the UPSsupport
time will be less than specified, and after a prolonged
emergency can take 48 to 60 hours for the battery to reach
38
peak condition. In the event that the UPSitself fails, the static
bypass switch will connect the load without break to the
alternative bypass power source, usually a separate service
from the mains input to the UPS. For areas of high security,
specifkations typically demand four-hour standby.
It is normal to provide a UPS for all the central equipment
with the field hardware being supported either from the
central urs or by the fitting of float chargers. Float chargers
consist of stepdown mains, transformer, full wave rectifier
and battery to provide a constant supply of 12 V DC.
4.19 Alarm system control panels
Control panels must meet the requirements of BS 4737’).
Manufacturers offer their own variety of operational arran-
gements and facilities.
Panels should fulfil the following criteria:
— They should be carefully commissioned.
— They should be compatible with the components and
wiring used throughout the system.
— They should be user-friendly, but also difficult for m
intruder to overcome.
— They should be installed professionally.
— They should be maintained to the manufacturer’s
specification.
The panel should be located in a protected area adjacent to
the front main entrance. To discourage any unauthorised
activity at the control panel it should be in full view of
passers-by, but in such a way that the visual display remains
hidden from general view. Permanent night lighting should
be provided to the entrance foyer with key switch control in a
protected location.
Surface cabling can disclose information of connected
circuits and be open to attack. Therefore distribution cabling
should wherever possible be installed flush or hidden from
view in the vicinity of the control panel and at situations
where multiple runs occur.
Panels must be constructed to resist attack. They should be
rigidly f~ed by screws and able to sound an alarm if
tampered with or removed from their wall or desk mounting,
Main electrical services should be installed in such a manner
so as to prevent unauthorised or accidental isolation. The
service should be dedicated to the panel and not form part of
any other circuit or sub-circuit.
Battery back-up should be provided to activate an alarm and
power the system should the mains fail. Dual components
and circuitry should be incorporated wherever possible to
safeguard the integrity of operation. Tried and tested
modules can offer higher assured integrity and reduce
maintenance call-out.
The operational facilities for alarm control panels can
include:
— a timer to isolate alarm sounders after a protracted period
— a timed memory log of panel activity with hard copy
print-out at request
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
— an extended memory store, desirable for certain situations — system and panel testing facilities
— an automatic time-based mtivatiotiisolation, programmable — a coded or real language alpha numeric display of panel
to take account of weekends, holidays and variable status, zone and detector in alarm, setting procedures and
working patterns maintenance information
— facilities to incorporate a personal attack circuit, to enable — a keypad interface to permit activation, isolation and
guards or police to respond to a personal alarm carried by control functions
or positioned near members of staff
— on intelligent systems, flexibility of zone configuration
— audio and visual alarm circuits
for installed systems.
— a visual display unit (VDU) interface to provide a diagram
of detector locations and alarm states
— fault monitoring and reporting functions References for section 4
— a variable alarm threshold for fine tuning to reduce false
alarms
1 BS 4737: Irswu&r alarm systems (Milton Keynes: British Standards
— an adjustable time delay to permit the last personnel in Institution) (1977-88)
the building to exit through a controlled route
2 BS 6799:1986 Code of practice for wire-jree intruder alarm systems
— an individual zone control to permit a zone isolation in (Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1986)
fault condition or selection of particular zones for
actuations with partial occupation 3 Control of Pollution Act 1974 (London: HMSO) (1974)

— the ability to communicate with other remote panels or 4 Noisefr.m audible inrru&r alarms Code of Practice (London HMSO)
control stations (1982)

39
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
5 Control rooms
5.1 General
Having established that full-time personnel will be required
to monitor security functions within a building complex, it
will be necessary to advise on the requirements of the room
from which they will operate. There is a tendency to
underestimate the space required. As a result of being the
only personnel to constantly man the building, security
personnel are called upon to perform many more functions
than just guard the building from intruders. The following
sections deal with the functions for which a control room
must cater.
5.2 Control room functions
S92.1 httruder alarm panel
This is usually a night-time and weekend function, but
increasingly includes daytime surveillance of emergency
exits. The control panel itself may well incorporate override
or ‘shunt’ facilities for certain doors. Space should be allowed
for standby batteries or UPS, preferably local to the control
panel.
S.2.2 Fire alarm panel
This is a continuous monitor function, and is usually
automatic in operation. Larger premises may require
decisions by the security officer in the event of fire, regarding
evacuation or warning alarms. The security officer will
almost certainly be responsible for ensuring the safe escape of
occupants and will require the communication facilities to
ensure this.
5.2.3 Sprinkler alarm panel
This monitor function generally operates in conjunction with
the fire alarm panel.
5.2.4 Mains and generator status panel
Standby generators may require closing down after mains
restoration. During the night and at weekends this function
may involve security personnel.
5.2.5 Heating, vontilatien and air conditioning
status panel
Remote alarms and status panels are positioned invariably
within the control room. Usually the security personnel
monitor and advise maintenance personnel. There is also a
requirement for a smoke ventilation control panel, to be
activated by a fire officer in the event of fwe, to enable
extraction of smoke by switching selected plant,
40
MANUAL
5.2.6 public address system
This is sometimes associated with the control room to allow
message broadcasting in an emergency situation. Standby
batteries must be considered if evacuation instructions are
normally given via the public address (PA)system. This might
occur in multi-storey office blocks, exhibition halls, theatres,
cinemas. If interlinked with the fire alarm system batteries
and control, the PA systems must meet the relevant British
Standard.
502.7 Two-way radio
This is required for communication between security patrols
and the control room. It hugely replaces the security patrol
time clock. Space for radio racks and battery recharging is
required.
S.2.8 Pocket paging
Pocket paging is not necessarily a security function but
invariably the security personnel will be required to monitor
the use of a pocket pager and ensure all units are returned
when staff leave the building. There could be a requirement
for a charging rack for the batteries or pagers.
5.2.9 Radio coded entry
Certain areas such as computer rooms may require this
facility. Again security personnel will be required to monitor
its operation, respond to alarms and ensure that radio units
are returned for recharging when staff leave the premises.
5.2.10 Card mccoss
Card access control is becoming a more common requirement.
Coded cards may double as identity cards for all personnel.
The issue and coding of such cards is a security function
requiring storage space.
5.2.11 Identity/time cards
These are regarded as the responsibility of security staff and
require records and storage space.
5.2.12 Lift aiarms
These are remote alarms usually positioned within the
control room and requiring security personnel to advise
engineering staff or take action.
5.2.13 Bomb alert
An alarmconnection to reception and to telephone operators
allows security personnel to advise engineering staff or take
action.
S.2. 14 Car park monitoring
This will require remote gate or barrier operators, and is a
function associated with CCTVand card access.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
5.2.15 Persennel records
Security records and personal data on staff require filing
space.
5.2.16 Plant monitoring
In addition to building services, other urocess functions mav,
require monitoring at-night. A separate alarm panel can also
incorporate alarms conneeted to cold rooms, rest or medical
rooms, computer-controlled environmental services or UPS
status monitoring.
5.2.17 External lighting
Although usually operated by time switch or photocell
arrangements, override facilities may be required in the
control room to illuminate areas at night in cases of out-of-
hours delivery or incident.
5.2.18 CCTV
CCTVis most useful in surveying hidden areas and entrances
in places such as underground ear parks and loading bays. It
carries a high deterrent value. Thought should be given to
discreet surveillance of visitors in reception areas where more
obvious security checks are not desired. The space requirements
for monitors, pan and tilt switching, auto-switching and
recording equipment within the control room should not be
underestimated. Infra-red cameras will require additional
lighting control.
5.2.1 9Telephones
All external telephone lines from the control room should be
ex-directory and inaccessible from the internal private
automatic exchange (PAX) system. An internal extension
should be provided for staff to contact the control room on
non-urgent matters. Otherwise all internal alarm calls should
be routed to a separate ‘internal only’ extension. StaiTshould
be dissuaded from calling emergency services direct as this
may result in several phone calls repornng the same incident.
The emergency telephone should have an automatic conference
facility to assure staff that the incident is being monitored,
and does not leave them with an engaged tone. A private wire
telephone link to the local central station alarm should be
considered. In the event of out-of-hours personal attack a
pre-recorded tape can be initiated on this line by a simple
panic button. All emergency telephones should be configured
to ensure full ‘stand alone’ operation in the event of a PAX
power down. Consideration should be given to panel-
mounted telephones which allow the provision of more desk
or console space.
5.2.20 Drawisy#s
Up-todate drawings showing the position of all emergeney
exits, hose reels, fire-fighting appliances, fire shutters, and so
on, should be available and stored within the control room.
5.2.21 Keys
Invariably, duplicates of keys, including master keys, should
be stored in the control room and a key issue record book
maintained.
5.2.22 Doorbells and entryphones
These should be provided to enable security staff to be
contacted out of working hours. A video entryphone may be
advisable for full visual inspection of all persons requesting
entry.
5.2.23 Health and safety
Increasingly, security personnel are being requested to take
responsibility for tasks associated with health and safety and
therefore they may require space to store relevant material
and fust aid equipment.
5.2.24Time clecirs
Time clocks are usually associated with security, and the
security room will need space for the storage of cards.
5.3 Canfrol room design
5.3.1 Position
The control room is usually associated with the reception
area, but where the staff entrance is separate from the
visitors’ entrance preference should be given to the staff
entrance, leaving the receptionist to cope with normal
visitors. It is good practice to ensure that staff have day-to-
day contact with the security staff to enable on-sight
recognition.
The security room should permit observation of outside
activity but prevent internal activity being viewed from
outside. The particular lighting needs of control rooms are
discussed in section 3.5.
5.3.2 ~U*
The structure of the control room should offer the occupants
and equipment inside a high level of physical protection. It
may also be necessary to totally enclose the control room as
protection against terrorist action,
Consider installing bullet-proof glass and plastics. Access
doors should be lockable from the inside only and open
inwards, preferably from the main corridor or reception area.
The door should be heavy duty, with no door handles on the
outside, and any glass should be one-way.
5.3.3 clothing facilities
Waterproof or protective clothing, boots, and so on, will
require storage as will normal clothlng if uniforms are worn.
Drying facilities should be provided insecurity personnel are
required to monitor the premises externally in bad weather.
41
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
5.3.4 5ervices
The-lighting in a control room should not cause veiling
reflections on TV monitors or control panels. Luminaires
should contain emergency power packs to ensure illumination
during periods of mains failure. Separate heating and
ventilation will be necessary as the main heating, ventilation,
and air-conditioning (HVAC)system will probably be off
during the night and weekends. It is recommended that very
good ventilation is provided to prevent a drowsy atmosphere.
Some form of cooling may be required. Toilets should be
nearby, preferably associated with a changing room and
shower. Cooking facilities should be provided as security
persomel are on duty for long periods of time. A small
refrigerator, microwave oven and sink may be all that is
required. It is essential that security personnel do not have to
leave the building or secure area in order to obtain meals.
Power supplies to the control room should be protected as far
as possible; they should be derived from two separate circuits
on the main distribution. If a standby generator is available
the supply should be maintained from this source.
5.3.5 Miiellaneous items
Storage facilities should be provided for equipment such as
torches, spare batteries, first aid kit or whistles. Simple items
such as a notice board or duty rosters can take up a surprising
amount of space,
The layout of the control room should allow for future
flexibility or modification. Ensure that routine maintenance
of items such as TV monitors can be carried out without
disrupting the whole system.
5.3.6 5taffing
The total number of security staff to be employed should be
ascertained, remembering that in normal circumstances
three or even four times the number of staff on duty will be
required to provide 24-hour security. Each of these
personnel will require personal storage facilities, and at times
of changes of duty a small control room and changing facility
can easily become congested,
5.3.7 Visual display units
Care must be taken in the design of the control room and
security system to take account of the steady growth of
electronic interface and presentation of information on visual
display unit (VDU) screens. The combination of the lighting
and desk or other internal surfaces should not produce
reflections on the screen which cause eye discomfort and risk
of misunderstanding of the information displayed, See
section 3.5 for further @idance on lighting.
Recent research has shown that personnel can only view VDU
screens for an average of 10 min before losing concentration.
The computer program must present alarms that will initiate
an immediate response. Multiple screens are now commonplace
and yet the degree to which the brain can absorb simultaneous,
incoming information is limited.
42
The integration of alarm systems with a common ‘head end’
permits a single screen, printer and un~led graphics package
in a neat, condensed central control station. Even with CCTV
h is possible to have an ‘alarm screen’ mounted in a central
position with routine permanent VDUS on either side. The
alarm screen comes into play on an alarm signal, and displays
a ‘need to know’ format of information particular to that
alarm signal. In addition, the image from the CCTV camera
nearest to the incident can be automatically displayed on the
screen and panned towards the incident location.
The size of the screen has a direct relationship with the ability
to discern information presented. Investigations in dealer
rooms showed that the change from 9-inch to 12-inch VDUS
had a significant consequence in reducing error rates in
reading the data on screen. Careful planning ensures an
efficient relationship between operator and computer.
5.3.8 Developments
As fire alarm systems, building management systems, and
security controls become computerised it can be foreseen
that a processor will eventually carry out all the functions at
present represented by lights and sounders, presenting an
alarm or incident call on a VDU with a summary of its effect,
previously known faults, and action to be taken.
At present, this type of control is only available by slaving a
processor from the various individual control panels situated
elsewhere. Great care should be taken to ensure that this
approach, whilst perhaps reducing the space requirements
within the control room, does not produce a situation where
the actual control is remote and interfaced thereby adding to
the possibility of fault. Until such time as properly co-
ordinated processor-controlled fire, security and alarm
function systems are produced any slave operating system
should be carefully assessed.
Where systems are stand-alone and interfaced to a central
monitoring point each system retains its individual alarm
priority and switching program. In such circumstances the
central monitoring point, such as a building management
system (BMS)console, is effectively only a data collecting
agency which must be directed to display signals in priority.
Graphics are a great aid, allowing the colour coding of alarm
levels and systems.
Multiplexer can be employed to transmit data from the
central monitor to outstations which can initiate a programmed
response to the alarm condition across all systems. The most
common form of central control is digital format; however,
systems using analogue signaling are available.
Effective interaction means a simple, ‘user-friendly’ control
centre. Touch-screen graphics are being introduced to aid
interaction (the operator drives the system by touching
screen prompts). Detailed operation choices are displayed in
event of any changes of state or manual override. The
standards applicable to each individual system must be met
on other systems at the interface and control.
The benefits of bringing together all systems are control
room integration, co-ordinated maintenance, central station
monitoring and better ergonomics.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING

5.4 External considerations point and a proportion of the high security network costs,
thus providing effective central station supervision at a more
viable cost.
5.4.1 Fence wiring

Normal perimeter fencing can incorporate wiring which 5.5.2 5tmndards

initiates an alarm when cut or disturbed. Some versions
include fibre optic cables that are virtually tamper-proof. The National Approval Council for Security Systems
Double security fences are recommended for high risk areas. (NACOSS) carries out inspections of central stations
operated by BSIA member companies to ensure compliance
with BS 5979(]‘. A certificate of compliance is issued which
5.4.2 Mkrowaw fences must be renewed by further inspection after 12 months.
Items investigated include operating procedures, location,
In areas where traditional fencing is inappropriate, microwave construction, entrances, exits, surveillance, alarm protection,
systems can be installed which raise an alarm when a body safety equipment, standby power, communications, reliabilhy,
passes between the receiver and transmitter (see Figure 4,4), records and facilities. Subse uent inspections examine the
‘1
However, they are subject to false alarms and should only be quality of service to BS 5750( ‘.
connected to a local control room and not to an automatic call
system. A control room will usually be equipped with infra-
red CCTVto monitor any alarm. The system can automatically
5.5.3 Design
turn on perimeter floodlighting to act as a deterrent.
Requirements for central stations are contained within BS
The ranges of such devices and the method of installation
varies between manufacturers. The overlapping of systems 5979 and relate to physical construction, across, communication
paths, services, manning and operations. Because the
offers higher security and helps to identify false alarms.
commercial central station caters for such a diversity and
volume of alarm monitoring the protection of equipment,
communication paths, persomel and information are of
5.&3 Exterior security
lighting paramount importance.
Exterior security lighting should be controllable both The freed parts of the building shell must be capable of
manually from the control room and automatically by infra- withstanding sustained attack and explosion. Entrances,
red, ultrasonic or microwave detectors. Security lighting is normally scrutinised by CCTV,should be of the airlock type
presented in more detail in section 3.5. with electrically interlocked double doors. Hinges on the
doors should be on the secure side, and care should be taken
to ensure that electric locks or bolts are of the type that will
resist attack. Also make sure effective escape is possible in the
5.5 Commerdal central stations event of fire.

Keep glazed openings to a minimum. Ventilate the rooms

5.5.1 Functions artitlcially with heating, cooling or filtration as necessary,
and arrange ventilation ducting to prevent the introduction
Commercial alarm companies operate continuously staffed of noxious substances. Physical covers, such as grilles, should
central stations to provide: be provided for bolting over ductwork in the event of an
— monitoring of remote security alarm systems using emergency. Seal all cable, duct, and pipe entries into the
telephone cables; with intelligent systems the central central station, Provide emergency power and lighting for the
station can identify individual detectors and the nature of station from a secure battery and diesel generator system.
the alarm
— monitoring of remote fire alarms
5.5.4 communication paths
— control and supervision of guards and patrols

control and supervision of delivery and collection services
— maintenance of liis with the police
— maintenance of links with the fire brigade
— control and storage of keys
— other monitoring, checking, and supervisory duties as
appropriate.
Charges relate to the functions performed, plus a telephone
connection and rental charge based on the grade of circuit
and distance travelled by the signal.
A nemtork of secondary, unmanned (satellite) collector
stations link remote subscribers to the central station. The
subscriber is charged for the lime cost to the local collection
To prevent breaks in communication, provide duplicated,
protected routes for telephone cables, private circuits and
other monitoring cables. Incoming cables should emanate
from two dfierent telephone exchanges and enter the
building from opposing directions. Breaks in supply usually
occur as a result of local road or site excavations.
References for section 5
1 BS 5979:1987 Codeoj practicefor rsmote csrures for intruder alarm
sysrems (Milton Keynes British Standsrds Institution) (1987)
2 BS 5750: Quality gwsenss(Miiton Keynw. British Sumdsrds Institution)
(1987-90)

