Do Think Tanks Matter Assessing The Impact of Public Policy Instit

Do Think Tanks Matter?

Assessing the Impact of
Public Policy Institutes
DONALD E. ABELSON
Third Edition, Revised and Expanded
McGill-Queen’s University Press

Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago
© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2018
ISBN 978-0-7735-5324-8 (cloth)

ISBN 978-0-7735-5325-5 (paper)
ISBN 978-0-7735-5385-9 (eP D F )
ISBN 978-0-7735-5386-6 (eP U B )
Legal deposit fourth quarter 2018

Bibliothèque nationale du Québec
Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer
recycled), processed chlorine free
This book has been published with the help of a grant from the J.B. Smallman Publication Fund,
Faculty of Social Science, University of Western Ontario.
We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts, which last year invested $153
million to bring the arts to Canadians throughout the country.
Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien. L’an dernier, le Conseil a investi
153 millions de dollars pour mettre de l’art dans la vie des Canadiennes et des Canadiens de tout
le pays.
The author and publisher are grateful to the following for permission to draw on previously
published material: Donald E. Abelson, “Do Think Tanks Matter? Opportunities, Constraints and
Incentives for Think Tanks in Canada and the United States,” Global Society 14, no. 2 (2000):
213–36; Donald E. Abelson, “Public Visibility and Policy Relevance: Assessing the Impact and
Influence of Canadian Policy Institutes,” Canadian Public Administration 42, no. 2 (summer
1999): 240–70; and Donald E. Abelson and Christine M. Carberry, “Following Suit or Falling
Behind? A Comparative Analysis of Think Tanks in Canada and the United States,” Canadian
Journal of Political Science 31, no. 3 (1998): 525–55.
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Abelson, Donald E., author

Do think tanks matter?: assessing the impact of public policy institutes/Donald E. Abelson. –
Third edition, revised and expanded.
Includes bibliographical references and index.

Issued in print and electronic formats.
I S B N 978-0-7735-5324-8 (cloth). – I S B N 978-0-7735-5325-5 (paper). – I S B N 978-0-7735-

5385-9 (eP D F ). – I S B N 978-0-7735-5386-6 (eP U B )
1. Policy sciences. 2. Research institutes. 3. Research institutes – Canada. 4. Research institutes –

United States. I. Title.
C2018-900333-2
H97.A24 2018 320.6
C2018-900334-0
This book was typeset by Marquis Interscript.

To four dear friends, Adrian and Susan Hoad-Reddick and Ralph
and Mary Germaine
Contents
Tables and Figures

Acknowledgments
Acronyms
Introduction
1 Surveying the Think Tank Landscape in the United States and Canada
2 Thinking about Think Tanks: A Conceptual Framework
3 In the Arena: Opportunities, Constraints, and Incentives for Think Tanks
in the United States and Canada
4 Competing in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Strategies of Think Tanks
5 Public Visibility and Policy Relevance: Assessing the Influence of Think
Tanks
6 On the Road to the White House: Presidential Candidates and the Think
Tanks That Advised Them
7 Policy Experts or Policy Instruments? Think Tanks and the Debate over
Constitutional Reform in Canada
8 In the Pipeline: Think Tanks and the Debate over Keystone X L
9 Conclusion: The More Things Change … Policy Influence, Policy
Relevance, and the Future of Think Tanks in Canada, the United States,
and Beyond
Appendix One: A Profile of Selected American Think Tanks

Appendix Two: A Profile of Selected Canadian Think Tanks
Appendix Three: Media Citations for Selected American Think Tanks,
1998–2008; 2009–16
Appendix Four: Media Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks,
2000–2008; 2009–16
Appendix Five: References to Selected American Think Tanks in the US
Congress, 1999–2008; 2009–16
Appendix Six: References to Selected Think Tanks in Parliamentary
Committees, 1999–2008; 2009–16
Appendix Seven: Documents Related to Keystone X L Pipeline
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Tables and Figures
TA B L E S
1.1 Selected Profiles of American Think Tanks

1.2 Selected Profiles of Canadian Think Tanks
Newspaper Citations for Selected American Think Tanks,
5.1
1991–97
Newspaper Citations for Selected American Think Tanks,
5.1.1
1998–2016
A B C , N B C , C B S, and C N N Evening News Citations
5.2
for Selected American Think Tanks, 1991–97
A B C , N B C , C B S, and C N N Evening News Citations
5.2.1
References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks on C B C
5.3
Radio, 1988–96
References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks in C B C
5.3.1
Radio, 1997–2016
Media Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 1985–
5.4
99
Media Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 2000–
5.4.1
16
Newspaper Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks,
5.5
1985–99
5.5.1
2000–16
5.6 Globe and Mail Citations for Selected Canadian Think
Tanks, 1985–99
Globe and Mail Citations for Selected Canadian Think
5.6.1
Tanks, 2000–16
C T V National Evening News Citations for Selected
5.7
Canadian Think Tanks, 1998–99
5.7.1
C B C T V National Evening News Citations for Selected
5.8
5.8.1
5.9 Ranking Research Institute Consultations
Federal Government Departments Consulting with Selected
5.10
Canadian Think Tanks
Parliamentary Committee Reports Consulted for Think
5.11
Tank Testimony
Appearances by Selected Think Tanks before Parliamentary
5.12
Committees, 1980–99
Appearances by Selected Think Tanks before Parliamentary
5.12.1
Appearances of Institutes for House Committee Testimony,
5.13
1980–99
Appearances of Institutes for House Committee Testimony,
5.13.1
2000–16
Appearances of Institutes for Senate Committee Testimony,
5.14
1980–99
Appearances of Institutes for Senate Committee Testimony,
5.14.1
2000–16
Appearances of Institutes for Joint Committee Testimony,
5.15
1980–99
5.16 Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient Results
References to Selected American Think Tanks in National
A3.1
Media (television, newspapers, and magazines), 1998–2008
A3.1.1 American Media (television, newspapers and magazines),
2000–16
References to Selected American Think Tanks on American
A.3.2
Television News, 1998–2008
A3.2.1
A3.3
Television News by Network, 1998–2008
A3.3.1
References to Selected American Think Tanks on A B C
A3.4
News, 1998–2008
A3.4.1
News, 1999–2016
References to Selected American Think Tanks on N B C
A3.5
News, 1998–2008
A3.5.1
News, 2009–16
References to Selected American Think Tanks on C B S
A3.6
News, 1998–2008
A3.6.1
News, 2009–16
References to Selected American Think Tanks on C N N,
A3.7
1998–2008
A3.7.1
2009–16
A3.8 References to Selected American Think Tanks on F O X
News, 1998–2008
References to Selected American Think Tanks on F O X
A3.8.1
News, 2009–16
A3.9
Newspapers, 1998–2008
A3.9.1
A3.10
Magazines, 1998–2008
A3.10.1
References to Selected American Think Tanks in Canadian
A3.11
and International Newspapers, 1998–2008
A3.11.1
A3.12
A3.12.1
References to Selected American Think Tanks in
A3.13
International Newspapers, 1998–2008
A3.13.1
Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of National
A3.14 Media References for Selected American Think Tanks,
1999–2008
A3.14.1 Media References for Selected American Think Tanks,
2009–16
A3.15 Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of International
Media References for Selected American Think Tanks,
1999–2008
Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of International
2009–16
Media Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks (radio,
A4.1
television, and newspaper), 2000–08
A4.1.1
television and newspaper), 2009–16
Television Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks,
A4.2
2000–08
A4.2.1
2009–16
A4.3
A4.3.1
A4.4
A4.4.1
A4.5
Radio, Oct. 2004–08
A4.5.1
Radio, 2009–16
A4.6
2000–08
A4.6.1
2009–16
References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks in American
A4.7
A4.7.1 References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks in American
A4.8 Media References for Selected Canadian Think Tanks,
1999–2008
Comparisons of Annual Budget to Number of National
A4.8.1 Media References for Selected Canadian Think Tanks,
2009–16
Total References to Selected American Think Tanks in the
A5.1 US Congress (Senate, House of Representatives, Extension
of Remarks, and Daily Digest), 1999–2008
A5.1.1 US Congress (Senate, House of Representatives, Extension
of Remarks and Daily Digest), 2000–16
References to Selected American Think Tanks in the US
A5.2
Senate, 1999–2008
A5.2.1
Senate, 2009–16
A5.3
House of Representatives, 1999–2008
A5.3.1
A5.4
Congress (Extension of Remarks), 1999–2008
A5.4.1
A5.5
Congress (Daily Digest), 1999–2008
A5.5.1
A5.6 Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of References in
the US Congress for Selected American Think Tanks,
1999–2008
Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of References in
A5.6.1 the US Congress for Selected American Think Tanks,
2009–16
Appearances by Selected American Think Tanks before
A5.7
Congressional Committees, 1999–2008
A5.7.1
Committees, United States Senate and House of
A5.8
Representatives
Appearances by Selected Canadian Think Tanks before
A6.1
Parliamentary Committees, 1999–2008
A6.1.1
A6.2
Senate Committees, 1999–2008
A6.2.1
Appearances by Selected Canadian Think Tanks before the
A6.3
House of Commons, 1999–2008
A6.3.1
References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks during
A6.4
Debates in the House of Commons, 1994–2008
A6.4.1
Debates in the House of Commons, 2009–16
A6.5
Debates in the Senate, 1994–2008
A6.5.1
Debates in the Senate, 2009–16
A6.6 Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of Appearances
before Parliamentary Committees for Selected Canadian
Think Tanks, 1994–2008
Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of Appearances
A6.6.1 before Parliamentary Committees for Selected Canadian
Public Exposure of Selected US Think Tanks in Relation to
A.7.1
Keystone X L
Newspaper Coverage of Selected Canadian Think Tanks in
A.7.2
Relation to Keystone X L
FIGURES

A3.1
Media (television, newspapers, and magazines), 1998–2008
A3.1.1
American Media, 2009–2016
A3.2
A3.2.1
A3.3
A3.3.1
A3.4
News, 1998–2008
A3.4.1
News, 2009–2016
A3.5
News, 1998–2008
A3.5.1 References to Selected American Think Tanks on N B C
News, 2009–2016
A3.6
News, 1998–2008
A3.6.1
News, 2009–2016
A3.7
1998–2008
References to Selected American Think Tanks on C N N
A3.7.1
News, 2009–2016
References to Selected American Think Tanks on F O X
A3.8
News, 1998–2008
A3.9
A3.9.1
A3.10
A3.10.1
A3.11
A3.11.1
A3.12
A3.12.1
A3.13
A3.13.1 References to Selected American Think Tanks in
1999–2008
2009–2016
1999–2008
1999–2016
A4.1
A4.1.1
A4.2
2000–2008
A4.2.1
2009–2016
A4.3
A4.3.1
ctv National Evening News Citations for Selected Canadian
A4.4
A4.4.1
A4.5
Radio, Oct. 2004–2008
A4.5.1 References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks on C B C
Radio, 2009–2016
A4.6
2000–2008
A4.6.1
2009–2016
A4.7
A4.7.1
A4.8
Media References for Selected Canadian Think Tanks
A4.8.1 Media References for Selected Canadian Think Tanks,
2009–2016
A5.1 US Congress (Senate, House of Representatives, Extension
of Remarks, and Daily Digest), 1999–2008
A5.1.1 US Congress (Senate, House of Representatives, Extension
of Remarks, and Daily Digest, 2009–2016
A5.2
Senate, 1999–2008
A5.2.1
Senate, 2009–2016
A5.3
A5.3.1
A5.4
A5.4.1 References to Selected American Think Tanks in the US
A5.5
A5.5.1
A5.6
the US Congress for Selected American Think Tanks
A5.6.1 the US Congress for Selected American Think Tanks,
2009–2016
A5.7
A5.7.1
Appearance by Selected Canadian Think Tanks before
A6.1
A6.1.1
A6.2
A6.2.1
A6.3
A6.3.1
References to Selected Think Tanks during Debates in the
A6.4
A6.4.1
A6.5 References to Selected Think Tanks during Debates in the
Senate, 1994–2008
A6.5.1
Senate, 2009–2016
A6.6 before Parliamentary Committees for Selected Canadian
A6.6.1 before Parliamentary Committees for Selected Canadian
A7.1
A7.2
Acknowledgments
Since the first edition of Do Think Tanks Matter? appeared in 2002, I have
been able to rely on a dedicated team of students and staff to help gather,
consolidate, and organize information for many of the projects I have
undertaken. In writing the third edition of this text, I have once again
benefited from their professionalism and commitment to academic research.
I am grateful to Tom Cooke and Christine Wall for helping me update and
format many of the tables, graphs, and charts in this book, and to Hannah
Guiang, Ryan Park, and Kaitlyn Tyschenko for devoting countless hours to
tracking down new information for several of the appendices. I would also
like to thank Anna Zuschlag for her meticulous attention to detail in
preparing the index. Over the past few decades, I have been able to reach
out, and receive feedback from, several scholars who share my interest and
passion for the study of think tanks, and for this, I am eternally grateful.
They are Stephen Brooks (University of Windsor/University of Michigan),
Kent Calder (Johns Hopkins University), Evert Lindquist (University of
Victoria), Mark Garnett (University of Lancaster), James McGann
(University of Pennsylvania), Inderjeet Parmar (City University London),
Diane Stone (University of Warwick), and R. Kent Weaver (Georgetown
University).
As my fascination and preoccupation with the study of think tanks have
grown, my family and friends have exhibited far more patience and
understanding than I deserve. I would like to thank my father, Alan
Abelson, for his encouragement and guidance, and my three sisters, Lynn,
Joan, and Karen, for their love and support. My mother, Estelle Abelson,
who passed away in the fall of 2004, continues to be a great source of
inspiration. I think of her often. Rebecca and Seth, my two wonderful
children, should also be recognized. I have had the great privilege of
watching them grow and mature over the years, and take such pleasure in
observing the things in life they most value. I could not be more proud.
In my first year as an undergraduate at the University of Toronto, I had
the good fortune of meeting three amazing people – Adrian Hoad-Reddick,
Susan Hoad-Reddick (née Munn), and Ralph Germaine. We met in the Sir
Daniel Wilson Residence at University College and it did not take long for
us to strike up a friendship, one that has spanned over thirty-five years. This
book is dedicated to them and to Mary Germaine, Ralph’s wife, for always
being there for me.
Monda Halpern, a professor in the Department of History at the
University of Western Ontario and the person with whom I share my life,
continues to be my strongest and most vocal ally. Her warmth, intelligence,
tremendous wit, and beauty stop me cold in my tracks. And if for some
unknown reason I neglect to acknowledge all she has done, her twin sister,
Sonia, will not hesitate to remind me. I would like to express my sincere
thanks and gratitude to Sonia and to her terrific partner, Lawrence Burden,
for their love and friendship.
My sincere thanks to Gillian Scobie for her superb copy editing. I was
fortunate to have Gillian copy edit my 2016 book, Northern Lights, and was
thrilled to have her on board for this project. My work could not be placed
in more capable hands. Finally, I would like to thank Philip Cercone,
executive director of McGill-Queen’s University Press (MQ U P) and his
incredible staff for their advice and assistance over the years. When I was
considering a publisher for the first edition of Do Think Tanks Matter?
Richard Vernon, my distinguished colleague and friend, suggested that I
contact Philip at MQ U P. Rarely have I received better advice.
Acronyms
AEI American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

A I MS Atlantic Institute for Market Studies
APEC Atlantic Provinces Economic Council
CAP Center for American Progress
CCACD Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament
CCFPD Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development
CCIPS Canadian Council for International Peace and Security
C C MD Canadian Centre for Management and Development
C C PA Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
CCSD Canadian Council on Social Development
CIC Canadian International Council
CEIP Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
CFR Council on Foreign Relations
CIIA Canadian Institute of International Affairs
CIIPS Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security
CIGI Centre for International Governance Innovation
CIPE Center for International Private Enterprise
CISS Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
CNAS Center for a New American Security
CPRN Canadian Policy Research Networks, Inc.
CSE Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies
CTF Canadian Tax Foundation
C WF Canada West Foundation
ECC Economic Council of Canada
GDN Global Development Network
IPS Institute for Policy Studies
IRPP Institute for Research on Public Policy
NIRA National Institute for Research Advancement
N PA National Planning Association
NSI North-South Institute
P PA C Private Planning Association of Canada
PNAC Project for the New American Century
PPF Public Policy Forum
PPI Progressive Policy Institute
PRI Policy Research Initiative
RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs
SCC Science Council of Canada
Introduction
According to the 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, an annual

publication compiled by James McGann and his associates at the University
of Pennsylvania, close to 8,000 public policy institutes, or think tanks, as
they are more commonly called, exist worldwide.1 Of these, slightly more
than 1,870 are headquartered in the United States, with the largest
concentration located inside Washington: think tanks such as the world-
renowned Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute,
which recently moved into its brand new multimillion-dollar headquarters
on Think Tank Row, a stone’s throw from Washington, D C’s Dupont
Circle. For many scholars and journalists studying the so-called think tank
phenomenon, the explosion of policy institutes since the latter part of the
twentieth century and in the first decades of the twenty-first reflects their
growing importance, stature, and influence, both in the political arena and
in the policy-making process. This perception is reinforced by directors of
think tanks, who often credit their institutes with shaping the discourse
around major policy debates as well as the language in key pieces of
legislation. Yet, despite the more visible presence of think tanks in many
advanced and developing countries, few studies have engaged in serious
discussions about how to assess or evaluate their impact. Acknowledging
that such an assessment is notoriously difficult, many scholars have
consciously avoided conversations about how best to measure their
effectiveness; others have simply asserted that think tanks exercise
influence, without demonstrating how they actually achieve it.
Fortunately, in recent years, as scholarly interest in the role of think
tanks has grown, more attention has been devoted to exploring ways to
evaluate think tank performance. Although few definitive answers have
been offered, scholars are at least beginning to think more critically about
the complex nature of the policy-making process and the efforts of think
tanks to mold the policy preferences and choices of policy-makers. They
are also beginning to think more methodically and systematically about
how, and under what circumstances, think tanks may, through various
governmental and non-governmental channels, influence public opinion
around a host of domestic and foreign policy issues. In 2002, the title of the
first edition of this book posed what to most readers was a seemingly
straightforward and unambiguous question – Do Think Tanks Matter? Yet,
as my research at the time concluded, there are no simple answers when it
comes to revealing the extent to which think tanks make a difference in the
policy-making process. However, as more data have become available
about the visibility of think tanks in the political arena and their efforts to
more effectively market ideas to multiple stakeholders, it is possible to offer
a more nuanced argument, along with more informed observations about
their involvement at different stages of the policy cycle. Making this
information available and accessible to readers was the motivation for a
second edition of Do Think Tanks Matter?, which appeared in 2009. In that
edition, and in this, the third edition, I look again at the experiences of think
tanks in the United States, a country where these organizations have
become an integral feature of the political landscape, and in Canada, where
think tanks have become increasingly visible in recent years but, compared
with their American counterparts, enjoy less prominence in policy-making.
My central argument, which builds on the thesis I unveiled in the first
edition, is that think tanks in both countries have at times played an
important role in shaping the political dialogue and the policy preferences
and choices of policy-makers, but often in different ways and during
different stages of the policy cycle. For instance, several American think
tanks, including the American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institution,
the Heritage Foundation, and the Brookings Institution, have undertaken
active roles in several presidential campaigns and in the transition periods
that followed. Indeed, several scholars from these and other institutes
provided advice to Donald Trump, Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and
other presidential candidates during the hotly contested primaries in which
they were engaged, and made a concerted effort to pass along policy
recommendations to them and to those in their administration. Conversely,
think tanks in Canada are rarely important repositories of policy expertise
during federal and provincial elections. They tend to maintain a modest
presence during a new government’s transition to power. Nonetheless, a
handful of Canadian think tanks, including the Fraser Institute, the C.D.
Howe Institute, the Caledon Institute, and the Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, among others, are often active at other stages of the policy
cycle, particularly when the parameters of policy debates are being framed.
To market their ideas, these and other think tanks pursue a range of
strategies, including relying on print, broadcast, and social media,
distributing a range of publications to policy-makers and journalists,
inviting presidents and members of their administration to unveil new
policy proposals at their institutes, and testifying before various legislative
committees. As will become clear in the chapters that follow, while think
tanks in the United States and Canada share a common desire to influence
public opinion and public policy, how and under what circumstances they
seek to do so ultimately depends on a wide range of internal and external
factors, ranging from the priorities they assign to engaging key stakeholders
at various stages of policy-making, and the financial resources available at
their disposal, to the policy direction set by boards of directors and trustees.
Much of the literature that compares think tanks in the United States
with those in parliamentary systems such as Canada and Great Britain,
sparse as it is,2 suggests that the “distinctive characteristic of think tanks in
the United States is not their size or, for that matter, the considerable
funding of some institutions … What makes think tanks in the United States
unique, besides their sheer number, is the extent to which they have become
involved actively in various stages of the policy-making process.”3 Implicit
in this observation is the idea that think tanks, by virtue of the multiple
channels of access they are afforded, tend to play a more significant role in
the United States. That country’s political system is more decentralized and
fragmented than Canada’s, where the principles of strong party unity and
cabinet solidarity are enforced and where the presence of a permanent
senior civil service entrusted with advising policy-makers is thought to limit
opportunities for think tanks and other non-governmental organizations to
influence policy-making. Significant disparities in the financial resources
available to top-tier think tanks in the US and in Canada may also account
for why Canadian think tanks generally engage less actively in policy-
making than their counterparts in the United States. The perception that
think tanks in the United States have had a more discernible impact on
policy-making and in shaping specific policy issues than think tanks in
Canada has, for the most part, been supported by scholars in the field.
Indeed, the few case studies on the subject have concluded that while
several US think tanks have played a decisive role advising leading policy-
makers, shaping key policy debates, and contributing to the formulation of
government legislation by offering detailed blueprints on how to implement
important policy initiatives, Canadian think tanks, with few exceptions,4
have made only modest contributions to public discussions on issues
ranging from pension reform and tax policy to how to enhance Canada’s
role on the world stage.5
Think tanks in the United States may indeed have more opportunities, or
access points and channels, than Canadian think tanks, to directly and
indirectly influence public policy and may face fewer constraints in
conveying ideas to policy-makers.6 However, it would simply be wrong to
ignore the contributions several Canadian think tanks have made both to
policy-making and to shaping the policy- or decision-making environment.7
The importance of distinguishing between influencing policy-making and
the policy-making environment will become clearer in the case studies
included here. It will also become clear that although some institutional
constraints or political structures, as well as a host of other factors, have
limited the potential impact of Canadian think tanks at some stages of the
policy cycle, it would be naive to suggest that their presence in the political
arena goes unnoticed.8 Parliamentary systems, parliamentarians, and public
servants do not pose an insurmountable barrier to think tanks or to their
leaders, as some have suggested.9 The ability of think tanks in
parliamentary systems to convey their ideas effectively is constrained less
by the political environment they inhabit and more by the challenges many
think tanks face in remaining afloat. Interestingly enough, although
American think tanks have more opportunities to influence public policy,
modest institutional resources also plague the majority, who do not have the
luxury of drawing on massive budgets. Unlike the R A N D Corporation, the
Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, and a handful of other well-
heeled institutes that have annual budgets approaching, or vastly exceeding,
$100 million, most US think tanks face similar financial constraints as those
in Canada.
Scholars continue to struggle with the question of how much impact or
influence think tanks wield in policy-making and in shaping the policy-
making environment. And despite some progress that has been made in
identifying the conditions under which think tanks can position themselves
to affect policy change, scholars still resist offering definitive conclusions
about the influence of think tanks. But in all fairness, rather than stating
categorically that think tanks, by their very nature, exercise considerable
influence, those who study these institutions would be on stronger footing if
they pointed out that the amount of influence think tanks wield varies
enormously across the think tank population, and even more across the
various stages of the policy cycle. It also depends on a host of political
factors, many of which are beyond the control of think tanks competing in
the marketplace of ideas. These findings may continue to fuel frustration
among those looking for more concrete answers, but providing a measured
and qualified response is entirely appropriate. Having studied think tanks
for over two decades, I too struggle to determine how these organizations
leave their mark on policy-makers and on public policy. But the alternative
– making unfounded and unsubstantiated assertions about how much or
little influence think tanks enjoy – is even more disconcerting for those
seeking to provide a more nuanced and subtle understanding of their
behaviour in the policy-making process.
One major methodological problem in assessing influence is that think
tanks and policy-makers, not to mention the scholars who study them, have
different perceptions of what constitutes influence and how it can best be
evaluated.10 Moreover, as the policy-making community becomes
increasingly crowded, tracing the origin of a policy to a particular
individual or organization can prove futile in all but the most exceptional
cases. As many have claimed, every successful policy idea has a hundred
mothers and fathers; every bad policy idea is an orphan.
Some efforts, including those taken in this study, have been made to
track how often think tanks in Canada and the United States are referred to
in the media, as well as the frequency with which their staff testify before
parliamentary and congressional committees. But despite the large data sets
that have been compiled on these and other indicators that often speak to
the level and intensity of think tank engagement around different policy
issues, scholars have reached few hard and fast conclusions on their impact
in policy-making.11 The extent of media coverage think tanks generate may
speak to how adept they are at placing issues on the political agenda, not to
mention the priority and resources they assign to media outreach; several
journalists and directors of think tanks in both countries have made such
claims. Yet, as will be discussed, media exposure cannot, and should not, be
used as the sole indicator, or, indeed, even a reliable indicator, of policy
influence, even at the most preliminary stages of the policy-making process.
Several factors explain why some think tanks in Canada and in the United
States appear to have more impact on the policy-making community than
others. As Monique Jérôme-Forget, former president of the Montreal-based
Institute for Research on Public Policy observes, “quantitative measures,
such as the number of media citations, show only that ideas are being talked
about, as opposed to genuinely influencing the thinking of observers of an
issue.”12
This book will follow two central paths of inquiry to explain how and to
what extent think tanks shape the policy-making environment and the
policy-making process. First, it must consider the stage or stages in the
policy cycle at which think tanks are most actively engaged. While think
tanks in both Canada and the United States rely on similar strategies to
convey their ideas to policy-makers and to the general public, they often
take advantage of different opportunities to achieve their goals. As noted,
providing advice to US presidential candidates or to an incoming president
and his or her staff is an opportunity they cannot afford to miss. Chapter 6
notes that it is not uncommon for American think tanks to devote
considerable resources to providing presidential candidates and new
administrations with detailed blueprints revealing the various ways to
manage the nation’s affairs. During the riveting and mind-boggling 2016
US presidential election, which saw Donald Trump, the billionaire real
estate mogul and reality T V star, defeat Hillary Clinton to become the 45th
president of the United States,13 Trump, the self-proclaimed Washington
outsider and political neophyte, dipped into a gift basket of ideas
painstakingly prepared by the Heritage Foundation to help him move the
country far more to the right. From proposing concrete ways to repeal and
replace the Affordable Care Act (a shortened version of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act), widely known as Obamacare, to
assembling a list of potential conservative appointees to the US Supreme
Court (a list that included Judge Neil Gorsuch, who was confirmed as a US
Supreme Court Justice by the Senate during Donald Trump’s first 100 days
in office), the Heritage Foundation emerged as the darling of the Trump
administration. Several of these studies have hit the bestseller list.
Ironically, despite the widespread exposure that Heritage’s latest blueprint
on how to reform the federal government generated, and the extent to which
the organization established close ties to the Trump transition team and to
key figures in the Oval Office, Heritage president Jim DeMint was forced to
resign his post in April 2017. His term was cut short by Heritage’s board of
trustees, which had become increasingly concerned with the direction the
former South Carolina senator (2005–13) was taking, that DeMint was far
more invested in having Heritage engage in political advocacy than in
policy research. A call from the board of trustees for DeMint’s resignation
passed unanimously, and Edwin Feulner, co-founder and president of
Heritage for over thirty years, was reinstated as president until DeMint’s
successor, Kay Coles James.14
Other US think tanks and the people who staff them have made their
presence felt during the first months of the Trump administration. In fact,
some have gone to great lengths to ensure that the president fulfills many of
the commitments he made on the campaign trail. These included:
supporting the construction of the Keystone X L pipeline, a bilateral
initiative embraced by the Harper government but rejected by the Obama
administration; and withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, for
which, under President Obama, the US became a signatory. As will be
discussed in more detail in chapter 6, the Competitive Enterprise Institute
(C E I), a Washington, DC-based think tank with strong libertarian leanings,
employed several tactics to pressure Trump to make good on both promises.
Already predisposed to moving forward with Keystone and withdrawing
from the Paris accord, Trump’s controversial decision, particularly on the
latter, has generated considerable opposition from all but a handful of world
leaders. When Trump announced from the Rose Garden on 1 June 2017 that
the US would withdraw from the historic agreement, Myron Ebell, director
of Global Warming and International Environmental Policy at the
Competitive Enterprise Institute, and several of his colleagues, applauded
the president’s actions. Ebell, a supporter of global climate deniers Scott
Pruitt, head of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Steve Bannon,
Trump’s controversial former White House chief strategist, rarely concealed
his contempt for the Paris Climate Agreement. Still, while Ebell and his
colleagues at C E I and in the broader anti-climate-change-agreement
community celebrated Trump’s announcement, closer scrutiny is required to
determine how much credit they could legitimately take for the president’s
decision. Although C N N reported that C E I exercised enormous influence
on Trump’s vitriolic stance on the Paris Climate Agreement, an important
question remains: did policy experts at C E I convince Trump to move in
this direction or did they simply reinforce what the president intended to do
if he assumed the reins of power? How much influence did C E I truly
exercise? Did it provide the intellectual ammunition to Trump about the
“science” of climate change so that he could justify his decision, or did it
simply offer him some political reinforcement? Perhaps both. How crucial a
role did C E I play in informing Trump’s decision and his efforts, albeit
limited, to sell his position to world leaders and to the American public?
Questions regarding how much policy influence think tanks wield, and
the kind of drama that has unfolded in recent months among the leadership
at several top-tier US think tanks is not unique to US think tanks; it simply
plays out on a larger stage, which creates the impression that think tanks in
the US often find themselves embroiled in internal and external political
squabbles. Indeed, during the formative years of the Centre for International
Governance Innovation (C I G I), one of Canada’s largest think tanks, based
in Waterloo, Ontario, co-founder Jim Balsillie came under fire for his role
in replacing key figures in C I G I’s leadership team.15 Although the internal
squabbles at think tanks and their efforts to influence public policy
occasionally grab the headlines, what is even more pressing is how these
organizations navigate their way through the policy-making process. Unlike
in the US, think tanks in Canada rarely regard elections and transition
periods as the most opportune time to convey their ideas to policy-makers.
Many Canadian think tanks place a higher priority on identifying key issues
in policy debates and on working closely with senior and middle-level
public servants and members of the cabinet on an ongoing or ad hoc basis
to advance their interests. This strategy is pursued by such think tanks as
the Caledon Institute, the Public Policy Forum, and the more advocacy-
oriented Canada 2020, a think tank with close ties to the Washington-based
Center for American Progress (C A P). As noted, Canadian think tanks may
not enjoy the stature and visibility of some think tanks in the United States,
but their less noticeable presence does not necessarily translate into limited
policy influence. As Judith Maxwell, founding president of the now defunct
Canadian Policy Research Networks, Inc. (C P R N), stated, “the most
important type of influence is never documented.”16
By determining where in the policy cycle think tanks in the two
countries are most actively engaged, we can explore several factors that
may help to explain why think tanks in the United States are thought to play
a more significant role in the policy-making process than those in Canada.
As this study will reveal, while think tanks in Canada and the United States
function in very different political systems, their ability or inability to
establish and maintain a strong presence in the policy-making community
may have as much to do with how they define their missions and with the
directors who lead them, and the resources and strategies they employ to
achieve their stated goals, as with the political environments they inhabit
and seek to shape.
In addition to considering how various institutional, political, economic,
and cultural factors facilitate or constrain think tank development, it is
important to think more critically about how to measure their relative
performance in what has become, particularly in the United States, an
increasingly competitive space where think tanks compete intensely for the
attention of key stakeholders. Should their influence be measured by media
citations; number of appearances before legislative committees; followers
on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram; and total number of publications
released in a given year or downloaded from their websites? Or should
other performance indicators be taken into consideration? This second and
more difficult avenue of inquiry may not necessarily allow us to confirm
how much influence think tanks wield or whether they deserve to be ranked
higher or lower in global rankings and surveys of think tanks, but it will,
nonetheless, provide tangible and some intangible indicators to consider in
evaluating the strengths, limitations, and priorities of policy institutes.
C L A S S I F Y I N G T H I N K TA N K S
Several scholars who have studied think tanks have made important
contributions to our understanding of how these institutions have evolved
and the many political, economic, and social factors that have influenced
their development. James Smith’s exploration of American think tanks, The
Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite; Thomas
Medvetz’s recent study of American think tanks, Think Tanks in America;
and a co-edited volume, Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-Politics, that
I produced with my colleagues Stephen Brooks and Xin Hua that focuses
on think tanks in several different countries, are but three examples of
studies that have assisted both students and practitioners of public policy
and public administration to better understand the role of think tanks in the
policy-making process.17 But some basic questions remain unanswered. To
begin with, what are the defining characteristics of think tanks? How do
they differ from the multitude of other organizations, including interest
groups, that populate the policy-making community? What is their primary
function? And what conceptual frameworks have been constructed to study
their involvement in policy-making?
Defining a think tank has long posed problems for those seeking to
accurately describe what has become an increasingly diverse set of
organizations. As R. Kent Weaver and James McGann acknowledge,
although the term think tank was originally employed in the United States
during the Second World War to refer to a secure room or environment
where defence scientists and military planners could meet to discuss
strategy, it has since been used to describe several different types of
organizations engaged in policy analysis. Consequently, several
classifications of think tanks have been developed.
These organizations elude simple definition, in large part because there
is no consensus about what constitutes a think tank. While it is not difficult
to identify universities and trade unions, organizations that also engage
actively in research and analysis, trying to agree on what a think tank is and
what its primary goals are results in more questions than answers. For
some, the term “think tank” should be reserved only for a handful of large
well-funded organizations populated with dozens of high-powered
intellectuals committed to studying critical political, social, and economic
issues. In the United States, the Brookings Institution, a Washington icon
long heralded as the quintessential think tank; the R A N D corporation; the
National Bureau of Economic Research; the Peterson Institute for
International Economics; and the Urban Institute would likely be among the
special class of institutes satisfying these rather restrictive conditions. In
Canada, the list would be even shorter: the Conference Board of Canada,
the Centre for International Governance Innovation, and possibly one or
two others. If this use of the term was adopted, a large cohort of less visible
institutes that also engage in serious research and analysis would be
overlooked or identified as something other than what they are. By contrast,
if the term think tank is too inclusive, it could capture organizations with
more nefarious objectives, such as the National Policy Institute (N P I),
headed by Richard Spencer, the poster child for the alt-right, who, along
with his associates and followers, remains committed to preserving a white
America. The N P I attracted considerable attention during the 2016 US
presidential campaign for its vocal support of Donald Trump. In March
2017, the Internal Revenue Service revoked the N P I’s tax-exempt status as
a 501 c. 3 charitable organization, a designation held by a majority of think
tanks in the US. We will return to this subject later in this study.18
After struggling to define what a think tank is, most scholars have
concluded that there is no typical think tank. As McGann concedes, “I
know one when I see one.”19 Think tanks may range in size from entities
with as few as one or two people to ones with several hundred staff and
researchers. They may possess budgets as low as one to two hundred
thousand dollars or as high as several million dollars. A think tank could
look like R A N D, one of America’s premier foreign and defence policy
institutes, with an annual budget exceeding $300 million and an impressive
complex on prime oceanfront property in Santa Monica, California, or the
Toronto-based Mackenzie Institute, which has less than a handful of staff
and a budget barely topping $200,000.
Think tanks also vary tremendously in areas of specialization, research
output, ideological orientation, and in their institutional independence.
Some are affiliated with university departments and must rely on their
resources to sustain them. The various defence and foreign policy centres
established at over a dozen Canadian universities under the Department of
National Defence’s Military and Strategic Studies Program (MS S P), now
called the Strategic Defence Forum (S D F), is a case in point. There are
also think tanks that function inside government, including the
Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget Office in the
US.20 Of particular interest to this study, though, are independent public
policy think tanks. These organizations function much like private
corporations but their bottom lines are measured not by profit margins but
by their impact on policy ideas. We will emphasize these types of think
tanks, in large part because their survival depends less on the willingness of
legislators to sustain their operations (although some rely heavily on
government funding) or on academic departments prepared to support their
activities, than on how effective their directors and staff are in marketing
and promoting their ideas.
Despite their considerable diversity, think tanks do share some
characteristics: they are generally non-profit, nonpartisan organizations
engaged in the study of public policy. The majority in Canada and the
United States are registered as non-profit, tax-exempt organizations under
the Income Tax Act and the Internal Revenue Code, respectively. They
qualify for non-profit status by applying as educational organizations
committed to increasing public awareness about a host of policy issues. To
obtain tax-exempt status, they must also remain nonpartisan. In other
words, while think tanks in Canada and the United States are not prohibited
from taking positions on various policy issues, as many frequently do, and
are not required by law to disclose the names of the individuals and
organizations who fund them (although some think tanks in both countries
are becoming more transparent about the sources of their funding), they
cannot publicly endorse or oppose any political party or devote more than a
legally prescribed percentage of their budget to lobbying government.21
Think tanks can embrace whatever ideological orientation they desire and
provide their expertise to any political candidate or office holder willing to
take advantage of their advice. However, by law they must refrain from
engaging in certain overt political activities.
What has traditionally distinguished think tanks from the multitude of
other organizations in the policy-making community is the emphasis they
place on research and analysis. Not all think tanks share the same
commitment to scholarly research or devote comparable resources to
performing this function, yet it remains, for many, their raison d’être.
However, any contemporary study must reconsider the nostalgic vision of
think tanks as idea factories, or brain trusts, created to address society’s
most pressing social, economic, and political problems.
T H E R O L E O F T H I N K TA N K S
During the progressive era of the early 1900s, leading industrialists and
philanthropists in the United States, including the Scottish-American steel
baron Andrew Carnegie; Robert Brookings, a St Louis businessman; and
Herbert Hoover, the 31st president of the United States, recognized the
importance of creating institutions composed of prominent economists,
statisticians, mathematicians, political scientists, and historians capable of
bringing their scientific expertise to bear on important public policy issues.
Carnegie, Brookings, and Hoover believed, as did Jane Addams, the
founder of Chicago’s Hull House,22 that by establishing an environment
where academics would not be distracted by teaching responsibilities, but
could focus entirely on research relevant to public policy, think tanks could
play an important and much-needed role in policy-making. Several
institutional features of the American political system, including the
vacancies left by thousands of senior civil servants following a presidential
election, have given rise to ample opportunities for think tanks to provide
their insights and expertise.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Brookings
Institution, and a handful of other think tanks created during the first
decades of the twentieth century to improve government decision-making,
have contributed largely to the widely held perception of think tanks as
objective and politically neutral organizations devoted to research and
analysis. In recent years, however, as many policy institutes have placed a
higher premium on marketing and recycling ideas than on generating them,
this view of think tanks has come under closer scrutiny. In fact, as several
think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise
Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, to name a few, have placed a higher premium on political
advocacy than policy research, it has become increasingly difficult to
differentiate between think tanks and other types of non-governmental
organizations like interest groups, advocacy coalitions, and lobbyists, which
are also committed to shaping public policy.
The comparison often drawn between think tanks, particularly those that
are more advocacy-oriented, and interest or pressure groups, is not entirely
unwarranted. After all, many of the tactics that interest groups use to
convey their concerns to governments, including preparing and distributing
studies, publishing articles in newspapers, giving interviews on television
and on radio, reaching their large constituencies through social media,
arranging meetings with policy-makers and inviting them to speak at their
conferences and workshops, and testifying before various legislative
committees, are also frequently employed by think tanks. As charitable
organizations, think tanks, like interest groups, also try to recruit high-
profile individuals to their organizations in an effort to attract more funding.
The Hoover Institution, located on the picturesque campus of Stanford
University, is but one think tank that has done this. Included on its roster are
Condoleezza Rice, former national security advisor and secretary of state to
President George W. Bush; George Shultz, former secretary of state; Newt
Gingrich, former speaker of the House of Representatives; and, for a brief
period after he left his post at the Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld, former
secretary of defense during the Bush administration.
Still, despite the many similarities between think tanks and interest
groups, there are some notable differences. To begin with, although some
think tanks try to appeal to as large a segment of the electorate as possible,
like most interest groups, they do not speak on behalf of a particular
constituency. For instance, although the conservative-leaning Heritage
Foundation may in principle support the right of Americans to bear arms, a
constitutional right protected by the second amendment, it does not speak
directly on behalf of gun owners in the United States. This function is
performed by the National Rifle Association (N R A), one of America’s
most vocal interest groups and a staunch and vigorous opponent of gun
control legislation. Second, the main purpose of interest groups is not to
advance social science research (although some do devote considerable
resources to it), but to ensure that elected leaders pursue policies compatible
with their interests. To this end, interest groups, political action committees
(PA Cs), and super PA Cs donate to the campaign chests of political parties,
incumbents, and challengers most likely to support their wishes. Think
tanks, by contrast, are prohibited by law from endorsing or opposing
candidates for office and are not allowed to make donations to political
parties or to candidates. They can, however, contribute in other valuable
ways, including discussing various domestic and foreign policy issues with
incumbents and aspiring office holders.
As think tanks place greater emphasis on marketing their ideas and as
interest groups continue to invest more resources in building a stronger
research capacity to enhance their credibility and legitimacy, the
characteristics distinguishing the two will become increasingly blurred.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that think tanks do perform a
range of functions that in many ways make them unique. It is to this that I
now turn.
There has been much debate over what the motivations and priorities of
think tanks are, but one of their primary functions is clearly to help educate
policy-makers and the public – not to mention the private and non-profit, or
third, sectors – on pressing social, economic, and political issues. As
educators, think tanks draw on various sources of information and expertise
to communicate their views and concerns to multiple target audiences. Just
as teachers attempt to shape the minds of their students, think tanks actively
seek to mold public opinion and leaders’ policy preferences and choices,
some far more effective and engaging than others.
Think tanks perform their educational tasks frequently. At times they
serve as research brokers by acting as a conduit between the scholarly
community and policy-makers.23 In this role think tanks communicate their
findings to government officials and their staff in a clear and easily
digestible form. At other times they provide a forum for policy-makers,
academics, and representatives of the private and non-profit sector to
discuss issues of common concern. A handful of think tanks perform this
function well, including two Ottawa-based organizations, the Public Policy
Forum and Canada 2020. Outreach and consultation are other important,
related functions performed by think tanks. To share their ideas with the
public and with policy-makers and to discover more about the concerns of
particular stakeholders, think tanks frequently sponsor conferences and
workshops. Several also undertake contract research for government and for
the private sector.
For many think tanks, serving in an educational or research capacity
does not mean that they should, or must, avoid taking positions on policy
issues or advocate a particular set of values, beliefs, or principles. On the
contrary, as outlined in their mission statements, all are committed to
carrying out a set of goals and objectives. These may range from supporting
the preservation of free market principles – a goal embraced by the Heritage
Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, the Fraser Institute, the
Montreal Economic Institute, the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, and
the C.D. Howe Institute, among others – to stimulating public discussion on
poverty and social policy, the mandate of the Ottawa-based Caledon
Institute. The question for scholars studying think tanks is not whether they
are committed to policy research or to political advocacy but how much
emphasis they place on each. By better understanding the priorities of think
tanks, which can often be assessed by looking at how their budgets are
allocated, it is possible to provide more informed insights into the strategies
they rely on to convey their ideas.
S T U D Y I N G T H I N K TA N K S
In a 1987 study, Joseph Peschek remarked correctly that little research had
been conducted on think tanks and their role in the policy-making process.
At the time, only a handful of institutional histories of prominent American
think tanks and a few academic articles had been written. Acknowledging
this lack of scholarship, Peschek claimed that unless political scientists
began to focus more on the “subtle levels of [policy-making where]
identifying and defining problems, shaping public understanding of issues,
and constructing a political agenda” occurred, the significance of think
tanks and their impact would be overlooked.24 Peschek’s admonition has
not been ignored. Since the publication of his study of elite policy planning
organizations, several books, articles, and book chapters, not to mention
hundreds of newspaper articles and blogs, have been written detailing the
role of think tanks in various advanced and developing countries and their
efforts to shape public opinion and public policy.25 Directories have even
been produced to keep track of the hundreds of policy institutes established
worldwide, and several organizations in North America, Europe, and Asia
have taken it upon themselves to issue global rankings of think tanks.26 But
as diverse as these publications are, so too are the various theoretical or
conceptual approaches, or frameworks, employed to study think tanks.
As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, think tanks have been
regarded by some, including Peschek, William Domhoff, Thomas Dye, and
John Saloma, as organizations that often serve the economic and political
interests of the corporate elite. The several-million-dollar endowments
enjoyed by a select group in the United States, the number of prominent
business leaders who serve on their boards of directors and trustees, and the
steady pool of former and future high-level policy-makers working at these
organizations, provide elite theorists with evidence to support their
theories.27
However, since the think tank population is so ideologically and
economically diverse, some theorists prefer to treat them not as instruments
of the ruling elite but simply as one type of organization competing for
attention in a pluralist political system. Like interest groups and trade
unions, think tanks are seen as non-governmental organizations that employ
a wide range of resources to influence the content and outcome of public
policy. Influenced to some extent by elite theory, however, even proponents
of the pluralist approach acknowledge that some think tanks are better
positioned to engage in policy-making than others.
Drawing on the literature on elite and pluralist theories of democracy, a
handful of scholars have studied think tanks from a different perspective.
For instance, Hugh Heclo and Evert Lindquist treat think tanks as part of
larger epistemic or policy communities, whose researchers are often called
upon to help advise on particular policy matters.28 In this sense, think tanks
are regarded as sources of expertise that at times can help supplement the
research capacity of government departments.
Many of these approaches are useful and can help to shed light on think
tank development; this study of Canadian and American think tanks,
however, will adopt a rather different perspective. Since the purpose of this
book is to determine where and how think tanks have an impact on policy-
making, more emphasis will be placed on trying to understand why some
are far more effective at gaining access to some stages of the policy cycle
than others. On this question the literature on think tanks and on other types
of non-governmental organizations has been noticeably silent. As
previously mentioned, the differences in the institutional or political
structures of the two countries may help in part to explain why think tanks
in the United States appear to have more access to policy-makers than those
in Canada.29 Nonetheless, differences in institutional structures tell us very
little about why some think tanks in the same country are more visible at
certain stages of policy-making than others. Explanations for different
access to the executive, legislature, bureaucracy, and the media can be
provided only by looking more closely at the priorities, resources, and
strategies of think tanks.
Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the think tank population in
Canada and the United States. The chapter will trace their evolution in the
two countries and will discuss some of the many factors that have
contributed to their increasingly diverse nature. Among other things, it will
become apparent that think tanks in Canada and in the United States have
followed a similar path of development, albeit in Canada’s case at a more
staggered pace. In the process of tracing the evolution of think tanks, the
chapter will highlight some of the more prominent institutes in both
countries.
Chapter 2 will shift from a discussion of the think tank population in the
two countries to an assessment of the competing conceptual approaches that
have been employed to study think tanks. As noted, scholars have tended to
treat think tanks as elite organizations with close and lasting ties to policy-
makers, as one of many non-governmental organizations that seek to
influence public policy, or as institutes composed of experts who frequently
participate in policy or epistemic communities. While each of these
approaches can yield and has yielded important insights about the
behaviour of think tanks, this chapter argues that a different conceptual
framework is needed to better assess the impact of think tanks, one more
deeply rooted in the literature on agenda setting and policy formulation.
Rather than trying to determine how much or how little influence think
tanks have in shaping the policy-making environment and the policy-
making process, an endeavour that, in most cases, proves futile, I suggest
that scholars more closely scrutinize how think tanks become engaged at
different stages of the policy cycle to ascertain the value they add to key
policy discussions. By focusing on how think tanks attempt to shape the
political agenda, contribute to policy formulation, and assist in policy
implementation, a clearer picture emerges of which think tanks may or may
not have played an important role during critical stages of the policy-
making process.
Building on the conceptual framework set out in chapter 2, chapter 3
will explain why think tanks in the United States appear to be more actively
engaged at some stages of the policy cycle than their Canadian
counterparts. By comparing the different political systems, we can begin to
explain not only why think tanks in the United States appear to be in greater
demand but where in the policy cycle think tanks make their presence
strongly felt. We will emphasize the importance of evaluating the various
internal and external constraints that might limit the involvement of
Canadian and American think tanks in policy-making, as well as the
incentives decision-makers in the two countries might have to turn to think
tanks for policy advice.
In chapter 4 I will discuss the various governmental and non-
governmental channels that think tanks rely on to convey their ideas to
policy-makers and to the public, distinguishing between the public and
private uses of influence. The chapter will place particular emphasis on how
think tanks in both Canada and the United States are relying increasingly on
the media to shape the political dialogue and some of the implications of
this strategy.
Documenting how think tanks attempt to influence policy is a
reasonably straightforward exercise, but determining how to assess their
impact at various stages of policy-making is not. In chapter 5 I will also
explore how scholars use various indicators such as media citations,
parliamentary and congressional testimony, and consultations with
government departments and agencies to evaluate the impact or relevance
of think tanks at particular stages of the policy-making process. I will also
discuss the many methodological obstacles that must be overcome before
any useful conclusions about think tank performance can be reached.
The amount of media exposure think tanks generate and the number of
appearances they make before legislative committees may provide some
insight into how visible particular organizations are. Such indicators,
however, tell us little about what impact think tanks have had either on
specific policy issues or in assisting policy-makers to formulate policy
ideas. To acquire better insight into the relevance of think tanks, one must
go beyond simple data sets. To this end, the chapter will employ three case
studies that highlight some of the many functions think tanks perform in the
policy-making process: an analysis of the involvement of a select group of
American think tanks in several recent US presidential campaigns (chapter
6); an evaluation of the role of Canadian think tanks in the constitutional
conferences leading up to the Charlottetown Accord (chapter 7); and a
discussion of how a select group of think tanks on both sides of the Canada-
US border attempted to shape the policy discourse around the construction
of the Keystone X L Pipeline (chapter 8).
I have selected these case studies for several reasons. To begin with, by
placing think tanks under a microscope, it is possible to ascertain how and
to what extent these organizations engaged directly and indirectly in the
policy-making process. Second, identifying the key think tanks involved
does not require monitoring the activities of dozens of organizations, a
problem frequently encountered in studying US think tanks. From various
media accounts, government documents, and material from various
presidential and think tank archives, a clear picture emerges of which think
tanks played a critical role in advising various presidential candidates.
Identifying the think tanks involved in the constitutional conferences is
even easier: the federal government selected five think tanks in 1991–92 to
organize a series of conferences on constitutional reform. And, finally, over
a several-year period during which a handful of think tanks in Canada and
the US weighed in on the potential benefits and costs of building a pipeline
from Alberta to Nebraska, think tanks occupied centre stage in a battle that
has re-emerged during the early days of the Trump administration.
Although these case studies provide valuable insights into how think tanks
in Canada and in the United States can contribute to policy development in
different ways, an obvious disadvantage is the temptation to draw general
conclusions about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of think tanks from
such limited studies. As a result, these cases are simply offered as probes or
snapshots of how think tanks have become involved in policy-making at
specific times. They are not intended to serve as the basis for making
sweeping judgments about the behaviour of these or other institutes.30 In
chapter 9, I will present more recent data on the public exposure of a select
group of think tanks in Canada and in the United States. These data reveal
that over the last decades similar patterns in the various think tanks have
emerged in both countries which capture the attention of journalists and
policy-makers. Among other things, we will explore why some think tanks
continue to attract far more exposure and notoriety than others.
In addition to discussing the many challenges confronting think tanks in
Canada and in the United States in the future, including funding and
recruitment, the concluding chapter will examine how policy institutes have
come to play an increasingly active role in domestic and international
politics. As will become apparent, think tanks, not unlike other non-
governmental organizations committed to influencing public policy, clearly
believe in the power of ideas.
CHAPTER ONE
Surveying the Think Tank Landscape in the

