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Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle

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Robert Laurence Gallagher
a
American University of Beirut, USA
Published online: 19 Jun 2014.

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 HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC, 2014
Vol. 35, No. 4, 317–331, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2014.916894

Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle

ROBERT LAURENCE GALLAGHER
American University of Beirut, USA
rg19@aub.edu.lb

Received 22 June 2013 Accepted 28 August 2013

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Antiphasis is a case of core-dependent homonymy, and has three significations in Aristotle’s philosophy: (1)
antiphasis as an opposition between propositions (a propositional signification); (2) antiphasis as the opposition
between ‘subject’and ‘not a subject’in coming-to-be and perishing (an ontological signification); and (3) antiphasis
as the opposition between possession and privation (an ontological signification). Argument based on the fifth type
of priority described in Cat. 12 shows that, for Aristotle, the ontological significations are prior to the propositional.

Elders made a seminal contribution to the study of homonymy in Aristotle when he

argued that there are two distinct significations of antiphasis in Aristotle’s works: the first
signification, antiphasis as the relation between being and non-being in coming-to-be or
perishing, Elders called ‘ontological’; the second, antiphasis as the opposition between
an affirmation and a denial (cf. Int. 6), he called ‘logical’ (Elders 1961, p. 54),1 but I call
‘propositional’ because it signifies a relation between propositions, for ontological antipha-
sis is also ‘logical’, though in a different way. Writing decades before recent foundational
work on homonymy (e.g. Shields 1999), Elders did not identify the multiple significations
as homonyms. Rather, as a student of Jaeger, he proposed that they represent different
phases of Aristotle’s development (Elders 1961, pp. 54–55, 122). In order to support this
hypothesis, he had to bracket a passage in Met. Iota—which he said makes use of both
significations—as a ‘later interpolation’ (Elders 1961, p. 122). Below, I investigate whether
antiphasis is a case of core-dependent homonymy. The evidence suggests that Aristotle
employs multiple, associated significations of antiphasis in the Metaphysics, as in the Iota
passage that Elders thought interpolated.2
In Aristotle’s theory of homonymy, distinct significations of a word refer to distinct
entities. Homonymy is not a matter of semantics, but a concern of ontology. The Categories
opens with the statement:
When things have only the name in common and the definition of being which cor-
responds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Thus, for example,
both a man and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common, but the
definition of being which corresponds to the name is different; for if one is to say
what being an animal is for each of them, one will give two distinct definitions.3
The picture is an animal only homonymously. Similarly, blind eyes, stone eyes, and painted
eyes are eyes only homonymously, because ‘the eye is the matter of sight; if sight is lacking it

1
For the first, Elders cites the Physics (e.g. v.1, vi.5), Met. 1050b8, 25, 34; 1067b22; An. Post. 73b21; for the second, S. El.
168b12; An. Post 72a14. Elders’ study is regularly cited by other scholars. Textual references to An. Post., Met., and S. El. are
to Ross 1964, Jaeger 1957 and Ross 1958, respectively.
2
Regarding core-dependent homonymy, cf. Shields 1999, Chapter 4. Regarding homonymy based on multiple significations,
cf. Top. 107a3–18 and Shields 1999, pp. 52, 54–56, and Chapter 3.
3
Translation from Ackrill 1963, p. 3.

© 2014 The Author

 318 R. L. Gallagher

is no longer an eye’(An. 412b18–22).4 The four different types of eyes (blind, stone, painted,
and functional) are homonyms (cf. Shields 1999, pp. 28–31). Again, a wooden saw or a saw
in a picture is a saw only homonymously (Meteor. 390a10–15) (cited in Shields 1999,
p. 33). The three types of saws (wooden, pictured, and functional) are homonyms. There
are many cases of discrete homonyms which are not associated with each other, because their
functions completely differ (e.g. painted and functional eyes, wooden and real saws). But
the homonymy of antiphasis is more interesting, for it seems to associate distinct types of
opposition with each other, as I discuss below. I describe ontological antiphasis, contrast it
with propositional antiphasis, discuss how it plays a role in Aristotle’s thought, and consider
whether either signification of antiphasis is prior to the other.
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1. The authenticity of Met . I.4.1055a38–b9

The passage Elders doubted reads:

(1) If antiphasis, privation (sterēsis), contrariety (enantiotēs), and relatives are

opposed (antikeitai), and of these antiphasis is first, and of antiphasis there is no
intermediate, but of contraries an intermediate is possible, it is obvious, on the one
hand (men), that antiphasis and contraries are not the same thing, but, on the other
hand (de), that privation is a kind of antiphasis: for either that which is in general
impossible for something to have, or that which it would have by nature but does
not have, it is deprived of, either in general or through some determination (for
we speak of this in many ways, just as we have distinguished in other matters), so
that privation is a kind of antiphasis or incapacity determined in or acquired by
that which is capable of receiving it (dektikon): That is the reason why there is not
an intermediate of antiphasis, but of the privation of something an intermediate is
possible: for everything is equal or not equal, but not everything is equal or unequal,
or if it is, it is only in that which is capable of receiving (dektikon) the equal (Met.
10.4.1055a38–b11).

Neither Ross nor Furth finds anything objectionable in the passage (cf. Ross 1924,
pp. 291–292; Furth 1985, p. 139). Elders claimed there is a ‘discontinuity’ between the
passage and its context, and that the passage ‘which deals with the oppositions, has nothing
to do with the rest of the chapter, in which contrariety only is studied’. He said antiphasis
is used with its propositional signification in the passage, and that that is inconsistent with
the rest of Iota 4, which he says is concerned with physical opposition. He also cites the
change of person of the verb to first person plural as further grounds for considering the
passage an interpolation (cf. Elders 1961, p. 122).
Even if the passage is a later interpolation, however, its author could very likely be
Aristotle, and then the passage could be expressing a mature view. One piece of evidence
that Aristotle is the author, is the first person plural remark to which Elders objects—a
parenthetical, signature reference to homonymy, such as Aristotle frequently inserts in the
middle of an argument when relevant, as it is here.
The main point of the passage is that there are four things pertaining to difference
(diaphora) that are opposed, but only one of them, antiphasis, cannot have intermediates.
This is plainly so for the principal ontological signification of antiphasis, which signi-
fies the opposition between ‘subject’ and ‘not a subject’ in coming-to-be and perishing
(cf. Phys. v.1; vi.5), and which Elders himself discusses. There can be no intermediate of
that antiphasis, for when being comes-to-be from non-being, or ‘white’ from ‘not-white’,

