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Article
Characterization of TSO and DSO Grid System Services and
TSO-DSO Basic Coordination Mechanisms in the Current
Decarbonization Context
Ricardo Silva * , Everton Alves , Ricardo Ferreira, José Villar and Clara Gouveia
INESC TEC—Institute for Systems and Computer Engineering, Technology and Science,
4200-465 Porto, Portugal; everton.l.alves@inesctec.pt (E.A.); ricardo.j.ferreira@inesctec.pt (R.F.);
jose.villar@inesctec.pt (J.V.); clara.s.gouveia@inesctec.pt (C.G.)
* Correspondence: ricardo.emanuel@inesctec.pt; Tel.: +351-22-209-4230
Abstract: Power systems rely on ancillary services (ASs) to ensure system security and stability.
Until recently, only the conventional power generation resources connected to the transmission grids
were allowed to provide these ASs managed by the transmission system operators (TSOs), while
distribution system operators (DSOs) had a more passive role, focused on guaranteeing distribution
capacity to bring power to final consumers with enough quality. Now, with the decarbonization,
digitalization and decentralization processes of the electrical networks, the growing integration of
distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution grids are displacing conventional generation
Citation: Silva, R.; Alves, E.; Ferreira, and increasing the complexity of distribution networks’ operation, requiring the implementation of
R.; Villar, J.; Gouveia, C. new active and coordinated management strategies between TSOs and DSOs. In this context, DERs
Characterization of TSO and DSO are becoming potential new sources of flexibility for both TSOs and DSOs in helping to manage the
Grid System Services and TSO-DSO
power system. This paper proposes a systematic characterization of both traditional and potentially
Basic Coordination Mechanisms in
new ASs for TSOs, and newly expected DSO local system services to support the new distribution
the Current Decarbonization Context.
grid operation paradigm, reviewing, in addition, the main TSO-DSO coordination mechanisms.
Energies 2021, 14, 4451. https://
doi.org/10.3390/en14154451
Keywords: TSO grid services; DSO grid services; congestions management; voltage control;
Academic Editors: Nicu Bizon,
distributed flexibility; TSO-DSO coordination
Mihai Oproescu, Philippe Poure,
Rocío Pérez de Prado,
Abdessattar Abdelkefi and
Tomonobu Senjyu 1. Introduction
Ancillary services (ASs) are grid services needed to support the transmission of electric
Received: 27 May 2021 power from the generators to the consumers at the distribution grids, to guarantee the con-
Accepted: 19 July 2021 tinuity, quality and security of the supply. ASs, traditionally provided by conventional gen-
Published: 23 July 2021
eration power plants connected to the transmission grid, have been mainly directed to the
provision of system services to the transmission system operators (TSOs) for the operation
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral of the transmission grid. Some ASs are mandatory and not remunerated, with requirements
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
stipulated by network codes, while others are traded under market mechanisms.
published maps and institutional affil-
The increase of non-dispatchable and less predictable distributed generation (DG)
iations.
and the progressive decrease of conventional dispatchable generation is making the bal-
ance between supply and demand harder to achieve, which emphasizes the relevance of
balancing ASs. At the same time, this is also transforming the distribution grids from
passive to active grids by accommodating many of the new power system resources and
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors. increasing the operational complexity and responsibilities of distribution system operators
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. (DSOs) [1]. Indeed, deregulation, decentralization and decarbonization of power systems,
This article is an open access article
with the progressive closure of CO2 -emitting power plants (the traditional providers of
distributed under the terms and
system services due to their high controllability), the increasing digitalization [2] and the
conditions of the Creative Commons
integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) [3,4], demands: (a) the introduction
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
of new system services to ensure the secure operation of an increasingly complex and
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
distributed electrical system [5] and (b) the need for designing the appropriate market
4.0/).
works that could help further research on new strategies for flexibility services design,
acquisition mechanisms and facilitating tools.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the regulatory background
and defines the main system and market actors involved in the flexibility provision pro-
cesses. Section 3 describes the current and expected (due to the decarbonization path) TSO
needs and services, while Section 4 focuses on the analysis of DSO needs and potential
future services as one of the main topics addressed in this work. Section 5 reviews the main
basic TSO-DSO coordination mechanisms, and lastly, Section 6 presents the conclusions
and final remarks.
Figure 1.ofSchematic
Figure 1. Schematic of the between
the interaction interaction
thebetween the
different different
actors actors identified.
identified.
