C. Lawyers: Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers.

Supervision and Control over Members of the Bar:

CONST., ART. VIII, §5, ¶ 5;
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Art. XII, §14, ¶ 2;

SECTION 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs,
professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by
the State. The State shall encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the national benefit.

The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.

In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, March 18, 1954

In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, March 18, 1954
• According to the Rules of Court, in order to pass the bar, one must have obtained a
general average of 75% in all subjects and without a failing grade below 50% in any
subject.
• But in spite of this rule, the Court passed bar candidates with the averages of 70% to 74%
from 1946 to 1949; while the 74% was raised to 75% from 1950 to 1953.
• Unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those
admitted above felt discriminated by the Supreme Court and asked for reconsideration.
• The President requested the views of the Court on the bill. Complying with that request,
seven members of the Court were not in favor of the bill and the President vetoed it.
FACTS
• Congress did not override the veto and instead approved Senate Bill No. 371 which is
similar to the vetoed bill. This bill became R.A. No. 972 on June 21, 1953 without the
President’s signature.
• Republic Act No. 972 or “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953”: An act to fix the passing marks for
bar examinations from 1946 up to an including 1955. Any bar candidate who obtained a
general average of: a. 70% from July 4, 1946 to August 1951 b. 71% in 1952 c. 72% in
1953 d. 74% in 1954 e. And all without a grade of below 50% in any subject shall be
admitted to the bar.
• 1094 bar candidates are to be benefited by RA No. 972.
1. Whether RA 972 is unconstitutional – YES
ISSUE 2. Whether the Congress exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter, and supplement
rules on admission to the Bar in passing RA 972 – YES
1. YES. Republic Act no. 972 is declared unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without
any force nor effect because it qualifies 1094 bar candidates who confessed to having
inadequate preparation for the bar.
HELD
The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should
be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To approve officially of those

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
 inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is
to create a serious social danger

2. YES. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter,
and supplement the rules on admission to the bar. In the judicial system from which ours
has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.

To say that the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of attorneys at

law is a legislative function is unacceptable. This function requires:
i. Previously established rules and principles
ii. Concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals
iii. Decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles

The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial. “The relation of the bar to the courts is
a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attaché of the courts. The quality of
justice dispensed by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar.
An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice
and bring the courts themselves into disrepute.” State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441

Supreme Court of Massachusetts 1932, 180 NE 725: “It is an inherent power of such a
department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this
respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing
good moral character.”

In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952,
a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend,
disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the
practice of law. Its power is to repeal modify or supplement the existing rules on the
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession
requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit,
suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal
profession.

However, for the lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers
to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955
inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article
VII of the Constitution.
• This power (to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law)
exclusive to the Supreme Court or is it shared with any other entity? Congress may
repeal, alter, and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of
RATIO
attorneys-at- law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.

• According to Justice Labrador’s concurring and dissenting opinion, “The rules on the
holding of examinations, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are
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 within the scope of the legislative power but the power to determine when a candidate
has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this
Court. I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and
lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules.

Nature and Scope of the Legal Profession:

Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, Sep. 3, 1991;
Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, Sep. 3, 1991;
• Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC.
• Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner Renato Cayetano as a citizen and taxpayer, questioned
the appointment for Monsod lacked the necessary qualifications of having been
FACTS
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
• The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C that the Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, and majority of the members of the commissioners, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
• Whether Christian Monsod satisfies the Requirement of the position of Chairman of the
ISSUE
COMELEC – YES
• YES. Monsod is qualified to be COMELEC Chairman. The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying.

In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
HELD application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

“To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a
practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.”

After graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Bar, respondent worked in his
father’s law office for a short while, then worked as an Operations Officer in the World
Bank Group. He also worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief Executive Officer
of an investment bank and has subsequently worked either as Chief Executive Officer or
Consultant of various companies. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than 10 years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a
lawyereconomist, a lawyer- manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
 more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least 10 years.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
RATIO those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.

