Ps Moot Pet

THE COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
TEAM CODE : 110

______________________________________________________________________
BEFORE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF DEMOCRATIQUE
ARYANA
______________________________________________________________________
Original Writ Jurisdiction

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
______________________________________________________________________
W.P. (CIVIL) NO. _________ OF 2020
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE DEMOCRATIQUE ARYANA CONSTITUTION
______________________________________________________________________
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
SAKEENA MOHAMMAD &ANR ……….……………………..PETITIONER

V.
UNION OF DEMOCRATIQUE ARYANA……………………….RESPONDENT
______________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS
COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF DEMOCRATIQUE
ARYANA.
______________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sr. No Particulars Page No.
1. Table of content 2
2. Index of Abbreviations 3-5
3. Index of Authorities 6-8
4. Statement of jurisdiction 9
5. Statement of fact 10
6. Statement of issue 11
7. Summary of argument 12
8. Argument advanced 14-33
9. Prayer 34&35
2
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS
S.No ABBREVIATION FULL FORM
& AND
1.
ALL INDIA REPORTER

2. AIR
3. Annex. ANNEXURE
Anr. ANOTHER
4.
ARTICLE
5. Art.
6. Commr. COMMISSIONER
CORPORATION
7. Corpn.
IMINAL APPEAL
8. CA
9. Ed. EDITION
10. GOVERNMENT
Govt.
3
11. HC HIGH COURT
12. HONORABLE
Hon’ble
13. INDIAN PENAL CODE

IPC
14. No. NUMBER
15. NAMELY
Viz.
16. OTHERS
Ors.
17. ¶ PAGE
18. Pvt. Ltd. PRIVATE LIMITED
19. READ WITH

r/w
20. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
21. SUPREME COURT REPORTER

SCR
22. Supp. SUPPLEMENT
23. SC SUPREME COURT
4
24. SECTION
Sec
25. i.e THAT IS
26. UNDER SECTION

U/S
27. UNION OF INDIA

UOI
28. V./Vs. VERSUS
29. WITH RESPECT TO

w.r.t
5
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
BOOKS REFERRED
S.No PARTICULARS
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 25th edition- by

DD Basu
2. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA by- Dr.Subhash C.Kashyap
3. State and Minorities : What Are Their Rights and How to Secure Them in the
Constitution of Free India- Dr. BR Ambedkar
STATUTES REFERRED
S.No PARTICULARS
1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950
2. DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1948
3. THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW (Shariat) Act, 1937
6
WEBSITES REFERRED
S.No PARTICULARS
1. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170570619/
2. www.octopus.com
3. www.lexisnexis.com
4. www.mupratafast.com
5. www.cpwd.gov.in
6. www.history.com
7. www.judis.nic.in
CASES CITED
S.No PARTICULARS
1. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994
2.
Dipak Sibal vs. Punjab University and others, 1989
3. Shayara Bano vs. Union of India, 2017
4. Air India vs. Nargesh Meerza, 1981
7
5 Sri Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore and others, 1958
6. Indian Young Lawyers Association. v. Union of India, 2018
7. S. Mahendran v. the Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board,

Thiruvananthapuram, 1993
8. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978
9. Francis coralie v. Union territory of Delhi,1981
10. Rustom cavasjee cooper V. UOI, 1970
11. Bal Patil and Anr. v. Union of India, 1999
12. Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2015
13. Shani Shinganapur temple case (Gram Panchayat Shani Shingnapur ... vs The
State Of Maharashtra And Ors, 2018)
14. Electricity Board, Rajasthan V. Mohan lal, 1967
15. Ajay Hasia V. Khalid Mujib, 1981
16. Vishakha V. State of Rajasthan, 1997
17. Karmanya Singh Sareen V. Union of India, 2016
18. Dr. Sangamithra Acharya & Anr. V. State [Nct of Delhi] & Ors, 2017
19. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano, 1985
20. Sarla Mudgal v. UOI AIR 1995 SCC 635
22. John Vallamattom v. UOI AIR 2003 SC 2902
23. Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chowthia, 1985
8
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Democratique Aryana by filing a PIL UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA FOR PASSING OF AN APPROPRIATE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
THEREBY PERMITTING THE PETITIONER AND FEMALE MUSLIMS TO ENTER
MOSQUE AND OFFER THEIR PRAYER AND APPROPRIATE WRIT ORDER OR
ORDERS OR DIRECTIONS FOR SETTING ASIDE THE ALLEGED
FATWA/DIRECTIONS OF IMAMS WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14,15,
25, 29 AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
DEMOCRATIQUE ARYANA. Therefore the jurisdiction of this court, which protects the
citizen of Democratique Aryana from any violation of their fundamental right, is
applicable in the present case and the court can hear and grant subsequent
directions/orders/writs in regard to subject matter of the PIL filed by the petitioner, under
the Article 32 of Constitution of Democratique Aryana.
9
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February 2020, Sakeena Mohammad and her husband Mohammad wrote a letter to the
Mohmdiya Jama Masjid, Indapuria to seek permission for Sakeena to enter local mosques
to offer namaz (prayer). The Mohmdiya Jama Masjid administration responded, stating
that women may not enter mosques in Indapuria and other areas. However, they also
stated that they referred the request to Daud Kajha and Daud Ullum Devvand. After
receiving no response from either Daud, the petitioners wrote a reminder letter in March
2020. In response, the Imam of Jama Masjid, Indapuria refused the request, but again
expressed that he would refer the matter to higher authorities, saying that he was unsure
about whether women could enter mosques.
Aggrieved by the vague reasons cited by the Imam, the petitioners approached the
Supreme Court by way of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL), filed on 4 May 2020. Their
PIL challenges practices prohibiting the entry of Muslim women into mosques on the
ground that they are unconstitutional. In particular, the petition argues that such practices
violate the fundamental rights to equality, life and liberty and freedom of religion under
Articles 14, 15, 21, 25 and 29 of the Constitution. Further, the petitioners argue that
practices that prohibit Muslim women from entering mosques stand in conflict with the
Holy Quran and various Hadiths, which do not require gender segregation. The Quran
does not prohibit women from offering prayers where men do. Thirdly, the petitioners
contend that customs that prohibit women from entering mosques stand in conflict with
Article 44 of the Constitution of Democratique Aryana, which encourages the State to
secure a uniform civil code for all citizens, by eliminating discrepancies between various
personal laws currently in force in the country.
In addition, the petition relies substantially on the Constitutional Bench judgment in the
Swami Hindu Temple Case. In December 2019, the Supreme Court struck the Swami
Hindu Temple's custom of prohibiting menstruating women from entering its inner
sanctum. In the present case, the petitioners argue that religious customs cannot be used
as cover deny rights of worship to women and, further, their dignity.
10
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1) Whether practices prohibiting the entry of women into mosques violate the
fundamental rights to equality, non-discrimination, freedom of religion, and life and
liberty under Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution of Democratique Aryana?
2) Whether the fundamental right to equality of Muslim women can be enforced against
non-state actors, i.e. Mosques in this case?
3) Whether the act of preventing the females from entering mosque is violative of Article
44 of the Constitution of Democratique Aryana, which encourages the State to secure a
uniform civil code for all citizens, by eliminating discrepancies between various personal
laws currently in force in the country?
11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1: Whether practices prohibiting the entry of women into mosques violate
the fundamental rights to equality, non-discrimination, freedom of religion, and life
and liberty under Article 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution of Democratique
Aryana ?
The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner humbly submits before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of Democratique Aryana that the prohibition of the entry of Muslim women into
the mosques violates Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution of Democratique
Aryana.
ISSUE 2: Whether the fundamental right to equality of Muslim women can be

