symplokeˉ 145

Creating neCessity:
Well-Used ViolenCe in
the thoUght of MaChiaVelli

dUstin ells hoWes

Vettius Messius said to his soldiers: “Follow me. There is neither wall
nor rampart in the way, but just armed forces to oppose armed forces. In
valour we are equal, but in necessity which is the last weapon and best of
all, you have the advantage.”
—Machiavelli, The Discourses on Livy, III:12

In his State of the Union address in January 2003, President George W.

Bush made the case for invading Iraq, even if the United Nations failed to
approve military action. Offering a personal pledge, he remarked “Whatever
action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom
and security of the American people” (Bush, 2003). On the ifth year anni-
versary of the Iraq War, he addressed critics of the war in a speech at the
Pentagon by saying the “costs are necessary when we consider the cost of
a strategic victory for our enemies,” and ended the speech with the remark:
“The battle in Iraq is noble; it is necessary; and it is just” (Bush, 2008). When
Barack Obama was elected later that year, it was in part due to his early
opposition to the war and his pledge to withdraw from Iraq. However, in his
speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, he afirmed the principle of neces-
sity. Expressing admiration for Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, he
averred that sometimes force is unfortunately required. Using the examples
of Hitler and al Qaeda, he said: “Evil does exist in the world.…To say that
force is sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism—it is a recognition of
history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.” For this reason,
“I—like any head of state—reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to
defend my nation” (Obama, 2009).
A few thinkers, namely radical paciists, have argued that violence is
never necessary or justiied. Some politicians and ideological movements,
fascists most prominently in contemporary politics, have argued violence is

© symploke Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2 (2012) ISSN 1069-0697, 145-169

146 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

good in its own right and therefore needs no justiication. However, most
contemporary politicians and modern political theorists forward the idea
that violence is necessary. As the disagreement between President Bush and
President Obama regarding the war in Iraq demonstrates, this pragmatic
claim tells us little about when and what kind of violence is unavoidable. Those
subjected to violence, whether individuals or states, usually do not agree
with the assessment that violence inlicted upon them is necessary (although
they often respond by arguing violence is the necessary response). Some of
the disputes between luminaries of modern political thought can be viewed
through this lens. Hobbes, Locke and Marx, for instance, each claim that
violence is necessary, but what they think must be achieved through violence
differs (e.g. to overawe dissenters, defend one’s property, or end capitalism).
What, then, does the idea that violence is necessary mean? Why does
violence seem necessary to some but not others in particular circumstances?
The work of Machiavelli provides some clues. A number of scholars have
noticed that in Machiavelli, necessità “is not just a hostile force [but] may
create opportunities” (Gilbert, 1965). Victoria Kahn writes that Machiavelli’s
invocation of the verità effettuale, or the “effectual truth,” implies that “one
does not simply imitate necessity but that one can manipulate it—effect it—to
one’s own advantage” (1993, 211). Claude Lefort says that for Machiavelli
“the political art derives from the knowledge of necessity—a knowledge
guided by the examination of extreme situations” (2000, 122). Vickie Sullivan
writes that when Machiavelli describes necessity he “attempts, as far as
possible, to make human beings its source” (1996, 181). These commentators
set us on the trail of answers to the above questions that undermine some of
our basic assumptions about necessity. Machiavelli suggests that trying to
determine when violence is necessary or not misses the ways in which our
very impressions of what is necessary are linked to how violence is practiced.
Extant scholarship offers a wide variety of opinions on Machiavelli’s
understanding of the proper role of violence in politics. Sheldon Wolin
argues that Machiavelli counsels us to use violence in an economical fashion,
which reduces the number of instances in which it must be applied (1960,
222). Maurice Merleau-Ponty claims that Machiavelli is “against violence,”
but wants to show us that it may be more cruel to not use cruelty in some situ-
ations (1964, 211, 216). Timothy Lukes suggests that these scholars and others
(Dietz, 1986, Strauss, 1978) have been too keen to emphasize Machiavelli’s
recommendation that rulers be cerebral and tricky like the fox at the expense
of his recommendation that rulers be bold and virile like the lion (Lukes,
2001). Likewise, John McCormick argues that republican interpreters of
Machiavelli, such as Pocock (1975), Skinner (1990, 1981, 1998) and Pettit
(1997), tend to downplay or ignore Machiavelli’s approving description of
aggressive plebs that vanquish foreign enemies and nobles alike (McCormick,
2003, 635). Some have gone so far as to argue that Machiavelli encourages
excessive and unnecessary violence (Hulliung, 1983, 164) or that his concept
of virtù is fundamentally a military value (Wood, 1967, 165).
 symplokeˉ 147

I argue that Machiavelli is more concerned about the quality of violence

than the quantity of it and that the quality of violence largely depends upon
how people view it. He begins The Prince by introducing a paradox of politi-
cal violence: new rulers must injure their subjects and at the same time retain
the support of those who are injured or might be injured. Well-used violence
delects blame, distracting people’s attention from the ruler’s other activities,
or cloaks violence in good qualities. In this way, Machiavelli allays anxieties
rulers might have about the paradoxical character of political violence by
showing us that well-used violence appears to be good. In The Discourses on
Livy, Machiavelli explains that well-used violence in republics ought to both
appear good and have good effects. He describes how well-used violence
reinforces the law, expresses the will of the people, and quashes partisanship
and dissention. People who share in rule are no longer duped about the truth
of well-used violence. Instead, they use it for good effect and ensure that it
appears good as well.
What this paper tries to show is that these activities create necessity. For
most interpreters, facing up to the necessity of violence in politics eschews or
requires a distinctive kind of ethics. Michael Walzer thinks Machiavelli can be
interpolated to encourage a tragic sensibility that accepts dirty hands (2004).
Max Weber’s more forceful reformulation and bolstering of Machiavelli’s
worldview argues that those who refuse to use violence in politics reject an
ethics of responsibility for the results of their actions (1958). I argue that by
placing necessity under the purview of human action, Machiavelli’s thought
has a paradoxical effect. Since one person’s freedom of action is another
person’s necessity, his analysis undermines the idea that violence is neces-
sary after all. Machiavelli shows us that “necessity” in politics, military and
otherwise, is usually made by us.

Well-Used Violence in The Prince

The Problem: The Paradox of Necessary

Political Violence

The irst ive chapters of Machiavelli’s most famous work introduce an

important, but little remarked upon, paradox of political violence. Every
non-hereditary prince who assumes power over a new territory faces the
following problem: A “new prince must always harm those over whom he
assumes authority, [yet however] strong your armies may be, you always
148 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

need the backing of local people to take over a province” (III).1 A new ruler
must treat the people in a physically harmful way and yet maintain their
support. Chapters three through ive elaborate the paradox by showing how
strategies for dealing with it are highly contingent. He says a ruler should
live with his subjects in order to remain sensitive to how they are reacting to
his touch (III). He says it will be easier to gain the support of the nobles if
the previous prince’s power was diffuse, but they will also be more sensitive
to injury (IV). He writes that even if a ruler follows all of this advice, some
populations, especially those that are in the habit of freedom, may still be
unruly, and the only sure way to subdue them is to destroy and disperse
them (V).
From the outset, then, Machiavelli suggests that rulers are pressed by
necessity in two different directions. Even as rulers have a need to harm their
subjects or some portion of them, they must take account of the psychologi-
cal disposition, ambitions and desires of those they are ruling. He sets out
to describe how rulers can use violence in a way that is attentive to human
needs and proclivities. Well-used violence is the best means for grabbing
ahold of necessity and bringing it under human control. The Prince gives four
examples of violence that harms one’s subjects in a way that will gain their
support or at least their cooperation.