Transmission 3. Characterization
System Operator of(TSO)
TSO Needs
[20,22,23]andisServices
a “natural or legal person who is
responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance
This chapter proposes a general characterization of and, if necessary, developing
of TSO needs and the the ser
transmission systemrequired in a togiven
meetarea and,and
current where applicable,
future needs, aits interconnections
topic with other discuss
that has been extensively
systems, and forliterature.
ensuring However,
the long-termevenability of the system
if the starting point oftothis
meet workreasonable demands
is an extensive literature re
for the transmission
of recent of electricity”
institutional(Directive
reports and (EU) 2019/944,
European Article
projects, 2, see value
its added definition
relies on the
(35)) [19]. Its main rolewhich
result, [23] isistonot
transport energyoffrom
the collection eachcentralized
individual sourceproducers visionto but
dispersed
a unified, consi
industrial consumers/prosumers
and more comprehensive approach of all the sources analyzed. precisely,
and DSOs over its high-voltage (HV) grid. More
the TSO is responsible for the reliable transmission of electricity from large-sized generation
plants to regional 3.1.orSystem
local electricity distribution
Needs, Scarcities, Servicessystems [24].Definitions
and Products The TSO must guarantee
the security of supply Asby ensuringinthat
proposed [13],the grid always
a flexibility needremains
can bestable
defined [18],as which entails
the requirement of a h
meeting the demand for transmission to maintain generation and consumption
level strategical action or set of actions for the better operation and/or planning levels of the
balanced to keeptothe system’s
enhance nominal
the security frequency
and quality between its nominal
of supply. This is limits,
coherentwhichwith
is based
the more spe
on non-local resources
proposal of [35], where system needs refer to ensure that the system [25].
such as inertia and automatic and manually activated reserves It
is operated wit
is also responsible for keeping voltages and power flows of its grid within
number of defined limits and that likely events can be properly managed. Specific n their operational
security limits, and
depend the sufficient
on the type active and(transmission
of grid reactive power vs. reserves
distribution)to withstand a set of in the
and are discussed
predefined contingencies [18]
sections of this paper. (Articles 18 and 33). To acquire the flexibility needed, EU
guideline [18] (Article 182, Section 2.1) already considers the possibility of the
A grid service is a specific strategy designed to satisfy one or several system n TSO making
use of distributed active
with a set power reserves requirements
of technical with the appropriate designed coordination
according to with DSOs
these (see that mu
needs
also the SmartNet projectand
defined [26]complied
or the ASM byTSO-DSO
the service Report [27] forFor
providers. TSO-DSO
example, coordination
automatic and ma
schemes, summarizedfrequency in Section 5). reserve (aFRR and mFRR, respectively) are different services fo
restoration
Distribution System Operator
frequency control need (DSO)
(see [2,28]
Table is 1).a “natural or legal person who is respon-
sible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of,
In a services market context, products and, if necessary,
are thedeveloping
tradable units the distribution
delivered by the FPs
system in a givenTSOs area,and andDSOs
wherecan applicable, its interconnections with other
procure for one or several services [13]. The complexity systems, and for of adap
ensuring the long-term
products to services can be left to the FPs side by developing aggregationofalgorithm
ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the distribution
electricity” [19] (Directive (EU) 2019/944,
to the flexibility selectionArticle 2, seealgorithms,
or clearing definition (29)).if theyMoreare precisely, the
able to combine diff
DSO is responsible for thetooperation
products fulfill the (and sometimes
services technicalowner) of the electricity
requirements. distribution
Differentiating services from n
network, in some cases
(and even from HVproducts,
more grids throughsinceprimary
servicessubstations
are very often (HV/MV)
tied totothe theneed
finalthey add
consumers and allowsfor ensuring
to design theservices
agreed (and
power flow between
products) able todistribution
fulfill more than and transmis-
one need, and to r
sion grids operating
some level at LV,ofmedium-voltage
harmonization and/or (MV) standardization
and, in some cases, (one of HVthe distribution
main objectives of
Energies 2021, 14, 4451 5 of 30
networks [29]. The increasing integration of RESs and other DERs, such as distributed
energy storage and Electric Vehicles (EVs), has changed the distribution network paradigm,
with higher uncertainty and bidirectional power flows, imposing new challenges to ensure
an efficient and secure grid operation [30] and the injection of the distribution generation
surplus from the DG to the TSO grid. DSOs technical challenges are mostly local, such
as branch congestions, under- and over-voltages and network service restoration after
local outages by reconfiguring the network or, in the cases of longer interruptions, through
emergency generation groups. The local nature of distribution network problems requires
finding feasible solutions within an enclosed geographical area. To do so, DSOs need to
foster, as market facilitators, the participation of all types of potential market actors in a
non-discriminatory and transparent way [31] to unlock the flexibility available in their dis-
tribution grid for planning and operational purposes. Market-based flexibility acquisition
should be seen as preferential whenever it proves to be the most cost-efficient solution
–versus other solutions, such as mandatory flexibility provision or grid reinforcements) [19].
Balance Responsible Party (BRP) [32] is a market player or its chosen representative
responsible for actively balancing supply and demand for its portfolio (of producers,
suppliers, AGGs, prosumers, etc.).
Metering Data Operator (MDO) [20] (also metering responsible party or metering
data company) is and entity responsible for acquiring, storing and distributing validated
measured data. In this case, this is rather a role than an actor, very often performed by
TSOs for those assets connected to the transmission grid, or by DSOs for those connected
to the distribution grid.