enforced against non-state actors, i.e Mosques in this case?
The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner humbly submits before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of Democratique Aryana that the fundamental right to equality of Muslim Women
can be enforced against non state actors like the mosques which is mentioned in the
present case.
ISSUE 3: Whether the act of preventing the females from entering mosque is
violative of Article 44 of the Constitution of Democratique Aryana, which
encourages the State to secure a uniform civil code for all citizens, by eliminating
discrepancies between various personal laws currently in force in the country?
The counsel on behalf of the petitioner submits that the act of preventing the females
from entering mosque is violative of Article 44 of the Constitution of Democratique
Aryana, which encourages the State to secure a uniform civil code for all citizens, by
12
eliminating discrepancies between various personal laws currently in force in the country
as the UCC aims to provide protection to vulnerable sections as envisaged by Ambedkar
including women and religious minorities, while also promoting nationalistic fervour
through unity and Observing that the hope expressed under Article 44 of the Constitution
should not remain a 'mere hope', the petitioner (Sakeena) seeks permission to enter
local mosques to offer namaz (prayer).
13
ARGUMENT ADVANCED
ISSUE 1: Whether practices prohibiting the entry of women into mosques violate
the fundamental rights to equality, non-discrimination, freedom of religion, and life
and liberty under Article 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution of Democratique
Aryana ?
The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner humbly submits before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of Democratique Aryana that the prohibition of the entry of Muslim women into
the mosques violates Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution of Democratique
Aryana. The act of prohibition of females from entering mosques is void and
unconstitutional as such practices are not only repugnant to the basic dignity of a woman
as an individual but also violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14,
15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution.
In the landmark judgment, S.R. Bommai v. Union of India1, the Supreme Court of India
held that 'Secularism' is also a part of basic structure which is the basis of the Indian
Constitution, and that all citizens are equal and that the religion of a citizen is irrelevant
in the matter of his enjoyment of Fundamental Rights and which upheld the indispensable
secular nature of the state.
The various sources of Islam including Quran, Sunnah, Ijma and Qiyas clearly indicates
that women attended mosques during the time of the Prophet and the earlier generation of
Muslims, as did men for all sorts of prayers, practises and activities, but with the
emergence of orthodox notions of women, the teachers of morality challenged their
attendance in the mosque2, which is leading to the violation of the fundamental rights of
the Muslim Women.
1
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India ([1994] 2 SCR 644 : AIR 1994 SC 1918 : (1994)3 SCC)
2
Farahati A., The Mosque As The First Political-Ideological Base In The Islamic Society, 4(1) JOURNAL
OF POLITICS AND LAW,(2011)
14
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14:

As per Article 14 of the Indian Constitution3, any law being Discriminatory in nature has
to have the existence of an Intelligible Differentia and the same must bear a rational
nexus with the object sought to be achieved. But in the case of prohibiting the women
from mosques does not have any Intelligible Differentia and any kind of rationality
behind it therefore it violates Article 14.
The Test of Reasonable Classification: The classification to be reasonable must fulfill two
conditions :-
(i) As per the Article 14 the classification must be founded on an Intelligible Differentia
which distinguishes between persons or things that are grouped together from others left
out of the group.
(ii) The differentia must have rational relational to the object sought to be achieved by the
Act.
If there is no reasonable basis of classification, then classification may be declared as
discriminatory but prohibiting women’s entry to mosque has no Intelligible Differentia. It
is submitted that the Quran casts the same religious duty on both the sexes - women are
not subject to less religious duties or obligations. Further, both sexes are promised the
same spiritual rewards - men are not promised more.
In the case of Dipak Sibal vs. Punjab University and others4, The exclusionary
practices per se violate the Sacrosanct Principle of Equality of Women and Equality
before law. In Shayara Bano vs. Union of India5: As it is solely based on physiological
factors and, therefore, neither serves any valid object nor satisfies the test of reasonable
classification under article 14 of the Constitution.
3
Equality before law : The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth
4
Dipak Sibal vs. Punjab University and others 1989 AIR 903 1989 SCR (1) 689 1989 SCC (2) 145 JT 1989
Supl.
5
Shayara Bano vs. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1
15
In Air India vs. Nargesh Meerza6: An air hostess was given a compulsory retirement
upon attending the 35 years or upon pregnancy but there are no such restrictions imposed
upon the male counterparts. The Hon'ble court has stuck down this rule because of unjust
classification. The judgment of this court in Sri Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of
Mysore and others7 have been cited to submit that a religious denomination cannot
completely exclude or prohibit any class or section for all time. All that religious
denomination may do is to restrict the entry of a particular class or section in certain
rituals.
Discrimination and inequality can occur in different ways, including through laws or
policies that restrict, prefer or distinguish between various groups of individuals.
ARTICLE 15(1)-directs the state not to discriminate against the citizen on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, sex , place of birth or any of them.
ARTICLE 15(2)-prohibits citizens as well as state from making such discrimination with
regard to access to public places. Clause 2 declare that no citizen shall be subjected to
any disability restriction or condition on ground only of sex to access public place.
It is submitted that the exclusionary practice per se violates Article15(1) of the
constitution which amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex.
That Article 15 directs that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds
only of religion, race, caste, sex, and place of birth or any of them. Any law
discriminating on one or more on these grounds would be void.8 Article 15 prohibits
discrimination on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of
them. This right can be enforced against the State as well as private individuals, with
regard to free access to places of public entertainment or places of public resort
maintained partly or wholly out of State funds. It is submitted that the mosques which are
6
Air India vs. Nargesh Meerza AIR 1981 SC 1829
7
Sri Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore and Others 1958 AIR 255; 1958 SCR 895
8
Article 15 of Indian Constitution, 1950
16
receiving state funds cannot make segregation and discrimination amongst entry of
people inside mosque based on sex and gender.
Islam is not forbidding women to go to a mosque. To depict this, it was encouraged by

the Prophet as he said:“Do not prevent the female servants of Allah from going to the
mosque”9 It is only a Hadith10 in which the Prophet advised a woman that “prayer in her
home is better than prayer in the mosque”, is often used to curtail women’s entry to
mosque and this Hadith is used in order to substantiate the restriction on women to enter
mosque as a prescribed rule in Islam. Although the Prophet advised the woman that she
was better off praying at home, he did not prohibit her from coming to the mosque at all.
In the Indian Young Lawyers Association. v. Union of India11, The Supreme Court,
while taking cue from the Bombay High Court decision on Shani Shignapur temple7,
held that no law or custom could justify the ban on entry of a woman to the temple.
“Gender equality is a constitutional message and they (temple management) cannot say
that this (banning women) comes under their right to manage religious affairs," - Justice
Dipak Misra.
The court also criticized the 1991 Kerala High Court judgment in S. Mahendran v. the
Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthapuram12, where the High
Court upheld Section 3(b) of Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of
entry) Rules which prohibits entry of women and justifies the same.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also recently held that, "Women are not lesser or inferior
to men. Patriarchy of religion cannot be permitted to trump faith. Biological or
physiological reasons cannot be accepted in freedom of faith. Religion is basically a way
of life however certain practices create incongruities"..Anything destructive of
individuality is anachronistic of Constitutionality. To treat women as lesser people blinks
9
Ibn Umar (Abdullah bin Umar) reported, Muslim, No.888 (See also Nos. 884-891 and Bukhari Vol.1, Nos.
824, 832).
10
The narration of the life of the Prophet.
11
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, WP (C) 373/2006; RP (C) 3358/2018
12
S. Mahendran .v. the Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvananthapuram AIR 1993 Ker 42
17
at the Constitution itself". It is important to understand that in spiritual matters, there is

no sex-based difference, heaven and its blessings are intended the same for both men and
women.
The few women who go to mosques, where they are allowed, having separate prayer
halls, perform their prayers separately, as men think women will distract them during
prayer prostrations and to the question of male mingling with women, the impurity
concept of menstruation, females as an object of attraction pops up13. Also, The right to
become an imam has been refused to women. Moreover, because of problems of
unchastely created by engaging in sexual behaviour, women should not lead prayers in
the mosque14. Therefore, in religious leadership, women have often been discriminated
against because they are considered unclean and, most notably, they are thought to
distract men.
Apart from these factors of discrimination, we can also see unjust and discriminatory
practices on marriage, clothing, sexuality etc, as the matter of discussion is not related to
them, it is not explained further. The religious personal laws that discriminate against
women are still being applied almost 75 years after the adoption of the Constitution.
It is further submitted that to achieve actual equality, the underlying causes of women’s
inequality must be addressed. Also, There is no gender discrimination while offering
worship in Mecca, the holiest city for Muslims. The petitioners have therefore pleaded
that all mosques be opened for Muslim women.