Solution One: Combine Violence

with Prophetic Inspiration

Having raised and conveyed the complexity of the problem, Machiavelli

sets out to explain how to use violence. He begins by looking to good
examples. First, he suggests we look to founders of states, such as Moses,
Theseus, Cyrus and Romulus, whom he calls armed prophets (VI). Founders
and prophets describe a new way of living and propound “new laws and
measures” that are unfamiliar to people. They have little trouble winning
people over to their cause and do so without violence. However, those who
are invested in the old order will resist new ways, and even those who are
inspired by the divine vision of a founder will ind it dificult to maintain
their belief. Prophets ind that people are ickle and, as suggested by the
paradox of violence, it becomes necessary to injure or threaten injury to them.
“[T]o persuade them of something is easy, but to make them stand fast in
that conviction is hard. Hence things must be arranged so that when they no
longer believe they can be compelled to believe by force.” Violence is well-
used when it is coupled with a new vision of how things ought to be and

1
I have relied upon the Adams translation of The Prince throughout. Niccolò
Machiavelli, The Prince: A Revised Translation, Backgrounds, Interpretations, Marginalia, trans.
Robert Martin Adams, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1992). Citations refer to the chapters, which
are relatively short.
 symplokeˉ 149

keeps “the backsliders in line” or “[converts] the doubters” (VI). As Rebhorn

remarks, violence is “unmistakably the handmaiden of faith.”2 The relation-
ship to necessity is twofold: such violence is necessary because people will
not hold to their beliefs, and well-used violence can make it necessary for
people to hold to their beliefs.

Solution Two: Delect Responsibility

by Raising Up and Killing a Scapegoat

Those who have the requisite virtù to establish new states are rare, so
Machiavelli next discusses the more human Cesare Borgia, who perhaps does
not have prophetic vision but uses violence with extraordinary acumen none-
theless. Borgia acquires his state through good fortune and loses it because
bad fortune eventually bests him. Yet in his short career, he nearly succeeds
in consolidating his rule and becoming self-suficient, in part because of an
emblematic series of events “worthy of special note” (VII). The previous rulers
of the Romagna had exploited the people who, following the example of their
leaders, became lawless criminals. Borgia appoints a cruel minister, Remirro
de Orco, to set the unruly citizens straight and impose unity and peace. Yet
when this “excessive authority was no longer necessary” Borgia appoints a
civil court with a good judge and representatives from each city. In order to
“clear the minds of the people and gain them over to his cause completely, he
determined to make it plain that whatever cruelty had occurred had come,
not from him, but from the brutal character of the minister.” Borgia cuts Orco
in half, leaving the people stunned and satisied (VII).
Borgia was nominally in control of the Romagna prior to these events
through an act of trickery,3 but with this use of violence he not only controls
the Romagna but also controls it as a friend. At play here is Borgia’s ability to
use violence against the population by way of his minister, and then delect
responsibility for it by indulging their desire for revenge. Machiavelli’s
description of the Romagna suggests that the irst use of violence against
the population is for their own good: disunity and crime are transformed
into unity and peace. But this is not suficient to make it well-used violence.
Borgia understands that since the population is accustomed to feuding and

2
Wayne A. Rebhorn, Foxes and Lions: Machiavelli’s Conidence Men (Ithaca: Cornell UP,
1988), 125. Rebhorn expresses some ambivalence about the accuracy of Machiavelli’s assertion,
later saying that “violence supposedly generates faith” and indeed it is not clear how exactly
a prophet uses violence if everyone offers only tepid support. Perhaps this would be a sign
that someone is not a prophet as Machiavelli’s analysis seems to imply that some portion of
the population must be inspired to be true believers in order to use violence on those who are
ambivalent. But it raises the question of why the prophet was only able to convince a few and
why the rest of the population does not become disillusioned with the new ways when the
prophet and the followers take up arms. Ibid., 131.
3
The Orsini, whose troops he had been relying upon, are tricked into coming to
Sinigaglia where he kills their leaders and wins over their followers as friends.
150 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

division, the overwhelming use of force by his minister will inspire hatred
of the prince that might quickly dissolve the progress that has been made.
Using violence is not only necessary, but also dangerous. Borgia must
manage the emotional response that his violence inspires. The paradox of
needing to use violence but also needing the support of the people is resolved
by allowing the people to feel as though violence is done in their name. This
is the importance of setting up a court to hear complaints before he kills de
Orco. Foreshadowing Machiavelli’s description of well-used violence in The
Discourses, Borgia’s violence inspires the regard of the people because they
would have liked to author it themselves.

Solution Three: Extreme Cruelty

that Nonetheless Beneits
the People over Time

Machiavelli’s inal example is the tyrant Agothocles. Like Borgia,

Agothocles sets the stage for a dramatic act of violence through trickery by
gathering the senate and the people together under the pretense of making an
announcement of public concern (VIII). Agothocles then kills all of the sena-
tors and the wealthy people, eliminating all of his most formidable competi-
tors. Though Agothocles had already worked his way up from poverty to gain
the appointment of military governor, he decided to “make himself prince,
and take violent possession, without obligation to others.” Machiavelli says
that while Agothocles’s boldness and spirit cannot be doubted, it “cannot be
called “virtue” [virtù] to murder his fellow citizens, betray his friends, to be
devoid of truth, pity, or religion; a man may get power by means like these,
but not glory” (VIII). Agothocles is not like the founders. Unlike Moses, he
does not have the ear of God and his relative lack of vision sets a ceiling on
what he can achieve from a historical standpoint. Indeed, his penchant for
sheer brutality makes him less honorable than Borgia, who is also cruel and
tricky but still somewhat sensitive to “the material” of humanity.
Yet Machiavelli does not condemn Agothocles. Instead, he ponders his
success and concludes that he uses violence well.

Somebody might wonder how it happened that Agathocles and

others of his ilk, after they had committed so many acts of treach-
ery and cruelty could live long, secure lives in their native cities,
defend themselves from foreign enemies, and never be conspired
against by their fellow citizens. And yet many other princes were
unable, because of their cruelty, to maintain their power, even in
times of peace, not to speak of the troubled times of war. I believe
this depends on whether the cruelty is used well or badly. Cruelty
can be described as well used (if it is permissible to say good words
about something evil in itself) when it is performed all at once, for
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reasons of self-preservation; and when the acts are not repeated

after that, but rather turned as much as possible to the advantage of
the subjects. Cruelty is badly used, when it is infrequent at irst, but
increases with time instead of diminishing. Those who use the irst
method may ind some excuse before God and man for their state,
as Agothocles did; the others cannot possibly stay in power. (VIII)

Here Machiavelli shows us that the paradox of well-used violence can

be resolved in yet another way. The founders are able to win people over
without violence but then use violence to make them hold fast to their belief
in the new order. Borgia inspires the people’s hatred but then transforms it
into love for him with the ritual killing of a scapegoat. Although Agothocles
has some share of virtù in that he is courageous and spirited, Machiavelli
says that Agothocles’s success is due neither to virtù nor fortune. He neither
inspires nor manipulates the people. He imposes necessity. There is no one
left to rule but him. In doing so, he gives up the chance for great things, but
he also makes himself secure. Agothocles succeeds without virtù, whereas
Borgia ultimately fails despite his extraordinary display of it.
Agothocles does not resolve the paradox of political violence by simply
using an extreme amount of it. Even someone as cruel as Agothocles cannot
ignore the needs and opinions of his subjects. Agothocles’s pure brutality is
of a particular character. It is front-loaded and focused. It is for the purpose
of preserving himself against his enemies and, since he kills all of the wealthy
and powerful citizens, his cruelty can be quickly turned “to the advantage
of the subjects.” Since he does not continue to rampage against the citizens
of Syracuse, he can “ind some excuse” before both God and the people. As
brutal and cruel as he is, he retains legitimacy through attentiveness. If his
apparently unbounded cruelty was not in fact bounded in very particular
ways, the people would not have stood for it and he would have failed.

