Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 2008, 49, 439–446 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9450.2008.00652.

Personality and Social Sciences

Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Individual differences in processing styles: validity of the

Rational–Experiential Inventory
FREDRIK BJÖRKLUND and MARTIN BÄCKSTRÖM
Lund University, Sweden

Björklund, F. & Bäckström, M. (2008). Individual differences in processing styles: validity of the Rational-Experiential Inventory. Scandinavian
Journal of Psychology, 49, 439–446.
In Study 1 (N = 203) the factor structure of a Swedish translation of Pacini and Epstein’s Rational–Experiential Inventory (REI-40) was
investigated using confirmatory factor analysis. The hypothesized model with rationality and experientiality as orthogonal factors had
satisfactory fit to the data, significantly better than alternative models (with two correlated factors or a single factor). Inclusion of “ability”
and “favorability” subscales for rationality and experientiality increased fit further. It was concluded that the structural validity of the REI is
adequate. In Study 2 (N = 72) the REI-factors were shown to have theoretically meaningful correlations to other personality traits, indicating
convergent and discriminant validity. Finally, scores on the rationality scale were negatively related to risky choice framing effects in Kahneman
and Tversky’s Asian disease task, indicating concurrent validity. On the basis of these findings it was concluded that the test has satisfactory
psychometric properties.
Key words: Reasoning, intuition, individual differences, test, validity.
Fredrik Björklund, Department of Psychology, Lund University, Box 213, SE-221 00 Lund, Sweden . E-mail: fredrik.bjorklund@psychology.lu.se

INTRODUCTION concerns systematic reasoning, which is usually described as

People differ in how they process information. Knowledge
of such differences is helpful for understanding and predicting
behavior in a variety of domains. The way people perceive
the world, make judgments and decisions and solve problems
is jointly explained by situational factors and person factors.
Individual differences in information processing are examples
of the latter, and the purpose of the present research is to
investigate the psychometric properties of a Swedish version
of, perhaps, the most important measure of individual
differences in processing styles, the Rational–Experiential
Inventory (REI-40; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). We present both
self-report data and performance data for estimation of its
validity. Our first study investigates the structural validity of
the test, and the second study investigates the convergent
and discriminant validity, as well as the concurrent validity.
Sloman (1996) describes the long-standing debate in
psychology between, on the one hand, those who claim that
information processing is best described in terms of internal
representations that are processed in a deliberate and
sequential way and, on the other hand, those who claim that
it is best described in terms of a network of associated units
that are activated in a parallel and distributed way. Sloman
(1996), and many others with him, propose that both exist
(cf. Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Such
models of two separate processing modes are often called
dual process models. One of the two processing modes
relatively slow, effortful, conscious and deliberate. Accordingly,
for our purposes, one way in which people differ when process-
ing information is the extent to which they rely on reasoning.
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) captured this dimension nicely in
their self-report measure of the Need for cognition. Epstein,
Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier (1996) adopted this measure,
modified it, and made it part of the REI, dubbing it Rationality
(which of course is to be understood in a descriptive rather
than a normative sense). But they also added another measure.
Based on Epstein’s (e.g. 2003) Cognitive Experiential Self Theory
(CEST), a dual process model itself, they developed a measure
of intuitive processing: Experientiality. This is the second
mode of the dual-process models and is often described as
relatively fast, effortless, unconscious and automatic. Following
CEST, Epstein et al. (1996) suggested the two processing
modes to be independent of each other and accordingly pre-
dicted the related measures of individual differences in them
to be orthogonal, which they also found to be the case. In
other words, it is possible to score high (or low) on both
rationality and experientiality. Pacini and Epstein (1999)
developed a new and improved version of the test, the REI-
40, with 20 items each for the rationality and experientiality
measures (each with a subscale related to “ability” and
“favorability”), which were again found to be orthogonal to
one another. We therefore hypothesize the two factors of the
present version of the REI-40 to be independent too, and
test the hypothesis by means of factor analysis.

© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600
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440 F. Björklund and M. Bäckström Scand J Psychol 49 (2008)

Table 1. Means, standard deviations and reliabilities of the REI scales processing preferences, also known as “engagement”). Turning
and subscales (Study 1) to Table 2, the two final columns display the item-total
correlations to both the main scales (Item Tot2) and the
Min Max M SD α
subscales (Item Tot4). Item-total correlations to subscales
Rationality (total) 40 99 76.57 10.53 0.86 were somewhat higher. If the correlation between an item
Rational ability 20 49 40.04 5.72 0.81 and its scale is too low (below 0.20) the item does not
Rational favorability 20 50 36.52 6.36 0.78 contribute enough to the systematic variance in the scale
Experientiality (total) 49 95 69.29 11.29 0.88 (Giles, 2002). Only one item had such a low correlation
Experiential ability 26 48 34.58 6.62 0.79
Experiential favorability 23 47 34.71 5.77 0.84
(“Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to
me”), and should therefore be revised in future versions of
the scale. To summarize, the scales showed high homogeneity,
suggesting high reliability.

STUDY 1: METHOD
Participants
Participants were 203 students, mainly in the social sciences, of
Lund University, volunteering to complete the REI-questionnaire
as well as some other measures not reported here. There were 90
females and 113 males, with a mean age of 25.2 (SD = 6.1).
Materials and procedure
The original (English) version of the REI-40 was translated into
Swedish by one investigator, and then back-translated into English
by another. Both translators were fluent in both languages and
experts in the field. The back-translated version was compared to
the original and minor adjustments were made. The items are pre-
sented in English in Table 2 and in Swedish in the Appendix. Those
items that are to be reverse scored are marked with minus signs.
Ratings were made on a Likert-scale ranging from 1 (definitely false)
to 5 (definitely true).
Participants were tested in a laboratory at the Department of
Psychology. They were instructed to “Please rate the following state-
ments about your feelings, beliefs and behaviors using the scale
below. Work rapidly.” Completion of the test took about 5 –10 minutes.
LISREL 8.54 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993) was used for the structural
equation modeling, where the STREAMS program (Gustafsson &
Stahl, 2000) simplified the process of defining the models and
generating start values. The χ2 goodness-of-fit test and the fit index
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) were used as
measures of fit between data and a model. The RMSEA estimates
the lack of fit in a model in comparison to a perfect model, taking
parsimony into account. Low values indicate good fit. When comparing
models the difference in χ2 between them (Δχ2) will be tested. All
statistics presented here were estimated with the maximum likelihood
method based on the covariance matrix.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Exploratory factor analysis
Before the data were subjected to exploratory factor analysis
they were screened for outliers. Two cases with extreme
values were excluded (analyses using all participants did not
produce different results). Exploratory factor analysis
concerns the structure of the data and, more specifically,
whether it follows the expected pattern. First, a principal
component analysis was conducted on the 40 test items. It
was found that the two first components explained 17.77%
and 14.81% of the variance, respectively; together they
explained 32.58%. The third component explained only
about 6% of the variance. The loading matrix with two
components was subjected to a Varimax rotation and was
found to reveal the expected pattern. Loadings are displayed
in Table 2. The first factor (Exp.) had its highest loadings to
the experientiality items, and the second factor (Rat.) to the
rationality items. Almost all items had a loading higher than
0.3, but the item “Learning new ways to think would be very
appealing to me” did not load on any of the factors. One
experientiality item, “My snap judgments are probably not
as good as most people’s”, had its highest loading from the
wrong factor, suggesting that it was rather an indicator of
rationality.
The exploratory factor analysis provided rather strong
support for the assumption that rationality and experientiality
are two distinct factors. A four-factor solution was tested as
well, but it failed to clearly reveal the expected 2 × 2 structure
with rational ability, rational favorability, experiential ability
and experiential favorability. However, exploratory factor
analysis is inappropriate for testing strong hypotheses
concerning correlated factors. Therefore, confirmatory
methods were used instead.

