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14-2
INVESTMENT SUBSECTORS—BUSINESS FIXED,
RESIDENTIAL, AND INVENTORY
Figure 14-6 demonstrates the volatility of each of the three investment subsectors: busi-
ness fixed investment, residential investment, and inventory investment. Fluctuations are
on the order of several percent of GDP. Business fixed investment is the largest of the
three, but all three subsectors undergo swings that are substantial fractions of swings in
GDP. Inventory investment is considerably smaller than the other two portions, but as
you can see, it is particularly volatile.
Figure 14-6 shows fixed investment as a share of GDP. In a recession or shortly before,
the share of investment in GDP falls sharply; then investment begins to rise as the
recovery gets under way. The cyclical relationships extend much further back in history.
For instance, gross investment fell to less than 4 percent of GDP in the Great Depres-
sion years 1932 and 1933.
Credit Rationing and Internal Sources of Finance Table 14-1 shows the sources of
manufacturing firms’ funding in the United States during the period 1970–1984. The
predominance of retained earnings as a source of financing stands out. Firms of all sizes
14
use outside funding from banks, bond markets, and equity only to a limited extent.7
Instead, they rely on retained earnings, profits that they do not pay out to stockholders,
to finance investment. As the last column of the table shows, retained earnings exceeds
50 percent of earnings for all firms and is relatively most important for the smallest
firms.
What do these facts mean for the investment decision? They suggest that there is a
close link between the earnings of firms and their investment decisions. If firms cannot
readily obtain funding from outside sources when they need it, the amount of assets they
have on hand will affect their ability to invest. This would mean that the state of a firm’s
balance sheet, and not just the cost of capital, is a financial determinant of investment
decisions.
Box 14-6 describes the important phenomenon of credit rationing, which occurs
when individuals cannot borrow even though they are willing to do so at the existing
interest rates. There are good reasons for credit rationing, all stemming from the risk
that the borrower will not repay the lender, for instance, because the borrower goes
bankrupt. These arguments suggest that credit rationing is more likely for small firms
without an established reputation than for large firms with a track record. The fact that
the retention ratio in Table 14-1 declines with firm size is consistent with this implica-
tion. These data, as well as the experience of firms that want to borrow, are consistent
with the assumption that firms are rationed in their access to funding.8
7
Equity funding is excluded from the table, but independent evidence, noted in the article by Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Petersen (cited in Table 14-1) shows that it provides very little financing for firms, especially small ones.
8
See Stephen D. Oliner and Glenn D. Rudebusch, “Is There a Broad Credit Channel for Monetary Policy?”
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 1 (1996), for evidence showing that internal
sources of funds are especially important for small firms and especially important in downturns.
*Minus sign indicates that firms have net assets (rather than liabilities) in this category.
Source: Steven M. Fazzari, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen, “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment,”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1988).
Under such conditions, firms’ investment decisions will be affected not only by the
interest rate but also by the amount of funds the firms have saved out of past earnings
and by their current profits. The cost of capital must still affect the investment decision,
because firms that retain earnings have to consider the alternative of holding financial
assets and earning interest rather than investing in plant and equipment. There is indeed
evidence that the rate of investment is affected by the volume of retained earnings and
by profits, as well as by the cost of capital.
In the early 1990s, in the aftermath of severe banking problems due to losses in
real estate, credit rationing was held responsible for the slow—despite low short-term
interest rates—rate of investment in the United States. Banks were lending very little,
especially to small- and medium-size firms. The problem was especially severe in de-
pressed regions, because small businesses can only borrow locally, from banks, but
banks in a depressed region are especially unwilling to lend.
Irreversibility and the Timing of Investment Decisions Beneath the stock-demand-
for-capital-leads-to-investment-flow model lies the idea that capital is “putty-putty.”
Goods are in a malleable form that can be transformed into capital by investment and
then easily transformed back into general goods. Much capital is better described as
“putty-clay.” Once capital is built, it can’t be used for much except its original purpose.
A warehouse (putty-putty) may have high-valued alternative uses as a factory or an
office building. A jetliner (putty-clay) isn’t of much use except for flying. The essence
of putty-clay investment is that it is irreversible. An irreversible investment will be
executed not when it becomes merely profitable but, rather, when it does not pay to wait
for any further improvement in profitability.9
9
This statement is based on a sophisticated argument in terms of financial option theory. See Robert Pindyck,
“Irreversible Investment, Capacity and Choice and the Value of the Firm,” American Economic Review,
December 1988; and Avinash K. Dixit and Robert S. Pindyck, Investment under Uncertainty (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1993).
*For a comprehensive survey on credit rationing, see Dwight Jaffee and Joseph Stiglitz, “Credit Rationing” in
Ben Friedman and Frank Hahn (eds.), Handbook of Monetary Economics (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1990).
†
Frederick Mishkin provides a readable introduction to the transmission mechanism between monetary policy and the
private economy in “Symposium on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall
1995. In the same issue, see also John B. Taylor, “The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: An Empirical Framework,”
Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler, “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission,” and
Allan H. Meltzer, “Monetary, Credit (and Other) Transmission Processes: A Monetarist Perspective.”
◆OPTIONAL◆
The Business Investment Decision: The View from the Trenches
Businesspeople making investment decisions typically use discounted cash flow
analysis.10 The principles of discounting are described in Chapter 18. Consider a
businessperson deciding whether to build and equip a new factory. The first step is to
figure out how much it will cost to get the factory into working order and how much
revenue the factory will bring in each year after it starts operation.
For simplicity, consider a very short-lived project, one that costs $100 to set up in
the first year and then generates $50 in revenue (after paying for labor and raw materi-
als) in the second year and a further $80 in the third year. By the end of the third year
the factory has disintegrated.
