REPLEVIN

1. SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO. INC. vs. PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CO. and PEDRO BALUBAL
G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing public transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its
buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, swerved and crashed into the radio room of
respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC).

The bus was thereafter turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own investigation of the incident.
Because of lack of adequate space, the bus was, on request of traffic investigator, towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound
where it was stored.

Petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release the bus, but respondent Balubal denied the same. Respondent Balubal
instead demanded the sum of P40,000.00, or a collateral with the same value. Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery
of personal property (replevin) with damages.

Respondent claimed that they merely towed the bus to the PNCC compound for safekeeping pursuant to an order from the
police authorities; that petitioner, in claiming the bus, failed to present the certificate of registration and official receipt of
payment to establish ownership thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether the recovery of the possession of the bus proper?

RULING:
YES. Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is in order.

The term replevin is popularly understood as the return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to
be wrongfully taken or detained upon the persons giving security to try the matter in court and return the goods if defeated
in the action; the writ by or the common-law action in which goods and chattels are replevied, i.e., taken or gotten back by a
writ for replevin; and to replevy, means to recover possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of goods or
chattels under a replevin order.

Bouviers Law Dictionary defines replevin as a form of action which lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which
have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to take
possession of the property therein described and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to
the sheriff to prove his title, or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority states that the term, to replevy
means to re-deliver goods which have been distrained to the original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of
replevin.

The term therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the provisional remedy
traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained during
the pendency of the action.

In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the
possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof,
wrongfully detains the same.

Petitioners ownership of the bus being admitted by respondents, consideration of whether respondents have been
wrongfully detaining it is in order.

2. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. REGINA M. ASTORGA

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G.R. No. 148132, 151079, 151372, January 28,

2008

FACTS:
Astorga was employed by respondent SMART as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group/
Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD). SMART thereafter launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient
operations. It entered into a joint venture agreement with NTT of Japan, and formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Incorporated
(SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the sales and marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorga’s division.

SMART then conducted a performance evaluation of CSMG personnel and those who garnered the highest ratings were
favorably recommended to SNMI. Astorga landed last in the performance evaluation, thus, she was not recommended by
SMART.

The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and
other benefits with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART.

In the meantime, SMART demanded Astorga to pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to
her under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition. Astorga,
however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati (RTC).
Astorga filed a motion to dismiss the replevin case.
RTC issued an Order denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss the replevin case, since car is registered in the name of the plaintiff.
CA ruled that the car plan privilege is a benefit arising out of employer-employee relationship. Thus, the claim for such falls
squarely within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters and the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the replevin case?

RULING:
YES.
RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss.
SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but
a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the
dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or
chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to
permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the
property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy
traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the
pendency of the action.

In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit, explained:

Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is
the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to
adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of
possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said
property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of
specialization of Labor Arbiters.
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each
forum can be resolved independently on the other.

3. PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC. vs. SPOUSES GEORGE M. DAI and DIVINA DAI
G.R. No. 148980, September 21, 2007
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FACTS:
Respondent spouses obtained a loan on June 16, 1994 from petitioner, PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. The proceeds of
the loan partly financed the purchase by respondents of a vessel-fishing boat. To secure the payment of the loan,
respondents executed a chattel mortgage over the vessel in favor of petitioner.

Respondents failed to pay the second and third installments, prompting petitioner to file before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City a complaint for replevin and damages, praying (a) issuance a writ of replevin ordering the seizure of the
vessel xxx; (b) In the event that manual delivery of the said vessel cannot be effected xxx render judgment ordering them to
pay the plaintiff, the sum of P3,502,095.00 plus interest and penalty thereon.

Sps. claimed that, inter alia, the possession of the vessel including its registration certificate had been surrendered to
petitioner before the filing of the complaint. Thereafter, petitioner foreclosed the chattel mortgage and bought the vessel at
the public auction.

Cebu RTC ruled that there was no bad faith on defendant’s part when they failed to comply with their obligation, due to the
fact that their fishing area in Batanes and their boat were badly damaged.

More than a year and a half following the promulgation by the trial court of its, petitioner filed a complaint for deficiency
judgment and/or collection of sum of money before the Cebu RTC.

Respondents pleaded bar by prior judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s complaint for deficiency judgment proper, after foreclosing the chattel mortgage?

RULING:
NO. Section 9 of Rule 60 categorically defines or limits the judgment or decision that may be rendered by the court in an
action for replevin, thus:

Section 9. Judgment. After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the right of possession to and the value of the
property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value
in case delivery cannot be made and also for such damages as either party may prove, with costs.

Careful reading of the above-quoted procedural law would show that it does not authorize the court to render judgment on
the deficiency after foreclosure.

Petitioner ignores the fact that it prayed in the replevin case that in the event manual delivery of the vessel could not be
effected, the court render judgment in its favor by ordering [herein respondents] to pay . . . the sum of P3,502,095.00 plus
interest and penalty thereon.

Since petitioner had extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel mortgage over the vessel even before the pre-trial of the case, it
should have therein raised as issue during the pre-trial the award of a deficiency judgment. After all, the basis of its above-
stated alternative prayer was the same as that of its prayer for replevin the default of respondents in the payment of the
monthly installments of their loan.