Prohibition of the entry of Women in Mosque violates their right to life and personal
liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution 15.
13
Paidar Parvin, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran, CAMBRIDGE:
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
14
(Abu Khalil &Asvad, Toward the Study of Women and Politics in the Arab World: The Debate and the
Reality, 13:1 FEMINIST ISSUES, 3-22 (Spring 1993)).
15
Protection of life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law
18
In the Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India16, the supreme court has given a new
dimension to Article 21 it has been held that the right to live is not merely confined to
physical existence but it includes within its ambit the right to live with human dignity .
elaborating the same view the court in Francis coralie v. Union territory of Delhi17, said
that the right to live is not restricted to mere anyone's existence; it means something more
than physical survival. The right to live is not confine to the protection of any faculty or
limb through which life is enjoyed or the sole communicate with the outside world but it
also include right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the
bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter, free moving.
Therefore keeping Maneka Gandhi judgment by the hon’ble court in the mind petition
would like to submit that stopping women entry to mosque is equivalent to violation of
free moving which ultimately results in violation of Article 21.
It is submitted that Muslim women are being 'discriminated' as they are not allowed to
enter and pray in the main prayer hall of mosques in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution. This is an encroachment into the realm of personal liberty and social
security.
Since the decision of eleven bench judges in Rustom cavasjee cooper V. UOI18, it is
now a well settled doctrine that the fundamental rights contained in part III are not, as it
has been said , water-tight compartments.
Equality should be the basis of all personal law since the Constitution envisages equality,
justice and dignity for women. Failure to eliminate de jure (formal) and de facto
(substantive) discrimination against women including by non- State actors, either directly
or indirectly, violates not only the most basic human rights of women but also violates
their civil, economic, social and cultural rights as envisaged in international treaties and
covenants.
16
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597; (1978) 1 SCC 248
17
Francis coralie v. Union territory of Delhi 1981 AIR 746, 1981 SCR (2) 516
18
Rustom cavasjee cooper V. UOI 1970 AIR 564, 1970 SCR (3) 530
19
“Religion cannot be used as cover to deny rights of worship to women and it is also
against human dignity”. “Prohibition on women is due to non-religious reasons and it is a
grim shadow of discrimination going on for centuries”.
That the Quran does not differentiate between man and woman. It speaks only about the
faithful. But Islam has become a religion in which women are being oppressed. It is
submitted that women are never allowed inside Sunni mosques to pray and they, too,
have the right. Women were allowed to enter mosques even during the time of the
Prophet. It is submitted that Muslim women are being 'discriminated' as they are not
allowed to enter and pray in the main prayer hall of mosques in violation of Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution. This is an encroachment into the realm of personal liberty and
social security.
The freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
guaranteed by Article 25 of the Constitution is not absolute and, in terms of Article
25(1), “subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this
Part”. It is submitted that harmonious reading of Part III of the Constitution clarifies that
the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
guaranteed by Article25 is subject to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14,
15 and 21. In fact, Article 25 clearly recognizes this interpretation by making the right
guaranteed by it subject not only to other provisions of Part III of the Constitution but
also to public order, morality and health.
Article 25(1), by employing the expression ‘all person’, demonstrates that the freedom of
conscience and the right to profess, practice and propagate religion is available, though
subject to the restrictions delineated in Article 25(1) has nothing to do with gender or,
for that matter, certain physiological factors specifically attributable to women.
This Fundamental Right equally entities’ all such persons to the said Fundamental Right.
Every member of the religious community has the right to practice the religion so long as
20
he does not, in any way, interfere with the corresponding right of his co-religionists to do
the same. Three defining features of Article 25(1) is violated by the Respondent:
(i) Firstly, the entitlement of ‘all persons’ without exception;
(ii) Secondly, recognition of equal entitlement ;
(iii) Thirdly, recognition of both freedom of conscience and the right freely profess,
practice and propagate religion ;
In Indra v. Raj Narain19, the basic feature of the secularism was explained by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court which held that, secularism means' that state shall have no
religion of its own and all persons of the country shall be equally entitled to the freedom
of their conscience and have the right freely to profess, practice and have the right freely
to profess, practice and propagate any religion''. This Hon'ble Court has ruled in Bal
Patil and Anr. v. Union of India20, that the State has no religion and the State has to treat
all religions and religious people equally and with equal respect without in any manner
interfering with their Individual rights of religion, faith and worship.
In Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others21, this Hon’ble
Court has also taken the view that practices permitted or not prohibited by a religion do
not become a religious practice or a positive tenet of the religion, since a practice does
not acquire the sanction of religion merely because it is permitted. There are no records
stating that the Holy Quran and Prophet Muhammad had opposed women entering
mosques and offering prayers. Like men, women also have the constitutional rights to
offer worship according to their belief. There should not be any gender discrimination
and allow Muslim women to pray in a mosque, cutting across denominations. It is
submitted that there is no such gender discrimination to offer worship in Mecca, the holy
city. The faithful, both men and women, together circle the Kaaba. At present, women are
allowed to offer prayers at mosques under Jamaat-e-Islami and Mujahid denominations,
while they are barred from mosques under the predominant Sunni faction. It is submitted
that even in the mosques where women are allowed, there are separate entrances and
19
Indra v. Raj Narain 1975 AIR, S.C 2299
20
Bal Patil and Anr. v. Union of India Appeal (civil) 4730 of 1999
21
Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2015) 8 SCC 439
21
enclosures for worship for men and women. The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner also
relies on some International Conventions that supports equality and non-discrimination.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person22 while Article 7 provides that everyone is
equal before the law and is entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law.23 Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the universality
and indivisibility of human rights have been emphasised and it has been specifically
recognised that women’s human rights are part of universal human rights.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International