4
Textual references to de anima are to Ross 1963.
 Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle 319

or when being ceases to be, or ‘white’ passes to ‘not-white’, there cannot be intermediates.
Elders’ view that Iota, Chapter 4, is concerned with physical opposition, if correct, would
make it a fitting context for that ontological signification. Nothing in the passage requires
taking the propositional signification for antiphasis.
Ontological antiphasis contrasts in Iota 4 with enantiōsis, another term for contradiction
(or so Liddell and Scott gloss it), and with the discussion of which Aristotle begins that
chapter (cf. enantiōsis in Liddell and Scott 1897). Aristotle calls enantiōsis the ‘greatest
difference’among members of a genos (1055a3–5), and says that a possession and a privation
which is complete (teleia), are a primary enantiōsis (1055a33). Elders claimed the topic
of the chapter is only contrariety, and translated enantiōsis as ‘contrariety’. But Aristotle
uses a different term for contrariety in the chapter, as well as in the passage, and that is
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enantiotes (cf. 1055a16, 22, b1, 15). To render both enantiōsis and enantiotēs with the
same word is to lose a distinction that Aristotle makes between the two members of a
genos that constitute ‘the greatest difference’ among its members (e.g. one that possesses a
capacity and another that lacks it), i.e. enantiōsis, and mere contrariety,5 for contrariety does
not capture the significance of ‘the greatest difference’, for as Aristotle says in Phys. E.1,
even an intermediate exhibits contrariety in relation to the extremes of its genos (224b32–
35).6 An example of enantiōsis is blindness in the mole. Of all vivipara, only the mole is
blind.7 The difference between the viviparum whose sight is the best and the mole is the
‘greatest difference’ for that genos: it is enantiōsis: the opposition between sighted and not-
sighted (blind). It may be better to render enantiōsis ‘contradiction’, or at least ‘complete
contrariety’, in distinction from ordinary contrariety for enantiotēs.
Since privation can be the denial (apophasis) of something defined for a genos (Met.
.6.1011b19–20), and antiphasis is a contradicting pair of kataphasis and apophasis
(cf. Int. 6; An. Post. A.2.72a12–14), privation is a ‘kind of antiphasis’ (antiphasis tis, cf.
passage 1), for in that case the privated entity ‘completely’ lacks something that other mem-
bers of the genos have. Again, the mole illustrates the text. Its blindness contradicts its
genos. Blind moles totally lack one capacity with which membership in the genos vivipara
is ordinarily defined. We can conceive of such enantiōsis with a set-theoretic example: the
blind types of mole constitute a subset M of the set vivipara V. Every member of the com-
plement of M in V is by nature sighted, but the members of M are not. So, privation of this
sort (total lack of a capacity) is a contradictory opposition within a definite, wider class
(genos). Aristotle’s description of privation as a kind of antiphasis is evidence that passage
1 refers to two ontological significations of antiphasis: (a) the opposition between subject
and not-a-subject in coming-to-be, or perishing (both unqualified and qualified), of which
there are no intermediates; and (b) the opposition of possession and privation, of which,
passage 1 says, intermediates are possible when, Aristotle says, possession or privation of
something is determined in a recipient with particular characteristics, e.g. flesh and bones,

5
This error is made by Furth 1985 and Ross 1933. In Ross’ translation, this produces the unfortunate sentence: ‘clearly all
contrariety (enantiōsis) must be privation, but presumably not all privation is contrariety (enantiotes)’, for which I suggest:
‘clearly every complete contrariety would be a privation, but presumably not every contrariety is privation’ (1055b14–15), i.e.
complete privation (cf. 1055a33) is a kind of contradiction, but not all cases of contrariety are privations, for Jack is more just
than Robert but neither are deprived of justice or completely just (cf. passage 3 and its discussion below).
6
Textual references to the Physics are to Ross 1936.
7
Aristotle says in Met.  that the mole is an example of ‘something [that] does not have that which … its genos is constituted by
nature to have’ (1022b22, 24–27). In the History of Animals, he says the mole is blind because ‘nature was lamed or incapacitated
in generation’ (532b33–533a17). The mole has eyes but they are covered by its thick skin and are disabled, though they have
all the parts of functional eyes (533a5–11). So, the eyes of the mole are eyes only homonymously. Aristotle says that the mole
is the only viviparum that is blind. All other vivipara possess all five senses. Textual references to the History of Animals are to
Peck 1965–1991.
 320 R. L. Gallagher

which introduces a variability not present in other types of antiphasis: ‘the reason is that the
privated entity can be privated in many ways’ (1055b15–16). Neither of these ontological
significations of antiphasis is the same kind of contradictory opposition as the contradictory
propositions treated in Int. 7, but rather the three signify different types of antiphasis.
All this shows that passage 1 fits into Iota 4 quite well. The passage develops the contrast
among different types of contradictory oppositions with which the chapter opens and closes,
and continues the exploration of privation developed both before and after it. The lines
immediately before the passage introduce the notion that privation is a ‘a kind of antiphasis’
in saying that ‘The primary enantiōsis is a possession and a privation … which is complete’,
i.e. complete privation of something. The lines that follow the passage illustrate the contrast
between privations that are ‘complete’ (e.g. evenness in odd numbers) and those that are
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graded (e.g. men are usually neither all good nor all bad) (1055b23–25), which is discussed
in passage 1, for ‘of the privation of something an intermediate is possible’ if the recipient
(e.g. some kind of matter) of form or privation may accept it in a limited or particular way.
So, at the end of passage 1, Aristotle says: ‘for everything is equal or not equal, but not
everything is equal or unequal, or if it is, it is only in that which is capable of receiving the
equal’, and he continues the discussion of the contrast between complete privations and the
graded kind in the lines after the passage, as I have just mentioned. In sum, the continuity
between passage 1 and the chapter in which it is situated (Iota 4) is quite smooth, contrary
to Elders. The notion that the chapter’s topic is only contrariety is not consistent with the
textual evidence.
In sum, I claim that
(I) Aristotle makes use of three significations of antiphasis:
(A) Propositional antiphasis, of which there cannot be intermediates;
(B) Ontological antiphasis in the opposition between not a subject and subject in
coming-to-be or perishing, of which there cannot be intermediates, for either
the subject exists or it does not; and
(C) The ontological antiphasis between possession and privation of something, of
which, in some cases, there can be intermediates.
A signifies an opposition between propositions; B signifies the opposition between ‘not a
subject’ and ‘subject’ in coming-to-be or perishing; and C signifies the opposition between
possession and privation of something. Aristotle uses these differing significations in dis-
cussing different topics. In Int. 6 and Met. .4 he is using signification A; in Phys. E.1, Met.
.4 and K.11 signification B; and in Met. Iota 4, as I argue above, significations B and C.
Aristotle has a theory of antiphasis which embraces three significations of the term.8
The three significations of antiphasis satisfy a first, very broad definition of core-
dependent homonymy: (i) they have their name in common, i.e. antiphasis; (ii) their
definitions do not completely overlap, as we have shown; but (iii) they have something
definitional in common (cf. Shields 1999, p. 106). Each antiphasis signifies an opposition
between a pair of entities or states, distinguished in that something belongs to one (e.g.
whiteness, subject-ness, sight), that does not belong to the other (e.g. for A, ‘Socrates is
white’, ‘Socrates is not-white’; for B, ‘subject’, ‘not a subject’; for C, sighted, not-sighted).
We will more precisely distinguish them in what follows.