Descriptive statistics
Means and standard deviations from the REI scales are pre-
sented in Table 1. The ranges are rather large and neither
skewness nor kurtosis data indicated serious departures
from normality. The Cronbach alpha coefficients indicate
satisfactory reliability. This is the case for both the main
(total) scales and for the subscales related to ability (i.e.
self-reported processing skills) and favorability (i.e. self-reported
Confirmatory factor analysis
The aim of confirmatory factor analysis is to test whether
the theoretical model fits the data, or whether either simpler
or more complex models can compete and give either a more
parsimonious or a more complex but complete account of
the data. The first model tested here will be the one with the
highest theoretical credibility. It will then be compared with

© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.
Scand J Psychol 49 (2008) Individual differences in processing styles 441

Table 2. Factor loadings and item-total correlations (Study 1)

Item-

Item and subscale Exp. Rat. Tot 2 Tot 4

Experientiality scale
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. (ef) 0.76 0.03 0.71 0.60
Using my “gut feelings” usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. (ea) 0.75 0.01 0.69 0.63
I don’t have a very good sense of intuition. (ea–) 0.73 0.13 0.67 0.68
Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. (ef) 0.73 0.02 0.67 0.66
I believe in trusting my hunches. (ea) 0.70 −0.01 0.65 0.63
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. (ef) 0.64 −0.20 0.58 0.58
I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions. (ef–) 0.64 0.00 0.59 0.61
I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. (ef–) 0.62 0.08 0.55 0.50
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. (ef) 0.58 −0.29 0.51 0.58
I trust my initial feelings about people. (ea) 0.56 −0.03 0.48 0.42
I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition. (ef) 0.54 −0.10 0.49 0.48
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. (ea) 0.54 0.13 0.47 0.48
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. (ef–) 0.53 −0.08 0.47 0.52
If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. (ea–) 0.51 0.12 0.46 0.46
I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. (ef–) 0.51 −0.05 0.43 0.46
I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest “gut feelings” to find an answer. (ea) 0.47 0.01 0.40 0.45
I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive. (ef–) 0.41 −0.10 0.35 0.39
I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate. (ea–) 0.37 0.11 0.32 0.35
I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know. (ea) 0.30 0.06 0.26 0.30
My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people’s. (ea–) 0.28 0.34 0.25 0.25
Rationality scale
I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. (ra–) −0.17 0.74 0.66 0.66
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. (rf–) 0.02 0.70 0.60 0.56
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. (rf) −0.01 0.66 0.60 0.67
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. (rf–) 0.13 0.65 0.57 0.53
I have a logical mind. (ra) −0.22 0.64 0.57 0.64
I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems. (ra–) −0.15 0.63 0.55 0.64
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. (ra) −0.36 0.61 0.55 0.62
I enjoy intellectual challenges. (rf) −0.07 0.58 0.54 0.60
Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. (ra–) 0.03 0.58 0.50 0.44
I am not a very analytical thinker. (ra–) 0.04 0.56 0.48 0.40
I prefer complex to simple problems. (rf) −0.06 0.54 0.47 0.49
Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. (rf–) 0.17 0.46 0.41 0.46
I don’t reason well under pressure. (ra–) −0.03 0.46 0.36 0.35
I have no problem in thinking things through clearly. (ra) 0.04 0.42 0.39 0.46
I enjoy thinking in abstract terms. (rf) 0.10 0.40 0.31 0.33
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind 0.12 0.37 0.34 0.37
it is good enough for me. (rf–)
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. (rf–) 0.24 0.37 0.30 0.43
I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. (ra) 0.15 0.35 0.30 0.34
Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. (ra) −0.11 0.32 0.29 0.39
Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me. (rf) −0.05 0.11 0.14 0.13

Notes: N = 203. Minus signs denote reverse scoring.