Solution Four: Manage the Appearance

of Violence to Avoid Hatred

Having explained why relying on ordinary citizens is the best way to

secure one’s rule,4 Machiavelli offers his most important general advice about
how to use violence well. While relying on the people holds the advantage

4
Chapters nine through fourteen explain that to use violence in a way that gains the
support of the people, a ruler must be attentive to who carrying it out and who is subject to
violence: citizens, nobles, or soldiers. Relying on one’s own citizens and troops is preferable to
counting on nobles, auxiliaries and mercenaries who make it dificult for you to employ violence
effectively. Gaining the support of the people requires that you treat them lightly, or not actively
oppress them. Gaining the support of the nobles will require causing more injuries due to their
ambition. Machiavelli, The Prince, IX. Of course, one’s circumstances may require that you rely
on unreliable people for a time, but ideally a ruler will employ violence in a way that gains the
loyalty and regard of his citizens and troops and reduces dependence on unreliable people. This
152 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

that they are not ambitious like the nobles, the problem with ordinary people
is that they are ickle.

While you serve their welfare, they are all yours, offering their
blood, their belongings, their lives, and their children’s lives…so
long as the danger is remote. But when the danger is close at hand,
they turn against you. (XVII)

This is a version of the problem that was faced by the founders: even
a prince who has the regard of his subjects may not be able to keep it.5
Returning to the original paradox of political violence proposed fourteen
chapters earlier, Machiavelli now gives us an empirical reason for its exis-
tence: Violence is necessary and unavoidable because others may employ
violence to intimidate your populace, making their support for you tepid.
The paradox of political violence becomes particularly acute in the face of
danger, either from conspirators within the state or foreign invasion from
outside.
Unlike the founders and Borgia, most rulers will not be able to inspire
or maintain the love of the people while using violence against them or
confronting the violence of others. Instead, most rulers will have to choose
whether to be loved or to be feared. Fear is more reliable than love. Why?
Machiavelli’s reasoning in chapter seventeen is the key to understanding the
signiicance of knowing how to use violence well.

People are less concerned with offending a man who makes himself
loved than one who makes himself feared: the reason is that love
is a link of obligation which men, because they are rotten, will
break any time they think doing so serves their advantage; but fear
involves dread of punishment, from which they can never escape.
(XVII)

Love facilitates obedience; fear necessitates it. Inspiring fear produces

reliable results that are under the control of the ruler. Others may try to
impose necessity on a populace and inspire them to disobey you. To balance
the scales, you must ensure that your population is fearful of the violence you
might do to them. Necessity, created by others, requires that rulers inspire
an inescapable dread of punishment in their own population. Necessity
requires the imposition of necessity.
Chapter seventeen also offers Machiavelli’s best advice about how to use
violence against one’s own population in a way that does not backire. He
says “a prince should make himself feared in such a way that, even if he gets

in turn should produce a virtuous cycle whereby the ruler’s ability to ight and win wars is
enhanced. Ibid., XIV.
5
Recall that Machiavelli says a “new prince must always harm those over whom he
assumes authority.” Ibid., III. He reiterates the point at the beginning of chapter seventeen
saying a “new prince…cannot possibly avoid a name for cruelty.”
 symplokeˉ 153

no love, he gets no hate either; because it is perfectly possible to be feared

and not hated” (XVII). Chapters ifteen through twenty-one explain how to
do this. Much of Machiavelli’s advice about how to avoid hatred while using
violence is captured by his recommendation that a ruler should combine the
ferocity of the lion with the cunning of the fox. The lion portion of the anal-
ogy explains how to best channel the use of violence, and the fox portion
explains how to manage one’s appearance while using it. Brute force is best
when one has superior forces that allow for victory, but one must also be able
to manage the emotional fallout that ensues in the wake of violence. Lukes
writes that the lion, in literature of the time, had many laudable characteris-
tics in addition to brute strength, such as virility, emotional sensitivity, and
respect (2001, 568). There are limits to what the lion can do without ruining
his reputation; some kinds of violence are more likely to produce hatred than
others.6
Lions are also susceptible to traps, so one needs to be cagey.7 Well-used
violence cloaks itself in good qualities, is perceived as being done by some-
one other than the ruler,8 or distracts people’s attention from the ruler’s other
activities.9 The analogy of the lion and the fox conveys Machiavelli’s anxieties
about the necessity of using violence against one’s population and also offers
some solutions. If you consistently appear to have the qualities of a good
person, and the outcomes of your actions are generally for the beneit of the
population, the negative effects of using violence can be minimized.10

6
“[M]en are quicker to forget the death of a father than the loss of a patrimony.” Ibid.,
XVIII. Indeed, “most men, if you don’t touch their property or their honor [i.e. attack their
women], will live contentedly.” Ibid., XIX.
7
Superior brute force can be subverted by well-planned military maneuvers or the
deceit and delection of weaker parties. Deceit is the tool of the weak to defeat those who are
more physically powerful and the people are always more physically powerful than the prince.
Even rulers who have won over the people and thereby gained a great capacity for violence
cannot take on the entire world at once and will need to trick some while they ight others. For
instance, the Roman emperor Severus “made good use of the fox and the lion” when, in order to
consolidate his rule in both the East and the West, he attacked Pescennius Niger in the East but
made a false peace with Albinus in the West. Once the East was secured and Niger defeated, he
betrayed Albinus and defeated him as well. Ibid. See also II:13 of The Discourses.
8
One should “delegate unpleasant jobs to other people and reserve the pleasant
functions for themselves.” Ibid. However, as Borgia’s killing of de Orco demonstrates, the
meaning of “pleasant functions” differs depending upon the character of the audience. “[I]t
should be noted that hatred may be earned by doing good just as much as by doing evil; and
so…a prince who wants to keep his state is often bound to do what is not good. Because when
that group is corrupt whose support you think you need—whether the people or the army or
the nobility—then you have to follow their humors to satisfy them; and in that case, good deeds
are harmful to you.” Ibid.
9
Machiavelli is particularly impressed with violence that is used to secure tangible
physical beneits and that allows one to achieve other political goals at the same time. For
instance, when Ferdinand of Aragon came to power he attacked Granada, which kept the barons
busy while he made changes to the laws and “enthralled and preoccupied the minds of his
subjects.” Ibid., XXI.
10
“[T]he masses are always impressed by the supericial appearance of things, and
by the outcome of an enterprise.” Ibid., XVIII. If a ruler wins over the masses, they are still
left to contend with the few ambitious men who wish to take their place, but if the populace
feels favorably toward the prince, conspirators will estimate that their chances of success are
154 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

Machiavelli may also be trying to convince a wider audience that one

should not hate a ruler for using violence that is well-used and necessary.
He writes that “a prince who wants to keep his authority must learn how
not to be good, and use that knowledge, or refrain from using it as necessity
requires.” Since things that princes are blamed for are usually required for
ruling, the prince “should not be too worried about incurring blame for any
vice without which he would ind it hard to save his state” (XV). This advice
for rulers also serves to shift the perspective of his readers without states. If
he can make the case that we ought not judge rulers too harshly, we might be
less likely to hate those who rule us. In this way, his new political science is of
direct assistance to rulers. By getting “down to the truth” instead of abiding
by “all the imaginary things that are said about princes,” he shows us that
rulers are only doing what necessity requires when they injure us—and that
it will be to our beneit over the long run.