2. Ontological antiphasis in coming-to-be and perishing: preliminaries

Having defended the authenticity of passage 1, I review Aristotle’s theory of ontological
antiphasis as it appears in the discussion of change in Phys. v.1. He says: ‘that which changes

8
cf. Shields 1999, p. 58 on use of homonyms in ‘constructive theory building’.
 Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle 321

must change in one of four ways: from a subject (hupokeimenon) to a subject, from subject
to not a subject, from not a subject to subject, or from not a subject to not a subject’, of
which the second and third involve antiphasis. About that, he says:

(2) On the one hand, the change (metabolē) from not a subject to a subject is
coming-to-be (genesis) through an antiphasis (kat’ antiphasin), first, unqualified
coming-to-be when the change (metabolē) is unqualified (hē men haplôs haplē),
second, some coming-to-be of something (hē de tis tinos). For example, the coming-
to-be from not-white (mē leukon) to white is of the latter sort, but the coming-to-be
in an unqualified way from non-being (to mē on) to substance is unqualified, with
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respect to which we say there is unqualified coming-to-be, not that something comes-
to-be. But, on the other hand, the change from a subject to not a subject is perishing
(phthora), if unqualified, the change is from substance to non-being (to mē eînai);
if qualified, the change is to the opposing denial (tēn antikeimenēn apophasin), just
as was said also about coming-to-be (225a12–20).

I translate kat’ antiphasin as ‘through an antiphasis’ because the antiphasis is the ‘distance’
and opposition through which change occurs.9 In the passage the antiphasis can be either
‘from not a subject to a subject’ in coming-to-be or ‘from a subject to not a subject’ in
perishing. In unqualified change, that ‘subject’ is a substance.
It may at first seem unsatisfying to base definition of an ontological signification of
antiphasis on passages in the Physics, rather than texts in the Metaphysics or Organon, for
if the Metaphysics does not discuss or even refer to such a signification in other than the
reference I claim is made in passage 1, then we may hesitate to attribute any significance to it.
But it turns out that Met. K.11 refers to the discussion in Phys. v in distinguishing movement
(kinēsis) from other forms of change (metabolē).10 Moreover, Met. .4 and Cat. 10 both
make distinctions between antiphasis of logoi and antiphasis of things (pragmata).11 But
I begin discussion of an ontological signification to antiphasis not in reference to those
passages but rather by investigating Phys. v.1, because there Aristotle uses antiphasis to
describe the processes of coming-to-be and perishing of substances, and therefore, Phys.
v.1 directly pertains to the study of being-qua-being, the topic of metaphysics announced
in Met. .1.
Aristotle constructs ontological antiphasis in passage 2, out of the opposition, ‘subject’
and ‘not a subject’, for, as he says in Met. .4, ‘it is impossible for a being [subject] to
both exist and not exist at the same time’, and that, he adds, ‘is the firmest of all principles’
(1006a3–5).12 Aristotle says that ‘every change is from something to something (ek tinos
eis ti) … for something is after another and it is obvious that one thing is earlier and the
other later’ (Phys. E.1.225a1–3). In unqualified change, substance as ‘subject’ comes to
be ‘from non-being’ (to mē on), and perishes ‘to non-being’ (to mē eînai).13 In qualified
change, some particular thing (e.g. ‘white’) comes to be from the negation of that thing

9
Following ‘kata’, B.I.2 in Liddell and Scott 1897.
10
Aristotle says in Met. K.11:
“Since every movement is a change of some kind, and since there are three kinds of change, as has been discussed, and of
those the changes with respect to coming to be and perishing are not movements, and these are changes through an antiphasis,
change from subject to subject must be the only movement.” (1068a1–5)
11
cf Met. .4.1006b18–22; Cat. 10.12b5–16. Textual references to Cat. are to Minio-Paluello 1949.
12
Ross says about ontological antiphasis that ‘the relation of the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem in this case [change “from
subject to not a subject (or) from not a subject to subject”] is one of contradiction’. cf. Ross 1950, p. 617.
13
cf. Met. .2.1069b18–20.
 322 R. L. Gallagher

(‘not-white’); its perishing ends in that negation. Aristotle emphasizes in Phys. viii the
necessity that signification B conform to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC).14

