N O T E S A N D C O M M E N TA RY

Could Pronatalist Policies

Discourage Childbearing?

Nikolai Botev

Humans are generally believed to respond eagerly to rewards and incentives.

Ever since childhood we study hard to earn good grades, do errands for pocket
money, and try to avoid or hide behaviors that may result in punishment. This
fact has been used widely in educational systems, employee reward schemes,
and other institutions or systems anchored in the concept of homo economicus.
The assumption is that people, being rational and self-interested actors, will
respond positively to extrinsic incentives in an attempt to maximize utility.
Social policies also use incentives to encourage or compel behaviors consid-
ered socially desirable. In the context of population policies, financial or other
pronatalist incentives are often used in low-fertility settings to encourage
childbearing. Even though there is still debate on whether, to what extent,
and how fertility can be affected through policy interventions,1 an increasing
number of countries are adopting measures to stimulate fertility. According
to the latest issue of the UN’s World Population Policies, 32 European countries
reported pursuing policies to raise fertility in 2013, up from eight in 1986
(United Nations 2013).
Over the past several decades psychologists, economists, and others
have produced a sizable body of research and evidence that questions the
traditional notions of how people react to extrinsic incentives.2 Researchers
have found that in some contexts monetary or other incentives can un-
dermine intrinsic motivation—defined as the motivation to do something
because it is personally rewarding, because it fulfills our beliefs and expecta-
tion, or because we feel that it is important and significant—and can produce
outcomes opposite to those intended. For example, in a survey among resi-
dents of two communities in central Switzerland, where the government in-
tended to build a nuclear waste repository, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997)
found that the proportion of the population supporting the construction of
the facility fell by half when they were offered public compensation; similar

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 41(2): 301–314 (JUNE 2015) 301

Published on behalf of the Population Council by Wiley-Blackwell.

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results were found in a survey conducted in northeastern Switzerland in six

communities designated as potential sites for a second nuclear repository
(ibid.). This type of outcome has been referred to as a “crowding out” effect
(Frey 1997), a “hidden cost of reward” (Lepper and Greene 1978), or a “cor-
ruption effect” (Deci 1975).
This article explores the relevance of findings about the effect of extrinsic
incentives on intrinsic motivations for population policies, especially for pro-
natalist measures. I argue that if such measures are to be effective, they need
to better take into account the motivational underpinnings of reproductive
behavior and particularly the impact that pronatalist incentives could have on
the intrinsic motivation for childbearing. Two key assumptions underlie this
argument. The first is that reproductive behavior is intrinsically motivated,
and if appropriate policy instruments are used (those perceived as helping
individuals or couples to attain the intended number of children) under the
right conditions, they can enhance the intrinsic motivation for childbearing.
The second assumption is that under specific and identifiable conditions,
pronatalist incentives (especially those that are perceived as controlling or
coercive) could undermine the intrinsic motivation for childbearing. Besides,
some incentives could affect behaviors not directly targeted by the policy
measures (Frey 1997). Certain incentives could increase fertility in the short
term, but undermine the intrinsic motivation for childbearing in the long
term (see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole 2003).
I draw attention to possible unintended consequences of pronatalist
interventions. Hence, I first review the evidence on the effects of extrinsic
incentives on intrinsic motivation, drawing mostly on research in psychol-
ogy and economics. I then discuss research on the behavioral underpinning
of childbearing, seeking to determine whether reproductive behavior could
be considered an intrinsically motivated behavior. Finally, I examine the
mechanisms through which pronatalist measures could undermine the mo-
tivation for childbearing, focusing on various factors related to the nature of
the policy interventions.