Well-Used Violence in
The Discourses

The Problems: Foundings, Empire,

Appearances, and Natural Decay

Everything Machiavelli tells us about violence in The Prince appears to

be contingent upon the fact that he is analyzing a particular type of regime.
Princes need to be adept at using violence in ways that are attentive to the
needs and psychology of their subjects; however, we would not expect the
paradox of political violence to haunt republics. Theoretically, at least, citi-
zens who rule themselves have little need of violence because there is no
need for a group of people to force themselves to live as they want to live.11

unlikely. “There is nothing in the conspirator’s life but fear, jealousy, and the awful prospect of
punishment; while the prince is defended by the majesty of his ofice, by the laws, by the help
of his allies, and by the state itself. And if to all this you add the good will of the people, it is
impossible that nay man will be rash enough to conspire against you.” Ibid., XIX.
11
In the irst few chapters of the irst book of The Discourses, Machiavelli describes how
the Roman plebs created and sustained republican laws and institutions (e.g. the creation of
tribunes and the reform of the censors and consuls) through their contentious relations with the
Senate and the nobility. Though commentators have often lamented the turbulence, Machiavelli
says it was the source of Rome’s greatness. Rarely did the plebs’ actions lead to “any banishment
or act of violence inimical to the common good, but they led to laws and institutions whereby
the liberties of the public beneited.” Instead of violence “the plebs en masse would troop out of
Rome” or “when the populace wanted a law passed…refused to enlist for the wars, so that, to
placate it, it had to some extent to be satisied.” Niccoló Machiavelli, The Discourses, trans. Leslie
J. Walker (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, [1970] 2003), I:4. Afirming a strong belief in
the potential for virtù and reasonableness in ordinary people, he writes near the end of Book One
 symplokeˉ 155

If some portion of the citizenship becomes wayward or corrupt, the problem

of the legitimacy of violence does not arise. “The brutalities of the masses are
directed against those whom they suspect of conspiring against the common
good; the brutalities of a prince against those whom he suspects of conspiring
against his own good” (I:58). When the people take the reins of government,
it would seem that they self-evidently use violence to secure the public good
over and against the ambitions of a few—or do not need to use violence at all.
Violence no longer needs the appearance of legitimacy to temporarily fool
people or avoid their hatred.
Unfortunately, the problem of how to use violence well is not solved by
a change in regime type. Instead, Machiavelli tells us that well-used violence
is equally necessary and perhaps even more dificult to identify and master
in the republican context. Four reasons stand out. First, republics, like all
states, must be founded in violence. Second, much like new princes, repub-
lics with empires must harm their subject peoples and yet win them over.
Third, the good character of republican citizens inevitably decays so that it
is necessary to refound republics every ive or ten years. Finally, well-used
violence may, for a time, appear bad, and poorly used violence may, for a
time, appear good.
Each of these intertwined problems are introduced early on in The
Discourses. Discussing the founding of Rome, Machiavelli writes:

[M]en never do good unless necessity drives them to it; but when
they are too free to choose and can do just as they please, confusion
and disorder become everywhere rampant. Hence it is said that
hunger and poverty make men industrious, and that laws make
them good. There is no need of legislation so long as things work
well without it, but, when such good customs break down, legisla-
tion forthwith becomes necessary. Hence when the regime of the
Tarquins collapsed and the nobility were no longer kept in check by
the fear of them, it became necessary to devise some new institution
which should produce the same effect. (I:3)

Necessity refers to natural forces that impose limits upon human activity,
choice, and freedom. Poor land or a drought might force frugality and good
decisions about the distribution of resources that keep some members of the
community from taking too much. However, Machiavelli will explain how
well-used violence can serve as an artiicial substitute for natural necessity.
This can come from within or outside of the state. Machiavelli admires that

that “government by the populace is better than government by princes.” Even “a licentious
and turbulent populace, when a good man can obtain a hearing, can easily be brought to behave
itself; but there is no one to talk to a bad prince, nor is there any remedy except the sword...if to
cure the malady of the populace a word sufices and the sword is needed to cure that of a prince,
no one will fail to see that the greater the cure, the greater the fault.” Ibid., I:58. Roman citizens
were keen to exercise their power through civil disobedience and were responsive to reasonable
speech.
156 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

the Romans replaced the fear-inducing violence of the Tarquins in the new
Rome, just as he praises the rebirth of Roman law provoked by the Gauls.12
Machiavelli notes that that, like all states, foundational laws and institu-
tions of republics are created “by one person;” indeed, “it is necessary to
be the sole authority if one is to organize a state.” Reafirming and honing
his position on the praise and blame of rulers and echoing his analysis of
Agothocles’s well-used cruelty, he writes:

It is a sound maxim that reprehensible actions may be justiied by

their effects, and that when the effect is good, as it was in the case of
Romulus, it always justiies the action. For it is the man who uses
violence to spoil things, not the man who uses it to mend them, that
is blameworthy. (I:9)

Well-used violence does not necessarily appear to be good. In fact, he

says that historians have been apt to judge Romulus harshly. But he set in
motion a process that led to a prosperous republic. This sets up the surpris-
ing revelation that making violence appear good can be dangerous to both
rulers and peoples.
In fact, the solutions offered in The Prince are the problems that drive
Machiavelli’s analysis in The Discourses.13 The Prince describes how a ruler,
needing to be bad, can manipulate appearances and use violence to achieve
good outcomes. But Machiavelli says that rulers are apt to be deceived,
perhaps by their own manipulation of appearances, into using violence poorly
and justifying actions with harmful effects. Representing or having the good
will of the people can seduce leaders into using violence for their own private
purposes.