3. TERLYNGRACE RIVERA vs. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS

G.R. No. 165895, June 5, 2009

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FACTS:
Respondent Vargas filed a complaint against petitioner and several John Does before Branch 2 of the RTC
in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, for the recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon. Vargas claims
ownership of the said equipment, having purchased and imported the same directly from Hyun Dae Trading Co.,
in Seoul, South Korea. The equipment was allegedly entrusted to petitioners husband, Jan T. Rivera, who died sometime in
late 2002, as caretaker of respondents construction aggregates business in Batangas. According to Vargas, petitioner failed to
return the said equipment after her husband’s death despite his repeated demands, thus forcing him to resort to court
action. The complaint was accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and the necessary bond amounting
to P2,400,000.00.
Summons was served upon petitioner through her personal secretary at her residence in Parañaque City. The writ of
replevin was served upon and signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty in petitioners crushing plant in
Sariaya, Quezon contrary to the sheriffs return stating that the writ was served upon Rivera.
RTC issued an Order disapproving petitioner’s redelivery bond application for failure to comply with the requirements under
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. The RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to file the application for
redelivery bond within five (5) days from the date of seizure as provided in the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
1. What is the effect of a writ of replevin that has been improperly served?
2. Whether the disapproval of petitioner’s redelivery bond waives his right to question the improper service?

RULING:
1. Not only should the writ or order of replevin comply with all the requirements as to matters of form or contents
prescribed by the Rules of Court. The writ must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be
directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not only has the possession
or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent of a party to the action.

Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action
of replevin if it seizes and detains a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in
this case.

The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of
the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this
case) together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide
proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with the courts order upon application by
the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.

Here, the writ was received by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya, Quezon, where the property
to be seized was located. The law presumes that every possessor is a possessor in good faith. He is entitled to be respected
and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof until a competent court rules otherwise. Before a final
judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of law.

2. NO
Petitioner’s filing of an application for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question the
improper service. Nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint
accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the redelivery bond for having
been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. But since the writ was invalidly
served, petitioner is correct in contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall
commence to run.
It now becomes imperative for the trial court to restore the parties to their former positions by returning the seized property
to petitioner and by discharging the replevin bond filed by respondent.
5. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. vs. HON. HELEN BAUTISTA-RICAFORT, et al.
G.R. No. 166901, October 27, 2006

FACTS:

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Section 1, Republic Act (RA) No. 8506, which took effect on February 22, 1998, provides that it shall be unlawful for
any person to import, cause the importation of, register, cause the registration of, use or operate any vehicle with its steering
wheel right hand side thereof in any highway, street or road, whether private or public, or at the national or local x x x.
Herein duly-licensed importers of vehicles (Tabuelog, et al.), imported 72 secondhand right-hand drive buses
from Japan. When the shipment arrived at the SouthHarbor, Port of Manila, the District Collector of Customs impounded the
vehicles and ordered them stored at the warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI), a customs-bonded warehouse under
the custody of the Aviation and Cargo Regional Division.
The RTC granted the application for a writ of replevin on a bond of P12,000,000.00. The Sheriff served a copy of the Order on
ATI and succeeded in taking custody of the vehicles and signed a receipt therefor. The District Collector of Customs agreed to
transfer the custody of the vehicles to the RTC, on the condition that the required taxes, dues, and other charges are paid.

The overwhelming number of PNP personnel who accompanied the sheriff (there were at least 20 police cars which swarmed
over the area), pitied against only three (3) hapless Customs policemen, plus the threat to arrest anyone who would obstruct
the implementation of the Order granting the application for a Writ of Replevin, left the Bureau of Customs with no choice
but to allow the release of the subject vehicles.

ISSUE:
Whether the writ of replevin issued by the RTC valid?

RULING:
NO. As the Court ruled in Jao v. Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon
the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs and to enjoin or
otherwise interfere with these proceedings. It is the Collector of Customs, sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings, who
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The
Regional Trial Courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus. The Court further explained:
The rule that Regional Trial Courts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing no
unnecessary hindrance on the governments drive, not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon Customs, but more
importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the
government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to perform.
Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by respondents herein, issue the writ of
replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of Customs had already seized the vehicles and set the sale thereof at
public auction. The RTC should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset. By granting the plea of respondents
(plaintiffs below) for the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of custody to the court, the RTC acted without jurisdiction
over the action and the vehicles subject matter thereof. It bears stressing that the forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau of
Customs is a proceeding against the goods and not against the owner. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, i.e., directed
against the res or imported articles and entails a determination of the legality of their importation . In this proceeding, it is, in
legal contemplation, the property itself which commits the violation and is treated as the offender, without reference
whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner.