Ulep v. Legal Clinic, B.M. No. 553, June 17, 1993

Ulep v. Legal Clinic, B.M. No. 553, June 17, 1993
• Ulep, a member of the bar, filed a petition against the Legal Clinic because its
advertisements are ‘unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar’ and that as a
member of the bar, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements.
• The advertisement of the Legal Clinic includes “secret marriage” and “divorce” among
others.
• The Legal Clinic admits the fact of publication of the advertisement but claims that it is
not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of “legal support services” through
FACTS paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines.
• Position paper of IBP:
o The use of the name “The Legal Clinic Inc” gives the impression that it is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services. There is no difference
between “legal support services” and “legal services.”
o The advertisements in questions are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy. This is against Rule 1.02
which states that, “a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.”
1. Whether the services offered by the Legal Clinic Inc., advertised by it constitutes
practice of law? – YES.
ISSUE
2. Whether the same (the law profession) can be subject of advertisement at all –
generally NO but there are instances allowable – Generally, NO. But with exceptions.
1. YES. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. Generally, to practice law
is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.

In practice, a lawyer engages in three principal types of professional activity:

(1) legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations
(2) preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles
not possessed by ordinary layman
(3) appearance for clients before the public tribunals which possess power and
HELD
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order
to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law

Applying the criteria, the activities of The Legal Clinic constitute practice of law. With its
attorneys and so-called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisement represents and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
definition of “practice of law.”

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
 2. NO. The standard of legal profession condemns the lawyer’s advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The canon of
the profession states that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for profession capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.

Not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed (brief biographical and
informative data) and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions (use of
professional card).
• The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents.
This is based on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession and
RATIO not a trade. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct.

Admission to the Practice of Law: Good Moral Character as a Prerequisite;

In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Examinations, B.M. No. 1154,
June 8, 2004
In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Examinations,
B.M. No. 1154, June 8, 2004
• Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez filed a petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling, a member of the
Shari’a Bar from taking the 2002 Bar Exam with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).
• Petition alleged the following:
o Meling did not disclose that he has 3 pending criminal cases before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Cotabato City arising from incident on May 21, 2001
for cases of grave oral defamation – uttering defamatory words against
Melendrez and his wife in front of media and another case for less serious
physical injuries – attacking and hitting the face of Melendrez’s wife
FACTS • Meling has been using the title “Attorney”
• Meling did not disclose the cases because their former professor, Judge Corocoy
Moson, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. He believed that the
cases were “closed and terminated” when Moson advised so, just because Moson had
moral ascendancy over them.
• Meling admitted the use of the title “attorney” in some of his communications as they
were typed by the office clerk.
• OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the
Roll of Attorneys if he passes the Bar Exams and that he be suspended in the Shari’a Bar.
1. Whether Meling should be barred from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of
ISSUE Attorneys, sanctioned, and suspended as a member of the Shari’a Bar – YES
2. Whether Meling was correct in using the title “attorney” – NO
1. YES. Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." Bar takers are required to
HELD disclose that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by
law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted
for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving
moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her."

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
 Note: The petition to disqualify Meling was dismissed because he failed the exam and
cannot be admitted to the bar anyway; not because he was deserving.

2. NO. he should not be using the word “Atty” to refer to himself. In Alawi v. Alauya, the
Court declared:
a. Those who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar.
b. Only those admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are entitled to use
“Attorney”
• All lawyers are supposed to have a good moral character (as this is a mandatory and
continuing requirement for membership in the bar). Practice of law, whether under the
RATIO
regular or the Shari'a Court, is not a matter of right. It is a privilege given to those who
are not only educated in law but to those who embody honesty and integrity.

Nature of the Lawyer’s Oath:

Form 28, Rules of Court;
Sebastian v. Calis, A.C. No. 5118, Sep. 9, 1999
Sebastian v. Calis, A.C. No. 5118, Sep. 9, 1999
• Complainant Marilou Sebastian was referred to respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis to fix
her travel documents to the US. The complainant would pay P150,000 and in return all
her travel documents will be fixed.
• Before leaving, she saw that the passport was under a different name. This alarmed
her which prompted her to ask for a refund but the respondent assured her that it was
safe and it could be done and he would make sure to give her back her money if
anything were to happen to her.
• On her flight to the US, they stopped over in Singapore. It was here where the
FACTS
complainant was apprehended by the police and was detained in jail for three days.
• She was deported back to the Philippines. She asked for a refund from the respondent
and was given only a total amount of P36,000, as the respondent subsequently went
into hiding.
• The respondent was given demand letters and notices to appear in court but he
ignored all of these.
• The IBP recommended suspension but the board of governors amended it to
disbarment.
ISSUE 1. Whether Atty. Calis should be disbarred because of his actions – YES
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule
101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as he deceived the complainant is
saying that he would arrange her travel documents, but then provided fake documents
with the promise of refund in case things go wrong all for money.

