!30 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

[1965]
1963 sue on the bill of lading, could have avoided article I I I , rule 6. A
COMPANIA ^- r - L i t t m a n said t h a t I should treat t h e m as within the pro-
COLOMBIANA tective umbrella of the insurance company's New York suit,
SEGUEOS assuming t h a t to have been well founded. Quite how an umbrella,
*• however " p r o t e c t i v e , " can protect from the consequences of
STEAM suing the wrong party I do not follow. Nor does the decision in
NAVIGATION Firestone Plantations Co. v. United States,70 which was cited to B
1 me by Mr. L i t t m a n , help him out of this predicament. B u t as
RoskiU/. I have said, for the reasons I have given, this last point is not
of practical importance, and I refer to it only for the sake of
completeness.
I t only remains for me to thank counsel for their able and
erudite arguments, and to say that, so far as this court is con- C
cerned, both actions fail and are dismissed.

Judgment for the defendants in

both cases with costs.

Solicitors: Bernard Obcrman & Co.; Hill, Dickinson & Co. D

H . J.
"> (1945) A.M.C. 46.

C. C. A. E E G I N A v. ALLAN AND OTHERS.

1963
June 11,12, Crime — Affray — Principal in the second degree—When jury may
13, 18. properly convict—Whether encouragement a requirement before an -^
Edmund Davies accused person can be convicted.
Marshall and Crime — Aidinq and abettinq — Encouraqinq unlawful act — Minimal
Lawton JJ. . " . •' . . , ." * . ' .a
requirement to constitute principal in second degree—Affray.
Three men pleaded not guilty before a judge and jury on a
charge of making an affray. In the course of his summing-up the
trial judge handed to the jury typed copies of his direction on the
law of affray. Paragraph 4 of the direction read as follows: G
" Every person is, however, a party [to an affray] and guilty who:
" (i) agrees that such a fight should take place and, in pursuance
"of that agreement, is later present at i t ; or (ii) without such
" agreement unlawfully joins in such a fight, or, being present,
" chose to remain present, either (a) knowing that his continued

[Reported by M. M. MOODLEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.]

 1 Q.B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. 131

A " presence encouraged the fight, or (b) intending to join in the fight C. C. A.
" if his help was needed by his side." ...
All three defendants were found guilty and were sentenced to
various terms of imprisonment. On appeal against convictions and R E Q.
sentences by the first two defendants and against conviction only by t>.
ALLAN
the third:— -
Held, allowing the appeals, that the judge had misdirected the
•g jury as part of his direction was tantamount to telling the jury
that they were duty bound to convict an accused who was proved to
have been present and witnessing an affray if it was also proved
that he nursed an intention to join in if help was needed by the
side he favoured, and this notwithstanding that he did nothing by
words or deeds to evince his intention and outwardly played the
role of a purely passive spectator; whereas the law was that before
_ a jury could properly convict an accused person of being a principal
in the second degree to an affray, they must be convinced by the
evidence that, at the very least, he by some means or other
encouraged the participants; to hold otherwise would be, in effect,
to convict a man on his thoughts, unaccompanied by any physical
act other than the fact of his mere presence.
Dicta of Cave J . and Lopes J . in Begina v. Coney (1882)
8 Q.B.D. 534, 539, 552 applied.
D Per curiam. Encouragement in one form or another is a
minimal requirement before an accused person may properly be
regarded as a principal in the second degree to any crime (post,
p. 138E).
Dictum of Devlin J. in National Coal Board v. Gamble [1959]
1 Q.B. 11, 24; [1958] 3 W.L.R. 434; [1958] 3 All E.R. 203, D.C.
explained.
E
APPEALS against conviction and sentence.
George Donald Allan, J a m e s Joseph Boyle, Albert Ballan-
tyne, Michael Mooney and others appeared at Lincoln Assizes on
J a n u a r y 30, 1963, before Thesiger J . and a jury on an indictment
charging t h a t on September 8, 1962, they unlawfully fought and
F m a d e an affray in certain highways in Scunthorpe.
Allan, Boyle and Ballantyne pleaded not guilty; Mooney
pleaded guilty to the charge.
The following facts are taken from the judgment. On Sep-
tember 8, 1962, a fight with knives took place between a number
of Somalis and white m e n in streets in the vicinity of t h e Oswald
G Hotel in Scunthorpe. During t h e evening a Somali n a m e d Yusef
was stabbed to death in Allanby Street. The fight appeared to
have lasted 15 m i n u t e s ; a large n u m b e r of people had collected
in Frances Street, W e s t Street and Allanby Street, where the
principal fighting occurred, and during its course Allan, Ballan-
tyne and Mooney received knife wounds.
The Court of Criminal Appeal had on J u n e 12, 1963, dismissed
132 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. [1965]