In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of replevin and its implementation are void. While it is
true that the District Collector of Customs allowed the release of the vehicles and the transfer thereof to the custody of the
RTC upon the payment by the private respondents of the required taxes, duties and charges, he did not thereby lose
jurisdiction over the vehicles; neither did it vest jurisdiction on the RTC to take cognizance of and assume jurisdiction over the
petition for replevin. As very well explained by the Office of the Solicitor General, the District Collector of Customs agreed to
transfer the vehicles to the custody of the RTC since the latter had ordered the arrest of those who would obstruct the
implementation of the writ. The District Collector of Customs had yet to resolve whether to order the vehicles forfeited in
favor of the government, in light of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that, under RA No. 8506, the importation was
illegal.
6. SERVICEWIDE SPECIALISTS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HILDA TEE, & ALBERTO M. VILLAFRANCA
G.R. No. 110048 November 19, 1999

FACTS:

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Leticia L. Laus of Quezon City purchased on credit a Colt Galant from Fortune Motors (Phils.) Corporation. As a
security, a chattel mortgage was constituted over the said motor vehicle with a deed of assignment incorporated therein such
that the credit and mortgage rights were assigned by Fortune Motors Corp. in favor of Filinvest Credit Corporation with the
consent of the mortgagor-debtor Leticia Laus.

Filinvest Credit Corporation in turn assigned the credit in favor of Servicewide Specialists, Inc.

Leticia Laus failed to pay the monthly installments for that month. The installments for the succeeding 17 months were not
likewise fully paid, Servicewide demanded payment of the entire outstanding balance inclusive of interests. Despite said
formal demand, Leticia Laus failed to pay all the monthly instalments.

Servicewide instituted a complaint for replevin, impleading Hilda Tee and John Dee in whose custody the vehicle was believed
to be at the time of the filing of the suit.

Alberto Villafranca however, filed a third party claim contending that he is the absolute owner of the subject motor vehicle
duly evidenced by the Bureau of Land Transportation's Certificate of Registration.

Alberto Villafranca was substituted as defendant. Summons was served upon him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a case for replevin may be pursued against the defendant, Alberto Villafranca, without impleading
the absconding debtor-mortgagor?

RULING:
NO. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound
by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.

When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence
of, but also the mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold the right to
replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for such action lies with the plaintiff.

Leticia Laus, being an indispensable party, should have been impleaded in the complaint for replevin and damages. An
indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the
Court which is effective, complete, or equitable.

In case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such possession or that of his principal, is
put to great doubt (a contending party may contest the legal bases for plaintiffs cause of action or an adverse and
independent claim of ownership or right of possession may be raised by that party), it could become essential to have other
persons involved and impleaded for a complete determination and resolution of the controversy. In the case under scrutiny,
it is not disputed that there is an adverse and independent claim of ownership by the respondent as evinced by the existence
of a pending case before the Court of Appeals involving subject motor vehicle between the same parties herein.

7. TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs. RUFINA AND

COMPANY G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006

FACTS:

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Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of rhum, wines and liquor under the name
and style Tanduay Distillers. In the conduct of its business, it sells its products to the public excluding the bottles. It makes
substantial investments in brand new bottles which it buys from glass factories and which they use for about five times in
order to recover the cost of acquisition. Twin Ace thus retrieves its used empty bottles, washes and uses them over and over
again as containers for its products.

Rufina is engaged in the production, extraction, fermentation and manufacture of patis and other food seasonings. In
producing patis and other food seasonings, Rufina uses as containers bottles owned by Twin Ace without any authority or
permission from the latter. In the process, Rufina is unduly benefited from the use of the bottles.

Twin Ace Holdings Corporation (Twin Ace) filed a Complaint for recovery of possession of personal property with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of replevin.

The RTC of Manila granted the issuance of a writ of replevin.

Rufina claimed that the marked bottles it used as containers for its products were purchased from junk dealers; hence, it
became the owner thereof.

Under Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700, is quoted hereunder for clarity:

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has
successfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such
bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other similar containers so marked or stamped, for
the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not to use the same
for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes, for any other purpose than that registered by the
manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos
or imprisonment of not more than one year or both.

Twin Ace asserts that the provision under the law affords protection only to small scale producers/manufacturers that do not
have the capacity to buy new bottles for use in their products and cannot extend to Rufina who is engaged, on a large scale
basis, in the production and manufacture of food seasonings.

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of writ of replevin justified?

RULING:
NO. In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and
consequently there is thus no basis for the demand by it of due compensation. As stated by the court in the earlier case
of Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals:

Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Sec. 5 of RA No. 623 to support its claim of continuing ownership over the subject bottles. In
United States v. Manuel [7 Phil. 221 (1906)] we held that since the purchaser at his discretion could either retain or return the
bottles, the transaction must be regarded as a sale of the bottles when the purchaser actually exercised that discretion and
decided not to return them to the vendor. We also take judicial notice of the standard practice today that the cost of the
container is included in the selling price of the product such that the buyer of liquor or any such product from any store is not
required to return the bottle nor is the liquor placed in a plastic container that possession of the bottle is retained by the
store.

8. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999

FACTS:
Two police officers of the Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck, carrying 4,000
board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along the Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, and brought the

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truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the
DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered various
discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber which are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD)
Circular No. 10.

Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Secretary)
issued an order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck and were subsequently advertised to be
sold at public auction.