Aggregator (AGG) (also flexibility provider, FP, or flexibility service provider) is a
third-party company that specializes on electricity demand-side participation by estab-
lishing, in practice, aggregator contracts with individual demand sites (i.e., industrial,
commercial or residential consumers) to aggregate their flexibility and operate it as a single
FP to TSOs, DSOs and BRPs [33] to maximize the value of that flexibility. Sometimes AGG
refers only to the role of aggregating and managing a portfolio of resources, while FP refers
to the role of interacting with the market to provide the flexibility managed by the AGGs.
AGGs can interact with the resources they aggregate through local monitoring and control
systems that can either control specific flexibility resources or through homes or building
integrated energy management systems (HEMS and BEMS, respectively) [34].
Supplier (SUP) (also retailer) is the entity responsible for buying electricity in the
wholesale market and selling and invoicing it to its customers. SUPs can also play the
roles of BRP or AGG. When the SUP is not the AGG of its own customers, then different
interaction models between them can be considered to account for the impact of the
flexibility provision on the SUPs forecast [23].
Forecast Provider (FCP) (also data service provider) is an entity that provides forecasts
of RES, generation and consumption based on different data (e.g., weather data and
historical load flow) to be used for grid analysis and flexibility availability computations,
as well as other data analytics services.
Figure 1 describes the main interactions among these actors around a generic flexibility
market. AGGs (or FPs) use HEMS and BEMS to determine and aggregate the available
flexibility to be offered to commercial or regulated flexibility markets. Typically, TSOs and
DSOs go to the regulated markets to procure the flexibility they need (see Section 5 on
TSO-DSO markets coordination), while BRPs go to commercial ones for balancing and
portfolio optimization purposes. The effective provision of flexibility is then verified by the
TSOs or the DSOs, depending on the procurer, based on comparing the FP commitments
with the metering data collected by the metering data operator. Finally, forecast providers
can provide, among other data, forecasts to help AGGs assess their available flexibility or
TSOs and DSOs to assess their upcoming flexibility needs.
Energies 2021, 14, 4451 6 of 30
Table 1. Cont.
Table 1. Cont.
Date of Completion
Project Acronym Country(ies) Refs.
(or Expected)
ATLAS 2017 UK [42]
CoordiNet 2022 Spain [43]
De-Flex-Market 2015 Germany [44]
EcoGrid 2.0 2019 Denmark [45]
EMPOWER H2020 2018 Norway [46]
Enera 2020 Germany [47]
FLECH-iPower 2016 Denmark [48]
Flex-DLM 2018 Spain [49]
FlexHub Eu-SysFlex 2021 Ireland [50]
FLEXICIENCY 2019 Spain [51]
FlexMart 2016 Belgium [52]
Future Network Modelling Functions 2017 United Kingdom [53]
GOPACS-IDCONS Active platform The Netherlands [54]
InteGrid 2020 Portugal [55]
Interflex 2019 France [56]
INTERRFACE 2022 Luxembourg [57]
IREMEL Ongoing project Spain [58]
NODES Active platform Norway [59]
Open Networks 2020 United Kingdom [60]
Piclo Flex (and Piclo) Active platform United Kingdom [61]
PlatOne 2023 Germany [62]
Power Potential Ongoing project United Kingdom [63]
SENSIBLE 2018 Germany [64]
USEF Active organization The Netherlands [65]
Table 4. Cont.
Parameter Description
Moment when the service is contracted.
Procurement timeframe (a) Operational (real-time);
(b) Short-term planning (D-1 to M-1);
(c) Long-term planning (>M-1 to Y-1, or more).
Reservation and/or activation If procurement requires reservation in advance (e.g., D-1) or activation in real-time or both.
Activation of flexibility can either be manual, at the request of the operator or automatic, in case of
Mode of activation
local control strategies.
Estimation of the time required to solve the technical problem, which is necessary to evaluate the
Expected duration of the response
capability of the DER to provide a requested service.
Period comprehended between activation and full delivery of the service; encompasses seconds,
Full activation time
minutes or hours depending on the resource.
Identifies if the response must be provided by node or for a wider scope; from local (LV) to regional
Geographic scope (MV) and cross-regional (HV), can also be defined per point of common coupling (PCC), feeder or
substation; relevant for understanding if and how resources can be aggregated.
Participation of the mobilized flexibility can be mandatory (in which case, non-delivery is met by
Mandatory status penalties) or procured on the market (in which case, DER can be remunerated according
to participation).
If the service allows the aggregation of resources as a way of meeting minimum quantities at a
Aggregation
specific location.
Minimum quantity Minimum power that can be provided per offer; usually in the order of magnitude from kW to MW.
Maximum quantity Maximum power that can be provided per offer; usually in the order of magnitude from kW to MW.
Represents the estimated time for a resource to stop delivering a service upon receiving a
Deactivation period
deactivation signal; usually in the order of magnitude from seconds to minutes.
Minimum duration of the service provision (coincides with the step for product definition, when
Minimum duration of delivery period
services are defined in steps of equal time length); a typical value encountered is 15 min.
Maximum duration of delivery period Maximum duration of the service provision; usually in hours.
Energies 2021, 14, 4451 14 of 30
grid performance and on several types of loads, particularly on electronic loads, inverter-
based DER and induction machines.
