[G.R. No. 15025. March 15, 1920.

In the matter of the estate of REMIGIA SAGUINSIN, deceased. ARCADIO DEL

ROSARIO, Applicant-Appellant, JOSE A. DEL PRADO, ET AL., Legatees-Appellants, v. RUFINA
SAGUINSIN, Opponent-Appellee.

Fernando Manikis and Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for applicant and Appellant.

No appearance for legatees and appellants.

Claro M. Recto for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS, REQUISITES OF; NECESSITY OF SIGNING LEFT MARGIN OF EACH PAGE OF A WHO;
"FOLIOS" OR "HOJAS," AND PAGE DISTINGUISHED; SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190 AS
AMMENDED BY ACT No. 2645, INTERPRETED. — Section 618 of Act No. 190 as amended by Act No.
2646 provides that: "No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect
known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attended and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person
to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Held: That under the provisions of said law no will shall be valid, except as provided
in the preceding section, unless the testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will shall also sign each and every page of the will on the left margin of each
page, in addition to their signatures at the end of the will; that when the will is written on both sides of the
sheet, then and in that case the testator and witnesses must also sign on the left margin of each page;
that the phrase "hojas o folios," used in the Spanish term of the law, must be interpreted to mean each
page of the sheet upon which the will is written, where it is written on both sides of the same sheet.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J.  :

There was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for allowance an instrument which
the petitioner calls the will of Remigia Saguinsin. It is a manuscript signed by the alleged testatrix and
three witnesses on October 3, 1918, the conclusion of which says: "I, the testatrix, sign in the presence of
the witnesses this will written by D. Lino Mendoza at my request and under my direction." (Yo, la
testadora, firmo en presencia de los testigos este testamento que ha escrito D. Lino Mendoza a mi ruego
y bajo mi direccion.) — Then follows a signature and then these expressions: "The testatrix signed in our
presence and each of us signed in the presence of the others." (La testadora ha firmado en nuestra
presencia y cada uno de nosotros en presencia de los demas.) "Witness who wrote this will at the request
and under the free and voluntary personal direction of the testatrix herself." (Testigo que escribio este
testamento a ruego y bajo la libre y voluntaria direccion personal de la misma testadora.) (Sgd.) Lino
Mendoza — "Attesting witnesses." (Testigos del testamento.) Then come three signatures.

These three signatures together with that of the alleged testatrix are written also on the left margin of the
first page or folio and on the third page or second folio, but not on the second page or reverse side of the
first page where, as is seen, the manuscript is continued, the second folio not containing anything but the
date and the end of the manuscript.

Under these conditions the instrument was impugned by a sister of the alleged testatrix and after the
taking of the declaration of the authors of the signatures which appear three times and in different parts of
the manuscript, the court declared that the document attached to the record could not be allowed as a
will.

Certain persons who allege themselves to be legatees appealed jointly with the lawyer for the petitioner.

And upon considering the case on appeal, this court decides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That, in conformity with Act No. 2645, amendatory to section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
concluding part of the will does not express what that law, under pain of nullity, requires. Section 618, as
amended, says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used upon which the will is written . . . ." None
of these requirements appear in the attesting clause at the end of the document presented. The second
page, i. e., what is written on the reverse side of the first, engenders the doubt whether what is written
thereon was ordered written by the alleged testatrix or was subsequently added by the same hand that
drew the first page and the date that appears on the third. With this non-fulfillment alone of Act No. 2645 it
is impossible to allow the so-called will which violates said law.

That besides this violation there is another as evident as the preceding. Said Act No. 2645 provides: "The
testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet." The English text differs from the
Spanish text: the former says only pages (paginas) while the latter puts (hojas). "Hoja," according to the
Diccionano de la Academia, "is with respect to books or notebooks folio." According to the same
dictionary "pagina (page) is each one of the two faces or planes of the leaf of a book or notebook: that
which is written or printed on each page, for example I have read only two pages of this book." Two
pages constitute one leaf. One page represents only one-half of one leaf. The English text requires that
the signature which guarantees the genuineness of the testament shall be placed on the left hand margin
of each page and that each page should be numbered by letter in the upper part this requirement is
entirely lacking on the second page that is, on the reverse side of the first. According to the old method of
paging "folio 1 1/2 y su vto." that is, first folio and the reverse side, should have been stated, and the
second page would then have been included in the citation. By;the failure to comply with this, requisite the
law has been obviously violated. In the English text the word "pages" does not leave any room for doubt
and it is invariably used in the text of the law, whereas in the Spanish text, "hoja" and "pagina" are used
indifferently as may be seen in the following part which says: "El atestiguamiento hara constar el numero
de hojas o paginas utiles en que esta extendido el testamento." This failure to comply with the law also
vitiates the will and invalidates it, as the second page is lacking in authenticity.