3. Ontological antiphasis in possession and privation of something

Aristotle develops examples of the graded sort of privation—the ones that fall under
ontological signification C of antiphasis—in discussing the genos of colour in Metaphysics
Iota, and ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ in Kappa. In Iota 2, Aristotle says that white and black are the
contraries of the genos colour (cf. 1053b25–33), that ‘black is privation of white, just as dark-
ness is privation of light’ (1053b30–31; cf. .1070b19–21). White and black constitute the
antiphasis tis, or enantiōsis, of the genos, for the greatest difference (cf. 1055a3–5) among
colours is the difference between white and black. All other colours, e.g. purple, or grey,
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are intermediates composed of white and black in differing proportions (cf. 1057b13–14),
and can be ordered by how much white, or black they possess (cf. 7.1057a19–26).15 Con-
traries of possession and privation of this kind are graded because their recipients ‘can be
privated in many ways’ (cf. 1055b15–16). They constitute a kind of antiphasis that permits
intermediates (signification C). Such an antiphasis is the greatest difference among things
that share a common nature, for white and black are both colours. Aristotle uses the case of
‘unjust and just’ to explain in Met. Kappa.
(3) Concerning all such cases one must maintain that the privation is not of the whole
definition, but of the last form (eidos). For example, if the just human is obedient to
the laws by virtue of some disposition, the unjust human will not in every case be
deprived of the whole definition, but may be in some respect deficient in obedience
to the laws, and in this respect the privation will belong to him; and similarly in all
other cases (1061a22–28).
So, the privation is of the ‘last form’ of the other, which, in this case, is the disposition
possessed by the just human. The privation need not lack the thing in question totally. It
simply lacks it ‘in some respect’, i.e. more than any other member of the class in question,
in this case, say, the class of Thebans. So, the unjust person is not totally without justice
(though his/her neighbours may think otherwise). S/he is not the negation of the other,
for they share a common nature: both are human, and all humans are just to some extent.
Moreover, there are intermediate states between the just human and unjust human to which
the passage refers. Similarly, black is not the negation of white: it is only the colour with the
least diakritikon (‘piercing’) differentia and the most sunkritikon (‘compressing’) differentia
(cf. Met. Iota 7).16 Though we may sometimes consider white and black, or just and unjust,
to constitute a contradiction, Aristotle cautions us that they only constitute a contradiction
of a particular type (1055b3), a type that admits intermediates. Between the poles of such
an opposition, there is a range of intermediate states, e.g. of persons who are more or less
just, like the human of Iota 4 who is neither good nor bad (1055b23–25). Justice belongs
to subjects by degree.17
Accordingly, we can draw three more conclusions from our discussion of signification
C of antiphasis:
(II) If contraries have intermediates, then contrariety is not dichotomous.

14
‘It makes no difference’, he says, ‘whether the changes through antiphasis are contraries or not contraries, just as long as it is
impossible for them to be present in the same thing at the same time’ (7.261b7–9).
15
The issue here is not whether Aristotle exhibits a correct understanding of colours, but how the example illuminates his theory
of privation.
16
‘Piercing’ and ‘compressing’ are Ross’ renderings.
17
Aristotle discusses gradations between white and black, and just and unjust also in Cat. 10.12a11–25.
 Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle 323

(III)Since antiphasis signification C allows intermediates, there are intermediate states

between some antiphatical states.
(IV) The operator ‘belonging to’ is not binary in all circumstances, for there are inter-
mediate states between something (e.g. ‘just’) belonging to something and not
belonging to it, that is, between something having something, and not having it.

4. Formal relations among associated homonyms

Aristotle writes that a core instance of associated homonyms is a source (archē) for the
others (cf. Met. 1003a34–b6).18 In order to determine whether any of the three significations
of antiphasis can serve as such a core instance, I consider what relations of definition may
hold among them. First,
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(1) Significations A, B, and C are each defined as an opposition between two entities.
In this way, and in other ways we examine below, they are similar in form. They differ
insofar as the antikeimena of A are propositions that affirm (kataphasis) or deny (apopha-
sis) something, the antikeimena of B are ‘not a subject’ and ‘subject’ in coming-to-be or
perishing, and the antikeimena of C are states of possession and privation of something.
Second,
(2) Significations A, B, and C conform to the LNC,
for it cannot be true that x is a subject and not-a-subject at the same time and in the same
respect, nor that x is just and not just (or just and unjust) at the same time and in the same
respect, nor that x is white and black at the same time and in the same respect, etc. though
Wilson can be just and unjust in different respects, and my checkered shorts can be white
and black in different respects, i.e. places. Third,
(3a) Significations A and B signify oppositions of which there are no intermediates.
Signification C would definitely seem to differ in form from A and B, for
(3b) Signification C signifies an opposition which allows intermediates.
Signification C possesses a dimension of variability that significations A and B lack. As
Aristotle explains in Iota 4 and is discussed above, signification C embraces two types of
opposing states of possession and privation:
(a) Absolute possession and privation, as of something such as ‘evenness’ predicated of
recipients that are integers: odd numbers are always privated: they are not even.19
Even numbers always possess evenness. No intermediate is possible. This kind
of opposition has the form P & ¬P (e.g. ‘N is even’, ‘N is not even’), as does
signification A.
(b) Relative possession and privation, as of something such as of ‘just’ predicated
of recipients that are humans.20 This kind of opposition does not have the form
P & ¬P.
Aristotle specifies that whether any particular instance of antiphasis signification C allows
intermediates or not depends on the recipient of the privation, i.e. the receiving subject,
which, in some cases, may introduce variability. The subject ‘colours’ permits such variabil-
ity: colours, according to Aristotle, vary between contraries white and black; intermediate

18
For discussion of the core as source, cf. Shields 1999, p. 105.
19
cf. Met. Iota 4.1055b23–25.
20
cf. passage 3.
 324 R. L. Gallagher

colours are representable by proportions of white and black, which are equivalent to degrees
of possession and privation of white and black (cf. Met. Iota 2). By contrast, the subject ‘inte-
gers’ does not introduce such variability: integers are either even or not even. So, privation
is very much tied to the recipient that is subject to privation.
We have analysed antiphasis signification C into two sub-types. One, C(a) adheres to
conditions 1, 2, and 3a, above, in common with antiphasis significations A and B. The
other, C(b), adheres to conditions 1, 2, and 3b. On the basis of the agreement of A, B, and
C(a) to defining condition 3a, we can restate condition 3a, as follows:
(3a ) Antiphasis significations A, B, and C(a) signify oppositions of which there are
no intermediates.
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We may be inclined to understand significations A, B, and C(a) as isomorphic insofar as