Private respondents filed a complaint before Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City, with prayer for the issuance of writs of
replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated lumber and six-
wheeler truck, and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the subject narra lumber.

Petitioners contend that the confiscated lumber cannot be subject of replevin.

ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court correctly issued the writ of replevin?

RULING:
NO. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 60 of the
Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention by the defendant of the
properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is
offered, the writ should not be issued.

Here, (1) the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of
P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277. As the petitioner Secretary’s administrative authority to
confiscate is clearly provided by law, the taking of the subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of
a writ of replevin prayed for by private respondents.

(2) The Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his power under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No.
705. By virtue of said order, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck of private respondents were held in custodia legis and
hence, beyond the reach of replevin.

Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in custodia legis. When a thing is in official custody of a
judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. Otherwise, there
would be interference with the possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the
property was taken. So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should
not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have
been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.

9. SERGS PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY vs. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.
G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000

FACTS:
Respondent PCI Leasing filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for a sum of money, with an application for a writ of
replevin. Respondent judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment
to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.

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Petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the
parties agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial to
innocent third parties.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject machineries are proper subject of the writ of replevin?

RULING:
YES. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the recovery of personal property
only. Section 3 thereof reads:

SEC. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall issue an order and the
corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff
forthwith to take such property into his custody.

In the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal
property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement reads as follows:

12.1 The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part
thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon,
real property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent.

Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under
the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.

The machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own
land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of
them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry. In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are
real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not proper subjects of the
Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After
agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.

In Tumalad v. Vicencio, the Court upheld the intention of the parties to treat a house as a personal property because it had
been made the subject of a chattel mortgage. Further, the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile
Mills also held that the machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a proper subject
of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract.

10. LIBRADA D. TORRES vs. NELSON C. CABESUELA

A.M. No. P-00-1391 September 28, 2001 (Formerly AM OCA IPI-98-506-P)

FACTS:
Complainant Torres alleging that she is one of the owners of San Antonio High School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija.
Said school is the owner of a Mitsubishi Pajero mortgaged to Philam Savings Bank, Inc. The school failed to pay its obligation
so the bank filed a complaint for replevin and damages. MeTC, Branch 9, Manila, granted the bank's prayer for a writ of
replevin.

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After Judge Fabros came out with the writ of seizure, Respondent Sheriff issued the "Sheriffs Deputization" addressed to the
Chief of Police of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija requesting for assistance in the implementation of said writ. According to him, he
"deputized" the police officers only after he attempted to implement the writ and found the vehicle at a local motorshop
undergoing repairs; that he was not familiar with the place and for said Chief of Police to seize the vehicle; that complainant
was a very powerful and influential person as shown by her ability to remove the vehicle from the motorshop without
seeking the permission of the court; and that he issued the "Sheriff's Deputization" in good faith although he admitted that
his act was unlawful.

Complainant filed her opposition and/or comment thereto contending that the act of the respondent in deputizing the police
officers in implementing the writ of seizure did not find support in law and in the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of “Sheriff’s Deputization” in order?

RULING:
NO. The act of respondent in issuing the Sheriff’s Deputization is without legal basis.

Under Administrative Circular No. 12 (5) it is provided that "No sheriff or deputy sheriff shall execute a court writ outside his
territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in writing and seeking the assistance of, the sheriff of the place where the
execution shall take place".

Respondent's act of implementing the writ in Nueva Ecija when his territorial jurisdiction is confined only to Manila is a clear
violation of the law. The proper recourse would have been to seek the assistance of the sheriff of Nueva Ecija rather than
deputizing the police officer of said place.

Furthermore, in Tordesillas vs. Basco (108 SCRA 551,556) it was held that under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court, it is the personal duty and responsibility of the sheriff to personally implement the writ and it constitutes serious
misconduct and gross negligence for a sheriff to delegate his primary role in implementing a writ of seizure. Respondent's
absence during the seizure of the subject vehicle by the police officers falls squarely within this prohibition for which he should
be held liable.
As a ministerial officer, respondent sheriff should have known that it was his duty, in the absence of instructions, to faithfully
perform what was incumbent upon him to do. Administrative Circular No. 12 was promulgated in order to streamline the
service and execution of court writs and processes in the reorganized courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and to better
serve the public good and facilitate the administration of justice. Paragraph 5 of said Circular is clear and self-explanatory.
"No sheriff or deputy sheriff shall execute a court writ outside his territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in writing, and
seeking the assistance of the sheriff of the place where the execution shall take place."

Officers of the court and all court personnel are exhorted to be vigilant in the execution of the law. Sheriffs, as agents of the
law, are therefore called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence. They cannot afford to err in
serving court writs and processes and in implementing court orders lest they undermine the integrity of their office and the
efficient administration of justice.

11. JOHNNY GOMEZ and MAR GUIDOTE for SABINO S. RAMOS vs. RODOLFO A. CONCEPCION, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Branch
28, Cabanatuan City – A.M. No. P-98-1283. May 9, 2000

FACTS:
Sabino Ramos, while driving his owner-type jeep, figured in a vehicular accident. The vehicle was bumped by a
passenger jeepney, causing damage to the jeep of Ramos and injuries to the passengers. The offending vehicle, the passenger
jeepney, turned out to be under the custody of respondent Sheriff. When required to comment on the complaint, he averred
that the passenger jeepney was carnapped in front of his residence, which incident he immediately reported to the Philippine
National Police of Cabanatuan City.