43
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
6 operation. ‘Silent’ fire alarms, like those used in theatres
Specialist applications
6.1 Retail outlets
6.1.1 General
Losses can occur due to shoplifting, theft by staff, theft or
loss in transit, accidental damage, or vandalism. A well
phmnedlayout, good security systems and security personnel
minimise such losses. Staff should be properly trained in how
to identify potential shoplifters and be able to take necessary
action.
The designer should plan the layout and lighting carefully.
Observation mirrors integrated with shelves and display
units can allow a clear field of view over all parts of the sales
area.
There are many security devices and systems specifically
developed for retail situations. Security personnel are
essential to monitor goods and staff entrances, cash checkout
points and sales areas. Uniformed and plain clothes officers
are required, and they must all understand their powers of
arrest.
Different security measures are necessary for trading
periods, out-of-hours working and when the shop is
completely unoccupied. During unoccupied hours the
security system should offer perimeter protection plus
particular protection for items of high value. Regarding out-
of-hours working when staff require early or late entry to the
premises, their access should be restricted to the areas
necessary for their allocated task. Locate toilet and changing
room facilities within these defined areas and maintain the
security measures to barred sections. During opening hours,
the security measures concentrate on the security of the
displayed wares.
Thefts by the public and shop staff alike are commonly
referred to as ‘wastage’ by retail organisations. Shoplifting
can be controlled by surveillance by staff and ‘tagging’ goods,
as explained below. Theft by staff can only be controlled by
the retail organisations.
6.1.2 Pkmning cemsidemtiens
Careful planning of the shop layout and communication
routes can reduce ‘wastage’. Consider the following guidance.
— Avoid stafT entering through the goods entrance.
— Ensure the goods entrance is supervised or overlooked by
a manager or senior staff (the use of Ccrv is a particularly
effective deterrent).
— Ensure that all goods are delivered to the same point.
— Provide toilet facilities for delivery drivers outside the
protected area.
— Windows accessible by staff should not overlook the staff
car park areas or side streets.
— Alarm wiring
should be fully protected to prevent
tampering during the daytime.
— Ensure that fire exits cannot be opened without an alarm
sounding. A particular problem is where a group of shop-
Mters will deliberately initiate a fire alarm to cover their
44
and cinemas, may prevent this problem (where a
particular tune is broadcast over the background music
system). However, fire officers may resist such a measure.
6*I.3 Merchandise tagging
Most tagging systems use magnets which are detected by
simple coil circuits mounted adjacent to the exit doors. If the
shopper is in possession of a stock item that has not had rhc
tag or detection trigger removed or demagnetised an alarm
will sound. The magnets are usually encapsulated in plastic
and disguised as shop labels and are removed at the checkout
desk. The magnetic tags can be pre-sown into the lining to
combat unauthorised removal. High value items would
normally be fitted with a detection trigger that requires
removal by a special tool. Items such as radios or domestic
appliances can have the detection trigger fitted internally, the
shop assistant removing the trigger at the same time as fitting
batteries or testing. Boxed items can be protected by self-
adhesive name tags that incorporate a very flat trigger
magnet. Instead of being removed, these can be demagnetised
at the checkout by a demagnetising coil fitted below the
counter top.
Similarly, library books can be fully protected using the same
system. The book, on being checked out, is automatically
passed over a demagnetising coil at the same time as date
stamping occurs. The customer is not aware of the security
system being in use. When returned, the book trigger is
remagnetised before being returned to the shelves.
Metallic items such as hardware goods can be protected by
direct magnetizing without using a tag system. Again,
demagnetizing occurs at the checkout position and can be
hidden below the counter top.
A thief-resistant safe provides the safest place for cash, and
till contents should be moved into the safe as frequently as
possible, with the tills being locked during working hours
and the safe being locked at all times, High denomination
bank notes should be passed at the tiIl directly into a high
security deposit box rigidly f~ed to and forming part of the
checkout counter. Alarm pushes at each till should summon
an immediate response in the event of an incident. Staff
should be trained in using the tills and responding to an
alarm. Monitor staff at all times.
The movement of cash from the till to the safe should be
undertaken speedily, by at least two reliable and fit people,
fidly aware of the security procedure. The movement of cash
from the safe to the bank should be undertaken by a specialist
security firm at varied time intervals with only small amounts
of cash ever retained in the store overnight. At the close of
business all tills should be empty and left open thus reducing
the possibility of damage by night-time intruders,
Electronic tills can identify the operative and verify their
efficiency. CCrV cameras at the checkouts can assist in the
idemiflcation of offenders and video back-up can substantiate
any accusation. cm systems are available which interface
with the till to superimpose on the security guard’s monitor
in the control room the actual amounts being keyed. Any
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
discrepancy between the price keyed in and the actual price
can be easily spotted.
When the electricity supply fails, shops become prime targets
for theft, therefore an emergency power back-up system, or
UPS, is essential to power the security system and maintain
the integrity of the checkout computer and till.
6.1.5 Fu* measu~
The following measures serve to reduce losses in sales areas:
— Plan display arrangements to maximise the visual fields of
staff.
— Protect items of high value by providing locked cabinets
or continuous staff presence.
— Place all items of high value together and away from exits.
— Correctly price all items with coded tags.
— Ooerate
. strict till mocedures
. for removing or de-
activating tags, enclosing items in bags an~ issuing
itemised receipts.
The following measures serve to improve stock control:
— Verify the quantity, condition and identity of all
deliveries.
— Operate strict stock control and provide frequent,
unannounced spot checks.
— Ensure the accountability of individual members of staff
for the receipt, storage, despatch and delivery of specified
consignments.
— Store goods of high value in a secure room and monitor
and record all movements in and out.
— Introduce discrete security systems to selected areas.
6.2 Computer rooms
6.2.1 General
The security required for a computer installation will depend
upon the nature of the work being progressed. It is necessary
to assess the different risks, categorise them and develop an
overall security strategy. Such risks are listed below. Looking
at these points it must be appreciated that the motivated and
well informed professional is not going to be stopped by the
usual security measures.
Deliberately sabotaging a computer is another matter
entirely. Considerable damage can be done to tapes and disks
very simply and access must be denied to all persons not
specifically required within the computer suite or storage
areas. One person with a magnet can cause as much damage
to operations as one with a sledge hammer, for instance.
6.2.1.1 Terrorist attack
This type of threat usually takes the form of mechanical
damage. To date, terrorist attacks throughout the world have
been notable for their lack of sophistication. Precautions to
be undertaken include the following:
— Do not advertise the location and relative importance of
the establishment.
— Provide the structure with physical protection.
— Position the most sensitive areas in the most inaccessible
parts of the building.
6.2.1.2 Industrial espionage
Almost certainly such a threat will come from within the
organisation. External means of accessing computers, through
wide and local area networking, should prevent a well
informed outsider from stealing or altering stored data. For
further guidance see section 6.5 on industrial espionage.
6.2.7.3 Fiscal gain
Any system should prevent an employee or an outsider from
unofficially transferring funds to their own accounts.
Introducing a parallel cross-checking facility enhances the
integrity of the operating and records system.
6.2.1.4 Unintentional or malicious errors
A careless employee can make a costly mistake, or an
aggrieved employee can take deliberate, damaging action, by
wiDinz out the vear’s accounts, for instance. Regular,
su&r~lsed back-up copies are essential, and should be ~laced
in a fire-proof safe with the master copy, to which access is
restricted. Off-site storage, supervised by a specialist security
operator, offers an alternative.
6.2.1.5 Physical damage
By monitoring and restricting the numbers and identities of
persons allowed access, the probability of physical damage is
reduced. Building services tradesmen undertaking works in
computer rooms should be strictiy supervised and areas in
which they work clearly defined.
6.2.1.6 Computer viruses
This threat must be considered and the integrity of all
programs introduced investigated. Only use pro~arns from
known and trusted sources. Further protection can be
introduced by fitting special circuit boards and operating
software to detect either attempts to load permanent memory
changes, or instructions to self-replicate and invade another
program.
6.2.2 Hardwaro eantral
Key systems can be incorporated to ensure staff are approved
for access. To energise the computer or activate operations
control the inputting of a card or access code is required. A
hand-held remote unit, using a decoder, for wide area
networks is effective in discouraging deliberate or accidental
access to central databanks.
6.2.3 6oftwaro control
Computer software programmers can build security devices
into their programs. These require the operator to enter a
code correctly before access is permitted to the relevant
information. The final level, to permit amendment to the
operating system itself, should only be known to the most
trusted and senior staff.
45
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
Data is best protected, however, by encryption techniques.
Systems are available which offer automatic fde encryption,
multi-tier management hierarchy, internal test functions,
audit trial recording, and limitation of access to pre-assigned
hours and dates. This kind of protection is available in the
form of a softnvare package, or a plug-in printed circuit or
security card.
6.2.4 Room entry control
If the computer suite is contained within a building that is in
itself protected by central access control and security
persomel, then they can operate the systems described
below.
6.2.4.1 Curd access
All computer personnel and visitors are issued with coded
access cards. These cards are inserted into the control point
of the access door which unlocks the door. Remote recording
of time of entry and exit and the card holder’s name can be
used, This system does not stop unauthorised personnel
entering by ‘invitation’ of a card holder. Unauthorised entry
by the use of lost or stolen cards is controlled by regular
updating and changing of codes or by having to enter a
personal code into a numeric keypad at the point of entry.
Refer to section 4.16 for greater detail on access control.
6.2.4.2 Radio coded entry
All authorised personnel would carry a battery operated
transmitter that looks similar to a pocket paging unit. These
transmitters can be used to open or unlock doors to
authorised personnel and sound an alarm if any unauthorised
personnel approach.
6.2.4.3 CC7V
This is of particular use to observe staff at work within the
room, alone, at night, or at weekends, for monitoring their
safety, as well as for security reasons. Refer to section 4.17 for
details on CCTV systems.
6.2.4.4 Metal detectors
These are used to ensure that no magnetised material,
intentionally or otherwise, is brought into the computer
room.
6.3 Museums and ati galleries
6.3.1 Geneml
A museum or art gallery normally contains rare and unique
exhibits of great monetary value, or of political significance,
reflecting their antiquity and irreplaceability.
Security systems within museums and art galleries should be
divided into two groups: those which remain energised
permanently, such as local protection for showcases or
pictures; and those which need to be de-energised during
opening hours to permit the public to gain admission. The
cabling to both circuits should be permanently monitored.
46
Consider at the design stage the policy for manning the
building. If patrolling security staff are envisaged during
closed periods then facilities need to be provided to monitor a
patrol’s progress, avoid the activation of false alarms and to
permit speedy reporting of security breaches.
6.3.2 ExMbh ~
Significant exhibits may be protected by placing them within
glass-fronted showcases with, if applicable, bandit glass.
Access to the case may be permanently contacted and the
glass protected by a sonic or seismic device to detect
breakage.
Where the viewing of exhibits is required without any
interposing glass, a physical barrier (for example, rope) can
be used to prevent the public touching the exhibit, and an
active infra-red or photo-electric sensor added to detect a
breach of the barrier. Further protection may be given by
using proximity or pressure pad techniques so that any
movement to interfere with the exhibit results in an alarm
condition.
6.3.3 Piciuros
Pictures may be iIlegally removed, cut from their frames or
defaced. Several patent solutions are availaLIe in the form of
concealed microswitches, proximity device., reed relays with
magnets adhered to the rear of pictures, or seismic detectors
to signal interference with the frame or canvas.
6.3.4 Flexibility
The seeurity systems in modem museums and art galleries
should permit regular changes to the exhibition layout. A
cabling system to include floor, ceiling and wall outlet
positions permits the location of high risk items as required
but with minor constraints upon positions for alarms. In art
galleries a system of flush outlets at eye level will permit
variable connections to be made. Where pictures are
suspended from a rail the cables maybe concealed within the
rail and cords. Also, floor outlet boxes for both power and
security cables, with adequate segregation, may solve the
problem of retaining flexibility.
6.3.5 Zoning
Permanent alarm circuits associated with the building fabric
and access routes can be logically zoned and diagrammatically
represented on a master indicator panel. Where flexible
alarm circuits are used care needs to be taken to ensure the
accurate location of a sensor in an alarm condition.
6.3.6 Alarm procedures
Examine the interrelationship between the alarm system, the
security warders, the exit routes and the position of the
protected risk. To be effective all staff should know precisely
the action required of them upon aiarm conditions both
during occupied and unoccupied hours, A clear, logical
display of alarm zones, meticulous attention to records and
lock security, and prompt action upon an alarm will help to
keep the risk to a minimum.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
— technical process information
6.4 Ammunition and explos”mes
— quotations, offers, pricing formulae

6.4.1 5torage — correspondence, meeting notes.