“[A]lmost all men, deceived by the false semblance of good and

the false semblance of renown, allow themselves either willfully
or ignorantly to slip into the ranks of those who deserve blame
rather than praise; and, when they might have founded a repub-
lic or a kingdom to their immortal honour, turn their thoughts to

12
Poorly used-violence can impose a kind of necessity too. In the Florentine Histories,
Machiavelli describes how violence motivated by family feuds, religion, personal ambition and
class struggle requires violence in return. For instance, a daring, nameless pleb rises to give
courage to a rebellion by arguing that “when necessity presses, boldness is judged prudence…I
believe that when one sees the prisons, tortures, and deaths being prepared, standing still is more
to be feared that seeking to secure ourselves against them.” Florentine Histories (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton UP, 1988), III:13. Unfortunately, the rebellion devolves into division among the plebs.
Necessity requires that one reply to violence with violence, but Machiavelli wants to describe
how violence can be deployed and organized in a way conducive to great accomplishments.
Good rulers replace the chaotic, disorganized, often self-defeating bloodletting that plagues
Florence with the more deliberately created necessity of well-used violence.
13
This gives The Prince and The Discourses a dialectical character both within each text
and across the two works. Violence and necessity present challenges, which can then be solved
by rulers who manipulate appearances when they practice violence, which in turn presents
problems for republican citizens, which in turn can be solved through the use of violence that
both appears good and has good effects.
 symplokeˉ 157

tyranny, and fail to see what fame, what glory, security, tranquility,
conjoined with peace of mind, they are missing by adopting this
course, and what infamy, scorn, abhorrence, danger and disquiet
they are incurring.” (I:10)

In a similar way, and with interactive effects, bold leaders often deceive
people with good habits and customs. A populace is often misled “by the
false appearance of good” and “seeks its own ruin.” This is especially true if
“the population is of any account” because they will be responsive to ideas
set before them by leaders who ask them to “engage in undertakings which
appear bold” (I:53). He offers the examples of the Romans’ overly-bellicose
response to Hannibal, the failed Sicilian expedition of the Athenians, and
the Florentines’ ill-advised siege of Pisa. Fooled by appearance, Machiavelli
(quoting Dante) says “the populace often used to cry Long live its death! and
Death to its life!” (I:53)
In The Discourses, Machiavelli shifts the standard for assessing well and
poorly used violence. Whereas in The Prince, Machiavelli tries to convince
rulers that beneiting one’s people is the most effective means to staying in
power, in The Discourses using violence for the beneit of the people is the
preeminent end. If princes can make bad violence appear good to their
(temporary) beneit, how are republican citizens to discern what to do? How
can citizens know when violence will actually have good effects? Machiavelli
argues that, like effective princes, republican citizens and founders of repub-
lics must grab ahold of necessity and bring it under their control. He offers
two methods.

Solution One: Legalize Violence

That Is Bad, Refrain From Illegal
Violence Even If It is Good

In Book I of The Discourses, Machiavelli argues that violence is used

well when it expresses the will of the people and when it is legal. Despite
its dangers, he advocates for the dictatorship because “in a republic
in which no such provision is made, it is necessary either to stand by
the constitution and be ruined, or violate it and not be ruined” (I:34).
Similarly, the censors could be harmful but were necessary.14 The examples
of the censors and the dictatorship suggest that violence is well-used when
it is an expression of the will of the people consistent with public authority
and law and in accordance with the exigencies of the moment. However, the

14
He writes that “though wrong may be done when a citizen is punished” it is essential
to have public institutions whereby the people can accuse, exile and execute individuals.
Without such a safety valve, people will act outside the law and private feuds will replace public
authority. Machiavelli, The Discourses, I:7.
158 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

examples do not so much describe well-used violence as show how legalizing

violence mitigates some of the problems that arise when people are fooled
by appearances. By legally condemning innocents or appointing dictators,
the people can at least avoid private vendettas and outright subversion of
the constitution. The Roman Senate wisely authorized Marcus Centenius
Penula’s mission against Hannibal even though it failed miserably. Why?
If they had denied him the opportunity to use violence poorly, the people
would have rebelled (I:53). By making it legal, the deleterious effects of
poorly used violence are mitigated.
At the same time, even violence that expresses the will of the people
and on its face is justiied and good can be destructive if it is outside the
law. Machiavelli says that the decimvir Appius “no doubt merited the sever-
est punishment,” but Virginius made a mistake when he arrested him and
denied him the right to appeal. Instead, he should have upheld that right,
which the people had only recently secured. Threatening to break the law
left the nobility feeling exposed to an arbitrary government and, repeating
his advice from chapter seventeen of The Prince, Machiavelli says that when
injuries increase over time and people are constantly insecure, “they will take
any means to protect themselves and grow more bold and less restrained in
attempting revolution” (I:45). So in the irst case, necessity demands violence
outside of regular constitutional authority, and the best option is simply to
bring it within a legal framework, even if it means sanctioning dangerous,
poorly used violence. In the second case, even well-used violence that would
have good effects should not be done without bringing it under the law.
The law is a critical means for rulers—both the people and the nobles
in republics—to manipulate appearances so that the most dangerous effects
of necessary violence are averted. Necessity in these passages refers to the
possibility of rebellion: when people feel threatened they will act. The law
can quell those fears or channel them. By upholding the appeals process,
the law can make the well-used violence of the people less threatening to
the nobles. By authorizing and legitimizing the poorly-used violence of the
people, the nobles can make it less harmful. In effect, the law is a way to make
bad violence less harmful and good violence less dangerous.
Book II of The Discourses takes the lessons of Book I into battle. When
Machiavelli discusses how peoples in republics are likely to be misled, he is
particularly concerned with the appeal of war. The Romans’ methods helped
them overcome such dangers by combining violence with legal mechanisms.
Instead of trying to turn all of the surrounding states into subjects, they
 symplokeˉ 159

made accords in conjunction with destroying those who opposed them.15

In another sense, this is the lesson of well-used violence from The Prince
writ large. Machiavelli says that the Romans made their wars “short and
crushing” (II:6), used fraud until they gathered enough strength to use force
(II:13), and were wary of auxiliary and mercenary troops.16 But even as the
Romans contended with and crushed the desire for freedom of other virtuous
republics, they offered opportunities for those they conquered to contribute
to the vitality of Rome (II:2-3). In order to rule others who were formerly
free, force was combined with legitimacy, over the long run bringing beneit
to those who were ruled. Republican institutions can be used in combination
with violence, making such violence well-used. Quoting Livy, Machiavelli
says that “‘not only the arms of the Romans, but Roman law began now to
prevail.’”17 The law helps make one’s violence appear good, which can make
even poorly-used violence have good effects.

Solution Two: Use Violence to Renew

Or Establish Good Laws, Thereby
Doing Violence That Both Appears Good
and Has Good Effects

Though Rome tricked those who fell under her yoke, its violence also
improved their lives. This suggests that there might be a brand of violence
that appears good and has good effects. In the inal book of The Discourses,
Machiavelli sets out to describe such violence by examining “good examples.”
Book III begins by reminding us that good laws and institutions decay as a
consequence of their own success, and that the violence of outsiders threaten-
ing to destroy the state can sometimes prevent such decline. The Romans
“had begun to take less account than what was reasonable and necessary”
of the good constitutions established by Romulus, but the invasion of the