C. C. A. the appeal of John Gow against hLs conviction for non-capital A

1963 murder in respect of Yusef.
At the trial the judge in the course of his summing-up directed
„ ' the jury on the law of affray. He had caused to be typed copies
ALLAN. of his direction which were handed to the jury. The direction
was in the following terms:
" 1. An affray is a fight between two or more people in a B
" public street that is likely to terrify passers-by or residents.
" 2 . Every person who is a party to an affray is guilty of an
" offence.
" 3 . Mere presence at the fight does not make a person a
" party to it, even if he does nothing to stop it; nor is he a party
" t o it if he tries to stop the fight and restore the Queen's peace, G
" o r if he tries to defend someone from being hurt, because it is
" lawful to intervene for this purpose.
" 4 . Every person is, however, a party and guilty who:
" (i) agrees that such a fight should take place and, in pursuance
" of that agreement, is later present at it; or (ii) without such
" agreement unlawfully joins in such a fight, or, being present, D
" chose to remain present, either (a) knowing that his continued
" presence encouraged the fight, or (b) intending to join in the
" fight if his help was needed by his side."
All four defendants were found guilty on February 11, 1963.
Allan and Boyle were sentenced to four years' imprisonment,
Ballantyne to three years' and Mooney, in addition to three years' E
imprisonment, was recommended to be deported to Ireland at
the end of his sentence.
Allan and Boyle appealed against their convictions and sen-
tences, Ballantyne against conviction only, and Mooney against
the order recommending deportation.
F
Anthony Cri-pps Q.G. and Alan de Piro for Allan and Ballan-
tyne. Allan's ground of appeal is that the evidence did not
warrant his conviction. His defence was that he was a drunken
bystander and was almost incapable of participating in the affray
through the influence of drink. It was not challenged that by
reason of drink he was unable to give a coherent account of what G
had happened. Ballantyne appeals on the ground that his defence
was not sufficiently put in the trial judge's summing-up.
Geoffrey Lane Q.G. and R. D. Lymbery for Boyle and
Mooney. The legal point that calls for determination is the
correctness or otherwise of the trial judge's direction regarding
the proof necessary to convict a person of making an affray. The
 1 Q.B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. 133