When designing security systems for the storage of ammunition The importance of the information and consequences of loss
and explosives the basic principles of detection apply. In should dictate the provision security, in the form of locked
addition ensure the provision of adequate fire protection and cabinets, fire-proof safes or strongrooms, for instance. A
explosion resistance. good system of housekeeping requires the shredding of
unwanted documents before disposal and the typing of
These special installation methods directly relate to the classified information onto coioured, non-photocopiable
sensitivity of the stored items to ignition. Where relatively paper.
inert items are stored the regulations are less stringent, but
where there is the possibility of explosive dust being present
6.5.2 Cemputer espionage
tlte criteria will be correspondingly more exacting.

Thk is possibly even more difficult to detect than any other

The regulations basically apply to the degree of mechanical
form of criminal activity. Unauthorised access to computers
protection required:
via telecommunications networks, modems or subtle modifi-
— Flame-proof cations to software can result in fraud of considerable
magnitude. Whilst card access systems and security alarm
— Dust-tight
arrangements described in this document may defeat the
— Totally enclosed. inquisitive or malicious they are unlikely to assist in the
detection of criminal activity within computer systems. For
Relatively low levels of electromagnetic radiation can initiate further guidance refer to section 6.2 on computer rooms.
ignition of some stored items, and this factor prevents the use
of electromagnetic sensors.
6.5.3 ‘Bugging’
Equally, attention must be given to the selection of the type
of sensors and the way in which their operational characteristics Bribing or ‘head hunting’ key staff are much more certain
may be affected when mounted in enclosures. Alarm panels ways of obtaining discreet information from the competition
are best sited in non-storage areas to avoid the unnecessary than investing in listening devices. Only in exceptional
expense of certified flameproof equipment. circumstances do companies or their agents resort to
‘bugging’. ‘Bugging’ devices are more frequently used
internally to identify petty thieves than for espionage.
6.4.2 Precessi~
6.5.3. ? ‘Bugging’ devices
The regulations for the processing and filling of ammunition
and explosives are very similar to those which apply to stored The microphones and transmitters can take the form of
items. The level of protection required depends on the everyday items to be found in an office. The larger devices
activity involved and will relate to the following categories: have long range transmission of about 1000 m, a battery life
of 250 h, and a good listening range of up to 5 m. Portable
— Normal industrial
units are available aspens, for example, or even in a shape flat
— Totally enclosed enough to slip inside an envelope. The smaller the device, the
less the range and life expectancy. Short-life ‘bugs’ come in
— Flame-proof
sizes as small as a grain of rice, and transmit a distance of up
— Dust-tight to 300 mm.
— Acid-proof.
Telephone ‘bugs’ on analogue circuits are powered by
‘leaching’ current from the line service, and can therefore
operate indefinitely. Digital telephone exchanges have
6.5 Industrial espionage introduced certain difficulties, but some specialists claim to
have overcome them.
6.5.1 General
The costs of ‘bugging’ devices are relatively small and it is not
Most cornrnerckd and industrial organisations have information an offence to sell the apparatus. However, unregulated radio
which, if released, may either harm them or be of use to other transmissions are illegal in the UK and, if committed on
parties. Such a breach of security may remain undetected and another’s property, civil action may be instigated. Any
result in the failure to gain contracts, or the loss of a market damage to British Telecom or Mercury equipment could
lead. Sensitive information can include: result in financial liability.
— patents in the course of preparation
Another form of listening device is a powerful parabolic laser
— formulae, particularly of complex products and chemicals microphone. This can record conversations inside a building
from distances of up to 600 m outside.
— design information

— drawings, sketches and plans 6.5.3.2 Detecting ‘bugging’ devices

— trade contracts, business opportunities, sales strategy
A tunable air band receiver will detect the more basic type of
— research papers, results, conclusions transmitter, but for devices using VHF and higher frequencies
47
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
a radio wave detector with LED display is employed.
Telephone devices may be ac~ivated only after lifting the
handset, so it is necessary to trigger calls when undertaking
regular building scans. Equipment is available for connection
to the telephone exchange which monitors each line and
detects any significant power change. Analysers are also
available to identify the tapping of incoming national
network lines at the main exchange.
6.5.4 Electromagnetic interference
Computers, VDUS,cables and electronic equipment all emit
electromagnetic radiation which can be detected and
reconstructed remotely. The gathering of information in this
manner is now an offence. The most vulnerable components
in a computer network are the screens and printers due to
their high energy levels. Equipment to decode radiated
signals is cheap, readily available and can operate several
hundred metres away, With protection, this distance is
reduced to about 10 m.
One form of protection against eavesdropping is the use of
TEMPEST (Transient Electro Magnetic Pulse Emanations
Standard) approved computers and terminals. TEMPESTwas
developed by the American National Security Agency (NSA)
for important data establishments. The approved equipment
restricts the radio frequency emissions. Only approved users
may purchase TEMPESTequipment, however, but suppliers
do offer similar equipment of a standard close to TEMPEST
specification.
Interlining cabling is also at risk to ‘tapping’. A fibre optic
network offers greater security, with no electromagnetic
radiation and less opportunity to splice into the data
highway. EquaIly, data waves can cause ‘screen interference’,
data corruption and in extreme cases data wipe-out. Directed
radiated signals and radar waves can be used in an act of
sabotage.
The only satisfactory method of deterring electronic eaves-
dropping is to reduce the level of emissions so that they are
contained within an acceptable radius. The main data
processing equipment and access terminals containing
sensitive information should be located centrally within the
structure and the wails, ceilings and floors of the computer
suite should be specially treated. The treatment can take the
form of lead plaster for the walls, a close, metal mesh buried
in the structure, or a laminated mesh contained in the
partitioning and each ceiling tile’s core. All screening should
be earthed to a common point or connected to a mask
transmission generator. To offer continued protection it is
essential the superimposed frequencies are constantly changed
at random. A transparent fdm is available to give a limited
reduction of emissions through glazing panels.
Purpose-built rooms in new developments can incorporate
the mesh within the cast concrete and enclose the rooms with
individual layers of protection. Meeting rooms can be
similarly treated to combat emissions from ‘bugs’ inside the
room.
There are a small group of specialist companies whose advice
should be sought when considering securing rooms against
electromagnetic interference (EMIJ.
48
6.6 Drugs storage
Any place where drugs are used or stored is a prime target for
attack. Stores containing large quantities of hallucinatory
drugs attract a particularly high risk. Pharmaceutical
companies have their own standards and security advisers
who specify the measures to be taken.
The storage of these drugs in hospitals, clinics, and
pharmacies is governed by an Act of Parliament. An HMSO
publication’ 1)gives details for the planning and construction
of pharmacies as well as the construction and installation of
approved drugs cupboards. Sensors in the pharmacy or
drum cupboards could inform Dersonnel of an intrusion and
ther~for~ initiate a response to minimise any theft or damage
already taking place. -
6.7 isolated premises
6.7.1 General
Although the treatment and design of security measures for
isolated premises should always follow the basic principles
set out in this manual in the way of protection and detection,
false alarms and response time need parncularly careful
consideration.
6.7.2 Nature of isolation
Isolation can take several forms: a single unattencied
building; a remote installation with difficult access, in full
view of a control and protection post; an installation hidden
from such a pos~ or even a large, fully staffed building, well
away from any other, Each situation should be treated on its
own merits with a consideration of response being one of the
most critical factors.
6.7.3 Physical protection
Isolated premises can lend themselves to more effective
physical protection than can often be achieved elsewhere and
this can be very effective, particularly if it is coupled with
silent detection at the earliest possible point in an attack,
Long perimeter fences are susceptible to both local weak
points and false alarms. A combination of detection methods
is advisable, incorporating monitoring and correlation
facilities to identify alarms as real or false.
Wherever possible, and particularly for unattended buildings,
walls should be breach-proof. Windows, doors and duct
openings require a high level of protection.
6.7.4 Response
The aims of any security system must be the earliest possible
detection and the earliest possible, effective response. The
system must take account of the purpose of detection: the
apprehension or deterring of intruders. Silent alarms help to
apprehend, and loud, local alarms deter. The sealing or
control of escape routes, at the earliest possible time after
detection, can trap intruders and permit longer response
times.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
6.7.5 False alarms
Increasing the sensitivity of an intruder detection system
generally increases the incident of false akums. In the final
analysis the balance between sensitivityy and false alarms
must favour the response and not the intruder.
The testing of detectors needs to be carried out under
conditions closely simulating those found in practice. Of
particular importance is the impact of environmental factors,
including animals, which can produce unwarranted alarms.
In essence this is no more true for isolated premises than for
any other. Good installation practice is an essential complement
to good design.
6.8 Gilil installations
6.&1 General
The category of civil installations includes airports, seaports,
oil and petrochemical installations, power stations and
industrial complexes. The security threats depend on the
function and geography of the site, as well as a variety of
external factors. The potential threats must be identified, the
risks analysed and the necessary responses defined.
An approach to protecting civil installations should follow
the following operational phases:
(a) ~~;~sij: Initial client discussions. Threat and risk
(b) Phase 2: Site survey. Further client meetings.
(c) Phase 3: Development of detailed specification, balancing
costs against risks.
(d) Phase 4: Presentation of detailed proposals to client.
(e) Phase 5: Evaluation by client, discussion and approval,
A system must offer the correct balance between physical
protection, electronic detection, surveillance, and response
measures. The text covers civil airports, large industrial sites,
and marine installations.
6.8.2 Civil airperis
A@orts and other international ports of entry present one of
the most challenging and unique security hazards known
today. They comprise public, passenger and runway areas
which, though interconnected, all pose different sets of
security problems. They attract the most determined
politically motivated terrorists and, because they now handle
large volumes of high value cargo, are a tempting target for
the professional criminal. The security system and procedures
must therefore be designed to counter these threats and yet
not impede a smmth passage for travelers.
The airport security system must perform two principal
tasks. The first is to protect the expanse of runways, radar
installations, fuel depots and other service areas. The second
is to monitor access to, and movement within, the main
buildings. Security fencing and a number of different
perimeter detection systems may be required, incIuding
fence-mounted sensors, buried pressure sensors and beam
type devices. The exact specification will depend on
environmental and topographical considerations as well as
the level of the perceived threat.
Long range detection is also possible using radar and CCTV,
Ground movement surveillance radar can be used by security
personnel to monitor the airport with a sensitivity that
detects intruders crawling through grass at a range of 2 km
from the antenna.
CCTVis an invaluable long-range surveillance tool. Linked to
a movement detection system, it can scan a sensitive area and
raise an audible warning whenever persomel or vehicles
enter the protected area. CCTValso allows security personnel,
customs or immigration officials to conduct unseen surveillance
of passengers passing through the arrival halls or similar
areas.
Access by airport staff to airport facilities, offices and the
controi tower must be carefully controlled and monitored. A
card access system is a highly effective solution that can be
enhanced by the addition of a keypad. The employee must
use the keypad to enter a personal identification number (a
secondary form of identification to the coding recorded on
the card).
Central control stations are employed to monitor the security
status of the entire airport and alert the appropriate response
forces whenever an alarm is generated.
Baggage X-ray, metal detection and explosives sensing for
cargo surveillance are specialised areas beyond the scope of
this document.
6.8.3 Large industdai sites
Power stations, petrochemical installations and large industrial
sites face threats of vandalism, pilfering, politically motivated
sabotage, or terrorist attack. The result can range from
relatively minor inconvenience or loss to major damage
which could cause a complete shutdown with subsequent loss
of sales and profits.
The approach to the protection of large sites is similar to that
usually adopted for defending military installations. This
involves the construction of layers of security so that if one
layer of defence is compromised further obstacles face the
intruder. The lines of detection or defence are often
combined so that full alarms are raised only when detection
has occurred in two layers, one after another. This type of
system design can dramatically reduce the incidence of
nuisance alarms, Industrial installations can occupy a large
area requiring at the very least a visible and robust boundary
fence to warn off trespassers and keep out wildlife.
Sometimes a second fence is erected on which sophisticated
detection equipment can be installed.
Sensing equipment on boundary fencing should incorporate
units to detect vibrations caused by cutting or climbing, and
units to register attack with oxyacetylene torch equipment. A
barbed wire is available incorporating a central fibre optic
core which monitors continuous integrity. Further lines of
defence are outdoor microwave detection, buried pressure
systems and infra-red beams, all of which are best installed in
the sterile zone between the inner and outer fences,
Perimeter security systems are normally backed up by CCTV
and specialised lighting. Security personnel in remote
control rooms can therefore investigate alarm conditions and
assess whether intrusion has occurred. Linked to CCTV,
monitors incorporating a video movement detector can alert
49

CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
security control room staff to any movement. Overall
security is therefore improved because security operators no
longer have to maintain constant and tedious vigilance of the
TV monitors.
Personnel entering, leaving or moving within the site will
need to be monitored and controlled. It maybe necessary to
provide a full range of access control equipment from high
security mechanical locks to advanced electronic systems
using identity cards. The latest high security systems, termed
biometric, use human body characteristics, such as finger
print, voice or eye retina identification techniques, to ensure
the highest level of security. As the systems become more
developed and techniques refined, virtwdly foolproof access
control will evolve.
Forming an integral part of any system are various elements
of physical protection. These range from bullet resistant
security screens and doors to protect personnel in offices
where cash is handled, to highly sophisticated blast resistant
doors for use in nuclear power stations.
Large installations, particularly those engaged in chemical
and petrochemical processing, face a serious threat from fire.
The duty of the security staff may also include the reporting
of and response to fire situations.
6.8.4 Marine instaiiatiens
Installations bordering on rivers and estuaries present extra
problems which have to be taken into account when
designing security systems,
Systems should be robust and suitable for operating in the
ambient conditions. The movement of piers and jetties with
tidal flow must be considered together with access below the
waterline. Isolation of installations into sections can minimise
the detrimental effects of attack.
6.9 Defence establishments
6.9.1 General
The ideal security system will accurately detect a threat from
land, sea or air at the earliest opportunity and transmit an
immediate warning, indicating the required action from the
security staff. It will also employ a variety of automatic
counter-measures and physical barriers to obstruct the
progress of the intruder.
A military establishment requires defences against outside
attack, electronic eavesdropping, unauthorised access, theft,
fire and sabotage. These measures will consist of successive
layers of defence so that, in the event of one layer being
breached, the protected area is not immediately vulnerable.
The approach to security management is based on two clear
principles. The first is to assume that the person against
whom the security measures are directed is highly intelligent
and knows exactly how your defences are constructed. It is
essential that they are designed so that such knowledge does
not immediately enable the devices to be compromised. In
fact, such knowledge shouid, if anything, deter the intruder
because he knows the quality of the obstacles he faces. The
second principle is that no matter how refined the detection
50
.—
and warning devices are, they need to be backed up by
physical barriers, The reason for this is that intruders may
not fear detection, perhaps because they are sufficiently
strong in numbers, possess equipment to overcome resistance,
or because they can achieve their objectives and escape before
the defenders have had time to react. Intruders may even
wish to be caught inside the sensitive area for the purposes of
publicity.
The following zones are considered individually: distant
protection; immediate perimeter; within the perimeter; inner
protection. Note that a military threat is not the sole danger
and so other factors are discussed.
6.9.2 Distant pretectien
Very early warning of approaching problems on land, sea or
in the air can be provided by the use of long range
surveillance systems. Closer to the perimeter a highly
sensitive ground movement radar can provide coastal and
area surveillance, pinpointing the direction from which the
threat is approaching.
However, if the enemy can remain hidden by hilly ground or
thick vegetation, the conditions will be unsuitable for
detection by radar. The answer is a series of remote ground
sensors linked by radio transmitters to a monitor unit that
receives, decodes and presents the information on an LED
display, Such systems can be effectively deployed in a wide
range of terrains and can detect the difference between a tank
and a lorry, between one and two tanks, and between motor
vehicles and persomel on foot. They therefore give [he
control centre additional, vital information about the scale of
the approaching threat.
6.9.3 Perimeter pretectien
To reinforce distant protection a series of barrier devices
should be considered for the perimeter of the site. The exact
specification of these devices will be determined by
environmental and topographical considerations, Typical
proposals would consider microwave outdoor movement
detectors, fence-mounted geophone systems, or buried
pressure systems which have the advantage of being invisible
to the intruder.
All these measures still need to be supplemented by physical
barriers to block the path of the intruder, such as security
fencing, anti-personnel barbed wire systems, electrified
fences, hydraulic ramps and bullet resistant gatehouses,
6.9.4 Within the perimeter
The security measures inside the site must strike a balance
between detecting and obstructing the intruder while, at the
same time, allowing the day-to-day activities of the command
centre to proceed efficiently and without undue hindrance.
Where there is a clear risk of sabotage, for instance to
communications equipment, fuel storage or vehicles, the
types of detection devices used at the site perimeter can also
be applied within the boundary. In addition, an all-weather,
omni-directional Doppler radar sensor will detect anyone
approaching within a range of 20 m and yet be insensitive to
the presence of birds and small animals.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
Continuous surveillance of other parts of the site can be
provided by CCTV systems, perhaps incorporating video
movement detectors in areas particularly at risk. Compressed
video techniques, using standard voice-grade telephone
lines, enable the economic installation of distant camera
positions.
6.9.5 Inner protection
The prime target within the military establishment requires
the ultimate levels of physical protection and the most
sophisticated types of access control. Access control is
available in many forms. These range from high security
mechanical locks to advanced. electronic systems using
identity cards or human body characteristics, such as
fingerprint reference, with others using voice recognition
and retina identification.
6.9.6 Oiher factors
The telephone, data and intercommunications networks
must take account of the sensitive nature of information
transfer. Take measures to prevent electronic eavesdropping
from within and outside the premises. Direct access to the
decoded signals by personnel needs especially rigorous
control. When planning the security system take steps to
prevent the unauthorised removal or copying of documents,
the removal of equipment, or unauthorised photography.
6.10 Financtal organisations
6.10.1 6eneral
The financial community is a prime target for the professional
criminal, who remains undaunted by the obvious security
measures that would deter the opportunistic housebreaker.
Such a criminal expects to find obstacles in his way but is
confident that careful scrutiny will reveal occasional weak
spots often enough to secure a lucrative living.
Potential victims obviously do their utmost to prevent
security lapses but such is the speed at which their systems,
services and premises are being adapted that it is all too
possible for loopholes to become exposed. Types of crime
include safecracking, armed robbery, petty theft and
computer fraud. Security measures to protect against these
are considered at branch, head office and international level.
6.1 O.ZThe local branch
At the local branch level the counter staff, the strongroom
and the automatic teller machines IATM5Jare at greatest risk.
The methods of attack usually involve considerable physical
force. Such has been the success in developing VirNtiy
impregnable safes and strongrooms that the pattern of
criminal attack has centred on the points at which cash is on
the move and subject to human handling. As a result, armed
attacks on local branches, with staff being subjected to
terrifying threats, have become all too common.
Bullet-resistant screens and security doors provide staff with
the assurance that, despite the extreme unpleasanmess of the
experience, their personal safety need not be at risk. The
physical protection offered by this equipment will always be
reinforced by appropriate electronic detection and alarm
systems. These will register the presence of an intruder,
transmit a warning to an off-site monitoring station, together
with pre-determined instructions for subsequent action by
the staff at the station. Such carefully planned instructions
remove the risk of panic reactions.
The alarm devices available cover an enormously wide range
of possibilities so that all environments can be successfully
monitored. Breaking glass or vibration detectors, window
and door contact breaker switches, infra-red, ultrasonic or
microwave movement detectors, and personal attack buttons
can all be supplied and tailored to create a network of alarms
to meet all identifiable risks.
The alarm contacts for safes are generally seismic devices and
should be arranged with the safe manufacturer’s consent so
as to ensure that the units do not degrade the integrity of the
safes. Detectors are available with a swivel plate which covers
the keyhole, thus enabling them to detect an attempt to insert
skeleton keys or explosives.
If the safe weighs less than a ton it is best fixed by an extra
strong method to the floor or structure. Before purchase
always ensure that the safe proposed is approved by the
insurers for the specific risk involved. Various categories of
safe are available to protect against fire and against the
different types of forced entry. Members of the Association
of Burglary Insurance Surveyors (ABIS) can advise on the
recommended maximum value of items to be protected by
each type of safe.
CCTV provides yet another means by which electronic
security can thwart the criminal, and linking CCTV to slow-
scan transmitters or video movement detectors enhances the
system still further.
A prominent feature of financial organisations and retailing is
the growth of plastic card-based transactions. These present
ever increasing scope for fraudulent use of stolen cards and
robbery from cash dispensers. Card authorisation terminals
use the public telephone network to contact the card issuer’s
central computer and provide a direct check on validity and
credit capacity. They are now in service with major retailers,
making a significant contribution to the reduction of credit
card fraud.
The ATMS, relying as they do on the secure containment of
cash and the integrity of their data transmission networks,
create a number of security threats, The provision of effective
barriers will protect against physical penetration, alarm
systems to warn of unauthorised access to the ATMS or access
under duress, protection against vandalism and security for
the data networks on which the ATMS depend.
6.10.3 Head office
Nowhere are the demands on security more pressing than at
the regional or head office level of an organisation, partly
because of the higher value of transactions undertaken and
partly because completely new risks arise. The head office
will be the source of highly confidential commercial
information about the organisation’s own plans and those of
its customers. Maintaining confidentiality will demand
carefully controlled personnel procedures and skillful incor-
51
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
poration of locks, cabinets, safes and access control systems
to provide the finest back-up for those staff involved.
Card access systems provide an ideal means of controlling the
movement of people within the head office. Each employee’s
card can be programmed to permit entry within specified
time limits to particular areas or combinations of areas within
the premises. PIN keypads, higher security card technologies
(such as Wiegand cards) or fingerprint, signature, voice, and
retina identification provide the access system with optional
security enhancements to the highest levels. Effective control
of access is a fundamental component of modern security.
The correct approach will provide the maximum freedom of
movement for authorised personnel and the most effective
barriers against unwanted visitors. See section 4.16 for more
details.
The greatest risks, however, relate to the computing centre
and its data networks. The development of data cmnrnunications
within and between financial institutions has brought
dramatic improvements to operating efficiency and customer
convenience. The extension of transactional networks to
corporate offices, retail outlets and even the private home is
already a technological reality and will undoubtedly be
accelerated by the increasingly fierce competitive pressures
within the financial sector.
As the flow of funds through the expanding networks
increases, so too does the opportunity for crime. Information
leakage, fraud, theft and malicious disruption all become
greater risks with possibly devastating consequences. The
need for the highest standards of network security has never
been more pressing and can only increase as the systems
expand. Seek the advice of a specialist in data communications
when introducing control of network access, limitation on
access levels, user authentication and message privacy. The
exact nature of protection will vary in relation to the
individual circumstances, the network configuration and
user needs.
With such a wide range of risks and so many possible
elements of security, financial organisations must have an
effective means of integrating the various threads and
ensuring an instant, co-ordmated response to alarms.
Sophisticated detection and signaling systems serve no
purpose if nobody reacts to the warnings they transmit.
6.1 0.41ntomational communicdons
Advances in the communication frameworks of the financial
community have revolutionised its ability to conduct high
speed transactions of colossal value. This creates enormous
and ever-growing demands on security.
The security and integrity of electronic transactions have
become a major headache for international bankers as the full
significance of the consequences of a failure in the system
becomes apparent, The size of the routine transactions, the
spread of the various international networks, and the shared
access to them, amplify the severe problems already
described in this Manual to an even higher level. The
integrity and assured security of international links require
specialist applications beyond the scope of this document.
52
MANUAL
6.11 SchooIs and colleges
As audio-visual aids for education become more sophisticated
and microcomputers more prevalent, schools and colleges
become more attractive targets for theft. Another disturbing
trend is the crime of arson. Nearly a thousand schools were
attacked in 1989. Offenders were mostly male and aged
between 14 and 16. Fires started deliberately cause four times
more damage than accidents as they are set in the most
vulnerable locations.
Early warning of unauthorised out-of-hours entry is essential
to prevent such attacks. A survey of 15 schools in northern
England ‘2) showed that the total number of break-ins
reduced from 119 to 13 following the installation of alarm
systems,
Full protection for such large buildings can become
prohibitively expensive so a more subtle approach is
required. The locking away of all portable valuables in secure
stores each evening and inventory checks must be an
enforced discipline.
Passive infra-red detectors in all major thoroughfares and
classrooms containing expensive equipment and alarm
contacts in secure store areas should identify the presence of
intruders. Strategically placed alarm sounders and security
lighting, initiated by detectors, may deter any trespassers
before they cause extensive damage.
Relay of the alarm to a central station to bring out a speedy
response is equally important. The intruders are usually local
chlIdren who may know about the effectiveness or otherwise
of the system. System designers and installers must be astute
in the location and camouflage of detectors. Any damage to
the system may have been done deliberately to allow later
access and should therefore be quickly repaired.
For detailed guidance refer to Building Bulletin 6flj), which
details various preventative measures against vandalism,
theft and arson in schools. Building Bulletin 69(2),deals with
the technical aspects of intruder alarm systems.
6.12 Churches
Current estimates indicate a quarter of all churches suffer
from some form of theft or vandalism each year. Goods taken
include altar pieces, offertory boxes, and an increasing
amount of structural artifacts (e.g. stained glass windows,
carvings, doors, door handles and hinges etc.) for which
interior decorators will pay high prices.
In most situations a basic burglar alarm system will suffice,
but also provide special protection for valuable items or
works of art.
References for section 6
1 Mzkse oj Drugs (Safety Custody) Regulations Schedule 2 1973(1)
(London: HMSO) (1973)
2 Cn”nzepreventions in schools — specificarim intmlla tiers and maintenance
oj iktruder alarm systems Building Bulletin 69 (London: Department of
Education and Science/HMSO) ( 1989)
3 Cn”rneprevention in schools — pracrical guiohnce Building Bulletin 67
(London: Department of Education and Scienee/HMSO) (1987)
 SECURITY ENGINEERING

