Whether or not a right is sovereign is a question of more than academic interest.

States and their

courts must also confront the range of legal issues that arise from interpreting a condominium
agreement. For example, in the early twentieth century, French courts struggled to define, at least
on a consistent basis, the status of the residents of Andorra, a territory jointly governed by France
and Spain.4° One court held that Andorrans should be treated as foreigners, while another stated
that the "rights of sovereignty which France exercises in Andorra d[id] not permit of the territory
being considered as foreign.'1

Schneider, supra note 19, at 733. The status of Moresnet was discussed by Belgium's main court
of last resort in the ag. EL-ERIAN, supra note 28, at 94 (citing Kepp et consorts, Cour de
Cassation [Ct. of Cassation], May 25, 1925, Pasicrisie Belge 1925, pt. I, 253-55). On September
16, 1924, the Belgian Court of Compensation for War Damages at Verviers denied claims
against Belgium for damages inflicted during World War I on property located in the Commune
of La Calamine (the territory formerly known as Moresnet). Id. The court of last resort reversed
the decision, finding that the territory was Belgian at the time of the attack. Id. It further held that
Belgian sovereignty did not begin with the Treaty of Versailles, when Germany officially
recognized Belgian unilateral sovereignty over the territory, but rather with the Treaty of Vienna
in 1815. Id. It stated that the Treaty of Versailles simply removed the obstacle of joint
sovereignty by rescinding Germany's rights over the territory; however, no new rights of
sovereignty were provided by Belgium's acquisition of unilateral sovereignty, even though
additional powers might be drawn from the new arrangement (such as the right to police the
territory). Id. Thus, the Belgian court concluded that Moresnet must be considered "as having
been a part of the Netherlands since 1815 and of Belgium since 1830." Id. (citation omitted)2

the condominium shows that contiguous States can exercise joint sovereignty over a territory
with which they share a common border.3

1
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1155&context=mjil pg 736
2
Ibid, citation no. 64, pg 740 look citation 19
3
Supra 1 pg 743
The tribunal also referred to the reasoning of the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan where the tribunal
held that the injunction of funds into the territory of the host state by the investor is enough to
suffice the territoriality requirement.4

, the mere existence of cross-border trade activities is not sufficient to meet the territoriality
requirement, and something more permanent than mere cross-border interests is required to
qualify as an investment. According to this tribunal, the decision could have been different if the
investors had inserted capital or operated a business activity in the respondent state.5

n. The tribunal in Deutsche Bank v Sri Lanka47 examined this BIT. Despite the fact that the
language in the treaty did not provide the territoriality requirement, the tribunal held that “the
existence of a territorial nexus with Sri Lanka is a condition of its jurisdiction. This tribunal’s
finding on the issue of territoriality requirement is justifiable because their interpretation is in
conformity with the rules laid down in Art 31 of VCLT.6

4
https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1104813/FULLTEXT01.pdf pg 11.
5
ibid pg 13
6
Ibid pg 18