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The Investigating Judge recommended the dismissal of the complaint, additionally noting that the sworn statements of
Sabino Ramos and Edna Ramos had failed to mention any possible personal gain on the part of respondent Sheriff in the use
of the passenger jeepney.

ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal is proper?

RULING:
NO. The undersigned Court find a valid explanation why the passenger jeepney under custodia legis should be
placed in front of respondent’s residence without taking into account the problem of safety and security. He unduly exposed
the jeep to undesirable elements, making it an easy prey for thieves and carnappers.

Section 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides: xxx When the officer has taken property as herein provided, he must keep it
in a secure place and shall be responsible for it and ultimately deliver it to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees
and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same.

Evidently, the respondent was remiss in the performance of his official duty and responsibility to safely secure the property in
his custody until its delivery to the party entitled to it, as mandated by the rules. The vehicle could have been deposited in
the premises of the court where it is secured, or, at any other place where the required security is provided for and available.
For after all, the respondent should have known that his office could have charged the party entitled to it, allowable fees for
storage, necessary in safely keeping the property in custodia legis.

But, for reasons only known to the respondent, he breached his official duty and responsibility making him answerable for
the consequences of his lapses.

Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice, and being agents of the law and the courts, high standards are
expected of them. Respondent Sheriff did not proffer any explanation for parking the vehicle in his custody in front of his
residence instead of having it stored in a secure place. Respondent Sheriff has clearly been remiss in the performance of his
assigned task.

12. SPOUSES NORMANDY and RUTH BAUTISTA vs. ERNESTO L. SULA

A.M. No. P-04-1920, August 17, 2007

FACTS:
Ruth borrowed P300,000 from Glor. To secure the loan, Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her Honda CRV in
favor of Glor.

Despite the repeated demands, Ruth refused to pay her debt, or surrender possession of the vehicle. Thus, Glor filed with the
RTC, Branch 98, Quezon City, a civil case for judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of replevin.

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Without waiting for the trial courts instructions regarding the vehicle, respondent filed his sheriff’s return on 28 May
2004 stating that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sheriff acted with GAOD?

RULING:
YES. Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered
immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it to the defendant, if
the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return and files a counter[-]bond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court).

The purpose of the five (5) day period in Section 6, Rule 60 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the
return of the property by filing a counter[-]bond. Considering that there was no court order to release the property to the
applicant/plaintiff and the complainants were able to require the return of the property and file their counter[-]bond
within the five (5) day period required by the Rules, respondent should have been more circumspect in releasing the
property to the plaintiff/applicant. By hastily deciding to release the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant without
waiting for the courts order, respondent patently abused his authority.

Under Section 5, complainants may require the return of the vehicle by (1) posting a counter-bond in double the value of the
vehicle and (2) serving Glor with a copy of the counter-bond. Both requirements must be complied with before the vehicle is
delivered to Glor. Put differently:

If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within five days
from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof,
both requirements as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned being mandatory. x x x

Conformably, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filing a
redelivery bond executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiffs affidavit within the
period specified in Sections 5 and 6.

Under Section 6, the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor only under the following instances:
1. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants do not object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the
surety or sureties thereon;
2. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants object to the sufficiency of the bond and the trial court
affirms its approval of Glors bond or approves a new bond; or
3. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants require the return of the vehicle and their bond is objected
to and found insufficient and they do not forthwith file an approved bond.

13. ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE INC., and MELBAROSE R. SASOT vs. THE GOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP.
G.R. No. 164521, December 18, 2008

FACTS:
Allandale Sportsline, Inc. (ASI) obtained a loan of P204,000.00 from The Good Development Corp. (GDC). To provide
additional security, ASI and Melbarose executed in favor of GDC a Deed of Mortgage.

GDC demanded that Melbarose pay the unpaid account of P179,000.00. When no payment was made, GDC filed with the RTC
a Complaint for Replevin and/or Sum of Money with Damages.

The RTC issued a Writ of Replevin. GDC disclosed that the properties of petitioners which were seized by virtue of the Writs
of Replevin were extra-judicially foreclosed and sold at public auction by respondent in the exercise of its absolute

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right under the contract entered into by the parties, without need of prior notice or demand to forthwith judicially or extra-
judicially foreclose this mortgage and proceed against all or any of the mortgaged rights, interests and properties for the full
satisfaction of the mortgagors' entire obligation to the mortgagee.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of respondent’s act of foreclosing the seized property?

RULING:
One effect of the election by respondent of the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure is the inapplicability of Section
9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 9. Judgment. After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the right of possession to and the value of
the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its
value in case delivery can not be made and also for such damages as either party may prove, with costs.

By causing the auction sale of the mortgaged properties, respondent effectively adopted and pursued the remedy of extra-
judicial foreclosure, using the writ of replevin as a tool to get hold of the mortgaged properties. As emphasized in Bachrach,
one effect of respondents election of the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure is its waiver of the remedy of collection of the
unpaid loan.