Effects of extrinsic incentives on

intrinsic motivation
In an experiment in the late 1940s aimed at studying learning and problem-
solving ability among primates, psychologist Harry Harlow and his colleagues
observed that the introduction of an incentive (food) to solve a simple me-
chanical puzzle tended to disrupt, rather than facilitate, the performance
of the rhesus monkeys involved in the experiment (Harlow, Harlow, and
Meyer 1950). On the basis of this finding, Harlow postulated the existence
of a “strong and extremely persistent” drive beyond biological needs and the
external rewards and punishments and coined the term intrinsic motivation.
Nikolai Botev 303

Little attention was paid to these findings until the early 1970s, when Edward
Deci performed a similar experiment among college students, some of whom
were paid to work for a certain time on an interesting puzzle, while others
who worked on the puzzle were not paid. The unpaid students played with
the puzzle significantly longer in a later unrewarded “free-time” period than
did the paid students and also reported a greater interest in the task (Deci
1971). This effect has been replicated in numerous subsequent experiments
involving different subjects and variations in design (see e.g. Deci, Koestner,
and Ryan 1999). Consistently, individuals offered incentives showed higher
engagement and compliance at the beginning, but lower re-engagement/
persistence and compliance in the long term compared to individuals who
received no incentives.
A theory of human motivation known as self-determination theory,
developed on the basis of these findings, is premised on the understanding
that an individual’s behavior is to a significant extent self-motivated and
self-determined (Deci and Ryan 1985, 2012). The theory centers around the
concept of intrinsic motivation, in contrast to extrinsic motivation,3 which
arises from external incentives. Extrinsic motivation is based not on the na-
ture of an activity or behavior, but on the separate consequences to which it
leads. For example, people pursue a hobby because they find it is personally
rewarding, whereas they go to work to earn an income. Self-determination
theory identifies three needs that are key to intrinsic motivation, are in-
terpreted as universal and innate, and are observed in humans across time
and cultures. These are: autonomy (the need for a sense of personal control),
competence (the need to feel able and productive), and relatedness (the need
for social connection and for maintaining important personal relationships).
While the importance of relatedness and competence for human behavior
has also been addressed by other theories of motivation, self-determination
theory is distinguished by its emphasis on autonomy.
Two sub-theories of self-determination theory—cognitive evaluation
theory and organismic integration theory—explain the underlying mecha-
nisms of the influence of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motivation. Cogni-
tive evaluation theory, which focuses on the factors affecting intrinsic mo-
tivation and its variability, postulates that the perceptions of autonomy and
competence are enhanced or diminished under the influence of social and
environmental factors, and in turn reinforce or undermine intrinsic motiva-
tion, depending on whether perceived competence is accompanied by feelings
of autonomy (Deci and Ryan 1985). Organismic integration theory addresses
the ways in which extrinsically motivated behavior is regulated, recognizing
that a sense of autonomy can also be experienced when a behavior is extrin-
sically incentivized. Specifically, it postulates the existence of an organismic
integration process through which people internalize values, behaviors, and
beliefs, including behaviors that are not inherently enjoyable (ibid.). People
304 C o u l d P r o n ata l i s t P o l i c i e s D i s c o u r a g e C h i l d b e a r i n g ?