Covenant on Economic, social and cultural rights:
Non-discrimination and equality between women and men are central principles of
human rights law. Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (to both of which India
acceded on 10.04.1979)prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender and guarantee
women and men equality in the enjoyment of the rights covered by the Covenants.
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for
equality before the law and equal protection of the law, while Article 2(2) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights24 requires States to
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the Covenant can be exercised without any
discrimination of any kind including on the lines of gender or religion.
The Constitution neither grants any absolute protection to the personal law of any
community that is unjust, nor exempts personal laws from the jurisdiction of the
Legislature or the Judiciary. Entry 5 of List III in the Seventh Schedule confers power on
the Legislature to amend and repeal existing laws or pass new laws in all such matters
which were on August 15, 1947, governed by personal laws, and the Legislature has
22
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights UDHR,1948 Article3
23
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_RightsUDHR, 1948 Article7
24
Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966
22
practically abdicated its duties and permitted the basic fundamental rights of Muslim
women to be widely violated which also affects the entire country as a matter of public
order, morality and health.
Recalling the Swami Hindu Temple Case (Sabarimala case) order in which the court said
“religion cannot be used as cover to deny rights of worship to women and it is also
against human dignity. Prohibition on women is due to non-religious reasons and it is a
grim shadow of discrimination going on for centuries”. By gaining a lot of courage and
confidence from the Swami Hindu Temple Case (Sabarimala Case) judgement, the
petition has been filed in the Supreme Court praying for issuance of writ to permit
Petitioner and other female Muslims to enter mosque and offer their prayer and also to set
aside the alleged fatwa/directions of imams which are violative of Article 14, 15, 25, 29
and directive principles of the Constitution of India.
The patriarchal set up of the country, illiteracy, lack of exposure of women, unawareness
about constitutional and legal rights, the fear of opposition and suppression if spoken
against the practice, fear of losing votes against any reformative measures if adopted by
the politicians, traditions are placed at a greater hierarchical position than legislations, the
rudimentary social values which have now become archaic are still in fashion, the
concept of purity also comes into play; the physical attribute of the women is linked to
the purity of the place of worship are the main reasons for the continuing restrictive
practice in the country. Can any authority governing a place of public worship have the
power to prohibit women’s entry, isn’t it a clear violation of the constitutional mandate of
equality, is the issue which needs the prior attention. Hence, the rights of women to enter
places of religious worship, the extent of their right to freedom of religion should be
pondered and studied from the Constitutional, Human Rights and legislative aspects, so
that it would ultimately fill up the differences or mitigate the gap of gender
discrimination and lead to attain dignity of a woman in the true sense25.
25
14.139.185.167:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/79/1/LM0119008%2C%20CAL.pdf
23
Therefore, The Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner humbly submits before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of Democratique Aryana that the prohibition of the entry of Muslim
women into the mosques violates the right to equality, non-discrimination, life and
liberty, freedom of religion Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution of
Democratique Aryana respectively.
ISSUE 2: Whether the fundamental right to equality of Muslim women can be