This is a defect so radical that there is no way by which what is written on the reverse side of the first folio
may be held valid. It is possible that this document consists of only the two folios numbered 1 and 2, and
that on the reverse side of number 1 nothing may have been written upon the order of the testatrix, the
testament ending at the foot of the first folio with the legacy "To my nephew Catalino Ignacio, P200" (A mi
sobrino Catalino Ignacio doscientos pesos) and from that part then immediately follows folio No. 2 —
"Manila a tres de Octubre de mil novecientos diez y ocho. — Yo la testadora firmo en presencia etc."
(Manila, October 3, 1918. — I, the testatrix, sign in the presence of etc.) There is nothing which
guarantees all the contents of page 2. The margin of this page is absolutely blank. There is nothing which
gives the assurance that the testatrix ordered the insertion of all the contents of page 2. It may very well
be that it was subsequently added thereby substituting the will of the testatrix, a result for the prevention
of which this manner of authenticity by affixing the signature on each page and not merely on each folio
was provided for by law. This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the
signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been
written, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed with the signatures of the alleged
testatrix and her witnesses. The English text which requires the signing of pages and not merely leaves or
folios should prevail. It is so provided in section 15 of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2711).

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs of this instance against the Appellant.

[G.R. No. L-21151. February 25, 1924. ]

In re will of Antonio Vergel de Dios, deceased. RAMON J. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant,

HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA JAVIER, Legatees-Appellants, v. FERNANDO
VERGEL DE DIOS ET AL., opponents-appellees.

Jesus Ocampo, Reyes & Imzon, Camus & Delgado and Gibbs & McDonough for Appellants.

Eusebio Orense and Antonio M. Opisso for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; NUMBERING OF PAGES; ATTESTATION CLAUSE. — Although the numbering of the sheet
containing the attestation clause does not appear in the upper part thereof, yet if that numbering is found
in its text, as when it is said therein that the will consists of three sheet actually used, correlatively
numbered, besides this one, that is to say, the sheet containing the attestation clause, the requirement
prescribed by the law is substantially complied with, for if the will consists of three sheets besides the one
containing the attestation clause, it is evident that the latter is the fourth page, that is to say, that the
document consists of four sheets.

2. ID.; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; THE LATTER MUST STATE COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS;
SUFFICIENCY OF. — The attestation clause must state, among other things, that the testator signed on
the margin of each sheet of the will in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of each
other; and such a fact cannot be proven by any other proof than the attestation clause itself. This does not
mean, however, that to express it, the same words used in the statute must be employed, for if the fact
appears in any manner intelligible from the attestation clause, the latter would be sufficient and valid.
Thus the attestation clause in question is sufficient in this respect which says: ". . . and he (the testator)
signed at the bottom of the aforesaid will in our presence, and at his request we also signed our names as
witnesses in his presence and that of each other, and finally, the testator, as well as we, his witnesses,
signed in the same manner on the left margin of each and everyone of its sheets," for the phrase, in the
same manner, means that the testator signed in the presence of the witnesses, and the latter in his
presence and that of each other.

3. ID.; ID.; SIGNATURE OF TESTATOR. — The signature of the testator is not necessary in the
attestation clause. (Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.)

4. ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED; NECESSITY OF BOTH. — The will is distinct and different from the
attestation clause, although both are necessary to the validity of the will. The will proper must meet all the
requirements enumerated in the second paragraph of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
text of the attestation clause must state compliance with the requirements prescribed for the will.
DECISION

ROMUALDEZ, J.  :

The question in this case is as to the validity of the document Exhibit A as a will, which was propounded
by Ramon J. Fernandez for probate, and contested by Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo
and Virgilio Rustia, the Court of First Instance of Manila having denied its probate.