The subscale to which each item belongs appears in parentheses: ef, experiential favorability; ea, experiential ability; rf, rational favorability;
ra, rational ability; Item Tot2, item total correlations of the two main scales; Item Tot4, item total correlations of the four subscales.

a simpler model, and finally with a model with added paths
based on the highest modification indices. The hypothesis
concerning orthogonality between the experientiality and
the rationality dimension will also be tested. To increase
reliability, items were aggregated into parcels. This was
made in a systematic way by taking, for each subscale, the
first and the last item to create the first parcel, the second
and the next to last to create the second parcel, and so on.
The confirmatory analyses reported here are based on
these parcels.
The first model (Model 1) was a four-factor model with
two correlated factors for experientiality and two correlated
factors for rationality; χ2(168) = 344.26; p < 0.001; RMSEA
= 0.070; CFI = 0.94. The model fit was rather good, but
far from perfect. The correlation between the ability and
favorability subscales was 0.67 and 0.87 for the rationality

© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.
442 F. Björklund and M. Bäckström
Table 3. Chi-square values, degrees of freedom, p-values and fit indices for the different models
Model χ2 df p RMSEA
Model 1 344.26 168 <0.001 0.070
Model 2 485.26 170 <0.001 0.109
Model 3 484.92 169 <0.001 0.109
Model 4 313.27 167 <0.001 0.064
Model 5 256.31 163 <0.001 0.048
Note: N = 203. RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation; GFI, goodness of fit index; CFI, Bentler’s comparative fit index;
NFI, Bentler’s normed fit index; PGFI, parsimony goodness of fit index; ECVI, expected cross-validation index.
and experientiality factors, respectively. Model 1 was compared
with a model based on two orthogonal factors (Model 2),
which was found to have clearly worse fit Δχ2(2) = 141.00;
p < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.109; CFI = 0.90. The results favored
the four-factor model.
A core question was whether rationality and experientiality
could be estimated to be independent. When freed, the two
factors of Model 2 had a correlation of −0.05 (Model 3;
Δχ2(1) = 0.34; p > 0.05) and when covariation among the
four factors of Model 1 was freed (Model 4; Δχ2(1) = 30.99;
p < 0.001) only one significant crossover correlation was
found, between experiential favorability and rational ability
(−0.27). So on the whole, the present estimations favor a
model with two orthogonal factors, each with two sub-
factors, as was suggested by the theory.
Perfect fit is rarely reached in models based on personality
test items or small parcels. As a way of increasing fit, one
may use modification indices and look for secondary
loadings in the residual matrices. Modification indices
provide an estimate of what improvement can be expected
when a fixed parameter is turned into a free parameter. They
indicate relations that are not part of the model but would
contribute to the variance explained if introduced. A
number of rather high secondary loadings were found and
the four with the highest modification index values were
added to Model 1. This model (Model 5 in Table 3) did
show better fit to the data (e.g. RMSEA = 0.048) indicating
that at a lower level there were particular items with loadings
from factors other than those suggested by the theoretical
model. Pairs of items (or parcels) with high modification
index values suggests them to have a common origin, making
a more complicated factorial structure likely. We did not find
any modification index values suggesting correlations
between parcels to be higher than 0.15, so there appears to
be little indication that the introduction of another factor
would improve fit in any substantial way. Of course a more
fine grained analysis would increase fit even more, eventually
reaching the goal of a non-significant model. However, it
was decided that this was not important here since the goal
was limited to investigating the structural validity of the test.
We could not find any pattern in the modification indices
indicating that an important factor had been left out.
© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.
Scand J Psychol 49 (2008)
GFI CFI NFI PGFI ECVI
0.84 0.94 0.90 0.69 2.27
0.78 0.90 0.86 0.63 3.46
0.78 0.90 0.86 0.63 3.47
0.87 0.95 0.91 0.68 2.13
0.89 0.97 0.92 0.69 1.85
The hypothesized structure of the REI was supported by
the results. However, it is also important to investigate the
practical usefulness of the test, such as whether the measured
concepts show meaningful correlations with other theoretically
related scales and behaviors.
STUDY 2
Study 1 showed that rationality and experientiality are
separate factors also in the Swedish translation of the REI.
The next step in the validation process is to examine the
convergent and discriminant validity of the rationality and
experientiality measures, by means of comparison to other
personality tests. The selection of measures for the current
analysis largely follows the logic of Pacini and Epstein
(1999), where it was predicted and found that rationality is
more strongly related than experientiality to measures of
adjustment (e.g. low neuroticism and high ego strength),
whereas experientiality is more strongly related than rationality
to measures of positive interpersonal relationships (e.g.
extroversion and emotional expressivity).
The neuroticism-facet Vulnerability from the well known
personality test NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1985) was assumed
to correlate negatively with rationality (indicating convergent
validity), but not with experientiality (indicating discriminant
validity). Persons reporting low vulnerability to stress per-
ceive themselves as capable of handling difficult situations,
which should be related to rationality but not necessarily to
experientiality. A negative correlation between vulnerability
and rationality would be consistent with the findings of
Pacini and Epstein (1999). The neuroticism-facet Impulsive-
ness from NEO-PI measures the lack of ability to resist
temptations, which could be predicted to correlate positively
with experientiality and negatively with rationality. Further,
based on similar findings by Pacini and Epstein (1999) the
extroversion-facet Gregariousness from NEO-PI, i.e. preference
for the company of other human beings, was assumed to
correlate positively with experientiality (indicating convergent
validity) but not with rationality (indicating discriminant
validity).
Experiential processing is assumed to be intimately