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable, as a
HELD
lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good
faith, fairness, and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers’ oath. The lawyer’s oath
is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and
keep inviolable.

The court also noted that the fact that the respondent cavalierly jeopardized the life
and liberty of complainant when he made her travel with spurious documents showed
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 the utter lack of moral qualms and scruples, which is a real threat to the Bar and the
administration of justice.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege. The membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior
and he can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.
• A lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of
good faith, fairness, and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers’ oath.
RATIO • The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
must be upheld and keep inviolable.
• Four-fold duty to (1) the Court; (2) the bar; 3.) to society; and 4.) to their clients

The Code of Professional Responsibility

The Lawyer and Society: Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 1974
Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 1974
• Atty. Adelino Ledesma filed a certiorari proceeding due to the denial by respondent
Judge Rafael Climaco (First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City) of a
motion to withdraw as counsel de officio.
• He reasoned that due to his appointment as Election Registrar for the Municipality of
FACTS Cadiz, which requires his full time service, he believes that he may not be able to
perform his duties as counsel de parte.
• However, respondent judge rejected his motion but instead, assigned him as counsel
de oficio because the pending case Atty. Ledesma is handling now has been long due
and his withdrawal will only further delay the case
1. Whether the denial by the respondent judge of a motion to withdraw by the petitioner
ISSUE
as counsel de oficio is just. – YES
1. YES. The Court stated that with the expectation that a lawyer must have a bigger dose
of social conscience and a little less of self-interest, a counsel de oficio is required to
exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his
care. Additionally, the Constitution declares “Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right.”

HELD In relation, Atty. Ledesma must not let his self-interest of withdrawing from the
responsibilities as a counsel de oficio overpower his duty as a lawyer to administer
justice. Furthermore, he must keep in mind that his services must be driven by his
desire for the protection of his client’s rights rather than for the accumulation of his
wealth. Lastly, it was also stressed by the Court that his appointment as Election
Registrar will not hinder him from fulfilling his duties as a counsel de oficio since his
volume of work is expected to be less in the future. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the denial of respondent judge is justified and the petition is denied.
• Attorneys have an indispensable role as members of the Bar to defend the accused.
Those enrolled in the ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one’s basic
purpose of the State, the administration of justice. He must assume responsibilities
RATIO
entrusted to him by the court – in this case, as a counsel de oficio. He must perform
his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, to prove one’s fitness to
remain as a member of the profession.

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
The Lawyer and the Legal Profession: In Re: Edillon, A.M. No. 1928, Aug. 3, 1978;
In Re: Edillon, A.M. No. 1928, Aug. 3, 1978
• The respondent Atty. Marcial A. Edilion is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines.
• The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions
of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization
of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
FACTS • Respondent Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled financial support
of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
• Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his membership
fee to the IBP – YES
ISSUE
2. Whether the payment of membership fee and suspension to pay the same violates his
constitutional rights – NO
1. YES. Under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges —
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.

2. NO. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and
welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes,
"Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
HELD fundamental principle of government, the rights of individuals are subordinated. It is
an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and
all individuals from some freedom.

Even without the enabling Republic Act No. 6397, and looking solely to the language
of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of
law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were
(and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good,
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 even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed
the public with an interest in his concerns.

The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the
By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor
illegal.

The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
• All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.
• The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed
with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as
an officer of the court.
• The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created.
• Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
RATIO member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All
that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member.
• Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries
of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
•

Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, A.C. 11394, Dec. 1, 2016

Belo-Henares v. Guevarra, A.C. 11394, Dec. 1, 2016
• In 2002 and 2005, Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (“Complainant), director of Belo
Medical Group corporation, performed cosmetic surgery that allegedly harmed a patient.
Thereafter, Roberto C. Guevarra (“Respondent),” a licensed attorney, brought criminal
complaints against the Complainant on behalf of the patient.
• During the criminal actions, the Respondent engaged in a series of derogatory attacks
directed at the Complainant and her company on social media. Through his personal
Facebook profile, the Respondent posted dozens of sexually-charged insulting and
FACTS
abusive statements intended to discredit the Complainant’s professional reputation.
• The Respondent, who had some 2000 Facebook friends, threatened to “paralyze” the
company, which at the time had 300 employees, and also threatened the Complainant
with criminal conviction and sought to extort money from her.
• In August 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), a branch of IBP, recommended
that the Respondent be suspended from practicing law for one year. It rejected his
argument that the complaint violated his constitutional right to privacy, asserting that