each signifies a state of opposition which conforms to LNC and of which there are no
intermediates. They appear to differ only insofar as the antikeimena are propositions in the
case of A, the presence or absence of a subject in the case of B, and states of possession
or privation of something in the case of C(a). In each, one antikeimenon is the negation
of the other, for in A, opposed to P (e.g. ‘Socrates is white’) is ¬P (e.g. ‘Socrates is not-
white’) and in B, opposed to ‘subject’ (e.g. ‘substance’ or ‘white’, cf. passage 2) is ‘not
a subject’ (e.g. ‘non-being’ or ‘not-white’), and in C(a), opposed to possession (e.g. ‘N is
even’) is privation (‘N is not even’). If significations A, B, and C(a) are isomorphic, they
could be relatable by formal causation. But there is a difficulty here, for if A, B, and C(a)
are isomorphic, if they have the same form, i.e. are all F, then the accounts of F-ness in both
applications of the predicate are the same. Then they are synonymously, not homonymously,
F. Indeed, some may argue that the difference in contradictory entities in the three cases does
not warrant their distinction into different types of antiphasis, for the difference between
my matter and your matter does not warrant that we differ in form. On the other hand,
if A, B, and C(a) are each F, and the accounts of F-ness in the three applications of the
predicate are not the same, then they are homonymously, not synonymously, F, that is,
their definitions do not completely overlap. In that case there would not be formal causal
relations among the three, for, it may be argued, for example, that A’s being F can be a formal
cause of B’s being F only if they are synonymously F. That account, that core-dependent
homonyms cannot be related by formal causation, Shields argues, rests upon the assumption
that formal causation is sufficient for univocity and so is inconsistent with homonymy,
but that premise is false. Counterexamples can be drawn from Aristotle’s De Anima. For
example, ‘perception is the reception of perceptible forms without the matter’(424a17). That
is, Aristotle’s philosophy of perception holds that the sensory faculty becomes isomorphic
with the objects of perception representatively, but they are not—obviously—synonymously
so, for one entity is a visual faculty and the other is a blue ball, for instance.21 Another
example: the intellect is ‘capable of receiving a form’ (429a15–16). Again, the intellect
becomes isomorphic with the object contemplated, not synonymously, for the intellect
itself does not become the Pythagorean theorem. So, it is possible for distinct entities, e.g.
core-dependent homonyms—such as the mooted core-dependent homonyms, antiphasis
significations A, B, and C(a)—to be isomorphic and related through formal causation,
without thereby being synonymous. In conclusion, antiphasis significations A, B, and C(a),
at least, are isomorphic, with respect to characteristics 1, 2, and 3. Antiphasis significations
A, B, and C(a) can be related by formal causation.
We are able to distinguish antiphasis signification A from B and C, however, by a fourth
characteristic as follows:

21
Some of the argument of this paragraph is paraphrased from Shields 1999, pp. 114–117.
 Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle 325

(4a) The opposition of antiphasis signification A is between propositions, i.e. an

affirmation and a denial.

(4b) The opposition of antiphasis significations B or C is between ontological states.

This is clear, for the possession or privation of something, such as a capacity for vision—
recall the case of the mole—is an ontological state of the thing possessing or deprived
of that something. Furthermore, the absence of a subject or the existence of a subject in
coming-to-be or perishing is an ontological state. But propositional affirmations and denials
are not ontological states but rather propositions.
Moreover, there is a fifth characteristic by which the significations differ, namely, whether
their opposing entities (antikeimena) assume a subject.
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(5a) The antikeimena of antiphasis significations A and C assume a subject.

(5b) One of the antikeimena of antiphasis signification B explicitly assumes that there
is ‘not a subject’.
The sentence ‘S does not exist’ does not invalidate the claim that antiphasis signification
A assumes a subject, for the sentence names a subject, so the antikeimena of signification
A assume, at least, a propositional subject.22 The assumption of a subject in significations
A and C could separate them from signification B.
In conclusion, we have the following results:
(a) Antiphasis significations A and B share three characteristics (1, 2, 3), which suggests
that they are homomorphic.
(b) Antiphasis significations B and C share three characteristics (1, 2, 4b), which
suggests that they are homomorphic.
(c) Antiphasis significations A and C share three characteristics (1, 2, 5a), which
suggests that they are homomorphic.
With this analysis, the multiple significations of antiphasis are clearly distinguished.
At the same time, it might be proposed that signification A bears a privative relation to
signification C. That is, like C(a), A signifies oppositions that do not allow intermediates,
but unlike C(b) it cannot signify oppositions that allow intermediates. If this is correct,
antiphasis significations A and C may be relatable by formal causation in another way:
signification A might be considered a privation of signification C, for it realizes ‘the form
in question [that of C] incompletely’ (cf. Shields 1999, p. 117), for A might be derivable in
part by applying constraints of some kind to C. But if antiphasis signification A is somehow
a privation of signification C, then they would have to be in the same genos, for in Met.
 Aristotle says that privation is the denial of something defined for members of a genos
(1011b19–20). So, for signification A to be a privation of signification C, the two would
have to share the same genos. But propositions are not in the same genos as ontological
states. Moreover, Shields warns that ‘core dependent homonyms cannot be members of the
same functionally specified class’ (cf. Shields 1999, p. 109, emphasis added). Put otherwise,
if signification A is a privation of signification C, it should be possible to derive A from C in
a manner similar to how Aristotle proposes to derive the colour grey from a mixture of white
and black in Met. Iota 2 and elsewhere. But grey and white are members of the same genos,
that of colours, while, as noted, the antikeimena of the two significations of antiphasis differ
in genos. It would seem difficult to derive propositions from ontological states except by
going outside those states to a method of discourse about them, i.e. to a different genos.

22
For an interesting discussion related to this issue, cf. Crivelli 2004, Chapter 5.
 326 R. L. Gallagher

So, a privative relation, restricted as it must be to relations within a single genos, cannot
hold. The proposal to consider antiphasis signification A as a privation of signification C
would seem to fail.
Nonetheless, we have shown that the three significations of antiphasis are at least pair-
wise homomorphic in three different ways, and are relatable by formal causation.23 Shields
notes that ‘it is difficult to produce uncontroversial examples of core and derived homonyms
related by formal causation’, but antiphasis may prove to be an example. Whether one of
the three significations can be said to be serviceable as a core instance in relation to the
others has not yet been determined.