As presented in Table 4, and following Standard EN50160 [68], three voltage quality
problems were identified that could potentially be solved with flexibility resources, namely:
under and overvoltage problems, voltage unbalances and voltage sags.
Voltage regulation in distribution networks has been mainly performed through the
control of OLTC at the HV/LV substations, with the objective of compensating the voltage
along the radial feeders. However, this control principle can become ineffective in MV
and LV networks integrating high shares of RES, where reverse power flows can occur,
causing the voltage to increase in the end of the feeders [66]. This problem is accentuated
in LV networks, due to the low reactance-over-resistance (X/R) ratio of the cables. LV
networks are also three-phase four wire networks where the loads and DER are mostly
single-phase and unevenly connected to the three phases, consequently causing voltage
unbalance problems that cannot be solve at the HV/MV substation.
Increasing voltage regulation and balancing capabilities in MV and LV networks
through DER control has been foreseen in several countries that have DER grid connection
requirements [69]. This implies either the remote control of DER by the DSO or local
DER inverter functions, usually referred to as dynamic VC. However, these local control
functions do not allow the DSO to forecast the network behavior in predictive management,
and in scenarios of high integration of RES, this can lead to unwanted oscillatory voltage
behavior [70]. In this sense, coordinated VC has been proposed in the literature in addition
to these local control strategies [71].
Voltage sags are considered power quality disturbances, defined in EN 50160 [68] as
a “sudden reduction of the supply voltage to a value between 90% and 1% of the declared voltage
Uc (reference voltage) followed by a voltage recovery after a short period of time ( . . . ) between
10 ms and 1 min”. These can occur in both MV and LV networks, as previously described,
originating from faults occurring at the transmission level. Larger disturbances can be
further caused by the disconnection of large shares of DER generation. DER connected
at MV and LV should, therefore, be endowed with Low Voltage Ride Through (LVRT)
capabilities, which may help mitigate the effects of these larger disturbances [69,72].
VC is considered for the LV and MV networks and can be tackled by active and
reactive power management (AP-M and RP-M). Solutions for all timeframes are considered
interesting, depending, as for CM, on the event/trigger of the need for VC. With the excep-
tion of voltage sags that can result from faults requiring real-time response to compensate
the voltage dip, voltage magnitude and unbalance compensation are triggered mainly by
the forecasted status of the MV and LV network for the next day or hours and consequent
errors detected in (near) real-time. Therefore, as for CM, VC services can be classified by
their timeframe into Operational VC and Short-Term Planning VC.
Operational VC consists of the capability of regulating voltage in (near) real-time, ei-
ther through remote control of DER active and/or reactive power or dynamic VC schemes.
It is particularly directed for localized problems, requiring a quick response of the avail-
able flexibilities.
Short-Term Planning VC is designed for forecasted disturbances, again from DA or ID
to month-ahead timeframes. For example, a forecastable problem that occurs cyclically and
repeats at specific times (such as PV production in summer on a high insolation location)
would be best tackled by the frequent acquisition of a service that extends over long periods
of time.
The planning horizon and the voltage level of the network are key factors in the
definition of VC services. Both of them, although sharing general technical assumptions
across different timeframes, can be substantially different depending on the voltage level.
First, the geographical scope of the services will generally be limited, since VC needs
are localized in nature. Nonetheless, VC problems may also span across several voltage
levels. Both the amount of power and the duration of the service can, for example, vary
significantly when considering LV lines (which are more resistive, and therefore, more
Energies 2021, 14, 4451 17 of 30
suited for AP-M) or MV/HV lines (which are more inductive, and therefore, more suited
for RP-M).
In addition to voltage regulation, reactive power management in the distribution
network also has the objective of meeting the limitation of reactive power import/export
with the transmission network, following ENTSO-E recommendations [68]. Reactive power
regulation will even become more urgent in high RES integration scenarios, where a large
share will be connected to the distribution network.
The resources to provide such a service are not very different from the ones considered
for islanding, and include local generation and storage units, either stationary or mobile.
DER should also have black-start capability, and fast frequency and voltage services to
operate in islanded mode [75]. To ensure the stability and balance of the recently restored
system, adequate communication channels between DSOs and all parties involved is
also fundamental.
Emergency load control may be needed for additional load shedding when other
solutions (market based) cannot provide the required amount to maintain stability and
prevent further problems, while avoiding generation curtailment. A social merit order
should guide the selection of the loads to be curtailed, so that, for example, hospitals, police
stations and firefighter’s headquarters are usually the last in that merit order. Regulatory
mandates are preferred to market mechanisms by DSOs (the latter of which should have
already been depleted before), since it is an emergency service, with manual activation to
ensure that priority loads are not interrupted.
Finally, islanding and black-start services could be provided by mobile generation
capacity, which, similarly to diesel emergency generation, provide an alternative and
temporary power to supply to consumers connected to a certain grid area or to avoid
under-voltages and stability problems caused by planned or unplanned operation or
extreme events. This service can be market-based and could rely on long-term bilateral
agreements between DSOs and FPs.