associated with effect and emotional involvement (Pacini &
Scand J Psychol 49 (2008)
Epstein, 1999). Gross and John (1997) have developed the
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ) as a measure
of emotional expressiveness, which was predicted to cor-
relate positively with experientiality (indicating convergent
validity) but not with rationality (indicating discriminant
validity). The BEQ consists of three facet scales; Negative
expressivity (behavioral expression of negative emotional
response tendencies), Positive expressivity (behavioral
expression of positive emotional response tendencies) and
Impulse strength (general strength of emotional response
tendencies), each of which was predicted to correlate positively
with experientiality.
Concurrent validity is defined as the extent to which the
scores from a test correlate with some other measure that is
believed to be valid. In the present case, high self-reported
rationality in the REI-40 should be correlated with rational
thinking in a cognitive task. High self-reported intuition
should be related to intuitive thinking, but since no validated
instrument of intuitive thinking could be found the concurrent
validity analysis will be restricted to rationality. To explore
the concurrent validity of the rationality scale of the REI-40
it was related to a performance criterion, namely the famous
“Asian disease” framed choice problem from Kahneman and
Tversky (1981). This approach has been used in previous
research (Shiloh, Salton & Sharabi, 2002; Simon, Fagley &
Halleran, 2004; Smith & Levin, 1996). Framing problems
measure contextual effects on judgments of otherwise
identical outcomes. In the Asian disease task, two differently
framed versions of a problem that are identical in terms of
the expected value for the pair of options given render very
different choice preferences. The framing has to do with
whether the outcomes are presented as gains or losses, and
produces a preference reversal such that people are prone to
choose the risky option when presented with outcomes that
are stated negatively (loss of lives), and the risk-averse
option when presented with outcomes that are stated
positively (saving lives). People high in self-reported rationality
can be assumed to be comparatively more motivated and
able to perform well in cognitive tasks. When faced with a
framed choice task, for example, greater tendency to reflect
and ponder over problems may involve the capability of
reformulating losses in terms of gains and vice versa. So
it can be expected that persons high in self-reported
rationality are less susceptible to framing effects in the Asian
disease task.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were 72 students of Lund University (37 females, 34
males, and one person who did not report sex). As in Study 1 most
of them were in the social sciences. Their mean age was 24.3 years
(SD = 8.1). All volunteered to participate without compensation
when recruited on the university campus as part of a study on group
differences in decision making.
© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.
Individual differences in processing styles 443
Materials and procedure
The REI-40 questionnaire was the same as in Study 1. Self-ratings
further included the three NEO facets: vulnerability (α = 0.76),
impulsiveness (α = 0.74) and gregariousness (α = 0.78), as well as
the three BEQ facets: negative expressivity (α = 0.69), positive
expressivity (α = 0.68) and impulse strength (α = 0.69) (all alphas
from this study). Rather low correlations are expected from the
BEQ factes due to the lower homogeneity of these scales.
In the Asian disease task participants were instructed to imagine
that Sweden is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease
which is expected to kill 600 people, and that two alternative programs
to combat the disease have been proposed. Those in the negative
framing condition were instructed that the estimated consequences
of the programs were that if program A is adopted 400 people will
die, and that if program B is adopted there is a 1/3 probability that
nobody will die and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. Those
in the positive framing condition were instructed that the estimated
consequences were that if program A is adopted 200 people will be
saved, and that if program B is adopted there is a 1/3 probability
that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 probability that no people
will be saved. Participants were then asked to indicate which program
they would choose. Kahneman and Tversky (1981) found that most
participants chose program B in the negative framing condition and
program A in the positive framing condition, although the two
versions of the problem are identical in terms of expected utility for
the alternative programs. For the present purposes of concurrent
validation we test the hypothesis that the framing effect is moderated
by individual differences in self-reported rationality.
To increase power, the results from the negative and the positive
framings were collapsed into a single framing effect measure. For
each condition (positive versus negative) the more attractive choice
was given the value 1 and the less attractive choice the value 0.
Accordingly, in the negative framing condition an A-response was
given the value 0 and a B-response was given the value 1, and vice
versa for the positive framing condition. At the level of the group a
value of 0.5 would indicate no framing effect (since choices would
be expected to be random).
Testing took place at the Department of Psychology. Participants
were randomly assigned to either the positive or the negative fram-
ing condition and asked to complete first the Asian disease task and
then make the self-ratings. Participants were told to take their time
when completing the tests, which took about 20 minutes on average.
Afterwards they were thanked and debriefed about the purpose of
the study.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics
All correlation coefficients reported in this paper are Pearson
product-moment correlations. Intercorrelations and reliabilities
for the REI scales are presented in Table 4. As in Study 1
the rationality and experientiality scales were weakly correlated
with one another, the only correlation diverging from this
pattern being the one between rational ability and experiential
favorability (r = −0.243, p < 0.05).
Personality correlates
The correlations of the six selected personality scales and the
REI-scales are displayed in Table 5. As expected, vulnerability
444 F. Björklund and M. Bäckström Scand J Psychol 49 (2008)