5. The issue of relative priority

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If antiphasis is a case of core-dependent homonymy, one homonym may serve as the

‘source’ for the others. Alternatively, all three of the significations we have examined could
depend on a core different from each of them. In either case, there is a relationship of asym-
metry between a core and its associated or derived homonyms, for if the core is a ‘source’
(archē) for the other significations, as Aristotle says in Met. , they are asymmetrically
dependent on it.24
I begin the investigation whether any one of the three associated homonyms qualifies to
serve as a core by returning to passage 1. That passage makes a statement that one of the
significations of antiphasis is prior, for it states that ‘antiphasis is first’. It is worthwhile to
review the text:
If antiphasis, privation, contrariety, and relatives are opposed, and of these antiphasis
is first, and of antiphasis there is no intermediate, but of contraries an intermediate
is possible, it is obvious, on the one hand, that antiphasis and contraries are not
the same thing, but, on the other hand, that privation is a kind of antiphasis. (Met.
1055a38–b4)
In saying that ‘antiphasis is first’ among antiphasis, privation, contrariety, and relatives,
Aristotle affirms that signification C is posterior, for signification C is based on the opposition
of contraries—possession and privation (cf. Met. Iota 4)—and such an opposition, the
passage says, is posterior to whichever antiphasis Aristotle has in mind here. The statement
in the passage is rather weak, however, for it says that ‘antiphasis is first’ in the protasis of a
conditional, which argues that if antiphasis is first and antiphasis excludes intermediates, but
contraries allow them, then antiphasis and contraries are obviously not the same thing. The
conclusion is hardly surprising, and the conditional nature of the statement that ‘antiphasis
is first’, presses us to search for some justification. It is not even clear whether the fact that
a signification allows intermediates or not, has anything to do with the issue of priority.
Aristotle does not explain why antiphasis is first, and does not support that claim in passage
1 or its environs.
To understand what Aristotle may have in mind when he says that ‘antiphasis is first’, I
turn to Cat. 12, where Aristotle says that there are five kinds of priority: (1) priority in time,
(2) priority as regards implication of existence, (3) priority in order, (4) priority in value,
and (5) of two things that reciprocate in regards implication of existence, ‘the one that is in

23
If this is correct, that antiphasis is a case of three associated homonyms relatable by formal causation, then antiphasis satisfies
Shields’ third definition of core-dependent homonymy, that is, “a and b are homonymously F in a core dependent way iff: (i)
they have their name in common, (ii) their definitions do not completely overlap, and (iii) necessarily, if a is a core instance of
F-ness, then b’s being F stands in one of the four causal relations to a’s being F.” (cf. Shields 1999, pp. 118–119).
24
cf. Met. .2.1003b6 for an example of asymmetry between core and associated homonyms. cf. also Shields 1999, p. 122, ‘one
feature of Aristotle’s commitment to core-dependent homonymy [is] … the asymmetry in dependence that derived instances
bear towards core instances’. (cf. Shields 1999, p. 118)
 Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle 327

some way or other the cause of the existence of the other (to aition hopôsoun thaterô(i) tou
einai) may reasonably be called prior by nature’ (14b12–13). In attempting to determine
the relative priority of the significations of antiphasis, I focus on priority types 2 and 5.25
Aristotle says in regards to the second type of priority, that which is prior ‘does not
reciprocate as regards implication of existence’ (14a30). The secondary entity implies, i.e.
conceptually requires, the existence of the prior but the prior does not imply the existence
of the secondary entity. Aristotle says by way of example
one is prior to two, for if two exists, it follows immediately that one exists, but
from there being one, it is not necessary that two exists, therefore the implication of
existence of the remaining [counting] numbers does not follow from the one, and
that from which the implication of existence does not reciprocate is thought to be
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prior. (14a31–35)26
In regards to antiphasis signification C, the opposing entities assume a subject, for as
argued above, both possession and privation of something require an existent being that
can accept, or be deprived of, the something in question. If that is correct, then following
priority type 2, signification C assumes the existence of processes signified by antiphasis
B, for antiphasis B signifies the coming-to-be of a subject from ‘not a subject’, and the
subject entities of signification C clearly must first come-to-be before they can possess or
be deprived of something. The relationship is asymmetrical, for signification B does not
imply the existence of signification C, but is independent of it, for the idea of possession or
privation is not present in signification B, for the opposing characteristics of signification B
are ‘subject’ and ‘not a subject’ (e.g. being and non-being), rather than differing states of a
subject (possession and privation) as in C. Moreover, signification B would somehow also
be prior in time (type 1) and in order (type 3), for a subject must come-to-be before it can
take on something, for subject is a prior constituent of the opposing entities of signification
C. If that is correct, then Shields’ dismissal of the relevance of types 1 and 3 to determining
priority may have been hasty. Earlier we wonder whether the fact that a signification allows
intermediates, is related to the issue of priority between signification B and C. We can
now say that insofar as intermediates are permitted only between antikeimena that possess
subjects, only in that sense is the issue of intermediates related to the issue of priority
between signification B and C.
In conclusion, we have found an explanation for Aristotle’s assertion that antiphasis is
first among antiphasis, privation, contrariety, and relatives, namely, antiphasis signification
C implies the existence of antiphasis signification B, but the latter does not imply the
existence of the former, and therefore is prior to signification C. Moreover, the process of
coming-to-be of a subject represented by antiphasis signification B is prior in time and
in order to the subjects of the opposing entities (antikeimena, cf. Int. 17a34) in antiphasis
signification C.
Regarding the relative priority of antiphasis significations A and B, one might be inclined
to say that since the antikeimena of signification A are propositions with grammatical
subjects, they therefore assume the existence of those subjects, and therefore signification
A is posterior to antiphasis signification B, as B signifies processes that bring such subjects
into being. But this would be hasty, for clearly the proposition ‘S does not exist’ does
not assume the existence of S (in fact, it assumes the non-existence of S); nor does the
proposition ‘Homer is a Greek poet’ assume the present existence of Homer. Unlike the