The applicant takes this appeal, assigning error to the action of the lower court in holding the attestation
fatally defective and in not finding Act No. 2645 void.

The facts attributed to the will by the contestants are as follows, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of the will.

(b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will.

(c) He did not request anybody to attest the document as his last will.

(d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witnesses.

(e) The witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with knowledge on
the part of the testator that they were signing his will.

(f) The witnesses did not sign the attestation clause before the death of the testator.

(g) This clause was written after the execution of the dispositive part of the will and was attached to the
will after the death of the testator.

(h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of Exhibit A are not authentic.

The evidence sufficiently shows that when Attorney Lopez Lizo read the will to the testator, the latter’s
mind was perfectly sane and he understood it; that he signed all the pages of the will proper, although he
did not sign the page containing the attestation clause; that while he did not personally call the witnesses,
yet the latter were invited by Attorney Lopez Lizo to act as such in his presence. The law does not require
that the testator precisely be the person to request the witnesses to attest his will. It was also sufficiently
established in the record, besides being stated in the attestation clause, that the testator signed the will in
the presence of the three witnesses and that the latter, in turn, signed it in the presence of the testator
and of each other, the testator knowing that the witnesses were signing his will; that the witnesses signed
the attestation clause before the death of the testator; that this clause, with the names of the witnesses in
blank, was prepared before the testator signed the will, and that the sheet containing said clause, just as
those of the will proper, was a loose sheet, and that all the four sheets of which the will Exhibit A was
actually composed were kept together and are the very ones presented in this case; and finally, that the
signatures of the testator on page 3 of said exhibit are authentic.

It thus appearing from the record that there are no such defects as those mentioned by the opponents,
and it having been proven that the testator executed said will in a language known by him and
consciously, freely and spontaneously, it would seem unnecessary to go further, and the matter might be
brought to a close right here, by holding the will in question valid and allowable to probate, were it not for
the fact that the trial court and the opponents questioned the sufficiency and validity of the attestation
clause because the sheet on which it is written is not numbered, and it is not stated there that the testator
signed on the margin of each sheet of the will in the presence of the three witnesses, or that the latter
signed it in the presence of the testator and of each other, specially because said attestation clause is not
signed by the testator either at the margin or the bottom thereof.
As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is true that it does not appear on the
upper part of the sheet, but it does appear in its text, the pertinent part of which is copied hereinafter, with
the words, having reference to the number of sheets of the will, underscored, including the page number
of the attestation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . We certify that the foregoing document written in Spanish, a language known by the testator
Antonino Vergel de Dios, consisting of three sheets actually used, correlatively enumerated, besides this
sheet . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

If, as stated in this clause, the foregoing document consists of three sheets, besides that of the clause
itself, which is in singular, it is clear that such a sheet of the attestation clause is the fourth and that the
will, including said sheet, has four sheets. This description contained in the clause in question constitutes
substantial compliance with the requirements prescribed by the law regarding the paging. So it was held
by this Court in the case of Abangan v. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), where the sheet containing the
attestation, as well as the preceding one, was also not paged. Furthermore, the law, as we shall see later
on, does not require that the sheet containing nothing but the attestation clause, wholly or in part, be
numbered or paged. Consequently this lack of paging on the attestation sheet does not take anything
from the validity of the will.

Turning now to the question whether or not in this clause it is stated the testator signed on the margin of
each sheet of the will, in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of each other, let us
see what is said in said clause on this point, and to this end its pertinent part is hereinafter transcribed
and is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . and he (the testator) signed at the bottom of the aforesaid will in our presence and we at his request
did the same in his presence and in that of each other as witnesses to the will, and lastly, the testator, as
well as we, as witnesses, signed in the same manner on the left margin of each sheet." (Italics ours.)

