CASE DIARY

DR. SHAKUNTALA MISRA NATIONAL REHABILITATION

UNIVERSITY,
Lucknow
Faculty of Law

CASE DIARY ON

DINESH KUMAR YADAV VS STATE OF U.P. & A NR., C RIMINAL REVISION NO. 582 OF
2016

&

VINEETA SHARMA V/S RAKESH SHARMA & ORS. (2019) 6 SCC 162.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 32601 OF 2018

Submitted by
HIMANSHU KUMAR (9 )SEMESTER

Roll No. 174140013

[B.Com.LL.B (Hons.]

Academic Session:-2021-22

Under the Guidance of and Submitted to

Dr. Gulab Rai

Asst. Prof.
Faculty of Law

Dr. Shakuntala Misra National Rehabilitation University

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I, B.Com LLB(Hons.) 9th semester Roll no. I feel myself highly elated, as it gives me a
tremendous pleasure to come out with work on the topic A STUDY ON CIVIL SUIT AND
CRIMINAL CASE. I started this project two weeks ago on its completion. I feel that I have
not only successfully completed it but also earned an invaluable learning experience. First of
all I express my sincere gratitude to my teacher Dr. Gulab Rai Sir who enlightened me with
such a wonderful and elucidating research topic.

I also express my humble gratitude to my parents and classmates for helping me in

completing this project.

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INDEX

DINESH KUMAR YADAV VS STATE OF U.P. & A NR., CRIMINAL REVISION

NO. 582 OF 2016

1. Facts………………………………………………………………….04
2. Issues for Determination……………………………………………..04-05
3. Relevant Laws……………………………………………………….05-06
4. Arguments…………………………………………………………...06-07
5. Case Discussed………………………………………………………07-09
6. Judgment…………………………………………………………….09-10
VINEETA SHARMA V/S RAKESH SHARMA & ORS. (2019) 6 SCC 162.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 32601 OF 2018
7. Facts………………………………………………………………...11-12
8. Issues before the Supreme Court in this Case………………………12
9. Arguments…………………………………………………………..12-14
10. Judgment……………………………………………………………14-15
11. Conclusion…………………………………………………………..15

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 CASE DIARY

DINESH KUMAR YADAV VS STATE OF U.P. & ANR., CRIMINAL REVISION

NO. 582 OF 2016

DECIDED BY: HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD.

DELIVERED ON: 20/10/2018

1. FACTS:
The facts of the cases can be summarized as below:
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A Criminal Revision, bearing No. 582 of 2016, by one Dinesh Kumar Yadav against
the State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. Was filed under Section 397/401 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 assailing an order dated 08.04.2016 passed by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 2015 filed by
husband under Section 29 of the D.V. Act, 2005. The appeal was preferred against the
order dated 15.07.2015 passed by learned Magistrate under Section 20 (3) of the D.V.
Act, 2005, granting an interim maintenance of Rs. 2,000/- to the wife. In the course of
hearing of the revision, an objection was raised by learned Government Advocate, as
to the maintainability of the revision. While dealing with the objection, learned Single
Judge noticed the conflicting judgments rendered by different coordinate Benches on
the question, including the judgments in Nishant Krishna Yadav1 case and Manju
Shree Robinson case2, referred to in the second question. It appears that the
judgments, holding that a revision under Sections 397/401 of Cr P C against the order
in appeal under Section 29 of the Act, 2005 is not maintainable, were mainly based on
the observations made by the Supreme Court in Shalu Ojha Vs. Prashant Ojha 3,.
Thereafter the question was referred for determination to a larger bench of the High
Court.
2. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
The issues that were required to be determined by the High Court in the present case
were largely related to question of law. They were as following:
 Whether a revision under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is
maintainable before the High Court challenging an order passed by the Court of
Sessions under Section 29 of the Act 2005?

1
Nishant Krishna Yadav (Criminal Revision No.4016 of 2015)
2
Manju Shree Robinson and Ors. Vs State of U P and Ors. (Writ Petition No.7926 (MS) of 2015)
3
Shalu Ojha Vs. Prashant Ojha, (2015) 2 SCC 99.