25
Shields argues that only types 2 and 5 are relevant to homonymy. (cf. Shields 1999, p. 123).
26
I find Aristotle’s example unpersuasive, for though unity may not imply plurality, the situation differs for one as a counting
number, for, given one, the remaining natural numbers follow. Aristotle’s argument seems to rest on homonymy.
 328 R. L. Gallagher

opposing entities of an instance of antiphasis signification C, which Aristotle’s definitions

of privation and possession require to exist, the opposing entities of signification A can name
something that does not exist, and therefore, in at least that sense, is ‘not a subject’. We will
see below that, for Aristotle, significations A and B reciprocate in regards to implication
of existence, as do antiphasis significations A and C, and that priority test type 2 is not
able to determine their relative priority, as that test requires that the entities in question not
reciprocate in regards to implication of existence.
To treat such cases of entities that mutually imply the existence of each other, Aristotle
discusses a fifth type of priority. This type is particularly interesting because it treats the
ontological relationship between things (pragmata), and propositions, which is not explicitly
treated by the other types. In discussing type 5, Aristotle holds that propositions that refer to
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things imply something about the ontological status of those things, i.e. whether they exist
or not, but they do not cause their existence, whereas existent things, according to Aristotle,
not only imply the existence and truth or falsity of propositions about themselves, but, for
Aristotle, also ‘somehow’ cause those propositions to exist, and be true or false, and for that
reason are prior. Aristotle defines the fifth type as follows:
(4) Of things which reciprocate as regards implication of existence, the one that
is in some way or other a cause of the existence of the other (to aition hopôsoun
thaterô(i) toû eînai; 14b12) may reasonably be called prior by nature (proteron
eikiotôs phusei legoit’an; 14b12–13). That such cases exist is obvious, for that there
exists a human (to eînai anthropon) reciprocates as regards implication of existence
with the true proposition about him; for if a human exists (éstin anthrôpos),27 the
proposition with which we say that a human exists is true; and it reciprocates, for
if the proposition with which we say a human exists is true, a human exists; but
the true proposition is not in any way a cause that the thing exist, indeed the thing
(pragma) is somehow (pôs) a cause of the existence (aition toû eînai) of the true
proposition: for the proposition is said to be true or false in relation to whether the
thing exists or does not exist (14b11–22).
For 14b19–20 I have taken the reading which Shields explains is intended by Aristotle,
because only that reading is consistent with 14b12: to aition hopôsoun thaterô(i) toû eînai.
Aristotle holds that the thing is responsible for the very existence of the proposition, and
therefore of its being true.28 It is clear from passage 4 that for Aristotle, things are what

27
A caveat: Jones 2010, pp. 26–67 has argued that statements of the form ésti leukos anthrôpos, which he classifies as statements
‘about universals, not made universally’ (35), are ‘ambiguous’ (37) and ‘indeterminate’ (cf. Jones, Section 1.3.3). Ésti leukos
anthrôpos is variously translated as ‘a man is white’ (Ackrill) or ‘man is white’ (Whitaker). Jones argues that the first reading
‘has the absurd consequence that “A man is not-white” is semantically equivalent to “No man is white”’, and that the second
reading violates LNC (37). If Jones is right, éstin anthrôpos (cf. passage 4, where it appears at 14b16, 16–17, and twice at 18)
could also be ‘ambiguous’. Translators seem to agree. Éstin anthrôpos is translated as ‘there is a man’ (Ackrill) or ‘man is’
(Crivelli). Crivelli employs his reading in his hypothetical treatment of passage 4 in a way that is compatible with his view that
Aristotle believes in the existence of universals, such as ‘the species man’ (Crivelli 2004, p. 104), but that view would appear
to be inconsistent with Met.  (cf. 4.1071a19–20) and other texts. Nonetheless, Crivelli’s treatment of the relation between
pragmata and propositions in Cat. 12 seems consistent with the one developed here. cf. Ackrill 1963, pp. 129 and 39–140, and
Whitaker 1996, pp. 83–94, as cited by Jones.
28
For a similar argument, cf. Cat. 10.12b5–16. Shields says that for Aristotle the thing (pragma) ‘is responsible not for the
proposition being true, but for its very existence’. cf. Shields 1999, 123n27. Shields sums up the fifth type: ‘Core and non-core
homonyms may reciprocate as regards implication of existence, even though core homonyms are responsible for the existence
of non-core homonyms in a way that non-core homonyms are not responsible for the existence of the core cases’ (cf. Shields
1999, p. 124). Regarding 14b12, Ackrill says: ‘It is odd to call this a reciprocal implication of existence: we should not say that
the existence of there being a man implies and is implied by the existence of the true statement that there is a man’ (Ackrill 1963,
p. 112). I disagree with Ackrill; I think we can perfectly well say what he says we should not say and I do not find anything
odd about it. The dispute, between Ackrill and Aristotle, is over different senses of what it means for a proposition to be ‘true’.
 Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle 329

cause propositions, insofar as they are the referents of the propositions, and make the
propositions true or false. Passage 4 enables us to better understand how and whether
antiphasis significations reciprocate in regards to implication of existence.
We have not yet settled the question whether significations A and B reciprocate in regards
to implication of existence, but passage 4 puts us in a better position to do so: in passage 2,
which defines antiphasis signification B, ‘subject’ refers to a pragma which is coming-to-be
or perishing, and ‘not a subject’ refers to the absence of such pragma. If this is correct, and
we apply the argument of passage 4, the antikeimena of instances of antiphasis signification
B imply the existence of opposing propositions: ‘pragma exists’, ‘pragma does not exist’,
e.g. ‘human exists’, ‘human does not exist’. If this is correct, an instance of antiphasis
signification B implies the existence of an instance of antiphasis signification A. Conversely,
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also in accordance with passage 4, for opposing propositions, ‘Tony exists’ and ‘Tony does
not exist’, the first implies that there is a subject of change, and the second implies that
there is not such a subject. Then, some instances of antiphasis signification A imply the
existence of instances of antiphasis signification B. Therefore, antiphasis significations A
and B reciprocate in regards to implication of existence, and we cannot use priority test type
2 to determine their relative priority, but we may be able to use priority type 5. Obviously,
propositional signification A pertains to propositions (logoi), and ontological signification
B pertains to states of being, i.e. whether a subject exists or not. The argument of passage 4
leads to the conclusion that ontological signification B is prior to propositional signification
A, for the contradiction, ‘Tony exists’ and ‘Tony does not exist’, consists of propositions
that are caused, and made true or false, as the passage says, by ‘whether the thing exists
or does not exist’. As discussed above in connection with passage 2, if a human exists,
and then perishes, i.e. s/he no longer exists, Aristotle regards that as a case of antiphasis
signification B, for he says, ‘the change from a subject to not a subject is perishing, if
unqualified, the change is from substance to non-being’, and the change from an existent
human to a corpse, i.e. to the dead body of a human that has perished, is a ‘change from
substance to non-being’. That ontological antiphasis is ‘the cause of the existence’ of the
propositional antiphasis, ‘Human exists’ and ‘Human does not exist’. If this is right, then
signification B is prior to signification A. We have already seen that Aristotle’s theory of
priority implies that signification B is prior to signification C. Therefore, it appears that we
have a conclusion: Signification B is prior to the other two significations, insofar as it is
arguably the cause of the others, and therefore, in accordance with passage 4, can serve as
the core of the three associated homonyms of antiphasis.
I turn now to investigate which of significations A or C is prior to the other. Consider the
following opposed propositions, instances of antiphasis signification A:

(a) ‘That number is even’ and ‘That number is not even’.29

(b) ‘That human is just’ and ‘That human is not just’.30
(c) ‘That viviparum is sighted’ and ‘That viviparum is not-sighted’.31

According to passage 4, these instances imply the existence of the following pragmata: a
number possessing evenness and a number lacking evenness, and a human possessing justice
and a human deficient in justice, and a viviparum possessing sight and a viviparum lacking

For Aristotle it means that the proposition describes or explains some existent reality; and if it does not correspond to such a
reality the proposition is false.
29
cf. Met. Iota 4.1055b23–25.
30
cf. passage 3.
31
cf. Met. .22.1022b22, 24–27.
 330 R. L. Gallagher

sight. If that is correct, instances of antiphasis signification A imply the existence of oppos-
ing ontological states of possession and privation of the things named in the corresponding
propositions, opposing ontological states that are instances of antiphasis signification C.32
Conversely, such opposing ontological states imply the existence of such propositions. So,
we can say that antiphasis significations A and C reciprocate as regards implication of
existence, for many kinds of contradictory pairs that fall under antiphasis signification A
describe cases of possession and privation, such as examples a, b, and c, above. Following
the definition of priority type 5 in passage 4, this suggests rather compellingly that antipha-
sis signification C is prior to antiphasis signification A, for the real cases that fall under
signification C cause, as Aristotle would have it, the cases that fall under A. The argument
of passage 4 assigns priority to the ontological signification over the propositional. If that is
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sound, then antiphasis signification A is posterior to both antiphasis significations B and C.

In conclusion, if antiphasis significations A, B, and C are at least homomorphic, then
the three significations of antiphasis are related by formal causation, and if one of them,
signification B, is, for Aristotle, prior to the others, such that it is asymmetrically responsible
for the existence of the others, insofar as it can be said to be the cause of the others, then
antiphasis satisfies Aristotle’s account of core-dependent homonymy.33

6. Aristotle’s theory of antiphasis

Aristotle’s theory holds that antiphasis originates in the opposition between being and
non-being for a subject, between whether a substance (e.g. ‘human’) or property (e.g.
‘white’) exists or does not exist. The contradiction between being and non-being is the
primary antiphasis of Aristotle’s philosophy. Secondary, after that, is the antiphasis between
possession and privation of something, such as sight, or a mathematical property such as
evenness, or of a virtue, such as justice. That secondary domain of the theory treats not
only two-valued predicates such as ‘even’ when applied to integers, but also multi-valued
or continuously varied predicates such as ‘just’ said of humans. Last is antiphasis between
propositions. This treatment suggests that there are strong grounds for development of
ontological logics in accordance with antiphasis significations B and C. Discussing what
such logics might look like is beyond the scope of this article.
The homonymy of antiphasis discussed here has explanatory power in understanding
Aristotle’s works: for example, it resolves some of the paradoxes of Met. .7, where Aristo-
tle leads the reader into a series of absurdities from premises which he, at first, presents as
reasonable. For shortly after denying that there can be intermediates of antiphasis (1011b23–
24) as is consistent with antiphasis significations A and B, he affirms that there can be
intermediates, just as grey is intermediate between white and black (b29–31), for such
cases are possible under antiphasis signification C within Aristotle’s theory of privation
(cf. Iota 2 on colours). Contrary to the playful considerations of  .7, however, someone
cannot speak truly and falsely at the same time (a6–7), for that would violate signification
A, nor can there be some state intermediate between being and non-being (a7–8), nor a
kind of change intermediate between coming-to-be and perishing, for such would violate

32
Aristotle says in Cat. 10 that just as there is the same manner of opposition between an affirmation and a denial and between
the things ‘under’ the affirmation and denial, so there is the same manner of opposition between possession and privation (e.g.
blindness and sight) as there is between the thing that has the possession (a sighted thing) and the thing that is privated (a blind
thing) (cf. 12b1–16).
33
As Shields summarizes it, “a and b are homonymously F in a core dependent way iff: (i) they have their name in common, (ii)
their definitions do not completely overlap, (iii) necessarily, if a is a core instance of F-ness, then b’s being F stands in one of
the four causal relations to a’s being F, and (iv) a’s being F is asymmetrically responsible for the existence of b’s being F.”
(cf. Shields 1999, pp. 124–125).
 Antiphasis as Homonym in Aristotle 331

signification B. So, it is not the case that there are intermediates of all (pasas) (a5) antipha-
seis, but only of those that fall under signification C, and, of those, only of the graded type
of privation discussed above, for there is no intermediate between even and odd, nor any
number that is neither odd nor not-odd (a9–12).
The ranking presented here of the significations of antiphasis is consistent with Post.
An. ii.19, in which Aristotle says that concepts, universals (kathalou), such as antiphasis,
come to rest in the psuche as a result of experience (empeiria) (100a6–7). We come to know
the first universals by induction (epagogē) (b4). Intuition (noûs) is primary in this, not
science, not demonstration (b7–8).34 So, whichever signification(s) of antiphasis humans
would experience first, that signification is primary. I propose that that would have to be
the ontological significations, for they signify contrary states within our experience, e.g.
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birth and death, as the passage from non-being to being and vice-versa (signification B), or
the loss of eyesight of a formerly seeing person (signification C). Propositional antiphasis,
therefore, is an abstraction of the ontological antiphaseis that we experience.

Acknowledgements
I am thankful to Christopher Shields for his inspiration and to John Martin, John Corcoran, Ray Brassier, David
Konstan, Jose Ignacio Murillo, and the referees of this journal for their helpful comments on earlier versions of
this article.

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Mure’s translation of noûs in the Oxford Aristotle (Mure 1994) is used.