Should the project be undertaken? Discounted cash flow analysis says that the
revenues received in later years should be discounted to the present in order to calculate
their present value. If the interest rate is 10 percent, $110 a year from now is worth the
same as $100 now. (See Chapter 18 for a more extended discussion.) Why? Because if
$100 is lent out today at 10 percent, a year from now the lender will end up with $110.
To calculate the value of the project, the firm calculates the project’s present discounted
value at the interest rate at which it can borrow. If the present value is positive, the proj-
ect is undertaken.
Suppose that the relevant interest rate is 12 percent. The calculation of the present
discounted value of the investment project is shown in Table 14-2. The $50 received in
year 2 is worth only $44.65 today: $1 a year from now is worth $11.12 0.893 today,
and so $50 a year from now is worth $44.65. The present value of the $80 received in
year 3 is calculated similarly. The table shows that the present value of the net revenue
received from the project is positive ($8.41); thus, the firm should undertake the project.
Note that if the interest rate had been much higher—say, 18 percent—the decision
would have been not to undertake the investment. We thus see that the higher the inter-
est rate, the less likely the firm will be to undertake any given investment project.
10
Discounted cash flow analysis and the rental-cost-equals-marginal-product-of-capital models are simply
different ways of thinking about the same decision process. You will sometimes hear businesspeople discuss-
ing what we call the marginal product of capital as the “internal rate of return.”
At any time, each firm has an array of possible investment projects and estimates
of the costs and revenues from those projects. Depending on the level of the interest
rate, the firm will want to undertake some of the projects and not undertake others.
Adding the investment demands of all the firms in the economy, we obtain the total
demand for investment in the economy at each interest rate.
RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT
18
16
14
12 Mortgage
Percent
10 interest rate
8
6
4
Residential
2 investment/GDP
0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
from the gross return and, after tax adjustments, constitute the net return. An increase in
the net return on housing, caused, for example, by a reduction in the mortgage interest
rate, makes housing a more attractive form in which to hold wealth.
Monetary policy has powerful effects on housing investment. Part of the reason is that
most houses are purchased with mortgages. Since the 1930s, a mortgage in the United
States has typically been a debt instrument of very long maturity, 20 to 30 years, with
fixed monthly repayments until maturity.11
Monetary policy has powerful effects on housing investment because the demand
for housing is sensitive to the interest rate. There is sensitivity to both the real and the
nominal interest rates. The reason for this sensitivity can be seen in Table 14-3, which
shows the monthly payment that has to be made by someone borrowing $100,000
through a conventional mortgage at different interest rates. All these interest rates have
existed at some time during the last 30 years: 10 percent at the end of the 1970s and end
of the 1980s, 15 percent in 1981 and 1982, and 5.5 percent in spring 2003. The monthly
repayment by the borrower approximately doubles when the interest rate doubles. Thus,
an essential component of the cost of owning a home rises almost proportionately with
the interest rate. It is therefore not surprising that the demand for housing is very sensi-
tive to the interest rate.
Table 14-3 also shows the effect of taxes and inflation on housing costs. In the
United States, interest payments on a principal residence are deductible from the per-
sonal income tax. The deduction, not available in many other countries, is part of a de-
liberate attempt to encourage individual homeownership. A further feature of the U.S.
tax system is that nominal interest payments are deductible and nominal capital gains
*The assumed mortgage is a loan for $100,000 paid back over 30 years, with equal monthly payments throughout the
30 years. A 30 percent tax rate is assumed, and real after-tax payments assume capital gains are effectively untaxed.
11
Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) were introduced in the United States in the 1970s. The interest rate on
such mortgages is adjusted in accordance with some reference rate, such as the 1-year Treasury-bill rate. Both
fixed rate mortgages and ARMs are now used to finance housing. Arrangements for housing finance differ
significantly across countries. Five-year renewable mortgages are common in Canada. In Japan and Korea,
home buyers (and family) provide more housing funding than is common in the United States.
due to inflation are essentially untaxed. This means that the combination of high
nominal rates and high inflation strongly encourages housing investment. Consider pay-
ments on a $100,000 mortgage when the nominal interest rate is 15 percent and the in-
flation rate is 10 percent. Annual interest is approximately $15,000. For a homeowner in
the 30 percent marginal tax bracket, the mortgage interest deduction is $4,500, so the
after-tax interest cost is approximately $10,500. But at 10 percent inflation, this cost is
offset by a $10,000 increase in the nominal value of the house. In effect, the real cost of
capital for the house is nearly zero.
Despite this analysis, high nominal interest rates do discourage homeownership
because of two kinds of liquidity effects. First, the homeowner has to make the full
nominal payments up front and receives the offsetting capital gain far in the future. Sec-
ond, banks use rules of thumb to qualify mortgage applicants (e.g., that payments can be
no more than 28 percent of income) that don’t adjust very much in periods of high infla-
tion. Both these liquidity effects depend on the nominal, not real, interest rate.
INVENTORY INVESTMENT
Inventories consist of raw materials, goods in the process of production, and com-
pleted goods held by firms in anticipation of the products’ sale. The ratio of manu-
facturing inventories to sales in the United States was in the range of 13 to 17 percent
until about 1990. Since then the ratio has fallen and is now around 11 percent, as indi-
cated in Figure 14-8. Adoption of just-in time manufacturing techniques has contributed
to this decline.
17
16
15
14
Percent
13
12
11
10
9
1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
12
The accelerator model is actually a special case of the flexible accelerator. (The former came first.) To see
this, ignore the role of the rental cost and set 1 in the formula for the flexible accelerator.