7 Vandalism Careful consideration should be given to the overall design of

the structure and the surrounding grounds. Successful
solutions have been obtained by the avoidance of large areas
7.1 Production of unallocated public space on housing estates, by avoiding
blind spots where vandals can work unseen, and by the
design of building structures which prevent climbing on
Vandi&m takes different forms, and the motivation behind walls and roofs.
it varies. The major area of concern for the build% services
engineer is the damage of public and private property. This Further physical measures include keeping unoccupied
includes not only intentional, malicious damage but also the property to a minimum. Perhaps the most important factor in
continuous process of thoughtless treatment of property so limiting vandalism is the selection of suitably durable
that over a period of time the minor incidents result in construction materials and finishes, previously tried and
widespread neglect and decay. tested,

The police categorise vandalism under the crime of criminal Other factors which reduce the risk of vandalism include:
damage. Vandalism is committed both by chddren and — workmanship and installation
adults, and Figure 7.1 indicates the disposition of age of
persons found guilty of, or cautioned for, criminal damage in — increased levels of lighting (see section 3.5)
1988. The figures are taken from government statistics(]).
increased frequency of maintenance
From these figures it follows that the majorhy of offenders in
this category are male and under the age of21. However, it — increased surveillance
must be noted that the statistics provide only a partial picture — increased perimeter security
of actual crime in this category. The 1988 BrMsh Crt-me
Swwy[2), indicated that there were about 10 times as many — fast, effective responses to unauthorised activity.
offences of vandalism than were reported to the police.
In addition, it is worth noting the following guidelines:
Ad
14-17 — The introduction of a mirror in lifts operating on
commercial premises reduces vandalism inside the car.
— A fence with a natural wood finish is less likely to be
vandalked than one painted white.
A surface should be cleaned of graffiti as soon as possible
or it will attract more fyafilti. -

7.3 Alarm systems

Alarm systems can provide a warning of possible vandal

attack. Normally, these systems are part of the intruder alarm

‘~ Aged
over 21
system. Vibration detectors, foil on glass, and rigid wiring
systems can all detect attacks on external building services.
Space detection devices will react to intruders.

Generally, an anti-vandal system is intended to deter rather

than assist apprehension. Such an alarm system must react
43% immediately by turning on alarm sounders and possibly
Figure 7.1 Offenders in crimimd damage camgoryby age group, England normal and security lighting in an attempt to frighten and
and Wales 1988(’] deter vandals.

For those intruder systems where one of the prime purposes

7.2 Preventative measures is the apprehension of the criminal a silent alarm is initiated
for a long enough period to enable the police to reach the
scene. This is then followed by an audible alarm. During the
The following factors have been found to influence the risk of silent alarm period it is possible that considerable vandalism
vandalism: would have taken place. Care must be taken to try to reconcile
— proximity to areas of public gathering (e.g. public houses, the anomaly of requirements between anti-vandal systems
clubs) and anti-intruder systems.