United States and Canada
In the early 1900s, policy-makers in the United States and Canada did not
need a directory to keep track of think tanks conducting research and
analysis on domestic and foreign policy. Until the outbreak of the Second
World War, fewer than two dozen policy institutes existed in the United
States, and only a handful had been established in Canada. However, by the
mid- to late 1970s and early 1980s, the think tank community in both
countries had grown considerably. In his 1991 study on the rise of
American think tanks, James Smith estimated that more than 1,200 private
and university-based think tanks had sprung up throughout the United
States, most notably in and around Washington, D C.1 By 2017, this number
exceeded 1,870, with approximately 400 policy institutes inside the
Washington Beltway.2
Although much of the literature on think tanks has focused almost
exclusively on the largest and most visible of the institutes in the United
States, a typical American think tank more closely resembles the Climate
Institute of Washington, D C, with fewer than ten full-time staff and a
budget that has yet to reach $700,000, than the world-renowned Brookings
Institution. Indeed, the majority of American think tanks have little in
common with the Brookings Institution, the Hoover Institution, the Heritage
Foundation, and a select group of other prominent institutes that have
budgets greater than $40 to $100 million.3 Most think tanks in the United
States have even less in common with R A N D, which has 1,875 staff and a
budget exceeding $300 million. Interestingly enough, in size and resources,
the majority of think tanks in the United States resemble those in Canada,
where in recent years there has also been an increase in the think tank
population.
The purpose of this chapter is not to chronicle the origin of the several
hundred think tanks created over the last several decades but to illustrate
their evolution and diversity in Canada and the United States. This will be
done by focusing on four distinct periods, or waves, of think tank
development: 1900–46, 1947–70, 1971–89, and 1990–2017. I begin by
setting out a typology, or classification, of think tanks that can be used to
describe the different types of policy institutes in the two countries. This
will help to identify the major types of think tanks associated with the four
time periods outlined above. To further highlight the significant differences
among think tanks, I provide a brief profile of some of the most prominent
institutes in both countries. For comparison, think tanks from the United
States and from Canada, established during each of the periods under
consideration, are profiled.
C L A S S I F Y I N G T H I N K TA N K S I N T H E U N I T E D
S TAT E S A N D C A N A D A
Since there is no consensus about what constitutes a think tank, several

scholars have constructed various typologies to account for the diversity
among policy institutes that comprise the policy research community.4 They
have also attempted to identify the key motivations and institutional traits
associated with each generation, or wave, of think tanks. For instance, in
studying the evolution of American think tanks, Weaver identifies three
types of think tanks in the policy-making community: universities without
students, government contractors, and advocacy tanks. McGann, on the
other hand, has indicated that at least seven types of think tanks may
account for the entire spectrum in the United States: academic diversified,
academic specialized, contract/consulting, advocacy, policy enterprise,
literary agent/publishing house, and state-based. Additional typologies have
surfaced as well.
These and other typologies were originally intended to help identify the
different types of think tanks in the United States, but they can, with
appropriate modifications, also provide a useful framework for comparing
American and Canadian think tanks. Before chronicling the different kinds
of policy institutes associated with the four major waves of think tank
development, I will highlight some of the similarities and differences
between the major types of think tanks in the two countries.
Universities without Students
Universities without students, the first category of think tanks identified by

Weaver, are composed of dozens of academics hired to write scholarly
studies, rather than assume teaching and administrative responsibilities.
They function like universities in the sense that their principal mission is to
adhere to rigorous academic standards in promoting a greater understanding
of important social, economic, and political issues confronting society.
Unlike universities, however, the seminars and workshops they offer and
the studies they produce are generally intended for policy-makers, not
students. Supported in large part “by funding from the private sector (with
varying mixtures of foundation, corporate and individual funding),”
scholars working at these institutions regard book-length studies as their
primary research product.5 The Brookings Institution and the Hoover
Institution, two of the largest private research institutions in the United
States, are among the few think tanks that would fall into this category,
although even these institutes devote considerable resources to advocacy.
The Brookings Institution, the Hoover Institution, and other research-
driven institutes have long been permanent fixtures in the United States, but
these types of think tanks are noticeably absent in Canada. Despite
recommendations made to the federal government in the late 1960s to
create an independent interdisciplinary think tank on the scale of the
Brookings Institution, Canada has yet to become home to a university
without students. There are several think tanks that regard academic or
policy-relevant research as one of their principal functions, including the
Centre for International Governance Innovation (C I G I) based in Waterloo,
Ontario, and the Mowat Centre, housed in the School of Public Policy &
Governance at the University of Toronto. But none come close to
resembling the largest and most distinguished research-oriented think tanks
in the United States. In the Canadian context, then, it might be more
appropriate to refer to these types of think tanks simply as policy research
institutions than as “universities without students.” Institutions in this
category are staffed by economists, political scientists, and other trained
academics who conduct research on a diverse range of policy issues. The
majority of their resources are devoted to research, although book-length
studies are not necessarily regarded as their primary outputs. The Ottawa-
based Conference Board of Canada, well known for its expertise in
providing economic forecasting to policy-makers and business leaders, is
one think tank that would warrant this classification.
Government Contractors
What distinguishes government contractors from the preceding category is

not so much the type of research they conduct (although some of what
government contractors do is confidential) but their principal client and
primary source of funding. Think tanks like R A N D and the Urban
Institute, two of the leading government contractors in the United States,
rely primarily on government departments and agencies to sustain their
operations. Similarly, there are several examples of think tanks in Canada
whose work is, or was, almost entirely funded by government sources. In
fact, during the 1960s the federal government created a handful of think
tanks or “government councils” to provide advice in specific policy areas.
Many of these institutes, including the Economic Council of Canada, and
the Science Council of Canada, were disbanded in the early 1990s. Others,
including the North-South Institute, which relied for much of its funding on
the Canadian International Development Agency (C I D A), and the National
Council of Welfare and the Canadian Policy Research Networks, Inc., both
of which received the bulk of their funding from the federal government,
were forced to close their doors in recent years because of budget cuts.
Advocacy Think Tanks
Since the early 1970s, the most common type of think tank to emerge in
both Canada and the United States has been what Weaver refers to as the
advocacy think tank. Advocacy think tanks, as the name implies, “combine
a strong policy, partisan or ideological bent with aggressive salesmanship
[in] an effort to influence current policy debates.”6 Known more for
marketing and repackaging or recycling ideas than for generating them,
advocacy think tanks have played a critical role in transforming the
complexion of the policy research community, a subject that will be
explored in more detail in chapter 4. Advocacy think tanks tend to place
greater emphasis on producing brief reports for policy-makers than on
producing book-length studies. Moreover, to influence public opinion and
public policy, these types of institutes also place a high premium on gaining
access to the media. Their staff frequently appear on network newscasts and
political talk shows to share their insights on a wide range of topical policy
issues, and take advantage of various social media to attract even greater
exposure.
It is useful for comparative purposes to add a fourth and possibly fifth
and sixth category – vanity, or legacy-based, think tanks, policy clubs, and
think-and-do tanks. Legacy-based think tanks are created by aspiring office-
holders (or their supporters) and by former leaders intent on advancing their
political and ideological beliefs well after leaving office. Although at one
time these institutes were far more numerous in the United States (the
Jimmy Carter Center, the Center for the National Interest [formerly the
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom], etc.) several examples of Canadian
think tanks now fall into this category. These include: the Calgary-based
Manning Centre for Building Democracy and the Manning Foundation,
established by former Reform party leader Preston Manning; the Broadbent
Institute, founded by former federal N D P leader Ed Broadbent; the Allan
MacEachen Institute for Public Policy and Governance at Dalhousie
University launched by the former federal Liberal cabinet minister; and the
Brian Mulroney Institute of Government, which will open its doors at Nova
Scotia’s St Francis Xavier University in 2018. A 1959 graduate of St F X,
the eighteenth prime minister has raised $60 million for the institute that
bears his name.
The fifth category – policy clubs – may, according to Evert Lindquist,
best describe the majority of think tanks in Canada. In his assessment of the
impact of Canadian policy institutes, Lindquist suggests that it may be more
appropriate to portray several think tanks in Canada as policy clubs (where
academics, policy analysts, and, occasionally, policy-makers meet to
discuss public policy issues) than as policy research institutions capable of
providing long-term strategic analysis.7 Since they are unable to compete
with the institutional resources available in several bureaucratic
departments and large trade associations, Lindquist contends that the
nostalgic vision of think tanks as creators of new and innovative ideas
simply does not conform to the experience of Canadian policy institutes. He
bases his observations on the work of several policy institutes created in the
early 1970s, but his insights about think tanks as policy clubs can also
account for the activities of a handful of relatively small policy shops
created in the first decades of the twentieth century.
Finally, we could add a new category of think tanks commonly referred
to as think-and-do tanks. These are organizations that make a concerted
effort to translate their policy proposals into concrete action. This may
include, for example, developing a more effective system of wells in
countries suffering from drought. Among the handful of think-and-do tanks
that perform these dual roles is the Washington, DC-based Center for
Global Development.8
P R O C E E D I N G WI T H C A U T I O N : T H E L I MI T S O F
T H I N K TA N K T Y P O L O G I E S
Classifying generations, or waves, of think tanks according to specific

institutional criteria may allow scholars to distinguish one type of think tank
from another, and typologies can be useful in comparing think tanks in
different countries. Nonetheless, problems can arise in making such
classifications. To begin with, since some organizations possess
characteristics common to more than one type of think tank, they could
conceivably fall into several categories. For instance, while few observers
are likely to encounter difficulty distinguishing between the work of the
Conference Board of Canada and the Fraser Institute or between the
Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation, these institutions engage
in similar activities: they all conduct research and, to varying degrees,
market their findings. The main difference is in the emphasis they place on
pure research and political advocacy. To argue, then, that the Conference
Board of Canada and the Brookings Institution are policy research
institutions and that the Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation are
advocacy think tanks, would, on the surface, be misleading. Each could
conceivably be classified as both a policy research institution and an
advocacy think tank.
This potential problem cannot be understated. How scholars and
journalists classify institutes can have a profound impact on the way
different think tanks are perceived in the media and by the public. Referring
to the Brookings Institution as a world-renowned policy research institution
provides the organization with instant credibility, legitimacy, and notoriety.
Indeed, it creates the impression, rightly or wrongly, that Brookings
produces objective, balanced, and scientifically rigorous research.
Conversely, labelling the Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute as
well-known advocacy think tanks may imply that they are more committed
to advancing their ideological agenda than to pursuing scholarly research.
The implication is that the views and recommendations of “research
institutions” should be taken more seriously than those of “advocacy think
tanks.”
The problem of classifying think tanks incorrectly may become more
pronounced as these organizations adopt similar strategies to convey their
ideas. Like chameleons constantly changing their complexion to suit new
environments, think tanks frequently alter their behaviour to become more
competitive in the marketplace of ideas. To enhance their profile, some
think tanks that were created in the early decades of the twentieth century
now rely on tactics employed by the newer generations of institutes.
Moreover, some newly created institutes have looked to older generations
of think tanks for ideas on how to manage their operations. In short, despite
the diverse and eclectic nature of think tanks, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to isolate their unique institutional traits.
In distinguishing between different types of think tanks, scholars may
describe some institutes incorrectly. Unfortunately, given the
methodological problems often encountered in classifying them, this
problem might be unavoidable; nevertheless, typologies can still be useful
in identifying the kinds of think tanks that emerged during particular
periods. As the section below illustrates, think tanks in each of the four
waves of think tank development possessed certain defining characteristics.
It is these characteristics that allow a new generation of think tanks to be
identified.
T H E E V O L U T I O N O F T H I N K TA N K S I N T H E
U N I T E D S TAT E S A N D C A N A D A
The First Wave, 1900–45
The first decades of the twentieth century were a formidable period for
think tank development in the United States. Although there were several
prominent universities at the time, including Harvard University, Johns
Hopkins University, and the University of Chicago, a handful of
philanthropists and policy-makers believed that what was needed were
institutions whose primary focus was not teaching but research and
analysis. Guided by the belief that modern science could be used to solve
social, economic, and political problems, a philosophy that was widely
embraced during the Progressive Era,9 a small group of philanthropists and
social reformers set out to establish privately funded research institutes
ostensibly dedicated to serving the public interest.10 With generous funding
from Robert Brookings, Andrew Carnegie, Herbert Hoover, John D.
Rockefeller Sr, and Margaret Olivia Sage, among others, several of
America’s most venerable institutions were created. These included the
Russell Sage Foundation (1907), the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (1910), the Conference Board (1916), the Institute for Government
Research (1916; it merged with the Institute of Economics and the Robert
Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government to form the
Brookings Institution in 1927), the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution
and Peace (1919), the National Bureau of Economic Research (1920), and
the Council on Foreign Relations (1921).11 Founded under different and
often unusual circumstances, these institutions shared a commitment to
debating and investigating a wide range of domestic and foreign policy
issues in the hope of improving governmental decision making (for selected
profiles, see table 1.1). Composed of scholars recruited primarily from the
social sciences, the think tanks created during this era placed a premium on
producing objective and neutral policy research. However, as previous
studies have revealed, their goals were not always entirely altruistic, nor
were those of their generous benefactors.12
While many of the studies produced by these institutes meet the highest
scholarly standards, the institutes themselves can rarely be regarded as
value-neutral research bodies. The Brookings Institution is a case in point.
One of America’s oldest and most revered think tanks, Brookings has
cultivated a reputation as an independent institute that assigns the highest
priority to providing objective research and analysis. Preventing its board of
directors from interfering in the research agendas of its scholars is just one
way the institute has attempted to maintain its intellectual independence.
Nonetheless, being independent and producing objective research are two
different things. Until recently, few scholars studying think tanks have
questioned Brookings institutional independence, but this is beginning to
change. As a result of a series of high-profile newspaper articles by Brooke
Williams and a team of investigative journalists exploring the relationship
between prominent US think tanks and funding from foreign governments,
the extent to which policy institutes are able to remain insulated from
donors is being questioned.13 Allegations that many think tanks, including
Brookings, are being seen increasingly as lobbyists paid to extract
concessions from lawmakers, has created a hypersensitivity around the
issue of funding in the think tank community. While think tank presidents,
including Strobe Talbott, formerly of the Brookings Institution, have
adamantly denied that donors are able to undermine the integrity of research
conducted by his institute, rumours about pay for play at top-tier think tanks
persist.14 What is clear, however, is that think tank researchers, whether
they are employed at Brookings or Heritage, are expected, and, in fact,
encouraged, to make their policy preferences known. As early as 1920, a
handful of scholars at the Institute for Government Research, one of the
institutes from which Brookings evolved, engaged in an aggressive
lobbying campaign to convince the federal government to adopt a national
budget system. The result was the passage of the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921.15
Since then, Brookings has been at the forefront of many other major
policy debates. What distinguishes Brookings and other early-twentieth-
century policy institutes from more contemporary think tanks is not their
reluctance to become involved in the political arena but the emphasis they
continue to place on engaging in medium- and long-term research. In short,
unlike such think tanks as the Heritage Foundation, which concentrates on
providing policy-makers with what it would like them to know now, many
first-generation think tanks focus on issues policy-makers may want to
consider in years to come.
Despite gaining national prominence in the United States, major
research-oriented think tanks were noticeably absent in Canada during the
early 1900s.16 There were a handful of relatively small organizations
concerned about Canadian foreign policy, including the Round Table
Movement; the Canadian Association for International Conciliation; the
Institute of Pacific Relations, which enjoyed strong Canadian
representation; and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (C I I A),
established in 1928 as the first offshoot of the British Institute of
International Affairs (B I I A, later the Royal Institute of International
Affairs (R I I A), known as Chatham House). Yet even the C I I A was
created more as a “club” of influential Canadians interested in the study of
international affairs and Canada’s role in it,17 than as a policy research
institution composed of scholars preparing detailed analyses of world
events. Some organizations were committed to the study of domestic policy
as well. The National Council on Child and Family Welfare, which
eventually led to the creation of the Canadian Council on Social
Development (C C S D), was formed in 1920.18 These organizations, as
associations of interested individuals and groups, may not have looked like
“policy” think tanks when compared with those south of the border.
Nevertheless, they undertook important networking functions, and they did
commission some research outside the government. Still, with few
exceptions, the think tank landscape in Canada remained relatively barren
until the early 1960s (for selected profiles see table 1.2).
The Second Wave, 1946–70
By the end of the Second World War, a new wave of think tanks was
emerging in the United States, largely in response to the growing
international and domestic pressures confronting American policy-makers.
Acknowledging the invaluable contribution that defence scientists had
made during the war, the Truman administration considered the enormous
benefits that could be derived by continuing to fund private and university-
based research and development centres. By tapping into the expertise of
engineers, physicists, biologists, statisticians, and social scientists, policy-
makers hoped to meet the many new challenges they had inherited as the
United States assumed its role as a hegemonic power in the atomic age. It
was in this environment that the idea for creating the most prominent
government contractor, the R A N D Corporation (R A N D is an acronym for
research and development) was born (1948).19 In addition to making many
important contributions to American defence policy, R A N D was a
prototype for other government contractors, including the Hudson Institute,
founded by Herman Kahn, and the domestic-policy-oriented Urban
Institute, whose creation was strongly endorsed by President Lyndon
Johnson.20
In the post–Second World War era, policy-makers in Washington, like
the philanthropists during the early part of the twentieth century, recognized
the important role think tanks could play in several crucial policy areas.
They also recognized the potential benefits of drawing on the expertise of
independent research institutes that had the luxury of engaging in medium-
and long-term strategic research, instead of relying on government officials
and their staff, who were often besieged by daily paper work. Particularly in
the area of defence policy, it was crucial for the government to be able to
turn to think tanks that had assembled some of the best defence scientists in
the country and that, unlike policy-makers and bureaucrats in Washington,
were unlikely to be influenced by partisan interests.
Table 1.1
Selected Profiles of American Think Tanks, in Chronological Order
Source: Data for American Think Tanks obtained from various think tank websites, annual reports,
and from Charity Navigator.
Table 1.2
Selected Profiles of Canadian Think Tanks, in Chronological Order
Notes:
* The C I S S was folded into the Canadian International Council as of 5 May 2008.
** part of Imagine Canada Umbrella; facts are for Imagine as a whole
Source: Data for Canadian think tanks obtained from their websites, annual reports, and through
personal correspondence.
The United States had entered an era in which its defence and foreign
policy would have a profound impact on shaping world affairs. What it
required was sound, informative policy advice. For much of it, it looked to
R A N D and the Hudson Institute. But just as the federal government drew
on these and other think tanks for advice on defence and security issues,
President Johnson looked to the Urban Institute to suggest ways to alleviate
the many economic, social, and political problems that were contributing to
urban unrest throughout the turbulent 1960s. For Johnson, the war waging
inside the United States deserved as much, if not more, attention at times as
the conflicts taking place beyond America’s borders. The onset of the Cold
War and the war on poverty placed new demands on the United States
government and provided new opportunities for think tanks to make their
presence felt. Like the generation of think tanks before them, government
contractors began to fill a void in the policy research community.
The postwar period in the United States also witnessed the emergence of
several other think tanks, including the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (C S I S) and the Institute for Policy Studies (I P S),
which were not established as government contractors, but quickly became
immersed in Washington’s policy-making community nonetheless. Founded
in 1962 by David Abshire, former assistant secretary of state for
congressional affairs, and by Arleigh Burke, former chief of naval
operations, C S I S has been home to several luminaries such as the late
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Carter; Admiral
William Crowe, former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and James
Schlesinger, former secretary of defense. From its new $100 million state of
the art headquarters near Dupont Circle, C S I S often works closely with
incoming administrations to outline foreign and defence policy issues. In
many respects CSIS functions both as a research institution and as an
advocacy think tank.21 It has established an impressive research program
but has also undertaken considerable efforts to market its ideas. The I P S,
created in 1963 by Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnett, is another
Washington-based think tank known for its interest in American foreign
policy. However, unlike the more mainstream C S I S, the I P S has
developed a reputation as Washington’s think tank of the left for its
Marxist/radical approach US foreign policy. Few would dispute it is
ideologically driven.22
Several think tanks also emerged in Canada in the postwar period. The
Toronto-based Canadian Tax Foundation (C T F) was founded in 1946 by
representatives of the national law and accounting societies to conduct and
sponsor research on taxation. Eight years later, a branch office of the New
York–based Conference Board was established in Montreal to serve its
Canadian members. The Conference Board of Canada has since evolved
into Canada’s largest policy institute, with 200 staff and a budget exceeding
$40 million. In 1954, the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (A P E C)
was formed to promote economic development in the Atlantic region. And
in 1958 the Private Planning Association of Canada (P PA C) was founded
as a counterpart to the National Planning Association (N PA) in the United
States. P PA C was created by “business and labour leaders to undertake
research and educational activities on economic policy issues.” It was also
intended to support the Canadian-American Committee and two other
committees of the N PA, in an effort to help foster dialogue among
business, labour, and government representatives.23
The growth of think tanks in postwar Canada did not end there. The
Vanier Institute of the Family was established in 1965 by Governor General
Georges P. Vanier and Madame Pauline Vanier to study “the demographic,
economic, social and health influences on contemporary family life.”24 In
1968 the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs was created to provide
research support to parliamentary committees and government departments
examining various foreign policy issues.
By the early 1960s the Canadian government had also begun to show
interest in creating research institutes. Although the federal government had
traditionally relied either on bureaucratic departments or on royal
commissions and task forces to advise it on key policy matters, it began to
consider other ways to enhance its policy capacity.25 But unlike the
American government, which relied heavily on several private think tanks
for research and analysis, the Canadian government decided to establish its
own network of policy research institutes. It created several government
councils, including the Economic Council of Canada (1963),26 the Science
Council of Canada (1966), the National Council of Welfare (1968), and the
Law Reform Commission of Canada (1970) to advise it on a host of policy
issues. As Abelson and Lindquist point out,
These organizations received government funding in amounts that

most non-governmental think tanks could only dream about, but
operated at an arm’s length relationship inside the government (full-
time staff were public sector employees). Research activities,
including work undertaken on contract by academics and other
researchers outside government, were overseen by councils
consisting of representatives from the private and non-profit sectors
reflecting different constituencies and elements of society. The
councils identified new research initiatives, oversaw a rolling
portfolio of projects, and produced consensus reports informed by
commissioned research studies. Although the councils were
independent, members were appointed for fixed terms by the prime
minister and governments could request that new research initiatives
be undertaken by the councils.27
Although they operated at arm’s length from their employers, tensions

between the councils and various governments eventually began to surface.
The system of parliamentary and responsible government was simply not
conducive to allowing organs of the state, no matter how independent, to
express views on public policy that were at variance with government
priorities and policies.28 In its budget of February 1992, the government
took drastic measures to sever its institutional ties with the various councils:
in that year’s budget, the Mulroney government disbanded close to two
dozen policy institutes, including the Economic Council of Canada, the
Science Council of Canada, the Law Reform Commission, and the
Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.29 The Chrétien
government took steps to remedy some of the damage caused by the 1992
budget, including supporting the Privy Council Office’s Policy Research
Initiative (P R I).30 The P R I was intended to rectify the diminished policy
capacity of government by strengthening the ties between several federal
departments and agencies and the external research community. As part of
this initiative, a number of think tanks were called upon to help the
government think more strategically about the long-term impact of various
economic and social policies, a subject that we will return to later.
The Third Wave, 1971–89
The second wave of think tank development – the emergence of

government contractors and government councils – hit the United States
and Canada at approximately the same time. However, by the time the third
wave was making its presence felt in the United States, multiple waves
were simultaneously hitting Canada. In the United States in the mid-1970s
and 1980s, a new breed of policy institute – the so-called advocacy think
tank – was beginning to attract considerable exposure. What distinguished
advocacy think tanks from the earlier types of think tanks already
established in the United States was not their desire to study public policy
issues but their profound determination to market their ideas to various
target audiences. Rather than reflecting on important policy issues from the
comfort of their book-lined offices, founders of advocacy think tanks
understood the importance of immersing themselves in the political arena.
Ideas in hand, they began to think strategically and methodically about how
to most effectively influence policy-makers, the public, the media, and
other key stakeholders. Borrowing from some of the tactics adopted by the
American Enterprise Institute (1943), the Heritage Foundation, founded in
1973, was at the forefront of this new wave, elevating political advocacy to
new heights.31 Specializing in quick-response policy research, Heritage
emphasized the need to provide members of Congress and the executive
with hand-delivered one-to-two-page briefing notes on key domestic and
foreign policy issues. It also stressed the importance of marketing its ideas
to the media.32 Encouraged by the critical role Heritage played during the
Reagan transition of 1980,33 dozens of think tanks combining elements of
scholarship with aggressive marketing techniques began to take root
throughout this period.34 These included the Rockford Institute (1976),
which has enjoyed close ties to Reform presidential candidate Pat
Buchanan, the libertarian Cato Institute (1977), and the Economic Policy
Institute (1986).
As this new wave of think tanks was hitting the United States, three
distinct waves of think tank development were emerging in Canada. First,
by the late 1960s the federal government came to realize the potential
benefits of having a large independent research institute in Canada similar
to ones created in the United States during the early 1900s. Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau was familiar with the work of the Brookings Institution and
painfully aware of the absence of such an institution in Canada. In 1968, he
commissioned Ronald Ritchie to consider the feasibility of creating an
independent interdisciplinary policy institute. The resulting report,
submitted the following year, led to the creation of the non-profit Institute
for Research on Public Policy in 1972, with endowment funding from the
federal government and plans to receive additional support from the private
sector and provincial governments.35
Second, four established organizations underwent significant
transformations into modern think tanks during this period, and several new
ones were created: the Canadian Welfare Council, established in 1920, was
transformed into a social policy institute called the Canadian Council on
Social Development; the small Montreal office of the New York-based
Conference Board relocated to Ottawa, which contributed to its growing
expertise in developing economic forecasting models for both the public
and private sectors; and the C.D. Howe Research Institute was formed in
1973 (following a merger of the P PA C and the C.D. Howe Memorial
Foundation) to become a centre for short-term economic policy analysis.36
Finally, the profile of the Canadian Tax Foundation increased significantly
during the early 1970s, due to a national debate stimulated by the Royal
Commission on Taxation.
Several new think tanks in Canada were created as well. Two new
foreign policy think tanks were established in 1976: the Ottawa-based
North-South Institute, which, until it was forced to close its doors because
of budget cuts in 2014, received the bulk of its funding from C I D A, to
examine development issues, and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
in Toronto (C I S S), which, as of 2008, has been part of the Canadian
International Council (C I C), the successor to the Canadian Institute of
International Affairs. Moreover, the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy (now
called Imagine Canada, which grew out of a merger between the Canadian
Centre for Philanthropy and the Coalition of National Voluntary
Organizations in 2005) was formed in 1981 to advance “the role and
interests of the charitable sector for the benefit of Canadian
communities.”37 The following year witnessed the creation of the Toronto-
based Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (C I FA R), which supports
global networks of researchers in their quest for answers to some of the
world’s most pressing scientific, environmental, and social problems. And,
with an eye to resolving several other issues that were plaguing the
international community at the time, the federal government agreed to
establish and fund the Canadian Institute for International Peace and
Security (C I I P S) in 1984. (C I I P S was neither a government council, nor,
as it discovered after being dismantled in 1992, was it as independent as the
Institute for Research on Public Policy.) In 1985, the Calgary-based
Pembina Institute was established to study clean energy, among other
things. And in the following year, the Mackenzie Institute opened its doors
in Toronto. Notwithstanding its modest resources, the Mackenzie Institute
has generated exposure for its research interests in terrorism and radical
ideologies, a research area that has, since the events of 9/11 and the rise of
al Qaeda and I S I S, continued to generate widespread interest. In 1987, the
Public Policy Forum was established to improve public-policy-making by
providing a forum for representatives from the public, private, and non-
profit sectors to consider a wide range of policy initiatives. And in 1990 the
Institute on Governance, currently located in Ottawa’s historic Byward
Market, was formed to promote effective governance. Among other things,
it advises the Canadian government and governments of developing nations
on how to better manage public services and train executives, and it often
serves as a broker for Canadian agencies seeking to assist developing
governments.
In the third, several institutions devoted to the advocacy of particular
points of view, reflecting the latest wave of US think tank growth, were also
created in this period. The Canada West Foundation, established in Calgary
in 1971, was committed to injecting western perspectives on national policy
debates. The Fraser Institute was created in 1974 to promote the virtues of
free-market economics. And finally, the Canadian Institute for Economic
Policy was formed in 1979 by Walter Gordon, a former Liberal finance
minister, to sponsor a five-year research program working on the themes of
economic nationalism. In 1980 the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
(C C PA) was established by supporters of social democratic principles to
counter the influence of the Fraser Institute.38 Not surprisingly, the C C PA
has worked closely with the leadership of the New Democratic Party and
several public advocacy coalitions, including the Council of Canadians, to
convey its concerns on issues ranging from the growing disparity between
rich and poor to protecting the environment. The trend toward more
advocacy-driven think tanks also appealed to the Progressive Conservative
party. Following its defeat in 1980, several party members supported the
creation of a think tank on economic, social, and international issues, but
the initiative foundered when the party chose a new leader. However,
conservatives looking for fresh ideas have not been left out in the cold.
Since 2005, former Reform leader Preston Manning has welcomed
conservatives, both new and old, including those who support the
presidency of Donald Trump, to participate in activities sponsored by the
Manning Centre for Building Democracy (which, unlike its sister
organization, the Manning Foundation, is more of an advocacy body than a
think tank). Once a year, the Manning Centre hosts the Manning
Networking Conference in Ottawa, which attracts over 1,000 participants.
The think tank population in the United States and Canada grew
considerably during the 1970s and 1980s as both policy-makers and policy
entrepreneurs began not only to identify the need for independent policy
advice but to discover how effective think tanks could be in influencing
public opinion and public policy. The growth of conservative advocacy
institutions, in particular, was largely driven by generous benefactors who
believed that with sufficient funding think tanks could have a significant
impact in shaping the political dialogue, a subject that will be explored
further in chapter 3. Think tanks continued to spring up in both countries in
the 1990s, although at a much slower pace than in the previous decades.
While many recent think tanks have much in common with earlier
generations of policy institutes, there are, as the final wave of think tank
development reveals, some notable differences.
The Fourth Wave? 1990–2017
Vanity, or legacy-based, think tanks represent another type of think tank that
has emerged in the United States. Although they may not constitute a new
wave, they nonetheless represent an innovative and interesting
development. While legacy-based think tanks such as the (Jimmy) Carter
Center (1982) and the (Richard) Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom
(1994), now called the Center for the National Interest, have developed a
wide range of research programs to help advance the legacies of their
founders, some vanity think tanks appear more concerned with engaging in
political advocacy.39 Vanity think tanks are particularly interested in
generating, or at the very least repackaging, ideas that will help lend
intellectual credibility to the political platforms of politicians, a function no
longer performed adequately by mainstream political parties. Vanity think
tanks are also established, some have claimed, to circumvent spending
limits imposed on presidential candidates by federal campaign finance
laws.40 Examples of these types of think tanks include Senator Bob Dole’s
short-lived institute, Better America;41 the Progress and Freedom
Foundation (1993), an organization that enjoyed close links to former
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich;42 United We Stand, established by
Ross Perot; and Empower America, founded in 1993 by an impressive band
of neoconservatives, including the late Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Bennett,
and former Republican vice-presidential candidate, the late Jack Kemp. In
July 2004, Empower America joined forces with Citizens for a Sound
Economy to form FreedomWorks.
As noted, several legacy think tanks and advocacy organizations have
also taken root in Canada. In addition to the Manning Foundation and
Manning Centre, the country is home to the Broadbent Institute, the Allan
MacEachen Institute for Public Policy and Governance at Dalhousie, and
the Mulroney Institute of Government at St Francis Xavier. To this list can
be added the C.D. Howe Institute, named after its founder, a former Liberal
cabinet minister, and the Pearson-Shoyama Institute (created in Ottawa in
1993 to examine issues related to citizenship and multiculturalism and
named after former prime minister Lester Pearson and former federal
deputy finance minister Thomas Shoyama). Room in this category could
also be made for the Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, formed, as
noted, by a former finance minister to further his ideas on economic
nationalism.
An even more significant trend in Canada at the end of the twentieth
century was the privatization of existing government research. In 1992 the
Caledon Institute of Social Policy was created in Ottawa, with support from
the Maytree Foundation, to enable Ken Battle, a former executive director
of the National Council of Welfare, to develop a research agenda without
the constraints of serving a government council. In 1994, CPRN, Inc, was
created by Judith Maxwell, former head of the Economic Council of
Canada, to sponsor longer-term, interdisciplinary policy research programs
on social and economic policy issues and to leverage research capabilities
from across Canada. Unable to remain financially viable, C P R N was
disbanded in December 2009. Several other institutes were created in the
1990s: the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (A I MS, 1994); the
Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (C C I P S, 1995),
which evolved from the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and
Disarmament and the Canadian Centre for Global Security; the Centre for
the Study of Living Standards (1995); and the Canadian Centre for Foreign
Policy Development (1996),43 housed until recently in the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (D FA I T) and now called Global
Affairs Canada, one of the many federal government name changes
instituted by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau when he took office in the fall
of 2015.
The growth of think tanks did not end there. In 1997, the Winnipeg-
based Frontier Centre for Public Policy was established, and in the
following year in neighbouring Saskatchewan, the Saskatchewan Institute
of Public Policy (S I P P) was born. As of 2008, S I P P has operated under
the auspices of the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy at
the University of Regina. In 1999, the Montreal Economic Institute (ME I)
was founded, offering Quebec an alternative voice to the policy
recommendations of Montreal’s Institute for Research on Public Policy.
Although several of the organizations created in the early 1990s no longer
exist, those that remain have continued to maintain active research
programs.
As we entered the new millennium, the proliferation of think tanks in the
United States and Canada showed few signs of slowing down. In the United
States, a handful of newcomers, including the Center for a New American
Security (2007), a think tank with close ties to the Obama administration,
was making an impression. But ironically, it was in Canada where much of
the buzz about several new think tanks on the block was being heard, with
good reason. In 2001, Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis, then C O - C E Os of
the Waterloo-based company Research in Motion, creators of Blackberry,
provided a $30 million endowment to launch the Centre for International
Governance Innovation. In the same year, two other think tanks with
considerably fewer resources at their disposal were founded: the Parkland
Institute at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, the provincial capital;
and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (C D FA I), in
Calgary. With a second office in Ottawa, the C D FA I (now named the
Canadian Global Affairs Institute) boasts several distinguished scholars on
its roster of research fellows, including Jack Granatstein, David Bercuson,
and Colin Robertson, a former Canadian diplomat with considerable
expertise in Canada-US relations. No sooner did these think tanks begin to
gain momentum than four other organizations joined the policy research
community: the Wellesley Institute (2006), dedicated to addressing “urban
health disparities” in southeast Toronto, a think tank that, ironically, owes
its existence to the closure of the Wellesley Central Hospital in 1998;
Canada 2020, an advocacy think tank with strong ties to the Liberal party
and to a handful of progressive think tanks in the US; the Mowat Centre,
housed at the University of Toronto (2009); and the Macdonald-Laurier
Institute (2010), led by Brian Lee Crowley, a well-known figure in the think
tank community and founding president of the Atlantic Institute for Market
Studies.
The emergence of some of the aforementioned think tanks was
influenced by important and telling developments in public sector think
tanks. As noted, the federal government, as part of the first wave of serious
budget cutting in 1992, eliminated the Economic Council of Canada, the
Science Council of Canada, the Law Reform Commission of Canada, and
the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security – only the tiny
National Council of Welfare was left untouched.
Its fate was determined several years later when Stephen Harper decided
to cut its funding. The creation of the Caledon Institute and the Canadian
Policy Research Networks, Inc. were direct reactions to these eliminations.
The irony was that the government justified its decision not simply in terms
of savings but also because of the great number of non-profit think tanks
that had emerged in Canada since the 1960s. In the 1990s, Prime Minister
Mulroney and his colleagues had argued that there was sufficient policy
capacity outside government to supplement the research needs of federal
departments and agencies, a claim widely disputed in the media and in
some academic circles.44
In reviewing these waves, or periods, of think tank growth, it is
important to keep in mind that each new wave has not supplanted the
institutions that preceded it but rather has added new patches to an already
complex and colourful tapestry. Moreover, the older types of think tanks
have continued to be created in recent years in both countries. For example,
the Peterson Institute for International Economics, established in
Washington, D C, in 1981, is just one of many think tanks conceived of as a
“university without students,” an academic think tank similar to those of the
first wave. At the same time, however, a more crowded marketplace of
ideas has increased competition for funding and modified the practices of
the older institutions, creating a greater awareness of the need to make
findings accessible to and easily digested by policy-makers.45 This lesson
has not been lost on several new members of the think tank community in
Canada and the United States, including the Frontier Centre for Public
Policy (1997); the Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy (1998); the ME I
(1998); the Center for American Progress (2003), headed by John Podesta,
former White House chief of staff to President Clinton, co-chair of
President Obama’s transition team, and chair of Hillary Clinton’s 2016
presidential campaign; and the Center for a New American Security (2007).
In short, the institutes that comprise the think tank community in the United
States and Canada may have been created at different times and with
different goals in mind, but they recognize the importance of adopting the
most effective strategies to convey their ideas.
To provide additional insights into how some of the more visible think
tanks evolved in the United States and Canada and into what resources they
have at their disposal to market their ideas, the following section will
profile a select group of prominent think tanks that were established in the
United States and Canada during each of the four waves of development
discussed above. The profiles are intended not to provide a detailed
examination of the origins and activities of a select group of think tanks but
simply to help further illustrate the considerable diversity of think tanks in
the two countries. Among other things, these profiles will demonstrate that
while think tanks may have much in common, each seeks to establish its
own niche in the policy-making community, a subject that will be further
explored in assessing the impact of think tanks.
A P R O F I L E O F S E L E C T E D T H I N K TA N K S I N
T H E U N I T E D S TAT E S A N D C A N A D A
The Brookings Institution
The Brookings Institution, which claims to be guided by “Quality,

Independence, Impact” is one of the oldest and most prominent think tanks
in the United States. Located on Washington’s Massachusetts Avenue, a
popular location for several DC-based think tanks, the Brookings Institution
was formed when three separate institutions merged in 1927: the Institute
for Government Research (1916), the Institute of Economics (1922), and
the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government
(1924).46 Recognizing the achievements of the founding institutes, while
contemplating an even more significant role for his new institute, Robert
Somers Brookings (1850–1932), a St Louis businessman, philanthropist,
and social philosopher, was convinced that a nonpartisan interdisciplinary
research institute could serve both the needs of policy-makers and the
greater public interest. His determination to see the institute accomplish
these goals was reflected in the organization’s charter. It states that the
Brookings Institution was established “to promote, carry on, conduct and
foster scientific research, education, training and publication in the broad
fields of economics, government administration and the political and social
sciences generally, involving the study, determination, interpretation and
publication of economic, political and social facts and principles relating to
questions of local, national or international significance, to promote and
carry out these objects, purposes and principles without regard to and
independently of the special interests of any group in the body politic, either
political, social, or economic.”47
With about 300 resident and visiting scholars and support staff and an
annual budget exceeding $100 million, the Brookings Institution is one of
the largest think tanks in the United States. The majority of its revenues
come from philanthropic foundations, corporate and private donations,
including those from foreign governments (which as noted, has generated
some controversy), and its over $200 million endowment. According to its
Annual Report 2016, only 2 per cent of its revenues come from government
sources.48
Brookings, like most universities, maintains separate research
departments or what it refers to as programs. Its eleven main programs
include: business and industry, cities and regions, defence and security,
education, and global development economic studies. It also covers off
most geographic regions of the world. Each program is headed by a director
who is responsible both for overseeing the department’s research activities
and for generating sufficient funds to cover much of the department’s direct
costs. In addition, Brookings maintains several policy centers that focus on
specific policy areas or themes. These include the Center for Health Policy,
the Center for Middle East Policy, the Center on Social and Dynamics and
Policy, and the Tax Policy Center.
Few think tanks in the United States have established a more impressive
research record than Brookings. The institute publishes approximately two
dozen books each year, as well as a wide range of other publications geared
to different target audiences. Its scholars also take advantage of various
media outlets (including social media) and opportunities to testify before
congressional committees and subcommittees to convey their ideas on a
wide range of issues. Its impressive roster of scholars includes or has
included several former high-level policy advisers among its ranks, such as
Alice Rivlin, former director of the White House Office of Management
and Budget (1994–96), Charles Schultze, former chair of the President’s
Council of Economic Advisers (1977–80); former Brookings president
Michael Armacost, who served in the US Department of State (1984–89);
and Strobe Talbott, who occupied the Brookings presidency until November
2017 and served as deputy secretary of state during the Clinton
administration. Talbott was succeeded by General John Allen, a retired US
Marine Corps four-star general. This calibre of adviser also helps to
enhance Brookings reputation as a prestigious policy research institution.
RAND
Unlike the Brookings Institution, R A N D does not owe its existence to a

philanthropist who believed in the power of ideas but to a small group of
engineers and military leaders who understood how the development of
intercontinental missiles could both threaten and enhance America’s
national security. In late 1945, General H.H. Arnold, commanding general
of the Army Air Forces (the Department of the Air Force was established in
September 1947), acting on the initiative of two engineers from the Douglas
Aircraft Company, Arthur Raymond and Frank Collbohm, proposed a $10
million contract with Douglas to fund Project R A N D, “for the study of V-1
and V-2 rocket techniques and other intercontinental air techniques of the
future.”49 However, despite the government’s initial enthusiasm for the
project, relations between the air force and Douglas soured over the next
two years. Concerned that Douglas was more preoccupied with making
profits than advancing US security interests, the air force removed Project
R A N D from the aircraft company and proposed that an independent non-
profit organization be created to undertake the initiative.50
With an initial capital investment of $1 million and close to $5 million in
remaining funds from Project R A N D, the R A N D Corporation was
chartered in May 1948, “to further and promote scientific, educational, and
charitable purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the US of
America.”51 Under the leadership of Collbohm, who left Douglas to
become R A N D’s first president, a talented group of scientists, including
Bernard Brodie and Herman Kahn, gathered at the Santa Monica think tank
to consider how to protect and promote US security interests during the
nuclear age. Using systems analysis, game theory, and various simulation
exercises, R A N D scientists devoted themselves in the immediate postwar
years to serving the needs of the air force.52
R A N D continues to receive the bulk of its $300 million budget from
the US Air Force, the US Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
but its research interests are not confined to defence and national security
issues.53 As members of the largest think tank in the United States,
R A N D’s approximately 1,875 researchers and staff carry out research in
over a dozen major policy areas, including health care, education, science
and technology, energy and the environment, national security, and
population and aging. The majority of R A N D’s staff work at its Santa
Monica headquarters or its office in Washington, D C . Others are based at
R A N D’s Council for Aid to Education in New York City, R A N D Europe
in the Netherlands, or at one of its smaller sites.
In addition to overseeing an extensive research program that has resulted
in the publication of hundreds of books, policy briefs, reports, and academic
journals, R A N D established its own graduate school in 1970 to help train
future policy analysts. The Frederick S. Pardee R A N D Graduate School
stresses the importance of educating students to examine complex policy
issues from a multidisciplinary perspective. It is home to the largest PhD
program in public policy in the United States.
The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy

Research
Established in 1943 by Lewis H. Brown, president of the Johns-Mansville

Corporation, to promote the virtues of “free-market economics in the face
of a rising tide of Keynesianism,”54 the American Enterprise Association
(A E A) existed in relative obscurity for over a decade. Although Brown
hoped his organization would effectively challenge the growing influence
of the Brookings Institution, by 1954 the A E A only had four full-time
employees and an annual budget barely exceeding $80,000. In an attempt to
transform his organization from a small business association that analyzed
economic policies for corporate clients into an influential policy research
institution, Brown turned to the A E A’s executive vice president, William J.
Baroody Sr. Baroody, who had formerly served with the US Chamber of
Commerce, shared Brown’s vision of a research institution committed to
promoting free-market economics. After becoming president in 1962,
Baroody took the first step toward restructuring and revitalizing the A E A
by changing its name to the American Enterprise Institute “so that it
sounded less like a trade association and more like an intellectual centre.”55
Committed to promoting conservatism as the “dominant strain of
thought,”56 Baroody invented a new role for policy entrepreneurs – that of
impresario of intellectuals.57 As Sidney Blumenthal, a journalist and former
adviser to President Clinton points out, “A E I was his stage. Conservative
thinkers would rehearse ideas there, and then present them to political
leaders.”58
Combining the skills of an advertising executive, a corporate fundraiser,
and a political strategist, Baroody turned A E I from an insignificant
business association into the “MG M of Washington think tanks.”59 By
recruiting some of America’s most prominent economists, political
scientists, and former government officials, including Milton Friedman,
Jeane Kirkpatrick, and the late Herbert Stein, Baroody created a strong
platform from which to promote the organization’s conservative beliefs.
However, unlike Robert Brookings and Andrew Carnegie, who sought to
insulate their research institutions from partisan interests, Baroody took
pride in publicizing A E I’s mission. Guided by the belief that the
competition of ideas is fundamental to the survival of a free and democratic
society, Baroody undertook several measures to ensure that A E I’s
conservative message would be heard. By inviting government leaders to
participate in seminars, publishing books and periodicals, and encouraging
resident scholars to solidify their ties to corporate leaders and public
officials, Baroody carved out an important niche for A E I in the policy-
making community.
A E I’s rise to prominence can be largely attributed to Baroody’s vision
and guidance, but it may also have been facilitated by the changing
direction of political winds in the United States during the late 1970s.
According to Patricia Linden:
It was the right idea at the right time, a period when the insistent
voice of the neo-conservative think tanks began to invade opinion-
and decision-makers’ consciousness, and present formidable rivalry
for research dollars as well. A E I’s glittering lineup not only
invigorated the organization with fresh ideas, it all but guaranteed
lineage, attention, credibility and funding. The institute rocketed to
prominence: a world-class organization peopled with multi-
disciplinary star analysts whose wide-ranging views … gave
conservatism an intellectual depth.60
In 1978, after devoting more than twenty years to transforming A E I into

one of Washington’s leading think tanks, William Baroody Sr stepped down
as president and invited his son, William Baroody Jr, to guide the
organization into the 1980s. A former press secretary to Melvin Laird,
secretary of defense in the Nixon administration61 and the principal
architect of the Ford administration’s Office of Public Liaison, Baroody Jr
was well qualified to market A E I’s basic philosophy. Under his leadership,
A E I’s research program was expanded to encompass governmental, social,
and international affairs and several former officials of the Ford
administration, including the president himself, who became a distinguished
fellow at A E I after leaving public office, were hired to further enhance the
prestige and visibility of the organization. But like his father, Baroody Jr
realized that unless A E I’s ideas were properly marketed, the institution
would be unable to exercise influence on Capitol Hill and in the White
House. Consequently, in the ensuing years, he relied on his extensive
experience in media relations to increase A E I’s exposure in Washington.
With the confidence of a prize fighter standing over his defeated opponent,
Baroody extolled the virtues of marketing A E I’s research products:
I make no bones about marketing … We pay as much attention to the

dissemination of product as to the content. We’re probably the first
major think tank to get into the electronic media. We hire ghost
writers for scholars to produce op-ed articles that are sent out to one
hundred and one cooperating newspapers – three pieces every two
weeks. And we have a press luncheon monthly. [A E I also produces a
monthly television show on public policy shown on more than four
hundred stations, a weekly radio talk show on more than 180 stations,
and publishes four magazines (Regulation, Public Opinion, The A E I
Economist, Foreign Policy and Defense Review), legislative analyses
and books.] … It’s important for them [A E I scholars and
government officials] to deal with public issues that permeate the
environment in which they have to do business … That’s become
clear to them.62
Baroody’s preoccupation with marketing A E I and its products to policy-

makers and to the public began to generate concern among the
organization’s board members in the mid-1980s. Although the appointment
of close to three dozen A E I scholars to government posts, boards, or
commissions in the Reagan administration reflected the organization’s
growing visibility, Baroody’s inability to properly manage A E I’s research
program began to cause major setbacks. In addition to blaming Baroody for
mismanaging funds,63 conservative critics argued that while the United
States was moving comfortably to the right, A E I was drifting too far
toward the centre of the political spectrum.
As the rising tide of conservatism swept across the United States in the
mid-1980s, conservative foundations began to look to think tanks that were
willing and able to promote ideas consistent with their mandate. For
example, in 1986, fearing that A E I was not playing a leading role in the
conservative revolution, two prominent foundations, the Olin Foundation
and the Reader’s Digest Association, withdrew their financial support from
A E I and gave it to the Heritage Foundation, claiming that the former had
strayed too far from its rightward course.64 Faced with increasing criticism
from board members and corporate sponsors, Baroody was fired and
eventually replaced by Christopher DeMuth, a former official in the Reagan
administration.65 After leaving A E I, Baroody admitted that “he created too
rich a feast and served it too fast.”66 DeMuth, who resigned from A E I in
2008, learned from his predecessors’ mistakes. Commenting on the primary
goal of A E I, DeMuth stated, “We will continue to be a research institution
rather than a marketing institution.”67 With 225 staff and an annual budget
in excess of $50 million, A E I’s president Arthur C. Brooks oversees a
major research institute that has expertise in seven main areas: economics,
foreign and defence policy, health care, education, politics and public
opinion, poverty studies, and society and culture. Each area is further
subdivided into several program and policy areas. In addition to pursuing
active research in these areas which accounts for over 50 per cent of its
budget,68 A E I has not lost sight of the importance of marketing its ideas.
As Jeffrey Gedmin, a former research fellow at A E I points out, A E I “falls
between two worlds,”69 the secluded world of academic research and the
real world of Washington politics.
A E I understands the importance of increasing its visibility, which may
explain why it recently purchased and renovated one of Dupont Circle’s
most historic buildings. At a cost of $50 million (a pittance compared to the
$100 million C S I S spent on its new building), A E I’s new headquarters,
which for years was occupied by the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, is attached to the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. A E I has also raised its profile over the years by hiring several
former government officials and advisers, including Richard Perle, a
member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board; former speaker of the
House Newt Gingrich; Lawrence Lindsey, former chair of the National
Economic Council; Senator Fred Thompson; David Frum, a former speech
writer in the George W. Bush administration; John Bolton, former US
ambassador to the United Nations; and Paul Wolfowitz, former US deputy
secretary of defense and the tenth president of the World Bank.
Notwithstanding the many obstacles A E I has faced in its seventy-five-
year history, it has left a lasting imprint on many important policy
initiatives, from fighting the war on terror and recommending the surge in
Iraq, to advising the executive branch on how to further deregulate key
policy sectors.70 From its early beginnings as a proponent of free-market
economics, the American Enterprise Institute has paved the way for the
creation of other advocacy think tanks in the United States. By transforming
the role of think tanks from traditional nonpartisan research institutions to
vehicles for the expression of political beliefs, A E I is to a large extent
responsible for paving the way for third-generation think tanks. As Burton
Yale Pines, former senior vice president and director of Research at the
Heritage Foundation pointed out, “A E I is like a big gun on an offshore
battleship. We are the landing party. If they hadn’t softened it up, we
wouldn’t have landed.”71 Building on A E I’s achievements in marketing its
research findings, the Heritage Foundation has taken political advocacy to
new heights. In fact, for many observers of Washington politics, the
Heritage Foundation remains Washington’s quintessential advocacy think
tank.
The Heritage Foundation
Just as R A N D served as a prototype for other government contractors, the