4.3. Challenges for Upscaling the Integration of Flexibility in Distribution Networks: DSO
Vision Insights
Taking advantage of the flexibility of DER for improving distribution network ef-
ficiency, reliability and resilience is widely recognized by DSOs. However, three main
barriers have been identified for promoting market-based flexibility mechanisms at the
distribution level, namely: regulatory, network observability and deployment of DER
control and management systems [13].
Although Directive 2019/944 for electricity markets incentivize DSOs to procure
flexibility services, current national regulatory frameworks are distinct in the different
countries. Indeed, as reported in [8], national regulations often restrict the offering of
certain services or the participation of some FPs, as in the UK, where policy and regulatory
barriers are hindering the participation of smart solutions such as DR. However, in other
cases (see also [8]), these services cannot be financed, or the technology has not yet been
fully researched and assessed to provide these services, as is the case in Greece, where
the digitalization of the national networks is still in the preliminary rollout phase, namely
the installation of digital, smart metering devices. Oftentimes, the case is that no specific
regulation has yet been adopted for the use of flexibility in the distribution network.
Regarding the list of needs, the survey conducted by EDSO in [13] identified VC as
the more relevant need, followed by CM. This was an interesting result, considering CM
was the most addressed service in the projects analyzed (see Table 3). This can be explained
by the concerns towards the growing integration of DER and EV in LV networks, causing
mainly voltage magnitude and unbalanced phase problems associated to the specific
characteristics of these networks (e.g., radial topology and three-phase four wire network
with single-phase DER and loads connected) in a network with reduced monitoring and
control capabilities.
For VC and CM, both RP-M and AP-M are already addressed by most DSOs, partic-
ularly considering mandatory schemes. Implementing market-based flexibility services
implies a change in distribution network monitoring and control strategies towards a more
predictive approach. A predictive network management strategy will enable the forecast
of technical restrictions (e.g., voltage and congestions problems) and to define the optimal
operation strategy considering both network assets and flexibility resources [76].
Currently, the main Advanced Distribution Management Systems (ADMS) are moving
towards this predictive management strategy, particularly for HV and MV networks,
incorporating load and generation forecast tools and adapting traditional power system
Energies 2021, 14, 4451 20 of 30
simulation tools, such as optimal power flow [64]. The main challenge remains to develop
an adequate network management framework for the LV networks, considering the low
observability due to reduced monitoring capabilities and the high error of LV load forecasts.
Specific tools need to be developed, taking advantage of smart metering infrastructure and
its historical data and capable of dealing with poor topology mapping and network feeder
electrical parameter characterization [55,64,76].
Similarly, current network planning methodologies follow a business-as-usual model
considering conventional network reinforcement investments. To plan and assess the
benefit of long-term flexibility products, flexibility must be integrated as an additional
asset for planning purposes [64,77].
Therefore, implementing CM and VC through market-based mechanisms for short-
term and long-term planning requires significant updates in DSO systems and might
represent a costly solution to implement in the next 5 years for some DSOs [13]. The
potential value of services for support planned and unplanned actions are still considered
residual by DSOs, particularly islanding and black-start services. Islanding operation
in most countries is not allowed, also requiring wider implementation of network’s au-
tomatic switching equipment and complex network protection systems with adaptive
capabilities [78]. However, growing integration of RES and network resilience concerns
are increasing the interest on the possibility of islanding operation and distributed service
restoration, where tackling resilience becomes a more relevant operation and planning
criterion [79,80].
The early-stage development of local flexibility markets can also be explained by the
reduced number of FPs. The deployment of self-consumption solutions, EVs and other
flexible loads supported by interoperable energy management solutions will help scale up
flexibility in distribution networks, increasing the liquidity of local flexibility markets [15].
In conclusion, upscaling market-based flexibility services in distribution networks
requires: (1) the development of adequate national regulation framework; (2) increas-
ing the distribution networks observability and moving towards the predictive network
management framework, including adequate tools for LV networks; (3) promoting the de-
ployment of interoperable energy management solutions for increasing the remote-control
capabilities of flexible resources.
bids
Market agent
Prosumer,
DER
Aggregator bids DSO+TSO bids TSO
(market agent) Pre-qualification AS market(s)
Prosumer,
DER TSO/DSO resources
selection
TSO
DSO validation
Activation/scheduling for local use
Measurement for verification
bids
Market agent
Prosumer,
DER
Aggregator bids DSO+TSO DSO local TSO
(market agent) Pre-qualification flexibility market AS market(s)
Prosumer,
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DSO resources TSO/DSO resources
selection selection
Figure3.3.Local
Figure Local(DSO)
(DSO) and
and global
global (TSO)
(TSO) flexibility
flexibility markets
markets withwith resources
resources sharing
sharing (M2). (M2).
bids
Market agent
Prosumer,
DER
Aggregator DSO+TSO bids DSO local TSO
(market agent) Pre-qualification flexibility market AS market(s)
Activation/scheduling for local use
DSO TSO
Measurement for verification
Figure 3. Local (DSO) and global (TSO) flexibility markets with resources sharing (M2).
bids
Market agent
Prosumer,
DER
Aggregator DSO+TSO bids DSO local TSO
(market agent) Pre-qualification flexibility market AS market(s)
Prosumer,
DER
DSO resources TSO resources
selection selection
Figure 4. Local (DSO) and global (TSO) flexibility markets with shared responsibility (M3).