are more likely to internalize these behaviors if given autonomy rather than
being compelled or coerced.
According to self-determination theory, the inherently rewarding nature
of intrinsically motivated activities or behaviors provides sufficient justifica-
tion for performing them; the addition of an extrinsic incentive may lead
people to perceive the activity or behavior as “overjustified”4 and to reassess
their motivation for engaging in it. This reassessment might involve the per-
ception that the incentive negatively affects their autonomy or the perception
that an individual’s competence is questioned since the incentives could be
seen as signaling the difficulty, costliness, or unattractiveness of the activity
or behavior (see e.g. Bolle and Otto 2010). On the contrary, if an extrinsic in-
centive is perceived as supportive and enhancing the individual’s competence
and autonomy, it is likely to reinforce the intrinsic motivation.
Outside of psychology, the British social policy analyst Richard Titmuss
studied the supply of blood for transfusion in the UK, where it was based
primarily on blood donation, and in the US, where most blood for transfu-
sion was supplied through the market (Titmuss 1970). He found that both
the quantity and quality of the blood supply in the UK were higher than in
the US. This indicated, according to Titmuss, that what he called the “cher-
ished values” among UK blood donors were a stronger motivator than the
monetary incentives in the US. Moreover, individuals with “unhealthy” blood
(including alcoholics and drug users) in the US had the strongest motivation
to provide blood and to lie about their medical conditions, which accounted
for the lower quality of the blood in the US. Titmuss also conducted a survey
among British blood donors which suggested that if they were paid to donate
blood, the blood supply would be reduced. More generally, he claimed that
monetary compensation tends to undermine the sense of civic duty. Titmuss’s
book became a bestseller in the US and led to legislation to regulate the private
market in blood donations there.
From an economic perspective Hirsch (1978) argued that market mecha-
nisms, including monetary incentives, undermine the moral foundations of
society and could act as a limit to growth. Applying the concept of intrinsic
motivation to development economics, Ellerman (2005) contended that the
longstanding claims of the World Bank and other development agencies that
they help people help themselves are unfounded. According to Ellerman,
development agencies undermine the capacity of people to help themselves
by creating a dependency on assistance. What is needed in Ellerman’s opinion
is a shift toward enabling and autonomy-respecting indirect assistance. Other
economists approach the effect of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motivation
by seeking answers to questions such as “why would someone risk his or her
life in a war?,” “why would someone scale a mountain without a financial
reward?,” or “why would a programmer invest time and creativity in a com-
puter code and then make it available in the public domain?” Such questions
Nikolai Botev 305

cannot be answered satisfactorily within the homo economicus paradigm, which

is based on the assumption of self-interested, utility-maximizing individuals
whose behavior could be directed by external incentives.
To overcome the limitations of the homo economicus paradigm, Frey de-
veloped the “motivation crowding theory,” which combines a modified eco-
nomic model of human behavior with the key premises of self-determination
theory (Frey 1997, 2001). Contrary to the relative price effect, according to
which the more a behavior is incentivized, the more it is performed, motiva-
tion crowding theory posits that extrinsic motivators (whether incentives or
penalties) influence intrinsic motivation by reinforcing it in some circum-
stances (crowding it in) and undermining it in others (crowding it out). Ac-
cording to Frey, when the extrinsic motivators are perceived as supportive or
facilitating, “self-esteem is fostered, and individuals feel that they are given
more freedom to act, thus enlarging self-determination” (Frey 2012, p. 93).
On the other hand, when extrinsic motivators are perceived as controlling,
people’s self-determination and self-esteem suffer and their intrinsic motiva-
tion is reduced (ibid.).
According to critics of this and similar theories, the assumption about
the undermining effect of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motivation is driven
by a combination of “European romanticism’s stress on self-actualization with
American pragmatism’s concern with achievement” (Eisenberger, Pierce, and
Cameron 1999, p. 677). Specifically, critics believe that this assumption is
based on a conception of human nature that stresses the “motivational pri-
macy of individual self-fulfillment” and emphasizes the individual over the
collective (ibid.). Irrespective of whether this point is valid,5 such criticism
does not contradict my argument about the possible undermining effect of
certain pronatalist incentives, since low fertility and the policies to counter-
act it are associated with a shift of focus toward individual autonomy, self-
expression, and quality of life, where parenthood is seen as self-realization.
Hence, at least in modern developed countries, pronatalist policies are applied
in settings where there is a primacy of self-fulfillment, and some of these poli-
cies attempt to emphasize a supposedly collective good—higher fertility—over
individual interests by offering financial and other incentives.

Is childbearing intrinsically motivated?