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 Whether the decisions in the case of Nishant Krishna Yadav (Criminal Revision
No.4016 of 2015) and Manju Shree Robinson and Ors. Vs State of U P and Ors. (Writ
Petition No.7926 (MS) of 2015) lay down the law correctly on the question of
maintainability of a Revision under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure before the High Court against an order passed by the Court of Sessions
under Section 29 of the Act 2005 in view of the earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court in the case of Thakur Das Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., (1978) 1 SCC
27; National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd., Chidambaram Vs James Chadwaick and Bros.,
AIR 1953 SC 357, Maharashtra State Financial Corporation Vs Jayee Drugs &
Pharm, (1991) 2 SCC 637 ; and ITI Ltd. Vs Siemens Public Communications
Networks Ltd., (2002) 5 SCC 510, etc.?
3. RELEVANT LAWS:
There are few provision of certain laws that need to be stated for better understanding
of the judgment. They are as following:
3.1 PROVISIONS OF THE D.V. ACT, 2005
The Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005). This Act
provides for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the
Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and
for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Chapter IV of the Act, 2005
which consists of Sections 12 to 29. This Chapter provides the procedure for
obtaining orders of relief. In other words, it provides a remedy to an aggrieved person
against domestic violence under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23. Section 12
provides for an application to Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the Act,
2005. Section 18 empowers the Magistrate, after granting the aggrieved person and
the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that
domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in
favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from committing an act as
contemplated in clauses (a) to (g) of this Section. Section 19 empowers the Magistrate
to pass a residence orders, whereas Section 20 to grant monetary relief in favour of
the aggrieved person. Section 21 deals with custody order, while Section 22 deals
with compensation order and Section 23 empowers the Magistrate to grant interim or
ex parte order.

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3.2 SECTION-29 OF THE D.V. A CT

Section-29: Appeal- There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty
days from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the
aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later.
3.3 SECTION-401 OF THE CR.P.C.
High Court' s Powers of revisions:
(1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or
Which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion,
exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 386, 389, 390
and 391 or on a Court of Session by section 307 and, when the Judges composing the
Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the
manner provided by section 392.
(2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other
person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader
in his own defence.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a
finding of acquittal into one of conviction.
(4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by
way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have
appealed.
(5) Where under this Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been
made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such
application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it
is necessary in the interests of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the
application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly.

4. ARGUMENTS
Arguments were made before the High Court from both the sides. The Crux of the
arguments are as following:
4.1 ARGUMENTS FROM THE REVISIONIST
The Counsel on behalf of the revisionist submitted that Hon'ble Supreme Court while
dealing with the case of Shalu Ojha did not consider the scope of provisions of
Section 28 of the Act is concerned, he is am not in agreement with the submissions.
As is clear from the facts of the case of Shalu Ojha, orders passed by the learned

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Sessions Judge had been challenged by way of application under Section 482 Cr P C
and under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hon'ble Supreme Court after
making of brief survey of the provision of Act i.e. Sections 3, 12, 18, 20, 21, 23 and
29 of the Act laid down that no further appeal or revision is provided to the High
Court or to any other higher court against the order of the sessions court under Section
29 of the Act.
4.1.1 THE SC’S JUDGMENT IS NOT CASUAL IN NATURE
The view expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shalu Ojha case is not
casual in nature but was observed while dealing with the issue relating to the
controversy arisen in the Act and the same is binding upon all the courts
subordinate to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It cannot be said that the view taken by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not correct interpretation of the provisions of the D
V Act. Looking to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Shalu Ojha, the High Court held that it was not in agreement with the view
expressed by the Kerala High Court in the case of Baiju and another and the
Madras High Court in K. Rajendran case. Submissions raised by the learned
counsel for the revisionist regarding maintainability of the present revision are not
acceptable and the criminal revision is not maintainable. So far as the merit of the
case is concerned, since revision is not maintainable, therefore, he did not find any
necessity to discuss the merit of the case.
4.2 ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
It was submitted by the counsel on behalf of the respondents that the only remedy
against an order passed under Section 29 of the Act, 2005, is by way of a writ petition
or an application under Section 482 of Cr P C. Since the jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution is an extraordinary jurisdiction, the aggrieved
party has a right to seek remedy under Section 482 of Cr P C. Having gone through
the case laws relied upon by the parties, he submitted that the latest pronouncement of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that against the order passed by the Sessions Judge in
appeal, no further appeal or revision is maintainable under Section29 of the D.V. Act.
5. CASES DISCUSSED
Before expressing its final judgment on the issue the High Court discussed few
important relevant cases at length. A brief discussion of few of such cases is
summarized below:

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5.1 THE SHALU OJHA CASE AND THE DISCUSSION OF RATIO DECIDENDI AND

OBITER DICTUM
The high Court said that It can be seen from the Act, 2005 that no further appeal or
revision is provided for before the High Court or any other Court against the order of
the Sessions Court under Section 29, as observed by the Supreme Court in Shalu
Ojha. But the Supreme Court in that case had no occasion to consider whether a
further remedy by way of revision can be taken under Section 397/401 of Cr P C,
assailing an order of the Court of Sessions passed under Section 29 of the Act, 2005.
In other words, the question of maintainability of a revision before the High Court
under the provisions of Cr P C, assailing an order under Section 29 of the Act, 2005,
was neither specifically raised, nor considered nor addressed/decided.
The ratio decidendi is to be understood on a reading of the entire judgment keeping in
mind the issues involved, argued, considered and decided. Every observation made in
a judgment is not part of its ratio. It is true that even a general observation or obiter
dicta of the Supreme Court is to be given considerable weight. The High Court said
that they have no doubt that the Act, 2005 does not prescribe any further appeal or
revision to the High Court or any other Court against an order of the Sessions Court
under Section 29 specifically and this is evident from a bare perusal of the Act, but, it
is also a fact that the provisions of Section 397 of Cr P C were not taken into
consideration in the aforesaid judgment, obviously for the reason that the
maintainability of a revision under the said provision was not an issue involved
therein. Thus, the law is now well settled as to what a ratio decidendi is. An obiter
dictum as distinguished from ratio decidendi is an observation by the Court on a
legal question suggested in a case before it but not arising in such manner as to
require a decision. The law, which will be binding under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India extends to all observations of the points raised and decided by
the Court in a given case. The only opinion, which would be binding, would be an
opinion expressed on a question that arose for determination of a Supreme Court.
"Obiter dicta", therefore, as observed by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v.
Sudhansu Shekar Misra must be distinguished from casual observations made in a
judgment on a point not calling for decision and not argued before the Court. The
observation made in passing with reference to a general scheme of the Act would not
constitute an obiter dicta which is binding upon this Court on questions of
interpretation. A question which never arose before the Supreme Court, which was

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never argued, which was never considered and which was never decided could not be,
therefore, termed as "obiter dicta".
6. JUDGMENT
After hearing of the arguments the bench of the High Court expressed its judgment
and held that under Section 397 of Cr P C "the High Court or any Sessions Judge may
call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal
Court...". That the Court of Sessions is as an inferior Court to the High Court cannot
be disputed. Thus, the Court of Sessions before which an appeal has been prescribed
under Section 29 of the Act, 2005 is a Criminal Court inferior to the High Court and,
therefore, a revision against its order passed under Section 29 will lie to the High
Court under Section 397 Cr P C. Section 401 Cr P C is supplementary to Section 397
Cr P C. Section 4 (2) Cr P C does not have any application to the present case. Since
the D.V. Act, 2005 does not prescribe any special form of procedure either for the
proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 or for an appeal under
Section 29, therefore, Section 5 is also not attracted. In view of the above, as the
remedy of an appeal had been provided under Section 29 of the D.V. Act, 2005 before
a Court of Sessions, which means a Court of Sessions referred under Section 6 read
with Sections 7 and 9 of the Cr P C, without saying anything more as regards the
procedure to be followed in such appeal, and there being nothing to the contrary in the
Act of 2005 which may be indicative of exclusion of the application of the provisions
of CrPC to such an appeal, the normal remedies available against a judgment and
order passed by a Court of Sessions by way of appeals and revisions prescribed under
the Cr P C before the High Court, are available against an order passed in appeal
under Section 29 of the Act, 2005. The Single Judge Benches of this Court in the case
of Nishant Krishan Yadav and Mrs. Manju Sree Robinson have erred in holding that
such a criminal revision is not maintainable before the High Court. The judgment in
Chiranjeev Kumar Arya4 case against which the Special Leave Petition has been
dismissed by the Supreme Court on 12.08.2016 and the judgment in Prabhunath
Tiwari5 case lay down the law correctly. In the result, The High Court answered the
first question in the affirmative holding that the decisions in Nishant Krishna Yadav
and Manju Shree Robinson do not lay down the law correctly.

4
Chiranjeev Kumar Arya Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (Criminal Revision No.879 of 2015)
5
Prabhu Nath Tiwari & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.15337 of
2012)

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In other words, The High Court held that a revision under Section 397/401 of Cr P C
against a judgment and order passed by the Court of Sessions under Section 29 of the
Act, 2005 is maintainable and that the decisions in Nishant Krishna Yadav and Manju
Shree Robinson do not lay down the law correctly. The High Court held that the
Reference was answered and accordingly registry was directed to place the Criminal
Revision No.582 of 2016 before learned Single Judge for hearing on merits.