Figure 4. Local (DSO) and global (TSO) flexibility markets with shared responsibility (M3).
Coordination may sometimes include the communication from the DSO to the TSO of
• flexibility
the Common TSO-DSO
activated locallyflexibility market TSO imbalances. However, in many cases,
to avoid potential
locally
o activated flexibilities
This approach have a on
is based very low significant
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market, balancing.
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• theirTSO-DSO
Common bids to beflexibility
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market
#o The
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basedbids
on a by DSOflexibility
unique and TSOmarket,
is carried
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allinthea FPs
coordinated
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send their bids to be selected by TSO and DSO (Figure 5, model M4). take into account
# the
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selection of all thebids
grids
by involved.
DSO and TSO is carried out in a coordinated
o Ifprocess,
the resources
with many possible levels ofgrid
are used to resolve constraints,
complexity, the TSO
and should takeorinto
DSO need their
account
locational information.
the constraints of all the grids involved.
Energies 2021, 14, x FOR PEER REVIEW
# If the resources are used to resolve grid constraints, the TSO or DSO need 22 of 29
their
locational information.
bids
Market agent
Prosumer,
DER
Aggregator DSO+TSO bids DSO/TSO
Pre-qualification common
(market agent) flexibility market
Prosumer,
DER Coordinated DSO/TSO
selection
Figure5.5.Common
Figure CommonTSO-DSO
TSO-DSOflexibility
flexibilitymarket
market(M4).
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InIn[13,81],
[13,81],ananadditional
additionalTSO-DSO-BRP
TSO-DSO-BRPcoordination
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mechanisms
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the projects initiativesanalyzed
projects and initiatives analyzedinin[13],
[13], shows
shows that
that thisthis mechanism
mechanism is very
is not not very
often
often selected.
selected. Indeed,
Indeed, system
system operators
operators prefer
prefer to acquire
to acquire flexibility
flexibility in in regulatedmarkets
regulated marketsto
toavoid
avoidcompeting
competingwithwithcommercial
commercial parties
parties that
that could lower
lower their
their priority
priorityaccess
accessand
and
compromise
compromise their systems operation. In addition, the discussion on flexibilitypriority
their systems operation. In addition, the discussion on flexibility priority
access
accessisisalso
alsoaahot
hottopic
topicamong
amongDSOs
DSOsandandTSOs,
TSOs,with
withDSOs
DSOsgenerally
generallypreferring
preferringmodels
models
M2 and M3, which give them priority to their local flexibility, and TSOs opting for model
M4, which give them better visibility and access to the distributed flexibility resources.
M2 and M3, which give them priority to their local flexibility, and TSOs opting for model
M4, which give them better visibility and access to the distributed flexibility resources.
Correspondence to EUniversal
TSO-DSO Coordination Mechanism Addressed in
Market Organization [13]
CoordiNet, FlexHub Eu-Sysflex, SmartNet,
Centralized TSO flexibility market M1
TDX-ASSIST
CoordiNet, De-Flex-Market, EcoGrid 2.0,
EMPOWER H2020, FLECH-iPower, Flex-DLM,
Local (DSO) and global (TSO) flexibility FlexHub Eu-Sysflex. FLEXICIENCY, FlexMart,
M2
markets with resources sharing GOPACS-IDCONS, InteGrid, Interflex, IREMEL,
NODES, Piclo Flex (and Piclo), SENSIBLE,
SmartNet, USEF
Local (DSO) and global (TSO) flexibility
M3 CoordiNet, FlexHub Eu-Sysflex, SmartNet
markets with shared responsibility
Common TSO-DSO flexibility market M4 Coordinet, INTERRFACE, SmartNet
The review performed in [13] indicates that the TSO-DSO coordination with local
(DSO) and global (TSO) flexibility markets (models M2 and M3) were the most frequently
addressed among the project and initiatives listed in Table 2, as Table 7 shows. This is a
logical consequence of the fact that these markets organizations are apparently simpler,
with a lower optimization complexity, also allowing DSOs, the main facilitators of the use
of distributed flexibility, a better control and use of the resources located at their grids.
In addition, grid data are not shared between grid operators, something that can cause
privacy and security concerns. However, also note that this conclusion could sometimes
be misleading, since most initiatives, given their nature (commercial such as Piclo Flex,
Enera or GOPACS-IDCONS; conceptual such as FLECH-iPower or SENSIBLE; research
papers such as De-Flex-Market or EcoGrid 2.0) do not provide an extensive discussion
on coordination mechanisms and befell on the category of market mechanism associated
with that coordination scheme (market mechanisms M2 or M3). In fact, richer discussions
were found on projects that addressed different types of coordination mechanisms, namely
CoordiNet, FlexHub Eu-Sysflex, USEF and INTERRFACE. For example, INTERRFACE
focuses its discussion on the hypothesis of having or not separate or overlapping merit
order lists for CM and for the provision of balancing services. In any case, even if the
efficiency of common markets (mainly model M4) is widely recognized, data sharing issues
and co-optimization and coordination complexity are also widely acknowledge as potential
barriers, and since DSO flexibility markets are still a matter of research, smaller progressive
steps can support starting by simpler approaches, such as M2 and M3 models, which seems
to be coherent with what was observed in Table 7.