Petitioner ignores the fact that it prayed in the replevin case that in the event manual delivery of the vessel could not be
effected, the court render judgment in its favor by ordering [herein respondents] to pay x x x the sum of P3,502,095.00 plus
interest and penalty thereon from October 12, 1994 until fully paid as provided in the Promissory Note.

Since petitioner had extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel mortgage over the vessel even before the pre-trial of the case, it
should have therein raised as issue during the pre-trial the award of a deficiency judgment. After all, the basis of its above-
stated alternative prayer was the same as that of its prayer for replevin the default of respondents in the payment of the
monthly installments of their loan. But it did not.

14. THOMAS YANG vs. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO R.

VALDEZ GR No. 73317, August 31, 1989

FACTS:
Respondent spouses Morante brought an action in the RTC of General Santos City against petitioners, to recover
possession of two (2) Isuzu-cargo trucks. Morante spouses alleged that they had actual use and possession of the two (2)
cargo trucks, having acquired them during the period from 1982 to 1984. The trucks were, however, registered in the name
of petitioner Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the Morante spouses' business of buying and selling corn. The spouses
were allegedly deprived of possession of the vehicles in the morning of 3 January 1985, when petitioner Yang had the
vehicles taken from where they were parked.

Petitioner contends that the replevin bond was merely an undertaking of the bondsmen to pay the sum of P560,000.00, that
no tangible security, such as "cash, property or surety," was placed thereby at the disposal and custody of the court. It is

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argued, secondly, that the replevin bond was defective considering that it had been filed by only one of the two (2) private
respondents and that the bondsmen thereon had failed by its terms to undertake to return the cargo trucks to petitioner
should he (the petitioner) be adjudged lawful owner thereof.

The cargo trucks were taken into custody by the Sheriff on 7 January 1985. Petitioner Yang's counter-replevin bond was filed
on 25 January 1985 was approved by the lower court.

Petitioner further contends that since the respondent spouses are not the registered owners of the cargo trucks involved, the
writ of replevin should not have been issued.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Replevin Bond sufficient?
2. Whether the seized properties be returned to the Petitioners by their filing of counter-replevin bond?
3. Whether registration is necessary to grant the replevin?

RULING:
1. YES
A bond that is required to be given by law is commonly understood to refer to an obligation or undertaking in writing that is
sufficiently secured. It is not indispensably necessary, however, that the obligation of the bond be secured or supported by
cash or personal property or real property or the obligation of a surety other than the person giving the bond.

A "bond" is an obligation reduced to writing binding the obligor to pay a sum of money to the obligee under specified
conditions. At common law, a bond was merely a written obligation under seal. A bond is often, as a commercial matter,
secured by a mortgage on real property; the mortgagee may be the obligee, although the mortgagee may also be a third
party surety whose personal credit is added to that of the principal obligor under the bond.

The sufficiency of a bond is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which must approve the bond. In
the case at bar, the replevin bond given by the respondent Morante spouses was properly sered by the sureties themselves
who declared their solvency and capacity to answer for the undertaking assumed.

The fact that the other respondent, Ricardo Morante, did not act as surety on the same bond as his wife did, does not affect
the validity or the sufficiency of that bond. The replevin bond put up by Milagros Morante and Bayani L. Calonzo stated that it
was given "under the condition that [they] will pay all the costs, which may be adjudged to the said defendants and all
damages which said defendants may sustain by reason of the order of replevin, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
plaintiffs were not entitled thereto."

2. NO
Petitioner's right to file a counterbond had already prescribed. A lower court which approves a counter-bond filed beyond the
statutory periods, acts in excess of its jurisdiction.

A defendant in a replevin suit may demand return of possession of the property replevied by filing a redelivery bond within
the periods specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. Under Section 5, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the
property to the plaintiff" require the return of the property; in Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5) days after the taking
of the property by the officer." Both these periods are mandatory in character.

It is honestly believed that the five-day period spoken of by the Rule begins from the taking of the property by the sheriff and
not from the service of summons to the defendant, for even if summons was already duly served to the defendant but the
property has not yet been taken by the sheriff, the provision above cited does not apply. Hence, it is clear that
the prescriptive period for filing a counter-replevin bond must be counted from the actual taking of the property by the sheriff,
subject of the replevin bond and in this particular case on January 7, 1985.

The decisional principle on the filing of counter replevin bond to entitle the defendant to the redelivery or retaining
possession of the property, is compliance with all the conditions precedent pursuant to the rules, and failure to comply

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therewith entitles plaintiff to possession, and the initial steps in obtaining redelivery must be taken within the time limit
provided thereto.

3. NO
The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks immediate possession
of the property involved need not be holder of the legal title to the property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ of
replevin, he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the possession thereof."

16.ALIBSAR ADOMA vs. ROMEO GATCHECO

A.M. No. P-05-1942. January 17, 2005

FACTS:
On August 16, 2003 a writ of replevin for the recovery of an L-300 van was issued in his favor. On the same day,
respondent sheriff Romeo Gatcheco implemented the writ.