enforced against non-state actors, i.e Mosques in this case?
The Counsel on behalf of the petitioner submits before the Honourable Supreme Court of
Democratique Aryana that the fundamental right to equality of Muslim Women can be
enforced against non state actors like the mosques which is mentioned in the present case.
Article 12 of the Constitution defines a State to include the Government, the Parliament,
the State legislatures and local or other authorities. Earlier, the judicial interpretation of
the term ‘other authorities’ was restricted to authorities related to the Government and
legislature, such as governmental bodies. Now, it is being expanded to include other
aspects, such as corporation control, bodies granted certain powers etc26
The Sabarimala temple issue is not one of its kind. A similar ban was also in place
against the entry of women in the Shani Shinganapur temple in Maharashtra. The ban
was challenged before the Bombay High Court as being unconstitutional, arbitrary and in
violation of the fundamental right to equality of women and from the Bombay High
Court decision on Shani Shignapur temple, held that “no law or custom could justify the
ban on entry of a woman to the temple”. The court had ruled that women cannot be
barred from entering the temple, and that they should be given an equal right to
worship as men. It is important to note that courts in India have recognised that the right
to freedom of religion which is guaranteed under the Constitution also includes the right
to enter places of worship.27 In rare circumstances however, certain rights have been
26
Article 12 of the Indian Constitution, 1950- Defines state.
27
WRIT PETITION NO. 8593 OF 2016 WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12764 OF 2017
24
interpreted so as to have an indirect horizontal effect [i.e] a state duty can be imposed to
prevent the violation of fundamental rights by certain non-state actors.
Mosques in this case are within the meaning of state under Article 12(3)&(4). Therefore
this petition is within the jurisdiction of this hon’ble court. In the case of the Electricity
Board, Rajasthan V. Mohan lal, the Supreme court held that the expression ‘other
authorities’ created by the constitution or statute on whom power is conferred by the law.
The Supreme Court also held that it is not necessary that the statutory authority should be
engaged in performing governmental or sovereign function.28 In the case of Ajay Hasia
V. Khalid Mujib, the court had held that a society which has been registered under the
society registration Act 1898 is an independent agency or instrumentality of the state.29
Considering the above mentioned precedent, mosques will fall within the armpit of the
state under Article 12 of the Constitution of Aryana.
The Supreme Court in the case of Vishakha V. State of Rajasthan30 issued detailed
guidelines for the protection of working women under Articles 14, 19 and 21. These
guidelines were issued for mandatory adoption by all workplaces, which include both
State and non -State factors. This case indicates that the Supreme Court has not restricted
the issuance of writs and enforcement of fundamental rights against the State only. There
thus exists the possibility of enforceability of fundamental rights against private bodies as
well which includes the non state actors as well.
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights31 provides that everyone has
the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of person while Article 7 provides that everyone is
equal before the law and is entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law. These articles of the Universal declaration nowhere state that it applies only in
regards with the state actors and does not deal with the non-state actors.
28
1967 AIR 1857, 1967 SCR (3) 377
29
1981 AIR 487, 1981 SCR (2) 79
30
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1031794/
31
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948
25
In the case of Karmanya Singh Sareen V. Union of India which is popularly known as
the Whatsapp - Facebook Privacy case, there was a hurdle of whether a fundamental right
can be enforced against a private company [non-state actor] like Whatsapp. A notable
expansion on the definition of ‘state’ is that a writ under Article 32 in the Supreme Court
and under Article 226 in the High Courts can be invoked against a private body that is
performing a public function.32
The Counsel further submits that under Article 26 of the Constitution of Democratique
Aryana, the respondent can only manage the affairs33 of the mosque and cannot
regulate the same by imposing conditions or rules contrary to the Constitution of
Democratique Aryana and there is nothing brought on record by the respondent to show
that the banning of entry of women `is an essential and integral part of the religion' so as
to come within the purview of Article 26 of the Constitution of Democratique Aryana.
According Islam, there is nothing in the Qur'an which prohibits the entry of women in
mosques/dargahs. The counsel submits that Islam believes in gender equality and as such
banning the women devotees from entering the mosque was uncalled for. Islam is not
forbidding women to go to a mosque. To depict this, it was encouraged by the
Prophet as he said:“Do not prevent the female servants of Allah from going to the
mosque” 34
In the High Court of New Delhi, the case of Dr. Sangamithra Acharya & Anr. V. State
[Nct of Delhi] & Ors held that the fundamental rights can be enforced against not just
the state but non-state actors as well35. Violation of one’s right could be by state or
non-state actors. The obligation to respect one’s rights is placed both on state and
non-state actors.
In Justice K.S.Puttaswamy [Retd.] V. Union of India, the concurring opinion noted that
common law rights are horizontal in their operation when they are violated by one’s
32
W.P.(C) 7663/2016 & C.M.No.31553/2016
33
Article 26 of the Indian Constitution, 1948
34
Ibn Umar (Abdullah bin Umar) reported, Muslim, No.888 (See also Nos. 884-891 and Bukhari Vol.1,
Nos. 824, 832).
35
W.P. (CRL.) 1804/2017 & CM No. 9963/2017
26
fellow man and he can be named and proceeded against in an ordinary court of law. The
court also held that an impingement of the freedom of speech and expression could be
perpetrated by both the state and a non-state actor and an aggrieved person could come to
the court seeking protection against such invasion whether by the State or non-state actor.
It also held that Protection against an attack on the right of life, liberty, privacy and
dignity can be exercised not only against the State and non-State actors.
The High Court also held that Article 21 places an obligation both on state and non-state
actors not to deprive a person of life, liberty, privacy and dignity except in accordance
with the procedure established by law. From the precedent mentioned above it can be
interpreted that Articles 15[2], 17, 19, 21 and 23 acknowledge the horizontal nature of
those fundamental rights. They can be enforced against not just the State but non-state
actors as well. The mere fact that the enforcement of such rights might depend on state
action or enforcement of judicial orders by the state will not detract from their horizontal
nature.
ISSUE 3: Whether the act of preventing the females from entering mosque is
violative of Article 44 of the Constitution of Democratique Aryana, which
encourages the State to secure a uniform civil code for all citizens, by eliminating
discrepancies between various personal laws currently in force in the country?
The counsel on behalf of the petitioner submits that the act of preventing the females
from entering mosque is violative of Article 44 of the Constitution of Democratique
Aryana, which encourages the State to secure a uniform civil code for all citizens36, by
eliminating discrepancies between various personal laws currently in force in the country
as the UCC aims to provide protection to vulnerable sections as envisaged by Ambedkar
including women and religious minorities, while also promoting nationalistic fervour
through unity and Observing that the hope expressed under Article 44 of the Constitution
36
Article 44 of the Indian Constitution, 1950
27
should not remain a 'mere hope', the petitioner (Sakeena) seeks permission to enter local
mosques to offer namaz (prayer).
Article 44 requires the State to secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout
the territory of Democratique Aryana By establishing these positive obligations of the
State, the members of the Constituent Assembly made it the responsibility of future
Indian government to find a middle way between individual liberty and the public good,
between preserving the property and the privilege of the few and bestowing benefits on
the many in order to liberate the powers of all men equally for contribution to the
common good. According to the unifying force of secularism, one way of life shall be
the way of life for all. However, this view is the most controversial of all since it seems
to muffle the voice of diversity. The other reason that backs the UCC was the issue of
empowerment of women. Since the right to equality was already acknowledged to be one
of the most coveted rights, the unequal footing of genders through the word of law could
no longer be validated. Thus, the practices which undermined a woman’s right to equality
would necessarily be done away with.
A common civil law governing the personal matters would bring all the women under
one single umbrella and irrespective of race and religion the discriminatory practices
would be put to an end but the tragedy is that a secular country like India is lagging
behind according to the red carpet welcome to article 44. The question as to whether
after 72 years of the Constitution of Democratique Aryana is ripe enough to have a
uniform set of civil law has been raised yet again. The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) has
always been viewed as an effective tool to realize and effect the empowerment of
Indian women and uplifting their status in the social institutions. The restriction on
women to enter the places of religious worship has now become a contentious issue of
the time. This is not the case that has come up suddenly, such practices have been
persisting in India from time immemorial, but the awareness and the movements across
the nation have recently espoused these concerns, leading to several petitions and appeals
filed before the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
28
In a secular country, i.e. India, everyone has the right to freedom of religion and
practising and propagating it freely except reasonable restrictions under the
constitution, i.e., subject to public order , morality and health with other provisions of
part 3 of the constitution. So, In my opinion with the help of article 25 anyone can enjoy
freedom of religion and religious practices who reside in Democratique Aryana but those
practices shouldnt cause any harm or damage to the other. 37This case clearly shows that
the restriction on the name of religious practices of islam do violate the rights of the
women.
The Supreme Court of Democratique Aryana has always been an ardent supporter of the
UCC. It was the legendary case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano (hereinafter
referred as Shah Bano case), that once again brought the issue of UCC on the preface. In
this much celebrated case the Supreme Court brought a divorced Muslim woman within
the cover of section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and declared that she
was entitled for maintenance even after the completion of her iddat period. Although the
Supreme Court had assumed the role of a social reformer in many other previous cases,
Shah Bano case usurped a landmark position in the history of debates on religion,
secularism and the rights of women. Shah Bano case highlights the need for a uniform
law which addresses the core need of a woman in distress. It tries to state that it is the
suffering of the woman that should be at the core of any gender justice law. 38
The refusal of the entry of women into the mosques is the issue which the law should
address rather than addressing what the specific religion has laid down for that
woman. Muslim woman is assumed to be oppressed and downtrodden and comparison is
made with corresponding Hindu woman having the protection of a codified uniform
personal law. Since the Hindu personal law has been codified, the rights of Hindu women
have taken a backseat, assumed to be well protected by a codified personal law and in a
better position than a Muslim woman who still suffers the brunt of their archaic personal
law.
37
Article 25 of the Indian Constitution, 1950 ~right to freedom of religion
38
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano (hereinafter referred as Shah Bano case) 1985 AIR 945, 1985 SCR (3)
844
29
Article 44 : “Democratique Aryana Secularism” is understood as the State’s acceptance