The underscored phrase "in the same manner" cannot in the instant case mean, and it in fact means
nothing, but that the testator and the witnesses signed on the left margin of each sheet of the will "in the
same manner" in which they signed at the bottom thereof, that is, the testator in the presence of the
witnesses and the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other. This phrase in the same
manner cannot, in view of the context of the pertinent part, refer to another thing, and was used here as a
suppletory phrase to include everything and avoid the repetition of a long and difficult one, such as what
is meant by it. The same section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in order to avoid the repetition of the
same long phrase about the testator having signed in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the
presence of each other, resorts to a similar expression in the second paragraph and says, "as
aforesaid."cralaw virtua1aw library

Concerning the absolute absence of the signature of the testator from the sheet containing the attestation
clause, this point was already decided in the above cited case of Abangan v. Abangan, where this court
held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The testator’s signature is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies,
appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator."cralaw virtua1aw library

In that case of Abangan v. Abangan it was held that the signature of the testator is not necessary in the
attestation clause, but the theory is not announced that such a clause is unnecessary to the validity of the
will.

For this reason such doctrine does not annul the judgment in the case of Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca (43
Phil., 405), where in effect the doctrine, among others, was laid down that the attestation clause is
necessary to the validity of the will. One of the points on which greatest stress was laid in that case of Uy
Coque is that the requirements of the law regarding the number of the pages used, the signing of the will
and of each of its pages by the testator in the presence of three witnesses, and the attestation and
signing of the will and of each its pages by the testator in the presence of three witnesses, and the
attestation and signing of the will and of each of its pages by the witnesses in the presence of each other
cannot be proven aliunde but by the attestation clause itself which must expressed the compliance of the
will with such requirements. But it was not held in that case of Uy Coque that the signature of the testator
was necessary in the attestation clause, nor was such point discussed there, which was the point at issue
in the case of Abangan v. Abangan, supra.

The appellees, however, argue that such clause in the case of Abangan v. Abangan begins at the bottom
and on the same sheet in which the testamentary provisions terminated, that is to say, the will properly
speaking. Even then if it is intended to commit misrepresentation or fraud, which are things that with the
requirements of the law for the making and attesting of wills it is intended to avoid, it is just the same that
the clause; as in the case of Abangan v. Abangan, begins at the bottom of the will properly speaking, as,
like the case before us, it is wholly contained in a separate sheet. The fact is that this separate sheet,
containing the attestation clause wholly or in part, is not signed in any place by the testator in the case.

Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, contains three paragraphs, of
which the first enumerates in general terms the requirements to be met by a will executed after said Code
took effect, to wit, that the language or dialect in which it is written be known by the testator, that it be
signed by the latter or by another person in the name of the testator by his express direction and in his
presence, and that it be attested and signed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of each other.

These general rules are amplified in the next two paragraphs as to the special requirements for the
execution of the will by the testator and the signing thereof by the witnesses, with which the second
paragraph of the section deals, and as to the attestation clause treated in the third and last paragraph of
said section 618.

For this reason the second paragraph of this section 618 says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet."cralaw virtua1aw library

These are the solemnities that must surround the execution of the will properly speaking, without any
reference whatsoever to the attestation clause not treated in this second paragraph. It is in this second
paragraph which deals only with the will (without including the attestation clause), that the signature or
name of the testator and those of the witnesses are mentioned as necessary on the left margin of each
and everyone of the sheets of the will (not of the attestation clause), as well as the paging of said sheets
(of the will, and not of the attestation clause which is not yet spoken of).

Now, are the signatures of the testator and the paging of the will also necessary in the attestation clause?
Let us see the last paragraph of this section 618 of the Code which already deals with the requirements
for the attestation clause. This last paragraph reads thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other."cralaw virtua1aw
library

As may be seen this last paragraph refers to the contents of the text of the attestation, not the
requirements or signatures thereof outside of its text. It does not require that the attestation be signed by
the testator or that the page or sheet containing it be numbered.

From this analysis of our law in force it appears:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First. That the will must have an attestation clause as a complement, without which it cannot be probated
and with which only and not aliunde (Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca, supra) may the requirements to be
stated in its text be proven. The attestation clause must be prepared and signed, as in the instant case,
on the same occasion on which the will is prepared and signed, in such a way that the possibility of fraud,
deceit or suppression of the will or the attestation clause be reduced to a minimum; which possibility
always exists, as experience shows, in spite of the many precautions taken by the legislator to insure the
true and free expression of one’s last will.