Table 4. Intercorrelations and reliabilities of rational–experiential inventory scales (Study 2)

REI scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 M SD

1. Rationality (total) (0.81) 0.790** 0.809** −0.087 −0.050 −0.102 76.60 8.62
2. Rational ability (0.77) 0.279* −0.152 −0.020 −0.243* 37.28 5.27
3. Rational favorability (0.76) 0.010 −0.059 0.072 29.31 5.51
4. Experientiality (total) (0.86) 0.876** 0.892** 70.02 9.68
5. Experiential ability (0.80) 0.564** 35.05 5.65
6. Experiential favorability (0.79) 37.97 8.62

Note: N = 72. Reliabilities appear on the diagonal in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.

Table 5. Correlations between rational–experiential inventory scores and personality measures (Study 2)

Rationality Experientiality

Personality measures Total Ability Favorability Total Ability Favorability

Vulnerability (NEO) −0.334** −0.430** −0.111 −0.076 −0.203 0.060

Impulsiveness (NEO) −0.086 −0.221 0.078 0.124 −0.024 0.236*
Gregariousness (NEO) 0.078 0.174 −0.045 0.317** 0.165 0.388**
Negative expressivity (BEQ) −0.139 −0.202 −0.024 0.402** 0.249* 0.456*
Positive expressivity (BEQ) 0.009 −0.042 0.055 0.406** 0.269* 0.444*
Impulse strength (BEQ) −0.130 −0.230 0.017 0.240* 0.220 0.205

Note: N = 72. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.