of different religions and their practices. Consequently, the Constitution allows for
Personal Laws that empower religious authorities to enforce religious laws on personal
matters. However, legislators also approved a directive to establish a Uniform Civil Code
(UCC) applicable to all citizens. Of the three personal law systems, Hindu, Muslim and
Christian Personal Laws, the Muslim Personal Law (MPL) has received the most
scrutiny. Historically, the “Muslim woman” has been seen as a passive victim. (Varghese,
A. (2015). Personal Laws in India: The Activisms of Muslim Women's Organizations)
In Sarla Mudgal v. UOI AIR 1995 SCC 635, the SC has directed the Prime Minister to
take a fresh look at Art. 44 of the Constitution which enjoins the State to secure a UCC
which according to the Court is imperative for both the oppressed and promotion of
national unity and integrity. UCC is essential to protect the abused and in achieving
national solidarity.39
In John Vallamattom v. UOI AIR 2003 SC 2902, a three judge bench of the SC has once
again expressed its regret for non- enactment of Common Civil Code. It was said that
Article 44 is based on the premise that there is no necessary connection between religion
and personal law in a civilized society.The SC has emphasized that steps be initiated to
enact a UCC.40 In Ms. Jorden Deingdeh v. S.S. Chopra, the Court said that the time has
now come for a complete reform of the law of marriage and make a UCC for the
country.41
If we look at the countries in Europe which have a Civil Code, everyone who goes there
from any part of the world and every minority, has to submit to the Civil Code and even
in places like Mecca, there is no such gender discrimination to offer worship in Mecca,
the holy city where both men and women, together circle the Kaaba (is a building at the
center of Islam's most important mosque) It is not felt to be tyrannical to the minority.
39
1995 AIR 1531, 1995 SCC (3) 635
40
John Vallamattom v. UOI AIR 2003 SC 2902
41
1985 AIR 935, 1985 SCR Supl. (1) 704
30
But when we look at the THIRD largest Muslim populated country42 where Many women
are sadly not allowed to enter many mosques and eidgahs (an open gathering place to
perform prayers) in India is tryannical. This is a basic right they should have. Fraternity
is a very significant tool to combat the divisive factor. Religious harmony is a must to
promote fraternity particularly in the Democratique Aryana’s context. So it's a
constitutional mandate upon the state to combat the factors which curtails religious
fraternity.
V. R Krishna Iyer J. who is known to have given a scintillating judgment in Bai Tahira v.
Ali Hussain Fissalli Chowthia held that “religious practices cannot be justified and
upheld by sacrificing human rights and human dignity. Religion cannot and should not be
allowed to suffocate the dignity and freedoms of the citizens.” but when we look around,
there are several public worship places that impose various restrictions on women. Lord
Kartikeya Temple, Pushkar- It is said that women who dare to visit the Lord Kartikeya
Temple of Pushkar will be cursed and not blessed. This is the reason why this ban is in
place until now. Such restrictions and threats from the authority shall not be accepted or
entertained. Jain Temples, Guna, Madhya Pradesh- at the Jain temples of Guna, in the
northern part of Madhya Pradesh, women in western attire such as tops and jeans are
barred from entering the temple by the community leaders. Jama masjid, Delhi- the Jama
Masjid in Delhi, which also happens to be the biggest of its kind in the country, does not
allow the entry of women after sunset prayers also known as Maghrib. Patbausi Satra,
Assam-Patbausi Satra temple situated in Assam women are not allowed from entering the
temple as they think the temple will become impure. The authorities of the temple are of
the idea that menstruating women are unclean.
This all shows that our country still believes in the customs and beliefs that are from dark
ages. Many of the institutions mentioned have been ignoring various government orders,
which is quite disturbing as it is an issue of law and order that they do not want to follow.
People unite when there is any religious occasion, but these institutions are creating
barriers and divisions. Everyone has a right to pray in our democratic and secular
42
https://worldpopulationreview.com
31
country. When viewed from the point of view of humanity, these traditions do not allow
women to enter temples or mosques just because they consider women to be impure and
unclean, the act of preventing the females from entering mosque is violative of Article 44
of the Constitution of Democratique Aryana, which encourages the State to secure a
uniform civil code for all citizens, by eliminating discrepancies between various personal
laws currently in force in the country.
The act of restricting a woman from entering a mosque is violative because the
Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined under the
Constitution of Democratique Aryana that prescribe the fundamental obligations of the
states to its citizens and the duties and the rights of the citizens to the State. These
sections comprise a constitutional bill of rights for government policy-making and
the behaviour and conduct of citizens. These sections are considered vital elements of
the constitution, which was developed between 1947 and 1949 by the Constituent
Assembly. The Fundamental Rights are defined as the basic human rights of all citizens.
These rights, defined in Part III of the Constitution, applied irrespective of race, place of
birth, religion, caste, creed, or gender. They are enforceable by the courts, subject to
specific restrictions.
The Directive Principles of State Policy are guidelines for the framing of laws by the
government. Justice Dipak Misra “Gender equality is a constitutional message and they
(temple management) cannot say that this (banning women) comes under their right to
manage religious affairs”43 The problem of Gender Inequality in Democratique Aryana is
well reflected through its rank (131 out of 189 nations) in the Gender Inequality Index
released by the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) in the year 202144. This
indeed shows the importance of a need of UCC and bind all under one to stop
discrimination and inequality which occur in different ways, including through laws or
policies that restrict, prefer or distinguish between various groups of individuals. It is
further submitted that to achieve actual equality, the underlying causes of women’s
43
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, WP (C) 373/2006; RP (C) 3358/2018 (India)
44
https://www.undp.org
32
inequality must be addressed since it is not enough to guarantee identical treatment with
men.
It is submitted that the Legislature has failed to ensure the dignity and equality of women
in general and Muslim women in particular. Despite the observations of this Hon’ble
Court for the past few decades, Uniform Civil Code remains an elusive Constitutional
goal that the Courts have fairly refrained from enforcing through directions and the
Legislature has dispassionately ignored except by way of approval of or support for
insincerely or without taking any significant action towards it. Article 15 prohibits
discrimination on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of
them. It is submitted that the Legislature has failed to ensure the dignity and equality of
women in general and Muslim women in particular.
Despite the observations of this Hon’ble Court for the past few decades, Uniform Civil
Code remains an elusive Constitutional goal that the Courts have fairly refrained from
enforcing through directions and the Legislature has dispassionately ignored except by
way of approval of or support for insincerely or without taking any significant action
towards it. This right can be enforced against the State as well as private individuals, with
regard to free access to places of public entertainment or places of public resort
maintained partly or wholly out of State funds.
It is submitted that the mosques which are receiving state funds cannot make segregation
and discrimination amongst entry of people inside mosque based on sex and gender
because Directive Principles serve to emphasise the welfare state model of the
Constitution and emphasise the positive duty of the state to promote the welfare of
the people by affirming social, economic and political justice, as well as to fight income
inequality and ensure individual dignity, as mandated by Article 38 of the Constitution.
And therefore, the customs that prohibit women from entering mosques stand in conflict
with Article 44 of the Constitution of Democratique Aryana, which encourages the State
to secure a uniform civil code for all citizens, by eliminating discrepancies between
various personal laws currently in force in the country.
33
PRAYER
In the light of fact cited issues raised, arguments advanced, and authority cited, the
petitioner humbly submit that this hon’ble court in the interest of justice may graciously
be pleased to –
a) Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of mandamus to the the Central
Government of Democratique Aryana, the Sunni Waqf Board and the All
Democratique Aryana Muslim Personal Law Board permitting the Muslim Women
to enter mosque and to offer their prayer/ Namaj inside Mosque;
b) Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of mandamus permitting women