Demographers have long focused on fertility intentions both as a predictor
of reproductive behavior at the aggregate level and as a means of identifying
the factors that help or hinder the realization of these intentions (Bachrach
and Morgan 2013; Bongaarts 2001; Schoen et al. 1999; Westoff and Ryder
1977). Much of the theoretical work aimed at conceptualizing the behavioral
underpinnings of childbearing has focused on the conjuncture or disjuncture
between intentions and behavior. At least four broad models or frameworks
306 C o u l d P r o n ata l i s t P o l i c i e s D i s c o u r a g e C h i l d b e a r i n g ?

have been proposed in this context: Bongaarts’s model accounting for the
discrepancy between reproductive preferences and observed fertility (Bon-
gaarts 2001); Bachrach and Morgan’s cognitive–social model of fertility in-
tentions (Bachrach and Morgan 2013), which evolved from their theory of
conjunctural action (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011); Ajzen’s theory of planned
behavior (Ajzen 1985; for its application to reproductive behavior see Ajzen
and Klobas 2013) as an extension of the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein
and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980); and Miller’s traits–desires–inten-
tions–behavior (T-D-I-B) framework (Miller 1994, 2011a, 2011b).
Bongaarts’s model focuses on the discrepancies between reported child-
bearing intentions and observed fertility in low-fertility settings. He identi-
fied six factors responsible for these discrepancies: the effect of unwanted
fertility, gender preferences, child replacement, tempo changes, involuntary
family limitation, and competing preferences (see Bongaarts 2001). Some
of the ideas underlying this model, and specifically the conceptualization of
reproductive behavior as a function of childbearing intentions and of fac-
tors that facilitate or constrain fertility, were incorporated by Bachrach and
Morgan (2013) in their cognitive–social model of fertility intentions. Unlike
Bongaarts’s demographic model, which takes fertility intentions as a given,
Bachrach and Morgan draw insights from cognitive science, contextualizing
fertility intentions within a set of conscious and unconscious mechanisms.
They combine this with insights from social theory and propose a framework
accounting for how social structures affect cognition and behavior. Accord-
ing to their model, people do not necessarily have fertility intentions; rather
they form them when circumstances demand or motivate them (­Bachrach
and Morgan 2013, pp. 466–8).
As Bachrach and Morgan point out, their model is “highly compatible”
with the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Bachrach and Morgan 2013, p.
469). TRA is a theory about the link between behavioral intentions and the
underlying attitudes and subjective norms related to the behavior in ques-
tion, and a widely used model for predicting behavioral intentions (Fishbein
and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). To improve the predictive power
of TRA, Ajzen expanded it into the theory of planned behavior (TPB) by
incorporating perceived behavioral control into the model underlying the
theory (Ajzen 1985). In essence, TPB posits that human behavior is guided
by three types of factors: attitudes or preferences, norms, and constraints and
opportunities. TRA and TPB have been applied to various behaviors, including
demographically relevant ones such as union formation (Liefbroer, Gerritsen,
and Gierveld 1994), condom use (Albarracín et al 2001), and childbearing
(Liefbroer 2005; Ajzen and Klobas 2013). Applied to reproductive behavior,
the theory of planned behavior implies that more favorable attitudes and
subjective norms related to childbearing, and greater perceived control over
having a child, increase the likelihood that a person will form an intention to
Nikolai Botev 307

have a child (Ajzen and Klobas 2013, p. 206). This prediction is in line with
the assumption of self-determination theory that lower perceived control over
having a child would undermine the intrinsic motivation for childbearing.
While the three models discussed so far could account implicitly for
the role of motivation in reproductive behavior, they focus mostly on the
determinants of behavior that stem from motivation, and hence cannot
help answer the question whether and to what extent childbearing could be
considered intrinsically motivated. The traits–desires–intentions–behavior
framework is based on the notion that a three-step “motivational sequence”
precedes reproductive behavior and its outcomes. This sequence starts with
childbearing motivations (interpreted as dispositional traits), which are trans-
formed into desires and then into intentions of whether to have children,
when, and how many. Further, the T-D-I-B framework assumes that there
is a biological basis for the motivational traits that determine reproductive
behavior, and posits two major components of reproductive motivation—one
that drives mate-selection and sexual behavior, and another that drives the
care for and protection of the resulting progeny (Miller, Rodgers, and Pasta
2006). According to Miller and his colleagues, the motivational mechanisms
behind the second component play the more important role in the behavior
leading to childbearing and rearing, and the caring and protective behaviors
have to be intrinsically rewarding, which is accomplished through bonding
schemas (Miller and Rodgers 2001; Miller, Rodgers, and Pasta 2006; Miller
2011a, 2011b). Hence, childbearing and rearing are assumed to be mostly
intrinsically motivated.