NEO, NEO Personality Inventory; BEQ, Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire.

revealed a negative correlation to rationality (particularly
the ability subscale). As for the impulsiveness scale, it failed
to show significant correlations with any of the REI scales,
except experiential favorability. Gregariousness correlated
positively with experientiality (experiential favorability) but
not with rationality, just as expected. Finally, as predicted,
all three facets of the expressivity questionnaire (negative
expressivity, positive expressivity and impulse strength) were
positively correlated with the experientiality scale (primarily
the favorability subscale).
The coefficients were weak to moderate, which could be
expected on a theoretical basis, but also because of the rather
small number of participants and the fact that the sample
consisted mainly of social science students (heterogeneity
was not maximized). Some of the correlations in Table 5 are
close to significant. For example, we expected a negative
correlation between impulsiveness and rationality. We also
expected impulsiveness to correlate positively with experien-
tiality, but found that only the favorability subscale revealed
this correlation. However, the pattern of correlations indicates
that the Swedish version of the REI-40 measures the same
constructs as the English version does. The results are con-
sistent with the findings of Pacini and Epstein (1999) and
support the test’s convergent and discriminant validity.
Framing effects
As for the Asian disease risky choice task, 76.4% of the
participants chose the framed outcome alternative, i.e. the
B-response in the negative framing condition and the A-
response in the positive, respectively. Although presented in
a different way (collapsed conditions instead of separate)
these results are highly similar to those of Kahneman and
Tversky (1981). The main hypothesis for this examination of
the concurrent validity of the rationality scale of the REI,
however, was that high self-reported rationality would be
related to a lesser tendency to be affected by the framing of
the risky choice. In other words, we expected a negative cor-
relation. This was indeed what we found; r = −0.278, p = 0.018.
The correlation was somewhat stronger for rational ability (r
= −0.255, p = 0.031) than for rational favorability (r = −0.192,
p > 0.05, n.s.).
As reported above, a majority of the participants were
affected by the framing. In fact, when participants were cat-
egorized into four groups based on their level of self-
reported rationality in the REI, it was found that even in the
group with the highest rationality scores a majority (61%) of
the members chose the framed (i.e. negative/risky versus
positive/risk-aversive) alternative. This means that even the
highly rational participants tended to be affected by the
framing.
Do self-reported rationality and experientiality jointly
predict framing effects in the Asian disease problem? This
was tested by a multiple regression analysis. An interaction
variable was created by multiplying the rationality scale
scores with the experientiality scale scores. The only signifi-
cant effect was the previously reported negative relationship
between rationality and tendency to choose the negative/

© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.
Scand J Psychol 49 (2008)
risky versus positive/risk-aversive alternative, β = −0.308; t =
−2.615, p = 0.011. The effects related to experientiality (β =
−0.065; t = −0.532, p > 0.05) and to the interaction factor (β
= −0.115; t = −0.919, p > 0.05) were negligible.
CONCLUSIONS
In the present study the REI-40 (Pacini & Epstein, 1999)
was evaluated with regard to its psychometric properties. It
was found that (i) the hypothesized factor structure was
supported in factor analysis, (ii) the reliability was satisfactory
for all factors, (iii) the factors showed theoretically meaningful
correlations to other personality traits and, finally, (iv) the
test was shown to predict performance in a related task. We
therefore conclude that the current version of the REI-40
has satisfactory psychometric properties and can be used in
its present form, although its test–retest reliability remains
to be investigated. We trust it will be a useful research tool
for capturing individual differences in information processing.
Individual difference measures of information processing
are relevant for the many areas of research where human
cognition is involved, e.g. problem solving, judgment and
decision making. The way we process information is not
simply a matter of choice. Both situational factors and per-
son factors determine processing mode. If we know to what
extent people regularly employ each mode of information
processing, feeling intuitively versus reasoning systemati-
cally, and are also aware of the situational factors involved
(e.g. time pressure and mental load) we are better off under-
standing how they go about making decisions and solving
problems that they face in their lives.
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Received 17 July 2007, accepted 9 December 2007
446 F. Björklund and M. Bäckström Scand J Psychol 49 (2008)