A effect of paragraph (ii) (b) of that direction is that the jury were C. C. A.
instructed to convict any accused man who was proved to have 196 3
been present and witnessing the affray, if it was also proved that
he nursed an intention to join in in the event of help being needed „_'
by the side he favoured. This notwithstanding that he did nothing ALLAN.
by words or deeds to evince his intention, and notwithstanding he
B outwardly played the role of a purely passive spectator. If that
direction were correct, then where A and B behave themselves to
all outward appearances in an exactly similar manner, but it is
proved that A had the intention to participate if needs be, whereas
B had no such intention, it must result in A being convicted as a
principal in the second degree to the affray, whereas B would be
C acquitted. To do that would be to convict A on his thoughts,
even though they found no reflection in his actions.
One who actually participates in an affray is guilty of being a
principal in the first degree. One who aids, abets, counsels or
procures but is absent at the time of the affray is clearly guilty
of being an accessory before the fact. A principal in the second
D degree is one who is present and participating in an affray without
actually fighting. There must at least be some encouragement.
Mere presence is not encouragement. Mere intention to encourage
or an intention to fight is not enough. The essentials in the case
of a principal in the second degree are mens rea, i.e., an intention
to provide assistance or encouragement, and an actus reus, i.e.,
E the actual provision of encouragement or assistance. In the
absence of either of those two essentials, a person is not guilty as
a principal in the second degree. The real question for the jury
was: Has the prosecution proved mens rea and actus reus beyond
all reasonable doubt? What the trial judge was directing the
jury amounted to evidence of guilt as a matter of law was merely
F evidence from which such guilt might or might not be inferred by
the jury. [Eeference was made to Regina v. Coney 1 and Rex v.
Murphy.2]
J. A. Grieves Q.C. and E. F. Jowitt for the Crown. The
direction of the trial judge was correct in law and in the given
circumstances a jury doing its duty was bound to convict A of
G aiding and abetting an affray even though he uttered no word of
encouragement and acted throughout in exactly the same manner
as all the other spectators of what was happening. A principal in
the second degree is a person who is present aiding and abetting
an affray. [Eeference was made to Regina v. Young 3 (cited in
3
i (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534. (1838) 8 C. & P. 644.
2 (1883) 6 C. & P . 103.
1 Q.B. 1965. 9
134 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. [1965]
C. C. A. Regina v. Coney 4) and Wilcox v. Jeffery.5] A person who arrives A
1968 when a fight is in progress and chooses to remain at the spot whilst
the fight continues is committing an overt act. There must be
tf * some evidence of the purpose for which he continues to remain
ALLAN. there. The decision in earlier cases was that while the courts were
troubled by elements of the evidence, there was no clear distinc-
tion between intention and overt act. This case involves funda- B
mental principles of criminal law. As to the meaning of
" countenance," see Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.),
p. 405.
Alan de Piro replied.
Geoffrey Lane Q.C. in reply. Regina v. Young,6 cited in
Regina v. Coney,'' is misleading. C
Cur. adv. vult.

1963. June 18. EDMUND DAVIES J. read the judgment of the

court. After a trial lasting nine days at the Lincoln Assizes in
February last, the appellants Allan, Boyle and Ballantyne were
convicted of making an affray, the appellant Mooney having D
pleaded guilty on the second day of the trial. Allan and Boyle
now appeal against conviction and their sentences of four years'
imprisonment, Ballantyne against conviction only. Mooney
appeals only against the recommendation that he be deported to
his native Ireland. Having regard to the decision this court has
arrived at on the point of law relied on by the first three appel- E
lants, the facts need not be gone into in very great detail.
[His Lordship reviewed the facts and continued: ] Despite
the submissions of defence counsel, the court has come to the
conclusion that in the case of each of the appellants there was
sufficient evidence to justify the jury coming to the conclusion,
on a proper direction, that they had all unlawfully fought and F
made an affray. The case against Allan was a good deal less
strong than that against the other appellants, but, even so, we
should not have interfered with his conviction had the jury been
properly directed.
The legal point that calls for determination is as to the judge's
direction regarding the proof necessary before an accused person Q
may properly be convicted of making an affray, but the criticism
made upon it involves consideration of matters which have an
importance which reaches beyond the confines of the law as to

* (1882) 8 Q.'B.D. 534. • 8 C. & P. 644.

s [1951] 1 T.L.B. 706; [1951] 1 ' 8 Q.B.D. 652.
All E.B. 464, D.C.
 135
1 Q.B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

A affrays. The judge had caused to be typed out copies of his C. C. A.