Second. That the will is distinct and different from the attestation, although both are necessary to the
validity of the will, similar, in our opinion, to a document which is not public so long as it is not
acknowledged before a notary, the document being a distinct and different thing from the
acknowledgment, each of which must comply with different requisites, among which is the signature of
the maker which is necessary in the document but not in the acknowledgment and both things being
necessary to the existence of the public document.

Third. That the will proper must meet the requirements enumerated in the second paragraph of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Fourth. That the text of the attestation clause must express compliance with the requirements prescribed
for the will.

In the case at bar the attestation clause in question states the requirements prescribed for the will were
complied with, and this is enough for it, as such attestation clause, to be held as meeting the
requirements prescribed by the law for it.

The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear does not affect its validity, for, as
above stated, the law does not require that it be signed by the testator.

We find no merit in the assignment of error raising the question as to the validity of Act No. 2645, which is
valid. For the purposes of this decision, it is not necessary to reason out this conclusion, it being sufficient
for the adjudication of this case to hold the first error assigned by the appellants to have been
demonstrated.

The foregoing conclusions lead us to hold, as we do hereby hold, that the document Exhibit A, as the last
will and testament of the deceased Antonino Vergel de Dios, meets all the requirements prescribed by the
law now in force and therefore it must be allowed to probate as prayed for by the petitioner.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the lower court proceed with the probate
of the will Exhibit A in accordance with law, without express pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-18979             June 30, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.

CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellee.

Rosendo J. Tansinin for oppositor-appellant Natividad Icasiano.
Jaime R. Nuevas for oppositor-appellant Enrique Icasiano.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate the document and its
duplicate, marked as Exhibits "A" and "A-1", as the true last will and testament of Josefa Villacorte,
deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano, the person named therein as such.

This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the allowance and admission to
probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the
appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof.

The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, and caused notice thereof to be
published for three (3) successive weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper "Manila
chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof upon the known heirs.

On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition; and on
November 10, 1958, she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which
proponent objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958, the court issued an order appointing the Philippine
Trust Company as special administrator. 1äwphï1.ñët

On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his
own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will.

On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his evidence; but on June 1,
1959, he filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the
decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date,
submitting the signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959.
On June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad Icasiano de Gomez and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint
opposition to the admission of the amended and supplemental petition, but by order of July 20, 1959, the
court admitted said petition, and on July 30, 1959, oppositor Natividad Icasiano filed her amended
opposition. Thereafter, the parties presented their respective evidence, and after several hearings the
court issued the order admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors
appealed directly to this Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the ground that the same
is contrary to law and the evidence.

The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of Manila
on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and
testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila,
published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and
Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said
three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and
for the City of Manila; and that the will was actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also
present during the execution and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former
Governor Emilio Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental
witnesses to the execution of the decedent's last will and testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were
in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and authenticity of
the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and
attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared the document. The latter
also testified upon cross examination that he prepared one original and two copies of Josefa Villacorte
last will and testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one signed
copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.

The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the filing of the
petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page,
it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three
(3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition and marked as
Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of the will and its
duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page thereof by the
testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's presence
and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on page
three (3) of the original); that pages of the original and duplicate of said will were duly numbered; that the
attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein and is signed by the
aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix
that the attestation clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses; that the will was
executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the original and the duplicate copies
were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the same date June 2, 1956.

Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may
have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was
signed in his presence.

Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix
in the duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as
the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed through
mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her
last will and testament the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may
be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and
dispositions thereof, whereby proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as
attorneys-in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants
are enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it,
on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.

We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix signed both
original and duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1", respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the same
in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and Atty.
Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a
language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix
and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in
a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. The opinion of expert for oppositors,
Mr. Felipe Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix appearing in the duplicate original were not written by
the same had which wrote the signatures in the original will leaves us unconvinced, not merely because it
is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but principally because of the paucity
of the standards used by him to support the conclusion that the differences between the standard and
questioned signatures are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The expert has, in fact,
used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix besides those affixed to the original of the
testament (Exh. A); and we feel that with so few standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the
duplicate could not be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so since
the comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are radical differences that would
justify the charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of
her signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right the original. These,
factors were not discussed by the expert.

Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures
does not appear reliable, considering the standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds
of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, therefore, we do not find the
testimony of the oppositor's expert sufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental
witnesses, Torres and Natividad (Dr. Diy being in the United States during the trial, did not testify).
Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored
than others is proof of neither (see In re Butalid, 10 Phil. 27; Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163; Pecson vs.
Coronal, 45 Phil. 216). Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise,
the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary dispositions that the heirs should not inquire
into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of
forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear
motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often
results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non-heirs and speculators.
Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occassion. It is also well to
note that, as remarked by the Court of Appeals in Sideco vs. Sideco, 45 Off. Gaz. 168, fraud and undue
influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate
shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.

On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one
page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se
sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact
that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the
coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and
all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the
purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently
attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz.
1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it
or the attestation clause".

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown
by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures
in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public
likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the
law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses,
but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that
despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page
either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents
exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against
fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate
(Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one
signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the
original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate
(Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to
the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate,
Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament
was inadvertent and not intentional.

That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new publication does not
affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the petition for
probate. The amended petition did not substantially alter the one first filed, but merely supplemented it by
disclosing the existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new interests were involved (the
contents of Exhibit A and A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants were duly notified of the proposed
amendment. It is nowhere proved or claimed that the amendment deprived the appellants of any
substantial right, and we see no error in admitting the amended petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

G.R. No. L-1787             August 27, 1948

Testacy of Sixto Lopez. JOSE S. LOPEZ, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
AGUSTIN LIBORO, oppositor-appellant.

Tirona, Gutierrez and Adorable for appellant.

Ramon Diokno for appellee.

TUASON, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed unsuccessfully the probate of what
purports to be the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in
Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in question was executed. In
the court below, the present appellant specified five grounds for his opposition, to wit: (1) that the
deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3)
that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due
to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by
law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured
by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein
proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.

In this instance only one of these objections is reiterated, formulated in these words: "That the court  a
quo erred in holding that the document Exhibit "A" was executed in all particulars as required by law." To
this objection is added the alleged error of the court "in allowing the petitioner to introduce evidence that
Exhibit "A" was written in a language known to the decedent after petitioner rested his case and over the
vigorous objection of the oppositor.

The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The
first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is a fatal
defect.

The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of
preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil.,
476.) In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is
supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or
characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its
contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the
first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore,
the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital
that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of which, in the logical order of
sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two contains
only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of
the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other than page one.  Abangan vs.
Abangan, supra, and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922 are decisive of this issue.

Although not falling within the purview and scope of the first assignment of error, the matter of the
credibility of the witnesses is assailed under this heading. On the merits we do not believe that the
appellant's contention deserves serious consideration. Such contradictions in the testimony of the
instrumental witnesses as are set out in the appellant's brief are incidents not all of which every one of the
witnesses can be supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in which they occurred.

Everyday life and the result of investigations made in the field of experimental psychology show
that the contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of a certain incident, after a long
series of questioning, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of
good faith. Inasmuch as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is
but natural that in relating their impressions they should not agree in the minor details; hence, the
contradictions in their testimony. (People vs. Limbo, 49 Phil., 99.)

The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was
that the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place might have
directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing
curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his
will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is
satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28
R. C. L., 117.)

With reference to the second assignment of error, we do not share the opinion that the trial court
communicated an abuse of discretion in allowing the appellant to offer evidence to prove knowledge of
Spanish by the testator, the language in which the will is drawn, after the petitioner had rested his case
and after the opponent had moved for dismissal of the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
It is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the party offering the
evidence has rested, and this discretion will not be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused. (64
C. J., 160.) More, it is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the case to  be
reopened for the further introduction of evidence after a motion or request for a nonsuit, or a  demurrer to
the evidence, and the case may be reopened after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on
the request, motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the same, or after the motion has been
granted, if the order has not been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed. (64 C. J., 164.)