Heritage Foundation has become the type of policy institute other
advocacy-oriented think tanks have sought to emulate. Heritage was
established in 1973 by two congressional aides, the late Paul Weyrich and
Edwin Feulner, with $250,000 in seed money from Colorado brewer Joseph
Coors. The idea of creating a think tank that could provide policy-makers
with timely and policy-relevant information came to Weyrich and Feulner
when the two sat down for lunch one day in the Senate Office building. As
Feulner recalls,
Weyrich and I were having lunch together and he showed me a study

that had the pros and cons on the S S T (Supersonic Transport). It was
a good analysis, but it arrived on his desk the day after the vote took
place. We both kicked that around and said, “Wouldn’t it be great if
there were an institution that delivered the kind of timely, usable
policy analysis so that those of us working on the Hill could really
make use of it?” I immediately called up the President of the
organization to praise him for this thorough piece of research and
asked why we did not receive it until after the debate and the vote.
His answer: they did not want to influence the vote. That was when
the idea for the Heritage Foundation was born.72
Operating from a small office space over a grocery store in one of the less
desirable neighbourhoods of Washington, D C, Heritage rocketed from
relative obscurity in the early 1970s to become America’s most visible think
tank during the Reagan years. Now located in an impressive office building
only blocks from the Capitol Building, Heritage’s profile in Washington’s
policy-making circles has continued to rise. “Committed to rolling back the
liberal welfare state and building an America where freedom, opportunity,
prosperity, and civil society flourish,” Heritage’s main goal is to persuade
policy-makers, the public, and the media to embrace “the principles of free
enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American
values, and a strong national defense.”73
Like most advocacy-oriented think tanks, Heritage does not try to
conceal its mission. As Edwin Feulner, president of Heritage for over thirty
years admits, “Our role is trying to influence the Washington public policy
community … most specifically the Hill, secondly the executive branch,
thirdly the national news media.”74 In his second stint as president of
Heritage, Feulner is unlikely to change his strategy. However, it is unlikely
that he will depart drastically from a strategy that served Heritage well for
so many years. Although Heritage publishes several books each year, its
main focus is not on long-term studies but on what Feulner often referred to
as quick-response policy research. Aware that policy-makers rarely have the
time or inclination to sift through a report of several hundred pages,
Heritage has built its research program around providing members of
Congress and the executive with concise and timely reports on important
domestic and foreign policy issues. At Heritage, marketing ideas is
considered as important as, if not more important than, generating them.
According to Heritage’s executive vice president and chief operating
officer, Phillip Truluck, “We certainly spend as much money on marketing
our ideas as we do on research. We keep these two functions in balance
because we believe that the process doesn’t end when a paper is published
… Our aim is to change public policy – not merely to comment on it – so
we have to give marketing a key role in our total mission. We cannot just
put out a study and hope that it gets in the right people’s hands.”75
Heritage’s formula for balancing policy research with political advocacy
has clearly paid off, and the creation of its sister organization, Heritage
Action for America, founded in 2010 as an advocacy body with 501 c. 4
status under the Internal Revenue Code, has certainly helped raise the
profile of key conservative issues. The Heritage Foundation’s budget has
more than quintupled in the past thirty years, rising from $17.9 million in
1989 to over 90 million in 2017. Heritage has been particularly successful
in marketing its message to large numbers of conservative supporters
throughout the United States. Three-quarters of its revenue is generated by
more than a half–million individuals who make annual contributions to the
organization.76 Heritage has also received several generous donations from
philanthropists and foundations who look to the organization to promote
their conservative beliefs. Its largest contributor has been Pittsburgh
billionaire Richard Mellon Scaife, who has donated over $20 million to the
organization since its inception. In 1976, three years after Heritage opened
its doors, Scaife donated $420,000, or 42 per cent of the organization’s
revenue at the time. Comparing the generosity of Joseph Coors to Scaife’s,
officials at Heritage have said jokingly, “Coors gives six-packs; Scaife
gives cases.”77
With over 250 staff who conduct research in both domestic and foreign
policy, Heritage maintains a visible presence inside the Beltway. Often
contacted by journalists to comment on policy issues confronting Congress,
Heritage scholars rarely pass up an opportunity to convey their views. At
times, some of these views, including those on health care reform, which
became the foundation for President Trump’s campaign to repeal and
replace Obamacare, have generated considerable animosity. During
Trump’s first 100 days in office, a group of protesters stormed the lobby of
the Heritage Foundation expressing their anger at how the organization had
supported Trump’s efforts.78
The Project for the New American Century (P N A C )
Despite closing in 2006 and being replaced by the Foreign Policy Initiative
(closed in 2017 due to funding cuts) in 2009, P N A C continues to generate
interest among scholars looking to better understand the role and impact of
public policy think tanks. At the height of its notoriety in 2001, one might
expect that, like the Heritage Foundation, P N A C occupied a large
luxurious office space close to the main centers of political power. After all,
where else would the think tank apparently responsible for creating a
blueprint for the Bush administration’s invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq be
located? How about in a small suite of rented offices in a downtown
building that at the time housed the American Enterprise Institute and The
Weekly Standard, a conservative magazine edited by William Kristol, the
chair of P N A C . With a budget of $600,000, P N A C could hardly afford an
office building in Heritage’s pricey neighbourhood.
Established in the spring of 1997 “to promote global leadership,”
P N A C employed four full-time staff and a handful of interns who, among
other things, helped to write and disseminate policy papers and issue briefs
(2 to 4 pages long) to approximately 2,000 journalists, academics, members
of Congress, editorial writers, and think tanks every six weeks. This
strategy, according to P N A C’s president Gary Schmitt, a political scientist
with a PhD from the University of Chicago, allowed us “to make a case that
is well-reasoned and brief. We have a much bigger voice than our size
because we offer a vision that is clear and articulate.”79
P N A C’s vision and creation, which was shaped by a 1996 Foreign
Affairs article co-authored by William Kristol and Robert Kagan,80 the best-
selling author of Of Paradise and Power, was clearly articulated in its
Statement of Principles released in June 1997. It states in part:
American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have

criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton Administration. They
have also resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks.
But conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of
America’s role in the world. They have not set forth guiding
principles for American foreign policy. They have allowed
differences over tactics to obscure potential agreement on strategic
objectives. And they have not fought for a defense budget that would
maintain American security and advance American interests in the
new century. We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and
rally support for American global leadership.81
What caught the eye of most journalists scanning P N A C’s Statement of
Principles was not the organization’s desire to advance what amounted to a
“Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity,” but the list of
high-profile policy-makers who offered their endorsement. As noted in the
Introduction, among the original signatories to P N A C’s principles were:
Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense; Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of
defense; Lewis “Scooter” Libby, chief of staff to Vice President Dick
Cheney; and Vice President Dick Cheney.
When President Bush’s strategy to promote and protect American
security interests began to take shape in the months following the tragic
events of 11 September 2001, the small and relatively obscure conservative
think tank with powerful connections in the Bush White House was
propelled into the national spotlight. Its September 2000 report, entitled
Rebuilding America’s Defenses, outlined a series of policy
recommendations strikingly similar to the actions President Bush was in the
process of pursuing. Indeed, it appeared to several journalists, even those
weary of conspiracy theories, that P N A C had laid the foundation for what
became known as the Bush Doctrine. While there is no doubt that P N A C
played an important role in contributing to the debate on global terror, its
influence in shaping Bush’s post-9/11 strategy has, by its own admission,
been greatly exaggerated. This observation has been confirmed by further
investigative reports.82
A VIEW FROM CANADA
The Conference Board of Canada
In many respects, the Conference Board of Canada is unique among

Canadian think tanks. With a staff of over 200 and an annual budget over
$40 million, it is by far the largest research institution in the country. But
despite its visible presence in Canada, the Conference Board originated in
the United States. In 1916 the Conference Board was established in New
York to “facilitate a cross-fertilization of facts and ideas in industry as a
way of identifying and solving its problems and enhancing the public’s
understanding of these problems.”83 Like many other think tanks created
during the Progressive Era, the founder of the Conference Board insisted
that the organization engage in “unbiased fact finding” and “refrain from all
political activity.”84
During the decades following its founding, the Conference Board
established itself as a highly credible and competent research organization
that proved capable of addressing the needs of both American and Canadian
companies. Indeed, as Lindquist points out, “With 40 large Canadian
companies alone participating in the US-based organization, the creation of
a Canadian office seemed a natural step.”85
In 1954 the Conference Board opened a small office in Montreal to
respond to an expanding number of Canadian companies, Canadian-based
US subsidiaries, and US companies interested in obtaining more
information about Canada. The Conference Board of Canada has created a
well-defined niche in the policy-making community. Unlike many smaller
think tanks that attempt to influence public debates through their various
publications and exchanges with policy-makers and journalists, the
Conference Board specializes in providing knowledge in key areas to its
members in the public and private sectors. In exchange for a membership
fee, the Conference Board “[helps its] members anticipate and respond to
the increasingly changing global economy … through the exchange of
knowledge about organizational strategies and practices, emerging
economic and social trends and key public policy issues.”86 Its primary goal
is to help its members become better prepared to adapt to changes in the
marketplace.
As well as providing members with access to its publications and
conferences, the Conference Board undertakes contract research. Known
for its expertise in economic forecasting and analysis, the board also
specializes in several other areas, including economics, organizational
performance, public policy, and leadership and human resources.
Given its size and the breadth of its research expertise, it is not
surprising that the Conference Board attracts more media attention than any
other policy institute in Canada, a finding that will be explored further in
chapter 5. Its commitment to producing independent and unbiased research
may also help explain why it has developed a reputation as one of the most
credible institutes in Canada, despite the occasional slip-up that has proved
embarrassing to the organization.87
The Vanier Institute of the Family
Established under the patronage of Their Excellencies, Canada’s Governor

General Georges P. Vanier (1959–67) and Madame Pauline Vanier, the
“Vanier Institute of the Family began its work in 1965 immediately
following the Canadian Conference on the Family the two patrons
convened at Government House.”88 As the Vanier Institute observes in its
brief history of the organization, “That founding conference brought
together distinguished men and women from all walks of life, each of
whom knew that the contribution of families is vitally important and
ultimately shapes the world in which we live.”89 Governor General Vanier’s
“vision to create an enduring organization dedicated to the cause of our
society through the family was supported by the leadership of renowned
Canadian neuroscientist, Dr. Wilder Penfield.”90
The Vanier Institute’s vision to promote “the well-being of Canadian
families” is anchored by a four-pronged strategy to:
• Build public understanding of important issues and trends affecting the

healthy functioning of Canadian families;
• Foster a society that identifies and provides for the needs and aspirations
of families;
• Encourage a family perspective among policy-makers, service providers,
employers, educators and others whose work affects the lives of families;
and
• Promote the inherent capacity of families to help themselves.91
To convey its ideas to multiple stakeholders, the Vanier Institute relies on its
robust research program, its commitment to public education and traditional
family values, and its willingness to form “strategic partnerships with
public and private institutions, corporations, the media and the non-profit
sector.”92 The Vanier Institute pays close attention to its public profile. Its
annual reports state how often its publications, including its magazine,
Transition, have been downloaded, the various media outlets with which its
researchers have interacted, and the number of people who have attended
the many conferences, seminars, and workshops it has organized.93 With
more than $16 million in investments, the Vanier Institute is well-positioned
to continue the mandate it carved out over fifty years ago with assistance
from one of English Canada’s most popular governor generals.
The Fraser Institute
Well before Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced in his Christmas

message in 1974 that “the marketplace was not a reliable economic
institution and would increasingly have to be replaced by government
action in order to sustain the economic well-being of Canadians,” the seeds
for creating the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute had already been
planted.94 Increasingly concerned by the federal government’s Keynesian
economic policies and the election of the first N D P government in British
Columbia in 1972, T. Patrick Boyle, a senior industrial executive and then
vice president of planning at MacMillan Bloedel, began considering how
best to inform Canadians about the crucial role that markets play in
economic development. After meetings with several business leaders and
economists, including Csaba Hajdú and Michael Walker, Boyle “conceived
the establishment of an economic and social research institution which he
felt had to be unlike any other in existence in Canada.”95
In early 1974, Boyle enlisted the support of the Honourable J.V. Clyne to
raise seed money for the institute and managed to generate $75,000. Boyle
also began working closely with Walker, Hajdú, and several other
individuals, including John Raybould and Sally Pipes, to draft the institute’s
mission statement and operating plan. On 21 October 1974, the charter of
the Fraser Institute, “so named for the mighty Fraser River, thereby giving
this new institute a geographical, rather than ideological reference point,”
was granted by the Canadian government.96
The Fraser Institute experienced little difficulty locating its geographical
or its ideological reference point during its first year, but, like most think
tanks in Canada and the United States, it became preoccupied with staying
afloat. With meagre resources during its first year of operation, fundraising
became the greatest challenge confronting the newly created organization.
Sir Antony Fisher, Fraser’s acting director and founder of several other
policy institutes, including the Institute of Economic Affairs in London,
coordinated Fraser’s fundraising efforts in 1975. A year later Fisher left the
staff of the Fraser Institute, and Sally Pipes, who had worked in the British
Columbia government’s statistical agency and the Council of Forest
Industries in the province, assumed fundraising and membership
responsibilities. Michael Walker, who had worked in the Department of
Finance and at the Bank of Canada before joining Fraser, became the
Institute’s research and editorial director, a position he held until the fall of
2005 when he was replaced by Mark Mullins.97
The Fraser Institute’s operating revenue and media profile steadily
increased in the last quarter of the twentieth century and into the first
decades of the new millennium. With a full-time staff of fifty-five and a
budget hovering around $10 million, Fraser has become one of Canada’s
most talked about and written about think tanks.98
Fraser’s current president, Niels Veldhuis, oversees an active research
program that focuses on over a dozen policy issues and has resulted in the
publication of a blog, The Fraser Forum, and dozens of books, conference
reports, and bulletins. Fraser also recognizes the importance of encouraging
and training future generations of conservative thinkers, the institute
sponsors a university student internship program and an annual student
essay competition. The institute generates considerable attention for its
studies that examine school rankings, as well as the date each year when
Canadians can actually keep their earnings instead of turning them over to
the government. They call it Tax Freedom day.
The Fraser Institute, like the Heritage Foundation, has cultivated a
reputation, deservedly so, as a free-market advocacy-oriented think tank
that places considerable emphasis on shaping public opinion and public
policy. Indeed, its obvious bias toward relying on market solutions to
economic problems has often made it an easy target for critics. Still, it is
important to keep in mind that think tanks from the entire political spectrum
engage in some form of political advocacy.
As the final think tank profiles illustrate, even more liberal think tanks
with far more modest resources than the Fraser Institute recognize the
importance of conveying their ideas to policy-makers and the public.
The Caledon Institute of Social Policy

It is difficult to discuss the Ottawa-based Caledon Institute without
immediately invoking the name of its director Ken Battle. In fact, few other
think tank directors in Canada, perhaps with the exception of Michael
Walker when he held that position,99 have become so closely identified with
a policy institute. Battle’s reputation as one of the country’s most astute
thinkers on social policy is well known in Ottawa’s key policy-making
circles. Often invited to advise senior policy-makers on a range of social
and tax policies, including old age security and child welfare benefits,
Battle served as director of the National Council of Welfare, a citizen’s
advisory body to the minister of national health and welfare, before
founding Caledon in 1992.
After spending close to fifteen years at the National Council of Welfare,
Battle became increasingly sensitive to how critical a publicly funded
policy institute could be of government policies. As one of the Mulroney
government’s most vociferous critics, Battle was convinced that both his
position and the future of the National Council of Welfare could be in
jeopardy as long as he remained in charge. “At the time, I began looking
around for other positions,” Battle stated. “I thought for a while that I would
try to become director of the Canadian Council on Social Development
[C C S D], but then something else came up.”100
What came up was a meeting with Toronto businessman and
philanthropist Alan Broadbent, who wanted to fund a public policy
organization that would have an impact. Although Battle initially
approached Broadbent for funds to help rebuild the C C S D, Broadbent was
more interested in creating a new organization that would study social and
welfare policies than in revitalizing an existing institution: “Alan is one of
those capitalists with a social conscience who clearly wanted to fund an
organization that would make a difference … When he made me an offer to
head up a new institute, I accepted.”101
Following a handful of meetings with Broadbent, Battle developed the
Caledon Institute’s mission statement, which reads: “The Caledon Institute
of Social Policy is a leading private, non-profit social policy think tank that
conducts social policy research and analysis. As an independent and critical
voice that does not depend on government funding, Caledon seeks to
inform and influence public and expert opinion and to foster public
discussion on poverty and social policy. Caledon develops and promotes
concrete, practicable proposals for the reform of social programs at all
levels of government and of social benefits provided by employers and the
voluntary sector.”102
With roughly $300,000 from Broadbent’s Maytree Foundation, Caledon
opened its doors in February 1992. It currently has a budget of less than $1
million that is generated from the Maytree Foundation and from other
sources for project-specific funding. From its inception, Caledon has
purposely maintained a lean operation; its board of directors, which meets
once a year, barely satisfies the minimum legal requirement of three people.
In addition to Battle, the board consists of Broadbent, a lawyer, and a
financial analyst. “The advantage of having a lean operation is that we can
change direction fast if we have to,” Battle notes. “This allows us to move
ahead of the government and influence substantive policies and the political
agenda.”103
Caledon maintains a tiny research staff. Assisting Battle are Sherri
Torjman, vice president of Caledon, who has written extensively on several
issues, including social spending, health care, and fiscal arrangements; and
senior scholar Michael Mendelson, a former deputy secretary of the cabinet
in Ontario, who has several publications on social and fiscal policy to his
credit, as well as a handful of policy associates.
With a small research staff, Caledon has managed to establish an
impressive publication program. Its commentaries on various social policy
issues, “Caledon’s most useful product,” according to Battle, are widely
circulated to policy-makers, social advocacy organizations, and the media.
Caledon’s media profile is modest compared with several other think tanks
such as the Fraser Institute and the C.D. Howe Institute, but, as chapter 5
will demonstrate, its contribution to policy formulation is well recognized
by directors of party research offices and senior policy-makers.104
Parkland Institute
Located in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Alberta, with a second

office in Calgary, “Alberta’s left-leaning” Parkland Institute, as its critics
often label it, “studies economic, social, cultural and political issues facing
Albertans and Canadians using the perspective of political economy.”105
According to its 2008 “Self-Study,” Parkland’s values “include being open,
critical, innovative, transformative, and solutions oriented.”106 Its mission
rests on five pillars:
• “To [provide] top quality policy research focussing on Canadian energy

security and environmental sustainability, social justice, and social
equity.
• To lead and expand the policy and political debate through research and
outreach programming that changes the framing of issues in Alberta and
Canada.
• To [provide] policy research that is transformative, proposing positive
policy solutions that lead to systematic and structural changes that
improve the quality of life and social justice.
• To help inform an engaged public by publishing our research in
accessible language, disseminating our work widely, and by creating
spaces (colloquia, conferences, symposia, web dialogues) where
academics and citizens can actively engage with each other on current
issues; and
• To foster provincial, national and international research networks and
synergies.”107
The Parkland Institute began its life with “three years of seed funding from
the Faculty of Arts,”108 and, despite its small staff and modest resources,
has been able to establish a strong foothold in Western Canada. Its stature
has been enhanced in recent years by the launch of an endowment program
propelled by a million-dollar donation. In addition to its many research
studies on health care, environmental sustainability, and energy, the
Parkland Institute has relied on several other channels to communicate its
findings and policy recommendations to multiple audiences. The Institute
hosts several workshops and conferences throughout the year and its staff
and research fellows regularly interact with the media. Parkland is well
aware of the importance of demonstrating to potential donors how much of
an impact its work has on shaping public opinion and public policy. It also
recognizes that it may have a greater impact at some stages of the policy
cycle than others. To this end, it has compiled a body of data to assess its
reach and impact relative to some of its competitors.109 Although the
Parkland Institute may not enjoy the same level of public visibility and
notoriety as the Fraser Institute, the C.D. Howe Institute, and other public
policy research organizations, it occupies an important position on the
Canadian think tank landscape.
This chapter has explored in some detail the evolution and growing
diversity of the think tank community in Canada and the United States. In
the process, it has helped confirm why it is so difficult to define what a
think tank is. The think tank landscape does not consist of organizations
with similar profiles. Rather, it resembles an ever-expanding patchwork that
consists of institutes of all shapes and sizes. Although think tanks are far
more numerous in the United States than in Canada, it is clear that the same
types of policy institutes have taken root in both countries.
CHAPTER TWO
Thinking about Think Tanks:

A Conceptual Framework
As think tanks have come to have a more visible presence in both advanced
and developing countries, scholars have employed various theoretical
approaches to explain their role and significance in the policy-making
community. In this chapter, we explore what these approaches are and what
steps can be taken to provide more informed insights about their impact in
shaping public policy. As we will discover, it is important to both build on
and move beyond the existing literature in the field to develop a more
useful conceptual framework to evaluate their involvement in policy-
making.
When academics began thinking and writing about think tanks in the late
1960s and early 1970s, many of their observations about how policy
institutes interacted with state and non-state actors were deeply rooted in
liberal theories of the state: elite theory, pluralism, and statism. Although
admittedly dated, these theories continue to find their way into the literature
that seeks to evaluate the role, significance, and impact of think tanks in the
policy-making community. In the pages that follow, we consider the
strengths and limitations of these theories, and what steps can be taken to
provide more informed insights about how think tanks attempt to influence
public opinion and public policy. In the process, we will offer suggestions
as to how to examine these organizations in a more systematic and
comprehensive manner. We will come to the realization that what has
changed is not simply the terminology political scientists and sociologists
use to describe how think tanks engage different communities. The
continued growth and increased presence of think tanks on the political
landscape, and their desire to become more advocacy-oriented, compels us
to re-evaluate what they do, how their role has changed, and the extent to
which they have become more entrenched in policy-making.
As noted, several of the earliest studies of think tanks, which focused
predominantly on policy institutes in the United States, discussions about
how and why these organizations enjoyed privileged status, and were
rewarded with preferential access to powerful members of the bureaucracy,
Congress, and the White House, were linked to liberal theories of the state.
For example, elite theorists posited that many of those who occupied key
positions in think tanks, or donated large gifts to sustain their operations,
travelled in the same social and financial circles, attended many of the same
Ivy League institutions, and belonged to social clubs where the country’s
leading political figures congregated. Moreover, they argued that these
strong and overlapping ties provided think tanks with the access and
opportunities they required to advance both their institutional interests and
those of their corporate and philanthropic donors. Several American
scholars, including C. Wright Mills, relied heavily on elite theory to analyze
the US military-industrial complex in the mid-1950s. Indeed, his seminal
1956 work on the topic, The Power Elite,1 caused quite a stir in both
academic and policy-making circles when it first appeared. His growing
concerns about how the US Congress, the Pentagon, and defence
contractors worked together to fuel the Cold War was not lost on President
Dwight Eisenhower. In his farewell address on 17 January 1961,
Eisenhower warned the American people about the dangers of the military-
industrial complex.2 Over a half a century later, journalists and scholars all
too familiar with what and whom are driving US foreign policy are
expressing similar concerns.3 Studies on elite theory may not generate the
scholarly attention they once did, but much of what Mills and his
contemporaries revealed deserves our consideration. Although some of the
terms used to describe elites might be outdated, the assumptions underlying
this theory have remained largely intact. In fact, elite theory, which holds
that nearly all political power is held by a relatively small and wealthy
group of people sharing similar values and interests has helped to fuel other
theories, some fanciful, others not, about how think tanks, with other key
stakeholders, assist governments in convincing the public to embrace
controversial domestic and foreign policies.
As tempting as it is to assume that think tanks are an elite set of actors
that enjoy unlimited and unfettered access to the corridors of power, and as
much as directors of think tanks would like to be treated as royalty in the
White House and on Capitol Hill, some observers are not convinced that
they should be perceived differently from other groups competing for
attention in the policy-making community. Rather than elevating think
tanks to a status generally reserved for a handful of organizations at the
highest levels of government, those embracing the tenets of pluralism4
argue that policy institutes, like interest groups, trade unions, human rights
organizations, environmental associations, and a host of other institutions
committed to influencing public policy, face similar hurdles as they try to
navigate their way through the policy-making process. That some
organizations are more effective than others in capturing the attention of
policy-makers does not concern pluralists, as long as everyone follows the
rules established by government to oversee the participation of non-
governmental organizations in the policy process.
For pluralists, what matters is not that non-governmental organizations
have different resources at their disposal, but that they have the opportunity
to compete on a level playing field. By imposing restrictions on political
and partisan activities, legislative bodies, with the support of government
departments and regulatory agencies, attempt to exercise control over
policy inputs (who contributes to public policy), not policy outcomes (the
actual decisions of government). In other words, pluralists contend that
policy-makers simply want to ensure that the guidelines non-governmental
organizations must follow to participate in the policy-making process are
fair and transparent. They also claim that policy-makers are less invested in
who ultimately succeeds in influencing policy decisions, an assertion
disputed by elite theorists, who recognize that how governments control
policy inputs influences policy outcomes.
Third, there are a handful of scholars who, although they acknowledge
the presence of think tanks and other non-governmental organizations in the
policy-making community, suggest that relative to the state’s authority and
autonomy, they play a very modest role in shaping public policy. Contrary
to the assertions of scholars who argue that public policy is controlled and
manipulated by elites and/or by special interest groups, those embracing the
“statist paradigm” maintain that the state can and does act independently of
various societal and bureaucratic pressures,5 that the fate of the nation rests
in the hands of presidents, prime ministers, and their cabinets, not external
groups seeking to impose their agenda on the state. And, finally, there are
scholars who focus less on the elite, pluralist, or statist nature of think tanks
and the policy environment they inhabit and more on the institutional
structure and orientation of the organizations themselves. Scholars
influenced by the “institutionalist” tradition pay close attention to the
mandate and resources of think tanks, and to the many factors that influence
the strategic choices they make to become involved at different stages of
policy-making.6 It is to these particular approaches that we now turn.
T H I N K TA N K S A S P O L I C Y E L I T E S
For some scholars, including Joseph Peschek, Thomas Dye, William

Domhoff, John Saloma, and William Minter,7 think tanks not only regularly
interact with policy elites, they help comprise part of the nation’s power
structure. For example, in the United States, where think tanks frequently
serve as talent pools or holding tanks for incoming presidential
administrations and as retirement homes for former high-level policy-
makers, think tanks are considered elite organizations that are both able and
willing to influence public policy. The multimillion-dollar budgets at the
disposal of a handful of American think tanks, and the many prominent and
distinguished business leaders and former policy-makers who serve on their
boards of directors and trustees help reinforce this image. The close and
intimate ties between think tanks and the corporate and philanthropic
donors and foreign governments who fund them8 suggest to Marxists and
elite theorists9 that think tanks are indeed instruments of the ruling class.
They argue that by virtue of the unique space they occupy at the
intersection of the academic and policy-making worlds, think tanks are
more than capable of advancing the interests of those with economic and
political power over individuals and organizations that are marginalized in
and by the political system they inhabit. The argument scholars in this field
advance is straightforward: in exchange for large donations, think tanks use
their policy expertise and connections with key policy-makers to advance
the political agendas of their generous benefactors. On the surface, this
seems entirely plausible. After all, it is unlikely that corporations and
philanthropic foundations would donate thousands, and sometimes millions,
of dollars to think tanks that are acting contrary to their interest. They fund
think tanks that share similar ideals and concerns about the nation, and
those they believe are capable of affecting policy change. As David
Roodman, formerly of the Washington, DC-based Center for Global
Development observes, “Every funder has motives. Every funder of a
policy-influencing think tank can therefore be described as “buying
influence.”10 However, it is important to question the type of return donors
expect on their investment. To quote Enrique Mendizabal, founder of the
blog On Think Tanks, “Domestic or foreign, nobody hands over money to
think tanks without wanting [something] in return. They may want to
influence certain policy decisions or they may just want to see their name
outside an office in the think tank’s new building. They all want
something.”11
While it makes sense for philanthropic foundations, corporations, and
leaders of foreign governments to fund think tanks that can frame issues in
ways that will help advance their core interests, it is less important for these
and other donors to rely on them to help establish contact with senior-level
policy-makers. Through their sizeable donations to congressional and
presidential candidates, not to mention their personal friendships and social
ties to dozen of politicians, it is unlikely that donors with this kind of cachet
would require think tanks to introduce them to government officials. This is
not to say that think tanks are unwilling to make introductions – they often
do. The point is whether it is necessary for them to do so. Moreover, since
corporations and foreign governments can and do hire lobbyists to represent
their interests on Capitol Hill and on Parliament Hill, it is unlikely they
would turn to institutions like think tanks that are prohibited under the
Internal Revenue Code and the Income Tax Act from engaging in overt
political lobbying. And since professional lobbyists have an incentive to
work tirelessly on behalf of their clients, what can think tanks offer
corporate America and Canada that lobbyists cannot? The answer is simple:
credibility and respectability, or, what Joseph Sandler, an American lawyer
with expertise on statutes governing lobbying, refers to as a “patina of
academic neutrality and objectivity.”12
Corporations and philanthropic foundations turn to “elite” think tanks
such as Brookings, the Carnegie Endowment, and the Hoover Institution,
not so they can take advantage of their political connections (although this
could help periodically), but so they can benefit from the relationships these
and other think tanks have to the media, to universities, and to other power
centres in Canada and in the United States. But even more important,
corporations and philanthropic foundations can take advantage of the
reputation think tanks have cultivated as scientific, neutral, and scholarly
organizations to more effectively influence public opinion and public
policy. Writing large cheques to political campaigns may provide
corporations with access and political capital, but it does not necessarily
buy them credibility. Credibility, like valuable information, can prove to be
a commodity more precious than money. On the other hand, supporting
think tanks that supply the media and policy-makers with a steady stream of
information, expertise, and policy recommendations might allow donors to
secure both. This could explain in part why corporations and philanthropic
foundations also lend a helping hand to other types of research
organizations and university departments who can draw on their reputation
as scholarly institutions to influence both the policy-making environment
and actual policy decisions.
By closely examining the interaction between the largest think tanks in
the United States and Canada and key officials in government, scholars may
be justified in concluding, as some have, that think tanks play a critical role
in influencing public policy. However, since few institutes in Canada or in
the United States have resources comparable to the Brookings Institution,
the Heritage Foundation, or the R A N D Corporation, we must question the
utility of employing an approach that assumes that think tanks, by their very
nature and purpose, are capable of promoting the interests of the ruling
elite. We must also question whether think tanks, as charitable organizations
engaged in policy analysis, should be treated as elites.
Think tanks are in the business of shaping public opinion and public
policy, but, as noted, have very different ideas of how various domestic and
foreign policies should be formulated and implemented. Several think
tanks, for example, embrace the views of some elites that free market
solutions to economic problems should be pursued. The C.D. Howe
Institute, the Fraser Institute, the Montreal Economics Institute, and the
Washington-DC-based American Enterprise Institute, among others, would
certainly favour such an approach. But there are many other think tanks,
including the more progressive Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
(C C PA), the Parkland Institute at the University of Alberta, and the
Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies that have profoundly
different views of how governments should resolve economic and social
problems, and go to great lengths to address widespread inequality. Should
think tanks that regularly oppose the interests of the ruling elite and work
tirelessly on behalf of those marginalized in our country be considered part
of the elite?
Despite some limitations that will be explored in more detail below,
adopting an elite approach to the study of think tanks has some advantages.
As Domhoff and others have discovered,13 examining the close and
interlocking ties between members of think tanks and leaders in business
and government can provide interesting and useful insights into why some
policy institutes may enjoy far more visibility and notoriety than others.
Moreover, by keeping track of who sits on the boards of directors of think
tanks, we may be able to explain why some institutes generate more
funding than their competitors. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind
that while members of think tanks frequently interact with high-level
business leaders and policy-makers, their connections to key figures does
not necessarily allow them to exercise policy influence. The networks they
have established may facilitate access to important officials on Capitol Hill
and Parliament Hill, but their ability to influence public policy depends on a
wide range of factors.
By portraying think tanks as policy elites, scholars can make sweeping
assertions about who controls public policy. But as appealing as this might
be, it is also problematic because it tells us little about the ability or
inability of think tanks to exercise influence at different stages of the policy
cycle. It tells us even less about how to assess or evaluate the impact of
think tanks in policy-making. In short, an elite approach assumes that with
the right connections think tanks can and will be able to influence public
policy. Unfortunately, it offers little insight into how this will be achieved.
THE PLURALIST TRADITION: ONE VOICE

A MO N G MA N Y
Members of think tanks may occasionally travel in elite policy circles, but
according to some political scientists, including David Newsom,14 they
represent but one of many types of organizations that populate the policy-
making community. According to this perspective, which is deeply rooted
in the American pluralist tradition,15 think tanks compete among
themselves and other non-governmental organizations for limited resources.
The gains achieved by one group or organization are frequently offset by
costs incurred by others.16 Since policy-makers, and the governments they
represent, are assumed to behave as moderators or referees monitoring the
competition among groups, pluralists devote little attention to assessing
government priorities. They view public policy not as a reflection of a
specific government mandate, but rather as an outcome of the struggle
between competing interests.
Studying think tanks within a pluralist framework has its advantages.
For one thing, it compels scholars to acknowledge that, despite the widely
held view that think tanks enjoy preferential access to policy-makers and to
other key stakeholders, they constitute only one of many organizations
intent on leaving a mark on public policy. This approach also serves as a
reminder that think tanks, like interest groups and other non-governmental
organizations, rely on similar strategies to shape public policy, a subject that
will be explored further in chapter 4.
The pluralist approach, however, has serious weaknesses. To begin with,
although disciples of pluralism assume that, in the final analysis, decisions
on domestic and foreign policy matters reflect the outcome of an ongoing
struggle among groups to advance their respective interests, pluralism sheds
little light onto why some organizations may be better positioned than
others to influence public attitudes and the policy preferences and choices
of decision-makers. Is it simply a matter of which groups have the largest
budgets, staff resources, and most extensive research programs that
determines who does and does not have influence? Or, do other factors such
as access to the media, policy-makers, and affluent donors offer better clues
as to which group or groups are destined to succeed or fail in the political
arena?
The major deficiency of pluralism is not that it assumes that all groups
are able to influence public policy. On the contrary, pluralists acknowledge
that non-governmental organizations vary enormously in terms of size,
resources, and expertise, important factors that can account for how
successful organizations are in achieving their desired goals. The problem
with pluralism is that it exaggerates the virtues of a level playing field,
while ignoring how groups with vastly superior resources at their disposal
can easily outrun or outmanoeuvre their opponents. For pluralists, process
matters far more than outcomes. They are so concerned with following the
rules of the policy game that they pay little attention to why some
organizations always seem to cross the finish line first. By the same token,
if pluralists treat think tanks as simply one of many voices in the policy-
making community without recognizing what makes them unique, they will
overlook why, at times, some policy institutes have more opportunities to
influence public policy than interest groups and other non-governmental
organizations. Think tanks may indeed be part of the chorus, but they
possess certain attributes that allow them to stand out. By virtue of their
expertise and close ties to policy-makers, think tanks may compete among
themselves for prestige and status, but they do not necessarily compete with
the hundreds of other participants in the policy-making community. In fact,
in some policy areas, think tanks may face little competition at all.
Pluralists also need to acknowledge that as committed as policy-makers
might be to ensuring that the policy-making process is fair and transparent,
they often have a vested interest in influencing the outcome of group
competition. Instead of behaving as referees, policy-makers representing
various government branches and departments can and do rely heavily on
select organizations to achieve their goals. Many of these organizations are
also closely aligned with large voting blocs in congressional districts and/or
parliamentary ridings that elected officials cannot afford to ignore. As we
will discuss in the case studies included in this study, at critical stages of the
policy-making process members of the US Congress and the Executive, and
their counterparts in the Canadian Parliament, regularly turn to specific
think tanks for advice on how to tackle thorny policy issues. At other times,
they rely on think tanks to help frame the parameters of important policy
debates.
Marxists and pluralists disagree about the extent to which think tanks are
entrenched in the policy-making process and the willingness of the state to
embrace their ideas. However, both acknowledge that think tanks have the
ability to play a vital, and, at times, decisive role in public policy, a position
that has been questioned by proponents of state theory. While scholars
employing the first two approaches focus on various societal and
bureaucratic pressures to reveal how public policy is shaped and molded,
those advancing the statist paradigm look no further than the state to
explain who makes policy decisions.
I N T H E N AT I O N A L I N T E R E S T: A S TAT I S T
APPROACH
As multinational corporations, media conglomerates, and powerful special

interest groups have established a strong foothold in the western world, it is
not surprising that we have lost sight of who ultimately is entrusted with
protecting the national interest, a concern raised most recently by several
scholars in the United States.17 But despite their global reach and visibility,
it is not Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, or leaders of other blue chip companies
who speak on behalf of the United States and take steps to promote its
economic, political, and security interests. It is the president and the people
who surround him or her who make decisions that are intended to serve the
needs of the nation. To remind us of this, a handful of scholars, including
Theda Skocpol and Stephen Krasner, have emphasized the relative
autonomy of the state in making difficult policy decisions.18 State theory,
according to Aaron Steelman, advances the argument “that while the public
can indeed impose some restraint on the actions of the bureaucracy and
elected officials, the state retains a degree of autonomy and works
according to its own logic.”19
In his book, Defending the National Interest, Stephen Krasner elaborates
on the theory of statism. He notes: “[Statism] is premised upon an
intellectual vision that sees the state autonomously formulating goals that it
then attempts to implement against resistance from international and
domestic actors. The ability of the state to overcome domestic resistance
depends upon the instruments of control that it can exercise over groups
within its own society.”20 For Krasner, it is the central state actors – the
president and the secretary of state – and the most important institutions –
the White House and the State Department – that control foreign policy.
If Krasner, Skocpol, and other proponents of state theory are correct,
what impact could think tanks possibly have in influencing state behaviour?
Although one might assume that think tanks would be relegated to the
sidelines, Steelman suggests that state theory leaves ample room for think
tanks to make their presence felt: “State theory can help explain the
seeming anomalous cases of former think-tank staffers who enter
government pledging to work for a certain set of ideas and then enacting
policies that are quite different. In some cases, these individuals have been
co-opted by the system; in others, they are generally doing their best to
reach their goal, however slowly or circuitously. But either way, the state
itself is an important actor.”21
There are several advantages to incorporating state theory into studies of
think tanks. First, it helps to explain how think tank staffers can become
directly involved in making key policy decisions. If we accept Krasner’s
argument that the president and the secretary of state, and the two
institutions they represent – the White House and the State Department –
are the most important participants in the foreign policy-making process, it
becomes very clear which think tanks have or do not have access to the
highest levels of government. Rather than trying to monitor the efforts of
think tanks to influence Congress and the media, scholars could simply
explore the relationship between the president, the secretary of state, and
their closest advisers. If it appears that members from think tanks have been
advisers, or recruited to serve in the White House or in the State
Department, we could assume that they have had direct access to the policy-
making process. After all, if the president and secretary of state (along with
the secretary of defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and national security adviser)
are the most influential participants in foreign and defence policy-making
and often rely on think tank experts for advice, it would be logical to
conclude that think tanks are in a position to influence policy decisions.
Conversely, if there is little evidence to suggest that think tanks have gained
access to the upper echelons of government, scholars could, according to
state theory, conclude that they have had little impact in influencing state
conduct. In short, state theory, whether it is applied to domestic or foreign
policy decision-making in the United States, Canada, or in other
democracies, can explain when think tanks have or have not been
influential.
However, state theory is not without its limitations. It may be useful in
explaining why some presidents, such as Richard Nixon, were able to
insulate themselves from Congress and the American people.22 But by the
same token, it is less helpful in explaining why many recent presidents have
gone to great lengths to consult with the public, members of Congress,
foreign governments, international organizations, and a host of non-
governmental organizations before making important policy decisions.
President George H.W. Bush’s efforts in 1990–91 to secure an international
coalition to deter Iraqi aggression is a case in point. Before deploying US
armed forces to the Persian Gulf, President Bush made sure he had the
support of the United Nations and several of its member states, a strategy
that his son considered, but later abandoned, before invading Iraq.23 As the
foreign policy-making process has become more transparent over time and
as more governmental and non-governmental organizations have sought to
become involved in shaping world affairs, proponents of state theory have
had a more difficult time defending the relative autonomy of the state. They
certainly have had difficulty explaining why the US Congress appears to
have taken a more active interest in foreign policy.24 In the final analysis,
both advocates and critics of state theory acknowledge that the president
makes decisions that can profoundly influence America’s conduct in the
international community. Yet, as we have witnessed in recent years, how
presidents make policy decisions ultimately depends on their management
style and willingness to listen to their inner circle of advisers. State theory
might help to account for the management of US foreign policy under
President George W. Bush, but might do little to shed light on how
Presidents Clinton and Obama governed the nation.25
Thus far, we have looked at three different theoretical approaches and
how they can be employed to study think tanks. Before considering how it
might be possible to integrate them more effectively, it is important to
consider a fourth approach that has attracted considerable attention:
focusing on think tanks as a diverse set of organizations that have very
different priorities and concerns, rather than as members of the policy elite,
the state, or the broader policy-making community. This approach appears
more promising. As we will discover below, a more informed
understanding of how think tanks function at various stages of the policy-
making process can allow scholars to identify where these institutions have
the greatest impact.
D I F F E R E N T T H I N K TA N K S , D I F F E R E N T
PRIORITIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
Three distinct institutional approaches to the study of think tanks have
surfaced in the literature in recent years. The most common approach
focuses either on the history of particular think tanks or on the evolution
and transformation in particular countries. Several scholars have written
institutional histories of the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign
Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and R A N D.26
A number of studies have also detailed the rise of think tanks in the
United States, Canada, and other advanced and developing countries.27 The
obvious advantage of providing detailed histories of think tanks is that they
offer a wealth of information on the nature and mandate of organizations,
the research projects they have conducted over time, and the various
institutional changes they have undergone. The main disadvantage,
however, is that many of these studies are simply histories and offer little
concrete data to support or deny claims that particular think tanks have
played a major role in shaping public policies.
The second and more systematic institutional approach has concentrated
on the involvement of think tanks in what students of public policy
commonly refer to as epistemic or policy communities.28 These
communities consist of individuals and organizations that, by virtue of their
policy expertise, are invited to participate in policy discussions with
government decision-makers. The formation of policy or epistemic
communities is often seen as a critical stage in policy formulation and
regime formation. This approach has been undertaken by a handful of
political scientists, including Hugh Heclo, Evert Lindquist, and Diane
Stone, who regard think tanks as important participants in these
communities.29
By examining think tanks within a policy or epistemic community
framework, scholars can make several important observations. To begin
with, by focusing on policy issues such as the campaign to repeal and
replace Obamacare or the considerable domestic and international fallout
from President Trump’s executive order restricting travel to the US,
scholars can more accurately identify the key organizations and individuals
who have been invited to share their thoughts with policy-makers. In
addition to determining which groups and individuals participate in the
“sub-government,” a term used to describe the various non-governmental
and governmental policy experts who coalesce around particular policy
issues, this approach offers better insight into the nature of the policy-
making process itself. Among other things, a policy or epistemic
community framework compels scholars to delve far deeper into the
mechanics of policy-making. Rather than treating policy decisions as an
outcome of interest group competition or as a reflection of elite interests,
this approach requires scholars to think seriously about how policy
decisions can be influenced through discussions between non-governmental
and governmental policy experts.
There are other advantages to adopting this approach as well. Once the
actors participating in the sub-government have been identified, it is
possible to compare the recommendations made by participants to the
actual policy decisions that were made. Access to minutes of meetings,
personal correspondence, testimony before legislative committees,
published recommendations, and other information may not enable scholars
to make definitive conclusions about which participants in a policy
community were the most influential. Nonetheless, these and other
materials can offer useful insights into whose views generated the most
support.
Given the involvement of policy experts from think tanks in different
policy communities, it is not surprising that this framework is being used
more often. It is important to keep in mind, however, that while this
approach may be better suited to the study of think tanks than either an elite
or a pluralist framework, it too has its shortcomings. Examining think tanks
within a policy community is useful in identifying which institutes are
called upon to offer their expertise at an important stage in policy
formulation. Unfortunately, it does not tell us what impact, if any, think
tanks inside policy communities or those operating outside the sub-
government have in shaping public attitudes and the policy preferences and
choices of policy-makers. In short, this approach may tell us who is sitting
at the table when key issues are being discussed, but it does not tell us
whose voices have struck a responsive chord with those in a position to
influence policy decisions. Since we cannot assume that all, or any,
important policy decisions are made inside specific policy communities –
after all, it is politicians, not policy experts, who cast votes in the legislature
– a third group of scholars has begun to consider using a more inclusive
approach in studying the involvement of non-governmental organizations in
policy-making.
Recognizing that the mandates, resources, and priorities of non-
governmental organizations vary enormously, John Kingdon and Denis
Stairs, among others, suggest that rather than trying to make general
observations about how much or how little impact societal groups have on
shaping policy-making and the policy-making environment, scholars should
examine how groups committed to influencing public policy focus their
efforts at different stages of the policy cycle.30 Although Kingdon and
Stairs do not write specifically about think tanks, their approach to studying
how groups seek to place issues on the political agenda and how they try to
convey their ideas to policy-makers throughout the policy-making process
is well-suited to the study of think tanks.
POLICY CYCLES AND POLICY INFLUENCE: A

HOLISTIC APPROACH
For Kingdon and Stairs, trying to determine which domestic and external
forces shape public policy constitutes an enormous, and, at times,
overwhelming undertaking. In fact, as the policy-making community in the
United States and in Canada has become increasingly crowded, it has
become difficult, if not impossible, to identify those groups that have had a
direct impact on policy issues. As a result, instead of making
generalizations about which groups influence public policy, Kingdon and
Stairs, among others, recognize that not all organizations have the desire or
the necessary resources to participate at each stage of the policy cycle: issue
articulation, policy formulation, and policy implementation. While some
organizations may have an interest in placing issues on the political agenda
by articulating their concerns through a number of channels (issue
articulation), others may be more inclined to enter the policy-making
process at a later stage (policy formulation or policy implementation). In
other words, some organizations may be more interested in sharing their
ideas with the public than in working closely with policy-makers to
formulate or implement policy.
By acknowledging that think tanks do have different priorities and
mandates, it is possible to construct a conceptual framework that allows
scholars to make more concrete observations about the role and impact of
think tanks in policy-making. At the very least, a framework that recognizes
the diversity of think tanks and their distinct missions will discourage
scholars from making sweeping and often unfounded observations about
their impact.
The conceptual framework employed in this book, which will be
expanded upon in the chapters to follow, is based on a simple premise:
think tanks in Canada, in the United States, and in much of Europe,
represent a diverse set of organizations that share a common desire to
influence public policy. However, because of their unique institutional
characteristics, each think tank must make strategic decisions about how
and where in the policy cycle to make their presence felt. In other words,
since think tanks possess different resources, which, not surprisingly, affect
the nature and extent of activities they undertake, they naturally assign
different priorities to participating at various stages of the policy cycle. This
becomes particularly important in interpreting data such as media citations
and testimony before legislative committees that can be used to evaluate
think tank performance.
After considering the four approaches that have been employed to study
think tanks and their involvement in policy-making, one central question
remains: which approach or conceptual framework best explains their role
and function? Unfortunately, there is no simple answer. As we have
discussed, each approach encourages scholars to move in a certain direction
and to ask a unique set of questions. Therefore, the question that should be
posed is not which theory best explains how the functional role of think
tanks has changed, but which framework helps scholars to better understand
a particular feature or characteristic of their behaviour. For instance, those
concerned about the relationship between think tanks and corporations
could benefit far more from drawing on the assumptions underlying elite
theory than from tapping into pluralist theories of democracy. On the other
hand, scholars interested in explaining why some think tanks seem more
preoccupied with working on various policy initiatives than with grabbing
headlines would learn a great deal from Kingdon and other students of
public policy who have written extensively about how institutions set
priorities.
Examining the efforts of think tanks to influence key domestic and
foreign policy debates requires an integrated approach. This approach
would draw on the observations showcased by each of the theories outlined
in this chapter, but would not adhere exclusively to any particular one. The
advantage of relying on multiple theories to explain the involvement of
think tanks in public policy is that it offers scholars some breathing space to
test different hypotheses about when and under what conditions think tanks
can have the greatest impact. The alternative is to select a theoretical
framework that offers but one perspective on the nature of think tanks and
their relationship to policy-makers. For example, one could adopt Krasner’s
statist paradigm to explain why think tanks and interest groups have had
marginal success in constructing and implementing the Obama
administration’s war on terror. Given the relatively small group of advisers
to whom Obama listened, and the president’s decision to continue the war
on terror with limited support from the international community, state
theory might offer scholars the answers they need. However, the same
theory would offer little insight into the debate over national missile
defence that has been kept alive for over three decades by a handful of think
tanks, including the Heritage Foundation and the Center for Security Policy.
Contrary to the central assumptions underlying state theory, successive
administrations have succumbed to pressure from interest groups, think
tanks, and corporate and bureaucratic interests to construct and deploy a
missile defence. Rather than looking to Krasner for answers as to why this
has occurred, scholars would likely benefit more by reading the work of C.
Wright Mills and others who have provided valuable insights about the
military-industrial complex.
In the final analysis, scholars must select a theory or theories that will
help them to understand the information they have uncovered. They should
not rush to find a theory and then hope to gather empirical and statistical
evidence to make it more credible. Such an approach may be of little
comfort to those looking for a grand theory to explain what think tanks do
and how they achieve influence. Still, as many experts of American foreign
policy and international relations have learned, as tempting as it is to
construct one theory that will reveal the complexity of world affairs, such
efforts often amount to little more than an exercise in futility. But before we
rush to judgment about which theory or theories best explain how and to
what extent think tanks engage in the policy-making process, it is necessary
to more fully explore how think tanks function in very different political
environments. Only then can we determine how the various approaches
included in this chapter enhance or obscure our understanding of these
unique organizations.
CHAPTER THREE
In the Arena:
Opportunities, Constraints, and Incentives for
Think Tanks in the United States and Canada
In an ideal world, think tanks would have few, if any, financial concerns,
conduct research on a wide range of timely and policy-relevant issues, and,
from the comfort of their book-lined offices, would observe their ideas
translated into concrete policy decisions. The world of think tanks and the
reality of the policy-making process, however, is far from ideal. The vast
majority of think tanks in the United States, like those in Canada, lack the
resources they require to examine the many complex policy questions
confronting government. Many also lack the resources to convey their ideas
effectively to decision-makers. Moreover, since policy-makers must usually
juggle competing political interests, think tanks often have to struggle to
capture their attention.
Aware of the complexity of the policy-making process, as well as the
demands placed on their limited resources, think tanks must make a number
of strategic decisions, not the least of which is where in the policy cycle
they will seek to have the greatest impact. As I will discuss in this chapter,
although think tanks in both countries make similar choices, those in the
United States have far more opportunities to become involved in policy-
making than their Canadian counterparts. But why is this the case? Does the
highly fragmented and decentralized nature of the US government,
combined with a weak party system, provide think tanks and other non-
governmental organizations with more opportunities to influence policy-
making?1 Conversely, do the principles of strong party unity and cabinet
solidarity, reinforced by effective party leadership control over the rank and
file, the increasingly important role played by backroom strategists in
shaping party platforms,2 and the presence of a permanent civil service
entrusted with advising senior officials, limit opportunities for think tanks
in Canada to engage at critical stages of policy-making?
Comparing the institutional environments in which think tanks in the
two countries function offers some insight into why US policy institutes
have established a more visible presence than those in Canada.
Several features of the US political system have indeed facilitated think
tanks’ access to various stages of the policy-making process. However,
differences in political structures cannot entirely account for American
think tanks appearing to play a more significant role in policy-making than
those in Canada, nor can they explain why some institutes in both countries
are more influential than others. In fact, as some heads of Canadian think
tanks have argued, including David Zussman, former president of the Public
Policy Forum, the structure of the Canadian government may have very
little to do with whether think tanks are effective or ineffective at conveying
their ideas. The political structure of a country may influence the types of
strategies non-governmental organizations use to reach policy-makers, but
according to Zussman, it is the modest resources available to most policy
institutes that have limited their impact far more than the political system
they inhabit. Gaining access to policy-makers in Canada is not a problem,
Zussman claims. Rather, it is obtaining sufficient funds to conduct long-
term research and analysis.3
If Zussman is correct, then it is important to draw a distinction between
opportunities for think tanks to participate in policy-making and the
constraints that may undermine their effectiveness. In doing so, it can be
demonstrated, as Diane Stone has done in a study comparing think tanks in
Great Britain with those in the United States, that parliamentary
democracies and their structures may not pose as much of a barrier to think
tank access as previously thought.4
This chapter examines the opportunities for think tanks in both countries
to participate in policy-making, as well as some of the internal and external
constraints that might undermine their efforts to influence policy
formulation and the policy-making environment. It also looks more closely
at the incentives decision-makers in both countries may have to turn to
think tanks for policy expertise. The central argument here is that while
think tanks in the United States and Canada function in very different
political systems, this factor alone cannot account for their success or
failure.5 Their ability or inability to market their ideas effectively may have
as much to do with how they define their missions; the talent, skill, and
political savviness of the directors who lead them; the resources they have
at their disposal; and the strategies they employ to achieve their stated
goals. The amount of funding they have and the quality of their staff, not to
mention the timing of the issues they hope to advance, may be more
important in determining how influential they become.
O P P O RT U N I T I E S F O R T H I N K TA N K S I N T H E
U N I T E D S TAT E S A N D C A N A D A
There are few parts of the policy-making process or a branch or department