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 his remarks were only shared with his Facebook friends and did not include the
Complainant.
• The Respondent also argued that the disciplinary action was in violation of his right to
freedom of expression. He denied that his remarks were vulgar and abusive and were
intended to inspire hatred towards the Complainant and her company and that he had
attempted to extort money from her. He further asserted that the Complainant was a
public figure and was therefore a valid subject for fair comment.
• The Board of Governors of the Bar adopted the IBP-CBD’s report and recommendation,
following which the Respondent moved for reconsideration, arguing that there was no
specific act that could warrant a suspension of his law license.
• He also referred to a libel action brought against him by an employee of the
Complainant’s company, which had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In October
2015, the Board of Governors partially granted the Respondent’s motion, reducing his
suspension to six months.
• The Complainant later submitted her verified complaint to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
1. Whether the Respondent’s right to privacy and freedom of expression was violated –
NO.
ISSUE
2. Whether the Respondent was administratively liable based on the Complainant’s
allegations – YES
1. NO. The Respondent’s defense of privacy in sharing his derogatory remarks on Facebook
was “untenable.” The Court explained that in order to claim a reasonable expectation of
privacy on social media, and in this case, Facebook, “it is first necessary that said user
manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.” And such intention “can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook’s privacy tools.”

Here, the Court did not find any direct evidence that the Respondent had utilized any of
the privacy tools or features of Facebook that would ensure his remarks were only visible
to himself and his circle of friends. The Court further reasoned that even if the posts
were only viewable by the Respondent’s friends, there was no assurance that they would
be safeguarded within the confines of privacy, in part because any Facebook friend of
the Respondent could independently share the posts on their page.

The Court also rejected the Respondent’s claim that the impugned remarks were within
the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. It reiterated that the constitutional
HELD
freedom is not “absolute” and every person exercising the right is “obliged to act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The Court also noted
that the constitutional protection of the right “may not be availed of to broadcast lies or
half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.”
In this case, the Court found that the Facebook remarks “were ostensibly made with
malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and [her company].”

2. YES. Based on the foregoing analysis, the Supreme Court of the Philippines found the
Respondent “in complete and utter violation” of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s inappropriate and obscene language, and his act
of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject
Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions
in the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 7.03, Rule 8.01, and Rule
19.01.

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
 By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,
respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum
at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave
in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent.
Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of
the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning
complainant’s and BMGI’ s reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage
who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent’s disrespectful language. It is
the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent’s remarks against complainant
breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively
sanctioned.
Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
RATIO
Rule 8.01 -A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 -A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

The Lawyer and the Courts: Baculi v. Battung, A.C. 8920, Sep. 28, 2011
Baculi v. Battung, A.C. 8920, Sep. 28, 2011
• Judge Baculi, Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao
City, filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Melchor Battung.
• He claimed that in July 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of
Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi
advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his
voice.
• When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, “Then
cite me!”
• Judge Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The
FACTS respondent then left.
• While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the courtroom and
shouted, “Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” Judge
Baculi cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time.
• After his hearings, respondent again shouted in a threatening tone, “Judge, I will file
gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!” He kept on shouting, “I am not afraid
of you!” and challenged the judge to a fight.
• Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the building. Judge Baculi later found out that after
the respondent left the courtroom, Atty. Battung continued shouting and punched a table
at the Office of the Clerk of Court.
• Whether Atty. Melchor Battung violated Cannons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional
ISSUE
Responsibility – YES

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
 • YES. The respondent was guilty of violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP Commissioner found that the respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility that requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due
the courts and judicial officers. The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11
that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the courts. The respondent’s argument that Judge Baculi
provoked him to shout should not be given due consideration since the respondent
should not have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so, he created the impression
that disrespect of a judge could be tolerated.

The Supreme Court held that litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of
their position and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule,
demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents.
HELD
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter’s role,
stature and position in our justice system. When the respondent publicly berated and
brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the
law against the latter, the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the
public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability to decide cases.
Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the
manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot
act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into
disrepute.

Atty. Battung was ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a
WARNING that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
• Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty
to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and
the court that he represents. A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely
disregards the latter’s role, stature and position in our justice system.
RATIO
• Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the
manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot
act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into
disrepute.