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective direct
proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good
reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its
ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong and Co.
vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U. S. vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So, generally, additional evidence is allowed
when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the
purpose of the evidence is to the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. (I Moran's Comments
on the Rules of Court, 2d ed., 545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The omission to present evidence on the testator's
knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight.

Although alien to the second assignment of error, the appellant impugns the will for its silence on the
testator's understanding of the language used in the testament. There is no statutory requirement that
such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof
aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will
written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was
not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region,
from which the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.
The order of the lower court ordering the probate of the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez is
affirmed, with costs.

G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ,
(deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III,
Maasin), respondent.

Erasmo M. Diola counsel for petition.

Hon. Avelino S. Rosal in his own behalf.

GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:

This is a petition for review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch
III, in Special Proceedings No. R-1713, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Will of
Dorotea Perez, Deceased; Apolonio Taboada, Petitioner", which denied the probate of the will, the motion
for reconsideration and the motion for appointment of a special administrator.

In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and
testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, the will consists of two
pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of
the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The
second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the
attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.

Since no opposition was filed after the petitioner's compliance with the requirement of publication, the trial
court commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive the petitioner's evidence. Accordingly, the
petitioner submitted his evidence and presented Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the
will, who testified on its genuineness and due execution.

The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned order denying the
probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution. In the same order, the
petitioner was also required to submit the names of the intestate heirs with their corresponding addresses
so that they could be properly notified and could intervene in the summary settlement of the estate.

Instead of complying with the order of the trial court, the petitioner filed a manifestation and/or motion,  ex
parte praying for a thirty-day period within which to deliberate on any step to be taken as a result of the
disallowance of the will. He also asked that the ten-day period required by the court to submit the names
of intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the
motion together with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be acted upon by the Honorable
Ramon C. Pamatian due to his transfer to his new station at Pasig, Rizal. The said motions or incidents
were still pending resolution when respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the position of presiding
judge of the respondent court.

Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of special administrator.

Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the manifestation and/or
motion filed ex parte. In the same order of denial, the motion for the appointment of special administrator
was likewise denied because of the petitioner's failure to comply with the order requiring him to submit the
names of' the intestate heirs and their addresses.

The petitioner decided to file the present petition.

For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all
the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the
testatrix and of one another?

Article 805 of the Civil Code provides:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the lacier witnesses and signed the will and the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be

interpreted to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a notarial will to be
valid, it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must
also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the
attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not
sufficient compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that
page.

On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make it a condition
precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity of the wig that the signatures of the
subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of the wig after the signature of the
testatrix. He contends that it would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on
the space or particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular
location wherein the signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the honest frailties of human
nature.
We find the petition meritorious.

Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing
the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which
the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the
other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of
Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d
911).

Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case
was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.

The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not
only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied
in the attestation clause.

While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms
should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90
Phil. 444, 449).

The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions
on the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end
in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards
and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the
formalities in the execution of a will" (Report of the Code commission, p. 103).

Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were not for the defect in
the place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient to establish the
validity of the will.

The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary
dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang
to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the
questioned order.

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case,
it is discernible from the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by
the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of
the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and
Testament consists of two pages including this page".

In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following observations with respect
to the purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause must state the number of pages used:
 The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets
upon which the win is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an
effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the
pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be
bequeathed (In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil.
405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs.
Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi  of these cases seems to be that the
attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing
the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will
if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or
examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation
clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written,
however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of
eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of
construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more
liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by
purely technical considerations.

Icasiano v. Icasiano  (11 SCRA 422, 429) has the following ruling which applies a similar liberal approach:

... Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only (sic) the fact that the
testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the
coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified
by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally
interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness
over whose conduct she had no control where the purpose of the law to guarantee the
Identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or
deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the fun observance of
the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. Vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz.
1459, at 1479 (decision on reconsideration) 'witnesses may sabotage the will by
muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent court which denied
the probate of tile will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the motion for
appointment of a special administrator are set aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate
of the wig and to conduct further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement on
costs.

SO ORDERED.