Note that the project SmartNet was not included on the list of projects reviewed
by EUniversal, since it can be considered the basic reference for the identification and
characterization of the main TSO-DSO coordination mechanisms and, as such, addresses
them all, being the base for all the following works. Reference [26] summarizes its main
findings: centralized schemes show higher technical and economic performance but are
very much dependent on generation and consumption forecasts’ quality and have larger
computational complexity; small-sized local markets can suffer from a high risk of illiquid-
ity; and information and communication technology (ICT) investments play a fundamental
role for any coordination scheme. Regarding this last topic, project TDX-Assist [84] focused
on developing ICT tools that are scalable, secure and interoperable for data exchange
between TSO and DSO, and can be taken as a fundamental reference on the ICT involved
in TSO-DSO coordination procedures. However, it does not analyze whether different ICT
requirements are needed, depending on the different market mechanisms described in this
Energies 2021, 14, 4451 24 of 30
section. The use cases related to the data exchange required for market operations, such
as acquiring balancing services at the distribution network by the TSO, were performed
under a centralized market scheme [85], basically corresponding to model M1. Other use
cases involving, for example, a congestion at the border between distribution and trans-
mission grids, are not considered to be solved by acquiring flexibility under any particular
market mechanism. Also related to communication interfaces, [86] proposes a conceptual
architecture based on three different interfaces. The first one is a direct TSO-DSO interface
to guarantee security, stability and resilience, with fast data exchanges for emergency
situations, and for medium- and long-term coordination for TSO-DSO grid connections by
exchanging structural information, forecasts, needs and resources activation. The second
one is a shared resources interface, where the distributed resources shared by TSO and DSO
can easily interact with both operators by providing structural information, baselines and
measurements. The third one includes the market interfaces, for the flexibility providers
to offer their services and TSO and DSO to buy them. These market interfaces would be
dependent on the specific market organizations selected, and should take care of avoiding
double bids selection, harmful activations for other SO grids, etc.
When looking at other projects outside the EU context, the Australian project Open
Energy Networks [87] is very interesting, since it also classifies TSO-DSO coordination
mechanisms (or the equivalent entities there) into the Single Integrated Platform Model
(SIP), Two-Step Tiered Platform Model (TSTP), Independent Distribution System Operator
Model (IDSO) and Hybrid Model. A closer look at this proposal shows strong similarities
with what is proposed here, although in these markets, as in the USA, and unlike in
the EU, energy, reserves and congestions are solved at once in the market optimization.
Taking this into account, the SIP model, where a single platform is managed by AEMO,
the Australian system and market operator, where aggregators can offer DER flexibilities,
can be considered similar to model M1. In the TSTP model, the DSO (called distribution
network service provider or DNSP) is responsible for managing and optimizing its network
and the resources located at its network, as in the M2 and M3 models, giving the priority
for using DER resources to the DSO before the TSO (or IDSO in this case) can use them. The
IDSO model is based on the TSTP, but an independent market operator manages the local
flexibility market, so they still can be matched to functional models M2 and M3. Finally,
the Hybrid model is based on a single platform that includes transmission, distribution
and DER constraints, which are optimized together, as in the M4 model. Once again, the
larger efficiency of this common optimization is highlighted.
Another Australian pilot project, completed in 2019, the Networks Renewed [88–90],
conducted by Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA), Essential Energy (EE) and
United Energy (UE), also experimented with using aggregated distributed resources, in
grid services’ provision, to solve local LV voltage problems. In the assumed market model,
the DSO entity is responsible for managing the DER flexibility, using it for local voltage
services (reactive power management), and after that, the remaining flexibility is made
available for the global AS market (if needed by the TSO entity). Again, through the
clearance of the local market prior to the system-wide market, it can be assumed that this
model is close to M2 or M3 market models.
Focusing on the USA, current TSOs (or equivalent entities such as the independent
system operator or ISO) seem to focus on integrating DER for the provision of balancing
services. This is, for example, the case of the PJM Synchronized Reserve market [91,92],
the NYISO Wholesale market [93,94], the MISO’s Load Modifying Resource market [95]
and the AESO Load Shed Services for Imports [96], all in the USA and based on market
model M1. In 2011, the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory proposed an Energy
Imbalance Market (EIM) for balancing and congestion management in several areas of the
Western Interconnection [97]. Two different possibilities were considered: (1) a centralized
inter-area balancing market in which DER can participate (model M1); and (2) local and
global flexibility markets for congestion management, in which the DSO secures its own
flexibility needs, while also allowing the DER, within its control area, to offer flexibility to
Energies 2021, 14, 4451 25 of 30
other areas (other TSO or DSO), provided that the bids are cleared by a security-constrained
economic dispatch (model M3). As of January 2021, a total of 11 TSOs and DSOs integrated
the EIM [98], with four other members being expected to join by the end of the year.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents a practical review of the existing and potential new ASs for TSOs
and new local system services for DSOs, with an emphasis on DSO services that will help
to address the new operation paradigm of the distribution grids. It also summarizes the
main TSO-DSO coordination mechanisms and flexibility markets organizations proposed
in the literature to acquire this flexibility. The work in EUniversal project, including the
analysis of 24 research projects and initiatives dealing with DSO flexibility markets, is the
base for the identification of DSO services, the assessment of their relative relevance for the
DSO operation, and the identification of the main TSO-DSO coordination mechanisms for
flexibility acquisition.