— proximity to large housing estates and schools

— proximity to unsupervised waiting areas (e.g. bus stops,
stations)
References fer section 7
— influx of visitors to area (e.g. tourists, football supporters)
1 Criwtkdwati.wits:
Enghwrd and Wales 1988(London:HMSO)(1989)
— local crime rate
2 Tk 1988 British Crime Sung Home Office Researeh Study No. 1I 1
— current level of security precautions. (Londorx Home Oflk/HMSO) (1989)

53
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS MANUAL
Ap en~~x Al: Sources of advice
an s information
Al.1 Equipment suppiiers
Whilst equipment suppliers and manufacturers are generally
the best source of information about their products, care
must be exercised in using any general information obtained.
When requiring information on a particular item of
equipment, the building services engineer should in the first
place ask for copies of test reports prepared by an
independent body. Where these are not available the supplier
should be asked for the manufacturer’s test results with the
equipment installed in a manner similar to the intended use.
All questions about the equipment must be related to the way
in which it will be used on the specific project.
Al.2 Fire service
A common difficulty is applying security measures that
neither impede escape from the premises in case of fire or
some other emergency nor, conversely, weaken the security
of the premises. Resolution of these conflicting requirements
may be aided by consultation with the Fire Prevention
Officer of the local fire brigade early in the processes of
specification and design.
Al.3 hrsurance surveyors
Insurance surveyors may become involved in designing
security measures in one of two ways. They maybe requested
to contribute to security planning at the invitation of the
occupier or their technical or insurance representative, with a
view to overall risk improvement and the possibility of
improved insurance terms and conditions.
Alternatively they may be required to supply a report and
recommendations to the insurance underwriter to enable the
latter to quote the premium and any security improvements
required at the policy inception or renewal. In this case the
insurer’s requirements do not normally produce automatic
premium ‘discounts’, as in fire insurance, but the premium
reflects the fact that an essential basic standard of security
will exist.
In either case the insurance surveyor is equipped to consider
and suggest different approaches to the treatment of risk with
the prime objective of either limiting the consequences of
criminal acts or of reshaping the insurance profile of the risk
exposures.
Insurance surveyors are trained in risk analysis and have
wide experience of the methods and motivations of thieves,
vandals and fire-raisers. They are familiar with the various
techniques and devices employed to combat crime. They also
maintain a liaison with the security industry, police and
similar groups concerned with crime prevention.
Wherever theft, injury or malicious damage are significant
threats, insurers and advisers such as the building services
engineer will have a considerable area of common interest,
and close liaison with the insurance surveyor at the earliest
opportunity should ensure that the occupier’s security needs
are met in the most efficient and cost effective way.
54
Al.4 Local authority
The requirements of the Building Regulations and Planning
Regulations have to be considered in relation to all applicable
elements in the design of a building, including its security
equipment. Consultation with the local authority may be
needed in respect of various building elements such as
windows, smoke vents and other openings in the building
envelope.
Al.5 Police
As part of their traditional role in the prevention of crime, all
police authorities in the UK will provide some measure of
free advice on crime prevention. Many police forces have
specialist Crime Prevention Officers (CPOS) called Architectural
Liaison Ofllcers (ALOS). ln the Metropolitan Police they are
termed Crime Prevention Design Advisers (CPDAS), and are
informed about planning applications for building projects
such as shopping centres or housing estates. They analyse the
plans and recommend changes to reduce opportunities for
criminals.
The local CPO is able to draw on his own extensive police
experience, and be aware of risks existing in the locality of the
premises to be defended. He will know the pattern of crimes
in the area, and may be able to suggest the most effective
means of combating the risks.
If an intruder detection system with external audible alarms
is installed, even if fitted with a direct connection to a central
station or automatic emergency dialling facility, it is the local
police who will respond to an alarm condition. Therefore,
close co-operation and an early exchange of ideas between the
plamers and the police should take place, so that the
deterrent methods and the required responses to an intrusion
alarm can be arranged.
Al.6 Pubiic telephone operators
Only approved equipment may be connected to the public
telephone systems and this applies to equipment installed to
transmit alarm signals. Consultation with the network
operator before orders are placed for such equipment is
advised. Connections may include alarm terminals at a police
station or at a security company’s central station. Rental costs
and other charges are of importance to the occupier and user,
and need to be ascertained in advance.
Al.7 Association of Burglary Insurance
Surveyors
Membership is open to those people concerned with
insurance-related security matters, such as employees of
insurance companies or Lloyds, insurance brokers or loss
adjusters.
The objectives of the Association are: to improve all aspects
of security relating to premises, property and persons; to
collect, collate and dkseminate information of security
equipment and services; to promote meetings; to print and
publish documentation to meet objectives.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
The British Security Industry Association (BSIA) is a trade
association representing its members who are generally the
major security system companies. Membership is divided
into seven categories of manufacturers, suppliers and
installers covering specific sectors of the industry: safes and
locks, security equipment, security systems, security guards
and patrols, security transport, closed circuit television, safe
deposits. Companies must meet standards in the relevant
field to become a member of one of these sections. Such
standards cove~ business record, training, staff screening,
customer service, adherence to British Standards, and
quality assurance,
Al.9 British Security Registration Board
The British Security Registration Board (BSRB) has been
established in order to identify everyone employed within the
security industry. The primary function of the register is to
provide employers with a reliable source of reference. The
BSRB publishes a National Security Code of Conduct. All
those registered are obliged to abide by this Code.
The register records on a computer database the individual’s
details including name, date and place of birth, address,
personal description, exams passed, diplomas and certificates
awarded together with a recent employment record. A
registration book is issued to the individual containing the
above information together with a photograph, specimen of
signature and an annual date for the renewal and update of
records.
Al. 10 British Standards Institution
At all stages of the work reference should be made to the
relevant British Standards, noting that subscribing members
of BSI can make use of the Enquiry Section in their search for
standards and other information.
Al. 11 Electrical Contractors Association
Security Group and Electrical
Contractors Asseciatiin of Scetland
Security Division
These two Electrical Contractors Association (ECA) bodies
maintain a list of approved members. A rigorous scrutiny of
members is applied so that those appearing on the list are
recognised as companies of reliable financial and technical
standing. Members must offer a 24-hour service of proven
integrity, expertise, and fidly trained and equipped technicians.
All works must be undertaken to the latest British Standards
and the ECA Code of Practice for Security Installations.
Full-time staff check applicants for membership and carry
out on-going monitoring to ensure the highest standards are
being met. Additionally all ECA members offer guarantees of
workmanship uptoavalue~50000 per contract and valid for
up to five years after completion of the installation.
A joint co-operative agreement between the ECA and
NACOSS harmonises the standards of intruder alarm
installers for enrolment. ECA members meeting the criteria
are admitted to the Council’s roll and their installed systems
carry the NACOSS Certificate of Status and Competence.
Al.1 2 Health and Safety Executive
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has the function of
overseeing the operation of the Health and Safety at Work
etc. Act 1974. TMs is an Act that embraces all aspects of work
and other activities in which the compliance of all members
of the communily is required to achieve acceptable standards
of health and safety. All employers have a statutory
obligation to ensure their staff are safe from crime at work.
Experience shows that consultation with HSE inspectors
may not result in definitive advice about design criteria, but
is useful in reconciling differing opinions relating to matters
where the health and safety of persons maybe put at risk.
Al.1 3 Home Office
The Home Office promotes the publication of crime
prevention guidance. Small booklets are available free, but
copies of the Research Studies and other guidance volumes
can be purchased from HMSO bookshops or agents. Home
OffIce requirements relate to regulations on drugs, radio-
communications, prisons, fire service and civil defence.
Al.1 4 Institute of Security Management
The Institute of Security Management (ISM) was created to
represent senior security management personnel. It has no
political or commercial affiliations and aims to enhance the
ethical and educational standards within the security
industry.
Al.1 S International Professional
Security Associat”mn
The International Professional Security Association (IPSA)
was established in 1958 as a professional body to promote and
encourage the ‘Science and Professional Practices of Industrial
and Commercial Security’ in all its applications. It has no
trade union or political connections or aspirations. The IPSA
is a worldwide professional body which offers membership to
those employed in the field of security. Its purpose is to
improve the status of its members, providing a close liaison
between them through the exchange of ideas, knowledge,
information and experience. It fosters and encourages
professional standards of work by all members through its
Ethical Code of Conduct. The Association also holds
conferences and training courses on matters and problems of
interest to its members.
Al .16 loss Prevention Council
The Loss Prevention Council (LPC), supported by the
Association of British Insurers and Lloyds is the UK-based
organisation specializing in all aspects of fire and security
protection. Encompassing testing, codes and standards
setting, approval and certification, research, consultancy,
55
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
training, publications, advice and information, the Loss
Prevention Council directs and co-ordinates all activities and
services through its four component parts: LPC Technieal
Centre, Loss Prevention Ckrtiiication Board, Fire Protection
Association and the National Approval Council for Security
Systems (NACOSS).
Al.1 7 Master Locksm”fis Association
The Master Locksmiths Association represents the views of
its -members on British Standards committees as well as in
discussions with insurance companies, police and government
departments. Members of the Association must meet the
required standards of skill and integrity, and must pass the
intake exams. Affiiated members include leading lock
manufacturers and wholesalers. The Association provides