After the two respondents seized the vehicle, they demanded payment of P8,000.00, allegedly promised by complainant but
the latter was able to give only P1,000.00 and another P1,000.00 the following day.

The instant administrative complaint filed against respondents for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) and conduct unbecoming a court employee

ISSUE:

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Whether respondent sheriffs guilty of grave misconduct?

RULING:
YES. Respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place complainant in possession of the vehicle after five days from the
implementation of the writ because the latter failed to give the whole amount he promised.
The writ of replevin stated that the vehicle will be delivered to complainant after 5 days from the implementation thereof.
With the vehicle still undelivered on the 7th day, complainant threatened to file an administrative case against respondent
sheriff. Finally, on August 29, 2003, the latter was forced to release the vehicle to complainant. Respondents, however,
continued to demand P6,000.00, hence complainant filed the instant administrative case.
Since the adverse party did not object to the complainants bond nor posted a redelivery bond to recover possession of the
vehicle taken under the writ of replevin, respondent sheriff is under obligation to deliver the van to complainant. However, it
took respondent sheriff 13 days before he released the vehicle to complainant, a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse
party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects
and the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return
of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond , the
property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must
return it to the adverse party. (6a)

At the grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs are indispensably in close contact with the litigants, hence, their conduct
should be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of justice is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and
lowest of its personnel; hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good
name and standing as a temple of justice.

17. LEONARDO A. PAAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997

FACTS:
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan,
was seized by the DENR because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck.

Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans action of confiscation andordered
the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.

A suit for replevin, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the
RTC, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.

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Private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of
the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second paragraph
of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.

ISSUE:
Whether the replevin suit will prosper?

RULING:
NO. It is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.

By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by
private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting,
removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of
theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them
for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin
suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been
the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the
writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent
prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents right of action, is too
significant to be waylaid by the lower court.

Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he
is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of
detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized,
that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property.

Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is
legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
17. CITIBANK, N.A. (FORMERLY FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK) VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND DOUGLAS F.
ANAMA - G.R. NO. 61508. MARCH 17, 1999

FACTS:
A loan was obtained by private respondent Douglas Anama from Citibank. To secure payment of the loan, Anama
constituted a Chattel Mortgage in favor of petitioner, on various machineries and equipment.

For failure and refusal of the private respondent to pay the monthly installments due, despite repeated demands, petitioner
filed a verified complaint against Anama for the collection and for the delivery and possession of the chattels covered by the
Chattel Mortgage preparatory to the foreclosure thereof.

By virtue of the Alias Writ of Seizure, petitioner took possession of the mortgaged chattels of private respondent. As a
consequence, the sheriff seized subject properties, dismantled and removed them from the premises where they were
installed, delivered them to petitioner’s possession and advertised them for sale at public auction.

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Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by nullifying the writ of seizure issued below, in effect, rendered judgment on
the merits and adjudged private respondent Anama as the person lawfully entitled to the possession of the properties
subject of the replevin suit.

Petitioner also maintains that although there was no affidavit of merit accompanying its complaint, there was nonetheless
substantial compliance with the said rule as all that is required to be alleged in the affidavit of merit was set forth in its
verified complaint.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the CA’s order of nullifying the writ a judgment on merits?
2. Whether the absence of Affidavit of Merit fatal to the petition?
3. Whether the bond posted was sufficient?

RULING:
1. NO
A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties on the basis of the disclosed facts,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections, and it is not necessary that there should have been a trial.

The CA did not pass upon the issue of who, as between Anama and Citibank, is entitled to the possession of subject
machineries, as asserted by the latter. When it ordered the restoration of the said machineries to Anama, it merely brought
the parties to a status quo, by restoring the defendant to the possession of his properties, since there was a finding that the
issuance of the writ was not in accordance with the specific rules of the Rules of Court.

2. NOT
The absence of an affidavit of merit is not fatal where the petition itself, which is under oath, recites the circumstances or
facts constitutive of the grounds for the petition.

The facts that must be set forth in the affidavit of merit are
(1) that plaintiff owns the property particularly describing the same, or that he is entitled to its possession;
(2) wrongful detention by defendant of said property;
(3) that the property is not taken by virtue of a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law or seized under execution or
attachment or, if it is so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure; and the
(4) the actual value of the property.

Petitioner’s complaint does not allege all the facts that should be set forth in an affidavit of merit. Although the complaint
alleges that petitioner is entitled to the possession of subject properties by virtue of the chattel mortgage executed by the
private respondent, upon the latter’s default on its obligation, and the defendants alleged wrongful detention of the same,
the said complaint does not state that subject properties were not taken by virtue of a tax assessment or fine imposed
pursuant to law or seized under execution or attachment or, if they were so seized, that they are exempt from such seizure.

Although respondents defense of lack of affidavit of merit is meritorious, procedurally, such a defense is no longer available
for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.

3. NO
As there was a disagreement on the valuation of the properties in the first place, proper determination of the value of the
bond to be posted by the plaintiff cannot be sufficiently arrived at. Though the rules specifically require that the needed bond
be double the value of the properties, since plaintiff merely denominated a probable value of P200,000.00 and failed to aver
the properties actual value, which is claimed to be much greater than that declared by plaintiff, the amount of P400,000.00
would indeed be insufficient as found by the Court of Appeals.