direction which were handed to the jury and, one may take it, -^53
this was carefully studied by them and operated to guide their -
deliberations, as it was intended to do. t>.
[His Lordship stated the terms of the direction as set out ALLAN.
above and continued: ] No criticism has been, or properly could be,
B levelled against paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 (i) of that direction, nor as
to the direction in paragraph 4 (ii) that a person unlawfully joining
in an affray is guilty, notwithstanding the absence of prior agree-
ment. Paragraph 4 (ii) (a) is, however, attacked as containing
what counsel described as " a concealed dichotomy." This highly
alarming concept fortunately does not call for comment and we
C can turn forthwith to consider the more telling attack made upon
paragraph 4 (ii) (b). In effect, it amounts to this: that the judge
thereby directed the jury that they were duty bound to convict
an accused who was proved to have been present and witnessing
an affray if it was also proved that he nursed an intention to
join in if help was needed by the side he favoured and this not-
D withstanding that he did nothing by words or deeds to evince his
intention and outwardly played the role of a purely passive
spectator. It was said that, if that direction is right, where A
and B behave themselves to all outward appearances in an
exactly similar manner, but it be proved that A had the intention
to participate if needs be, whereas B had no such intention, then
E A must be convicted of being a principal in the second degree to
the affray, whereas B should be acquitted. To do that, it is
objected, would be to convict A on his thoughts, even though
they found no reflection in his actions. For the Crown, on the
other hand, it is contended that the direction was unimpeachable,
and that in the given circumstances a jury doing its duty would
p be bound to convict A of aiding and abetting in an affray
even though he uttered no word of encouragement and acted
throughout in exactly the same manner as all the other
spectators of what was happening.
The locus classicus on this branch of the law is the majority
decision of the Court of Crown Cases Beserved in Regina v.
Q, Coney,1 whereby the conviction of mere spectators of a prize-fight
as being aiders and abettors in the fight was quashed. Before
proceeding to quote from Hale (1 Hale P.C. 439) and from
Foster's Crown Law (1792), p. 104, Cave J. said 2 : "Now it is
" a general rule in the case of principals in the second degree
" that there must be participation in the act, and that, although
2
i (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534. Ibid. 539.
136
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. [1965]
CCA. " a man is present whilst a felony is being committed, if he takes A.
196 3 " no part in it, and does not act in concert with those who
" commit it, he will not be a principal in the second degree merely
c- ' " because he does not endeavour to prevent the felony, or
ALLAN. " apprehend the felon." The opening words of the trial judge in
paragraph 3 of his direction accurately adopted this passage, but
the difficulty arises, as we have said, in relation to the following B
paragraph (para. No. 4). In Bex v. Murphy3 Littledale J.
directed the jury as follows: " I am of opinion that persons who
" are at a fight, in consequence of which death ensues, are all
" guilty of manslaughter if they encouraged it by their presence;
" I mean, if they remained present during the fight. I say that
" if they were not casually passing by, but stayed at the place, C
" they encouraged it by their presence, although they did not
" say or do anything. . . . If the death occurred from the fight
" itself, all persons encouraging it by their presence are guilty of
" manslaughter." Commenting on this direction, Cave J. had this
to say in Begina v. Coney*: " This summing-up unfortunately
" appears to me capable of being understood in two different J)
" ways. It may mean either that mere presence unexplained is
" evidence of encouragement, and so of guilt, or that mere
" presence unexplained is conclusive proof of encouragement,
" and so of guilt. If the former is the correct meaning, I concur
" in the law so laid down; if the latter, I am unable to do so. It
" appears to me that the passage tending to convey the latter E
'' view is that which was read by the chairman in this case to the
" jury, and I cannot help thinking that the chairman believed him-
" self, and meant to direct the jury, and at any rate I feel satisfied
" that the jury understood him to mean, that mere presence
" unexplained was conclusive proof of encouragement, and so of
" guilt; and it is on this ground I hold that this conviction ought F
" not to stand."
With this judgment that great master of the criminal law,
Stephen J., expressed his agreement. 5 The basis of the majority
decision was neatly expressed in the short judgment of Lopes J.,
which contains this passage 6 : " I cannot hold, as a proposition
" of law, that the mere looking on is ipso facto a participation in G
" or encouragement of a prize-fight. I think there must be more
" than that to justify a conviction for an assault. If, for instance,
" it was proved that a person went to a prize-fight, knowing it
" was to take place, and remained there for some time looking
a (1833) 6 C. & P . 103, 104. * Ibid. 548.
6
* (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534, 543. Ibid. 552.
 1 Q.B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. i37

