9. People v. Givera G.R No.

132159, January 18, 2001

Facts:

Cesar Givera with Epefanio Gayon and Arturo Gayon is charged with a crime of murder of
EusebioGardon separately. Epefanio and Arturo were already convicted. The prosecution presented the
victim’s daughter Milagros Gardon and his niece Melinda Delfin as witnesses while only accused-
appellanttestified in his defense. The prosecution eye witness positively identified the accused and his
co-perpetrators as the killer of Eusebio while Cesar denied killing the victim contending that he was
fetchedby his cousin, Recto Gardon, because Maximo and the victim Eusebio Gardon were having
analtercation. He went to pacify the protagonists and then led the victim to his house. Without
hisknowledge, however, Eusebio went back and again engaged Maximo in a fist fight, as a result of
whichthe victim Eusebio was knocked down. Accused-appellant said he was going to help the victim get
up, but he saw the victim’s son, Ronilo Gardon, coming with a bolo.

Issue:

May the defense of the accused be given credit?

Held:

The prosecution presented evidence which shows beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant
andhis companions (Epifanio Gayon, Arturo Gayon, and Maximo Givera), all of whom were convicted
ofmurder in another case, were responsible for the killing of Eusebio Gardon on May 2, 1993. Milagros
Gardon’s testimony, an excerpt from which is quoted at the beginning of this opinion, is
spontaneous,detailed, and consistent. The defense tried to discredit through cross examination, but, as
shownearlier, the defense only succeeded in enabling her to give further details of her testimony in
chief. Milagros’ testimony belies accused-appellant’s claim that he was merely trying to pacify the victim
andMaximo Givera and that he ran away because the victim’s son, armed with a bolo, charged at him
(accused-appellant). There was no reason for the victim’s son to want to attack accused-appellant, if the
latter was merely trying to help the victim.

10. Pestillos V. Generoso GR No. 182601, Nov. 10, 2014

FACTS:

The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there no valid warrantless arrest took place. The RTC
denied the motion and the CA affirmed the denial.

Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The
latter called the Central Police District to report the incident and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve
dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and render assistance. SPO2, together with
augmentation personnel arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted the police
officers to “invite” the petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding,
the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon who
fortunately survived the attack. Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant.

ISSUE:

Are the petitioners validly arrested without a warrant when the police officers did not witness the crime
and arrived only less than an hour after the alleged altercation?

HELD:

YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an
offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

The Court’s appreciation of the elements that “the offense has just been committed” and ”personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it” depended on the
particular circumstances of the case. The element of ”personal knowledge of facts or circumstances”,
however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or
observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not
seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable
cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be
made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ”personal knowledge of facts or circumstances” is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered.

With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police officers gathered and which they
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the
crime, it is reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless arrests.

Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent inquest proceeding was likewise
appropriate.
11. Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, 19 April 2007

FACTS:

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong – 3 counts of Accepting Advantage as Agent,
7 counts of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants were issued and Hong Kong filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the extradition of private respondent. Private respondent filed, in the same case, a petition
for bail which was opposed by petitioner. The petition for bail was denied by Judge Bernardo.

Eventually, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case and thus it was then
raffled off to Branch presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in
his Order. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there
is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail.

2. What should be the quantum of evidence needed to grant such bail to a potential extraditee.

HELD:

1. Yes. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

2. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan,
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According
to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence”
that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a
flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence."

12. Comendador v. De Villa, G.R. No. 93177, 95020, 96948, 97454, 2 August 1991

Facts:

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in
person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on
December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for
reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by
GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However
he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial
proceedings can avail the right to bail.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that
they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding
after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after
their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held:

NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-
trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of
their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-
affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again
asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit
counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting
evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of
G/SCM)

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of
the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise
interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus
and quo warranto.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP
Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year
because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition
is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also
granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby
reversed and set aside. No costs

27. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, 4 July 2012

FACTS:

The petitioner, a former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal City, was charged with violation of Sec. 13 of RA
3019 in connection with the consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal City public market.

The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads: “..former Municipal Mayor of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official functions, committing
the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and
confederating with the private [individuals] acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said
[accused]..”

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension
despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages
by the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence." He alleges that the phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" actually refers not
to him, but to his co-accused, rendering the information fatally defective.
ISSUE: Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,
is valid

HELD:

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires,
inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the
acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that
these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise
language" and "in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged and for the court to pronounce judgment.

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with
such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged.
In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts
alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as
defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense.

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a
"person of common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality." A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of
the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving
unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-
legalistic reading of the information would yield.