How and when could pronatalist policies

discourage childbearing?
There are good reasons to assume that childbearing and rearing are largely
intrinsically motivated behaviors. There is also extensive evidence that ex-
trinsic incentives under certain conditions could undermine intrinsic motiva-
tion. I now explore how three types of population policies could affect the
intrinsic motivation for childbearing: (1) policies that facilitate a behavior or
an outcome, such as those in Scandinavia or France, which seek to make it
easier for couples to combine work and family responsibilities; (2) policies
that aim to compel a behavior or an outcome by incentivizing it, but without
overt coercion, such as the generous parity-targeted pronatalist incentives in
Russia or in Ukraine until 2014; or (3) interventions that coerce a behavior or
an outcome, such as Ceauşescu’s attempt to increase fertility in Romania by
eliminating access to abortion and contraception and taxing childless persons.
The distinction between these types of interventions is conditional since dif-
ferent people could perceive policy interventions differently (some could see
child allowances as facilitating fertility, others as compelling it).
308 C o u l d P r o n ata l i s t P o l i c i e s D i s c o u r a g e C h i l d b e a r i n g ?

Pronatalist policies perceived as facilitating fertility work mainly by en-

hancing people’s competence for childbearing and rearing and boosting their
sense of autonomy and are thus likely to enhance the intrinsic motivation
for childbearing. Interventions that aim to compel a behavior tend to lower
people’s autonomy, although if the incentives are sufficiently generous some
could perceive them as competence-boosting. On balance, such interventions
could be expected to reduce intrinsic motivation, although the effect will
depend on the nature of the incentives and the context in which they are
applied. Finally, coercive policies limit people’s sense of autonomy and will
result in lowering the intrinsic motivation for childbearing.
Research in psychology and economics suggests that how policy inter-
ventions are perceived, and whether and to what extent they tend to reduce
the motivation for childbearing, depends on the type of task or behavior that
is incentivized, the nature of the incentives or interventions, the context in
which they are applied, and the socioeconomic and behavioral characteristics
of the target individuals. For example, there is strong evidence that the greater
the importance and interest an individual accords to a task or behavior, the
more likely an external intervention could undermine the intrinsic motiva-
tion for performing it (see e.g. Frey 1997; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999).
In the case of pronatalist policies this underscores the fact that reproductive
behavior, given its importance for an individual, is likely to be particularly
susceptible to undermining the intrinsic motivation for childbearing.
The nature of incentives plays a critical role in how they affect intrinsic
motivation. There are several underlying factors. One of them is the contin-
gency of the incentives—whether they are task-contingent (used as an incen-
tive to engage in a task), performance-contingent (linked to meeting certain
performance goals), or non-contingent. Studies suggest that non-contingent
incentives are less likely to adversely affect intrinsic motivation, since indi-
viduals are less apt to perceive them as controlling (see e.g. Ryan, Mims and
Koestner 1983; Deci and Ryan 1985). One implication of this finding for poli-
cies to increase fertility is that parity-targeted incentives, being performance
contingent, are likely to be seen as controlling and thus might undermine the
intrinsic motivation for childbearing.
There are multiple examples, particularly in Eastern European countries,
of child allowances or birth grants that are steeply parity progressive. Accord-
ing to a policy enacted in Ukraine in 2008, which was in force until mid-2014,
the “baby bonus” for the birth of a third or subsequent child (equivalent to
over $15,000 as of 1 January 2014) was four times higher than the bonus for
a first child (see e.g. Zhurzhenko 2012). Under the terms of the “maternity
capital” introduced in Russia in 2007, a woman obtains the right to a one-time
payment (equivalent to over $13,000 as of 1 January 2014) upon the birth
of her second child (or a subsequent child, if she has not previously claimed
it). However, she does not receive payment until the child reaches age 3, and
Nikolai Botev 309