A " on, I think that would be evidence from which a jury might C. C. A.
" infer that such person encouraged, and intended to encourage, ^953
" the fight by his presence." ~
Finally, Hawkins J. had this to s a y 7 : " In my opinion, to v_ '
" constitute an aider and abettor some active steps must be ALLAN.
" taken by word, or action, with the intent to instigate the
B "principal, or principals . . . Non-interference to prevent a
" crime is not itself a crime. But the fact that a person was
" voluntarily and purposely present witnessing the commission
" of a crime, and offered no opposition to it, though he might
" reasonably be expected to prevent and had the power so to do,
" o r at least to express his dissent, might under some circum-
C " stances offer cogent evidence upon which a jury would be
" justified in finding that he wilfully encouraged and so aided
" and abetted. But it would be purely a question for the jury
" whether he did so or not."
Applying these passages to the direction in the present case,
we have come to the conclusion that, in effect, the trial judge
D here dealt with facts which, at most, might provide some evidence
of encouragement as amounting to conclusive proof of guilt. The
jury were in terms told that a man who chooses to remain at a
fight, nursing the secret intention to help if the need arose, but
doing nothing to evince that intention, must in law be held to be
principal in the second degree and that, on these facts being
E proved, the jury would have no alternative but to convict him.
In our judgment that was a misdirection. As Cave J. said in
Regina v. Coney6: " W h e r e presence is prima facie not acci-
" dental it is evidence, but no more than evidence, for the jury,"
and it remains no more than evidence for the jury even when one
adds to presence at an affray a secret intention to help.
F No authority in support of the direction given in the present
case has been cited to us. The passage in Regina v. Young 9
cited in Regina v. Coney 10 is incomplete, and reference to the
report itself makes clear that Vaughan J. was there dealing with
presence at a fight as the result of a previous arrangement. The
only other case cited by the Crown, Wilcox v. Jcffery,11 turned
G on special facts very different from the present and is one from
which we think no general principle can be deduced. In the
present case, the trial judge dealt with matters of evidence from
which encouragement (and, therefore, guilty participation) might
10
' (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534, 557, 558. (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534, 541.
« Ibid. 540. " [1951] 1 T.L.K. 706; [1951] 1
» (1838) 8 C. & P. 644, 652. All E.E. 464, D.C.
13
8 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. [1965]
C. C. A. be inferred if—but only if—the jury thought fit to do so as A
ig63 necessarily amounting in law to proof that guilt was established.
I n our judgment this amounted to a misdirection, and one,
„. ' unfortunately, of a basic kind.
ALLAN. This court considers that there is a further ground for criticism
of the directions to the jury. B y the third direction they were
rightly told that proof of mere presence at an affray is not B
sufficient ipso facto to establish guilt as a principal in the second
degree. So far, so good. B y paragraph 4 (ii) (a) of the direc-
tions the element of encouragement was dealt with. B u t , owing
to the somewhat complex grammatical construction of that para-
graph and the use of the disjunctive between parts (a) and (b)
thereof, when they came to deal with paragraph 4 (ii) (b) the 0
jury may well have been led into thinking that the element of
encouragement was a matter with which they need not then
concern themselves at all. So to think would be wrong. I n our
judgment, before a jury can properly convict an accused person
of being a principal in the second degree to an affray, they must
be convinced by the evidence that, at the very least, he by some D
means or other encouraged the participants. To hold otherwise
would be, in effect, as the appellants' counsel rightly expressed
it, to convict a m a n on his thoughts, unaccompanied by any
physical act other than the fact of his mere presence.
Indeed, in our judgment, encouragement in one form or
another is a minimal requirement before an accused person m a y E
properly be regarded as a principal in the second degree to any
crime. I t is true that in National Coal Board v. Gamble,12
Devlin J . , referring to Regina v . Coney,13 said: " I t would be
'' wrong to conclude . . that proof of encouragement is necessary
" to every form of aiding and abetting." B u t when the facts of
that case are examined, it does not, in our judgment, affect the F
validity of the proposition we have stated, for there the accused
had intentionally supplied an article essential to the perpetration
of the crime charged, and this Devlin J . described 1 4 as an
a fortiori case to that of voluntary presence. In that case there
was what was judicially described as "proof of intent to aid,"
which may properly be regarded as but one of the numerous Q
possible manifestations of encouragement.
In the light of these criticisms, we have considered whether,
in the circumstances, it would be proper to apply the proviso to

12 [1959] 1 Q.B. 11, 24; [1958] 3 ™ (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 584.