15
“[S]ince she made many states her allies throughout the whole of Italy, which to a
large extent lived under the same laws, and since, on the other hand, she reserved to herself the
seat of empire and the right to issue orders, these allies without being aware of it, fell under her
yoke and laboured and shed their blood on her behalf.” Ibid., II:4. It is not possible to physically
dominate everyone over the long term. Even with military victories, a state will not be able to
hold such territories. Instead, those who try to rule over others, “especially such as have been
accustomed to self-government,” will ind it a “dificult and tiresome business.” Ibid.
16
Ibid., II:20. Machiavelli sums most of this up when he writes “[T]he right way to
make a republic great and for it to acquire an empire is to increase the number of its inhabitants,
to make other states its allies, not its subjects, to send out colonies for the security of conquered
territory, to fund the spoils of war, to subdue the enemy by raids and battles, not by sieges, and
to enrich the public but to keep individuals poor, to attend with the utmost care to military
training.” Ibid., II:19.
17
Ibid., II:21. When the Romans extended their reach beyond Italy, the Capuans
and then the people of Antium sent for Roman praetors to resolve their differences. Ibid. The
Romans’ virtù was in their ighting abilities, which bolstered their reputation ibid., II:1., which in
combination with the appeal of their laws allowed them to continue expanding.
160 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

Gauls caused Rome to be “re-born and in its re-birth take on alike a new
vitality and a new virtue.” However, a better way for people to “have their
attention called to themselves” is through “some law” or “some good man.”
In fact, “life must be given [to good laws] by some virtuous citizen” (III:1).
Exemplary individuals take “drastic actions,” but “their unwonted severity
and their notoriety [bring] men back to the mark every time.” Such actions
must occur at least every ten years, and in Florence “it was necessary to
reconstitute the government every ive years” in order to instill the “terror
and fear” they had when the laws were irst instituted. (III:1)
Machiavelli lists a number of good examples in the irst chapter of Book
III, but two are particularly useful and repeatedly highlighted for their
signiicance. First, like Cesare Borgia, Junius Brutus attains position and
regard through deceit and good fortune.18 However, it is an awe-inspiring
act of violence that makes him great. Echoing chapters ive through eight
in The Prince, Machiavelli explains in I:16-18 of The Discourses that it is difi-
cult to change a tyranny into a republic. Indeed, the resistance of those who
beneited by the old ways combined with the skepticism and corrupt habits
of a people accustomed to servitude makes such a transition almost impos-
sible. What is required to pull it off is a leader with extraordinary lexibility.

[T]o reconstitute political life in a state presupposes a good man,

whereas to have recourse to violence in order to make oneself
prince in a republic supposes a bad man. Hence very rarely will
there be found a good man ready to use bad methods in order to
make himself prince, though with a good end in view, nor yet a bad
man who, having become a prince, is ready to do that right thing
and whose mind it will occur to use well that authority which he
has acquired by bad means. (I:18)

Brutus is one of the rare good people willing to use bad methods.
Brutus’s sons and other ambitious nobles are disappointed with their lack
of power in the newly founded republic and thus conspire against Brutus.
Brutus then commits an act of violence that both appears good and has good
effects. “[O]ne rarely comes across a case in history in which a father not
only sits on a tribunal and condemns his own sons to death, but is present
at their death” (III:3). By breaking his line and punishing his sons’ insolence
in a public spectacle, Brutus gives life to the laws of the Roman republic.
Killing one’s own sons is shocking and severe, which is bound to instill fear
in people. Yet it also shows a deep respect for the will of the people without
favor for the nobility. Finally, it accords with the law, so much so that no
one could subsequently imagine Brutus’s personal loyalties would keep him
from enforcing it.

18
He pretends to be stupid in order to appear unthreatening to the Tarquin family and
then takes his opportunity to condemn them when Lucretia commits suicide.
 symplokeˉ 161

Machiavelli laments that two thousand years later, Piero Soderini fails
to believe in the potential of well-used violence. Soderini refrains from
doing what is necessary to establish a lasting republic in Florence, thinking
that “by patience and goodness” he can “quell the desire of ‘Brutus’s sons’”
and worrying that taking “vigorous action against his opponents…[would]
assume extraordinary authority and introduce laws disruptive of civic equal-
ity” (III:3) The phrase “sons of Brutus” comes to refer to family members
or partisans that a leader has reason to suspect will be dissatisied with or
disadvantaged by a free government. Machiavelli says that had Soderini
taken dramatic action, he could have “convinced everyone that what he
had done, was done for the security of his country and not for ambitious
reasons,” and he could have “regulated things [so] that none of his successors
could do with evil intent what he had done with good intent” (III:3) Well-
used violence improves the world and manages its appearance all in one
stroke. Killing “the sons of Brutus” becomes a metaphor for acts of violence
that share a certain quality. If one wishes to rule a republic, “there is no way
more eficient, more sure, more safe or more necessary, than to kill the sons
of Brutus” (I:16).
Machiavelli’s second good example is the Roman people. While great
leaders can use calibrated violence to change a corrupt political culture, a
virtuous people are a bulwark against corrupt leaders. Machiavelli irst
mentions the story of Manlius Capitolinus in I:24 of The Discourses. There, he
makes a nascent rule of law argument regarding the distribution of beneits
and punishments in republics.

[N]o well-ordered republic allows the demerits of its citizens to be

cancelled out by their merits; but, having prescribed reward for a
good deed and punishments for a bad one, and having rewarded
someone for doing well, if that same person afterwards does wrong,
it punishes him, regardless of any of the good deeds he has done.
(I:24)

The Roman people’s treatment of Manlius of Capitolinus is a dramatic

example of following this principle. Manlius had saved the Capitoline hill
from attack by the Gauls and his fellow citizens gave him a small measure
of corn, which was a considerable reward given the state of the city at that
time. Yet when he tried to win over the people with material beneits and
incite sedition, “he was thrown headlong from the Capitol which he had once
saved with such renown” (I:24).
In Book III, Machiavelli uses the example to emphasize how discerning,
capable, good, and united the Roman people were in this period. None of
the nobles, who usually defended one another, rose to support Manlius. His
family did not appear in black to win sympathy at his trial. The tribunes
of the plebs, despite his overtures, “joined with the nobles in suppressing
a common pest.” The tribunes even referred the case to the assembly of the
people, but “this same populace, become now the judge of its defender, paid
162 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

no attention to this, but condemned him to death” (III:8). Livy writes that the
assembly adjourned to outside the city walls so as not to be able to see the hill
that he had saved.
Although both leaders and populations can be deceived by appearances
into initiating bad undertakings, both leaders and peoples are capable of
violence that is unmistakably good. Killing Manlius shows extraordinary
collective awareness and self-control on the part of the Roman people.
Instead of partisan interests and corruption carrying the day, they manage
to maintain a city where “political life is still vigorous” (III:8). Such a city is
tumultuous, but “when the material [i.e. the people] is not corrupt, tumults
and other troubles do no harm” (I:17). Giving the people arms in order to
build an empire means that one cannot expect to “handle [them] as you
please” (I:6); indeed, as mentioned above, the “fact that the Roman people
were not corrupt [made it] impossible for the dictator to overstep his terms of
reference and do the state harm” (I:34). If the material is good, the weapons
of the people will be put to good use staunching corruption and thwarting
tyrants. In the case of Manlius Capitolinus, “they chose he should die in
order that they might remain free” (III:8).
When a whole people knows how to use it well, the paradox of politi-
cal violence is solved. Killing Manlius Capitolinus is a matter of the people
reminding themselves of their own principles and perhaps striking fear into
the hearts of a few corrupt and ambitious citizens. Unlike Remirro de Orco’s
actions against the corrupt population of the Romagna, there is no need to
manage the emotional response to violence. The people welcome and enforce
the rule of law themselves. Machiavelli says that “with all of them love of
country weighed more than any consideration” (III:8). It seems that now
love, instead of fear, is the basis of loyalty to the state. Certainly, there seems
to be little reason to worry that the people will hate themselves for their own
violence. The appearance of violence and its actual effect are united and,
since the people authorize it, there is no question of its legitimacy.