it is to be used for one of three strictly defined purposes: for better housing,
for children’s education, or for the woman’s old-age pension. Irrespective of
the generosity of these incentives, their effect on increasing fertility seems to
be limited and mostly short term, affecting mainly the timing of births rather
than women’s completed fertility. For example, Slonimczyk and Yurko (2013)
reported that the maternity capital in Russia resulted in an increase of fertility
of about 0.15 children per woman, and Frejka and Zakharov (2013) found a
negligible impact of the pronatalist measures introduced in Russia in 2007,
an important part of which was the maternity capital.
Another factor associated with the nature of incentives and their effect
on intrinsic motivation is the universe of the incentives—that is, whether they
are provided to everyone uniformly or are based on a specific characteristic
(e.g., income). Some argue that the more uniform an external intervention is,
the more negatively it is likely to affect those individuals with higher intrinsic
motivation. Hence, uniform incentives are more likely to undermine intrinsic
motivation than incentives based on a given characteristic (see Frey 1997,
pp. 29–30). This argument raises the question of whether child allowances
should be universal or means tested. While, historically, support to families
with children has been mainly means tested, many countries currently opt for
universal child allowances. Given that a sizable proportion of the social policy
expenditures associated with family and fertility policies are distributed in the
form of child allowances or other cash benefits (e.g., Ireland, Luxembourg,
and the United Kingdom spend over 2.5 percent of GDP on family benefits
in cash—OECD 2014), it is important to look more closely at the effect of the
universe of benefits on childbearing motivations.
The effect of the universe is likely to be closely linked with the form of
the incentives (i.e., whether they are monetary/tangible or intangible) and
with their salience and adequacy (i.e., whether incentives are perceived as
appropriate and sufficiently generous). For example, in a review of the effect
of policies on fertility in countries of the European Union and OECD, Théve-
non and Gauthier (2011) concluded that financial benefits seem to have more
limited effects on fertility than policies that facilitate the work–family balance
(including the availability, quality, and affordability of child care facilities,
and the provisions for parental leave). One of the reasons, they argue, is that
financial benefits offset only a small fraction of the cost to parents generated
by the birth and care of children, while policies that facilitate the reconciling
of work and family obligations can sharply reduce or eliminate the opportu-
nity cost of children (Thévenon and Gauthier 2011, p. 211).
How extrinsic incentives affect intrinsic motivation depends also on
the socioeconomic and behavioral characteristics of the targeted individuals.
Several authors report that performance-related incentives differentially
affect various groups of individuals (see e.g. McCausland, Pouliakas, and
Theodossiou 2005; Artz 2008). In the context of fertility policies, Boccuzzo
310 C o u l d P r o n ata l i s t P o l i c i e s D i s c o u r a g e C h i l d b e a r i n g ?

et al. (2008) analyzed the impact of a monetary baby bonus introduced in

the northeastern Italian region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia in 2000. They found
that the bonus led to a reduction in abortions and an increase in births
among less-educated women who already had two or more children, but
had no perceptible effect on other women. This could suggest that pronatal-
ist interventions are more likely to be successful among people for whom
reproductive behavior is motivated extrinsically rather than intrinsically.
One could assume that the level of intrinsic motivation to perform a par-
ticular task and the extent to which targeted individuals are rational about
the incentivized behavior would be important factors mediating the effect
of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motivation. The implications of this as-
sumption for pronatalist policies are particularly interesting and counter-
intuitive: if a pronatalist measure undermines the intrinsic motivation for
childbearing, then the undermining effect will be stronger among those who
are more motivated to have children. It would also mean that the undermin-
ing effect is likely to be stronger among individuals who are more rational
about their reproductive behavior, thus widening existing socioeconomic
differentials in fertility levels.
One must emphasize, in any event, that the effect of extrinsic incen-
tives on intrinsic motivation is the outcome of an interplay of various factors,
including those outlined above. For example, how a child allowance would
influence the motivation for childbearing depends simultaneously on its
contingency, universe, adequacy, and the social context and characteristics
of the targeted individuals; moreover, the effects of these factors could go
in opposing directions. The effect of pronatalist policies on motivation will
also depend on the provisions of employment, taxation, and other policies, a
fact that calls for increased attention to coherence across policy domains and
incentive schemes. In addition, as pointed out earlier, the effect of extrinsic
incentives could differ in the short and the long term.