training facilities, and organises seminars across the country
providing information and guidance on the latest develop-
ments.
Al.1 8 National Approval Council for
Security systems
The National Approval Council for Security Systems
(NACOSS) sets standards of quality and workmanship to
56
MANUAL
which installers must comply before appearing on their
approved list. NACOSS was formed by the merger of the
National Supervisory Council for Intruder Alarms and the
National Security Systems Inspectorate. Areas of involvement
include intruder alarms, accesscontrol, closed-circuit television,
and the operation of central monitoring stations.
Approval is only obtained after NACOS S inspectors have
investigated and approved a company’s technical and
managerial competence. Such scrutiny covers maintenance
of completed installations, staff conduct and training,
customer relations, control of documentation and adherence
to codes of practice.
Al.1 9 Security Industry Training
0rganisa9ion
The Security Industry Training Organisation (SITO) is the
national training organisation for the UK security industry as
recognised by the Department of Employment. Training
activities and qualifications on offer include guard training,
transport, access control and intruder detection. Qualifkations
are endorsed by the national Council for Vocational
Qualifications and the City and Guilds.
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
Append”m A2: Identification of
reputable security companies
New technology has made security one of Britain’s fastest
growing sectors of industry. This has brought problems for
managers responsible for site security in terms of quality of
service as well as benefits in terms of choice and competition.
This section provides areas to investigate when considering a
prospective security company and key questions that need to
be addressed and investigated. These considerations are not
extensive, and some are common sense, but they help to
ensure that the choice of system provider is not random.
A2.1 Track record
Is the company sound financially and technically? How long
has it been established and what are its resources?
A2.2 Other sites
What is the company’s past record of satisfied clients,
installations of simiiar content and size to proposals?
A2.3 Quaiii control
1sthe company approved toB.S 575(9,or working towards BS
5750 approval?
A2.4 Service hi~ry
Service
and maintenance are key factors, so what back-up is
available to attend the site to rectify faults? How rapid is the
call-out? Check with previous clients for information about
service.
A2.S Site analysis
Are the company’s personnel professional in their approach
to analysing the circumstances prevailing or particular to
your site? Are they conscientious in their aims and guidance?
Have they looked at all angles? Have they made you aware of
further areas of risk you had overlooked?
A2.6 System design
Have they matched the available technology to the requirements
identified in the site analysis? Can they adequately demonsmate
the suitability of their proposals?
A2.7 System control
1sthe system simple in operation and control, and can all staff
quickly understand and feel confident in operating and
responding to alarms?
A2.8 Trade association
Check the firm’s credentials: are they members of a
recognised trade association? Are they approved by NACOSS
and the insurance company? Are they covered for professional
indemnity?
A2.9 Cost
Quotations should be examined on the following basis:
(a) What level of cost has been quoted?
(b) Is it in line with other quotations received?
(c) Have they quoted ‘like for like’ in terms of quality,
robusmess, central control functions, quantities?
(4 Is there an interface with a central alarm station?
(e) Have telephone lines been considered?
0 What additional costs are involved?
(1?) Are there any exclusions and why?
(h) Have they included builders’ works, making good of
damaged decorations, flush or surface installation?
(2) Have they included staff demonstrations?
(i) Is the equipment covered for defects and maintenance
for the first 12 months?
(k) How long will they be installing the system?
U) Who will constitute the labour force and are they trained
installers?
(m) Has the mains interface been included?
(?2) What emergency back-up is available if the mains fail?
(o) Is your insurance company satisfied with the proposals,
and can a reduction of premium be considered?
57
 CIBSE APPLICATIONS
Bibliography
BS 1722:Part 10:1990 Specsj$cation for arui-intruderfences in chain linkand
wekied mesh (M~lton Keynes British Standards Institution) ( 1990)
BS 3621:1980 Specification for lhief resimrst locks (Milton Keynes: British
Standards Institution) (1980)
BS 5051: Part I: 1988 Specification for glrzm”ngfor iruerior use (Milton
Keynes:BritishSmndardsInstimtion)(1988)
BS 5357:1976(1985)
Codeof Praczice. Installation of secun”tyglazing (Milton
Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1985)
BS 5544:1978 (1985) Specification for anli-bandil glazing (glazing reshsrrt to
manual attack) (Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1985)
BS 5725: Part 1: 1981 Spec$icaion for panic bolts and panic latches
mechanically operated by a hon”zontal push-bar (Milton Keynes: British
Standards Institution) (1981)
BS 58721980Specification for locks and latches for doors in buildings
(Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1980)
BS 5979:1987 Code of practice for remote cemres for intruder alarm sys~erns
(Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1987)
BS 6571: Parl 4:1989 Specr~ica[ion for barrier type parking control equipment
(Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1989)
BS 6707: 1986 Specification for intruder alarm systems for consumer
installation (Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1986)
BS 6799:1986 Code of practice for wire-free intruder alarm systems (Milton
Keynes: British Srastdards Institution) (1986)
3S 6800:1986 Specificationfor home and personal security devices(MJton
Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1986)
BS 6804:1986 Code of pracrice for sociaI alarm systems (Milton Keynes:
British Standards Institution) (1986)
58
MANUAL
BS 7042: 1988 Spec#icalion for high secrsn”ty intruder alarm systems in
buila%rgs (Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1988)
BS 7150:1989 Code of practice for imruder alarm system$ wish maim wiring
communication (Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1989)
BS 7352:1990 Specificationfor mzrtgrh and durability performance of metal
hinges for side hanging applications and dimensional requirements for remplate
drilled hinges (Milton Keynes: British Standards Institution) (1990)
BS 8220: Guide for secrsr+y of buildings against crime (Milton Keynes: British
Srandards Institution) (1986-90)
Carroll J M Computer sectsrr”ry2nd edition (London: Butterworths) (1987)
Charlett A J Security of buildiW sires (London: Chartered Institute of
Building) (1985)
Clark R and Mayhew P DesiWing out ti”rne (London: Home Office
Research Unit/HMSO) (1980)
Crime prevention in schools — practical guidarsee Building Bulletin 67
(Department of Education and Science/HMSO) (1987)
Crime preveruion in schools — spectjicatio~ irrsta[lation and mairrwnance of
inrruder alarm syswtn.r Building Bulletin 69 (Department of Edurmion and
Science/HMSO) (1989)
Cumming N Security: thecomprehensive guide to equipment selection and
installatibts (London: Architectural Psess) (1987)
Fay J Bsaerworths secun”ty dictimsary: retvm and concepts (London
Bumerworrhs) (1987)
Fennelly L J (Ed.) Handbook of 10IS pre-venrion and m“me prevernion
2nd edition (London Butterworths) (1989)
Green G Introduction to security 4th edition (Londoru Butterworths)
(1987)
Security sysrems BSRIA Bibliography LB 29/85 (Bracknelk Building
Services Research and Information Association) (1985)
 SECURITY ENGINEERING
Electric locks 12 Microphonicscable 23
flndex Electrical Contractors Association 55 Microwave detectors 25,28
Electrically operated releases 11 Microwave fences 43
Electromagnetic interference 48 Monitoring locks 11
ACCeSS cards 33 Electromagnetic locks 12 Monitors 36
Access COttttO1 10,32 Encoded cards 33 Museums and art galleries 46
reader 33 Equipment suppliers 54
Acoustic dezectors 26 National Approval Council for Security
Acrylic glazing 9 Fence wiring 43 Syslems 56
Ak conditioning 9 Fibre optic signaling 29 Newvicon CCTV camera 34
Alarm system control panels 38 Financial organisations 51
Alarms I Fire service 54 Open span continuous wiring 22
Ammunition and explosives 47 Floodlighting 16
Armesdcd (float) glass 9 F1oors, ceilings and roofs 8 Passive infra-red detectors 26
Association of Bur@ary Insurance Surveyors Foil detectors 24 Perimeter lighting 16
54 Physical protection 1,7
Audible alarms 30 Gatehouses Police 54
lighting of 16 Polycarbonare glazing 9
Basic concepts 1 General guide to detection equipment 19 Pressure mats .29
Beam detectors 25 Glazing 8 Protective switches for doors and windows 22
Bibliography 58 Government statistics 7 Proximity detectors 29
Bolts 9, 10 Grarsdmaster key suite 11 Public telephone operators 54
BreaMmgglass detectors 24
British Security Industry Association 55 Health and Safety Executive 55 Radio coded access 34
British Security Registration Board 55 Hinges 9, 10 Recommended ilhrminances for security
British Standards Institution 55 Home Office 55 lighting applications 13
Bugging 47 Hybrid electric locks 12 Reputable security companies
Building plan 8 identification of 57
Burglary Industrial areas Residential areas 13
risk of 2 lighting of 16 Response 1
Industrial espionage 47 Retail outlets 44
Capacitive detectors 29 Inertia detector 23 Rkk 1
Cathode ray tube camera 34 Infra-ted detectors 25 Risk assessment 2
Checkpoints 16 active 25 Rkk calculation examples 5
Churches 52 passive 26
Civil airports 49 Institute of Security Management 55 Schools and colleges 52
Civil installations 49 Insurance surveyors 2,54 Security furniture for doors and windows 9
Closed circuit television 34 International Professional Security Security Industry Training Organisation 56
csmeras 34 Association 55 Security lighting 12
lighting for 17 ISfT (intensified silicon intensified tube) Seismic detector 23
Combination locks 10, 11 camera 35 Shoplifting 44
Commercial areas Isolated premises 48 Shurters 9
lighting for 15 SIT (silicon intensified tube) camera 35
commercial central stations 43 Key locks 10, 11 Solid state cameras 35
Computer espionage 47 Keys 10 Space detectors 26
Computer rooms 45 Knock-out bars 23 Specialist applications 44
Continuous wiring 22,23
Control moms 40 Laminated acrylic and toughened glass 9 Tape dialler 31
desigm 41 Laminated annealed glass 9 Telephone warning devices 31
functions 40 Laminated polycarbonate, acrylic and Tills 44
Crime Prevention Offkers 2 toughened glass 9 Toughened (tempered) glass 9
Lamp typeS 13 Transverse continuous wiring 22
Defence estabtishrnents 50 Large industrial sites 49 TV and intercom door entry system 34
Detection 1 Lenses for CCTV cameras 36
Detection and alarm systems 19 Lighting for closed circuit television 17 Ultrasonic detectors 25>26
Detectors Local authority 54
Ukxicon CCTV camera 34
beam 25 Locks 10
Underground pressure detectors 29
breaking glass 24 combination 11
Uninterruptible power supplies 38
inertia 23 electric 12
infra-red 25 electromagnetic 12
miaowave 25 key 10 Vandalism 52,53
space 26 monitoring of 11 Vibration detectors 23,25
ultrasonic 25 Loss Prevention Council 55 Vibration detectors for safes and strongmom
underground pressure 29 Luminaires 13 doors 24
vibration 23 Vldicon CCTV camera 34
Differing 10 Magnetic protective switches 22 Visual alarms 31
Digital dialling units 31 Maintenance and review 1 Volumetric detectors 29
Direct Iine telephone warning devices 31 Marine installations 50
Domestic areas Master key suite 11 Walls 8
lighting of 13 Master Locksmiths Association 56 Warning devices 30
Doors 8 Mastering 11 Wastage 44
Double glazing 9 Mechanical key pads 32 Wiegand card 33
Drugs storage 48 Mechanical protective switches 22 Wired glass 9
Dual technolo~ detectors 28 Merchsndke tagging 44 Wire-free intruder alarm systems 29

59