The Lawyer and the Client: Sanchez v. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543, Mar. 16, 2016
Sanchez v. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543, Mar. 16, 2016
• Nenita Sanchez (petitioner) sought the legal services of Atty. Romeo Aguilos
(respondent) to represent her in the annulment case with her estranged husband
Jovencio C. Sanchez;
• Atty. Aguilos accepted the engagement and fixed the attorney’s fees at P150,000.00 with
the appearance fee of P5,000 per hearing.
• Sanchez had given him an initial amount of P90,000.00 but Aguilos said he would just
start working the case upon full payment of the acceptance fee and that the amount she
FACTS
had given for acceptance fee was for legal separation, contending that he did not know
that the complainant contemplated to file an annulment.
• Aguilos told her that she has to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of
marriage. Because of this, complainant subsequently withdraw the case and requested
for a refund of the amounts already paid through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez
• Respondent states that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez dismissed the
letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted that
monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
 he wrote in the last part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter
the following:

Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15
August 2005 (Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper or should have
been addressed by her counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully
relied on an unverified information furnished him, to the urinal project of the MMDA
where it may serve its rightful purpose.

• Respondent posited that he refused to do the same as he had already working on the
case. This made her bring an administrative complaint against Atty. Aguilos.
ISSUE 1. Whether Atty. Aguilos should be held administratively liable for misconduct – YES
1. YES. The SC fined Atty. Aguilos P10,000 and reprimanded him for his use of
offensive/improper language against his fellow lawyer Atty. Martinez. Lawyers shall
keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal education
program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent
repetition of such kind of advice that respondent gave to the complainant.

In giving an advice, he should be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal
separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his
answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the law. Clearly, the
respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant.
As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds
for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been
HELD
basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either
causes of action. His explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for
legal separation should be disbelieved.

The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was
engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with
her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancée. They did not contemplate
legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-
marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition
for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to
have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve
as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged."26 This duty of lawyers is
further emphasized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8
specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."
RATIO
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers
to use strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients.27 However, as
members of a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their
clients' cause, or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal
but that should not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In
maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in
his pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as
monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
 an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his
clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal Profession.

The Ultimate Penalty of Disbarment:

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, Sep. 15, 2004
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, Sep. 15, 2004
• Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office,
violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.
• Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA)
and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases.
• He hired respondent as his personal counsel. Consequently, respondent’s relationship
with complainant’s family became intimate. He frequented their hours and even turored
complainant’s 22-year-old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco.
• On June 22, without the knowledge of complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa,
the complainant’s daughter in Hongkong.
• Complainant came to know that:
a. On the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his
(complainant’s) office and airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in
Hongkong;
b. Respondent misrepresented himself as bachelor in the Hongkong authorities to
facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and
FACTS
c. Respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children.
• Complainant filed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and
Lisa.
• The complainant contented that with the moral ascendancy of the respondent over
Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition
to his contracting a second marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling
her into marrying him.
• Without complying with the requirements of the Philippine law that he should first obtain
a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the “advice”
of Maria Luisa’s parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two (22) years of
age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong in June 22,
1992 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is a
“bachelor.”
• The respondent contented that he married complainant’s daughter with "utmost sincerity
and good faith" and that "it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral man
to marry the woman he sincerely loves."
ISSUE • Whether respondent committed acts which warrant his disbarment – YES
• YES. Undoubtedly, respondent’s act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a ground for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. He exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In
particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty,
HELD justice, decency and morality.

This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have somehow come
up with a common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct, i.e., "that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." Measured against this

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
 definition, respondent’s act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife
and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him. And
third, he misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a
foreign land.

The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of
confidence. It was respondent’s closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the
latter’s complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with Lisa.
When his concern was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he sneaked at
the latter’s back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he
attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainant’s resources by
securing a plane ticket from complainant’s office in order to marry the latter’s daughter
in Hongkong. He did this without complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the
temerity to assure complainant that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had
crossed the limits of propriety and decency.

Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since he married
her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows a distorted mind and a
brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such relationship, the man and the woman
are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity. How could respondent
perform these obligations to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he
really loved her, then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away.

Corollarily, the responsibility is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath which every lawyer in the
country has to take before he is allowed to practice.

In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is not
commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the
imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.
• "The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar, the
Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor
lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the
risk of suspension or removal."
• The law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, not
RATIO only his professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at
any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities
• The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, is that they "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." This is founded on the lawyers’ primordial duty to society as spelled out in
Canon 1 which states:

"CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes."

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu
It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional Responsibility
ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration. They knew then that more than
anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -- who are most obliged to venerate
the law

monica.margarette.feril@obf.ateneo.edu