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VINEETA SHARMA V/S RAKESH SHARMA & ORS. (2019) 6 SCC 162.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 32601 OF 2018

1. FACTS:
The facts of the cases can be summarized as below:
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act of 1956) was enacted to amend and codify laws
relating to intestate succession among Hindus and brought about changes with respect
to succession and also conferred on women certain right which until then was not in
existence. Further, the Act of 1956 also recognized, under Section 6, the special right
of male coparceners of a Hindu Coparcenary to inherit by birth over the coparcenary
property and laid down rules for succession among the coparceners. This, however,
was discriminatory in terms of gender and also negation of constitutional right of
equality, in so far as the daughter of a coparcener was concerned. In order to do away
with discrimination, the Parliament passed the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of
2005 (Act of 2005), which came into effect from 09.09.2005, whereby Section 6 of
the Act of 1956 was substituted and recognized the daughter of coparcener to be on
par with that of a son, and conferred on her rights by birth on the coparcenary
property, however, with a proviso that conferment of such right on a daughter shall
not affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary
disposition of property took place before 20.12.2004. 
After the amendment Act of 2005, a Division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India, in the case of Prakash & Others vs. Phulavati & Others6, held that the Act of
2005 is prospective in nature and that rights conferred on daughter, under Section 6 of
the Act of 2005, is on the living daughter of a living coparcener, requiring the
coparcener to be alive as on 09.09.2005 so as to enable the daughter to claim rights
over the coparcenary property. In the said case, the coparcener had died prior to 2005
amendment and hence, it was held that the daughter is not entitled to a share in the
coparcenary property as she is not the daughter of a living coparcener. In a subsequent
judgement of a Division bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of
Danamma@ Suman Surpur & Another Vs. Amar & Others 7, although the Court did
not specifically deal with the concept of living daughter of a living coparcener, the
6
Prakash & Others v/s. Phulavati & Others, (2016) 2 SCC 36.
7
Danamma@ Suman Surpur & Another v/s. Amar & Others (2018) 3 SCC 343.

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Court took a contradicting view from that of decision in Phulavati case and held that
daughters have equal rights in the coparcenary property as that of son, even though
the coparcener had died before the amendment of 2005.
In the an appeal under analysis herein, i.e., in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma &
Others, similar questions were raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and
considering the contradicting view expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
above mentioned two decisions, i.e., Phulavati case and Danamma case, the issue was
referred to a larger bench constituting three judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

2. ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN THIS CASE

 Whether the amended Section 6 of the Act of 2005 requires the coparcener to be alive
as on 09.09.2020, for the daughter to claim rights in the coparcenary property?
 Whether the amended Section 6 of the Act of 2005 is prospective, retrospective or
retroactive?
3. ARGUMENTS
It was observed in the case of 2016 in Lokmant and others v Mahadevamma and
others that the High Court held that Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Amendment
Act 2005, is retrospective in nature and the effect of this provision would be from
17th July 1956. However, in the case of Prakash v Phulavati case, a division bench
held that Section 6 is not retrospective. It held that both the father I.e. the coparcener
and the daughter should be alive on the date of commencement of the Amendment
Act I.e. 9.9.2005. But in Danamma case, the Court held that the amended provision of
Section 6 confers full rights upon the daughter coparcener. Even if the father is not on
the date of commencement of this Act, the daughter can claim her rights. Now this
judgment was being contrary to the judgment that was passed in the Phulavati case.
People found it confusing in dealing with section 6 of the Hindu Succession
Amendment Act of 2005. A similar question arose in the case of Vineeta Sharma v
Rakesh Sharma.
3.1 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF UNION OF INDIA , BY THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

 The amendment act of 2005 is not retrospective but retroactive in nature. 