of the US government where think tanks have not made their presence felt.6
Think tanks specializing in a wide range of domestic and foreign policy
areas have conveyed their ideas to key policy-makers in Congress, the
executive, the bureaucracy, and, more recently, the judiciary.7 There are also
think tanks at the state level, including the New York-based Manhattan
Institute, which has established strong ties to local government leaders.8 As
will be discussed later in this section, dozens of staff from think tanks have
become policy-makers themselves.
Among the many factors that have contributed to the proliferation of
think tanks in the United States is the structure of the political system. As
several scholars have observed, few countries provide an environment more
conducive to the development of think tanks.9 With a government based on
separate branches sharing power, a party system in which members of
Congress are free to vote as they wish, and a growing number of
presidential candidates trying to develop new ideas, think tanks have
multiple opportunities to shape public opinion and public policy. In
Congress (the US House of Representatives and the US Senate) alone there
are 535 elected officials (in addition to three non-voting members from the
District of Columbia), not to mention dozens of staff and committee aides,
whom think tanks can approach to consider their policy ideas.10
Recognizing this, think tanks have employed several strategies to attract
attention, ranging from testifying before congressional committees and
distributing concise summaries of key policy issues to members of
Congress and the executive to inviting representatives and senators, White
House staffers, bureaucrats, and their staff to participate in seminars and
workshops.11 For a brief period, a select group of policy experts from some
of America’s leading think tanks could rely on another channel to share
their expertise regularly with members of Congress: in March 1998 the
Congressional Policy Advisory Board was formed to allow policy experts
from outside government to discuss several policy issues with the House
leadership. Of the twenty-eight policy experts who comprised the board,
twenty-one were affiliated with US think tanks, including the board’s chair,
the late Martin Anderson, who spent much of his distinguished career as a
senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.12 However, the board was disbanded
in 2000 with little notice or explanation. A more detailed assessment of
these and other channels think tanks rely on to influence policy-making will
be discussed in the next chapter.
Since members of Congress are not bound by party unity, but are free to
vote according to their conscience and the wishes of their constituents, they
need not be concerned that their association with particular think tanks, or
their endorsement of some of their policy ideas, would undermine party
cohesion. Rather than evaluating ideas from think tanks in terms of their
compatibility with party preferences and policies, members of Congress can
evaluate them on their own merits, and whether they will serve their
personal goals. Moreover, as Weaver and others have argued, the weak
party system in the United States not only provides opportunities for think
tanks to influence policy-making but has in some ways increased the
demand for them.13 In Germany, political parties have created their own
think tanks or foundations, supported by the state, to conduct research and
analysis; political parties in the United States have not.14 There are a
handful of congressional research institutes or public think tanks, including
the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office,
from which members of Congress can request information.15 However,
these bodies cannot be expected to provide timely and policy-relevant
research, as many independent think tanks do.
A number of think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation and its
advocacy arm, Heritage Action for America, assign the highest priority to
influencing Congress. Nonetheless, they also recognize the importance of
solidifying ties to the bureaucracy, the executive, and the many agencies
that advise the president. The Executive Office of the President (E O P),
which comprises several important agencies, including the National
Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget, provides think
tanks with further opportunities to influence government. During several
recent administrations, for instance, presidents have appointed senior staff
from think tanks to serve in cabinet- and subcabinet-level positions and on
advisory boards and executive agencies.16 Many of these appointees have
previously served on policy task forces and on transition teams in
presidential elections, a subject that will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 6.17
It is not uncommon for presidential candidates to establish task forces
during the primaries and the general election to investigate policy concerns.
These groups are particularly important for challengers who lack the
resources available to an incumbent president or who lack experience in
federal politics. For instance, during the presidential election campaign of
2000, Governor George W. Bush enlisted the support of scholars and policy
analysts from a handful of think tanks, including the Hoover Institution and
the American Enterprise Institute.18 Twenty years earlier, during the 1980
election, Martin Anderson and Richard Allen of the Hoover Institution were
responsible for organizing close to fifty task forces on domestic and foreign
policy to advise Governor Ronald Reagan on a host of issues.19 And in his
historic run for the presidency in 2008, Barack Obama turned to several
researchers from top D C think tanks to advise him on a host of domestic
and foreign policy issues.20 Although Donald Trump had limited interaction
with think tanks during his 2016 run for the presidency, experts from some
institutes, including the Heritage Foundation, contributed ideas during his
transition to power, a subject that will be examined more closely in chapter
6.
It is rare, however, for Canadian federal party leaders to organize task
forces, or to establish close ties to think tanks during campaigns. Part of the
problem is logistical: the election period is far shorter in Canada – it
typically lasts thirty-six days, from the time the prime minister advises the
governor general of his or her intention to call an election to the day
Canadians vote – compared with the lengthy primary season and general
election in the United States.21
And until the passage of the fixed election law in 2007, the electoral
cycle in Canada has also been more unpredictable, though some scholars
remain convinced that the government can still call an election at any time
during its mandate, up to a maximum of five years after taking office.22
This element of uncertainty poses further problems for think tanks
contemplating a more active role during elections. In addition, most
Canadian party leaders do not turn to the broader policy community for
advice but rely on their own staff, party research caucus, and party
strategists and pollsters instead.23 The prime minister may have even less
need for policy task forces during campaigns, for in addition to his or her
own staff, the prime minister enjoys the support of the Prime Minister’s
Office (P MO), which serves as a “practical policy think-tank charged with
an advisory capacity on the political fortunes of the prime minister and his
cabinet.”24 With a staff of over one hundred, including about a dozen
researchers, the prime minister has little incentive to seek the advice of
think tanks during campaigns. Staff from think tanks are more likely to be
called on when the prime minister establishes a royal commission or
commission of inquiry to study a particular policy issue, such as free trade
or the creation of a security intelligence agency.25
While there is little to prevent think tanks in Canada from releasing
studies before or during elections or discussing ideas with party members,
they do not, for the reasons given above, engage as actively in electoral
politics as some of their US counterparts. Yet it is important to point out
that while institutional and logistical constraints may limit the involvement
of think tanks during elections, so too does the desire of some think tanks,
primarily for legal and political reasons, to maintain an arm’s-length
relationship with political parties.26 The Vancouver-based Fraser Institute is
a case in point. Although Fraser rarely concealed its conservative leanings
or support for several policies advanced by the Harper government27 or by
the former Canadian Alliance, it has been reluctant to become too closely
associated, and justifiably so, with the Conservative Party of Canada.
According to Paul Wilson, who served as director of research for the
Canadian Alliance, while there has been some interaction between members
of his party and the Fraser Institute, “Fraser is concerned about being too
close to us. They do not want to be seen as a Reform [or an Alliance]
mouthpiece. We, on the other hand, are less choosey about the [think tanks]
we talk to. Parties are like intellectual prostitutes. We will take good ideas
from any source.”28 Other think tanks, however, appear less concerned
about their ties to political parties; for instance, the Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives (C C PA), headquartered in Ottawa with several regional
offices, maintains very close links to the New Democratic Party (N D P). As
Judy Randall, a former senior researcher with the N D P Caucus Research
Office acknowledged, “our strongest link to a think tank is the C C PA,
although we also use a lot of the work done by the Canadian Council on
Social Development, the National Council of Welfare (now defunct), the
National Anti-Poverty Organization and other organizations … Several of
our members have served on [the C C PA’s] Board of Directors and their
executive director Bruce Campbell worked for us.”29
There appear to be both external and internal limits to how much direct
access think tanks have to party leaders during campaigns. There also
appear to be limits to how much impact think tanks have during
government transition periods. As previously mentioned, a handful of think
tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, and
C S I S, have played key roles in assisting incoming presidential
administrations make the transition to power. In addition to serving on the
transition staff, several think tank scholars have helped by identifying
topical issues and have advised on placing appropriate people in the
thousands of vacant positions that become available when governments
change. These functions provide think tanks that are close to transitions
with further opportunities to expand and grow their networks and influence
policy.
By contrast, think tanks in Canada rarely offer or are called upon to
assist in transition planning, although some, including the Ottawa-based
Public Policy Forum (P P F) have in the past undertaken major projects on
managing transitions.30 Again, there are several reasons for this. First,
unlike in the United States, the transition period before a new government
assumes power in Canada does not take three months but is completed in
less than two weeks. This short time frame makes it extremely difficult for
think tanks to communicate their ideas to transition leaders. Second, few
Canadian think tanks have the resources or expertise to arrange the types of
transition planning seminars organized by the Heritage Foundation,
Brookings, C S I S, and other US top-tier think tanks.31 Third, and perhaps
more important, the federal transition process is overseen and orchestrated
by the Privy Council Office (P C O), which is “staffed by career civil
servants [and serves as] a major policy-advising agency of the federal
government.”32 Furthermore, unlike US think tanks, which take advantage
of transition periods to fill vacant positions in the bureaucracy, either with
their own staff or like-minded colleagues, Canadian think tanks have little
incentive to closely monitor job vacancies after an election. An incoming
US president must identify and recruit thousands of people to fill vacant
positions in a new administration, but a Canadian prime minister has the
power to fill only a limited number of senior bureaucratic posts after an
election, usually at the level of deputy minister. The majority of individuals
who obtain these positions are career civil servants, not think-tank staffers.
If think tanks in Canada do not make their presence felt during elections
and transitions, when and where do they have an impact? Canadian think
tanks, like many in the United States, do not always select the same target
audiences or stages in the policy cycle to become most actively involved.
When, where, and how they exercise policy influence ultimately depends
on several factors, including their mandate and resources, which, as the
previous chapter demonstrated, vary enormously.
The priority for some think tanks in Canada, including the Fraser
Institute and the C.D. Howe Institute, is to influence both the policy-making
environment and the policy-making process. As a result, both institutions
welcome opportunities to enhance their visibility by submitting articles to
newspapers, relying heavily on social media to reach multiple audiences,
and by giving interviews on radio, television, and through podcasts.
Moreover, these and other think tanks acknowledge how critical it is to
secure access to the cabinet and senior levels of the bureaucracy, where
political power in Canada is concentrated. Although think tanks frequently
testify before parliamentary committees and provide party research offices,
middle and senior-level policy analysts in government departments, and
MP s with their publications, they devote less attention to influencing the
fate of bills being considered by Parliament.33
They are reluctant to devote resources to influencing debates in the
House of Commons, particularly after a bill has passed first reading, largely
because of the strong party system. This system encourages party leaders to
exercise a virtual stranglehold over party members who are forced to accept
their role as spectators rather than active participants in parliamentary
discussions. Although all Westminster parliamentary systems are not as
suffocating for party members as Canada’s (Britain’s is far more relaxed),
the limited opportunities for MP s, particularly those occupying the
backbenches, to ask questions and highlight concerns during question
period is reason enough why parliamentarians generally do not attract the
sustained attention of think tanks. Put simply, unlike high-profile members
of Congress and key figures in the administration, who are in a position to
bring considerable attention to bear on various issues of concern to the
public and to think tanks and other N G Os, what takes place among MP s,
and even the prime minister on the floor of the House of Commons, rarely
captivates the daily work of think tanks. Think tanks in Canada understand
all too well that the time to influence the content and direction of a
proposed bill is before it reaches the floor of the House. Once the
government (assuming it has a majority of seats) has endorsed a bill, there
is little that opposition parties can do to prevent its passage.
Publishing op-ed articles in newspapers, writing blogs, providing
commentary on the radio and on T V, and testifying before parliamentary
committees (which appear to be operating more smoothly since Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau came to power) might be useful ways to reach
policy-makers, but to have a real impact, think tanks must get further inside
the policy-making process. Ken Battle, president of the Caledon Institute,
realized this shortly after he published an article in The Globe and Mail in
late 1993 on the ill-fated seniors’ benefits. As a result of his article, Battle
was approached by several provincial premiers for advice, and, later, by
some senior cabinet ministers interested in drawing on his expertise in these
and related areas.34 According to Battle, “I recall getting a call at home one
afternoon from Paul Martin [the Liberal finance minister], who proceeded
to grill me for the better part of an hour on a piece I wrote on the social
security review. It was worse than the grilling I took during oral exams at
Oxford.”35
Judith Maxwell, founding president of the now defunct C P R N, Inc.,
acknowledges that to have an impact in policy-making, think tanks must
rely on diverse, and, at times, less visible forms of policy influence.
Although Maxwell does not downplay the importance of media exposure,
she maintains, like Battle and Zussman, that think tanks exercise the most
influence working with key stakeholders behind the scenes, not by
discussing policy issues with reporters.36 Maxwell believes that part of the
C P R N’s role was to bring together senior bureaucrats, academics, and
representatives from the private and non-profit sector in closed door
meetings to discuss social and economic policy issues: “We are interested in
creating new mental maps for policy-makers. Our research [and workshops]
are not intended to simply summarize issues, but to generate new thinking.
We want to help start conversations between people that would have never
taken place before.”37
Canadian think tanks may not have as many channels to influence
policy-making as those in the United States, but the political structure in
Canada does not hinder their access to policy-makers as much as some have
suggested. What may restrict their influence more than the political
environment they function in are the limited resources most Canadian, and,
indeed, American think tanks have at their disposal.
CONSTRAINING IDEAS: DO CANADIAN AND

A ME R I C A N T H I N K TA N K S FA C E S I MI L A R
CONSTRAINTS?
Different types of political systems impose different types of constraints on

non-governmental organizations seeking access to power. Clearly, the
political system in the United States is more permeable than the system in
Canada and in some other parliamentary systems. Nonetheless, to better
understand why US think tanks appear to be more firmly entrenched in the
policy-making community than those in Canada, several factors unrelated
to the institutional structure of the Canadian and American governments
must be considered.
In Canada, as in the United States, most think tanks have modest
financial and human resources. The Brookings Institution, with its sizeable
endowment, multimillion-dollar operating budget, and over 300 staff and
researchers is sometimes mistakenly regarded as a typical US think tank.
However, as noted, Brookings and the handful of other institutes with
comparable resources are anything but typical. The typical think tank in
Canada and the United States has approximately a dozen staff and a budget
between $1 and $2 million, fewer resources in fact than several trade
associations, including the Ontario Federation of Labour and Canadian
Manfacturers & Exporters (C ME), which in 2014–15 posted revenues of
more than $17 million.38
The major difference between think tanks in the two countries is that
while the United States has such prominent repositories of policy expertise
as Brookings, the Hoover Institution, the Heritage Foundation, and R A N D,
think tanks that generate considerable attention in the media and in some
scholarly circles, Canada has few if any of comparable size and stature.
Even its largest institute, the Conference Board of Canada, functions more
as a business-oriented planning organization than as a traditional
interdisciplinary policy research institute like Brookings.39
The absence of a think tank of this scale in Canada cannot be attributed
to the lack of qualified individuals to staff it; for decades Canada has had a
surplus of PhDs in the social sciences – the degree most policy research
institutes require of applicants. The pool of graduating PhDs in the social
sciences in the United States and in Canada has remained relatively strong
over the past several years, with increases in the number of students
completing PhDs in science and engineering. In 2005, for instance, the last
year for which Statistics Canada kept data on the number of people who
have earned doctorates, 774 PhDs in the social sciences were awarded,
compared with slightly over 3,000 in the United States.40 In 2014, more
than 15,000 doctorates in the social sciences were awarded by American
universities.41 Given the tremendous difficulty PhD graduates face in
securing academic positions (assuming this is their preferred career path),
they may very well consider seeking employment at a think tank.
While finding qualified people to staff a large think tank in Canada is
not a problem, it is becoming increasingly difficult to secure sufficient
sources of revenue. As in the United States, the majority of think tanks in
Canada do not have endowments on which to draw to ensure financial
security and independence, and those that do, with few exceptions, continue
to face financial challenges. The Centre for International Governance
Innovation (C I G I), the Institute for Research on Public Policy (I R P P), and
the Caledon Institute are among the handful of policy institutes in Canada
whose core funding is secured through endowments.
Without endowments on which to draw, think tanks in Canada have no
alternative but to consider how to secure adequate revenue. For some,
including the various defence and foreign policy institutes at over a dozen
Canadian universities, this has meant relying heavily on government funds,
often in the form of specific contracts, and on support from private
foundations. This dependence places think tanks in a vulnerable position;
Roy Culpeper, former president of the North-South Institute (N S I),
observed years before N S I was forced to close its doors that receiving large
sums of money from only a few sources can be “both a blessing and a
curse.”42 Since government agencies and philanthropic foundations often
have vested interests in ensuring that their recipients express views
consistent with theirs, think tanks might be reluctant to be overly critical of
policies supported by their donors. As several government-funded institutes
experienced first-hand following the 1992 Canadian federal budget, and
more recently during the Harper years, as long as governments have the
power to change their priorities, there is little think tanks can do to ensure
their survival.
The financial security of think tanks that receive little or no government
funding is also precarious. These organizations must turn to the private
sector, to the public, and to foundations and private donors, for support. In
the United States, the Koch, Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations,
among others, have long supported social science research, much of which
has been at think tanks.43 This generous tradition of philanthropic support
in the United States, however, has not taken root to the same extent in
Canada, where the majority of think tanks struggle to keep afloat.
Relying too heavily on philanthropic foundations and corporations can
also be risky, of course. As mentioned, like governments that require
foreign aid recipients to make certain concessions, philanthropic
foundations and large corporate donors must be satisfied that the
organizations they are making grants to act in a manner consistent with their
institutional missions. Failing to appease the political agenda of
philanthropic and corporate donors can, as the American Enterprise
Institute (A E I) discovered in the mid-1980s, have serious repercussions.
When the A E I president, William Baroody Jr, was unable to convince
several right-wing foundations, including the Olin Foundation and the
Reader’s Digest Foundation, that A E I was committed to pursuing a truly
conservative agenda, these and other like-minded donors withdrew their
significant financial support, bringing the A E I to the verge of bankruptcy.44
As noted, several think tanks in Canada, including the N S I and the
National Council of Welfare, were not as fortunate. Conversely, acting in
the interests of affluent donors can pay handsome dividends for some think
tanks, as the Washington-based conservative think tank Citizens for a
Sound Economy (C S E) discovered after it began its campaign to derail a
multibillion-dollar federal plan to restore the Florida Everglades in 1998.
For its efforts, CSE received $700,000 in contributions from Florida’s three
largest sugar enterprises, “which stand to lose thousands of acres of cane-
growing land to reclamation if the Army Corps of Engineers plan goes into
effect.”45
For most think tanks in Canada, and in the United States for that matter,
achieving financial independence is the most significant obstacle they must
overcome to ensure a strong presence in the policy-making community.
Without a sustainable budget, think tanks will not be able to mount the
extensive research and media relations program necessary to attract the
attention of policy-makers. More important, without ample resources think
tanks will not be able to recruit the type of people most qualified to produce
policy-relevant research, as will be discussed in more detail shortly.
Some consideration should also be given to important cultural
differences between Canada and the United States, which could also affect
the prominence of think tanks in the policy-making process. One significant
cultural factor that may account for their playing a less visible role in
Canada is the relative absence of a strong, vocal entrepreneurial class in the
private sector. As Abelson and Carberry point out, “In the US, independent
policy entrepreneurs have provided important leadership in the formation of
think tanks dedicated to providing information and advice to government.
In Canada, on the other hand, such leadership is likely to come from the
government itself or from senior public servants. This difference reflects
both the incentives created by the institutional structure of each form of
government as well as cultural understandings of the appropriate
repositories of policy expertise.”46
John Kingdon’s work on policy entrepreneurs, defined as “advocates for
proposals or for the prominence of an idea,” demonstrates how these
individuals can have an important impact on policy issues: “their defining
characteristic, much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their
willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and
sometimes money – in the hope of a future return.”47 Why do policy
entrepreneurs undertake these investments? They do so, according to
Kingdon, “to promote their values, or affect the shape of public policy.”48
Without effective and meaningful government initiatives to establish
policy institutes like the I R P P and the various strategic and defence studies
institutes at various Canadian universities, leadership must come from one
or more policy entrepreneurs. According to the limited research conducted
in this area, there is some evidence to suggest that, with respect to the
private sector, these entrepreneurs are likely to be more prominent in the
United States than in Canada. In their study of the environmental agenda in
the two countries, Kathryn Harrison and George Hoberg observed a
difference in policy entrepreneurship.49 Among other things, they
discovered that policy entrepreneurs in the United States played an
important role in promoting certain environmental issues, particularly the
effects of radon, and were able to facilitate their discussion on the political
agenda. They also noticed that there was an absence of similar activity in
Canada. Harrison and Hoberg note how the presence of policy
entrepreneurship is, in a certain sense, tied to the institutional arrangements
of each political system.50 The highly fragmented American political
system, combined with an absence of strong party unity, provides incentives
to private policy entrepreneurs to shape the political agenda. By contrast,
the relatively closed and party-driven system in Canada offers few
allurements to such entrepreneurs.
As discussed in chapter 1, several think tanks in the United States owe
their existence, and, indeed, their success to the efforts of policy
entrepreneurs committed to injecting their political and ideological views
into the policy-making process. Robert Brookings, Andrew Carnegie, and
the Heritage Foundation’s Edwin Feulner and Paul Weyrich represent but a
handful of such entrepreneurs who have created think tanks as institutional
vehicles to promote their beliefs. This entrepreneurial spirit is also evident
in the vanity and legacy-based think tanks in the United States.
By way of comparison, Canada has few examples of think tanks that are
the direct creation of private sector policy entrepreneurship.51 The Fraser
Institute, under the initial guidance of Sir Antony Fisher, Patrick Boyle, and
economists Sally Pipes and Michael Walker; the Manning Centre and
Foundation; and a handful of others are notable exceptions.52 On the other
hand, the public sector has been a viable source of leadership. Senior public
servants, including Michael Pitfield and Michael Kirby,53 played important
roles in creating the I R P P, the Economic Council of Canada, the Science
Council of Canada, and other governmental advisory bodies.54
The fact that major initiatives for creating Canadian centres of policy
expertise tend to come from inside the government and not from the private
sector, as in the United States, is not surprising. In part, it reflects both
countries’ cultural understanding of the relationship between government
and the provision of policy expertise. This role for governmental leadership
in Canada is not unexpected, given the importance granted to bureaucratic
and party policy advice in the parliamentary process.55 Colin Gray, former
chair of the Virginia-based National Institute for Public Policy, has
suggested that the culture of “officialdom” in the Canadian and British
bureaucracies discriminates against external groups seeking to provide
advice to government. This ethos of officialdom contrasts with the
relatively open access of the US system, in which the role of the
bureaucracy in providing policy advice is often overshadowed by the
presence of “independent” advisors operating in the private sector.56
The difference in think tank development in the two countries,
particularly in the source of their creation and growth, may reflect broader
societal trends: sociological analyses of Canadian and American societies
provide an interesting comparison. Canada’s political structure has long
been viewed as more “conservative, traditional … statist, and elitist” than
the United States.57 By contrast, American attitudes about individualism
and the limited role of the state have supported a culture encouraging
private entrepreneurship. As Seymour Martin Lipset argues, “If one society
leans toward communitarianism – the public mobilization of resources to
fulfill group objectives – the other sees individualism – private endeavor –
as the way an ‘unseen hand’ produces optimum, socially beneficial
results.”58
In sum, think tank development in the United States is supported by
cultural influences: a value system stressing individual effort, a tradition of
philanthropy, and the presence of independent advisors operating alongside
the bureaucracy. This has encouraged policy entrepreneurship from the
private sector, with think tanks originating from society. The Canadian
cultural context provides a different environment for think tanks,
particularly its bureaucratic ethos, which, at times, discourages external
advice. Governments in Canada have taken, and continue to take, an active
role in creating and maintaining think tanks, as evidenced by the recent
creation of a handful of institutes, including the Saskatchewan Institute of
Public Policy in June 1998.59 This does not mean that private
entrepreneurship is unwelcome, but it means that it may face substantial
challenges to overcome both the cultural climate and institutional
arrangements to secure a meaningful role in policy debates.
The opportunities for think tanks to convey their ideas to policy-makers
and the constraints that may undermine their efforts helps to shed light on
some of the differences between them in Canada and the United States.
Still, it is also important to consider another issue – the incentives for
government officials to turn to think tanks for advice. A closer look at this
factor may help to better explain why think tanks in the United States
appear to be more relevant in policy-making than the majority in Canada.
E X P L O R I N G I N C E N T I V E S : WH Y P O L I C Y-
MA K E R S T U R N TO T H I N K TA N K S
There are several reasons why policy-makers in the United States would
turn to think tanks for information and advice. To begin with, a number of
US think tanks have established impressive research programs in domestic
and foreign policy by recruiting not only first-rate academics but many
former high-level policy-makers to their institutions. The presence of
former cabinet secretaries and other seasoned policy-makers also provides
an incentive for members of Congress, the executive, and presidential
candidates to solicit their advice. Access to think tank luminaries, including
Brent Scowcroft, Henry Kissinger, Condoleezza Rice, and George Shultz,
may help to open other doors for office-holders or for those aspiring to
become policy-makers. In short, members of Congress, the executive, and
the bureaucracy can benefit from the wealth of expertise and the extensive
network of contacts available at several US think tanks. Moreover, unlike
most university professors, who have little incentive to produce timely and
policy-relevant research, scholars at think tanks are more sensitive to the
policy needs of office-holders. They can provide decision-makers with what
they need – clear and concise summaries of the costs and benefits
associated with particular policy proposals.
There are other incentives to turn to think tanks. As previously
mentioned, several think tanks have been able to assemble talent pools of
scholars for incoming administrations to access to fill important positions in
government. For instance, during the Carter, Reagan, Clinton, Bush, and
Obama administrations, many think tanks, including the Brookings
Institution, the Hoover Institution, the A E I, and the Center for a New
American Security, contributed key staff.60 Politicians and aspiring office-
holders can also turn to think tanks for ideological support: advocacy-
oriented think tanks like the Heritage Foundation often help to validate or
reinforce the ideological views of incumbents and challengers.61
It is less clear why policy-makers in Canada would turn to think tanks
for advice. To begin with, some preliminary data reveal that the majority of
researchers at most private think tanks in Canada, unlike their colleagues at
equivalent institutions in the United States, do not possess doctorates
(although several think tank directors do), despite the availability of
individuals with PhDs in Canada. Most have an undergraduate or a masters’
degree in the social sciences.62 Furthermore, with few exceptions, the
majority of think tank analysts have little or no government experience.
This is not to suggest that previous government experience is necessary to
provide informed observations about government or the issues confronting
elected officials, but it does suggest that policy-makers may be more
inclined to rely on think tank personnel who have worked in government in
some capacity and who have some direct experience working with
stakeholders. Their extensive government experience may in fact explain
why Judith Maxwell, when she was in charge of C P R N, Inc., and Ken
Battle have been approached by cabinet ministers and senior officials for
advice. It may also explain why, compared with several other think tanks,
the Caledon Institute has become so firmly entrenched in the policy-making
process. Second, unlike in the United States, where there appears to be a
revolving door between think tanks and government, it is rare for think tank
scholars in Canada to be recruited into senior positions in the bureaucracy,
or for former cabinet ministers, bureaucrats, and experienced
parliamentarians to go to think tanks after leaving public office.63
Some directors of Canadian think tanks have, as noted, held important
government positions. However, few think tanks have been able to hire
leading policy experts, in large part because of limited financial resources.
Others, like the Public Policy Forum, elect not to actively recruit high-
profile policy analysts, preferring instead to hire individuals with an array
of talents.64 Regardless of the importance think tank directors place on
hiring prominent academics or policy-makers, the absence of high-profile
experts may discourage some government officials from using think tanks.
The uneven quality of research being produced at some institutes may also
discourage them. As Lindquist has noted, to be relevant think tanks must
produce work that contributes to a better understanding of the intricacies of
important policy issues. But as Lindquist discovered in his detailed
examination of Canadian policy institutes, it is questionable how much
some think tanks have added to major policy debates, a subject that will be
addressed in chapters 7 and 8.65 Finally, while many think tanks in the
United States may lend intellectual credibility to the ideological agenda of
policy-makers or aspiring office-holders, this function is less critical for
policy-makers in Canada. Members of Parliament may benefit from, and,
indeed, welcome ideological support from think tanks, but it is the party
leadership and backroom strategists, not independent think tanks, that
dictate the party line.
Policy-makers in Canada appear to have fewer incentives to rely on
think tanks for expertise, but this could be changing. As the internal policy
capacity of government diminishes, a subject that will be examined in the
concluding chapter, public servants are beginning to strengthen their ties to
the external policy research community. In this environment, Canadian
think tanks may be able to overcome some important obstacles and
constraints and play a more decisive role in the policy-making community.
Comparing think tanks across nations and understanding how political
structures can promote or impede their access to policy-makers is
invaluable in explaining why, for instance, think tanks in the United States
and in other democracies enjoy more opportunity to shape public opinion
and public policy than independent institutes operating in countries with
totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Yet, as this chapter has illustrated by
comparing two countries, it is important not to exaggerate the extent to
which institutional differences are responsible for elevating or diminishing
the profile of think tanks. In other words, the significant differences in the
governmental systems of the United States, and, say, China, helps explain
why, compared with US think tanks, those in China enjoy far less visibility,
although even this is beginning to change as China’s population of think
tanks continues to rise.66
Gray has noted that “American-style think-tanks could not function in
Canada or Great Britain … because of the differences in political culture
and government structure.”67 But, as this chapter and chapter 1 have
demonstrated, the same types of think tanks that exist in the United States
have not only emerged in Canada but have contributed in some instances
both to policy-making and to shaping the policy-making environment. They
have accomplished this in many ways: by advising cabinet ministers, as
Ken Battle and others have done; and by helping to increase public
awareness about the costs and benefits of introducing different pieces of
legislation by sharing their ideas with the media, as the Fraser Institute, the
C.D. Howe Institute, and others frequently do. Moreover, as the next
chapter reveals, contrary to Gray’s assertions, not only have American-style
think tanks taken root in Canada, but they have adopted many of the
strategies employed by US think tanks to influence policy-makers, the
public, and other important stakeholders.
CHAPTER FOUR
Competing in the Marketplace of Ideas:

The Strategies of Think Tanks
Think tanks are in the business of developing and promoting ideas and, like
corporations in the private sector, they devote considerable attention to
marketing their product. Unlike corporations, however, think tanks measure
success not by profit margins but by how much influence they have in
shaping public opinion and the policy preferences and choices of leaders.
Unfortunately, for think tank directors and those who study these
institutions, it is far simpler to read their annual reports than to measure
their performance. In this chapter, I lay the foundation for assessing the
impact of think tanks by exploring the many channels policy research
institutes use to market their ideas. It is important to keep in mind that while
think tanks in Canada and the United States have very different missions,
resources, and priorities, they tend to rely on similar strategies to influence
policy. Where they differ is in the emphasis they place on pursuing each
strategy. In other words, while generating media exposure is a preferred
tactic for more advocacy-oriented think tanks, including the Heritage
Foundation and the Fraser Institute, to name a few, it is not considered a
priority for some institutes, like the Public Policy Forum and the Caledon
Institute, which pay little attention to the media exposure they generate,
preferring instead to commit their resources to strengthening ties to key
policy-makers and other key stakeholders.
The chapter begins by highlighting the strategies think tanks usually
employ to generate attention in the public arena and in important policy
circles. Particular emphasis is placed on what has become the most visible
method think tanks pursue to attract exposure – gaining access to the media.
Finally, the chapter will discuss some of the many methodological problems
that arise in assessing think tank influence and what steps can be taken to
provide more informed judgments about the impact of think tanks.
PUBLIC INFLUENCE
Though often portrayed as elite organizations composed of scholars

pursuing research in relative isolation, think tanks have become
increasingly visible. As more think tanks have entered the marketplace of
ideas, there has been a growing awareness among both newer and older
generations of policy institutes that they must compete for the attention of
policy-makers and the public, not to mention the financial support of
government agencies, individuals, and corporate and philanthropic donors.1
While some of the strategies think tanks rely on to exercise influence are
concealed from the public, many can be easily identified. In fact, to varying
degrees, think tanks in the United States and Canada employ some or all of
the following strategies to influence policy-makers, academics, business
leaders, journalists, and the public:
• holding public forums and conferences to discuss various domestic and

foreign policy issues. Several of these events are podcast live;
• encouraging scholars to give public lectures and addresses;
• testifying before committees and subcommittees of Congress and
Parliament;
• publishing books, opinion magazines, newsletters, policy briefs, and
journals that are widely distributed;
• creating email distribution lists to facilitate the transmission of new
publications; and posting key information about the work of their
institute on websites;
• targeting the public during annual fundraising campaigns; and
• enhancing their exposure through the use of various social media.
Holding public forums or conferences is among the most common

strategies think tanks employ to increase awareness about a particular
domestic or foreign policy issue. Policy-makers, journalists, academics, and
representatives from the private and non-profit sectors are regularly invited
to discuss timely and often controversial issues before public audiences. At
times conferences are also arranged to generate exposure for a newly
released study. A well-publicized and well-attended conference on
important topics such as stabilizing world markets, enhancing border
security, and promoting a greener economy, several of which have been
organized by Canadian and US think tanks or a conference on the impact of
US presidential and congressional elections on domestic and foreign policy,
which several Washington-based think tanks have sponsored, can benefit
these organizations in many ways. In addition to taking credit for
encouraging opinion-makers to discuss issues they have helped identify,
think tanks use conferences to educate those in attendance about the role of
their institute and the work in which they are engaged. To reach even more
individuals who might be interested in the type of research they conduct,
think tanks in both countries encourage their resident scholars to give
lectures at universities, Rotary associations, and other organizations
interested in contemporary political affairs. Once again, high-profile
speakers from think tanks can serve as ambassadors for their institutes as
they travel across the country, sharing their thoughts on a host of policy
issues. Several scholars at think tanks regularly perform this role, and in the
process remind their audience of the efforts their organizations are
undertaking to convince policy-makers to follow the right path.
Several think tanks also recognize the importance of conveying ideas to
policy-makers and the public more formally. Some policy institutes in
Canada and the United States accomplish this by testifying before
legislative committees – although some, including the Brookings
Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the Canadian Council on Social
Development, and the Conference Board of Canada, clearly assign a higher
priority to performing this function than others. Providing testimony,
particularly to a prominent committee, can attract considerable attention.
The oral presentations and written briefs policy experts provide are
included as part of the official record and are often cited by journalists and
academics. Agreeing to appear before legislative committees can also serve
to enhance the credibility of think tanks in the eyes of some policy-makers
and help think tank directors convince potential donors of the widespread
influence of their institutes. This may explain why several think tanks in the
United States and Canada prominently display the testimonies given by
staff on their website.
Think tanks employ several other strategies to market their message.
Many, particularly those with well-established research programs, such as
the Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the A E I, and the
I R P P, rely on blogs, journals, newsletters, and books to reach their various
target audiences. For example, from 1977 to 2013, the Heritage Foundation
published Policy Review, an opinion magazine that contained brief articles
by many leading conservatives on various policy issues. The Foundation
now relies on issue briefs, factsheets, and other electronic and print
publications to reach out to the media and to other intended audiences. But
Heritage has taken its media outreach even further. In 2014, it created The
Daily Signal, a multimedia news organization designed to combat what it
believes is liberal bias in the media. Investigative reporters with The Daily
Signal examine and report on a host of policy issues inside and beyond the
Beltway through a conservative lens. Not to be outdone by Heritage, the
free-market-oriented Kansas Policy Institute, with the backing of the Koch
brothers, launched its own news service called The Sentinel in 2016 to help
infuse public policy discussions with a more conservative edge. Although
there appears to be a trend among some US think tanks to augment the
conservative media by creating their own news services, some continue to
rely on more academic research outlets to convey their views. For example,
the Brookings Review, published by the Brookings Institution, The
American Enterprise Institute Economics Working Paper Series, produced
by the A E I, and American Outlook, published by the Sagamore Institute,
are examples of opinion magazines distributed US think tanks. Several
think tanks in Canada also publish online opinion magazines and blogs,
including Policy Options and The Fraser Forum, published by the Institute
for Research on Public Policy and the Fraser Institute, respectively. For
many think tanks, these types of publications are their most effective
product, because, unlike books, which are often outdated by the time they
are released, opinion magazines and concise online commentaries provide
policy-makers with insights into current policy problems. These
publications, often on a particular theme, help to frame the parameters of
important and relevant policy debates, and, more important for policy-
makers’ hectic schedules, they can be read in a matter of minutes.
Think tanks produce publications for other consumers as well. Several,
for example, publish refereed scholarly journals that are intended to be read
by university students and academics. Among these are Foreign Affairs, the
flagship journal of the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations;
Orbis, produced by the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research
Institute; and International Journal, published by the Canadian
International Council, formerly the Canadian Institute of International
Affairs. In addition to scholarly journals and opinion magazines, dozens of
think tanks produce books and monthly newsletters that are intended to
keep readers informed about the most important developments at their
institutes.
A number of think tanks also reach potential consumers through other
forms of communication. In the past, for instance, the Heritage Foundation
produced Monthly Briefing Tapes, which included interviews with some of
their policy experts, as well as speeches given by prominent (mostly
conservative) opinion-makers. To market this product, Heritage often
sought the endorsement of high-profile policy-makers. Among those who
helped sell the monthly briefing tapes was former speaker of the house
Newt Gingrich. In his endorsement, which appeared in various Heritage
publications, Gingrich referred to the tapes as “A monthly dose of
conservative common sense. You’ll wonder how you ever got along without
it.”
As new technologies were developed, audio tapes were replaced with
video clips, podcasts, chat rooms, live interviews, and various forms of
social media, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc., linked to
websites maintained by think tanks. Virtually every think tank in the United
States and Canada relies extensively on the internet to publicize its work.
Their websites provide a wealth of information, ranging from an institute’s
most current publications and staff directory to upcoming conferences and
seminars. Some sites also provide links to important data bases. The Urban
Institute, for instance, provides a link to the National Center for Charitable
Statistics, a repository of data on the non-profit sector in the United States
that includes information on the budgets of thousands of non-profit
organizations throughout the US. Others – such as the one maintained by
the Heritage Foundation, one of the more sophisticated websites
constructed by US think tanks, have gone so far as to advise young
conservatives on how to find policy jobs in Washington. Think tanks also
regularly update their email distribution lists to ensure that academics,
policy-makers, journalists, and others interested in their work are kept
informed about key issues and events. Many think tanks also track the
number of website hits they generate as well as the number and kinds of
documents that are downloaded from their sites. These figures are posted
along with other performance indicators think tanks like to showcase in
their annual reports. These and other data may help think tanks make a
stronger case to potential donors that their work is attracting larger
audiences.
Fundraising is yet another way think tanks in both countries can market
themselves to the public and to policy-makers. Again, some think tanks,
particularly in the United States, have enlisted the support of high-profile
policy-makers to convince the American public to make donations. For
instance, in 1982, at the request of Heritage Foundation president Edwin
Feulner, Edwin Meese III, a special adviser to President Reagan and later
US attorney general, wrote a letter to potential Heritage donors telling them
that in exchange for a tax-deductible donation of $1,000, they would be
allowed to join the president’s club. The club, according to Meese, who for
several years has held a fellowship at Heritage, would entitle them to “a
series of meetings with the most senior members of the administration and
Congress.”2 In an accompanying fundraising letter, Feulner added, “You
will be provided with an access to Washington policy-makers which cannot
be had at any price. I have no doubt that you will find your membership fee
returned to you many times over.” Dismissing claims that he was directly
asking people to give money to the Heritage Foundation, Meese remarked,
“I am enthusiastic about the establishment of the Heritage Foundation
President’s Club … [It is] a vital communications link [between the White
House and those who support President Reagan and] this administration
will fully cooperate with your efforts.”3
Years later, Jim DeMint, in his role as president of the Heritage
Foundation, and his staff, would regularly send emails to members
requesting funds to support the organization’s activities. In exchange for
donations, DeMint would more than imply that donors would be rewarded
with access to top officials. It is this kind of gesture, along with the ties
many top-tier think tanks have with foreign governments, that led Ken
Silverstein, Brooke Williams, and other investigative journalists in the US
to make a strong case that think tanks are becoming more like lobbyists, a
subject that we will return to later in the study.
Still, of all the public uses of think tank influence, none are more visible
than the efforts of think tanks to secure access to the media. As will be
discussed in more detail later in this chapter, since several directors of think
tanks often equate media exposure with policy influence, many devote
considerable resources to enhancing their public profile. By ensuring that
they are regularly quoted in the print and broadcast media, think tanks seek
to create the perception that they play a critical role in shaping public
policy. However, as we will discover, while it is important for think tanks to
communicate their views to the public on television broadcasts or on the
op-ed pages (opposite the editorial page) of Canadian and American
newspapers, media exposure (including social media) does not seamlessly
translate into policy influence. Generating media attention may enable some
think tanks to influence public opinion, but it does not necessarily guarantee
access to other critical stages of the policy-making process.
P R I VAT E I N F L U E N C E
The many channels upon which think tanks rely to exercise public influence
are relatively easy to observe and document. However, it is often difficult to
monitor how think tanks seek to influence policy-makers privately. The
following list provides examples of how think tanks and the scholars
affiliated with them have attempted to exercise private influence. As will
become apparent, most of these strategies are unique to US think tanks.
Among the many private uses of influence are
• accepting cabinet, subcabinet, or bureaucratic positions in

administrations;
• serving on policy task forces and transition teams during presidential
elections and on presidential advisory boards;
• maintaining liaison offices with the House of Representatives and the
Senate;
• inviting selected policy-makers to participate in conferences, seminars,
and workshops;
• allowing bureaucrats to work at think tanks on a limited-term basis;
• offering former policy-makers positions at think tanks; and
• preparing studies and policy briefs for policy-makers.
There are few ways experts from think tanks can get closer to the policy-
making process than by becoming policy-makers themselves. As previously
noted, in several presidential administrations dozens of staff from think
tanks have been recruited into senior-level positions in the government.
Many, including the late Jeane Kirkpatrick (A E I) and the late Zbigniew
Brzezinski (C S I S), have served in cabinet and subcabinet positions, while
others have been appointed to important positions in the bureaucracy. More
recently, as will be discussed in chapter 6, a handful of prominent policy
experts, including Lawrence Lindsey and Robert Zoellick, left their
positions at think tanks to join the administration of President George W.
Bush, and many others found their way into the Obama administration and
to the Trump transition team. There are several potential benefits to think
tanks of having staff members appointed to an incoming administration, not
the least of which is the publicity surrounding the appointment itself. By
assembling a talent pool of scholars upon which administrations may draw,
not only do think tanks enhance their prestige and visibility, they can foster
even stronger ties to those making critical policy decisions. This may
explain why some think tanks, like the Heritage Foundation, closely
monitor vacancies in the bureaucracy in the hope of placing like-minded
colleagues in important positions.
Think tanks can establish and strengthen ties to key decision-makers
through other channels as well. Presidential campaigns, for example,
provide think tanks, particularly those that are ideologically in tune with
certain candidates, with a tremendous opportunity to help shape the political
platform and agenda of aspiring office-holders. As chapter 6 illustrates,
several presidential candidates have turned to experts from think tanks for
information and advice on how to address a wide range of domestic and
foreign policy issues. In the process, a number of experts have been invited
to serve on policy task forces or on transition teams to assist both
presidential candidates and presidents-elect to assume power. Furthermore,
during some administrations several think tank scholars have been
appointed to important presidential advisory boards, including the
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (P F I A B), the President’s
Intelligence Oversight Board (P I O B), and the President’s Economic Policy
Advisory Board (P E PA B).4 Since political power in the United States,
unlike in Canada, is not concentrated in the executive but is largely shared
with the legislative branch, US think tanks also develop strategies to
strengthen their ties to members of Congress. Several, including Heritage,
have done this by establishing liaison offices with the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Maintaining close contact with the
legislature enables think tanks to meet regularly with members to discuss
their concerns and policy needs. It also allows them to monitor and track
the most important issues on the floor of the House and Senate, which, in
turn, helps them prepare the type of research policy-makers require to make
critical choices. Some think tanks, including Brookings, have also held
focus groups with congressional staffers to better assess how useful they
find their research products. This type of input can prove extremely
valuable when think tanks consider the best ways to tackle complex issues,
not to mention the most effective channels through which to communicate
their findings. By contrast, think tanks in Canada, as noted, rarely devote
considerable resources to establishing strong ties to the legislature, other
than the time some experts invest in preparing testimony to deliver before
parliamentary committees. As noted, unlike in the US Congress, Parliament
is not home to hundreds of elected officials with the luxury or freedom to
automatically embrace the ideas espoused by outside policy experts,
especially if the policy recommendations being made are at variance with
the wishes of their party. Indeed, the limited freedom MP s have to express
their concerns or to challenge the direction of their party is one of the many
features of parliamentary democracy in Canada that several seasoned
parliamentarians are seeking to change.5 While think tanks routinely
distribute their publications to members of Parliament, there is less
incentive for think tanks in Canada to try to persuade individual MP s to
endorse their studies; more can be gained by working closely with cabinet
members and senior officials in the bureaucracy, who are in a position to
implement policy changes.
To discuss certain policy issues in more detail, some think tanks
regularly invite members of Congress to attend private seminars,
conferences, and workshops. Once again, this strategy enables policy
experts at think tanks to share their insights with policy-makers who are in a
position to influence the content of legislation. Think tanks like the
Heritage Foundation, C S I S, and the Hoover Institution also realize that
many newly elected members of Congress, as well as some seasoned
policy-makers, could benefit from acquiring more knowledge of particular
policy issues. They also realize the importance of establishing good
communications with congressional staff and legislative assistants who
regularly advise members of Congress.
Established in 1980, the Hoover Institution’s two-day Washington
Seminars (as they were then called), held on the picturesque campus of
Stanford University in Palo Alto, have played an important role in
facilitating the exchange of ideas between Hoover scholars and
congressional aides. Renamed the Stuart Family Congressional Fellowship
Program, the seminars, held twice a year, have been attended by
Democratic and Republican congressional staffers from the House and
Senate Committees on International Relations/Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, the Budget, Armed Services, Finance, Ways and Means,
and Intelligence and by the offices of the senate majority leader and the
house speaker, the minority leader, and the majority whip. The seminars are
often followed by meetings in Washington to bring together individuals
who have participated in the program, Hoover scholars, and other
government officials. According to the Hoover Institution, “these meetings
and seminars are now playing a critical role in the ongoing dialogue
between scholars and policy-makers, which is so important to the effective
development and implementation of legislative and executive department
policies and programs.”6
The Hoover Institution also sponsors seminars for journalists and recent
college graduates (known as the Hoover Policy Boot Camp) to help inform
and educate them about a range of policy issues. Some think tanks also
maintain close contact with bureaucratic departments and agencies. For
instance, through the State Department’s Diplomat in Residence Program,
diplomats can, between assignments, take up residence at think tanks and
universities to write, conduct research, and deliver lectures. Diplomats have
been sent to several think tanks, including the American Enterprise
Institute, the Hoover Institution, R A N D, the Council on Foreign Relations,
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Heritage
Foundation.
Some policy-makers, particularly in the United States, are so impressed
with think tanks that they decide to make them their permanent home after
completing their public service. However, it is important to point out that
many former high-profile policy-makers are not recruited to think tanks
because of their potential as researchers but because of their ability to
attract funds, which is likely why think tanks have often approached former
presidents and cabinet secretaries to join their ranks.
Finally, think tanks in both countries often hold informal meetings with
key policy-makers to discuss studies that their institutes have produced or
simply to outline a range of policy options elected officials have at their
disposal. Most of these meetings are rarely publicized or talked about, but
they nonetheless can help shape public policy. Indeed, for many think tanks,
working quietly behind closed doors might be the most effective channel
they have to influence policy-making.
The strategies think tanks use and the emphasis they place on each is
influenced not only by the political environment they inhabit but by their
mandate and resources. In other words, for advocacy-oriented think tanks
such as the Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute, which are
committed to influencing public dialogue and which have the resources to
market their ideas effectively, producing opinion magazines, securing
access to the media, and holding public forums will be a top priority. On the
other hand, as previously noted, institutes like the Public Policy Forum and
the Caledon Institute, which prefer to exchange ideas with policy-makers in
meeting rooms instead of in public, will devote less consideration and fewer
resources to marketing their message. To sum up, think tanks develop
strategies that allow them to reach their specific target audience or
audiences most effectively.
MA R K E T I N G T H E ME S S A G E : T H I N K TA N K S
A N D T H E ME D I A
For most policy experts at think tanks, testifying before a high-profile

congressional or parliamentary committee or publishing a study on a
controversial domestic or foreign policy issue may attract attention in some
policy-making circles. However, it is unlikely to generate the exposure that
an appearance on the C B S or C B C evening news would, or reach the
sizeable readership that an op-ed article in the New York Times or The
Globe and Mail would. This may explain why some think tanks devote
considerable time and resources to gaining access to the print and broadcast
media, and why, in recent years, they have paid far more attention to social
media. It might also explain why the competition between think tanks for
media exposure is so intense. As Patricia Linden explains, for think tanks to
compete, “their ideas must be communicated; otherwise the oracles of
tankdom wind up talking to themselves. The upshot is an endless forest of
communiques, reports, journals, newsletters, op-ed articles, press releases,
books, and educational materials. The rivalry for attention is fierce; so
much so that the analysts have come out of their think tanks to express
opinions on lecture and T V circuits, at seminars and conferences, press
briefings and Congressional hearings.”7
Securing access to the media on a regular basis provides think tanks with
a valuable opportunity to shape public opinion and public policy. At the
very least, media exposure allows think tanks to plant seeds in the mind of
the electorate that may develop into a full-scale public policy debate. There
was certainly no shortage of think tank commentaries on President Trump’s
first 100 days in office, and on virtually every important domestic and
foreign policy issue confronting policy-makers in Canada and the US, the
presence of think tanks has been felt, a subject that we will return to later in
this study.
In addition to contributing to the public dialogue, think tanks understand
that media exposure helps foster the illusion of policy influence, a currency
they have a vested interest in accumulating. At the very least, constructing a
narrative that suggests media exposure translates seamlessly into policy
influence is a message that think tank directors are only too willing to
convey and reinforce. The Fraser Institute is just one of many think tanks
that has employed this strategy. Although former Fraser Institute chair Alan
F. Campney acknowledged in the Institute’s 1976 annual report that it “is
almost as difficult to measure the effects of the Institute’s work as it is to
ascertain what Canada’s economic problems are,” Fraser has consistently
relied on media coverage to assess its impact. According to its twenty-five-
year retrospective, “One of the indicators the Institute has used from its
inception [to measure performance] is media coverage. How many
mentions does an Institute book receive in daily newspapers? How many
minutes of airtime do Institute authors and researchers receive during
interviews?”8 Such data, as the next chapter will reveal, may tell us which
think tanks attract the most attention, but it provides little insight into how
much impact institutes have in the policy-making process.
Few think tanks have devoted more time and resources to securing
access to the media than the Heritage Foundation. In 2015, Heritage spent
over $11 million of its close to $100 million budget on media and
government relations. By contrast, in the same year, A E I spent 13 per cent
or approximately $5 million of its budget on communications, and
Brookings allocated 3 per cent of its $95 million budget to performing this
function. To put this in context, Heritage’s media relations budget line
exceeds the operating revenue of the Fraser Institute.9
Heritage’s public relations program is based on a simple premise:
“provide journalists, opinion leaders and the general public with the
positive message of responsible conservatism and conservatism will remain
competitive, and even triumph, in the marketplace of ideas.” Its goal is even
simpler: “Make sure journalists never have a reason for not quoting at least
one conservative expert – or for not giving the conservative ‘spin’ in their
stories.”10
The Heritage Foundation has clearly accomplished its goal: the
mainstream media in the United States relies disproportionately on Heritage
and a handful of other conservative think tanks inside the Beltway for their
expertise and political commentary. In Canada, the media appears to rely
heavily on a handful of free-market institutes as well.
To make sure journalists do not overlook the views of their scholars, the
Heritage Foundation and several other think tanks, including the Hoover
Institution and the A E I, have developed programs designed to flood the
mainstream print media with hundreds of op-ed articles each year. For
example, between 1998 and 2008, well over 1,000 op-ed articles penned by
Heritage scholars appeared in some of America’s leading newspapers,
including the Chicago Tribune, the Christian Science Monitor, the Los
Angeles Times, the New York Times, U S A Today, the Wall Street Journal,
the Washington Times, and the Washington Post. In 2015 alone, close to
1,500 commentaries by Heritage experts were published in a wide range of
print outlets.11 Several think tanks have also given considerable thought to
how to increase their exposure on the air. While some American institutes
have created their own television programs or have had documentaries or
conferences broadcast on cable T V, most viewers recognize think tank
scholars from their regular appearances on network newscasts (C B S ,
A B C , N B C , C N N, and Fox News), P B S NewsHour, or a host of
political talk shows, including Meet the Press and This Week (with George
Stephanopoulos). Scholars from Canadian think tanks regularly appear on
the C B C and C T V evening news.
Establishing personal relationships with journalists is also critical for
think tanks trying to enhance their media profile. As Brian Lee Crowley,
president of the Ottawa-based MacDonald-Laurier Institute and founding
president of the Halifax-based Atlantic Institute for Market Studies
observed, to secure access to the media, think tanks should ensure that their
institutional interests coincide with those of journalists. According to
Crowley, “having sound ideas and doing the research to back them up are
only one-half of your job. The other half is putting a lot of energy into
strategic communications, and putting that strategy into effect. The place to
start is not with ideas, but with personal relationships. Journalists are moved
much more by personal contact than by the best ideas in the world. One
way that they economize on scarce time is by having a stable of people,
experts in their field, in whom they can have confidence, knowing that if
they are told something by these people, they can put a great deal of weight
on it without running the risk of looking stupid and foolish.”12
The potential benefits of being a guest commentator on a national
newscast or radio program or of publishing op-ed articles on a regular basis
are great. Not only do these activities bode well for think tank scholars
looking for a broader audience to convey their ideas, but they can also
promote the goals of the institutions they represent. As the late William J.
Taylor Jr, a senior adviser in the International Security Program at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (C S I S) for many years noted,
to raise the visibility of C S I S, “he [took] advantage of every opportunity to
appear on television, not so much for personal reasons “but for the glory of
CSIS and its mission of informing the public. When we’re on television,
we’re up there as individuals, but it says C S I S under our name.”13 Yet, as
Howard Kurtz, a former reporter with the Washington Post and currently
host of Fox News Channel’s MediaBuzz says, what the viewer fails to learn
from the title flashing under Taylor’s name – “C S I S Military Analyst” – is
that “C S I S is a markedly conservative organization that forms a sort of
interlocking directorate with the Washington establishment … That it has
received $50,000 to $250,000 from such defense contractors as Boeing,
General Dynamics, Rockwell, Honeywell and Westinghouse. [And that its
annual report boasts: ‘we network in Washington with the Congress, the
executive branch, the scholarly community, the corporate and labor
communities and the media.’]”14
It is not difficult to understand why think tanks covet media attention.
After all, as the Heritage Foundation, the A E I, the Brookings Institution,
the Fraser Institute, the C.D. Howe Institute, and others have discovered,
media coverage can and does play a critical role in allowing institutes to
effectively market their message. But what makes some think tanks more
media friendly than others? Although the next chapter will examine this
topic more fully, a few factors are worth noting. First, think tanks that have
large and diverse research programs supported by dozens of staff are likely
better positioned to attract more media exposure than institutes offering
only a narrow range of expertise. Think tanks such as many of those
mentioned above appeal to journalists because they can comment, on very
short notice, on a range of domestic and foreign policy issues. In a sense,
the A E I, the Heritage Foundation, and the Brookings Institution function as
one-stop policy shops. They also appeal to journalists who are looking for a
particular political perspective on an issue. When reporters call the Heritage
Foundation or the Fraser Institute, which are well known for their
commitment to free market principles, they can be assured that any
proposal by the president or Congress or by the prime minister to increase
taxes to pay for social welfare programs will be criticized. It is no
coincidence that scholars from the Heritage Foundation, a strong advocate
for many of the policy positions advocated by Donald Trump, regularly
appear on network newscasts and talk shows to bolster the president’s
agenda. Knowing what positions think tanks will generally take may also
account for the media’s reliance on the same group of think tank scholars.
The reliability of policy experts is also a consideration, as Crowley noted,
particularly when journalists are under tight deadlines. Sam Donaldson,
who served as a reporter and news anchor with A B C news for over forty
years, agrees:
Clearly there are problems with going to the same people … [But] to
sit down while you’re facing a deadline and say, “Gee, there must be
some other experts we haven’t thought of. Let’s beat the bushes and
launch a search of the city or the country for them.” Well, that takes a
lot of time and energy because for T V it involves a lot more than
flipping a card on the Rolodex. A second reason is that we know
[some guys] provide a succinct response. You can’t come to me and
say, “Sam, I know you’re on a deadline, you need to comment on
such and such, go out and take a chance on Mr X.” No, I’m sorry
folks, I don’t have the time to take a chance with Mr X … I know Mr
Y … is going to deliver the goods.15
As Donaldson implies, how effective pundits are at communicating their

ideas to the public is also important. Possessing the ability to explain
complex issues in a simple, straightforward, and engaging way is also a
highly marketable and sought after skill that think tanks look for when they
hire policy experts. Tammy Haddad, a media entrepreneur, and a former
executive producer of several shows, including Larry King Live, and
Hardball with Chris Matthews, agrees, observing that “there are so many
people out there who know so much, but they’re lousy guests. They have to
be able to explain [issues] in such a way that my mother in Pittsburgh
understands what they’re talking about.”16 During newscasts it becomes
even more crucial for guests to be succinct – they do not have the time to
offer long exposés on the state of the world. Those scholars who realize
what the broadcast media requires will continue to find their names at the
top of smartphone contact lists.
S T U D Y I N G T H I N K TA N K I N F L U E N C E
Think tanks frequently boast about their influence in the policy-making

community, and go to great lengths to publicize how much attention they
generate. In their annual reports, they regularly include a section entitled
“Think Tank by the Numbers,” which highlights, among other things, how
many media citations their institute has received in the past year; the
number of visitors to their website, the volume of publications downloaded,
the number of times their staff have testified before legislative committees,
and the number of followers they have on Facebook, Twitter, and other
social media, along with a smattering of other so-called indicators of
influence. These data are intended to convince donors how much influence
they have in shaping public policy. Think tanks also pay very close
attention to how they shape the narrative around their policy impact. For
example, a few months after Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office,
Heritage Foundation president Edwin Feulner claimed that over 60 per cent
of the policy recommendations included in his institute’s mammoth study,
Mandate for Leadership, had been or were in the process of being
implemented by the Reagan administration. To Feulner’s delight, his
remarks appeared in several newspapers throughout the United States. What
most journalists failed to point out, however, was that many of the
recommendations Feulner was taking credit for had been proposed by other
individuals and institutes years before. Indeed, not a single journalist
bothered to inventory the various policy recommendations Feulner claimed
had influenced Reagan’s domestic and foreign policy. The illusion of the
Heritage Foundation’s newly acquired policy influence, fostered in part by
the media, had become reality. Similarly, when asked to consider what
federal government programs or policies his institute had helped shape in
the previous ten years, Michael Walker of the Fraser Institute remarked,
“the Fraser Institute has played a central role in most policy developments
during the last decade and it is simply too onerous a task to specify.”17
The Fraser Institute’s current president, Niels Veldhuis, has made similar
claims about how extensive a reach his organization has in Canada’s policy-
making process. But Veldhuis should not be singled out. Most think tank
presidents understand how important it is to portray their institute in the
most favourable light, and go to great lengths to do this.18 They are not shy
when it comes to flaunting their organization’s achievements, nor are they
modest in seeking the praise and endorsement of high-profile policy-makers
and scholars. For years, the Fraser Institute would quote the late Nobel-
prize-winning economist Milton Friedman, who stated that “the Fraser
Institute has become a remarkably influential think tank: one of the most
influential in the world,” or former British prime minister Margaret
Thatcher, who acknowledged that “the great work [Fraser has done] has had
a tremendous influence.”19
These and other testimonials intended to raise the profile of think tanks
often appear in promotional material and on think tank websites, and in
some cases, they may even hold a kernel of truth. But whether or not the
praise heaped on think tanks is warranted, it is incumbent on scholars and
journalists to delve more deeply into how and to what extent think tanks
have shaped the discourse around key policy issues. Think tank directors
and presidents have good reason to showcase their accomplishments,
which, in many cases, continue to pay handsome dividends; on the other
hand, scholars interested in assessing policy influence have good reason to
be skeptical.
Evaluating think tank influence, a topic that we will return to in the next
few chapters, is inherently difficult because directors of policy institutes,
not to mention those who study them, have different perceptions of what
constitutes influence and the circumstances under which it can best be
achieved. As noted, for some think tank directors and presidents, the
amount of media exposure their institute generates or the number of
publications they produce reflects how much influence they wield.
Conversely, some think tank leaders rely on other performance indicators,
such as how many staff have been appointed to senior government positions
or the size of their budget, to assess their impact. What makes evaluating
their influence even more difficult is that the policy-makers, academics, and
journalists who subscribe to think tank publications or attend their
conferences and workshops invariably have different impressions of how
useful or relevant they find their work. Scholars thus cannot assume that
think tanks measure influence in the same way, nor can they take for
granted that policy-makers and other consumers of their products use
similar criteria to evaluate their work. This is one of the many problems of
publishing global rankings of think tanks, which tend to be highly arbitrary,
ad hoc, and impressionistic.20
Even if think tanks used the same performance indicators and assigned
the same priority to becoming involved at each stage of the policy-making
process, numerous methodological obstacles would still have to be
overcome to accurately measure their influence on public policy. Since
dozens of individuals and organizations seek to influence policy debates
through various channels, tracing the origin of a policy idea becomes
problematic. In an increasingly crowded political arena, it is often difficult
to isolate the voice or voices that made a difference. Moreover, it can take
months, if not years, before an idea proposed by a think tank or any other
non-governmental organization for that matter, has any discernible impact.
Indeed, by the time a policy initiative is introduced, it may not resemble a
think tank’s initial proposal at all.
Directors of think tanks can, and often do, provide anecdotal evidence to
reveal how much influence their institutes wield, but such pronouncements
offer little insight into how relevant think tanks are in the policy-making
process; claiming to have influence is far simpler than documenting how it
was achieved. In the following chapter we will examine one approach that
can be used to make more informed judgments about the relevance of think
tanks at different stages. Rather than assuming that think tanks in general
have influence or that some think tanks have more influence than others, we
will evaluate which think tanks in Canada and the United States appear to
be most actively involved at key stages of the policy-making process.
Drawing on extensive empirical data for a handful of performance
indicators, including media citations, parliamentary and congressional
testimony, and consultations with bureaucratic departments, the chapter will
show that it is possible to demonstrate, particularly in Canada, that policy-
makers do not always rely on the most visible think tanks for information
and advice. Several think tanks that generate little media attention are also
invited to participate in various stages of policy-making, and in doing so,
make their presence felt.
CHAPTER FIVE
Public Visibility and Policy Relevance:

Assessing the Influence of Think Tanks
Much has been written in recent years about the growing influence of the
Heritage Foundation, the Fraser Institute, and several other think tanks in
the United States and Canada. Those who study the burgeoning think tank
population in these countries point to their ever-expanding output of
publications, their appearances before congressional and parliamentary
committees, and their considerable media exposure as evidence of their
heightened importance in the policy-making community. This perception,
as noted, is reinforced by directors of think tanks who often credit their
institutes with, among other things, influencing major policy debates,
executive orders, and government legislation. While it is not surprising that
think tanks exaggerate their impact in policy-making, it is surprising that
few journalists, or scholars for that matter, have considered whether the
increased media visibility of policy institutes reflects how relevant or active
they are in shaping public opinion and public policy. Indeed, rather than
acknowledging that think tanks exercise different types of influence at
different stages of the policy-making cycle, it is assumed that the most
talked-about and written-about think tanks are those best suited, equipped,
and positioned to influence the discourse around key policy issues.
As funding agencies and philanthropists continue to place more pressure
on think tanks to provide evidence of policy impact, and as scholars
struggle to assess direct and indirect policy influence, it is important to
consider ways in which we can provide more informed observations about
think tanks and their involvement, or level of engagement, as I prefer to call
it, in the policy-making process. One approach is to undertake a quantitative
assessment of think tank performance by measuring, for instance, how
much media exposure think tanks have generated and how often staff from
various think tanks have testified before legislative committees. Keeping
track of other performance indicators, such as the number of publications
think tanks produce and the volume of studies that are downloaded from
their website, the number of followers they have on Facebook and Twitter,
and how many conferences and seminars they hold, might also be worth
considering.1
Although there are potential pitfalls in relying too heavily on a
quantitative assessment of think tank performance, there are also some
important benefits, as will become clear. At the very least, by monitoring
how much media exposure think tanks generate and how often they appear
before legislative committees, we can determine more easily how active or
inactive think tanks are on particular policy issues. These kinds of
indicators or metrics may thus provide useful insights into how engaged
some think tanks are, and why their activities may warrant closer scrutiny.
However, it is important to keep in mind that some think tanks do not relish
or covet public exposure, and indeed find it advantageous to avoid
attracting media attention. Preferring instead to work behind the scenes by
meeting and discussing policy issues with elected officials and other key
stakeholders in private, their limited visibility does not necessarily translate
into a lack of policy impact. On the contrary, flying below the radar might
be exactly what some policy institutes strive to achieve.
The purpose of this chapter, in undertaking a quantitative assessment of
think tank influence, is to challenge the widely held perception that the
most visible think tanks must also, by implication, be the most influential.
To do so, I will address one important and frequently ignored question: Do
policy institutes that generate high media exposure (hereafter referred to as
public visibility) also engage actively in other important phases of the
federal government’s policy formulation process – consultation with
government departments and testimony before congressional and
parliamentary committees (two indicators of policy relevance)? Can we
expect think tanks that are effective at capturing media attention to be as
effective at, or interested in, participating in other stages of policy-making?
Interestingly enough, in comparing the media visibility and policy
relevance of think tanks in Canada and the United States, two very different
patterns emerge.
As R. Kent Weaver and Andrew Rich discovered in examining the
visibility of fifty-one US think tanks, institutes that attract considerable
media exposure are more likely to be called upon to testify before
congressional committees than those with modest media profiles.2
Moreover, as Rich observed in a separate study, there appears to be a
relationship between think tanks that enjoy high media exposure and those
that policy-makers and other opinion leaders consider the most influential.3
By contrast, when the public visibility and policy relevance of a select
group of Canadian policy institutes is measured, a different set of
observations comes to light.4 As in Weaver and Rich’s study, the data on the
public visibility of Canadian think tanks reveal that, with few exceptions,
the print and broadcast media in Canada rely disproportionately on the same
group of policy institutes: the Conference Board of Canada, the Fraser
Institute, and the C.D. Howe Institute, which rank among the think tanks
most often cited by the media. Several factors that will be discussed could
account for the media’s reliance on these institutes. However, in Canada
high media exposure does not appear to be a precondition for advising
senior public servants and policy-makers. In fact, two institutes that advise
several government departments, the now defunct Canadian Policy
Research Networks, Inc. (C P R N), and the Caledon Institute of Social
Policy, have, relative to other institutes in Canada, limited public visibility.
A simple ranking test that focuses on the period between 1991–97, when
C P R N was still active, confirms that there is no correlation between public
visibility and the number of departments with whom institutes consult.
Unfortunately, the Canadian government has not issued a revised study
documenting the interaction of public policy institutes with government
departments. As a result, although reference will be made to the initial
findings showcased in the previous edition of Do Think Tanks Matter?
additional data cannot be presented. More recent data (1998–2016) on the
amount of media exposure a select group of American and Canadian think
tanks generate, as well as the frequency with which experts from many of
these institutes testify before various legislative committees, will instead be
highlighted. In comparing results between the first set of data (1991–97)
with our more up to date findings (1998–2016), it will become clear that
despite some variations in the rankings among American and Canadian
think tanks in media exposure and legislative testimony during the two time
periods, a strong relationship continues to exist between these variables. In
other words, think tanks that attract high media exposure also tend to have
their experts appear more regularly before legislative committees. It stands
to reason that the more familiar elected officials and staff serving on
committees are with the work and policy direction of particular think tanks,
the more likely they are to consider inviting some of those experts to share
their insights on proposed changes to legislation. Just as scholars garner
attention from their peers by publishing their findings in highly respected
academic journals and scholarly presses, think tank experts often enhance
their credibility and legitimacy with elected officials and other stakeholders
by being quoted in print, broadcast, and social media. Effective and
sustained media exposure for policy experts at think tanks can help to create
other opportunities for them to market and promote their ideas. Recognizing
the vitally important role many high-profile congressional and
parliamentary committees play in supporting or stalling legislation, the
efforts of scholars from think tanks to shape the conversation or discourse
around proposed laws simply cannot be ignored.
This chapter begins by evaluating Weaver and Rich’s work on the
visibility and impact of American think tanks and the many lessons that can
be drawn from their analyses. The chapter will then discuss the public
visibility of a cross-section of Canadian think tanks and offer several
reasons to explain why some think tanks in Canada have generated
considerably more media exposure than others. Following this, the
relevance of Canadian policy institutes during the phases of policy
formulation mentioned above will be examined. Think tanks will be ranked
according to the number of departments that list them as consultants and the
number of appearances they have made before parliamentary committees. A
Spearman’s rho, a statistical test to measure the correlation between two
sets of ranked variables, will be used to assess the relationship between
media visibility and policy relevance. The final section will briefly discuss
what additional steps scholars can take to assess the influence of think
tanks.
T H I N K TA N K S A N D T H E A ME R I C A N ME D I A
As the previous chapter discussed, gaining access to the media has become
one of the most common and important methods think tanks employ to
convey their ideas to policy-makers and to the public. For think tanks
committed to advocating a particular point of view, achieving widespread
media exposure is critical: “Without a mass constituency backing their
efforts, the influence of expertise-providing organizations often depends on
the visibility their research obtains. Moreover, media visibility is often
assessed as a measure of the organizational viability and success of research
organizations by those who might fund their activities.”5
To determine which think tanks in the United States generate the most
media exposure, Weaver and Rich analyzed references to fifty-one national
and regionally focused think tanks in six national newspapers (the
Washington Post, the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, U SA
Today, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times) between 1991
and 1996.6 A sample of their findings is given in table 5.1.
Weaver and Rich discovered that among the many factors that could
explain why some think tanks generated considerably more media exposure
than others, two important variables stood out – funding and location. First,
as the authors observe, “Money is critical for a think tank to gain visibility
and get its message out … Our analysis suggests that this funding translates
into media visibility, which, in turn, may encourage additional financing for
visible organizations.” With some notable exceptions, including R A N D,
which boasts the largest budget of all US think tanks, and the well-heeled
Urban Institute and Hoover Institution, think tanks with significant financial
resources generated the most media attention.7 Of the top five institutes
ranked by media visibility, none had budgets of less than $10 million. By
contrast, think tanks with budgets below $1 million received very little
exposure.
Second, being located in Washington clearly provides think tanks with
an advantage over institutes based outside the Beltway. Indeed, despite the
ease with which think tank experts spread out across the country can
communicate with journalists stationed in D C, having a physical presence
in the nation’s capital clearly pays handsome dividends. Weaver and Rich’s
data confirm that think tanks headquartered in Washington attract
considerably more media attention: “Washington-based think tanks remain
the overwhelmingly dominant players relative to think tanks based outside
the Beltway, not just as a function of size, but also of proximity, which
promotes the development of personal relationships and networks among
social scientists, journalists, and policy-makers’ staffs.”8 Think tanks with a
Washington address have the added benefit of cultivating ties to journalists
who cover national politics. As the previous chapter demonstrated, once
journalists have assembled a stable of local experts willing and able to offer
their insights at a moment’s notice, there may be little need to expand their
list of contacts.
Weaver and Rich did not examine the amount of exposure think tanks
generated in the broadcast media during the same period, but it appears
from table 5.2 that they would likely have arrived at similar conclusions.
All those that ranked high in print media exposure also attracted the
attention of television journalists. Ranked first in the number of citations it
received in the print media, the Brookings Institution topped the list of
institutes that received the most attention on America’s four major
television networks (ABC, N B C , C B S, and C N N). Between 1991 and
1997, staff from Brookings appeared on evening news broadcasts 171
times, more than twice as often as staff from the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (69 times) and the American Enterprise Institute (61
times), and more than three times as often as spokespersons from the
Heritage Foundation (47 times). With the exception of R A N D, think tanks
located outside the Beltway received little, if any, television exposure.
For the most part, the data revealed in tables 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 (which
cover the same media outlets) confirms the pattern observed by Weaver and
Rich. Over an eighteen-year period (1998–2016), the Brookings Institution
continued to generate the most print media references with a total of 19,977
mentions. A E I remained in second place with 11,782 mentions. The
Carnegie Endowment moved from its third-place ranking to seventh, losing
ground to several think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation which
catapulted from sixth to third. The considerable investment Heritage has
made in media and government relations has clearly paid off. Although it is
not surprising that Brookings’ more centrist leanings make it more
appealing to liberal media outlets such as the New York Times and the
Washington Post, Heritage also managed to generate hundreds of mentions
from these two newspapers. Because large and well-funded DC-based think
tanks with extensive research programs overseen by dozens of scholars can
comment on contemporary domestic and foreign policy issues through very
different ideological lenses, journalists will in all likelihood continue to turn
to them regularly for analysis. Indeed, as long as these and other top-tier
think tanks regard media visibility as a priority, they will remain among the
most cited policy institutes in the United States.
Table 5.1
Newspaper Citations for Selected American Think Tanks, 1991–97
Source: Data set compiled by R. Kent Weaver and Andrew Rich.
Table 5.1.1
Newspaper Citations for Selected American Think Tanks, 1998–2016
Source: Factiva.com
Table 5.2
A B C , N B C , C B S, and C N N Evening News Citations for Selected
American Think Tanks, 1991–97
Source: Vanderbilt University Television News Archive.
As to the frequency with which think tanks and their scholars are cited
by the broadcast media, there has been a noticeable change in rankings
among the top five thinks over the two time periods covered in this chapter.
Once again, Brookings remains the most cited think tank during evening
news programs produced by A B C , N B C , C B S, and C N N . C S I S is
ranked second according to the Vanderbilt Television News Archive, a
considerable improvement over its fifth-place ranking close to two decades
ago. CSIS has clearly made a long-term commitment to, and investment in,
strengthening its ties to the media. With state of the art communications
facilities, including access to its own satellite, C S I S understands the power
of ideas and how critical it is for think tanks to shape the narrative around
key policy issues. This lesson has not been lost on R A N D which has also
made significant headway in improving its media visibility. Moving from a
sixth-place ranking eighteen years ago to third represents a considerable
improvement. Rounding off the top five think tanks in broadcast exposure
on four of the major networks is Heritage in fourth place and the Carnegie
Endowment in fifth.
The data in tables 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 present a general picture of the extent
to which a group of top-tier US think tanks have attracted print and
broadcast exposure (in selected media outlets) over a twenty-year period.
Scholars who are intent in delving more deeply into these data sets could
also examine why some think tanks generate more attention in some
newspapers or on television networks than others, and why, for instance,
media exposure peaks for some institutes during specific periods of time. Is
it because of a particular news event that falls into a think tank’s area of
expertise, a controversial report that has been released, or possibly both?
Several factors could account for why some think tanks attract more
attention than others, but despite arriving at a compelling explanation, the
question remains – what does media exposure tell us about the nature and
influence of think tanks?
Table 5.2.1
A B C , N B C , C B S, and C N N Evening News Citations 1998–2016
Source: Vanderbilt University Television News Archive
Is Media Exposure a Reliable Indicator of Policy

Relevance?
Think tanks that attract considerable media exposure in the United States
are also effective at relying on other channels to shape public opinion and
public policy. Indeed, many of the think tanks that dominate the airwaves
and the op-ed pages of newspapers also make regular appearances before
congressional committees. And just as bias in certain news organizations
may account for why some think tanks are quoted more often than others,
the ideological preferences of committee members appear to influence the
frequency with which scholars from some policy institutes appear before
Congress.9 As Weaver and Rich note in a separate study, “data on
congressional testimony demonstrate the powerful effects of ‘gatekeeping’
by the majority parties in Congress.” They state, “Prior to the Republican
takeover of Congress in 1994, staff members from the Brookings Institution
were the most frequent think tank testifiers at congressional hearings in
most years, often followed by witnesses from the more conservative
American Enterprise Institute. In 1995, with Republican legislators and
staff controlling the bulk of witness slots, the Heritage Foundation became
the most frequently represented think tank, followed by the A E I, the
libertarian Cato Institute, and Brookings, in that order (see Appendix 5).
Testimony by liberal think tanks lagged far behind.”10
A similar pattern can be observed between 1999–2008, a period in
which the Republicans not only controlled the White House, but also, with
the exception of the 110th Congress, both the House and the Senate (see
Appendix 5). Between the 107th and 109th Congress, scholars from the
American Enterprise Institute testified before congressional committees
more than any of their counterparts. Below A E I’s first-place ranking, other
conservative and libertarian think tanks were well represented, including
the Heritage Foundation (ranked third) and the Cato Institute (ranked
fourth). C S I S placed third overall, and Brookings received an eighth place
ranking. However, by the time the Democrats retook the White House in
2009, and took control of both Houses of Congress (2009–11), the
appearances by scholars at Brookings increased dramatically. Even when
the Republicans regained a majority of seats in the house in 2011, the
Democrats, with majority support in the Senate, created opportunities for
scholars from Brookings and other more liberal think tanks to testify. It is
also worth noting that with a change in party leadership in the house
between 2001–17, Heritage Foundation scholars began to appear before
congressional committees with greater frequency (see Appendix 5),
findings consistent with Weaver and Rich’s earlier results.
Many of the conservative think tanks that frequently testify before
Congress are perceived to have the most influence in the political process.
In a 1997 survey conducted for the global consulting firm Burson-
Marstellar, Rich noted that of the 110 congressional staff and Washington-
based journalists surveyed, “68 per cent of respondents identified
conservative think tanks as having a greater impact on policy-making than
liberal think tanks: only five per cent named liberal think tanks as being
most influential.”11 The Heritage Foundation was considered by 42 per cent
of respondents as the single most influential think tank; Brookings was
ranked second by 28 per cent of respondents. However, when asked to rank
institutes according to their credibility, think tanks with no identifiable
ideology ranked considerably higher than either the liberal or the
conservative think tanks.
Weaver and Rich’s study on the media visibility and policy relevance of
US think tanks offers an interesting contrast when undertaking a similar
analysis in Canada. While the size and funding of institutes are important in
attracting media exposure, being located in Ottawa does not offer policy
institutes a decisive advantage. Indeed, many of Canada’s most prominent
think tanks, including C.D. Howe, CIGI, Fraser, and I R P P are
headquartered in other Ontario cities or in other provinces. An Ottawa
address may explain why some think tanks appear before parliamentary
committees and consult with federal government departments more often
than those located outside the nation’s capital. Yet, with few exceptions, the
institutes that receive the most media attention are based elsewhere. The
amount of media exposure think tanks in Canada generate may thus have
more to do with the type of expertise they offer, and the priority they assign
to media outreach, than with their proximity to policy-makers.
In addition, unlike the gatekeeper phenomenon observed in the US
Congress by Weaver and Rich, the frequency with which think tanks testify
before parliamentary committees does not appear to be heavily influenced
by the party in power. Finally, while there is a moderately strong correlation
between think tanks that generate high media exposure in Canada and those
that are invited to testify before legislative committees, the most visible
think tanks are not necessarily those that policy-makers always consider the
most relevant. If consultations with federal government departments can be
considered an indicator of policy relevance, some of the least visible think
tanks in Canada may be having the greatest impact at the most critical
stages of the policy cycle, a subject that we will return to later in the
chapter.
T H I N K TA N K S A N D T H E C A N A D I A N ME D I A
Although references to think tanks in newspapers and on radio and

television tell us little about their impact in shaping public opinion or about
the quality of their commentaries, data on media exposure can offer some
insight into which institutes are actively attempting to influence specific
policy debates. It can also reveal in which parts of the country think tanks
generate the most attention and whether the age, size, and financial
resources of institutes influence the amount of exposure they receive.
Between 1985 and 1999, four think tanks – the Conference Board of
Canada, the C.D. Howe Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the now defunct
Economic Council of Canada – generated 60 per cent of all media citations.
The Conference Board alone, which ranks first in public visibility, received
close to 25 per cent of all media coverage. Indeed, it is only on C B C Radio
that the Conference Board does not rank first in citations – it shares a sixth-
place ranking with the Mackenzie Institute (table 5.3), which places
nineteenth in overall visibility. The Canadian Tax Foundation (C T F), well
known for its commentary on tax reform and budgetary matters, rounds off
the top five institutes in the media visibility category, despite securing a
fifth-place ranking in only one category, newspaper citations (including The
Globe and Mail). Beyond the top four think tanks there is tremendous
fluctuation in media rankings. The former Science Council of Canada
received more citations than the C T F in The Globe and Mail. On C B C
Radio, the C T F was outranked by eleven institutes, including the Science
Council, the National Council of Welfare, the Canadian Council on Social
Development, and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (C C PA).
On the C B C and C T V national evening news, the Toronto-based Canadian
Institute of Strategic Studies generated more coverage than the C T F. On
C T V, three other institutes, the National Council of Welfare, the
Mackenzie Institute, and the Canada West Foundation, had slightly more
onscreen appearances or text references than the C T F. Of the twenty-two
policy institutes for which data on media citations were collected, only half
generated more than 1,000 references. The eleventh-ranked institute, the
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, received 1,007 citations, 915 more
than the lowest-ranked institute, the Parliamentary Centre, at 92 (table 5.4).
How do these data compare to results collected over a more recent time
period (2000–08 and 2009–17)? Between 2000–08, the Fraser Institute
squeezed by the Conference Board of Canada to secure a first-place
ranking, with a total of 5,547 media mentions, 316 more than the second-
ranked Conference Board. These organizations were followed by C.D.
Howe and the Canada West Foundation, which received third and fourth
place rankings respectively. Other institutes that fared well in media
exposure were the Calgary-based Pembina Institute, the C C PA, and the
I R P P (see Appendix 4). From 2009–17, the rankings among the top
Canadian think tanks reveal some movement, but overall, the pattern
remains unchanged (see Appendix 4). The Conference Board of Canada
returned to a first-place ranking with 7,549 media mentions, followed by
the Fraser Institute (5,175), C.D. Howe (4,716), the C C PA (2,378), and the
Canada West Foundation (948). On the C B C and C T V national evening
newscasts during this period, the Conference Board ranked first, followed
by the Fraser Institute, and the C C PA. And on C B C Radio, it was the
Fraser Institute (with 39 mentions) barely edging out the Conference Board
(with 37 mentions). Not surprisingly, the same group of think tanks
received the lion’s share of references in the various newspapers and other
media included in the study.
What factors could account for these rankings? Why do the media rely
disproportionately on four or five policy institutes? A number of possible
explanations are worth exploring. A useful point of departure is to consider
when the institutes generating the most media attention were created, since
one might expect the more established think tanks to attract more exposure.
Of the five institutes registering the highest media ranking between 1985
and 1999, the oldest is the C T F, established in 1945, followed by the
Conference Board (1954), the Economic Council (1963), the C.D. Howe
Institute (1973), and the Fraser Institute (1974). Only Fraser, C.D. Howe,
and the Conference Board are ranked among the top five think tanks in the
two more recent time periods studied (table 5.4).
The longevity of an institute may go some way to establishing its
legitimacy and credibility in the policy-making community, but even
possessing this valuable currency does not appear to be a crucial factor in
attracting media attention, a finding consistent with Weaver and Rich’s
study of US think tanks. Several policy institutes, including the Canadian
Council on Social Development (C C S D, 1920) and the Canadian Institute
of International Affairs (C I I A, 1928, now the Canadian International
Council), with considerably lower media rankings, predate C.D. Howe,
Fraser, and the Conference Board by decades.
Table 5.3
References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks on C B C Radio, 1988–96
Source: These data were obtained from the CBC Radio Archives, Toronto. In 1994, the CBC
introduced a new computer system (Prolog) for logging citations on newscasts and radio talk shows.
Though more comprehensive in scope than the previous database, the majority of institutes in this
table could not be accessed by Prolog. As a result, this table underestimates citations. The trends that
can be observed, however, provide an indication of think tank visibility on radio programs.
1 Includes data for its two predecessors, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament
(C C A C D ) and Centre for Global Security.
2 Data not included.
The size of an institute’s budget, which in turn influences how many

staff it employs and the range of expertise it offers, may provide a more
compelling explanation. The Conference Board, the largest policy institute
in Canada, with 200 employees, ranks first, with an annual budget of more
than $40 million, close to ten times that of the majority of Canadian think
tanks. With the exception of CIGI, which boasts a comparable budget, but
far fewer staff, and the Winnipeg-based International Institute for
Sustainable Development, which has a comparable number of staff, but less
than half the financial resources, only a handful of other institutes have
budgets larger than $5 million, a paltry amount when compared with high-
profile US think tanks. These include: the Asia-Pacific Foundation, the
C T F, the Fraser Institute, the C C PA, and the Canadian Institute for
Advanced Research.
Table 5.3.1
Source: Eureka.cc (formerly Newscan), via York Library.
There appears to be a strong relationship between high media visibility

and the amount of funding upon which think tanks draw; however, there are
some notable anomalies. The C.D. Howe Institute, which ranked third
overall in visibility between 2009–17, has a budget of $3.5–4 million,
comparable to that of several less visible institutes, including the
Parliamentary Centre, the Canadian International Council, and the now
defunct North-South Institute.
Closely related to the budgets of institutes is the number of staff they
employ. Again, the Conference Board ranks first. It employs over 200
people, who provide research and analysis on economic and social issues.12
The Conference Board’s ability to construct economic forecasting models is
particularly attractive to government and to the large number of
corporations who form part of its extensive client list. The Conference
Board’s size may help to explain why, at times, it has attracted almost twice
the amount of media exposure as the Fraser Institute. It might also explain
why several other institutes considered large by Canadian standards often
find themselves in the media spotlight – organizations such as the Fraser
Institute, which employs 55 staff, the C C PA (40), C.D. Howe (25), the
Public Policy Forum (22), and I R P P (15). However, size cannot explain,
for instance, why the International Institute for Sustainable Development
which, as noted, is as large as the Conference Board, with a healthy budget,
receives a fraction of the media attention paid to the Conference Board, nor
can it explain why CIGI, an organization with more than 80 people and a
budget hovering around $40 million, also garners only modest media
exposure.13 With some exceptions then, the size of an institute’s budget and
the number of staff it employs may explain why some generate more
exposure than others.14
Table 5.4
Media Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 1985–99
1 Source: Infomart, includes citations from January 1985 to December 1999 for papers as described
in Appendix 1.
2 Source: Info Globe, includes citations from January 1985 to December 1999.
3 Source: C B C Radio Archives; includes citations from January 1988 to December 1996.
4 Source: National Media Archive, Fraser Institute; includes citations and appearances from January
1988 to December 1999.
5 Includes references to its two predecessors, C C A C D and Canadian Centre for Global Security, for
all media citations, with the exception of C B C and C T V National News.
Table 5.4.1
Media Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 2000–2016
* Source: Eureka.cc.
** Source: Factiva.com.
At the risk of stating the obvious, with limited funding and few staff
resources on which to draw, the ability of think tanks to undertake extensive
long-range research projects and/or organize regular conferences and
seminars will be compromised, which in turn will likely affect the amount
of media attention they attract. Moreover, with limited funds, it is unlikely
that think tanks will have the luxury of employing communications or
media/public relations specialists who have the experience to effectively
market the products institutes produce; by contrast, well-heeled think tanks
can and often do hire individuals with these backgrounds to enhance their
profile. The Heritage Foundation, the Brookings Institution, the Hoover
Institution, and the American Enterprise Institute, to name a few, have well-
established public relations departments. With few exceptions, however,
this does not appear to be the pattern in Canadian think tanks; even policy
institutes with reasonably high budgets by Canadian standards rarely assign
more than a fraction of it for marketing purposes, although this may be
changing.15
A related and perhaps more important consideration in discussing media
exposure is the diversity of an institute’s research; think tanks that offer
expertise in a wide range of policy areas are likely to capture more media
exposure than those that focus on only one or two. For example, the
Ottawa-based Vanier Institute of the Family and the Caledon Institute may
be asked to comment on how proposed legislation on child or seniors’
benefits will affect Canadian families, but they are unlikely to be invited to
comment on constitutional reform, political scandals, or the general state of
Canadian parliamentary democracy, issues likely to find broader interest in
the media. The extent to which think tanks tap into their areas of expertise
in novel ways to engage the public and other stakeholders is also a
consideration in explaining their success in courting the media. For
instance, the Fraser Institute’s annual pronouncement of Tax Freedom Day,
the day Canadians can hold onto their hard-earned money instead of turning
it over to the Canada Revenue Agency, results in dozens of media citations
for the free-market-oriented institute each year.
The mandate of institutes may go a step further in accounting for why
some organizations receive more exposure than others and why some
institutes receive more media attention in specific regions of the country.
The Calgary-based Canada West Foundation is a case in point. Established
to study the social and economic characteristics of the western and northern
regions of Canada and to assess the West’s economic and social
contributions, the Canada West Foundation, not surprisingly, receives the
majority of its media exposure in western newspapers, such as the Calgary
Herald (309) and the Edmonton Journal (225) (table 5.5). These two papers
combined account for close to 65 per cent of Canada West’s exposure in
Canadian newspapers (The Globe and Mail excluded). In The Globe and
Mail (table 5.6), which, until recently, was regarded as Canada’s only
national newspaper, the Canada West Foundation received just over 2 per
cent of all references to think tanks. The Canada West Foundation’s
emphasis on regional issues may also explain its limited exposure relative
to other think tanks on the C T V (2.4 per cent) and C B C (4.4 per cent)
national evening news (tables 5.7 and 5.8).
The Canada West Foundation continues to generate considerable
exposure in western-based newspapers. Indeed, between 2000 and 2017,
33.6 per cent of its print media mentions came from the Edmonton Journal
and Calgary Herald, but as table 5.5.1 reveals, compared with two decades
ago, the foundation is attracting a great deal of media interest in other
provinces, including Ontario (Toronto Sun) and Nova Scotia (Halifax Daily
News). Still, its exposure in The Globe and Mail and on C T V and C B C
television evening news remains modest (see tables 5.6.1, 5.7.1, and 5.8.1).
Despite these findings, being located outside the nation’s capital need
not be a disadvantage for think tanks seeking media visibility. A very
different pattern emerges in Canada than in the US; ranked second in
overall visibility, Vancouver’s Fraser Institute is close to 3,000 miles from
Ottawa; the C.D. Howe Institute, the third-ranked institute, is in downtown
Toronto. Meanwhile, several think tanks based in Ottawa, including the
Parliamentary Centre, the Caledon Institute, and the Pearson-Shoyama
Institute, have limited public visibility. Thus, it may be that a determining
factor in generating media exposure for Canadian think tanks is not their
location but their mandate and resources.
Think tank resources are important when considering their media
visibility, but so too are other, less tangible, factors. The priorities think
tanks assign to attracting media attention may also help explain why some
think tanks receive more exposure than others. For instance, for institutes
committed to shaping the parameters of national public debates, gaining
access to the media will undoubtedly be a high priority. It would, after all,
be difficult for think tanks to influence public opinion without publicizing
their ideas in print or on the air. As a result, individuals from some think
tanks, including the Fraser Institute and the Canadian Institute of Strategic
Studies, like their counterparts in the Heritage Foundation and C S I S,
welcome opportunities to appear on network newscasts. These and other
think tanks also regularly submit op-ed articles to newspapers, in the hope
of stimulating public debate.
Table 5.5
Newspaper Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 1985–99
Source: Infomart.
1 Includes references to its two predecessors, the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and the
Disarmament and Canadian Centre for Global Security.
Table 5.5.1
Source: Factiva.
** Source: LexisNexis.
Table 5.6
Globe and Mail Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 1985–99
Source: Info Globe.
1 Includes references to its two predecessors, C C A C D and C G S .
A less tangible factor, but one that nevertheless deserves consideration,

is how the political environment in Canada can enhance or diminish the
profile of some think tanks. For instance, as Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
moved closer to adopting the type of neoconservative agenda that his close
friends and allies Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were adopting
south of the border, the policy recommendations of the free-market-oriented
Fraser Institute also began to receive more public attention. The amount of
coverage an institute receives can thus also be influenced by the political
climate of the day.
Table 5.6.1
Globe and Mail Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 2000–2016
Source: Factiva.
Search parameters: 1 January 2000–1 January 2017.
Numerous other factors can influence the media ranking of policy

institutes. Although only passing reference has been made to media bias
(whether regional, ideological, or both), it may also be an important
consideration when interpreting the data on public visibility. While many
factors, such as an institute’s diversity of size and research, may also
explain why some are called upon to advise government departments or to
testify before parliamentary committees, other factors, which will be
explored below, might account for why think tanks with limited media
visibility nonetheless appear to be actively engaged in critical stages of the
policy-making process.
Table 5.7
C T V National Evening News Citations for Selected Canadian Think
Tanks, 1988–99
Source: The National Media Archive, Fraser Institute.

1 Data do not include information on its two predecessors, the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and
the Disarmament and Canadian Centre for Global Security.
Table 5.7.1
Tanks, 2000–2016
Table 5.8
C B C T V National Evening News Citations for Selected Canadian Think
Tanks, 1988–99
Source: The National Media Archive, Fraser Institute.

1 Data for C C A C D and Centre for Global Security, the two predecessors of the Canadian Council
for International Peace and Security (C C I P S ), not included.
Table 5.8.1
Tanks, 2000–2016
Assessing Policy Relevance
The policy-making process consists of several stages, or cycles, including

agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy implementation.16 This
section focuses on the involvement of think tanks during two stages of
policy formulation – consultations with government departments and
parliamentary testimony. Although it is difficult to weigh the relative
importance of different stages of policy-making, it is still possible to make
more informed judgments about the relevance of institutes during particular
phases.
Think tanks may become involved in policy formulation in several
ways. They may, for instance, distribute copies of their reports on an issue
to policy-makers and bureaucrats, in the hope that their findings will have
an impact. They may invite members of Parliament and the public service
to participate in conferences and workshops or hold private meetings with
government officials. Depending on their area and level of expertise, they
may be called upon to consult with government departments or to testify
before a parliamentary committee. At times, the federal government might
also enlist the support of think tanks to organize public hearings on policy
issues, a subject that we will return to in chapter 7. The data on think tank
involvement during these particular stages of policy formulation may tell us
little about the quality of their advice, or the frequency or intensity of their
interaction, but it does show how active institutes have been in using these
channels to convey their ideas.
As part of ongoing efforts to assess the policy capacity of the federal
government, a task force, headed by Ivan Fellegi, chief statistician of
Canada, and Ole Ingstrup, then principal of the Canadian Centre for
Management and Development, was created in late 1994 to investigate the
state of the external policy research community.17 An umbrella group
composed of assistant deputy ministers was then formed to recommend
how to strengthen policy development and practices. The report, released in
July 1997, made several recommendations on how to enhance the ability of
government departments to generate their own policy research, including
strengthening ties between federal departments and policy institutes. This
recommendation was based in part on responses from a survey distributed
to government departments that asked senior civil servants to provide the
names of research institutes that assist them in policy development. This
list, summarized in table 5.9, sheds some light on which think tanks have
been called upon to consult with government departments. At the time of
writing, an updated study on think tank consultations with government
departments and agencies had yet to be released.
Some of the methodological weaknesses in how the data were gathered
must be pointed out before discussing the ranking of institutes in
government consultations. Many of these weaknesses reflect the
tremendous difficulty that policy-makers, not to mention scholars,
encounter in trying to isolate the influence of think tanks from the influence
of the multitude of other organizations that have vested interests in
influencing policy-making. Thus, despite some apparent gaps in the
questionnaire distributed to government departments, these data should not
be considered unreliable, but suggestive and preliminary.
Table 5.9
Ranking Research Institute Consultations
Source: Department of Finance, Umbrella Group on Policy Management, Report.
Table 5.10
Federal Government Departments Consulting with Selected Canadian
Think Tanks
Source: Department of Finance, Umbrella Group on Policy Management, Report.
While government departments were asked to provide a list of policy

research organizations they turn to for advice and guidance (table 5.10),
they were not asked several related questions critical for arriving at
conclusions about the potential relevance of think tanks in policy-making.
For instance, respondents were not asked what criteria they used to
differentiate policy research organizations from other types of
nongovernmental organizations, including interest groups, and advocacy
bodies, that are also committed to influencing public opinion and public
policy. In other words, did all the respondents agree what constituted a
think tank or policy research organization? In the absence of a consensus
among those who filled out the questionnaire, it is conceivable that senior
bureaucratic officials consulted with institutions that are not widely
regarded as think tanks. As a result, the lists that departments provided may
not be entirely accurate. Furthermore, officials were not asked to comment
on the frequency of consultations with institutes or the period over which
the consultations took place. We are not told, for example, if Environment
Canada consulted with the Caledon Institute once or one hundred times
during a particular period. We are not even told what policy issues these
institutes were consulting on or the nature and products generated from
these consultations. Did institutes submit extensive reports, policy briefs, or
other kinds of publications? Were they widely circulated and discussed?
More important, were their analyses and recommendations, assuming some
were made, found to be very useful, moderately useful, or not useful at all?
Responses to the last question would be particularly revealing in relation to
the size and prominence of departments. Thus, having moderate influence
in high-profile departments such as Finance or Global Affairs Canada may
be more important for some think tanks than exercising considerable
influence in a less visible department. Answers to these and other questions
would provide a better sense of the data. In the absence of such information,
however, we are left with only one indicator of relevance – the number of
government departments that list policy research organizations as
consultants.
On the basis of these data, problematic and preliminary as they are, we
can again provide a simple ranking. As in many other categories, the
Conference Board ranks first in government consultations (9), a reflection
no doubt of its wide-ranging expertise. The Canadian Policy Research
Networks, Inc., according to the survey, consulted with at least six
departments, one consultation more than the Canadian Council on Social
Development.18 Of the remaining institutes in the study, the Caledon
Institute of Social Policy and the C.D. Howe Institute had three
consultations, one more than the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, the
Institute for Research on Public Policy, the Public Policy Forum, and the
Fraser Institute.
The number of departments that turn to particular policy institutes for
assistance can be attributed to several factors. First and foremost, the think
tanks’ areas of expertise will determine a department’s decision about
which one to consult. It is unlikely that the Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation would seek policy input from C I S S (now housed at Canadian
International Council [C I C]), which studies defence and foreign policy
issues. A related factor is a department’s perception of the quality of
expertise offered by institutes. This in turn can be influenced by a host of
other factors, including the personal and professional contacts think tank
staff have established with senior public servants. Directors or staff of think
tanks who previously served in government may thus be better positioned to
foster close ties to the public service than those with limited knowledge or
experience with, or in, the bureaucracy.
A more reliable set of data on the relevance of policy institutes could be
obtained by tracking the number of appearances think tanks make before
parliamentary committees. Providing testimony to a committee as it
considers implementing or revising legislation affords think tanks an
important opportunity to convey their recommendations directly to policy-
makers. Extending invitations to members of think tanks to provide
testimony can also be an indication of how useful or damaging policy-
makers believe their input could be. After all, it would be naive to suggest
that members sitting on legislative committees do not have political
agendas when it comes to arriving at a witness list. Indeed, some members
may go out of their way to ensure that policy experts from think tanks with
well-known views on particular matters are either invited or intentionally
ignored.
Individuals testifying before parliamentary committees (table 5.11) have
either received a formal invitation to appear from the committee or have
requested the opportunity to share their expertise. Committee members
make the decision about who will be invited to appear, often in consultation
with staff members and public servants.19 Between 1980 and 1999, no
policy institute appeared more often before parliamentary committees than
the Economic Council of Canada, which registered 117 appearances (table
5.12), more than twice as many as the second-ranked institute, the Canadian
Council on Social Development (57). It was followed by the Conference
Board (44), the Fraser Institute (43), the North-South Institute (42), the
Science Council of Canada (40), the C.D. Howe Institute and the Institute
for Research on Public Policy (both had 38), and the National Council of
Welfare (37). Eight other institutes registered ten or more appearances.
Over the past eighteen years (2000–17), a reshuffling in the rankings of
think tanks testifying before parliamentary committees has occurred.
Moreover, several think tank staffers are appearing in Parliament with
greater regularity. During this period, experts from the Conference Board of
Canada registered the largest number of parliamentary committee
appearances with 785, over twice as many as the second-ranked Fraser
Institute (369). Ironically, the third-place ranking went to the Economic
Council of Canada (342), which was dissolved in 1993. Clearly, many
experts who once worked at the E C C were identified in committee reports
by their earlier affiliation. Staff from C I S S also appeared over 300 times
(310), and the now defunct National Council of Welfare had experts testify
on 222 occasions. Eight other institutes in the table registered over 100
appearances, with the remaining organizations testifying between 1 and 99
times. Unlike the data on government consultants, the figures on
parliamentary testimony reveal that far more policy institutes were
represented at this stage of policy-making.
What factors influence how often think tanks appear before
parliamentary committees? Again, the nature of their expertise, as well as
their willingness and ability to invest the time and resources necessary to
prepare testimony would have to be considered; proximity to Ottawa may
be advantageous. The ideological orientation of committee members and
their desire to invite like-minded think tanks to testify may also be worth
taking into account. In the United States, as noted, there has been a marked
increase in the number of appearances before congressional committees by
conservative think tanks since the Republicans assumed control of both
Houses of Congress.20 As gatekeepers, they have clearly made an effort to
fill congressional hearings with analysts from avowedly conservative think
tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute,
and the libertarian Cato Institute. In Canada, however, there does not appear
to be any relationship between the party in power and the ideological
orientation of think tanks invited to testify. For instance, the Fraser Institute,
not known for concealing its conservative leanings, appeared before
parliamentary committees more often under the Liberal government of Jean
Chrétien than under Prime Minister Mulroney’s Conservatives (see tables
5.13, 5.14, and 5.15).
Table 5.11
Parliamentary Committee Reports Consulted for Think Tank Testimony
Table 5.12
Appearances by Selected Think Tanks before Parliamentary Committees,
1980–99
Source: Parliamentary Committee Reports, Thirty-Second to Thirty-Sixth Parliament, First Session,

1980–99.
1 Includes references to its two predecessors, the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and
Disarmament and the Canadian Centre for Global Security.
Table 5.12.1
Appearances by Selected Canadian Think Tanks before Parliametary
Source: Parliamentary Committee Reports.
Indeed, in the six years before the Harper Conservatives gained power
(1999–2005), the Fraser Institute continued to appear on a regular basis
before parliamentary committees. During this period, experts from Fraser
testified seventy-six times (table 5.13.1), far more often than any other
think tank that does not accept government funding. Ranked second in
parliamentary testimony behind the Conference Board of Canada, and
ahead of the now defunct National Council of Welfare, the Fraser Institute
continued to be active before parliamentary committees during the Harper
years (2006–15).
While the ideological orientation of political parties and think tanks may
not help to determine why some policy institutes are invited to testify more
regularly than others, some consideration should be given to the range of
committees think tanks are qualified to appear before. The number of
committees before which think tanks that have a narrow range of expertise
could make presentations, such as the Canadian Global Affairs Institute
(formerly the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute) and the
Mackenzie Institute, are rather limited. Nonetheless, while they might
appear before only a few committees, they may do so far more regularly
than those institutes sharing their expertise with several committees. Much
insight can be gained by focusing on the participation of think tanks before
parliamentary committees, particularly high-profile committees; however,
we cannot assume that all think tanks assign the same importance to using
this channel to reach policy-makers: briefing members of Parliament may
be a priority for some institutes, but it could also be a channel deliberately
avoided by others. For instance, concerned about being perceived as a
policy advocate, for many years the highly visible C T F made a conscious
decision not to give testimony on a regular basis.21 Between 1980–99, it
made only eight appearances before committees. Interestingly enough, over
the past two decades, C T F has clearly had a change of heart, perhaps
recognizing the importance of increasing its public profile in a more
competitive market of ideas. From 1999 to 2017, the organization registered
thirty-one appearances before committees in the House of Commons, and
138 in the Senate (tables 5.13.1 and 5.14.1).
Table 5.13
Appearances of Institutes for House Committee Testimony, 1980–99, by
Parliamentary Session
Source: Parliamentary Committee Reports, 1980–99.
Table 5.13.1
Appearances of Institutes for House Committee Testimony, 1999–2016, by
Source: Library of Parliament.
Note: No data for 36th Parliament session avaialble on Parliamentary database.
Table 5.14
Appearances of Institutes for Senate Committee Testimony, 1980–99, by

Interpreting the Results: Comparing Public Visibility to
Policy Relevance
To compare the public visibility and policy relevance of think tanks

between 1989 and 2008, three Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients
were used to test the correlation between the following pairs of variables:
media ranking and parliamentary testimony, media ranking and government
consultations, and government consultations and parliamentary testimony.22
The results of the tests are shown in table 5.16. According to the tests, there
is a strong correlation between media visibility and parliamentary
testimony, but there is no correlation between media visibility and
government consultations and between parliamentary testimony and
government consultations.
What do the results of the tests tell us about the nature of think tank
influence? Perhaps most important, they tell us that it should not be
assumed that the most visible think tanks are necessarily the most
influential and credible institutes in the policy-making process. It is
important to recognize, as this chapter has shown, that the relevance or
impact of think tanks varies at different stages of the policy cycle. Think
tanks like the Cato Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the Public Policy
Forum might be effective in shaping the national agenda or enlarging “the
terms of political discourse,” as Les Pal observes,23 but they might be less
influential in contributing to policy development at more formal stages,
while, on the other hand, think tanks with more modest media profiles, such
as R A N D, the Caledon Institute of Social Policy, and the Canadian
Council on Social Development, might play a more active role in more
formal stages of policy formulation.
Monitoring how often think tanks are quoted in the media or provide
testimony may not allow scholars to ascertain which think tanks are the
most or least influential; indeed, such data may tell us very little about their
impact. Nonetheless, collecting data on these and other indicators helps to
shed light on where in the policy cycle think tanks appear to be most
actively engaged, if they are engaged at all. If some think tanks devote little
time and energy to conveying their views to the media, one could argue
with some degree of confidence that their influence on public opinion is
limited. After all, how can think tanks influence the way people think if the
public is unaware of their views? Similarly, how can think tanks claim to
have policy influence if they do not convey their ideas directly to policy-
makers? However, by tracking which think tanks rely most heavily on the
media to promote their views and which depend on other channels to
market their ideas, we can look more closely at their involvement at
different stages of the policy-making process.
In the following three chapters, I will take a closer look at how a select
group of think tanks in the United States and Canada has sought to
influence the policy-making environment and specific policy debates.
Beginning with a detailed examination of the involvement of several
American think tanks in presidential campaigns in chapter 6, I will explore
how they have taken advantage of a critical opportunity to influence the
policy direction of incoming presidents. In addition to identifying which
think tanks have contributed ideas to presidential candidates, some
consideration will also be given to why some candidates actively seek the
advice of think tanks. Chapter 7 will focus on how a small group of
Canadian think tanks became involved in a major policy debate in Canada –
the Renewal of Canada Initiative – which was intended to generate public
discussion about the future of constitutional reform. And chapter 8 will
provide an overview of how a select group of think tanks on both sides of
the border weighed in on discussions surrounding Keystone X L. Although
one must be careful not to generalize about the impact of think tanks by
relying on a handful of case studies, the following chapters will highlight
the many different ways think tanks can make their presence felt.
Table 5.14.1
Appearances of Institutes for Senate Committee Testimony, 1999–2016, by
Note: No data for 36th Parliament session avaialble on Parliamentary database.
Note: Senate of Canada website database no longer offers data prior to 40th Parliament, 3rd session –
existing data above is a reflection of previous research on select institutes. https://sencanada.ca/en/In-
The-Chamber/Debates/Search.
Table 5.15
Appearances of Institutes for Joint Committee Testimony, 1980–99, by

Data on testimony before joint committees of parliament not available for the period 2000–17.
Table 5.16
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient Results
Significant at p <.01.
CHAPTER SIX
On the Road to the White House:

Presidential Candidates and the Think Tanks
That Advised Them
In April 1998, Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush

interrupted a fundraising trip for a gubernatorial candidate in Northern
California to meet with several scholars from the Hoover Institution. The
purpose of the meeting, which took place at the home of former secretary of
state and Hoover fellow George Shultz, was to allow the governor of Texas
to get acquainted with some of the nation’s leading policy experts.
Although Bush had little knowledge of the Hoover Institution or the work
many of its scholars engaged in before accepting Shultz’s invitation, his
friendship with Hoover fellow and economist Michael Boskin may explain
why Bush gravitated toward the California think tank.1 As a result of the
close to four-hour meeting, Bush “engaged twelve or so Hoover fellows to
advise his presidential campaign on issues from taxation to welfare to
foreign affairs.”2 In addition to relying heavily on scholars from the Hoover
Institution to help educate him on the intricacies of domestic and foreign
policy issues, Bush enlisted the support of several other policy experts,
including his top economic adviser, Lawrence Lindsey, former Federal
Reserve governor and fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and
Robert Zoellick, who stepped down as president of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies after only four months to advise Bush.3
Bush’s decision to turn to some of the nation’s most prominent think
tanks for policy advice is not surprising. Indeed, it has become common for
presidential candidates, particularly those who lack experience in federal
politics, to establish close ties to think tanks. Eager to find candidates who
can help translate their ideas into concrete policy decisions, it has also
become common for think tanks to provide much of the intellectual
ammunition presidential contenders require to sell their message to the
electorate. As the late Martin Anderson, a senior fellow at the Hoover
Institution for many years and a close adviser to Ronald Reagan, observed,
“it is during this period that presidential candidates solicit the advice of a
vast number of intellectuals in order to establish policy positions on a host
of domestic and foreign policy issues. Presidential candidates exchange
ideas with policy experts and test them out on the campaign trail. It’s like a
national test marketing strategy.”4
This chapter provides a snapshot of how some think tanks in the United
States seek to influence public policy. I explore how a select group of think
tanks have capitalized on presidential elections to share their ideas with
candidates and incoming administrations to demonstrate one way policy
institutes in the United States have tried to make a difference. The chapter
begins by examining the various factors that motivate presidential
candidates to turn to think tanks for policy advice and the general
willingness of institutes to assist in their endeavours. As will be discussed,
both presidential candidates and the think tanks that advise them recognize
the enormous benefits that can be derived from a successful partnership.
Following this, the close ties that were established between think tanks and
six presidential candidates who would go on to win the presidency – Jimmy
Carter (1976), Ronald Reagan (1980 and 1984), Bill Clinton (1992 and
1996), George W. Bush (2000 and 2004), and Barack Obama (2008 and
2012) – will be examined. The chapter will also make some preliminary
observations about the various think tanks Donald Trump tapped into
during the hotly contested Republican presidential primaries, and in the
general election and transition period that followed. These candidates and
their elections have been selected for a number of practical and empirical
reasons: first, it enables scholars to identify the close ties that the leading
presidential candidates have established with a select group of think tanks
in each election. Materials obtained from presidential archives and from
other primary sources, including newspapers and speeches, enable scholars
to make some preliminary observations about the participation of think
tanks in these elections. Of course, considerable gaps will remain unfilled
until the remaining records from the Reagan years and the complete records
of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies become available. Second,
by focusing on these elections, scholars can demonstrate that the think tanks
that became involved in these important events in America’s history
mattered in different ways and at different times. For instance, unlike
several scholars from the Hoover Institution who provided their expertise to
Ronald Reagan during the 1980 campaign, the Heritage Foundation’s
contribution to the candidate’s policy education was modest. Nonetheless,
by providing Reagan’s closest advisers with a detailed blueprint on how to
reform government, Heritage played a decisive role during Reagan’s
transition to power. Close to forty years later, Heritage developed another
blueprint for reforming government that clearly spoke to many of Donald
Trump’s priorities and ambitions. As will be revealed, Heritage and other
think tanks inside the Beltway made their presence felt, but not always in
the same way. The final section of the chapter will consider some of the
many lessons to be drawn from the involvement of think tanks in
presidential campaigns and transitions: among other things, why think tanks
may find it difficult to resist the temptation to enter the political arena in
such a highly visible way, and some of the potential repercussions of their
engagement.
A P E R F E C T U N I O N : T H I N K TA N K S A N D
P R E S I D E N T I A L C A N D I D AT E S
To launch a successful presidential bid, candidates require not only

sufficient cash flow but a steady stream of policy ideas that they can share
and test out with the American public. Although the former is often in short
supply, particularly during the presidential primaries when candidates must
raise their own funds, rarely do those seeking the nation’s highest office
face a shortage of policy ideas.5 Surrounded by political strategists,
pollsters, media consultants, party loyalists, and lobbyists for various
causes, candidates are inundated with policy advice, some helpful and
informative, some very damaging and divisive. Yet, despite this, several
presidential candidates have, often with the encouragement of their closest
advisers, turned to think tanks. But why do candidates try to forge close ties
to think tanks? And why are so many think tanks, in all but a handful of
cases, willing to offer their services?
To begin with, candidates, especially those with little or no exposure to
politics at the national level, can, if they are so inclined, tap into the wealth
of knowledge available at some of America’s most distinguished think
tanks.6 Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush
had all been governors, but none had served in any federal government
capacity. The current occupant of the White House, Donald J. Trump, had
no political experience at any level of government before assuming the
presidency. Committed to “draining the swamp” in Washington, Trump
came to office with a limited and often misguided understanding of
domestic and foreign policy, but plenty of contempt for career politicians, a
subject that we will explore later in the chapter.
Presidential candidates also recognize the enormous benefits of relying
on think tanks that are populated with many former high-profile policy-
makers and leading policy experts willing to share their intimate knowledge
and sophisticated understanding of how Washington works. They
understand how helpful think tanks can be in providing tips on how best to
navigate their way through the policy-making process, and what they need
to do to nurture and strengthen their ties to the media and other key
stakeholders. Moreover, by attending meetings organized by the Council on
Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution, R A N D , C S I S, Heritage, and
others, where several former policy-makers and prominent business leaders
are often in attendance, candidates can develop additional contacts in the
private and public sectors that may prove invaluable as they travel the
country soliciting support. However, even more important than the network
of contacts think tanks can offer is the credibility and legitimacy they can
give to a candidate’s ideas, a currency often more valuable than money.
Receiving the endorsement of leading public intellectuals and world
leaders, or, better yet, having academics of such a high calibre providing
advice can significantly enhance the intellectual depth of a candidate’s
platform. Candidates can also benefit from their visible association with
think tanks that are in a position to reinforce the ideological underpinnings
of their policy ideas.
The support of think tank staff generally costs candidates very little.
Unless policy experts from think tanks take a leave of absence from their
institute to work on a campaign, they generally offer their services free.7 In
sum, for candidates there are few costs and potentially enormous benefits in
relying on think tanks that can help them strike a responsive chord with the
electorate; for think tanks, there can be considerable benefits that stem from
aligning themselves with a winning presidential candidate. Not only does an
election victory bring prestige, notoriety, and, at times, job offers, but a
higher profile can translate into more funds from affluent donors.
Although some candidates have relied more heavily on think tanks than
others, a clear pattern is emerging. When candidates need policy advice
from seasoned policy experts, they are turning to these organizations with
great regularity. And to the delight of many think tanks, candidates appear
willing to court them as they embark on the long and often difficult road to
the White House.
JI MMY C A RT E R A N D T H E S E A R C H F O R P O L I C Y
ADVICE
When President Gerald Ford granted Richard Nixon “a full, free and
absolute pardon” for “any and all crimes” committed during the Watergate
scandal, it seemed even more probable that a Democrat would become the
next president. Tainted by widespread corruption and unable to bring about
an expeditious conclusion to the Vietnam War, the Republican Party failed
to convince the American electorate that it could provide effective and
responsible leadership. In fact, well before President Nixon resigned in
August 1974, several political commentators were convinced that a
Democrat would win the 1976 presidential campaign.8 Yet, while a number
of prominent Democrats entered the presidential race, including Henry
“Scoop” Jackson and George Wallace, it was Jimmy Carter, a relatively
unknown one-term governor of Georgia who was sworn into office in
January 1977.
While Jimmy Carter’s rapid rise to power continues to baffle some
political analysts, his ties to prestigious policy research institutions in New
York and Washington, D C, may in part explain his ability to gain national
exposure. Analyzing Carter’s dependence on think tanks for policy advice
makes it possible to identify the organizations that played a major role
during and after his bid for the presidency. A closer examination of his
association with a handful of prominent northeastern think tanks also
reveals how research institutions seek to expand their networks of influence
throughout the policy-making community.
Shortly after Jimmy Carter became governor of Georgia in 1970, he
began to set his sights on the nation’s highest office. However, it soon
became apparent to Carter and his political and financial supporters that if
he was to launch a successful presidential campaign, he would have to
attract the attention of several prominent Democrats. Although Carter
enjoyed the backing of many prominent leaders in Atlanta’s business and
policy-making circles, it was the support of leading academics, financiers,
and journalists in the Northeast that he dearly coveted. According to
Laurence Shoup, by gaining access to the eastern establishment, Carter
hoped to become part of the national power structure in the United States.9
As early as 1971, Carter had become preoccupied with gaining national
exposure. Through some of his close personal advisers, such as former
secretary of state Dean Rusk, he met a number of individuals who were in a
position to broaden his base of political support. Among the most
influential contacts were David Rockefeller, chair of the Chase Manhattan
Bank, and Hedley Donovan, editor-in-chief of Time magazine. Following a
Time cover story on Carter and the New South in May 1971, Carter met
with Donovan, who introduced him to George S. Franklin, a Rockefeller in-
law and executive director of the Council on Foreign Relations.10 It was
through one or more of these connections that Carter became known to
David Rockefeller, who invited the governor to lunch with him at the Chase
Manhattan Bank in November 1971.
Carter’s southern disposition and Kennedy-style approach to state
politics must have impressed Rockefeller, because when the latter decided
to establish the Trilateral Commission in 1973, Carter was invited to
become a member.11 Zbigniew Brzezinski, who helped Rockefeller select
individuals for the Trilateral Commission, maintained that Carter was asked
to join because he seemed to share the organization’s commitment to
improving international economic relations: “We were very impressed that
Carter had opened up trade offices for the state of Georgia in Brussels and
Tokyo. That seemed to fit perfectly into the concept of the Trilateral.”12
While Carter’s international economic initiatives appeared to coincide
with the Trilateral Commission’s mandate, the possibility of having one of
their members occupy the Oval Office also appears to have influenced
Rockefeller and Brzezinski’s decision. As Barry Goldwater points out,
Carter’s invitation to join the Trilateral Commission was motivated by
political as well as institutional interests. “David Rockefeller and Zbigniew
Brzezinski found Jimmy Carter to be their ideal candidate. They helped him
win the nomination and the presidency. To accomplish this purpose, they
mobilized the money power of the Wall Street bankers, the intellectual
influence of the academic community – which is subservient to the wealth
of the great tax-free foundations – and the media controllers represented in
the membership of the C F R [Council on Foreign Relations] and the
Trilateral.”13
Goldwater and other conservative spokespersons recognized that a
Carter election victory would pay handsome dividends for the Trilateral
Commission, but Carter also derived many benefits from participating in
this organization. According to Laurence Shoup, “By becoming a member
of the Trilateral Commission, Carter met and became friends with powerful
upper class individuals who had contacts and influence where it mattered –
in business, the mass communications media, in governments at home and
abroad, in universities, in the associations and foundations. Jimmy Carter
… whom few people outside Georgia had even heard of in 1973, had
become part of a group which could help him become President of the
US”14
Few political commentators identified the close connection between
Carter and the Trilateral Commission during the early 1970s, but by 1976 it
had become increasingly apparent that the Democratic presidential
candidate was relying heavily on his Trilateral colleagues for policy advice.
For instance, in June 1976 the Los Angeles Times described a “task force”
that helped the candidate prepare his first foreign policy speech, which
began, “The time has come for us to seek a partnership between North
America, Western Europe and Japan.”15 With several of his Trilateral
advisers leading the applause, Carter emphasized the importance of
encouraging closer cooperation between advanced industrial nations. In the
ensuing months, the Democratic candidate continued to espouse other
foreign policy recommendations proposed by the Trilateral Commission. In
fact, Carter’s growing dependence on an elite group of Trilateral advisers,
including Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance, convinced some campaign observers
that “Carter’s entire foreign policy, much of his election strategy, and at
least some of his domestic policy [came] directly from the Commission and
its leading members.”16
It is difficult to determine the extent to which various Trilateral advisers
influenced Carter’s views on foreign and domestic policy, but there is little
doubt that membership on the commission left a lasting impression on him.
As Carter noted, “In order to insure the continuing opportunity for
penetrating analyses of complicated, important, and timely foreign policy
questions, there is an organization known as the Trilateral Commission. A
group of leaders from the three democratic developed areas of the world
meet every six months to discuss ideas of current interest to Japan, North
America and Europe … Membership on this commission has provided me
with a splendid learning opportunity, and many of the other members
helped me in my study of foreign affairs.”17
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Trilateral Commission’s first director and later
national security adviser to President Carter, agrees that the commission
offered Carter an invaluable learning experience but denies that it advised
him on domestic and foreign affairs:18
The Commission did not play any role in advising [Carter]

whatsoever. But I think the commission was of importance to him in
two ways. One, it provided the framework for his generally first
extensive exposure to international affairs. Prior to his membership
on the commission, he had no exposure to international affairs. It was
through the commission that he really became exposed to foreign
affairs. Secondly, on the commission, he met a number of people
interested in foreign affairs, some of whom he recruited to work for
him when he was making the appointments for his administration. I
believe that someone once counted, I don’t remember the exact
number, but I sort of vaguely remember that up to eighteen senior
appointees in his administration were from members of the
commission.19
Brzezinski, who passed away in May 2017, could not recall the exact
number of Trilateral commissioners who were appointed by President
Carter,20 but in an earlier interview with the author stated that “all the key
foreign policy decision makers of the Carter administration had served in
the Trilateral Commission.”21 Other than Brzezinski, several Trilateral
members received appointments in the Carter administration, including
Walter Mondale, Paul Volcker, and Paul Warnke.
Carter depended heavily on several Trilateral commissioners to fill key
posts in his administration, yet his search for policy advice did not end
there. The Trilateral Commission quickly established a reputation as one of
the premier policy research institutions in the United States. However, the
president-elect could not afford to ignore the elite group of policy
specialists at other distinguished think tanks, such as the Council on
Foreign Relations. Moreover, since many Trilateral commissioners were
also members of the C F R, Carter’s access to some of the nation’s most
prominent decision makers was greatly facilitated.22
At Carter’s invitation, at least fifty-four members of the C F R joined his
new administration. Among them were P.R. Harris, secretary of Housing
and Urban Development (H U D) and Health, Education and Welfare
(H E W); Philip Habib, undersecretary of state; Stansfield Turner, director of
the CIA; D. Aaron, deputy to the national security adviser; A. Solomon,
undersecretary of the Treasury; and Donald McHenry, ambassador to the
United Nations. Having assembled an impressive team of policy advisers
from the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations,
Carter finally turned to the Brookings Institution to complete his “brain
trust.”
Recognizing the invaluable contribution that several Brookings scholars
had made in formulating various governmental policies during previous
Democratic administrations, Carter first approached the institution in July
1975 for advice. During his brief visit, he attended two informal luncheons
on foreign policy and economics and began to establish ties to many of
Brooking’s most distinguished residents. Following his election victory,
Carter invited several Brookings scholars to join his staff. In addition to
Stephen Hess, who advised him on how to restructure his White House
staff, Carter appointed over a dozen other members of the Brookings
Institution to administrative posts, including Charles L. Schultz, chair of the
Council of Economic Advisors; C. Fred Bergsten, assistant secretary of the
treasury for international economic affairs; Henry Aaron, assistant secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare for planning and evaluation; Karen Davis,
deputy assistant secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; Emil Sunley
Jr, deputy assistant secretary of the Treasury; Barry Blechman, assistant
director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (A C D A); Barry
Bosworth, director of the Council on Wage and Price Stability; Henry D.
Owen, special White House representative for economic summits; L.N.
Cutler, White House counsel; L.W. Benson, undersecretary of state; Gerard
C. Smith, ambassador at large; and Nancy H. Teeters, Federal Reserve
Board.
With the support and advice of over 100 policy analysts from three of
America’s most prestigious think tanks, Carter rose from relative obscurity
to occupy the Oval Office. Although several factors contributed to his
election victory, the vital role think tanks played during his campaign
cannot be overlooked. Carter’s dependence on think tank specialists did not
end when he entered the White House. On the contrary, as the newly
installed president sought to chart a new course for America in the latter
half of the decade, he began to rely even more on his advisers for direction
and guidance. While Carter solicited the advice of his top economic
advisers to enhance America’s position in the international economy, his
preoccupation with resolving tensions in Latin America and the Middle
East provided foreign policy analysts, both in and out of government, with
unique opportunities to capture the president’s attention. In fact, on several
occasions Carter’s policies toward these particular regions appeared to be
shaped and moulded by prominent members of Washington’s think tank
community.23
R O N A L D R E A G A N A N D T H E T H I N K TA N K S
T H AT A D V I S E D H I M
Carter depended on several prestigious northeastern think tanks to gain

national exposure, but his successor turned to other policy research
institutions to transform his set of conservative beliefs into a winning
election platform. Ronald Reagan had occasionally solicited the advice of
policy analysts from prominent think tanks and universities during his
tenure as governor of California, but it was not until he launched his bid for
the presidency in 1980 that he began to surround himself with some of the
nation’s most respected conservative policy intellectuals.24
Despite finishing second to Gerald Ford at the 1976 Republican National
Convention in Kansas City, Missouri, Ronald Reagan wasted little time
preparing for the 1980 presidential campaign. As one of his campaign
advisers observed during the candidate’s return flight to California, Reagan
stared out the plane’s window for a few seconds and then proceeded to
write the following note on the back of a ticket to the national convention,
“We dreamed – we fought & the dream is still with us.”25
In those few words, Reagan expressed his commitment to return to the
campaign trail in the hope of securing the 1980 presidential nomination.
And on 17 July 1980 in Detroit, Michigan, Reagan won the Republican
nomination by an overwhelming majority. One hundred and eleven days
later, he won the general election. On 20 January 1981, Ronald Wilson
Reagan became the fortieth president of the United States.
Reagan’s sweeping victory over an increasingly despondent and
frustrated President Carter is often attributed to the Carter administration’s
failure to safeguard US economic and political interests in the international
community. Carter’s inability to prevent the overthrow of the Shah of Iran,
the installation of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the seizure of
the US embassy in Tehran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did little
to instill confidence in the electorate. Nonetheless, Carter’s foreign policy
failures alone did not ensure a Republican victory. The ability of Reagan’s
advisers to translate a set of conservative beliefs into an appealing political
agenda also contributed to the outcome of the 1980 campaign.
Before Reagan’s plane had even landed in Southern California following
his acceptance speech in Detroit, some of his campaign advisers began to
map out a new strategy to promote their candidate’s views on domestic and
foreign policy. And just as Reagan had undergone a political conversion by
leaving the Democratic Party to join the Republican cause following
Kennedy’s narrow election victory over Nixon in 1960, his campaign
advisers now had to determine how to expedite the American electorate’s
conversion to conservatism.26
For the late Martin Anderson, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution
and a key member of Reagan’s inner circle of policy advisers, the most
effective way to communicate his candidate’s political agenda to the
American public was to attract the support of some of the nation’s leading
intellectuals. Convinced that “ideas move nations”27 and that policy ideas
arise primarily in universities and think tanks, Anderson set out to assemble
an impressive team of academics who could promote Reagan’s vision of
America.28 As Anderson points out in his memoirs of the Reagan years,
“[A]s early as 1975, after I agreed to join his presidential campaign, I
started a systematic effort to introduce the nation’s best economists to
Reagan. Most of them were selected from my personal file of leading policy
experts I began collecting during Nixon’s campaign in 1967. This was part
of a more general effort to recruit an army of intellectuals to advise and
counsel Reagan on the entire range of policy issues.”29
After inviting such prominent economists as Milton Friedman, William
Niskanen, and Murray Weidenbaum to join Reagan’s campaign team,
Anderson began to set his sights on creating several policy task forces to
advise Reagan on domestic and foreign policy.30 Anderson first recognized
the importance of establishing policy task forces to advise presidential
candidates when he was in charge of policy research for Nixon in 1968. He
notes, “I learned that policy advisers from the intellectual world could be a
tremendous asset to a campaign … the very existence of a large group of
distinguished intellectuals gave a powerful boost to the credibility of the
candidate. In effect, those intellectuals were co-signing the ideas of the
candidate.”31
Anderson was in charge of organizing the domestic and economic policy
task forces, and Richard Allen, a fellow Hoover colleague, was entrusted
with overseeing the foreign and defence policy groups.32 Reflecting on how
his policy groups channelled information to Reagan, Allen stated,
I had a total of 120 people; 80 foreign policy advisers and 40 defence

and national security advisers. These people were typically
specialists in the field, either academic specialists or retired or
departed specialists from government, including people from the
Pentagon and the Department of State, former diplomats and the like.
[They] produced information, opinions, parts of speeches that would
be included in the speeches of the candidate … That’s the way that
part of the system worked. [The policy groups] were extremely
useful in providing background information and general data.33
A press release issued by Reagan on 23 October 1980 documented the
scope and function of the policy task forces: “Governor Reagan today
announced the completion of 23 domestic and economic policy task forces
with 329 advisers who have been asked to address the important issues that
will have to be faced by a new administration… These task forces join 25
foreign policy and defence working groups with 132 advisers that are
examining, in detail, the major questions that relate to these two important
areas.”34
Transition team director Edwin Meese III commented on the active
involvement of policy task forces during the Reagan campaign: “Reagan’s
1980 campaign had been served by policy task forces that comprised ‘the
largest and most distinguished group of intellectuals ever assembled for an
American political campaign.’ Nearly fifty groups, with over 450 advisers,
studied numerous areas of foreign, defence, domestic, and economic policy
and provided hundreds of recommendations.”35 By producing detailed
studies on topics ranging from welfare reform to missile defence, and by
outlining several policy recommendations, the policy task forces had, in
effect, established a blueprint for the incoming administration. As Martin
Anderson points out, “[w]hen Reagan took power in 1981, the battle plan
for what to do with that power was largely written.”36
Two weeks before president-elect Reagan took the oath of office, at a
dinner in honour of the Hoover Institution’s Board of Overseers, Meese
elaborated on the important contribution the policy development teams
made in assembling information for the new administration. “We have
already had a series of meetings … with [the] Heritage [Foundation] and
others to make recommendations to the new president-elect as to the course
his administration should follow. By the time January twentieth comes
around, there will already be an agenda of initial action projects which will
carry the administration through its first year of operation and which will
set major and intermediate goals so that there will always be an eye on the
blueprint of what the administration seeks to accomplish.”37
The president-elect wasted little time rewarding advisers who had made
important contributions to his campaign. Among those participating on
Reagan’s policy task forces who received high-level government
appointments were Alan Greenspan, chair of the board of governors of the
Federal Reserve; Antonin Scalia, appointed to the Supreme Court; George
Shultz, secretary of state; Caspar Weinberger, secretary of defense; William
Howard Taft IV, deputy secretary of defense; Richard Allen, national
security adviser; James Miller, chair of the Federal Trade Commission and
later director of the Office of Management and Budget (O MB ) ; Edwin
Harper, deputy director of the O MB ; Murray Weidenbaum and Beryl
Sprinkel, chairs of the Council of Economic Advisers (C E A ) ; William
Niskanen and Thomas Moore, C E A ; Norman Ture and Paul Craig Roberts,
undersecretary and assistant secretary for economic policy in the
Department of the Treasury; Arthur F. Burns, ambassador to Germany;
Darrell Trent, deputy secretary of Transportation; Rudolph Penner, head of
the Congressional Budget Office; and Martin Anderson, chief domestic and
economic policy adviser.38
Of these, more than half had been members of think tanks before joining
the Reagan administration. Their institutional affiliations were as follows:
Richard Allen: the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the
Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution; Martin Anderson, Thomas
Moore, and Darrell Trent: the Hoover Institution; Norman Ture: the
Heritage Foundation; Caspar Weinberger: the Institute for Contemporary
Studies;39 Murray Weidenbaum, James Miller, and Arthur Burns: the
American Enterprise Institute; and William Niskanen: R A N D and the
Institute for Defence Analyses.40
The number of individuals belonging to think tanks who decided to join
the Reagan crusade is far more extensive. Between 1981 and 1988, close to
200 members from America’s leading conservative think tanks participated
in the Reagan administration in a full-time consulting or advisory
capacity.41 Five think tanks in particular were well represented during the
Reagan years; fifty-five scholars came from the Hoover Institution, thirty-
six from the Heritage Foundation, thirty-four from the American Enterprise
Institute, thirty-two from the Committee on the Present Danger,42 and
eighteen from the Center for Strategic and International Studies.43
Until the 1980 campaign records at the Reagan Presidential Library
become available, it will be difficult to provide a more detailed examination
of the relationship between think tanks and the Reagan administration.
Nonetheless, a preliminary search of available materials indicates that some
think tanks played a crucial role in the transition period following the 1980
election. Although several think tanks were actively involved in the
campaign, few assumed more importance during the transition than the
Heritage Foundation.
In the fall of 1979, in anticipation of a Republican presidential victory,
Heritage president Edwin Feulner began to consider how his organization
could assist in the transition to a conservative administration. After
consulting several of his colleagues in the policy research community,
Feulner decided to launch an extensive research project to produce a study
that could, in effect, serve as a manual for conservatives to follow in
implementing domestic and foreign policy initiatives. According to Feulner,
“our strong feeling was that people who came into the administration
should have some source of information and guidance other than what you
get from the incumbents that you replace.”44
With the assistance of over 300 academics, consultants, lawyers, and
former government officials divided into twenty project teams, the Heritage
Foundation produced a 1,100-page “blueprint for the construction of a
conservative government.”45 In its Mandate for Leadership: Policy
Management in a Conservative Administration, the Heritage Foundation
outlined 2,000 proposals on issues ranging from how to streamline the
government bureaucracy to ways to improve US national security.46
Delighted with the results of Heritage’s year-long study, not to mention
the outcome of the 1980 campaign, Feulner presented a copy of the
manuscript to Edwin Meese III at the Hay-Adams Hotel in mid-November
1980.47 After scanning the extensive report, Meese said that the Mandate
for Leadership study was very impressive and that the Reagan team “will
rely heavily on it.”48 It was “one of the most meaningful and best things
that President Reagan and those associated with him will have to guide
them in the next few years.”49 According to Meese, “President Reagan gave
a copy of the book to each member of his cabinet and directed them to read
it.”50
In his memoirs of the Reagan years, Meese, former Ronald Reagan
Distinguished Fellow Emeritus at the Heritage Foundation, stated that the
Mandate for Leadership study was largely responsible for the growing
influence of the Heritage Foundation: “This major accomplishment put
Heritage ‘on the map’ as far as Washington decision makers were
concerned. Indeed, many leaders in the federal government were appointed
from among the Heritage staff and the contributors to Mandate for
Leadership. [Moreover] Edwin Feulner provided expert advice to the new
administration in varying capacities.”51 Meese’s overwhelming
endorsement of the Heritage study may explain in part why it appeared on
the Washington Post’s bestseller list for three weeks in early 1981. It may
also explain why observers of Washington politics began referring to the
study as the bible of the Reagan administration – even a year after Mandate
for Leadership was released, journalists and policy analysts were
speculating on the extent to which President Reagan’s domestic and foreign
policies had been influenced by the publication.
However, few paid more attention to how closely government officials
followed the policy recommendations outlined in the Heritage study than
Edwin Feulner, who estimated in early 1982 that more than 60 per cent of
Heritage’s proposals had been adopted by the Reagan administration.52 In
flaunting this statistic, Feulner neglected to explain that a number of the
policy recommendations included in his organization’s study did not
originate there but had been developed and refined by other policy research
institutions over several years. According to Glenn Campbell, former
director of the Hoover Institution, many of Heritage’s recommendations
were extracted from an earlier Hoover publication, The United States in the
1980s.53 Even former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev was convinced
that several of the Reagan administration’s policies were borrowed from the
Hoover Institution’s three-and-a-half-pound study. Waving a copy of the
publication in front of Secretary of State George Shultz and Robert
McFarlane, Reagan’s third national security adviser,54 Gorbachev shouted,
“We have read this book and watched all its programs become adopted by
the Reagan administration.”55
Notwithstanding the disagreement over where the majority of policy
recommendations outlined in the Heritage study originated, it is difficult to
ignore the integral role this organization played during Reagan’s transition
to power. As journalist Bernard Weinraub points out, “Working from an
out-of-the way, white brick building in north-east Washington that once
housed a Korean grocery and a halfway house for drug addicts, a group of
little-known academics and congressional aides … emerged as a major
force in Ronald Reagan’s transition to the presidency.”56
The Mandate for Leadership study had propelled the Heritage
Foundation into the national spotlight, and from its new headquarters
located just two blocks from the Capitol Building, the “feisty new kid on
the conservative block” as President Reagan called it, continued to shape
America’s political agenda.57 By 1984 Heritage’s clout in Washington’s
policy-making community had grown to the point that New Republic
columnist James Rosenthal, writing on the impact of Mandate for
Leadership II, commented, “Heritage helps shape what people in
Washington talk about after they read the morning paper. It helps set the
agenda.”58
Riding the new wave of conservatism that was quickly sweeping across
the United States, the Heritage Foundation soon became immersed in
Washington’s decision-making establishment. While several liberal policy
research institutions were simply concerned with remaining afloat during
the Reagan years, the Heritage Foundation, with the financial support of a
growing number of individuals and corporations, began to transform itself
into one of Washington’s leading think tanks. Yet, despite its increasing
visibility and overt desire to shape the political agenda, the Heritage
Foundation did not monopolize the attention of decision makers. By making
their way through Washington’s policy-making labyrinth, members of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Committee on the Present
Danger, the Hoover Institution, and the American Enterprise Institute were
also able to advise key government officials on a host of domestic and
foreign policy issues in various capacities.
Like his predecessor, Reagan surrounded himself with some of the
nation’s most distinguished scholars. By doing so, he not only broadened
his base of intellectual support throughout the academic community but,
more important, attracted individuals who could translate his conservative
beliefs into a set of viable policy options. In the process of advancing
Reagan’s political mandate, several think tanks that had previously
observed the mechanics of government from the sidelines became firmly
integrated into the decision-making network. As active participants in the
political arena, many took advantage of new opportunities to shape
governmental policies, though the extent to which various think tanks were
ultimately responsible for directly influencing American domestic and
foreign policy during Reagan’s terms in office is difficult to measure. What
is clear, however, is that during the 1980s think tanks assumed a more
visible profile on America’s political landscape. Indeed, it was not until
George H.W. Bush assumed the presidency in 1989 that the presence of
think tanks in key policy-making circles began to diminish.
Unlike Reagan, Bush did not invite dozens of academics from think
tanks to participate in his 1988 or 1992 presidential campaigns, nor did he
rely heavily on them to fill high-level positions in his administration. On the
contrary, Bush made a concerted effort to distance himself from think tanks
that had established and maintained close ties to his predecessor. As
Annelise Anderson, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and former
adviser to Vice President Bush points out, “President Bush wanted to climb
out of Reagan’s shadow and [therefore] distanced himself from most
Republican experts attached to Reagan. He also treated neo-conservatives
much like President Carter did. They both discounted their importance as
intellectuals … In doing so, they excluded a lot of intellectual firepower,
people like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Norman Podhoretz, and Irving Kristol, who
had inspired and invigorated the Reagan administration.”59
When Bill Clinton announced his bid for the presidency in 1991, think
tanks began to attract considerable attention once again. As Clinton’s
campaign gained momentum, journalists began to pay more attention to the
individuals and organizations who were advising the Arkansas governor.
What they discovered was that Clinton, like Carter and Reagan, had
established close ties to a handful of think tanks.
B I L L C L I N TO N A N D A P L A C E C A L L E D T H E
PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE
In the winter of 1991, few Democrats on Capitol Hill or, for that matter,
throughout the United States, could have predicted that the Republicans’
decade-long reign in the White House would soon come to an end.
Enjoying unprecedented popularity in the polls, largely as a result of the
overwhelming support for the US-led coalition to “liberate Kuwait,”
President Bush appeared destined to win a second term in office.60 As a
former Washington insider and long-time resident at a think tank
confidently remarked at the time, “Jesus Christ could run on the Democratic
ticket and he still wouldn’t beat George Bush.”61 Yet Bush’s political future
no longer seemed assured as American voters’ growing frustration and
concern over worsening economic conditions overshadowed their initial
enthusiasm for Operation Desert Storm. In fact, in the ensuing months it
became apparent that unless he could convince the US public that an
economic recovery plan for America constituted an integral part of his
vision for a New World Order, the Oval Office would soon have a new
occupant.
Anxiously anticipating a Democratic victory on election day, several
think tanks began preparing blueprints for the next administration.
Modelling their ambitious research projects on the Heritage Foundation’s
Mandate for Leadership,62 several think tanks outlined a series of
recommendations for the next president to follow on issues ranging from
health care and educational reform to international trade agreements and
defence procurement programs.63 By the spring of 1992, as Bill Clinton
began to accumulate enough delegates to secure the presidential
nomination, it appeared to many think tanks that if they were to have any
impact on shaping Clinton’s campaign platform, they would have to capture
the governor’s attention.
For Clinton, the five-term governor of Arkansas who easily secured his
party’s nomination at New York’s Madison Square Garden in July 1992,
there was little question about which think tanks and policy advisers he
would turn to for advice throughout his campaign and during his transition
to the presidency.64 Dozens of academics, interest groups, business leaders,
and representatives from a range of non-governmental organizations
conveyed their ideas to Clinton in the months preceding the November
election. However, it appeared to many journalists covering the campaign
that Bill Clinton would rely predominantly on the Washington-based
Democratic Leadership Council (D L C) and on its policy arm, the
Progressive Policy Institute (P P I), to develop his election platform.65
Making this prediction hardly required a crystal ball. After all, in
addition to being one of the forty founding members of the D L C, which
was created in 1985 following Walter Mondale’s humiliating defeat in the
election of 1984, Clinton was its chair from 1990–91.66 Throughout his
association with the D L C, Clinton, along with approximately 3,000 other
members, invested considerable time and energy to put the principal
mandate of the D L C in place: to move the Democratic Party from the left
to the centre of the political spectrum.67 In an attempt to broaden the
Democratic Party’s base of political support by appealing to disillusioned
voters, particularly in the southern and western regions of the United States,
Clinton participated in the creation of the P P I in 1989 to convince
Americans that Democrats, like Republicans, could successfully compete in
the marketplace of political ideas. By the 1992 election, the P P I was
prepared to spread its message across the country. Fortunately for the
institute, it found the right messenger. According to Achenbach, “After
creating the D L C, their next move was to create an idea arm, the P P I …
The solution was to come up with new ideas, and find someone to embody
them – which happened when Clinton became chair of the D L C and then
carried the group’s agenda into the presidential campaign.”68
Clinton did far more than just carry some of the P P I’s policy ideas into
the campaign, however. Once in office, he tried to translate several of the
institute’s suggestions into concrete public policies, often with the
assistance of a handful of staff from the D L C and the P P I that had joined
his administration.69 Several administration policies, including reforming
America’s health care system, linking student aid to national service,
helping communities cope more effectively with crime, demanding that
welfare recipients perform a variety of community services, and injecting
an entrepreneurial spirit into the federal government, are among the many
program initiatives that bear a striking resemblance to the recommendations
made by various contributors to the P P I’s study Mandate for Change.70
Some of these ideas had been advocated by other individuals and
organizations, but few institutions in the 1992 campaign offered a more
comprehensive guide to reforming government than the P P I.
In addition to drawing heavily on the recommendations made by the
D L C and the P P I, Clinton also consulted formally and informally with
several other individuals to solicit their advice on a wide range of policy
initiatives before assuming office. For instance, during the Clinton-Gore
economic conference held in Little Rock, Arkansas, on 14–15 December
1992, Clinton listened to 329 of the nation’s leading economists, corporate
executives, and labour leaders comment on how to address the economic
problems confronting the United States.71 In a less formal setting he also
mingled with several hundred members of America’s elite during the now
famous Renaissance Weekend held at Hilton Head, South Carolina, over
New Year’s.72
The involvement of think tanks in the campaigns that propelled Carter,
Reagan, and Clinton to office reveals one of the most visible channels think
tanks rely on to shape the policy direction of incoming administrations. It
also demonstrates how candidates can benefit from the considerable policy
expertise available at some of America’s leading policy institutes and the
potential rewards those institutes can earn by being so closely linked to a
winning campaign. This may explain why George W. Bush, unlike his
father, enlisted the support of policy experts from several think tanks and
why so many think tanks were willing to help shape his policy ideas.
PLANTING NEW IDEAS:

G E O R G E W. B U S H A N D H I S Q U E S T F O R T H E
PRESIDENCY
As a US congressman, former director of the C I A, ambassador to the

United Nations, and vice president and president of the United States,
George H.W. Bush was the consummate Washington insider. By contrast
his eldest son, George W. Bush, had little first-hand experience with the
types of issues he had to confront as president. In the Texas state legislature
in Austin, Bush became familiar with a host of local concerns, ranging from
education and health care to the environment and transportation, but as
president, he required insight into a multitude of domestic and international
issues that until then he had demonstrated little knowledge of.73 Like
Carter, Reagan, and Clinton before they declared their intention to run for
the presidency, Bush possessed only a limited understanding of foreign
affairs, an observation not lost on several journalists and political
opponents. In fact, his inability to pass a journalist’s pop quiz on foreign
policy in November 1999 raised serious concerns about his grasp of
America’s international priorities.74
In an attempt to allay concerns about his ability to lead the world’s
remaining superpower and to promote America’s economic interests in the
twenty-first century, Bush assembled a team of over 100 policy experts,
many from the Hoover Institution,75 to advise him on economic, foreign,
and defence policy. During his campaign, he also set up policy advisory
committees on issues such as education and technology to help deepen his
knowledge of domestic policy issues. Bush’s team of economic advisers
was headed by Lawrence Lindsey of the American Enterprise Institute
(A E I), who was appointed assistant to the president for economic policy.76
Joining Lindsey were several prominent economists, including John Taylor,
a Hoover fellow who served on President George H.W. Bush’s Council of
Economic Advisers; Harvard Economics professor Martin Feldstein; J.D.
Foster, executive director of the Washington-based Tax Foundation; and R.
Glenn Hubbard of Columbia University’s Business School.77
Bush’s thirteen-member education policy advisory committee was also
well stocked with experts from several leading think tanks. Among those
who agreed to take some time away from their institutes to assist Bush were
Lynne Cheney, a senior fellow at the A E I and wife of former vice president
Dick Cheney, and her colleague Lynne Munson; Williamson Evers, a senior
fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Diane Ravitch, a well-known historian
of education who has held research posts at the Brookings Institution and
the New York-based Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.78
The foreign policy and defence policy teams Bush assembled were even
more impressive, reading, as James Kitfield observed, “like a Who’s Who
of the Reagan and Bush foreign policy establishments.”79 Heading the
foreign policy brain trust were Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s national security
adviser, who, in addition to being a fellow at the Hoover Institution, had
also served in the National Security Council under President George H.W.
Bush;80 Rice’s colleague at Hoover, former secretary of state George
Shultz; and Vice President Dick Cheney, a former secretary of defense.
Other prominent defence and foreign policy analysts included Paul
Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and Robert Zoellick, former Pentagon and State
Department officials; Wolfowitz was dean of the Johns Hopkins School for
Advanced International Studies (S A I S) and president of the World Bank;
Perle was former assistant defence secretary and director of the A E I’s
Commission on Future Defenses; and Zoellick was former president of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the US trade
representative.81
Much has been written about the impact President Bush’s inner circle of
foreign and defense policy advisers – the so-called vulcans – had on
shaping his foreign policy agenda, a subject that I explore in considerable
detail in A Capitol Idea.82 Although it will take years for historians and
political scientists to paint an accurate picture of what and whom ultimately
influenced President Bush’s decision to wage war on Iraq, it is clear that
several policy experts at a handful of Washington-based think tanks,
including the Project for the New American Century (P N A C) and A E I,
played an important role in helping the Bush administration market the war
on terror to the American people.83 Given Bush’s lack of foreign policy
experience before assuming the presidency, it is not surprising that several
advisers close to him were able to shape his thinking. During his first
presidential campaign, it became clear that Bush would rely heavily on his
battle-hardened team of experts for advice. As Bush stated in an interview
with the New York Times during the 2000 campaign, “I may not be able to
tell you exactly the nuance of the East Timorian situation, but I’ll ask
people who’ve had experience, like Condi Rice, Paul Wolfowitz, or Dick
Cheney. I am smart enough to know what I don’t know, and I have good
judgement about who will either be telling the truth, or has got some agenda
that is not the right agenda.”84
Unlike his brother Jeb Bush, former governor of Florida and a 2016
Republican presidential candidate, George W. Bush never saw himself as a
“policy wonk,” a phrase often used in the media to describe political leaders
who enjoy immersing themselves in the intricacies of policy formulation.85
And according to Tim Adams, a veteran of President George Bush’s
administration who organized a briefing for the Texas governor on
technology, he did not want to be. As Adams observes, George W. Bush
“believes a chief executive should set out principles, a vision of where you
want to go, and then surround yourself with very smart people and listen to
them and work with them.”86 In many respects, Bush’s management style
proved to be similar to Reagan’s, who, unlike Carter, preferred to leave the
details of policy development to his subordinates. In Reagan’s case, the
decision to rely heavily on his subordinates often paid handsome dividends,
but as the Iran-Contra scandal demonstrated, it also led to some egregious
foreign policy debacles. For Bush, his willingness to trust the defence and
security of the United States and the stability of the international system to
a small group of advisers motivated by ambition and self-interest proved
disastrous. However, in the final analysis, as Daalder and Lindsay point
out,87 President Bush is ultimately responsible for the management and
mismanagement of American foreign policy in the post-9/11 world. His
decision to follow the advice of some key advisers, while ignoring dozens
of policy recommendations made by academics and policy experts at think
tanks, must fall on his shoulders. This may in part explain why, in the 2004
presidential campaign, Bush paid little attention to the advice of think tanks.
He knew what his game plan was and therefore did not feel compelled to
listen to policy experts shouting from the sidelines.
For Governor Bush, there was much to be gained and little to lose by
developing an extensive network of policy experts. Although he was under
no obligation to accept anyone’s policy advice, Bush had at his disposal
dozens of leading economists, political scientists, and former policy-makers
who could give substance to his vision of how America should be governed.
But Governor Bush forgot an important lesson when he became President
Bush. Great leaders do not make critical policy decisions while wearing
blinders. They make decisions only after reviewing the best possible
options and considering the potential consequences of their actions. Think
tanks, not unlike interest groups and other N G Os, are motivated by a
profound desire to leave an indelible mark on public policy. But they also
perform a valuable role by providing decision makers and the public with a
range of options for addressing particular policy problems. Unfortunately,
the Bush administration was simply not prepared to listen to anyone who
offered a perspective that differed with theirs.
As noted, with few exceptions (P N A C, Heritage, A E I, etc.), think
tanks had limited access to President Bush and his inner circle. However,
policy experts in the think tank community were more than prepared to
offer their advice to the long list of Democratic and Republican presidential
candidates as they competed to elect the forty-forth president of the United
States. While this may have been discouraging to the dozens of think tanks
inside the Beltway and hundreds of others scattered around the US, during
the 2008 presidential primaries, several candidates, including Barack
Obama, Hillary Clinton, John McCain, Rudy Giuliani, and Mitt Romney, to
name a few, shared and exchanged ideas on a multitude of domestic and
foreign policy issues with leading think tanks. Over a period of several
months, dozens of newspapers kept close tabs on which policy experts
comprised the brain trusts of leading candidates. Once the party nominees
were chosen, journalists and political pundits began to scrutinize more
closely who Senator Obama and Senator McCain would likely turn to for
advice during the general election and in the transition period. Senator
Obama’s roster of policy experts consisted of scholars from the Brookings
Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, C S I S, the Center for
American Progress, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Not
surprisingly, Senator McCain gravitated more to the right of the political
spectrum in search of policy experts willing to endorse and enhance his
policy positions. Scholars from A E I, Heritage, and the Hoover Institution
figured prominently in his discussion groups.88
In the weeks leading up to the beginning of Barack Obama’s historic
presidency, it was all but certain that several foreign policy experts from
leading think tanks would receive high-level positions in the new
administration. In December 2008, Susan Rice, a foreign policy expert from
the Brookings Institution who had advised Senator John Kerry in 2004 and
Senator Obama in 2008, was the first think tank resident to be catapulted
into a high-profile position; she was confirmed by the Senate as US
ambassador to the U N. But as the section below illustrates, Rice was not
the only think tank staffer to attract Obama’s attention.
C H A N G I N G MI N D S , C H A N G I N G C O U R S E :
O B A MA , T H I N K TA N K S , A N D H I S V I S I O N F O R
A ME R I C A A N D T H E WO R L D
When Senator Obama announced his intention to seek the 2008 Democratic
nomination for president on 10 February 2007, he understood what foreign
policy challenges he would confront if elected. Speaking before thousands
of people crammed into Springfield, Illinois’ Town Square, he said that one
of his priorities would be to bring US combat troops home from Iraq. But
the Democratic presidential candidate also understood that ending an
unpopular war would not, in and of itself, repair or restore America’s
position on the world stage. Before the United States could realize its
potential at home and abroad, Obama required a far more comprehensive
foreign policy plan – one that would address global challenges to America’s
economic, political, and security interests. To do this, he reached out to a
small, but well-connected core of international affairs experts, many of
whom he had come to know when he served on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
As early as May 2007, journalists in the United States began to track
whom Obama was turning to for foreign policy advice. Initially, his cadre
of foreign policy experts included Mark Lippert, a former staff member on
the Senate Appropriations Committee Foreign Operations Subcommittee;
Gregory Craig, director of policy and planning at the State Department
under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright; Anthony Lake, former
national security adviser; and Susan Rice, assistant secretary of state for
African affairs during the Clinton administration.89 It did not take long for
pundits to identify the number of people in the Obama camp who had
worked in the Clinton administration, nor did it take long for other
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates competing for their
party’s nomination to develop their own stable of experts. By the fall of
2007, comprehensive lists of foreign and defence policy advisers who had
gravitated to various Democratic and Republican campaigns appeared in
major US newspapers. In an article entitled, appropriately, “The War Over
the Wonks,”90 dozens of policy experts and their ties to the Clinton, Obama,
Edwards, Giuliani, Romney, and McCain campaigns were duly noted. Some
of these advisers had worked in government, taught at universities,91 or
consulted for the private sector. But overwhelmingly, these experts were
recruited from leading American think tanks.
These individuals brought different experiences to the campaign, but
what they had in common was a desire to associate themselves with a
candidate who shared their convictions and possessed the ability to engage
the public in important conversations about America’s role in world affairs.
It was not just about finding a messenger to communicate ideas they had
developed and crafted over years. They needed the right messenger. For
many of them, it was Barack Obama. The group of policy advisers who had
lent their names and offered their expertise to the Obama campaign
included: former ambassador Jeffrey Bader (Brookings Institution);
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Center for Strategic and International Studies); Ivo H.
Daalder (Brookings Institution); Richard Danzig (Center for Strategic and
International Studies and later the Center for a New American Security);
Philip Gordon (Brookings Institution); Lawrence Korb (Center for
American Progress); Denis McDonough (Center for American Progress);
Bruce Riedel (Brookings Institution); and Dennis Ross (Washington
Institute for Near East Policy). Not surprisingly, Republican candidates
turned to more conservative think tanks for advice. Policy experts from the
Heritage Foundation, Hoover Institution, A E I, and the Hudson Institution
were well represented.
The policy experts who had agreed to participate in the Obama
campaign in the weeks and months leading up to and during the presidential
primaries were not simply looking to pad their resumes. Many had already
established impressive credentials at think tanks and in previous
government positions. They were there to inform, advise, and educate a
candidate who could conceivably become the next president of the United
States. They were also there to exchange ideas with a candidate who was
committed to changing the nature and direction of US foreign policy. The
information that experts communicated to Senator Obama took different
forms, ranging from policy briefs and papers, to one or two sentences that
could be used in a stump speech or in a more formal address. They covered
topics ranging from counter-terrorism, how to deter Iran from acquiring a
nuclear capability, to expanding trade in the Pacific Rim. Few topics were
off limits. What Obama hoped to achieve by developing a network of policy
experts was not only a wealth of knowledge, but a group of talented people
who were prepared to defend their policy recommendations. He wasn’t
looking for consensus. What mattered more to Obama was engaging in
difficult conversations with leading foreign policy experts who were
prepared to outline the costs and benefits of moving the United States in a
different direction. After all, the senator – a former law professor – was
known for his willingness to encourage a lively exchange of views. By
surrounding himself with people who were capable of providing thoughtful
and penetrating insights about how the United States could navigate its way
through troubled waters, the candidate felt he could make some headway.
Obama’s thirst for more knowledge and advice about the complex world of
international affairs only increased when he finally captured enough
delegates on 4 June 2008 to secure his party’s nomination for president.
After defeating Senator Hillary Clinton in the hotly contested Democratic
primaries, Obama’s foreign policy team went into full swing.
In mid-July 2008, New York Times reporter Elisabeth Bumiller noted that
300 foreign policy advisers “divided into 20 teams based on regions and
issues” comprised what amounted to a “mini State Department” for Senator
Obama. A thirteen-member “senior working group” was also established as
part of the senator’s foreign policy bureaucracy. According to Bumiller,
“Every day around 8 a.m., foreign policy aides at Senator Barack Obama’s
Chicago campaign headquarters sent him two e-mails; a briefing on major
world developments … and a set of questions accompanied by suggested
answers.”92 This process was overseen by Susan Rice and other members of
the core foreign policy group, including Lippert and Craig. As Bumiller
noted, the foreign policy “infrastructure funnels hundreds of e-mail
messages and reams of position papers and talking points each day to
members of the core group, who in turn seek advice or make requests for
more information to team members down the line.” She added that
“advisers often say they are unclear about what happens to all the policy
paragraphs they churn out on request,” but recognize the constant pressure
to brief Senator Obama.
The hundreds of advisers assembled to help shape Obama’s vision of
America’s role in the world clearly paid off. Despite facing Senator John
McCain, a far more seasoned and knowledgeable expert on foreign affairs,
Senator Obama was more than capable of holding his own in debates over
foreign and defence policy. While several factors may explain Obama’s
historic win in the 2008 presidential election, presenting himself to the
American public as a viable leader in international affairs may very well
have had an impact. If Obama’s competence on important global issues was
indeed a factor in his election victory, think tanks deserve much of the
credit.
President-elect Obama did not have to be reminded of the important
contribution dozens of policy experts from think tanks had made throughout
his campaign. Within seventy-two hours of giving his victory speech in
Chicago’s Grant Park, the Obama campaign announced that John D.
Podesta, former chief of staff to President Clinton and president of the
Center for American Progress (C A P), would co-chair the transition team
along with Valerie Jarrett and Pete Rouse.93 Founded in 1993 as a
counterweight to the Heritage Foundation, C A P currently has over 100
staff and a budget in excess of $50 million. Well known for his progressive
views on domestic and foreign policy, Podesta also played an important role
in helping to launch the Center for a New American Security (C N A S) in
2007, a think tank co-founded by Kurt Campbell and Michèle Flournoy.
Both Campbell and Flournoy had previously held positions with the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (C S I S).94 As part of their strategy to
develop an effective transition for the incoming Obama administration,
Podesta and his co-chairs established several groups that would be
responsible for meeting with outgoing officials in the Bush administration
to identify key domestic and foreign policy issues that would have to be
addressed. According to Shailagh Murray and Carol Leonnig of The
Washington Post, “135 people divided into 10 groups, along with a list of
other advisers … will work until mid-December preparing reports to guide
the White House, Cabinet members and other senior officials.”95
Several prominent think tank staffers emerged as key figures in the
Obama transition. But in the area of foreign policy, no think tank generated
as much notoriety and media interest as the Center for a New American
Security. According to Yochi Dreazen of The Wall Street Journal, the
C N A S, “a small think tank with generally middle-of-the-road policy
views, is rapidly emerging as a top farm team for the incoming Obama
administration.”96 C N A S co-founders Campbell and Flournoy,97 along
with Susan Rice, Richard Danzig, Wendy Sherman, and James Steinberg,
members of the C N A S board of advisers, were singled out as leading
contenders for senior positions in the Pentagon and the State Department.
Other than Danzig, former Secretary of the Navy under President Clinton,
the remaining four members of the C N A S board of advisers would serve in
the Obama administration: Susan Rice, as US representative to the United
Nations; Michèle Flournoy, as undersecretary of defense for policy; Kurt
Campbell, as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs;
Wendy Sherman, as undersecretary of state for political affairs; and James
Steinberg, as US deputy secretary of state.
As this section has revealed, from the time Barack Obama won his
Senate seat in 2004, he had understood, and gained an appreciation for, the
contribution think tanks could make to shaping public policy in the United
States. He also understood, as did many of his colleagues in the Senate, that
President Bush’s efforts to advance US security interests in the post-9/11
era were not paying off. After involving the United States in two wars,
spending trillions of dollars, and sacrificing thousands of lives, Obama
argued that a different way of thinking about America’s role in the world
was required. To assist him in developing a new strategy for the United
States, he enlisted the support of dozens of policy experts from leading
think tanks. Scholars from think tanks shared their expertise with Senator
Obama during the 2008 presidential primaries and in the general election,
participated on his transition, and served in the first term of his
administration. Many of these experts also contributed their time to helping
President Obama secure a second term in office.
In his second term, a new foreign policy posture took root. Without
compromising America’s commitment to combatting global terror,
President Obama managed, among other things, to remove troops from Iraq,
impose a deadline for withdrawing US personnel from Afghanistan,
orchestrated the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden, reset America’s
relationship with Russia, and to mend fences with several world leaders.
Although it made several mistakes made along the way, the Obama
administration embraced a far more pragmatic and less ideological
approach to managing America’s international relations than the Bush
administration. Much of this changed, however, when Donald Trump, the
self-proclaimed Washington outsider and political neophyte was sworn in as
America’s 45th president. Since taking the oath of office, Trump has
confirmed in the minds of his critics what Hillary Clinton proclaimed on the
campaign trail: that the real estate mogul and former T V reality star is
temperamentally unfit and wholly unqualified to be commander-in-chief.
Although some policy experts at the Heritage Foundation and other
conservative think tanks took issue with Clinton’s remarks, they too were
reluctant to embrace Trump during the Republican presidential primaries.
This has changed, however, since Trump assumed the presidency. As we
will discuss below, a handful of DC-based think tanks have come out in
support of the president’s position on the travel ban on foreign nationals
from mostly Muslim countries, his decision to withdraw from the Paris
Climate Agreement, and his nomination of Neil Gorsuch to fill the vacancy
left by Justice Antonin Scalia on the US Supreme Court. As noted, some
think tanks, including Heritage, have been even more vocal in their support
of Trump and have offered him a detailed blueprint on how to reform
government. It is to the role that think tanks have played so far in the Trump
administration that we now turn.
N O T A WH O L E L O T TA T H I N K I N G G O I N ’ O N :
T H I N K TA N K S A N D T H E P R E S I D E N C Y O F
D O N A L D T R U MP
According to a model of think tank recruitment constructed by Abelson and