to pray in the mosque without being separated by a barrier, including in the front
and in mixed-gender congregational lines;
c) Issue an appropriate writ of certiorari and/ or order or directions quashing /

setting aside directions/ fatwa restraining the Muslim Women to enter mosque;
d) Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Democratique

Aryana, declaring the purported customary tradition is unconstitutional and
violative of Articles 14, 15, 21, 25 and 29 of the Constitution and Directive Principles
of State ;
g) pass ad interim ex-parte relief in terms of prayer (a) to (d)
h) Pass such other or further orders as to this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the case;
34
AND/OR
Pass any other order as the Honorable court deems fit in the interest of equity, justice ,fair
play and good conscience.
All of which is humbly prayed.
(Counsel on behalf of Petitioner)
35

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THE COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

TEAM CODE : 110

Original Writ Jurisdiction

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

SAKEENA MOHAMMAD &ANR ……….……………………..PETITIONER

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Sr. No Particulars Page No.

2. Index of Abbreviations 3-5

3. Index of Authorities 6-8

8. Argument advanced 14-33

S.No ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

ALL INDIA REPORTER

11. HC HIGH COURT

13. INDIAN PENAL CODE

14. No. NUMBER

18. Pvt. Ltd. PRIVATE LIMITED

19. READ WITH

20. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

21. SUPREME COURT REPORTER

22. Supp. SUPPLEMENT

23. SC SUPREME COURT

25. i.e THAT IS

26. UNDER SECTION

27. UNION OF INDIA

28. V./Vs. VERSUS

29. WITH RESPECT TO

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 25th edition- by

2. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA by- Dr.Subhash C.Kashyap

1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

2. DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1948

3. THE MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW (Shariat) Act, 1937

1. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994

3. Shayara Bano vs. Union of India, 2017

4. Air India vs. Nargesh Meerza, 1981

5 Sri Venkataramana Devaru vs. State of Mysore and others, 1958

6. Indian Young Lawyers Association. v. Union of India, 2018

7. S. Mahendran v. the Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board,

8. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978

9. Francis coralie v. Union territory of Delhi,1981

10. Rustom cavasjee cooper V. UOI, 1970

11. Bal Patil and Anr. v. Union of India, 1999

14. Electricity Board, Rajasthan V. Mohan lal, 1967

15. Ajay Hasia V. Khalid Mujib, 1981

16. Vishakha V. State of Rajasthan, 1997

17. Karmanya Singh Sareen V. Union of India, 2016

19. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano, 1985

20. Sarla Mudgal v. UOI AIR 1995 SCC 635

22. John Vallamattom v. UOI AIR 2003 SC 2902

23. Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chowthia, 1985

ISSUE 2: Whether the fundamental right to equality of Muslim women can be

VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14:

VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 15:

Islam is not forbidding women to go to a mosque. To depict this, it was encouraged by

at the Constitution itself". It is important to understand that in spiritual matters, there is

VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21:

VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 25:

Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International

ISSUE 2: Whether the fundamental right to equality of Muslim women can be

Article 44 : “Democratique Aryana Secularism” is understood as the State’s acceptance

b) Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of mandamus permitting women

c) Issue an appropriate writ of certiorari and/ or order or directions quashing /

d) Issue a Writ / Order or Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Democratique