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 Conferment of right on the daughter did not disturb the rights which got crystalized by
partition before 20.12.2004. 
 The daughter of coparcener in Section 6 does not imply daughter of a living
coparcener. The coparcener need not be alive as on the date of commencement of the
Amended Act.
 The explanation to Section 6(5) as regards requirement of registered partition deed is
directory in nature and not mandatory. 
3.2 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY SENIOR LEARNED COUNSEL AND AMICUS
CURIE , MR. R. VENKATARAMANI
 There is no conflict between the decisions of Phulavati and Danamma, and in both the
decisions, the provisions of Section 6 have been held to be prospective in nature. 
 On the death of a coparcener, his interest would have merged with the surviving
coparcenary and hence, on the death of a coparcener father, there will be no surviving
coparcener from whom the daughter will succeed. Therefore the daughter can succeed
only in interest of a living coparcener.
 Although equality has been brought in with effect from 2005 Amendment, the
incidence of birth of a coparcener before 2005 is of no consequence. 
 Oral partition and family settlement are not intended to be reopened by Section 6(1)
and 6(5). 
3.3 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY SENIOR LEARNED COUNSEL AND AMICUS
CURIE , MR. V.V.S RAO
 Logic of decision in Phulavati is upheld in Mangammal Vs. T.B.Raju & Others. 
 A daughter born before or after 2005 is considered as a coparcener. 
 By the language used in Section 6(1)(b) & (c) the Parliament intended to mean
conferring the rights in the coparcenary posterior to the amendment and not anterior. 
 As per the prevailing law, it was not necessary that a partition should be registered. In
case where an oral partition is recognised, it should be backed by proper evidentiary
support. 
 Parliament did not intend to confer a daughter with rights in the coparcenary property
retrospectively. 
 The use of the words “on and from” in Section 6(1) indicates that the daughter
becomes coparcener from the commencement of the Act. 

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 The status of a coparcener conferred on a daughter cannot affect the past transaction
of alienation, disposition, partition – oral or written. The Explanation safeguards all
genuine transactions of the past, including oral partition effected by the parties.  
 There should be a living coparcener to whom the daughter can inherit to become a
coparcener. 
3.4 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY ADVOCATE, MR. AMIT PAI
 Substitution of Section 6 under the Amended Act dates back to the commencement of
the Principal Act of 1956.
 A Notional partition on the death of a coparcener to ascertain his shares is not an
actual partition and same is not excluded by the proviso contained in Section 6. 
 Decision in Phulavati cannot be said to laying down the correct law. 
 The concept of living daughter of living coparcener is adding to the text of the
provisions of Section 6. 
 Section 6 includes all daughter, whether their father is alive as on the date of
amendment of the act. 
4. JUDGMENT

The Larger Bench of the Supreme Court, in the above Appeals, have referred to
various concepts of Hindu Law, both codified and customary, being concepts such as
Coparcenary and Joint Hindu Family and unobstructed and obstructed heritage, and
also referring to catena of Judgments, came to a finding, at paragraph No.44 of the
Judgment, that coparcener father need not be alive as 09.09.2005 in order for a
daughter to inherit rights over the coparcenary property, as per the Amended Section
6. Explaining obstructed and unobstructed heritage, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that the unobstructed heritage takes place by birth, whereas the obstructed heritage
takes place after the death of the owner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further went on
to hold that under Section 6, right  is given by birth, making it an unobstructed
heritage, and therefore coparcener father need be alive as on 09.09.2005 in order for
the daughter to inherits rights over the coparcenary property. The Court also added
that the concept of uncodified Hindu Law of unobstructed heritage has been given a
concrete shape under the provisions of Section 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(b) and that the
coparcenary right is by birth and therefore, it is not at all necessary that the father of
the daughter be living as on the date of the amendment, since she had not been

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conferred with the rights of coparcener by obstructed heritage. As such, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court did not consider decision in Phulavati case to be a good decision in so
far as this aspect is concerned.  

As regards the applicability of the amended section 6 to be retrospective or

prospective, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the amended Section 6 is
retroactive in nature. Explaining the concepts of prospectively, retrospectively and
retroactivity, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the operation of retroactive statute
operates based on a characteristic or event which happened in the past or requisites
which had been drawn from antecedent event. The Court further opined that Section
6(1)(a) contains the concept of the unobstructed heritage of Mitakshara coparcenary,
which is by virtue of birth and since the right is given by birth, that is an antecedent
event, and provisions operate on and from the date of the Amendment Act, making it
retroactive. The Court also added that the provision contained in Section 6(4) makes it
clear that the provisions of Section 6 are not retrospective. 

5. CONCLUSION

Among other issues answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above case, the
following were answered: 
 The right conferred on a daughter, in the coparcenary property is by birth and
hence, it is not necessary that the father be alive as on 09.09.2005. As such,
the decision in Phulavati case is overruled and the decision in Danamma case
is partly overruled to the effect where it said that the coparcener father has to
be alive as on 09.09.2005.  
 The amendment by way substitution of Section 6 of Act of 2005 is retroactive
in nature. 

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