Concluding remarks
In the current context of low fertility in many parts of the developed world,
a sense of urgency frequently permeates both the public discourse and the
policy debate on how to respond to the new demographic realities. The mea-
sures to stimulate fertility in this context are often seen as inherently “good”
and procrastination in responding to low fertility as a mistake (see e.g.
Špidla 2007). As a result, potential unintended consequences of pronatalist
interventions are rarely considered. A classic example of well-intentioned
policies that could have adverse side effects is the generous maternity leave
provisions in some countries, where a woman could take up to three years
of leave with entitlements to return to the same job, but without adequate
professional re-integration arrangements and measures to meet employ-
Nikolai Botev 311

ers’ concerns. Such provisions could negatively affect the employability

of women and undermine gender equality. In light of evidence that in the
current European context gender equality is associated with higher fertility,
such policies could ultimately undermine the original goals of pronatalist
policies (see e.g. Botev 2008).
In this article I focused on another source of potential unintended con-
sequences of pronatalist policies, namely how reproductive behavior, as an
intrinsically motivated behavior, could be influenced by extrinsic incentives.
Research in psychology, economics, and other fields has demonstrated that
under specific and identifiable conditions, extrinsic incentives could un-
dermine intrinsic motivation. The rapidly growing literature on population
policies has largely ignored this issue. Population studies in general have not
paid sufficient attention to the motivational underpinnings of reproductive
behavior. Most of the research on the factors affecting this behavior focuses
on the determinants of behavior that depend on motivation and particularly
on intentions as a predictor of fertility. Clearly, more attention is needed on
the motivational underpinnings of childbearing and reproductive behavior in
general, which requires further research and interdisciplinary collaboration
between demographers, psychologists, and scholars from other fields.
Policymakers and the experts who inform the policy formulation process
also need to take into account childbearing motivation as an important com-
ponent of reproductive behavior, and assess whether, how, and to what extent
such behavior could be influenced by policy interventions. They also need to
consider possible unintended consequences of pronatalist measures. Policies
should focus on giving parents sufficient autonomy in deciding whether to
have children, when, and how many, and on facilitating parenthood, rather
than on fertility targets and generous incentives that could bring political
dividends and short-term increases in the birth rates, but could undermine
childbearing motivation in the long term.

Notes
The views expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of UNFPA or the United Nations.
1 See e.g. Gauthier 2013; Luci-Greulich
and Thévenon 2013; May 2012; Chen 2011;
OECD 2011; Kalwij 2010; Botev 2008.
2 For a review of the literature and empir-
ical evidence see e.g. Deci, Koestner, and Ryan
1999 and Frey and Jegen 2001; for a critique
see Eisenberger, Pierce, and Cameron 1999.
3 See Deci and Ryan 2012 on the differ-
ent forms of extrinsic motivation and on the
other types of motivation addressed by self-
determination theory.
4 Some scholars refer to the adverse ef-
fect of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motiva-
tion as the “overjustification effect” (see e.g.
Lepper and Greene 1978).
5 Studies testing assumptions of self-
determination theory in different countries
and cultures (including China, Russia, South
Korea, and Turkey), which differ in whether
individualism or collectivism is emphasized,
and whether the societies are more horizon-
312 C o u l d P r o n ata l i s t P o l i c i e s D i s c o u r a g e C h i l d b e a r i n g ?

tal or vertical in their structures, have shown the culture and the values emphasized by it
the universality of the need for autonomy, (Gagné and Deci 2014).
competence, and relatedness, irrespective of

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