W.Ii.E. 434, 443; [1958] 3 All E.R. " [1959] 1 Q.B. 11, 24.
203, 209, D.C.
 139
1 Q.B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

A section 4 (1) of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907. But counsel for C. C. A.
the Crown, with characteristic candour, intimated that, should ^953
we hold (contrary to his submissions) that what was here said to ~
the jury amounted to a misdirection in the respects already „.
indicated, he felt unable to invite this court to say that it was ALLAN.
clear that no substantial miscarriage of justice had flown there-
B from. We think that the attitude of counsel for the Crown is
right. For the proviso to operate where there has been a wrong
direction on the law, " . . . the Crown have to show that, on a
" right direction, the jury must have come to the same conclu-
" sion " (per Channell J. in Rex v. Cohen and Bateman 15) and
that the Crown concede they cannot here show. This was in
C many respects a complex and difficult case, as well as a long
one. The witnesses were numerous, there were not unimportant
discrepancies even on the prosecution side as to the parts alleged
to have been played by the various accused, and in their two-
hour deliberations the jury must often have turned to the typed
legal directions as to a sheet-anchor. Profitless though it is to
D conjecture how their minds worked, it is by no means fanciful
to entertain the suspicion that their thought-process may well
have been: " The accused were present at the scene of the affray
" and chose to remain there, and we are satisfied that they
" intended to intervene if they thought the Somalis were getting
" the better of the whites; the judge has said that on those facts
E " w e must hold that they were parties to the affray; we, therefore,
"find them guilty."
For these reasons, in our judgment the misdirection was one
in respect of which the proviso cannot properly be invoked. It
follows that the appeals of Allan, Boyle and Ballantyne succeed,
their convictions are quashed and they are discharged.
F There remains the appeal of Mooney against the recom-
mendation that he be deported. He is 24, was convicted three
times in Eire as a juvenile, and came here in August, 1958. He
was fined £5 for larceny in January, 1959, £5 for wilful damage
in October of that year, and £15 in November, 1960, for receiving
stolen money, but has no previous convictions for violence to the
G person. His work-record, whilst not of the best, cannot be
described as a bad one, as these things go. He had taken drink
and himself received a serious stomach wound. It was estab-
lished that, at some risk to himself, he intervened to prevent one
of the Somalis from being kicked. He comes from a poor part of
Ireland, would have difficulty in finding re-employment there, .
is (1909) 2 Cr.App.R. 197, 207, C C A .
140
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. [1965]
C. C. A. and is engaged to an English girl. W e would not be prepared to A
jggjj interfere with the sentence of three years' imprisonment passed
upon him, nor has he sought this, but, in the light of all the
„_' circumstances, we do not think t h a t his participation in this affray
ALLAN. justifies his being deported. W e accordingly allow his appeal by
removing the recommendation to that end made by the trial judge.
B
Appeals allowed.

Solicitors: Registrar, Court oj Criminal Appeal; Director of

Public Prosecutions.

C A. W I L L I S AND ANOTHER V. ASSOCIATION OF U N I V E R S I T I E S

1964 OF T H E B R I T I S H C O M M O N W E A L T H .
Feb. 10, 11,
12, 26
[No. of Matter T. 631.] D
Lord Denning
Pearson and Landlord and Tenant—Business premises {security of tenure)—Land-
Salmon L.JJ. lord's intention to occupy—Joint occupation with unincorporated
body with separate entity—Landlord company's resolution for
voluntary winding-up—Intention to transfer business to new
chartered company—Whether landlord's intention to carry on
business—Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954 (2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 56), E
s. 30 (1) (g)—Companies Act, 1948 (11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38), s. 281.
Company—Winding up—Voluntary liquidation—Intention to transfer
business to new chartered company — Objective not financial —
Company's activities carried on pending transfer of business—
Whether "for the beneficial winding up"—Companies Act,
1948 (11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38), s. 281.
"P
Tenants of business premises applied for a new lease under
P a r t I I of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. The landlords,
a limited company (whose objects included the promotion of the
interests and well-being of British Commonwealth universities)
opposed the application on the ground that the premises were
required for occupation by them for the purposes of their activities
as provided by section 30 (1) (g) of the Act of 1954.1
G
1
Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, " termination of the current tenancy
s. 30: " (1) The grounds on which "the landlord intends to occupy the
" a landlord may oppose an applica- " holding for the purposes, or partly
" tion [for a new tenancy under the " for the purposes, of a business to be
" Act] are such of the following " carried on by him therein . . . (2)
" grounds as may be stated in the " The landlord shall not be entitled
" landlord's notice . . . that is to " to oppose an application on the
"say:— . . . ( g ) . . . that on the "ground specified in paragraph (g)