Fear and Love in Republics

This kind of well-used violence imposes necessity. I have already

suggested that, for Machiavelli, the use of violence is particularly important
in republics because a corrupt people, or “bad material,” cannot be improved
without severity, and because good material naturally decays. This assess-
ment is transformed into the advice that leaders in republics impose neces-
sity upon the people in order to foster discipline and good values. Likewise,
virtuous people should impose necessity upon the nobles through institu-
tions like the dictatorship and the censors. In lieu of harsh conditions or the
invasion of others, one needs the severity and violence of good leaders and
 symplokeˉ 163

laws to produce stern, frugal and courageous citizens. In fact, such violence
is superior to natural necessity.19
However, there are moments in The Discourses where Machiavelli appears
to contemplate an alternative method. Machiavelli even suggests such a
method may dramatically reduce the amount of necessary violence. A few
chapters after explaining the signiicance of the Junius Brutus and Manlius
Capitolinus examples, he ponders why some regime changes are bloody and
others are not. He says that when Rome became a republic “no one was
banished except the Tarquins, and nobody else at all got hurt.” Instead, the
“government [was] brought into being by the common consent of a whole
people” and “[r]evolutions of this kind are not attended with much danger.”
In contrast, revolutions “brought about by men who are out for vengeance”
hold the potential for much bloodshed (III:7). I mentioned at the outset
of my discussion of The Discourses that it might seem as though republics
would either not need to use violence or whatever violence they use would
be against very few people and self-evidently legitimate. Even though the
Romans killed the sons of Brutus and Manlius Capitolinus, the very charac-
ter of politics is different in a republic with a virtuous population. When a
people express and exert their collective will in order to create and maintain
republics, it seems they can bypass instilling fear with well-used violence.
Chapters nineteen to twenty-three of Book III return to the comparison
of fear and love from The Prince, and Machiavelli considers the possibility
that love might be best for republics. Chapter nineteen opens by noting that
Appius was a brutal and harsh commander and was badly obeyed, whereas
Quintius was kindly and humane and inspired his troops to follow him. This
does not show that having a punishing disposition never works. Instead,
what makes the difference is whether or not men are your associates or your
subjects. “[S]ince in Rome the plebs had an equal share in government with
the nobility, neither could, on becoming the ruler for the time being, treat the
other brutally and harshly” (III:19). Perhaps thinking of Aristotle’s concept
of political rule, Machiavelli says the character of the relationship between
the ruled and the ruling is different when one may become the other. Fear
is a less attractive and useful means than love in republics. Chapter twenty
further raises the ante by showing that acts of humanity and generosity can
be more effective than physical force, even outside the context of republican

19
Most commentators seem to agree on this point. Wolin writes that in “contrast to
Rome’s controlled use of violence were those destructive wars which had been compelled by
necessities, such as hunger, plague, or over-population. Necessity was the enemy of calculated
violence.” Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political
Thought (Boston: Little Brown, 1960), 222. Lefort writes that “it is up to the laws to constrain
the inhabitants to recognize necessity. In other terms, enlightened necessity is the kind
ittingly imposed upon men in order to make them forgo the license to which they would of
their own accord be disposed to abandon themselves. The constraint of law is greater than
‘natural’ constraints.” Claude Lefort, Writing, the Political Test, Post-Contemporary Interventions
(Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2000), 128.
164 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

government.20 In chapter twenty-one, he considers side-stepping the fear

versus love debate by arguing that both the kind and humane Scipio and the
cruel and violent Hannibal succeed because of their eficiency. As long as an
individual is judicious and incorruptible, says Machiavelli, their methods are
of secondary importance.
Yet in chapter twenty-two, he comes back around to reafirming that
well-used violence is more reliable and more essential to ruling than gener-
osity and love. Reversing himself, he says that relying on fear is especially
necessary in republics. He takes up the examples of Manlius Torquatus and
Valerius Corvinus. Manlius “used every type of severity,” and notably, like
Brutus Junius, even killed his own son “in order to secure the obedience of
the troops.”21 Most likely, Machiavelli has in mind Manlius’s speech convinc-
ing the Romans to refuse to pay ransom for their captured soldiers. Manlius
saw it as just punishment for not more strongly resisting Hannibal’s troops.
Machiavelli says that “such orders [are] useful in a republic, since they restore
its discipline to its pristine state and revive its ancient virtue” (III:22). Such
severity was the cause of the Roman’s victory over the Latins when Manlius
was consul.22
In the last chapter of The Discourses, Machiavelli offers a inal example
of well-used violence. He writes that “even if the greatness of [the Roman]
republic and its power of administration were not betokened in a thousand

20
Machiavelli tells the story of Camillus who was besieging the Falisci. A schoolmaster
from the city took his pupils outside of the city under the cover of giving them exercise. Instead,
he led the children to Camillus’ camp offering them as ransom with the hope of winning
Camillus’s favor. Camillus rejected the offer, had the teacher stripped and gave each of the
boys a rod to “beat him often and hard” as he was paraded back into the town. The people of
the town were so grateful and pleased that they handed the town over to Camillus. Though the
incident contains a strong element of ritual violence, the point of the story for Machiavelli is that
in some circumstances fear of physical force may fail to bend the will of an opponent but an act of
generosity and kindness will succeed. Not only is the incident outside the context of rule among
“associates,” it occurs in the context of war, where one might think that only well-used violence
could prevail. Machiavelli, The Discourses, III:20.
21
At irst, this seems attributable to the fact that Manlius needed methods that matched
his ambitious goals as opposed to more severe methods being better for everyone. If “one is to
hold a state by violent means, the force employed should be proportionate to the resistance
offered [so that it will last.” Should “the violated be stronger than the violator, it is probable that
the violence will some day cease.” Ibid., III:22. This is a warning about the overuse of violence
and a suggestion to calibrate its use to the potential for violent resistance. Since Manlius was
prone to bold and extraordinary things, which would inspire resistance, he needed to be severe.
22
After four chapters that together are marked by uncharacteristic ambivalence,
Machiavelli says that Manlius’ severity is preferable to Valerius’s humanity: “For a citizen who
is living under the laws of a republic I think it is more praiseworthy and less dangerous to adopt
the procedure of Manlius, since this way of behaving was entirely in the public interest, and was
in no way affected by private ambition, for it is impossible to gain partisans if one is harsh in
one’s dealing with everybody and is wholly devoted to the common good.” Ibid. With Valerius’s
procedure the contrary is true because it means that an individual will “win the special goodwill
of the troops” and should this person be in command for some time “there is grave reason to
fear that the result may be prejudicial to liberty.” There is a close connection between the use
of violence and republican rule of law. A generous and humane disposition is more suited to
regime types that rely on personalities and require the cultivation of personal loyalty. Ibid. Of
course, one can take severity too far and chapter 23 concludes the discussion with some advice
about how not to be hated while inspiring fear among free people.
 symplokeˉ 165

other ways, it is to be seen in the nature of the punishment on the evil-doer”