APPENDIX: THE SWEDISH VERSION OF REI-40

Table A1. Item wording and subscale

Experientiality scale

Jag litar gärna på mina intuitiva intryck. (ef)

Att använda mina instinkter brukar fungera väl för mig vid hantering av problem i mitt liv. (ea)
Jag har inte någon särskilt god instinktiv känsla. (ea–)
Intuition kan vara ett mycket användbart sätt att lösa problem. (ef)
Jag tror på nyttan av att lita till mina föraningar. (ea)
Jag går ofta på känsla när jag bestämmer mig för hur jag ska agera. (ef)
Jag tycker inte att det är någon bra idé att lita på sin intuition vid viktiga beslut. (ef–)
Jag gillar inte situationer där jag måste förlita mig på intuition. (ef–)
Jag tenderar att använda hjärtat som vägledare för mina handlingar. (ef)
Jag litar på mina omedelbara känslor om folk. (ea)
Jag tycker att det finns tillfällen då man ska förlita sig på sin intuition. (ef)
När det gäller tillit till andra människor kan jag vanligen förlita mig på mina instinktiva känslor. (ea)
Jag tycker att det är dumt att fatta viktiga beslut på känslomässig grund. (ef–)
Om jag förlitade mig på mina instinkter skulle jag ofta begå misstag. (ea–)
Jag tar vanligen inte mina känslor till hjälp när jag ska fatta beslut. (ef–)
Jag gör nästan aldrig fel när jag lyssnat på mina djupaste instinkter för att finna ett svar. (ea)
Jag skulle inte vilja vara beroende av någon som beskrev sig själv som intuitiv. (ef–)
Jag misstänker att mina föraningar är oriktiga lika ofta som de är riktiga. (ea–)
Jag kan vanligtvis känna på mig när en person har rätt eller fel, även om jag inte kan förklara hur jag vet det. (ea)
Mina snabbedömningar är förmodligen inte lika bra som de flesta människors. (ea–)

Rationality scale

Jag är inte särskilt bra på att lösa problem som kräver noggrann logisk analys. (ra–)
Jag tycker inte om att behöva göra en massa tankearbete. (rf–)
Jag tycker om problem som kräver hårt tankearbete. (rf)
Jag försöker undvika situationer som kräver grundligt tänkande om någonting. (rf–)
Jag har sinne för logik. (ra)
Jag är inte så bra på att lösa komplicerade problem. (ra–)
Jag är mycket bättre på att fundera ut logiska lösningar på saker och ting än de flesta andra. (ra)
Jag finner nöje i intellektuella utmaningar. (rf)
Att noggrant resonera igenom saker och ting är inte någon av mina starkare sidor. (ra–)
Jag är inte särskilt analytisk i mitt tänkande. (ra–)
Jag föredrar komplexa framför enkla problem. (rf)
Att tänka djupt och länge på någonting ger mig föga tillfredsställelse. (rf–)
Jag resonerar inte särskilt bra under press. (ra–)
Jag har inga problem med att tänka igenom saker och ting på ett klart sätt. (ra)
Jag tycker om att tänka i abstrakta termer. (rf)
Att veta svaret utan att förstå det bakomliggande resonemanget räcker för mig. (rf–)
Att tänka är inte vad jag menar med en trevlig aktivitet. (rf–)
Jag har vanligtvis klara, begripliga skäl till mina beslut. (ra)
Att använda logiskt tänkande brukar fungera väl för mig vid hantering av problem i mitt liv. (ra)
Att lära nya sätt att tänka vore mycket tilltalande för mig. (rf)

Notes: The items are presented in the same order as the English ones in Table 2. Minus signs denote reverse scoring.
The subscale to which each item belongs appears in parenthesis: ef, experiential favorability; ea, experiential ability; rf, rational favorability;
ra, rational ability.

© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.