The Rules of Court requires the plaintiff to give a bond, executed to the defendant in double the value of the property as
stated in the affidavit. Hence, the bond should be double the actual value of the properties involved . In this case, what was
posted was merely an amount which was double the probable value as declared by the plaintiff and, therefore, inadequate
should there be a finding that the actual value is actually far greater than P200,000.00. Since the valuation made by the

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petitioner has been disputed by the respondent, the lower court should have determined first the actual value of the
properties. It was thus an error for the said court to approve the bond, which was based merely on the probable value of the
properties.

In the case under consideration, the private respondent did not opt to cause redelivery of the properties to him by filing a
counter-bond precisely because he objected to the sufficiency of the bond posted by plaintiff. Therefore, he need not file a
counter-bond or redelivery bond.

18. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. ASTORGA

G.R. No. 148132 January 28, 2008

FACTS:
Regina Astorga was employed by SMART as District Sales Manager with P33,650 monthly salary and annual
performance incentive (30% of her annual gross salary), group life and hospitalization insurance coverage, and a car plan of
P455,000. SMART launched an organizational realignment, Part of the reorganization was the outsourcing of the marketing
and sales force. This resulted to the abolishment of Astorga’s division. Employees recommended by smart were to be
absorbed by SNMI, which excluded Astorga for being last on the performance evaluation.

Astorga was offered a supervisory position with a lower rank and rate so she refused. And, she continued going to work.
Consequently, SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her employment on ground of
redundancy. Pending the Labor Case on Illegal dismissal, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current
market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the
same to the company for proper disposition which she refused.

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This prompted SMART to file a suit for replevin before the RTC which was granted. Astorga appealed via certiorari to the CA,
which reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that the case is intertwined with Astorga’s complaint for illegal dismissal; thus, it
is the labor tribunal that has rightful jurisdiction over the complaint.
On the other hand, the labor arbiter held that Astorga’s dismissal from employment illegal. SMART appealed the unfavorable
ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC ruled in favor of SMART and ordered the return of the vehicle as it is civil in nature
within the competence of the regular court to decide. The CA affimed NLRC. However, it set aside NLRC’s order for the return
of the vehicle as it is civil in nature within the competence of the regular court to decide

ISSUE:
Was the CA wrong in setting aside the NLRC’s order for the return of the vehicle?

RULING:
YES. SMART’s replevin should be granted. Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to
repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or
who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in
specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the
recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may
be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action.

The relationship of the parties is debtor credito and not employer employee. The labor dispute involved is not intertwined
with the issue in the Replevin Case.

20. SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 182963, June 3, 2013

FACTS:
Petitioners spouses Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors,
Inc.

On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its rights, title and interests in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage to
ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc. (ABN AMRO), which later likewise assigned the same to respondent BPI Family Savings Bank,
Inc.

As demand for the unpaid instalments were left unheeded, respondent filed an action for Replevin and Damages before the
Manila RTC.

A writ of replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject vehicle was not seized.

ISSUE:

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Whether respondent’s remedy of resorting to both actions of replevin and collection of sum of money is contrary to
the provision of Article 1484 of the Civil Code?

RULING:
NO. The vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of
a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and
enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial
court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting
fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.

The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of one bars the exercise of the others.
This limitation applies to contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy by virtue of Art. 1485. The
condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of possession or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying Art.
1485 was fulfilled in this case by the filing by petitioner of the complaint for replevin to recover possession of movable
property.

21. KENNETH HAO vs. ABE C. ANDRES, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City
A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008

FACTS:
Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin pending before the RTC of Davao City.
Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order of Seizure against 22 motor vehicles allegedly owned by the complainant. On the
strength of the said order, Andres was able to seize nine subject motor vehicles on 3 different dates.

In his Affidavit-Complaint against sheriff Andres, Hao alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to Zenaida Silver in the
implementation of the order and that Andres seized the nine motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. He also averred that
Andres was accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on board a military vehicle which was excessive since there were
no resistance from them. Hao also discovered that the compound where the seized motor vehicles were placed is actually
owned by Silver.

In his report, Andres stated that he was shocked to find that the motor vehicles were already missing when he inspected it.
Hao reported that 3 of the carnapped vehicles were recovered by the police. He then accused Andres of conspiring and
conniving with Atty. Macadangdang (Silvers’ counsel) and the policemen in the carnapping of the motor vehicles.

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 REPLEVIN

ISSUE:
Whether Andres guilty of serious neglect of duties?

RULING:
YES. First, the rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the
plaintiff. In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to give the complainant
an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized
motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.

Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor vehicles on October 17, 2005, four on October 18,
2005, and another three on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the depository receipts, on October 18, 2005,
Silver received from Andres six of the seized motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October 19,
2005. Consequently, there is no question that Silver was already in possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately after
seizure, or no more than three days after the taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres committed a clear violation of Section 6,
Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with regard to the proper disposal of the property.

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