(III:49). Rome often faced circumstances where a large portion of the popu-
lation became unruly, such as the Bacchanal conspiracy, which involved
many thousands, or when all of the women of Rome planned to poison their
husbands. The Roman republic did not hesitate to punish the multitudes,
as in administering the death penalty to a whole legion at a time, banishing
thousands of citizens, or forcing soldiers who had not performed well in a
battle to eat standing up. The most impressive example of this is the innova-
tion of “decimating” an army, or putting every tenth man to death. He writes:

No more terrifying punishment than this could possibly be devised

for the purpose of chastising a multitude. For when a great number
of people have done wrong, and it is not clear who is responsible, it
is impossible to punish them all, since there are too many of them;
and to punish some, and leave others unpunished would be unfair
to those who are punished, and the unpunished would take heart
and do wrong at some other time. But by killing the tenth part,
chosen by lot, when all are guilty, he who is punished bewails his
lot, and he who is not punished is afraid to do wrong lest on some
other occasion the lot should not spare him. (III:49)

The practice of decimation merges the principles of republican equal-

ity with extraordinary violence. The lot, long the symbol of the impartial
distribution of public ofices, now becomes the fair distribution of death and
punishment. The rule of the people does not obviate the need for violence
or reduce the amount of it, but it does change its character. Cesare Borgia’s
killing of de Orco encourages the people of the Romagna to identify with
him over and against the cruel minister. The most admirable brand of
punishment in the Roman republic does not encourage identiication with a
particular leader or manipulate a desire for revenge by scape-goating an indi-
vidual. Instead, virtuous people and leaders in republics ind a way cultivate
discipline by keeping everyone terriied of an impersonal and impartial law.

Conclusion

As occupants of the most important ofice in the oldest republic in the

contemporary world, Machiavelli would expect Presidents of the United
States to contend with, invoke, and impose necessity. Many of the problems
Machiavelli perceived ive centuries ago seem to plague their attempts to do so.
He highlights the fact that imposing necessity requires manipulating appear-
ances, and therefore can dupe both leaders and peoples into ill-advised wars.
These misadventures often threaten the rule of law. After the September 11th
attacks, most Americans whole-heartedly embraced the bold course of action
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Machiavelli says that appointing dictators and
166 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

censors is necessary in such circumstances even if violence is used poorly.

We no longer have such ofices, but the Bush doctrine of preemptive attack
and President Obama’s extensive use of drones without regard for national
boundaries, together with their public statements taking personal responsi-
bility for the conduct of military affairs, share an afinity with them. Also,
in Machiavelli’s claim that harsh punishments are necessary to keep people
on their mark, we might see parallels with the Bush administration’s torture
policy, the Obama administration’s assassination of an American citizen in
Yemen, and the use of military commissions and the prison at Guantanamo
by both administrations. In these acts, poorly used violence, willed by the
people and practiced by enterprising politicians, is nominally brought under
the law. Whether it is used well or poorly, Machiavelli strongly afirms that
the law is a means for bettering the appearance of violence.
Taken together, Machiavelli’s examples tell us something more profound
about the nature of necessity. In the speeches cited at the outset of this paper,
Presidents Bush and Obama suggest that the United States ights wars and
practices violence when pressed by circumstances, namely, the actions of
other people. Implicitly (as made explicit by Machiavelli), the appropriate
reply to necessity is to impose necessity upon others. The Iraqi government
had not used violence against the United States, and yet the Bush administra-
tion was still able to convince the American people of the war’s necessity.
President Obama’s assassination of Osama Bin-Laden is likely to have a more
enduring cast of “necessity” in the public’s mind, while his continuation of
the war in Afghanistan seems headed for the category of Iraq. His use of
drones to kill suspected terrorists, with a great deal of innocents killed or
injured as well, is still very much up for negotiation. In each case, the belief
in the necessity of action signiies that violence was used well or used poorly,
which can be disputed or called into question in the future. The ambiguity of
the necessity of violence in a particular circumstance can be traced to the fact
that both our response to necessity and our imposition of it refers to human
action. Machiavelli shows us that what we call necessity is the terrain where
violence contends with violence, a terrain where human actions and choices
carry the day.
One conclusion we might draw from this is that the claim that violence
is necessary is just a clever way of delecting responsibility for violence. The
statement “I will take whatever action is necessary” has a kind of aporetic
quality. In the history of philosophy, necessity and human freedom are
usually opposed to one another. Following Machiavelli, Presidents Bush and
Obama try to hold fast to the idea that necessity cannot be refused even while
placing it under our control—indeed, their personal control. Contra Max
Weber’s claim that Machiavelli gives us a political ethic that takes responsi-
bility for the results of one’s actions (1958), the claim that one acts from neces-
sity is a way of avoiding responsibility by saying “I had no choice” while
seeming to take responsibility by saying “I will act.” In a way, this observa-
tion doubles back on Machiavelli. His claim that men can force others to be
 symplokeˉ 167

good by grabbing ahold of necessity sits in fundamental contradiction with

his claim that men never do good if they are “too free to choose.” The fact
that people are free to choose when and how to impose necessity is both an
invitation to evil and the purported solution to it.
With his concept of necessity, Machiavelli creates a political imperative
that is designed to trump ethical imperatives and prohibitions on violence in
particular. This does not involve calling into question all forms of authority as
Miguel Vatter (2000) argues. He shows quite adeptly how claims to necessity
can support and reinforce authority, even if the claim is more widely available
than some leaders would like to admit. Isaiah Berlin (2001) is closer to the
truth when he says that Machiavelli establishes an alternative ethical system
for politics. But what distinguishes Machiavelli’s thought is his attempt to
make proscriptive imperatives appear descriptive. Merleau-Ponty, for one,
is persuaded, saying that Machiavelli articulates politics as “a relationship to
men rather than principles” (1964, 219). Interpreters like Hulling, however,
do not buy it, and insist Machiavelli is on an “ideological mission to change
what exists” (1983, 165). I have tried to show that it is perhaps more precise
to say that Machiavelli explores how violence can create imperatives that
masquerade as descriptions of reality.
However, we might take something more heartening from his attempt
to put necessity under human control. Machiavelli raises the possibility of
changing the world irrespective of how it is or was and even, potentially,
without violence. Claude Lefort writes that in Machiavelli, “the common
good sees itself rigorously cut off from the domain of morality and that it is
established as a result of an ‘enlightened’ necessity” (Lefort, 2000, 123). By
telling us that we can create necessity with well-used violence, Machiavelli
calls into question the very idea of necessity. If he believes himself to be
an unarmed prophet (a founder who is all fox and no lion) this may be
what he intends us to do. The contrast between the real and the ideal that
Machiavelli’s new political science hinges upon is undermined if we observe
that his new ideas can become ascendant without violence.
The paradox Machiavelli sets out to solve is how to do violence without
losing people’s support. But what if people are resolved in their conviction
that violence is unacceptable? Would this change the nature of necessity?
By showing us that so-called necessity is often the product of human action,
Machiavelli places it under the purview of human freedom and judgment.
One of the reasons Machiavelli must go to such great lengths to describe well-
used violence is that people respond to it in so many ways, including ethical
standards. In a way, then, the fact that well-used violence is self-evidently
good in republics is a concession. Machiavelli shows us that ethics and
politics cannot be entirely divorced and, perhaps inadvertently or perhaps
intentionally, throws into question the claim that well-used violence is neces-
sary after all.

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

168 Dustin Ells Howes Creating Necessity

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