Carberry, Donald Trump, as a Washington outsider with strong ideological
leanings, would be the ideal candidate to embrace think tanks.98 He had
never served in political office, possessed little more than a rudimentary
understanding of domestic and foreign policy issues, and even less of an
appreciation for how a political system based on separate branches sharing
power was intended to function. He also infused many of his stump
speeches with political rhetoric that resonated at times with some advocacy-
oriented think tanks, including the racist National Policy Institute. But
Trump was anything but a typical candidate. Unlike George W. Bush, who
had the humility and good sense to acknowledge that he was smart enough
to know what he didn’t know, and, therefore, was inclined to turn to those
with appropriate expertise for help, Trump was simply unwilling, or
perhaps psychologically incapable of, recognizing his limitations. Not used
to taking a back seat to anyone, or admitting that he could actually benefit
from listening to those far wiser and more seasoned, the narcissistic Trump
maintained that he had little to learn even from the nation’s top national
security experts. Indeed, on multiple occasions during the presidential
primaries and in the general election that followed, Trump claimed that
when it came to fighting ISIS, he knew more than America’s top generals.
This brazen attitude may explain why, even as president-elect, he refused
daily intelligence briefings.
With no intellectual curiosity to speak of, and an aversion to reading
books unless of course they bore his name, Trump demonstrated repeatedly
that he was unwilling to listen to, or learn from, even his closest policy
advisers. For Trump, a third-party candidate who happened to find a
vacancy in the Republican tent, his primary concern was not to become
educated in the ways of politics; rather, it was to hold onto his base. Since
the majority of people who supported Trump shared his antipathy toward
the Washington elite, what incentive was there for him to reach out to think
tanks, organizations often regarded as key players in the D C establishment?
Moreover, according to Josh Rogin of the Washington Post, two of Trump’s
closest advisers, former chief strategist Steve Bannon, and his son-in-law
and senior adviser Jared Kushner, are also wary of think tanks. They see
them, Rogin writes, “as part of the Washington culture that has failed to
implement good governance, while becoming beholden to donors.”99
Quoting a Trump transition official, Rogin notes, “This is the death of think
tanks as we know them in D.C. … The people around Trump view think
tanks as for sale to the highest bidder. They have empowered whole other
centres of gravity for staffing this administration.”100 This view is not
shared by think tank presidents, nor by others in the Trump administration,
including former secretary of state Rex Tillerson, a long-time trustee of
C S I S, and defense secretary, retired general James Mattis, who has been
affiliated with the Hoover Institution. Nonetheless, Trump’s anti-intellectual
orientation, combined with his narcissistic tendencies, has not exactly
endeared him to policy experts at think tanks or to conservative intellectuals
more generally. Indeed, the National Review, a leading conservative
magazine in the US, devoted its entire February 2016 issue entitled,
“Against Trump,” denouncing the Republican candidate.101 Although
Trump did not tweet about this publication, he did mention think tanks on
occasion. In fact, one of the few times he referenced policy institutes during
the primaries was when he mentioned a poll conducted by the Center for
Security Policy which, among other things noted that “25% of those polled
agreed that violence against Americans here in the United States is justified
as part of the global jihad.”102 Trump relied in part on this report to justify
his controversial ban on foreign nationals travelling to the US from seven
predominantly Muslim countries.103
Not widely regarded among conservative intellectuals as a viable
candidate to lead the Republican Party, during the primaries most leading
conservative think tanks turned their attention to other candidates. For
instance, Florida senator Marco Rubio interacted with A E I scholars on
several occasions in the months leading up to the Republican national
convention, and was seen by many at the institute as someone who could
become the torch bearer for a wide range of conservative ideas.104
Meanwhile, his colleague and challenger, Texas senator Ted Cruz, was
making his presence felt at the Heritage Foundation, where he found a
receptive audience.105
Heritage Foundation scholars may have preferred a Cruz victory, but it
did not take long for the leadership at the foundation to jump aboard the
Trump train. By most accounts, Trump enjoyed and continues to enjoy their
company.106 Once it became a foregone conclusion that Trump would
become the Republican presidential nominee, several Heritage staff,
including former president Edwin Feulner, and James Carafano, vice
president for foreign and defence policy studies, agreed to participate on the
Trump transition team. Several other Heritage scholars contributed to a
study filled with dozens of policy recommendations entitled Blueprint for
Reform, reminiscent of its ground-breaking tome, Mandate for Leadership,
which Trump has been briefed on.107 In addition, since assuming office, the
president has periodically engaged other think tank staffers, although his
interaction with the think tank community has remained modest. He has
established ties to A E I’s John Bolton, former US representative to the U N;
and Jim DeMint, former president of Heritage; to discuss various issues,
including national security and potential nominees to the US Supreme
Court. Indeed, amid reports that Jim DeMint would be forced to leave
Heritage, Trump thanked him profusely for helping him navigate the
Gorsuch nomination through Congress.108 As noted in the Introduction,
there is no doubt that Trump is also grateful to Myron Ebell and his
colleagues at the Competitive Enterprise Institute (C E I) for their
unwavering opposition to the Paris Climate Agreement. When Trump
announced his intention to withdraw from the accord in the summer of
2017, Ebell and the C E I were able to check off another policy victory. As
the president moves forward on the construction of Keystone X L , C E I
will undoubtedly have more to celebrate.
Trump may not turn to think tanks to become better informed about key
policy issues, as many of his predecessors have done, but that does not
mean he will ignore them if he believes enlisting their support may prove
useful in advancing his political agenda. For Trump, think tanks represent a
means to an end, not a repository of expertise; if they can help him win
some political battles he may pay closer attention to them. Alternatively,
should the support he requires come from other centres of gravity, he will
not hesitate to ignore the steady stream of information and ideas think tanks
provide. Similarly, if think tanks are willing to do the president’s bidding,
and some have already shown they are more than prepared to, they may not
languish in obscurity as some have predicted, nor will they likely face an
untimely demise. As think tanks continue to adjust to a new reality in
Washington, they will make whatever adjustments are necessary to ensure
they have access to the stakeholders upon whom they have come to rely to
ensure their voices are heard. This certainly wouldn’t be the first time, nor
will it be the last, that think tanks are compelled to re-evaluate the strategies
they employ to reach key officials.
A N O F F E R TO O T E MP T I N G TO R E S I S T
Establishing close ties to the White House is an opportunity few think tanks
appear willing to pass up. Indeed, since they are organizations committed to
shaping public opinion and public policy, being in a position to influence
the policy direction of the president may be the best opportunity some have
to market their ideas. Yet in the process of finding an appropriate messenger
to translate their ideas into concrete policies, think tanks are becoming
increasingly aware of the potential costs of becoming publicly involved in
presidential campaigns.
Aside from the obvious concern of having their tax-exempt status under
the Internal Revenue Code revoked for engaging in inappropriate political
activities, think tank directors realize that their institute’s credibility can be
damaged in some academic and policy-making circles if they are perceived
as leading spokespersons for a particular candidate. As a result, although
several think tank staff have participated and will likely continue to
participate in presidential campaigns in various capacities, former directors
like John Raisian of the Hoover Institution acknowledge “that we have to
be very careful about how we handle it.”109 How Raisian’s predecessor,
Thomas Gilligan, and other think tank directors and presidents, including
Edwin Feulner of the Heritage Foundation, “handle it” is by making sure
that their staff are willing to provide policy advice, not political advice, to
any candidate willing to listen. In this way they attempt to create the
impression that, contrary to the views of their critics, they are nonpartisan.
Reinforcing their image as nonpartisan research institutes is not only
necessary to keep the Internal Revenue Service at bay; it is critical in
cultivating their reputation as independent and objective centres for
research and analysis. After all, unless think tanks can demonstrate that they
produce sound and balanced policy-relevant research that resonates among
large constituencies, few policy-makers, including aspiring presidential
candidates, will need their services. As the 2016 presidential campaign
confirmed, there are plenty of organizations that lobby on behalf of various
causes. But what most policy-makers require is sound policy ideas, not
more political lobbyists.
How think tanks balance the need to create a credible research program
with the desire to influence public policy will inevitably determine which
institutes are called upon to advise presidential candidates. For the think
tanks that are able to achieve an effective balance, the rewards can be vast.
Not only do close ties between think tanks and presidential candidates often
translate into more funds from admiring donors, but such an association can
result in high-level job offers for think tank staff. Alternatively, for think
tanks that are more interested in the cachet that comes from advising a
presidential candidate than in providing informative and well-balanced
policy advice, the costs can be significant. Being associated with a winning
presidential campaign may result in heightened media exposure, but the
long-term damage to a think tank’s credibility could prove far more
significant. This was clearly a concern for the Economic Policy Institute,
which took offence to candidate Trump referencing some of their reports
during the 2016 election.110
In examining the involvement of think tanks in the six presidential
elections discussed in this chapter, two observations come to mind. First,
Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush had much
in common before embarking on their road to the presidency: in addition to
being governors, none of the candidates had any formal experience in
foreign policy, which may explain why they all turned to think tanks for
insights on defence and foreign policy issues. Second, and perhaps more
important, the candidates were drawn to think tanks because they could
provide the candidates with credible and independent policy advice.
Probably the most significant function of think tanks for the presidential
candidates was their ability to enhance the legitimacy of the candidates’
policy ideas. This certainly accounts for why many presidential candidates
in the 2008 and 2016 campaigns established close ties to the think tank
community.
Much has been written about the extent to which think tanks in the
United States and, to a lesser extent, in Canada, have become engaged in
political advocacy, often at the expense of producing solid policy research.
While it is difficult to ignore how think tanks have become more advocacy-
oriented, we cannot assume that the institutes most adept at marketing their
institutional mandate will necessarily be of the greatest assistance to policy-
makers in the long run. As demonstrated in this chapter and in the chapter
that follows, despite what we have learned in the first months of the Trump
administration, policy-makers may at times be more inclined to enlist the
support of think tanks that are known more for their policy expertise than
for their desire to bask in the political limelight.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Policy Experts or Policy Instruments? Think

Tanks and the Debate over Constitutional
Reform in Canada
In their annual reports and promotional materials, think tanks in Canada,

like their American counterparts, frequently highlight their achievements.
Among other things, they list their recent publications, provide data on the
amount of media attention they generate, outline the many research
programs in which they are engaged, and summarize their contributions to
various policy issues. To put it simply, think tanks, like corporations, have a
vested interest in convincing their target audiences that the work they carry
out is important, and that the ideas and commentaries they offer are making
a difference. It is not surprising, therefore, that at times, think tanks
exaggerate both their impact in shaping the discourse around policy issues,
and their level of engagement in the policy-making process.
As noted, think tanks try to create the impression that they play a critical
role in injecting new and innovative ideas into policy debates. However, the
handful of scholars in Canada who have closely scrutinized their
contributions to various public policies have been less willing to embrace
their image as indispensable repositories of policy expertise. For instance,
rather than portraying think tanks as organizations that have had a decisive
impact on shaping policy decisions, Lindquist and Tupper claim that
Canadian think tanks have made only modest contributions to important
policy debates. In his comprehensive analysis of Canadian think tanks,
Lindquist examines the contributions of several research institutes to three
policy debates (energy policy, pension reform, and tax policy process
reform) that took place from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. He
concludes that while some think tanks may have played important roles
during the initial stages of these debates, policy-makers have not been
impressed by their contributions. As Lindquist observes:
The general finding … is that institute public inquiry was not of

direct relevance to actors interviewed in the case studies; the
institutes rarely appeared to challenge senior officials in their
deliberations and preparation for their political masters. This finding
is of considerable interest because institutes had significant early
roles in the debates on pension reform and tax policy process reform.
Each case study revealed different aspects of this more general
finding. The energy policy case revealed that institute studies were
monitored more for political considerations. Officials were hard put
to recall any influential work by the institutes, although there is
evidence that indicates some of the more technical activities were
viewed as being somewhat useful. The pension reform case study
showed that senior officials labeled the institutes as interest or
advocacy groups, yet none of the institutes were considered to be
particularly effective advocates. Nor were they repositories of
technical expertise and data on pension issues. The tax policy process
reform case study suggests that even when the institutes appeared to
have had the ear of senior officials, their work failed to provide
insightful analysis of the issues at hand.1
Lindquist’s conclusions about the relevance of think tanks in the policy-

making process have been supported by other scholars in the field,
including Allan Tupper. Tupper agrees that think tanks are becoming more
visible, but, like Lindquist, questions how much impact they have had in
shaping major policy debates. Although he admits that some institutes,
including C.D. Howe, may have played a critical role during the Canada-
US free trade debate, he is less convinced that think tanks in general
produce the type of research that is necessary to provide the basis for
informed policy discussions on critical issues. In his study, which examines
the research contribution of three Canadian think tanks – the C.D. Howe
Institute, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, and the Western
Centre for Economic Research – on the “vexing problem of the public
debt,” Tupper concludes that little of value was added to resolving this
ongoing issue confronting policy-makers. He notes, “I am critical of think
tanks’ contribution to our understanding of the public debt. Their research
is short-sighted, too polemical, and in the main too wedded to the
perspectives of modern economics. It adds little to our understanding of a
contentious issue.”2
In this chapter, I explore the contribution of think tanks to yet another
important policy issue, constitutional reform. The findings of this case
study, which is intended simply to illustrate the involvement of think tanks
in one policy area, are consistent with Lindquist’s and Tupper’s skepticism
about the contribution of think tanks to policy development. However, as
this case study reveals, I am skeptical, not because of the questionable
quality of some think tank publications, but because of the willingness of a
handful of think tanks to jeopardize their institutional autonomy by
advancing the political interests of policy-makers and other stakeholders.
However, it is important to remind ourselves that think tanks contribute to
public policy formation in different ways and at different times in the policy
cycle. Indeed, their inability to persuade government officials to embrace a
particular set of policy recommendations does not mean that they have
completely failed in their mission to influence public discussions around
key policy debates. As we will discuss in chapter 9, there are many ways
think tanks can make a difference.
During the winter of 1992, five think tanks – the C.D. Howe Institute,
the Institute for Research on Public Policy (I R P P), the Canada West
Foundation, the Niagara Institute, and the Atlantic Provinces Economic
Council (A P E C), were unexpectedly thrust into the public debate over the
future of constitutional reform in Canada. Although some of these institutes
had written extensively on various aspects of the Constitution, it was not a
particular publication or a speech given by a staff member that propelled
them into the national spotlight. It was, ironically, the collapse of a
parliamentary committee established to consult with Canadians on the
proposed changes to the Constitution leading up to the Charlottetown
Accord.
When the committee proved incapable of carrying out its
responsibilities, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Joe Clark, then
minister of constitutional affairs, relied on these five institutes to help
revive public interest in the Constitution. In what was dubbed the Renewal
of Canada, the think tanks were contracted to organize a series of
constitutional conferences focusing on specific themes and
recommendations outlined by the federal government in its 1991 report
Shaping Canada’s Future Together. Interestingly enough, the institutes were
expected not to contribute policy ideas, their raison d’être, but to help
transmit the government’s policy ideas to an increasingly disillusioned
public. According to most accounts, they performed this function
extraordinarily well.3 By serving as conference organizers and facilitators,
they not only established a legitimate forum for public discussion but
played a critical role in preventing the constitutional reform process from
being completely derailed. Unfortunately, in the process of providing this
crucial public service, some of the think tanks involved may have
compromised their own legitimacy as independent and credible centres for
research and analysis. As this chapter will demonstrate, rather than
promoting themselves as policy experts, the think tanks that participated in
the constitutional conferences actually served as policy instruments of the
government.
The involvement of think tanks in the constitutional conferences enables
scholars to bypass some of the many obstacles they encounter in trying to
assess the impact of these organizations. Unlike their behaviour during the
vociferous debate over free trade and the goods and services tax (G S T),
when several think tanks and other non-governmental organizations sought
to convey their views through government and nongovernment channels,
only a handful of think tanks were responsible for organizing the Renewal
of Canada initiative. Identifying them does not therefore pose a problem,
nor does isolating the group of scholars who were seconded to the Federal-
Provincial Relations Office (F P R O) in 1991 to draft the government’s
twenty-eight recommendations on constitutional reform. The participation
of think tanks in the constitutional conferences thus provides a unique
opportunity to evaluate the impact of several think tanks at the height of
their public visibility.
This case study has been selected because in addition to avoiding some
methodological hurdles, it provides insight into the role several think tanks
played in what might be the most important public policy debate in Canada
of the last quarter of the twentieth century. With the exception of the
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (F TA) and the North American Free
Trade Agreement (N A F TA), it is difficult to think of another policy issue
to which the Canadian government has assigned a higher priority. If think
tanks with expertise in constitutional issues could not play an important role
in shaping the outcome of this critical policy debate, when could they be
expected to have an impact?
Although the temptation to base observations about the nature of think
tank influence on one case study must be resisted, much can be gained by
looking more closely at the primary role these organizations played during
the constitutional conferences. In examining their involvement, this chapter
will address three major questions. First, why did the federal government
hire think tanks to facilitate public discussions on the Constitution? Are
they uniquely qualified to perform this role, or were there other factors that
motivated the government’s decision? Second, why did the think tanks
agree to serve as conference organizers and facilitators when it was clear
from the outset that they would not enjoy complete independence in
running the conferences? Did they become involved to enhance their public
visibility (all the conferences were televised by the C B C’s Newsworld), or
was the appeal of receiving large sums of government money sufficient to
entice them? Third, and perhaps most important, if the federal government
was not asking think tanks to generate their own policy ideas but simply to
transmit theirs, what does this tell us about the role of these organizations in
policy-making?
The government’s decision to enlist the help of think tanks, or what
Clark referred to as “credible independent organizations,” was clearly not
influenced by their in-house resources.4 A constitutional conference
secretariat, headed by Arthur Kroeger, an experienced deputy minister, had
to be established to handle most of the logistics related to the conferences.5
Rather, the decision to hire think tanks instead of professional
consultants or public relations/government relations firms was motivated by
the government’s desire to ensure the integrity and legitimacy of the public
conferences and of the constitutional reform process. Confronted by intense
and often harsh media scrutiny, not to mention a public that had grown
tired, increasingly skeptical, and suspicious of the government’s handling of
constitutional issues, Mulroney and Clark made a conscious and strategic
decision to engage organizations generally perceived as operating at arm’s
length to government. Because it had lost much of its own credibility, the
government hoped, by drawing upon the support and tacit endorsement of
think tanks, to enhance, or at the very least to restore some of their own
credibility. Tapping into the reservoir of think tanks gave the government
the much-needed transfusion of legitimacy it required to revive the
constitutional reform process.
On the other hand, the decision of the five think tanks to serve as
conference organizers was likely motivated by several factors, including a
desire to increase their cash flow. With the exception of the I R P P, which
draws on interest generated from its hefty endowment, the other institutes
have modest budgets. Securing access to funds that could help subsidize
their research for a long period of time had to have been a consideration. In
addition, the desire of many think tanks to increase their public exposure
also influenced their decision, as well as the prospect of increased access to
key policy-makers. However, even more important than the question of why
think tanks agreed to participate are the implications of the role they
willingly agreed to undertake.
While a handful of journalists and scholars still cling to the view that
think tanks are, first and foremost, serious research institutions of high-
powered intellectuals committed to addressing society’s most pressing
economic, political, and social issues, this image has long been challenged
and rebuked by many think tank directors and political scientists who work
in these organizations. For several think tanks, particularly those more
advocacy-oriented, policy research is only one of their functions; for some
it is not even the most important. Stimulating debate on domestic and
foreign policy issues through public workshops and seminars and by giving
interviews to the media is often seen as a main priority, rather than
producing scholarly studies. If this view of think tanks is accepted, then the
role of the five policy institutes in the constitutional conferences should not
be regarded as unusual. After all, if think tanks are no longer perceived as
repositories of policy expertise, why would we expect the government to
turn to them for policy advice? Moreover, why would they refuse to serve
as conference organizers for the government, a role that they are clearly
qualified to assume and one that many are prepared to accept?
Had the government turned to think tanks like the Fraser Institute or the
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (C C PA), which are known for
engaging in more sharply ideological advocacy and research, or to one of
several others in Canada that perform contract work for departments and
agencies, there would be little need to pursue this inquiry further. However,
given that Mulroney and Clark were concerned with preserving the integrity
and legitimacy of the conferences, they intentionally avoided selecting
think tanks that were perceived as overtly partisan or too closely linked to
government. Instead of inviting think tanks like the Fraser Institute, which
has often been subjected to negative media coverage, the government
turned to the Canada West Foundation and the C.D. Howe Institute, which
are widely recognized as highly competent research institutes. Yet despite
their expertise, the government did not ask them for independent policy
advice but simply to help spark public interest in the Constitution – the
government was interested not in the insights they could offer but in the
public relations services they could provide.
As will be revealed, the five think tanks clearly played an important role
for the government, but perhaps not the role one might have imagined.
They did generate public debate over constitutional reform, something the
government was clearly incapable of doing, and several of the conferences
led both to support for, and opposition to, some of the recommendations of
the federal government, a clear benefit to the provincial premiers
negotiating the Charlottetown Accord. Nevertheless, despite these
contributions, think tanks did not appear to have much impact in shaping
the initial recommendations for constitutional change.
This chapter will discuss background information on the events leading
up to the creation of the constitutional conferences, followed by a brief
profile of the five think tanks that participated in the Renewal of Canada
initiative and the factors that may have motivated their involvement.
Finally, the chapter will evaluate the contribution of think tanks in the
constitutional conferences.
P L A N B : T H E C R E AT I O N O F T H E
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES
In September 1991, the federal government released Shaping Canada’s

Future Together, a blueprint of twenty-eight recommendations or proposals
for constitutional reform that would, if implemented, “revise the rules that
shape the country’s political life.”6 To ensure that Canadians would have
sufficient opportunity to react to the government’s vision of a new
constitutional framework, something the government had been harshly
criticized for not doing before the Meech Lake negotiations, a Special Joint
Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate (the Castonguay-
Dobbie Committee, later to become the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee) was
established.7 The committee, as Kroeger points out, “was to hold hearings
across the country and submit a report by February 28 [1992]. The
government would then make decisions about constitutional changes, taking
into account the Committee’s findings.”8
Shortly after the committee began its public hearings, however, it
appeared that it might not be able to spark the interest of the Canadian
electorate, which had grown tired of what seemed like a never-ending
debate over the Constitution. Moreover, the government’s desire to engage
the public in a comprehensive and constructive dialogue on constitutional
reform was threatened by the committee’s “carnival of blunders.”
According to David Milne, “After an ill-prepared plunge into townhall
meetings in several provinces that seemed to offer either empty halls or
ready platforms for redneck comments damaging to national unity, after
consequent demands for the resignation of co-chairperson Ms. Dobbie, and
the departure of her counterpart, respected Quebec Senator Claude
Castonguay, the parliamentary committee had literally sputtered to a
complete stop.”9
Peter Russell, recognized widely as one of Canada’s leading
constitutional experts, offers an equally scathing indictment of the
constitutional hearings: “The trail of Canada’s constitutional odyssey is
littered with the wreckage of constitutional vehicles that went off the rails,
but for sheer disaster nothing can top the miserable performance of the
Castonguay-Dobbie Committee.”10 By early November 1991, the
committee appeared to have come to a complete standstill when no one
showed up at its hearings in Manitoba. According to Milne, at that stage
“the government needed to reassert its control over the constitutional
process, or face irreparable damage to the constitutional package and its
own reputation. Politically, the question was not simply one of finding some
other vehicle for testing public attitudes, but rather of finding a means of
restoring public confidence in the constitutional process itself.”11
The Mulroney government understood the important role the
parliamentary committee was asked to play and the potential repercussions
its implosion could bring. Public input into the constitutional reform
process was vital for the Conservative government, which had been harshly
criticized for excluding ordinary Canadians from discussions leading up to
the Meech Lake Accord. Sensitive to these and similar criticisms, Mulroney
recognized the importance of generating public interest and public views on
constitutional reform. But equally critical for the government was arriving
at an accord that was acceptable both to Quebec and to western provinces,
key constituencies for Mulroney. Not only was the Meech Lake Accord
unpopular with the West, but its failure spurred a growth in separatist
sympathies in Quebec, where Mulroney’s promise of constitutional reform
had secured his electoral victories in 1984 and 1988.12 Faced with these
considerable pressures before an election, it was critical for Mulroney to
arrive at a deal; the collapse of the Castonguay-Dobbie Committee was
nothing short of a disaster because of poor organization and poor
attendance.
While the government recognized the need to restore public confidence
in the constitutional reform process, it also acknowledged that it had little
time to reflect on what had gone wrong. With the parliamentary
committee’s 28 February deadline approaching, Mulroney had to quickly
reconsider his options. Cancelling the public hearings would be suicidal for
the government, but so too would allowing the parliamentary committee to
continue playing to sparsely attended halls. By mid-November the
government had decided that instead of terminating the faltering hearings, it
would resuscitate them by organizing “five Constitutional Conferences on
five consecutive weekends in five different major cities across the
country.”13 The government hoped the constitutional conferences, also
known as Plan B, would provide a more legitimate forum for public
discussion on the Constitution.14
The cabinet invited Arthur Kroeger to assume responsibility for the
initiative. The 2 December news release noted that a series of five
conferences on constitutional renewal would be held, with each sponsored
by an independent institute.15
Surprisingly, however, the news release made no reference to why the
five had been selected, or for that matter, why the government had decided
to enlist the support of think tanks. Why did the government select a group
of think tanks to save the sinking constitutional ship? Were think tanks a
logical choice, or could the government have turned to other public or
private organizations instead? And why did it select the A P E C and the
Niagara Institute, organizations not generally known for their expertise on
constitutional matters?
At first glance, the government’s decision appears logical. Think tanks
frequently organize conferences and invite policy-makers, academics,
journalists, and representatives from the private sector to participate. In
doing so, they decide on the format of the conference, arrange for speakers,
and determine whether and in what form to publish the proceedings,
although few had organized conferences on such a scale.
It is unlikely, however, that their ability to organize conferences was
sufficient incentive for government to invite their participation. Since the
think tanks lacked the resources to effectively run the conferences, the
government had to create a constitutional affairs secretariat, at a cost of
$8.96 million,16 to provide “logistic and operational assistance … and
information on the policy substance of the proposals.”17 The secretariat was
expected to ensure that the conferences ran smoothly, and to provide the
participants with background papers on the proposals under consideration.18
If the think tanks were not expected to assume full responsibility for
running the conferences or even to supply participants with independent
appraisals of the constitutional proposals (although some, including C.D.
Howe, did), why did the government solicit their assistance?
The simple answer is that what the government desperately needed was
something that public relations/media relations firms and a host of other
organizations capable of organizing conferences could not provide – instant
credibility and legitimacy with the public.19 The think tanks recruited had
reputations as institutions operating at arm’s length to government. They
were independent, non-profit, nonpartisan organizations. And they
attempted, though not always successfully, to portray themselves as
organizations committed to improving government decision-making, not to
advancing a particular ideological agenda, the priorities of their funders, or
the interests of one political party. It is this perception that Clark hoped
would play particularly well to the media, which had seized on the total
breakdown of the Castonguay-Dobbie Committee to predict the imminent
failure of future constitutional negotiations. The government also hoped
that selecting think tanks to help manage the conferences might not only
reignite public interest in the constitutional reform process, but would, at
least in the short term, provide a new distraction for the media. To their
delight, it did both.
Once the decision to engage think tanks was made, deciding which ones
would be invited to host the conferences did not likely create much
difficulty. Unlike in the United States, where policy-makers must rely on
directories to keep track of the hundreds of think tanks, in Canada fewer
than three dozen major independent think tanks exist. Of these, only a
handful that specialize in domestic policy have made their presence felt in
policy-making circles.20 According to Ron Watts, a constitutional adviser to
Joe Clark during this period, two important criteria influenced the selection
process: credibility and regional representation.21 It is unclear what factors
or criteria were taken into consideration in determining whether or not some
think tanks were deemed credible. However, the decision makers involved
in the process were intent on selecting organizations whose reputation for
balanced and neutral policy research was beyond reproach. In choosing the
C.D. Howe Institute (Toronto), the I R P P (Montreal), the Canada West
Foundation (Calgary), A P E C (Halifax), and the Niagara Institute (Niagara
on the Lake), the government, for the most part, satisfied both criteria.
The government’s decision to pursue Plan B proved to be an important
one. Not only did organizing the constitutional conferences save the
parliamentary hearings from imminent disaster, but it renewed public
interest in the debate over constitutional reform. By hiring think tanks to
serve as conference facilitators, the government achieved what it clearly set
out to do. It was able to significantly influence the public consultation
process, something the parliamentary committee was incapable of doing,
while creating the impression that “independent institutes” were running the
show. Ironically, in the process of making the conferences a more legitimate
public relations exercise for the government, the think tanks sacrificed some
of their own independence, as will be explored more fully in the sections
below.
THE CHOSEN FEW

The Atlantic Provinces Economic Council
Of the five think tanks invited to help organize the constitutional

conferences, the A P E C is the oldest. Created in 1954 “as a partnership
between the provincial governments and the private sector,” A P E C’s
objective is “to promote the Economic Development of the Atlantic Region
of Canada.”22 With about ten staff at the time, A P E C drew on its $1 to $2
million budget to analyze and evaluate current and emerging economic
trends and policies. Before the constitutional conferences, A P E C had
published very few newsletters and background papers on how a new
constitution could affect the Atlantic region.23
The Canada West Foundation
Although A P E C is not generally known for its expertise in constitutional

affairs, that is a claim the Canada West Foundation can legitimately make.
From its offices in Calgary, the C WF has been a strong advocate for
promoting and protecting western Canada’s economic, political, and social
interests in the Canadian federation. Founded in 1970, the C WF draws on
support from various corporations, foundations, and government
departments to maintain its active research program. In 1996 it received two
endowments totalling $1.5 million.24 By the time David Elton, former
president of the C WF, had been invited to participate in the Renewal of
Canada initiative, his institute had released close to two dozen publications
on constitutional issues, ranging from how to reform the Canadian Senate to
the possible repercussions of Quebec separation, as well as organizing a
handful of major conferences on constitutional reform.
The Niagara Institute
Unlike the C WF, the Niagara Institute, established in 1971, does not claim
to have expertise in constitutional affairs or in any specific policy area, for
that matter. According to Garry Rawson, former director of business
development at the Niagara Institute, before the 1992 conferences his
institute had never focused on constitutional issues. Niagara became
involved, Rawson stated, “because of their skill in managing search
conferences.”25
Although the institute has clearly benefited from the research programs
undertaken by the Conference Board of Canada, with which it merged in
1994, it does not engage in public policy research. Rather, it seeks “to
enhance the quality of Canadian leadership in business, government and
non-governmental organizations [by offering] specialized programs
designed to help leaders identify, understand and address the issues of our
time.”26 Of the five think tanks, the Niagara Institute was clearly the
anomaly.
The C.D. Howe Institute and the Institute for Research on

Public Policy
At the time of their involvement in the constitutional conferences, the two

remaining institutes, the C.D. Howe Institute (1973) and the I R P P (1972),
had similar institutional profiles.27 Both had about fifteen members and
budgets in the range of $2 million or more, and both institutes were created
to improve public policy in Canada by providing objective and sound
analysis of policy issues. Since then, both institutes have grown. As of
2017, C.D. Howe employs twenty-five staff and has a budget between $3.5
and $4 million and I R P P, with a budget of $2 to $3 million, has fifteen
staff. However, unlike C.D Howe, the I R P P has, as noted, a sizeable
endowment to support its activities. Of the two, C.D. Howe enjoys greater
public exposure, no doubt a result of its more extensive research program.28
C.D. Howe had published no fewer than twenty studies on constitutional
issues before becoming involved in the conferences, more than twice the
number produced by the I R P P.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCES
When the federal government approached the five institutes to help

organize the constitutional conferences, it clarified that it did not expect
them to produce independent appraisals of the twenty-eight proposals on
constitutional reform; nor did it expect them to assume full responsibility
for running the conferences. Instead, the institutes were contracted to
perform six specific functions: to define the conference agenda and format,
identify chairs and co-chairs for conference sessions, select appropriate
participants, prepare conference material, offer on-site supports, and submit
a conference report.29
Initially, it appeared that the institutes would exercise considerable
independence in organizing the conferences, something they had apparently
demanded in exchange for agreeing to participate. A closer look at the
government’s criteria, however, reveals that in several instances the
government dictated how it wanted the conferences run. In addition to
determining which of its twenty-eight proposals in Shaping Canada’s
Future Together would be the “primary thematic focus of each conference”
(the conference agenda), the government had considerable input into the
individuals who would be invited to participate. According to the news
release of 2 December 1991, “The institutes are to invite to the Conferences
on an ex-officio basis:
• all members of the joint parliamentary committee,

• two individuals selected respectively by each of the caucuses of the three
federal political parties with parliamentary status,
• two individuals from each province and territory, to be selected by the
Premier/Head of Government, and
• one representative of each of the four national aboriginal
organizations.”30
The government also specified that although the “Institutes are responsible
for determining the manner in which [members of the public] are selected
… individuals selected should have a demonstrated interest in, and some
knowledge of constitutional matters, and should have a significant record of
service to their communities.” Furthermore, it indicated that “experts
invited by the Institutes to participate in panels and workshops must, taken
together, represent a broad and balanced cross-section of views.”31
The government also went to great lengths to outline the format of the
conferences. It stated that at each conference, institutes had to provide “an
opportunity for a government spokesperson to outline the constitutional
proposals and underlying rationale with particular reference to those which
are the subject of each conference.”32 Apparently the government had little
confidence in the ability of experts from independent think tanks to explain
the nature of the constitutional proposals under discussion. Nor did
government officials demonstrate much confidence in the think tanks’
ability to prepare final reports on the conference proceedings. The
Constitutional Conferences Secretariat arranged with the Privy Council and
the Federal-Provincial Relations Office “to have a team of ‘note-takers’
available at each conference.” As Peter Harrison notes, “in summarizing
what had been the gist of discussion in the various forums, this assisted
rapporteurs in providing summaries to plenary sessions, and report writers
in pulling together the sense of the conferences.”33
Judging by the arrangements agreed to before the conferences began, it
was clear that the institutes would not be permitted to exercise complete
independence, a price however, that most institutes were prepared to pay.
Asked why their institute became involved in the 1992 conferences even
though they would not be permitted to enjoy complete independence, a
senior analyst from one think tank remarked, “We did not want to get
involved in the conferences but figured we had to. It would have been
perceived as bad P R to not want to save the country” (off-the-record
telephone interview). On the other hand, some institutes did not believe that
their institutional independence was compromised at all. Despite the
amount of government intervention, they continued to insist that they, not
Ottawa, were ultimately in charge. In a report on the constitutional
conference it helped organize, the Canada West Foundation stated: “The
Conference was organized and managed by the Canada West Foundation,
with assistance from a Conference Secretariat set up by the Government of
Canada to aid in logistics and media coverage. Canada West Foundation
exercised complete independence in the selection of conference
participants, the organization of the program, the setting of the agenda, the
selection of co-chairs and speakers, the preparation of pre-conference
materials, and the writing of final report. There was no interference or
direction, direct or indirect, on the part of the government.”34
While these and similar statements were no doubt comforting to the
government, the institutes were deluding themselves if they believed they
had complete independence.35 But sacrificing some independence may have
been a small price to pay in return for the potential benefits derived from
their participation, including, of course, establishing greater credibility with
the government. Becoming more firmly entrenched in policy-making circles
could pay handsome dividends for think tanks committed to shaping public
policy. In addition, by helping to organize the conferences, the institutes
were able to attract considerable media exposure. The importance of
generating media attention cannot be overstated – not only does increased
media coverage help foster the illusion of policy influence, but directors of
several think tanks can often parlay their organization’s media visibility into
corporate and private donations.36
Generating free publicity was only one of the factors that would have
motivated their decision to participate. Being centre stage at what might be
the most important public policy debate in a quarter-century was also a
strong incentive. For organizations committed to influencing public policy
and public opinion, the opportunity to help put the constitutional reform
process back on track would be difficult to pass up. Although they ran the
risk of participating in conferences that could become public relations
disasters, it would probably have been the government, not the institutes,
that would have been held accountable.37 If, on the other hand, the
conferences succeeded, the think tanks would forever be linked to a pivotal
period in Canada’s constitutional development.
The financial rewards of accepting a generous government contract may
also have convinced several of the think tanks with modest financial
resources to take on the task. For its efforts, the Atlantic Province Economic
Council received $314,000;38 the C.D. Howe Institute and the I R P P shared
$200,00 for co-organizing a conference; and the Canada West Foundation
received $315,000. These figures, however, pale in comparison to the
$760,000 cheque the Niagara Institute received.39 Perhaps even more
lucrative than accepting the government’s offer was the potential for
additional contracts in the future, an enormous benefit, since the majority of
Canada’s think tanks constantly struggle to keep afloat.
Each institute may have been motivated to participate in the Renewal of
Canada conferences for different reasons, but in the final analysis, they all
shared the government’s commitment to move the constitutional process
forward. The chapter has outlined the potential benefits and some of the
costs of this decision. What needs to be discussed now is what contribution
the think tanks made to this critical issue. I will now evaluate the role the
institutes played at critical stages leading up to and during the conferences.
S O ME C A U S E F O R C O N C E R N :
A N A S S E S S ME N T O F T H E I MPA C T O F T H I N K
TA N K S
Well before the federal government made its twenty-eight proposals on

constitutional reform known, most of the think tanks that participated in the
constitutional conferences had given considerable thought to the future of
the Canadian federation. With the exception of the Niagara Institute, the
institutes involved had published studies detailing the economic, social, and
political issues associated with a changed constitution, ranging from the
potential ramifications of introducing a Triple E Senate to granting Quebec
distinct status within the Constitution. The “independent credible
organizations” that the government was hoping would provide legitimacy to
the public consultation process on constitutional reform had already staked
out their positions. Nevertheless, when the government began considering
how to reform the Constitution after the failure of the Meech Lake Accord,
it did not turn to these think tanks to draft a new blueprint but to a small
group of academics in universities.
Shortly after Professor Ron Watts was seconded from Queen’s
University to the F P R O in April 1991 to serve as a constitutional adviser
to Joe Clark, a select group of constitutional experts consisting of Kathy
Swinton (University of Toronto), Roger Gibbins (University of Calgary),
Peter Leslie (Queen’s University), and Doug Purvis (Queen’s University)
were called upon to assist him in drafting the government’s constitutional
reform proposals.40 Watts was also asked to edit a series of background
papers intended to explain in a clear and straightforward manner the
government’s proposals for reforming the Constitution. So, when the
government was formulating its vision of a new federation, the views of a
handful of academics were clearly heard; the recommendations of private
think tanks, on the other hand, were barely noticed.
Directors of think tanks often credit their institutes with helping
formulate government legislation and initiatives, but in this particular case
they appear to have had little impact. It was not until the parliamentary
hearings on the Constitution failed that they even became part of the
consultation process, but not as transmitters of knowledge – as conference
organizers and facilitators. So they could not legitimately claim that their
ideas on how to reform the constitution mattered. Think tanks made a
difference in this later phase of constitutional discussions, but not in the
way one might imagine.
The absence of think tanks during this critical stage of policy-making
raises important questions about their role in policy research. If policy-
makers were aware of the institutes’ research on various constitutional
issues after Meech Lake, why were they not asked to help draft the
government’s proposals? Did policy-makers question the quality of their
publications or the credentials of their staff? If so, why then did the
government regard them as sufficiently credible to organize their
conferences? Were they simply selected because they were perceived by the
media as credible institutions? Alternatively, if the government was
unaware of their research, what does this say about the ability of think tanks
to convey their ideas?
For some of the think tanks, organizing the constitutional conferences
was a mixed blessing: it may have increased their exposure, but it did little
to advance their reputations as scholarly research organizations. It
demonstrated that some of the country’s most talked-about think tanks have
less influence than assumed in shaping some policy issues. The role of the
five think tanks in the constitutional conferences should encourage scholars
to think more critically about the contribution research institutes make to
public policy. If they are simply expected to serve as policy instruments of
government and provide tantalizing morsels of information to the media,
then there should be little cause for concern. On the other hand, if think
tanks are expected to serve as sources of policy expertise, then the nature of
their participation in the Renewal of Canada conferences should raise some
eyebrows.
LESSONS LEARNED?
The federal government clearly learned some important lessons from

soliciting the assistance of think tanks in the winter of 1992. Among other
things, it realized the potential benefits of enlisting the support of
independent policy research institutes to facilitate discussions on important
issues, particularly when the government’s handling of those issues was
being called into question. Policy-makers also realized that the reputation
think tanks have cultivated as independent centres of policy expertise could
work to their advantage. By drawing on their credibility, the government
could enhance its own.
The success of the constitutional conferences did not go unnoticed by
the federal Liberal government that handily defeated the Conservatives in
1993. In preparation for the 1994 budget, Minister of Finance Paul Martin
called for a more open process of budget consultations, which included four
public conferences. They would be held in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and
Calgary in January 1994 and would be hosted by four think tanks, all but
one of which, the Public Policy Forum, had participated in the 1992
conferences. The other think tanks involved were A P E C, the I R P P, and
the Canada West Foundation.41
In accepting Martin’s invitation, the four institutes requested and
received more control over the selection of the approximately one hundred
participants who attended each conference than they had enjoyed in 1992.
Some institutes, including the I R P P and the Canada West Foundation, also
distributed materials their institutes had prepared for the participants shortly
before the conferences began.42 However, even though the think tanks were
more conscious of playing a hands-on role at the 1994 conferences, many of
the same issues remained.
As in 1992, the think tanks that became involved in the 1994 pre-budget
consultations were looked to not for their policy expertise but as
organizations that could make the public consultation process work more
smoothly for the government. Once again they seemed to perform this
function admirably. Nonetheless, in the wake of the 1994 conferences, it is
important for think tanks to re-evaluate what their priorities are and how
they can best be advanced. While think tanks can serve the government’s
interests by acting as facilitators, they may not necessarily be advancing the
public’s interests, or their own. Think tanks, according to their own
promotional material, are in the business of developing and promoting
ideas. They exist to think critically about important policy issues, not
simply to advance or market the ideas of policy-makers.
The case study presented in this chapter, like the studies prepared by
Lindquist and Tupper, offers some insight into how Canadian think tanks
have become involved in particular policy areas. The picture that emerges
may not be favourable, particularly for the think tanks singled out for
examination. Nonetheless, the findings reinforce the central argument of
this book: that think tanks cannot be expected to play a decisive role at each
stage of the policy cycle or, for that matter, in every policy area. While
some think tanks may help to frame the parameters of key policy debates
through their publications and media commentary, they may be less
effective, as Lindquist and Tupper observe, in influencing specific policy
decisions. Or as the constitutional conferences revealed, policy-makers may
not even be aware of the publications think tanks have produced, preferring
instead to rely on them as conference facilitators.
The advantage of developing case studies that examine the participation
of think tanks in specific policy areas is that it enables scholars to go
beyond simple data sets to more accurately assess their relevance. The
disadvantage is that it is difficult to make general observations about their
impact in the policy-making process by relying on a handful of cases.
Indeed, by focusing on Ken Battle’s contributions to the development of
social welfare policy in Canada, one might conclude – and justifiably so –
that the president of the Caledon Institute has had a profound impact in
shaping public policy. A similar conclusion might be reached in examining
the contribution of the C.D. Howe institute to the free trade debate and to
the future of the Canada Pension Plan. Depending on the specific policy
issue that is under consideration and the particular stage of the policy-
making process that one is focusing on, scholars may walk away with the
impression that think tanks are either extremely influential or entirely
irrelevant. Both impressions would be right. In the following chapter, I
build on these observations by exploring the involvement of a select group
of think tanks in Canada and the US and their efforts to shape the discourse
around the construction of the controversial Keystone X L pipeline.
Although some think tanks took credit for either halting or advancing
discussions on the pipeline, conclusions about how much or little impact
they exercised cannot be made until we fully understand the nature and
scope of their contribution.
CHAPTER EIGHT
In the Pipeline:
Think Tanks and the Debate over Keystone XL
As Canada’s twenty-second prime minister, Stephen Harper had to learn the

most effective and expedient ways to manage bilateral relations with the
US, Canada’s leading trading partner. Indeed, for 150 years, Canadian
prime ministers have faced similar challenges in dealing with their
continental neighbour – finding a balance between representing the interests
of the country, and holding onto the support of their caucus, without
alienating or infuriating the United States. Walking this tightrope has often
required considerable political acumen and diplomacy. It becomes
particularly difficult when Canada, relegated as the junior partner in this
asymmetrical power relationship, finds itself at odds with US
administrations pursuing domestic and foreign policies deemed offensive,
destabilizing, and wholly inappropriate by the vast majority of Canadians.
As a member of N ATO , N O R A D, the U N, and other regional and
international organizations, as well as a signatory to several bilateral treaties
and conventions, including the North American Free Trade Agreement
(N A F TA) and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, it is difficult to
overstate the number of policy initiatives requiring Canadian and American
cooperation. It is also difficult to overstate that US officials have a general
expectation that Canada, as America’s most loyal and ardent ally, should
simply fall into lockstep with the United States.
When the interests of Canada and the United States do not converge,
Ottawa is compelled to think strategically about how best to advance its
sovereign interests in Washington, where Canada must compete with
hundreds of other countries struggling to make their voices heard. At times,
this involves working closely with key members of Congress sympathetic
to Canadian federal and provincial concerns and strengthening ties to
various government departments at the federal and state level. It may also
entail engaging senior officials in the US embassy in Ottawa to stress the
importance of keeping the Canada-US relationship intact and on track. But
what tends to set the tone for relations between the two countries is not the
many discussions with lawmakers that take place in the corridors of
Congress or state legislatures, or, for that matter, meetings held in their
respective embassies. It is the relationship that forms and evolves between
prime ministers and presidents – a relationship that unfolds in full view of
the media and millions of onlookers – that helps the electorate and the
media gauge the temperature of bilateral relations.1 How well or poorly
prime ministers and presidents relate to each other may not dictate the
success or failure of various bilateral initiatives. After all, the range of
issues that define Canada-US relations extends far beyond the offices of the
president and prime minister. Nonetheless, the relationship they form is one
of many factors scholars need to consider in evaluating the health of
bilateral relations.
Official state visits present a valuable opportunity for the Canadian
prime minister and the US president to lay the groundwork for broader
policy discussions. When US president Barack Obama made his first
official visit to Canada on 19 February 2009, the leaders had much to
discuss, from bilateral trade and climate change to border security and
fighting the war on terror. They discussed many of these issues further
when Stephen Harper made his first official visit to the Obama White
House on 16 September, over six months later. On the surface, Harper and
Obama seemed to get along well during both visits, strolling through
Parliament and posing for pictures in the Oval Office. However, it did not
take long for their facial expressions to change from warm and welcoming
smiles to what could best be described as a cold and distant gaze. In the
months and years following Obama and Harper’s trips to each other’s
capitals, it became painfully clear that it was unlikely that they would see
eye to eye on some bilateral policy initiatives. Although Harper and Obama
understood that the close economic, political, and security ties that had
bound the two countries for over a century and a half would weather
virtually any storm, it was the contentious and protracted debate over the
construction of Keystone X L, a proposed pipeline that would carry oil from
Alberta to the US Gulf Coast, that created a rift between the two leaders.
This rift became even more pronounced as Harper and Obama, in an effort
to assuage different constituencies, continued to invest considerable
financial and political capital to facilitate, or in Obama’s case, stall the
pipeline’s construction. Known for having a short fuse, Harper became
increasingly frustrated with Obama’s handling of Keystone, an issue over
which he believed the president was being needlessly obstructionist. At
times, Harper could barely conceal his disappointment in Obama, whom he
felt was dragging his feet on Keystone.2 As Harper’s frustration with
Obama reached new heights, pundits were reminded that despite the many
interests Canada and the US share, as sovereign countries they have their
share of policy differences. The periodic tensions that surfaced between
Obama and Harper over the proposed project resulted in some
uncomfortable moments in Canada-US relations. However, those who have
studied this complex and multifaceted relationship have come to expect
some friction. Throughout the history of Canada’s relationship with the
United States,3 several political conflicts between prime ministers and
presidents have emerged, some more intense and serious than others. John
Diefenbaker’s frustration with President Kennedy over his management of
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Lester Pearson’s less than cordial exchanges with
Lyndon Johnson during the height of the Vietnam War, Pierre Trudeau’s
expressions of animosity toward Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, and
Jean Chrétien’s opposition to the Iraq war waged by George W. Bush, serve
as a reminder that although we share the same border and inhabit the same
continent, our cultural and political differences often run deep. But there
have also been plenty of times, especially when prime ministers and
presidents have embraced similar ideological leanings, when the special
relationship between the two countries has been strengthened and bolstered.
Brian Mulroney’s close personal ties to Ronald Reagan and George H.W.
Bush, and Jean Chrétien’s admiration for Bill Clinton represent such
moments.4 In the final analysis, the enduring and deep relationship between
Canada and the US does not necessarily depend on whether prime ministers
and presidents get along, but rather how they manage and nurture the
relationship.
The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to summarize the long and
intriguing history between Canada and the United States, nor, for that
matter, is it to provide a detailed assessment of Stephen Harper’s
interactions with Barack Obama. Rather, it is to highlight the involvement
of a select group of Canadian and American think tanks in discussions
around the proposed construction of the Keystone X L pipeline, one of the
most controversial policy issues to surface in Canada-US relations during
Harper and Obama’s terms in office. By examining how think tanks on both
sides of the border interacted with key stakeholders to convey their support
for, or opposition to, Keystone X L, we will be able to provide yet another
example of the willingness and determination of think tanks to rely on
multiple channels to shape the discourse around key policy issues. During
different phases of this ongoing policy discussion, think tanks for and
against Keystone X L have claimed victory. Think tanks in Canada and the
United States adamantly opposed to the pipeline celebrated President
Obama’s 2015 decision to veto its construction; those in favour, including
Harper’s successor, Justin Trudeau, have applauded President Trump’s
decision to move this project forward, a project that could ultimately be
decided by Nebraska.
Examining how various individuals and organizations attempt to sway
policy discussions, particularly those that are already underway, presents a
host of challenges for scholars trying to figure out who or what has made a
difference. This case study is no exception. Recognizing that many things
can change between the time of writing and the final decision that is made
regarding the future of Keystone X L, this chapter presents some
preliminary findings on think tanks’ participation in this issue. What has
become clear is that a select group of think tanks in Canada and the United
States have taken an active interest in Keystone X L, and have relied on the
media to convey their views, presented testimony to legislative committees,
and published several studies to transmit their policy recommendations.
Among the Canadian think tanks that have made their positions known
about the pipeline are four policy institutes in Alberta – the Canada West
Foundation, the Calgary office of the Fraser Institute, the Parkland Institute,
the Pembina Institute – and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives,
headquartered in Ottawa. Of these, only the Canada West Foundation has
supported its construction. In the United States, there has also been a flurry
of think tank activity around Keystone X L with the Cato Institute, the
Center for American Progress, the Bipartisan Policy Center, the Council on
Foreign Relations, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a strong
advocate of the pipeline weighing in on this debate.
While the efforts of several think tanks to shape the discourse around
Keystone X L cannot be ignored, it is also important not to exaggerate or
inflate their impact. Think tanks have played an important and meaningful
role on both sides of the border to raise awareness about the economic
benefits and potential political and environmental costs of proceeding with
Keystone X L. In doing so, they have helped mobilize both support for and
opposition to its completion. Think tanks have also gone to great lengths to
reinforce and elaborate on the messages conveyed by two sets of prime
ministers and presidents. Still, it is important to keep in mind that think
tanks were not responsible for placing Keystone X L on the political agenda
– this mammoth project was a private sector initiative. Moreover, it does
not appear that the presence of think tanks was required to convince
political leaders in either country to support or oppose the pipeline. Stephen
Harper, an adopted son of Alberta with strong ties to the energy sector,
would have embraced the potential economic benefits of Keystone without
reading a single line from a pro-Keystone think tank report. By the same
token, Barack Obama did not require think tanks to persuade him that this
project could possibly damage the environment by releasing more
greenhouse gases, and adversely affect lands populated by Indigenous
Americans. Sensitive to both global environmental challenges and to the
plight of Indigenous peoples, Obama was politically and ideologically
opposed to Keystone. Think tanks adopting a similar position simply helped
to reinforce his concerns.
Although think tanks may not be able to take credit for influencing the
decisions taken by Harper and Obama, which led to a stalemate, or those
announced in recent months by Trudeau and Trump, which have
resuscitated Keystone, it does not mean that the voices of policy institutes
have fallen on deaf ears. Consistent with the argument advanced in this
study, think tanks can and often do make a contribution to shaping both the
policy-making process and the political environment in which key decisions
are made; but they do so at different times and in different ways. Indeed,
their involvement in policy-making can be sporadic; rather than maintaining
a consistent presence at various stages of the policy cycle, some think tanks
frequently enter or exit policy discussions. And as we will discover, while
their presence might be felt at some stages of the policy cycle, at other
points in the process they may be noticeably absent. In the case of the
debate around Keystone, the impact of think tanks was far more noticeable
once the decision to consider this initiative was made. Once the project
found its way onto the political agenda, a handful of think tanks got to
work. As they had done many times before, they mobilized the resources
they required to advance a series of policy recommendations they hoped
would gain significant political traction. In many respects, their efforts paid
off.
The first section of the chapter will present a brief history of Keystone
X L. Following this, a discussion of how think tanks engage different
stakeholders, and the major Canadian and American think tanks actively
involved in the debate over the construction of the pipeline will be
highlighted. Finally, the chapter will discuss some preliminary information
on the extent to which various Canadian and American think tanks were
able to raise awareness about the many political, economic, and
environmental issues pertaining to the pipeline.
AND BY EXTENSION:
A B R I E F L O O K AT K E Y S TO N E X L
The debate over building the Keystone X L pipeline has taken more twists
and turns than a John le Carré spy novel, and now that the Trump
administration has weighed in, there is no telling where it could end (see
Appendix 7 for a Keystone Pipeline timeline). Still, it is important to
provide a brief history of how this project has unfolded before we launch
into a broader discussion of the various ways in which think tanks on both
sides of the Canada-US border attempted to influence the outcome of this
controversial project.
On 19 September 2008, the Calgary-based TransCanada Corporation
submitted an application to the US State Department to obtain a presidential
permit to construct the Keystone X L pipeline. The 2,735 kilometre pipeline
would cross the Canadian border into the United States and cost
approximately US$5.3 billion. If permission was granted, the pipeline
would carry hundreds of thousands of barrels of bitumen from oil sands
from Alberta to Texas. As noted in TransCanada’s request for arbitration on
24 June 2016, three and a half years passed before TransCanada was
advised by the US State Department that its application for a permit had
been denied. After a new application was submitted to the US State
Department on 4 May 2012, TransCanada had to wait another three and a
half years before being told that its second request for a permit had been
turned down.5
During several speeches and engagements in Canada and in the United
States, including a discussion moderated by former US Treasury Secretary
Robert Reich at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations on 16
May 2013,6 Harper made a strong, and what his supporters believed was a
compelling case, that an extension to Keystone would be in the national
interests of Canada and the United States. Among other things, Harper
claimed that the proposed project would further reduce oil dependence on
the Middle East, generate billions of dollars in revenue, and lead to
thousands of temporary jobs in both countries. Admittedly, the number of
permanent positions created once the pipeline extension was completed
would be minimal.7 While Harper also went to some lengths to counter
growing concerns among environmental groups that the Keystone extension
would cause far higher greenhouse gas emissions, he knew as early as
November 2011 that it was highly unlikely that Obama would approve the
pipeline. Even with Harper’s full and unqualified support and aggressive
lobbying by other Canadian officials and industry representatives in
Washington, it became painfully clear that TransCanada would not be able
to convince the US State Department to approve the pipeline. In fact,
despite Harper claiming that Keystone was “a complete no brainer,”8 critics
of Keystone, including several well-known environmental groups, could not
be swayed, nor could President Obama, who repeatedly expressed
reservations about the pipeline because of its potentially damaging
environmental impact.9 Obama’s tough stance on Keystone became
particularly acute in the weeks and months leading up to his 2012 re-
election bid. Sensitive to the environmental lobby’s opposition to Keystone,
and by “California’s cultural elite,” who took issue with Canada’s “dirty
oil,” Obama was unwilling to risk losing their political and financial
support. Increasingly frustrated and disillusioned with the Obama
administration for catering to interest groups, celebrities, and members of
Congress opposed to the pipeline, Prime Minister Harper conceded in July
2015 that it would take a change in US leadership before Keystone could
move forward.10 He was proven right when President Trump issued a
presidential memorandum on 24 January 2017, paving the way for a
reconsideration of Keystone X L. Just as environmental concerns dominated
many of the discussions between Canada, the United States, and Mexico
leading to the passage and implementation of N A F TA,11 similar issues
were at the forefront of the debate around Keystone.
When it came to opposing or supporting Keystone X L, there was little
confusion over where various stakeholders stood. Not surprisingly, those
who advocated for an extension highlighted the economic benefits the new
pipeline would bring, while those opposed focused on environmental
concerns and the impact it could have on Indigenous territories in Montana,
South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma, states over (and under)
which the proposed pipeline would travel, carrying approximately 800,000
barrels of oil a day to the US Gulf Coast. Assembly of First Nations
national chief Perry Bellegarde addressed these concerns following Donald
Trump’s announcement, shortly after taking office, that Keystone was back
on the table. Bellegarde stated, “This is an important moment to remind
Canadians that First Nations hold inherent rights and treaty rights
recognized in Canada’s Constitution … This includes the right to free, prior
and informed consent over any activities that could affect our lands, our
lives or our future.”12
Encouraged by how effective groups and several prominent individuals
were in mobilizing opposition to the pipeline during the Obama
administration, including a handful of Hollywood notables, Bellegarde and
representatives from other Indigenous organizations have once again vowed
to protest the construction of the pipeline.13 They will not be alone. Joining
them on both sides of the Canada-US border will be environmental groups
such as the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, members of Congress and
Parliament who remain outspoken critics of Keystone X L, and of course,
think tanks that have positioned themselves strategically in this ongoing
debate. Before turning our attention to the various Canadian and American
think tanks weighing in on Keystone, it is useful to consider the various
stakeholders with whom they engage in an effort to shape public opinion
and public policy.
T H I N K TA N K S AT WO R K
As institutions ostensibly committed to analyzing the many challenges
associated with implementing a wide range of domestic and foreign policy
initiatives, it is not surprising that think tanks spend much of their time and
often the bulk of their resources on activities related to various research
programs and projects. Finding solutions to complex policy problems does
not occur by accident, and rarely do think tanks stumble across quick fixes.
The ideas they generate often take years to refine and package in a form
that is palatable to policy-makers and to the public. In short, for think tanks
to achieve lasting policy influence, they must be prepared to make a long-
term investment in both their researchers and in the research they
undertake. But as we have also discovered, competing in the marketplace of
ideas often requires think tanks to do what is expedient. Considering the
importance of providing policy-makers and other key stakeholders with
information that is timely and relevant, some think tanks are only too
willing to compromise the integrity and quality of their research. To make
their presence felt, think tanks, interest groups, lobbyists and other
organizations jostle, butt heads, and try desperately to outmanoeuvre each
other to leave a fingerprint on public policy. With no less than the future of
key domestic and foreign policies at stake, think tanks cannot afford to be
complacent when it comes to showcasing their findings. Communicating,
marketing, and promoting their work to multiple stakeholders,
constituencies, or target audiences is, to put it mildly, critical to their
success.
S TA K I N G A C L A I M: T H I N K TA N K S A N D T H E I R
S TA K E H O L D E R S
Policy-Makers
For most think tanks, conveying ideas and policy recommendations to