Enabling the participation of most potential players in the system services, with a
special focus on DER, is essential to provide flexibility for the system operation at all
levels: at the transmission level to account for new flexibility resources in a scenario where
thermal power plants, traditional FPs, are being progressively decommissioned, and, at the
distribution level, to cope with the increasing complexity of the distribution grids operation,
both to keep the security and quality of supply in a cost-effective way and to transport the
DG surplus from the decentralized generation to the transmission grid. The analysis of
this evolving transformation allows to identify new needs, scarcities and responsibility
in the operation of the transmission and distribution grids, as the basis to identify and
assess future grid services for a better and cost-effective grid operation, especially in the
DSO domain, where the precise definition and deployment of these new grid services is
still starting.
On the TSO side, grid services are very well established, and it is the move from
centralized to DG, with the decrease of dispatchable resources, that raises the existence
of new scarcities, and the need of compensating them with new flexibility resources
from the distribution side. The lower controllability of the new resources leads to the
challenge of guaranteeing the firmness and adequacy of the system. The shifting to
renewable generation and a more volatile net demand may require new fast reserves and
ramping services, new flexibility resources, and the decrease of physical inertia due to the
decommissioning of synchronous generators may require new inertia markets and the
participation of virtual inertia providers.
On the DSO side, grid services are still being discussed, but there seems to be a clear
consensus on the fact that VC and CM will need to be addressed first. The development of
these grid services to profit from the existing distributed flexibility also requires a careful
assessment of the most cost-effective solutions compared to more conventional practices,
such as the traditional approach of fit-and-forget approach based on grid reinforcements.
Indeed, the complexity and costs of developing potential new services is sometimes a
concern that needs to be properly assessed, and which will certainly depend on each grid’s
characteristics and expected evolution for the coming years. Technological advancements
also have an important role in increasing the controllability of DER and unlocking their
potential flexibility. The increasing role of the distribution systems in supporting extreme
events and outages, to increase the overall system resiliency, also provides new responsibil-
ities to DSOs. Although services such as islanding or black-start capabilities are not yet
seen as essential, they are expected to gain relevance in the coming years.
TSO-DSO coordination mechanisms are also under constant debate, and both the
complexity and the interests of TSOs and DSOs may sometimes make this coordination
difficult. Indeed, the most efficient approaches are those where all flexibility resources
are shared and optimally selected considering some kind of social welfare that simul-
taneously takes into account TSO and DSO grid constraints and needs. However, this
may require grid data sharing and the establishment of complex selection criteria and
Energies 2021, 14, 4451 26 of 30
priorities that may not properly satisfy all parties. In addition, moving from the current
system, where no distributed flexibility has largely been used yet, to this unique TSO-DSO
market framework may involve computational and organizational complexities that may
be better addressed with previous intermediate steps. This may explain why separated but
coordinated TSO and DSO flexibility markets are apparently preferred, as they could be a
reasonable approach to first unlock the distributed flexibility and develop the new DSO
market-based system services, as a previous step towards a more integrated and efficient
TSO-DSO coordination.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, R.S., E.A., R.F., J.V. and C.G.; methodology, R.S., E.A., R.F.,
J.V. and C.G.; formal analysis, R.S., E.A., R.F., J.V. and C.G.; investigation, R.S., E.A., R.F., J.V. and C.G.;
resources, R.S., E.A., R.F., J.V. and C.G.; data curation, R.S., E.A., R.F., J.V. and C.G.; writing—original
draft preparation, R.S., E.A., R.F., J.V. and C.G.; writing—review and editing, R.S., E.A., R.F., J.V. and
C.G.; supervision, J.V. and C.G.; project administration, C.G.; funding acquisition, C.G. All authors
have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s
Horizon 2020—The EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation 2014–2020, under grant
agreement No. 864334, EUniversal project. The sole responsibility for the content lies with the
authors. It does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Innovation and Networks Executive Agency
(INEA) or the European Commission (EC). INEA or the EC are not responsible for any use that may
be made of the information it contains.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is
not applicable to this article.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to express their gratitude to the EUniversal DSO partners
(E-REDES former EDPD from Portugal, E.ON. from Germany and Energa from Poland) and to
E.DSO (European Distribution System Operators association), as well as to other EU-SysFlex and
Interconnect partners that have, to some extent, help us to elaborate this integral vision on TSO and
DSO system services.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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