elected officials and career bureaucrats remains a priority. Although the
nature of the political system think tanks inhabit will dictate how and to
what extent they reach out to office-holders, a subject we explored in
chapter 3, organizations involved in the study of public policy must keep a
close watch on what policy-makers are thinking about and the issues they
will likely have to consider in the near and foreseeable future. Just as
government relations firms monitor how the legislative agenda could affect
their clients’ interests, think tanks cannot lose sight of the issues that have
come to preoccupy those in positions of power. Think tanks with the insight
and good fortune to anticipate and project the challenges policy-makers will
face in the ensuing months and years will likely enjoy a strategic advantage
over their competitors. However, even if think tanks can manage to stay
ahead of the curve, they cannot expect to make a splash if the issues they
tackle have little bearing on matters weighing heavily on the minds of
policy-makers. To ensure they are generating research that is timely and
relevant, it only makes sense for think tanks to establish extensive contacts
throughout government. In addition to strengthening lines of
communication, this gives think tanks confidence in knowing that they are
on the same page as policy-makers. Many government staff prove helpful to
think tanks: elected officials and their staff, policy advisors in the Prime
Minister’s Office (P MO) and the Privy Council Office (P C O); in the
United States, experts in various agencies that make up the Executive
Office of the President (E O P), employees in government departments and
agencies, those who staff important legislative committees, and directors of
party research offices.
For many think tanks, establishing and nurturing contacts throughout
government can, over time, pay handsome dividends. This explains why
several high-profile think tanks in the United States allocate millions of
dollars annually to government relations. The Heritage Foundation’s
success in extending its tentacles deep inside the corridors and conference
rooms on Capitol Hill, the executive branch, and the bureaucracy sent a
clear signal to other policy institutes that much could be gained by building
an extensive and expanding network throughout government. As noted,
Heritage accomplishes this through several channels that go well beyond
simply providing policy-makers with a full range of their publications: they
rely on liaison offices with both houses of Congress to more closely
monitor issues that are on the legislative agenda; maintain a database
similar to an online dating site that matches job vacancies in government
with suitable young Conservatives looking to start their careers in the
nation’s capital; host seminars and workshops for newly elected members
of Congress; invite seasoned politicians to participate in their conferences;
and provide accommodations for their staff to serve on presidential
campaigns.
Several of the strategies Heritage employs have been adopted by other
think tanks in the United States, in Canada, albeit to a lesser extent, and
around the globe. Even the Brookings Institution, the iconic think tank that
continues to be revered in the academic community, occasionally holds
focus groups on Capitol Hill with congressional staffers to find out if the
research it produces is well-received. Brookings, like manufacturers of
brand-name cereals, has a vested interest in making sure it is satisfying
consumer demands.
From the vantage point of think tanks, it would be illogical, not to
mention counterproductive, to avoid targeting policy-makers. After all, with
the public’s endorsement, they are entrusted with the responsibility to
implement public policy, so why wouldn’t think tanks devote the time,
energy, and resources (assuming they are available) to ensure that their
voices are heard. While think tanks clearly see policy-makers through their
view-finders, policy-makers, interestingly enough, are looking directly back
at them. As elected officials and aspiring office-holders have come to learn,
policy experts at think tanks can prove to be enormously helpful on the
campaign trail and once they have been elected or re-elected to office.
Yet, to maintain their independence and status as registered charities, it
is important for think tanks not to align themselves too closely with
political parties. Of course, there are exceptions in Canada14 and in the
United States, and in countries like Germany, where some think tanks
receive funding from the state to serve the needs of political parties.15
However, unlike in Germany, the majority of think tanks in Canada and the
United States do not want to be perceived as mere appendages of political
parties. This is not to suggest that policy experts from think tanks avoid
interacting with party members. As discussed, as part of a broad-based and
multi-tiered strategy, think tanks provide elected officials with a steady dose
of policy advice. While this channel affords think tanks valuable
opportunities to strengthen their ties to policy-makers, these interactions are
often mutually beneficial. Not only can policy-makers benefit from the
expertise that is being offered, both officeholders and those aspiring to
replace them can tap into much larger constituencies and networks think
tanks have developed over time. Think tanks and the interest groups and
other civil society organizations with whom they associate can, among
other things, help mobilize voters to support, or oppose, particular policy
initiatives. Such was the case when the N D P government of Premier Bob
Rae enlisted the help of several think tanks, including the Canadian Centre
for Policy Alternatives, to galvanize Ontario’s opposition to N A F TA.16
For both incumbents and challengers, there are other advantages to
maintaining close ties to think tanks. As we observed in chapter 7, during
the last several US presidential elections, dozens of policy experts from
some of the country’s most prominent think tanks have played a critically
important role in advising candidates. But even when experts from think
tanks have not taken a leave of absence from their employer to work on
presidential campaigns, candidates from both parties have been able to rely
on think tanks to help assess the public’s reaction to various policy
proposals. It goes without saying that on the campaign trail, presidential and
congressional candidates can ill-afford to be linked to highly unpopular
programs or initiatives. Therefore, rather than risk jumping into unfamiliar
waters with both feet, candidates can sit back and watch think tanks test
policy ideas with voters. It doesn’t cost their campaign valuable resources,
and, based on the public’s reaction to the ideas marketed by think tanks,
they can make strategic decisions about which issues to embrace and to
avoid.
In these and other ways, think tanks can wittingly or unwittingly be a
strategic asset for policy-makers. But as noted previously, they also provide
policy-makers with a currency even more valuable than solicited or
unsolicited advice: credibility and respectability. Although the golden age
of think tanks during the progressive era, when policy institutes assigned
the highest priority to helping government think its way through complex
policy problems, has long passed, think tanks have still managed to
preserve an element of credibility and respectability with the public.
Realizing this, policy-makers often turn to them or seek their endorsement
to garner more traction and support with the electorate. Yet, as important as
policy-makers are to think tanks and think tanks to policy-makers, neither
could function without the support and confidence of the public, a second
key stakeholder to which we will now turn.
The Public
In the US mid-term elections on 5 November 2014, a meagre 36.4 per cent
of eligible voters cast a ballot for their preferred congressional candidates.
Two years later, 59.7 per cent of eligible voters turned out for the US
presidential election that saw Donald Trump defeat Hillary Clinton to
become the 45th president of the United States. In Canada, voter turnout in
some recent provincial and federal elections was higher – 52.1 per cent in
Ontario in 2014, and 68.49 per cent in the 2015 federal election. However,
when half to two-thirds of the voting public neglects to exercise their
democratic right to vote, how invested is the electorate in issues as
important as health care, education, taxation, pensions, and peace and
security? And if they are apathetic about the various initiatives policy-
makers undertake, why should think tanks concern themselves with what
the public cares or doesn’t care about? Why should think tanks be more
committed to shaping public policy than the individuals who will be
directly affected by it?
While there is no doubt that growing public apathy has become a
widespread phenomenon,17 it has not discouraged think tanks from trying to
engage the public in a dialogue over a myriad of policy issues. For think
tanks, it is not about trying to reach half or more of the population that pays
little to no attention to current affairs. It is about creating a conversation
with the millions of people who do. And if think tanks are able to hit a
nerve with the attentive public as they probe more deeply into the costs and
benefits of embracing health care reform, or the advantages of introducing
significant changes to how personal income is taxed, their efforts could be
handsomely rewarded. To alter the political climate in ways that will
advance both their institutional and ideological interests, as well as those
shared by their corporate and philanthropic donors, think tanks need to tap
into a wellspring of public support. Once the public is prepared to weigh in,
or alternatively, to agree, it is only a matter of time before elected officials
act accordingly. Such was the case following the events of 9/11 when the
US Congress, at the urging of the Bush administration, voted the
controversial Patriot Act into law. Playing on heightened fears and growing
anxiety among the American public, policy-makers, with the
encouragement and blessing of several conservative think tanks, elected to
suspend civil liberties in pursuit of the war on terror. As intelligence and
security services were granted more extensive powers to monitor, wire-tap
and surveil, most Americans sat idly by and watched the government curtail
their freedoms, a mistake Canadians tried to avoid when the Harper
government passed its anti-terrorism legislation, Bill C-51, into law in the
summer of 2015.18 The Trudeau government has proposed amendments to
this bill.
The decision of the Bush administration to ramp up its fight against
terror was seen as a victory by the Project for the New American Century
(PNAC), A E I, the Heritage Foundation, and other think tanks inside the
Beltway who were calling upon policy-makers to send a clear message to
America’s adversaries.19 But think tanks were not satisfied with winning
periodic battles. Their goal was to once again claim victory in the war of
ideas, something Heritage and the conservative movement celebrated as
America moved further to the right during the Reagan-Bush years, and now
into the Trump years.20
The importance of making a long-term investment in shoring up public
support for their policy initiatives has not been lost on Canadian policy
institutes. As noted, both the Broadbent Institute and the Manning Centre
understand all too well how critical it is to train future generations of policy
experts and policy entrepreneurs to involve the public in ongoing
discussions about the future direction of the country. In doing so, think
tanks realize that they cannot just focus on supplying ideas, but must
assemble sizeable and vocal constituencies that will lend their voice and
support to the proposals they hope to advance. But to do this, think tanks
must introduce and maintain effective ways of communicating with the
public.
As we have covered in previous chapters, think tanks rely on various
channels to communicate ideas to the public and to other target audiences.
In addition to maintaining websites that keep readers updated about their
research projects and publications, think tanks highlight upcoming
conferences and workshops, lectures, and any other new initiatives that may
be of interest to those who monitor their activities. Think tanks also rely
increasingly on social media to share their insights with select audiences,
and, of course, take advantage of the print, broadcast, and electronic media
to comment on various domestic and foreign policy issues. In short, think
tanks recognize the importance of making their work accessible to the
public. They also understand that when it comes to educating, informing,
and mobilizing the electorate, it makes little sense to bombard them with
reams of information they are unable or unwilling to process. The same can
be said of policy-makers, who, given increasing demands on their time,
simply cannot wade through the mountain of documents on their desks. If
the purpose of think tanks is to generate and disseminate ideas that will
influence public opinion and public policy, how can they ensure that the
material they circulate is being read? While think tanks can never be
entirely certain that their work is having the desired effect on their intended
target audiences, they can all but guarantee how to discourage potential
stakeholders from considering their findings. They must produce materials
in a form that is specifically tailored to meet the needs and interests of their
audiences. Otherwise, they will not make a positive impression on their
intended audience.
When it comes to communicating with the public, think tanks have to be
particularly sensitive: they need to strike an appropriate balance between
informing the citizenry without overwhelming them with extraneous
information. Achieving this balance is not always easy given the complex
nature of many policy issues. Nonetheless it is essential. Think tanks cannot
afford to alienate the public or, for that matter, any of their core
constituencies. Determining how best to communicate with people who
may know little about think tanks, but who wish to remain informed about
current affairs, remains a priority for most policy institutes. However, for
think tanks to gain notoriety, it is not imperative for the public to remember
who they are, or what they do. Indeed, a telephone survey asking a cross-
section of Canadians to list two or three think tanks in Canada would likely
not generate positive results. What is more important for think tanks is to
plant ideas in the minds of the electorate that may develop and grow over
time. If and when this happens, think tanks will not have to look to the
public to acknowledge the contribution they have made to generating
discussions about pressing policy issues. On their own and/or with the
assistance of the media, another key stakeholder with whom they target
regularly, think tanks will be more than willing to seek out the adulation
and recognition they so dearly covet from policy-makers, journalists,
academics, and donors.
The Media
At any given time on any given day, policy experts from think tanks may be
called upon to comment on breaking news stories. As journalists scrambled
to make sense of why a Malaysian commercial airliner was shot down over
the Ukraine, or why a lone gunman killed an unarmed Canadian soldier
guarding Canada’s National War Memorial and then went on a shooting
rampage in the Parliament Buildings, they knew that help was only a few
key strokes away. Within a matter of seconds, journalists could phone, text,
and/or email experts at any one of dozens of think tanks in North America
or around the world. And more often than not, experts at policy institutes
are only too willing to oblige.21 At some high-profile think tanks in the
United States, scholars need only walk down the hall to access their
institute’s television and radio stations from where they can speak to the
national and international media.22 As noted in chapter 4, some think tanks,
including Heritage and the Kansas Policy Institute, have created their own
news services to disseminate political commentaries. But even the majority
of policy experts at think tanks that do not have access to their own news
outlets or communication facilities can and do make their way regularly to
network news studios to be interviewed. Although disparagingly referred to
as “talking heads,” think tank experts perform a useful, and, at times,
valuable public function by making themselves available to the media.
However, even more important, in the process of building a stronger media
profile, experts are helping themselves and the institutes they represent
grow their stature in the policy-making community.
The creation of C N N and other twenty-four-hour news stations was a
windfall for both the media and for think tanks. With plenty of air time to
fill, the media welcomed policy experts from think tanks of all political
persuasions who could summarize and explain why viewers should pay
attention to unfolding political events at home and abroad. And with the
launching of various political talk shows on Fox News, P B S , B B C ,
C B C , T V O, and other television networks, the opportunities for think
tanks to gain access to the broadcast media multiplied exponentially. Think
tanks, and the domestic and foreign policy specialists they employ, required
little encouragement to strengthen their ties to the media. For years, policy
experts have contributed op-ed articles to hundreds of newspapers around
the globe, and, more recently, have started blogs on their employers’
websites. But to further enhance their exposure, think tank scholars take full
advantage of opportunities to either appear as guests on network newscasts,
or as participants in conferences and seminars that are broadcast or live-
streamed by their institute.23
Increasing media exposure is not only vital to think tanks as part of their
ongoing efforts to affect policy change; it is critically important for
attracting donor funding. To assess their policy impact, think tanks rely on
different performance indicators or metrics, including media hits, testimony
by staff before legislative committees, the total number of publications
downloaded from their website, citations in academic studies, and
government reports. In the absence of a bottom line that highlights losses or
gains, think tanks, as not-for-profit organizations, are under heightened
pressure by their boards of trustees and directors to evaluate their
effectiveness. Think tanks thus need to demonstrate how they have made a
difference. And since directors of think tanks have an incentive to equate
public visibility with policy influence, no other indicator seems to
preoccupy them more than how much media exposure they generate
compared with their competitors.24
Chatham House, also known as the Royal Institute of International
Affairs, is widely considered to be the leading think tank in the UK.
According to some indices, it ranks among the world’s best.25 Yet, despite
its sterling reputation and hefty coffers, the institute, housed in stately
quarters overlooking London’s St James’s Square, does not take its status or
financial future for granted. For several years, Chatham House has enlisted
the services of a media consultant to track its exposure in newspapers in
more than 190 countries. Several times a week, staff in charge of media
relations receive a detailed breakdown of how many times the institute
and/or one of its studies/scholars have been cited in what is now a massive
database. These data are carefully maintained and monitored. But as with
other high-profile think tanks around the globe, Chatham House does not
collect this information so it can pat itself on the back but to remind both
current and potential donors how far, and to what extent, its impact is felt.26
Directors of think tanks understand better than most that public
visibility, often measured by media exposure, is hardly indicative of how
much policy influence their organizations wield. But when funding dollars
are on the line, that is not the kind of confession they are inclined to make.
Rather than point to the innumerable variables that can influence public
opinion and the policy preferences and choices of elected officials, they try
to keep the message simple: the more exposure we generate, the more likely
it is that the public and policy-makers will listen, and the more they heed
our advice, the better the likelihood that through the studies and
commentaries we generate, the more we will be able to shape the political
climate and hence public policy. And then comes the pitch, “if you too are
concerned about the direction our country is moving in, you may want to
consider making a tax-deductible gift to …”
That think tanks have not fundamentally changed the narrative they have
so adeptly constructed around the importance of media exposure suggests
that their strategy is paying off. They are simply repeating a story that those
considering investing in them want to hear. Developing and growing a
profile that can enhance an institute’s power and influence is something
donors understand and appreciate. It makes sense, and, after all, it is how
many of them achieved personal and professional success. As we will
discuss below, donors do not need to be lectured about the intricacies of
domestic and foreign policy, or how difficult it is to compete in the
marketplace of ideas. They want to know what kinds of products think
tanks provide and if they are in a position to grow their market. Providing
evidence that the media are interested in what they have to say can and does
go a long way to help think tanks make claims of widespread influence.
The interest think tanks have in augmenting their media profile will only
continue to grow, as evidenced by the sizeable investments some well-
heeled institutes are making in their communications infrastructure. Indeed,
if more newspapers close over the next several years, due to dwindling
advertising revenues, it is entirely conceivable that some think tanks will
step in to fill the void. Since they are already in the business of providing
commentaries on current events, it might not be much of a stretch for think
tanks to provide readers with a daily dose of news around the globe. This
may entail providing news feeds from other media organizations, offering
commentaries on various events from their unique ideological perspective,
or even hosting panel discussions that would help to promote the policy
recommendations of their institute. Taking on a more active role as a media
outlet is clearly something the Fraser Institute and other think tanks are
considering.27 The union that has formed between think tanks and the
media has clearly served both of their needs. The media depend on
information, analysis of current affairs, and succinct commentaries, and
think tanks, for the reasons outlined above, are well-positioned and
equipped to meet their demands.
Donors
The Montreal-based Institute for Research on Public Policy (I R P P), C I G I,

the Brookings Institution, the Hoover Institution, and a handful of other
well-financed think tanks on both sides of the border have the luxury of
drawing on interest generated from an endowment to help defray the costs
of running their institutes.28 Still, for most think tanks that do not have the
security of endowments, there is no alternative but to compete for donor
funding. The United States has several philanthropic foundations, including
the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations, that have donated billions
of dollars to support America’s leading think tanks. And with strong
support from the corporate sector and affluent private donors, top-tier US
think tanks enjoy multimillion-dollar budgets. However, the vast majority
of think tanks in the United States and Canada have annual budgets
hovering between $1 and $3 million. To just remain afloat, they must scrape
together sufficient funds. To avoid the fate of the North-South Institute,
think tanks must develop and maintain a diverse funding base.
Without strong donor support, it is unlikely, indeed improbable, that
healthy populations of think tanks would have emerged in the United States
and Europe over the past few decades. Think tanks need money, and
fortunately they have been able to attract the funding they require to make
their presence felt. But why, with so many causes to fund, from medical
research to enhancing the quality of inner city schools, have donors
invested so much and so often in the work of public policy institutes? One
possible explanation is that donors, like the think tanks they fund, are
committed to helping policy-makers make more informed decisions about
public policy. What better way to do this than to support organizations that
are well-equipped and positioned to exchange ideas with elected officials in
the hope of bringing about more enlightened domestic and foreign policies?
On the surface, this makes perfect sense. After all, philanthropy is about
helping others, so why not use private funds to serve the public interest?
Unfortunately, it is not that simple.
Whether they are providing funds to health care facilities, schools, think
tanks, or other not-for-profit organizations, donors are astute investors
looking to make solid investments. They may decide to allocate funds for
more hospital beds and MR I S or state-of-the-art computers in digital labs.
Donations might also be made to renovate conference rooms, build
libraries, and possibly to construct entirely new buildings. Still, when
donors make large gifts to think tanks, they are expecting far more in return
than a charitable tax receipt and a plaque acknowledging their contribution.
They are investing in institutions that straddle the academic and policy-
making worlds, that have the wherewithal and political connections to
shape the political climate for a long period of time. By supporting
organizations that can alter the very complexion of the political landscape,
as the Heritage Foundation and other conservative think tanks have done,
donors can amass a currency far more valuable than money – political
influence. As Inderjeet Parmar, an expert on think tanks and philanthropic
foundations, has observed, donors are intent on creating and sustaining an
extensive network of scholars and organizations that can promote and
nurture their vision of the world, a world in which they can continue to reap
enormous political and economic rewards.29 They are certainly not
investing in those who are intent on dismantling the society they have tried
to build. If Parmar is correct, and I have every confidence he is, we need to
consider what, if any, influence and control donors have over the kind of
research findings disseminated by think tanks, the main weapon they
employ in the war of ideas.
As mentioned, following the publication of a New York Times article in
the fall of 2014 by investigative reporter Brooke Williams and her
colleagues which claimed that in exchange for large donations to several
prominent US think tanks, including the Brookings Institution, foreign
governments expected donor recipients to lobby on their behalf,30 former
Brookings president Strobe Talbott wasted little time clarifying the
relationship between donors and scholars at his institution. He stated
unequivocally that donors have no say in what or how Brookings scholars
undertake research. Brookings is, as its president pointed out, an
independent think tank that produces independent research.31 Talbott’s
forceful denunciation of the New York Times exposé was predictable. After
all, the Brookings president could hardly remain silent when one of the
leading newspapers on the planet had given such extensive coverage to the
relationship between think tanks and donors. Perhaps he could have ignored
the story if it had been buried in the National Enquirer, but this was not the
case. And, in all fairness, what else could he have said? That with each
cheque donors make payable to Brookings, they should expect the
institution to do whatever it can to ensure their policy preferences are well
received by policy-makers? From his vantage point, the only recourse was
to do and say what he did.
Without being privy to Talbott’s innermost thoughts and to the
conversations in which he took part with donors and key personnel, we can
only speculate on the role donors play in shaping the research agenda of his
institute. Indeed, they may play no role at all, but we can never know for
sure. The same can be said of what latitude, if any, donors are granted in
providing input on the research projects at other think tanks. Nonetheless, in
light of the increased importance think tanks, including Brookings, have
assigned to political advocacy, the relationship that policy institutes have
forged with donors cannot and should not be overlooked. We may not be
able to eavesdrop on what is said between donors, think tank presidents,
and their fundraisers behind closed doors, but we do know this: donors are
not in the habit of continuing to invest in people and projects that don’t pay
off. The A E I learned this painful lesson when, in the mid-1970s, several
conservative foundations decided to withdraw their funding, leaving the
institute on the verge of bankruptcy.32 As the competition for funding
increases,33 we also know that think tanks have an incentive to keep donors
satisfied. Some think tanks may be able to do this by producing high-quality
independent research that is reaching its intended audiences and having a
discernible impact on the political climate. This should help keep donors at
arm’s length. Others, however, may have to be more accommodating of
those who fund them. In the process, they may be required to compromise
their autonomy.
The Academy
Policy experts who conduct research at think tanks are intimately familiar
with the academic community. Not only have they received advanced
degrees from some of the most prestigious universities in North America
and Europe, but many of them have held, or continue to hold, joint
appointments in the academy. Others, perhaps to keep a foot in the
academic world, or simply to pursue their true passion, offer university-
level courses on a part-time or sessional basis. But the links between think
tanks and universities does not end there. In their capacity as coordinators
of, and/or participants in, various think tank research projects, policy
experts often rely on university faculty to contribute to their studies. As
previously mentioned, I R P P and C.D. Howe, among others, contract out
much of their research to faculty across the country. Academics may be
asked to provide a chapter for an edited collection or an article for a journal
or opinion magazine, participate in a seminar, workshop, or conference, or
even be invited to become an adjunct or non-resident fellow at a think tank.
Furthermore, some faculty may, as noted, decide to spend part, or all, of
their sabbatical at a prestigious policy institute.
Scholars who study think tanks need not peer through a crystal ball to
figure out why policy institutes have a vested interest in establishing and
strengthening ties to the academic community. Indeed, just as policy-
makers turn to think tanks in the hope that some of the credibility policy
institutes enjoy will rub off on them, think tanks look to universities and to
many of their more accomplished scholars to help bolster their stature in the
policy-making community. In a similar vein, universities, to create the
impression that the work they undertake is of direct relevance to the public
and to policy-makers and therefore deserving of increased (not lower)
government funding, have demonstrated a growing interest in think tanks
and in the many marketing strategies they employ to enhance their
visibility. At times, this has resulted in the creation of well-funded think
tanks on university campuses such as C I G I, an organization made possible
through significant private and public funding. Other times, universities
have simply provided modest funding to support research centres and
institutes that, at least on paper, may go some way to augment their public
profile.
Thus far, we have identified four of the key stakeholders with whom
think tanks interact, and if I gave the impression that policy institutes make
a concerted effort to reach out to these constituencies in order to advance
their core institutional interests, then I have accomplished what I set out to
do in this chapter. To become even more entrenched in the policy-making
community, think tanks need to build alliances, and they have done this
with varying degrees of success with policy-makers, the public, donors, and
the academic community. Yet, in recent years we have discovered that think
tanks have cast their net even wider by becoming more integrated in social
movements, policy networks, and other fora that give even more
momentum and traction to the policy ideas they are attempting to
advance.34
N G O s, T H I N K TA N K S , A N D F E L L O W
T R AV E L L E R S
Think tanks have a vested interest in protecting their intellectual turf and
retaining whatever strategic advantage they enjoy over competitors. But as
we discussed in the previous chapter, think tanks are also creatures of habit
and remain committed to pursuing their goal to influence both the content
and direction of public policy. To this end, they have established relations
with domestic and foreign think tanks, interest groups, religious institutions,
and a smattering of other NGOs who share a commitment to shaping the
political discourse around a myriad of policy issues.
Building and expanding networks that comprise these and other
organizations can, as several think tanks in Canada and the United States
have discovered, help create the momentum they need to compel policy-
makers to rethink how they intend to approach pressing domestic and
foreign policy challenges. The cliché that there is strength in numbers is
particularly appropriate when it comes to generating support for, or
opposition to, government policies, and rarely do organizations engaged in
civil society or in various social movements miss an opportunity to make
their voices heard.
As part of these and other social and political movements, think tanks
are often regarded as centres of intellectual innovation that can provide
leadership and guidance in helping to frame the parameters of key policy
debates. And with the assistance of interest groups and advocacy coalitions,
they can play an important role in informing the public about the costs and
benefits associated with various issues dominating the country’s political
agenda. For think tanks and the many organizations with whom they
cooperate, the advantages of participating in common endeavours far
outweigh the drawbacks. By contributing their insights into how to navigate
the policy-making process and build coalitions that will lend strength to
their efforts, think tanks, interest groups, and other NGOs might be able to
achieve together what they could not possibly have achieved on their own.
In the end, each of the key participants may take credit for swaying public
opinion and public policy, but that is to be expected. For those engaged in
these networks, what matters even more is attaining results that they can
parlay into additional donor support.
Think tanks have not selected the various stakeholders they target by
accident. In their own way, each serves a particular purpose. Policy-makers,
donors, academics, N G Os, the public, and the media represent different
pieces of a puzzle that need to fit together to help think tanks achieve their
desired goals. On the surface, the pattern of cooperation and interaction
described in this chapter may suggest that a conspiracy is afoot. However, it
may be more accurate to interpret it as a well-conceived and multi-layered
strategy employed by think tanks to enhance their visibility and project their
influence in the policy-making community.
Think tanks often interact with similar stakeholders to affect policy
change, but they do not necessarily engage them in the same way or to the
same extent. Depending on the policy issue under consideration, think tanks
must make strategic decisions as to how best to move public policy and
public opinion in a direction that satisfies their institutional interests and
those of their donors. But the first decision they must make is whether the
policy issue in play is one in which they feel compelled to invest. This
decision can be influenced by various considerations, including how much
expertise they have on the subject (which speaks to their credibility), the
resources they can afford to inject into it, and whether this particular policy
concern, relative to the other issues they are exploring, will help augment
the profile and stature of their organization.
In the case of Keystone X L, a handful of think tanks in Canada and the
US deemed this issue sufficiently important to make their presence felt, and
pursued various strategies to ensure their voices were heard. Given their
location, mandate, and research focus, it is not surprising that four think
tanks with Alberta addresses – the Canada West Foundation, the Fraser
Institute (one of its regional offices is in Calgary), the Parkland Institute,
and the Pembina Institute – played an active role in the pipeline debate.
Given its interests in the impact of trade on the environment, it was also
predictable that the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives would not
remain on the sidelines while this hotly contested initiative was being
explored. Similarly, in the United States, several well-known fixtures in the
think tank community, with varying degrees of expertise in domestic and
foreign policy, engaged key stakeholders in an effort to shape the discourse
around Keystone X L. As noted, they included: the Cato Institute, the
Council on Foreign Relations, the Bipartisan Policy Center, the Center for
American Progress, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute. A brief
background on each of these organizations, and the stance each adopted and
advanced on the proposed construction of the pipeline is provided below.
T H E P L AY E R S – C A N A D A
The Canada West Foundation
With a mandate to promote the economic, political, and social interests of

the four western provinces, the Calgary-based Canada West Foundation
could hardly be expected to remain silent when TransCanada Corp
proposed extending the Keystone pipeline from Alberta to refineries along
the US Gulf Coast. Indeed, it did not take long for the C WF to issue a
warning to the entire country that stalling the construction of the pipeline
would cost Canada dearly. In a report commissioned by the Saskatchewan
government, Dylan Jones, then C E O of C WF stated, “The loss to the
Canadian economy will be devastating if we don’t dramatically expand our
pipeline capacity to multiple markets.”35 Michael Holden, author of the
report and formerly the foundation’s senior economist added, “If pipeline
projects such as Trans Mountain, Keystone X L and Northern Gateway
don’t move forward, Canada will be foregoing $1.3 trillion in economic
output, 7.4 million person-years of employment and $281 billion in tax
revenue between now and 2035.”36 The C WF has continued to follow and
engage in discussions around Keystone X L and other energy-related
projects, and has collaborated with scholars at the University of Ottawa to
identify local opposition to various energy projects. Its current president,
Martha Hall Findlay, supports the pipeline.37
The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (C C PA )
Few think tanks in Canada have played a more important role in raising
awareness about the environmental impact of N A F TA than the C C PA.38
The organization’s concerns with how increased trade can and often does
lead to a downward harmonization of both environmental and labour
standards continues to strike a responsive chord with experts at the
organization. Not surprisingly, the proposed construction of Keystone X L
has come under close scrutiny at the C C PA. In addition to highlighting
how the pipeline extension could affect climate change, the C C PA has
publicly challenged reports promoting the economic benefits of Keystone.
It has also brought attention to the impact of the pipeline on First Nations
fishing and hunting rights.
Based in Ottawa with regional offices in several provinces, C C PA has
been a major presence in the Canadian think tank community for decades.
Often partnering with other think tanks and NGOs to affect policy change,
C C PA, as we will discuss in the next section, relies on several channels to
convey its ideas. In the case of Keystone X L, it has taken a very strong
position against its construction.
The Fraser Institute
The free-market-oriented think tank, which has been discussed in some

detail in this book, has not been shy in confronting Keystone’s critics. In
several of its publications, analysts at Fraser challenged the Obama
administration’s concerns about how Keystone could affect greenhouse gas
emissions. They also argued that carrying oil through pipelines, despite
recent oil spills in Alberta, may be a safer mode of transportation than
relying on rail. Experts at Fraser have also suggested that, contrary to some
reports, pipelines are “safer, cheaper and greener.”39 Consistent with its
founding principles, the Fraser Institute, while recognizing some challenges
posed by the pipeline’s construction, remains a strong and vocal advocate.
The Parkland Institute

Located in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Alberta, with a second
office in Calgary, “Alberta’s left-leaning” Parkland Institute, as its critics
often label it, “studies economic, social, cultural and political issues facing
Albertans and Canadians using the perspective of political economy.”40
According to its 2008 “Self-Study,” Parkland’s values “include being open,
critical, innovative, transformative, and solutions oriented.”41 In addition to
its many research studies on health care, environmental sustainability, and
energy, the Parkland Institute has relied on several other channels to
communicate its findings and policy recommendations to multiple
audiences. The Institute hosts several workshops and conferences
throughout the year and its staff and research fellows regularly interact with
the media. Although the Parkland Institute may not enjoy the same level of
public visibility and notoriety as the Fraser Institute, the C.D. Howe
Institute, and other public policy research organizations, it occupies an
important position on the Canadian think tank landscape.
Unlike the C WF, scholars at Parkland have been outspoken critics of
Keystone X L and have released several publications, including one co-
authored with the C C PA, that question whether the pipeline would bring
significant economic benefits to the West and to the rest of Canada, or
would, in fact, send Canadian jobs to the US. Some scholars affiliated with
Parkland, including Gordon Laxer, a well-known political economist, have
gone so far as to work with the Alberta Federation of Labour to file a
motion with the National Energy Board to delay construction of the
pipeline.
The Pembina Institute
The Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development was incorporated in

1985 in response to a “major sour gas well” blowout near Lodgepole,
Alberta on 17 October 1982. For nearly two months, the Amoco Canada
well “spewed 200 million cubic feet per day of deadly hydrogen sulfide gas
– or poisonous sulphur dioxide when it was on fire – along with toxic
condensates.”42 According to the Pembina Institute, “the emergency
response by the company and government was completely inadequate,
characterized by the denial of responsibility, downplaying of human health
and environmental impacts, and failure to protect the community. As a
result, more than 200 residents joined together to form the Pembina Area
Sour Gas Exposures Committee.”43
In response to intense media exposure and growing public concern, the
group was able to help launch a public inquiry into the Lodgepole blowout.
The result was that many of the recommendations made by the group to
prevent similar catastrophes were adopted. It was from this experience that
a handful of individuals, including Rob Macintosh and Wally Heinrichs,
decided to establish and incorporate the Pembina Institute.44 The mission of
the Institute is “to advance clean energy solutions through innovative
research, education, consulting and advocacy.” To this end, “it envisions a
world in which our immediate and future needs are met in a manner that
protects the earth’s living systems; ensures clean air, land and water;
prevents dangerous climate change; and provides for a safe and just global
community.”45 Headquartered in Calgary with four branch offices, the
Pembina Institute focuses on six main policy areas, including energy
efficiency, liquefied natural gas, and the oil sands. Since its creation, it has
released an impressive array of publications and media commentaries.
Pembina has remained a strong and vocal critic of the Keystone X L
pipeline. Among other things, the institute is concerned that the extension
would lead to a significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions,
threatening Canada’s ability to reach its 2020 emissions target reductions.
As Pembina states in one of its blogs, “Until strong enough policies are in
place to ensure that the cumulative impacts of current and future oilsands
production remain below science-based limits, we see approving
transportation infrastructure that enables expanded oilsands production as
the wrong choice.”
T H E P L AY E R S – U N I T E D S TAT E S
When it comes to issues involving Canada, it is often difficult to grab the

attention of policy-makers in Washington, D C, unless of course the country
finds itself at the centre of a political storm. Such was the case when
Donald Trump lambasted several trade agreements during the 2016 US
presidential election, including the N A F TA, and the Softwood Lumber
Agreement, which he felt privileged Canada at the expense of the US. It is
also unusual for policy wonks outside the formal institutions of government
to take an active interest in Canada and the various social, political, and
economic issues affecting Canadians. Indeed, with the exception of a
handful of think tanks such as the Hudson Institute, the Brookings
Institution, the Canada Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center for
International Scholars, and C S I S, America’s leading policy institutes have
devoted little research to the study of Canada at. However, in the case of
Keystone X L, a project that would directly affect the US, a number of
American think tanks took it upon themselves to stake out positions. The
think tanks that appear to be most active in policy discussions surrounding
Keystone are referenced briefly below.
The Bipartisan Policy Center
Founded in 2007 by Bob Dole, George Mitchell, Tom Daschle, and Howard
Baker, the Washington, D C-based Bipartisan Policy Center conducts
research in nine major policy areas, including national security,
immigration, finance, governance, health, infrastructure, and energy. Its
current budget is approximately $25 million. The Bipartisan Policy Center
has embraced an interesting approach to Keystone. At times, it has focused
more on the efforts of Democrats and Republicans to come together on this
issue, an approach consistent with, and encouraged by, the Center’s
mandate; at other times, it has extolled the virtues of both Keystone and the
oil and gas industry, which has called into question its supposed bipartisan
position.46
The Cato Institute
Widely regarded as a libertarian think tank that has enjoyed strong financial
support from the Koch brothers, scholars from Cato have been very active
in discussions around Keystone. A more detailed description of the institute
can be found in Appendix 1. Generally supportive of the initiative, Cato
was critical of the Obama administration’s handling of the issue, and has
aggressively challenged environmental groups and other critics who
maintain that the extension to the pipeline will generate a significant
increase in greenhouse gas emissions.
The Center for American Progress
As noted in chapter 6, the Center for American Progress (C A P) was

established in 1993 to serve as a counterweight to the Heritage Foundation,
much like Heritage was created as a counterweight to the Brookings
Institution. The C A P has remained largely supportive of President
Obama’s domestic and foreign policy initiatives, including his decision to
veto the construction of Keystone X L.47 Analysts have been very vocal in
their support for this position, citing environmental concerns as well as the
impact Keystone could have on Indigenous people.
The Council on Foreign Relations
Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations, one of America’s most

distinguished think tanks, have commented extensively on Keystone, and
have, overall, maintained a measured, though at times critical stance on the
role played by President Obama and the US State Department in delaying,
and eventually vetoing, the permit required for TransCanada Corp to build
the pipeline. Commentaries, blogs, studies, and testimonies are among the
many outlets the C F R has tapped to convey their views about this ongoing
project.
The Competitive Enterprise Institute
Established in 1984 by Fred L. Smith Jr, the Washington, D C-based think

tank, with approximately $7.5 million in revenue, is dedicated to the
protection of free markets and limited government. The C E I has been one
of the most vocal advocates of Keystone X L, an endeavour consistent with
the institute’s desire to promote free market-environmentalism. Not
surprisingly, the C E I also remains staunchly opposed to the Paris Climate
Agreement and supports President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the
treaty.
S H A P I N G T H E P O L I T I C A L C L I MAT E : T H I N K
TA N K S A N D K E Y S TO N E X L
When it comes to assessing the impact of think tanks on public opinion and
public policy, it is important to consider several factors, including the
desired goals and objectives of policy institutes with respect to particular
issues, their level or degree of engagement, and the extent to which they
were able to achieve a preferred outcome. Although think tanks often assign
different priorities to, and invest varying degrees of resources in affecting
the content and direction of various policy initiatives, it is nonetheless
possible to provide some preliminary observations about their involvement
in policy discussions surrounding Keystone. As noted, if think tanks in
Canada and in the United States set out to change Prime Minister Harper’s
and President Obama’s minds on Keystone X L, their efforts were in vain.
From the time the idea of constructing the transboundary pipeline made its
way onto the bilateral political agenda, both leaders had carved out a
position, one that remained intact throughout their respective terms in
office. Similarly, both Justin Trudeau and Donald Trump have maintained
consistent messaging around Keystone since assuming power. But what if
altering the policy preferences and choices of successive prime ministers
and presidents was not the ultimate goal of the various think tanks engaged
in discussions involving Keystone? Indeed, what if their goal was to simply
increase public awareness about the benefits and drawbacks of the pipeline,
or to ensure that different stakeholders made their presence felt on this
issue? Judged by these goals or objectives, several think tanks could claim
victory.
Armed with both a nuanced and sophisticated knowledge of the policy-
making process and an acute understanding of what it takes to compete
successfully in the marketplace of ideas, think tanks are in the business of
thinking strategically about how to make an impact. In the case of
Keystone, the strategy think tanks embraced appeared to be less about
bringing direct pressure to bear on the political leadership of both countries
than mobilizing public support for, or opposition to, the construction of the
pipeline. Recognizing that Harper and Obama were unlikely to change their
stance on Keystone, think tanks had to ascertain the most expedient ways to
endorse or undermine the respective positions advanced by the two
governments. As they had in the past, think tanks placed considerable stock
in framing the parameters around Keystone, highlighting how the pipeline
would or would not result in significant economic benefits, and/or how it
could undermine the environment and encroach upon the rights of
Indigenous peoples.
On both sides of the border, think tanks relied on several channels to
inform and educate the public and other stakeholders about Keystone X L.
They published op-ed pieces in various newspapers, appeared before
legislative committees, released a steady stream of analyses and reports,
organized conferences, and networked with other think tanks and NGOs, all
in an effort to bring greater attention to this controversial initiative. While
some think tanks, such as the Cato Institute, the Council on Foreign
Relations, the Bipartisan Policy Center, the Fraser Institute, and Parkland,
may have generated more public exposure than others (see Appendix 7),
their goal remained the same – to raise awareness about the pipeline by
engaging the public, the private sector, and other interested parties. In short,
in the case of Keystone, think tanks did what they were supposed to do.
However, this rather simple observation remains problematic both for think
tank directors and presidents, who are accountable to their boards of
directors and donors, and for scholars, who continue to struggle with the
most appropriate way to assess their influence.
It is not enough to maintain that think tanks routinely perform their
assigned duties; those who represent think tanks in leadership positions are,
as noted, under increased pressure to demonstrate how the work their
institutes have undertaken has made a difference, whether in shaping actual
policy decisions or legislation, or by informing broader public discussions
around particular policies. This explains why think tanks closely monitor
various performance indicators or metrics such as media exposure and
legislative testimony, data that scholars who study think tanks continue to
view with suspicion. So where does this leave us with respect to evaluating
the impact of think tanks on the Keystone X L debate? On the one hand, we
can compile metrics such as those included in Appendix 7, which reveal,
over a specific period of time, how often a select group of US think tanks
testified before Congress and were cited by various media outlets. Some
preliminary data on the media exposure a small group of Canadian think
tanks generated in relation to Keystone X L, which is included in the same
appendix, might also be helpful in this regard. We could also expand this
database by looking at how often interest groups or other N G Os concerned
about the proposed pipeline were mentioned by different media sources,
and whether some of their staff appeared before legislative committees. Yet,
in the final analysis, we will likely end up where we started, desperately
trying, albeit with little success, to establish a correlation between public
exposure and policy relevance.
But why is it so difficult to assess the influence of think tanks and other
N G Os, especially when we are aware of the activities in which they are
involved? We know, for example, that on 7 May 2013, Paul C. “Chip”
Knappenberger, assistant director of the Center for the Study of Science at
the Cato Institute, presented prepared remarks to the US House of
Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Subcommittee on Energy and Subcommittee on the Environment.48 His
comments focused primarily on the scientific and environmental issues
around Keystone X L. Similarly, we are aware that on 26 March 2014 and
on several other occasions, Michael A. Levi of the Council on Foreign
Relations testified before various congressional committees on topics
related to energy and the environment. But even if a complete list of experts
from think tanks who were invited to testify before Congress was provided,
scholars would still be left wondering whether the comments made by these
and other policy experts left a lasting impression or even resonated with
committee members. Although it would be helpful to scholars if committee
members were required to fill out questionnaires indicating how useful or
instructive they found the presentations made before them, such an
undertaking would likely produce mixed results: for a variety of reasons,
some committee members might find the comments informative and worthy
of consideration, while others may be less than flattering in their
assessment. Moreover, unless access to each committee member was
granted though interviews or surveys, we could only speculate about the
extent to which the remarks they heard altered their position on a particular
issue. And even if a member found him- or herself swayed, an important
question remains: what overall impression was the subcommittee or full
committee left with, and what actions, if any, did they take as a result? The
fact that an expert from a think tank testified before a congressional
committee or subcommittee does not in and of itself mean that he or she
was able to exercise influence. The same can be said for commentaries
written by think tank scholars that appear in electronic and print newspapers
and magazines, the remarks they make on television or in blogs, or books
they have penned that make their way onto the desks or bookshelves of
elected officials and/or their staff.
CONCLUSION
To better understand how and to what extent think tanks have or have not
had an impact on shaping specific policy decisions or in affecting the
policy-making environment, it is critically important, as this study has
argued, to isolate their involvement at different stages of the policy cycle.
The fact that some think tanks were active during the issue articulation
phase of the policy-making process when the parameters around Keystone
X L were being framed does not mean that they were as engaged when, for
instance, US State Department officials were weighing the costs and
benefits of approving a permit for the pipeline’s construction. To more
effectively determine the extent to which specific think tanks left a mark on
Keystone, scholars must peel back multiple layers of the policy-making to
expose what actually took place. Unfortunately, this becomes a difficult
exercise, especially when issues such as Keystone are still in flux. A more
appropriate time to conduct this investigation is when the matter has finally
been resolved and scholars are able to determine what was said at meetings
or in correspondence between think tank analysts and key decision makers.
Of course, this assumes that material of this nature is made available for
review.49 An initial assessment, such as the one outlined in this chapter,
confirms that think tanks have pursued multiple strategies to ensure their
voices are heard. Although it is unlikely that any one policy institute will be
able to convince Canada and the United States to adopt a different posture
toward the pipeline, it does not mean that the investment that institutes have
made in informing the public and other stakeholders about Keystone will be
lost. On the contrary, as historians and political scientists have observed on
countless occasions, it often takes years, if not decades or centuries, for
ideas to gain traction. The inability of policy institutes to affect immediate
policy change should not be interpreted as a failure; rather, the seeds they
have planted in the minds of policy-makers, journalists, industrialists, and
the public should be viewed as opportunities for further discussion and
reflection. Viewed in this light, much of what think tanks have said and
done with respect to Keystone may resurface when pipeline projects in the
future are placed on the political agenda of Canada and the United States.
CHAPTER NINE
Conclusion:
The More Things Change … Policy Influence,
Policy Relevance, and the Future of Think Tanks
in Canada, the United States, and Beyond
Among the advantages of writing a third edition is that you are provided
with yet another opportunity to refine and clarify many of the observations
made in the first two versions. In theory, as time passes and your knowledge
of the subject matter increases, you should be able to shed further light on
your research findings. The third edition should thus be more informative
and instructive than the preceding ones. In an attempt to produce a more
enlightened understanding of think tanks and their role in the policy-making
process, I have updated and revised many sections of the book. But after
many months and countless revisions, I am left once again to ponder the
central question of the study: do think tanks matter? As in the first two
editions, I can only conclude that, after surveying the think tank population
in Canada and the United States and examining their involvement in the
policy-making process, there does not appear to be a simple answer.
Depending on whom the question is directed to, responses may range from
yes or no, to more than you can possibly imagine. In some respects all these
answers are accurate. Indeed, as this study has demonstrated, several
conclusions can be drawn regarding the role and significance of think tanks
in policy-making.
Notwithstanding the considerable differences in their political systems,
think tanks in the United States and Canada have often played an important
role in contributing to shaping the public dialogue and many continue to do
so. Through their publications, interviews with the media, their growing
reliance on social media, appearances before legislative committees, and
participation in conferences and seminars, think tanks have clearly made
their presence felt. Moreover, in both countries think tanks have relied on
less visible channels to convey their views to policy-makers. However,
largely due to differences in their political structures, think tanks in the
United States and Canada often attempt to exercise policy influence at
different times and at different stages of the policy cycle.
The highly decentralized and fragmented political system of the United
States, combined with its weak party system, helps explain why American
think tanks assign a high priority to sharing their ideas with members of
Congress. Since members of Congress are not constrained by party unity,
think tanks have an incentive to establish contact with as many Democrats,
Republicans, and independents as possible. The nature of the electoral cycle
in the United States, and the absence of party-based research institutes, also
helps to explain why think tanks regard presidential elections and the
transition periods that follow as opportune times to influence the policy
direction of government. By contrast, the presence of strong party unity in
Canada and the prime minister’s long-standing tradition of relying on the
Prime Minister’s Office, the Privy Council Office, and senior bureaucrats
for policy advice may account for why think tanks in Canada often rely on
different channels to reach policy-makers.
Differences in the institutional structures of the two countries may
explain why think tanks in the United States have more opportunities or
access points to influence policy-makers than think tanks in Canada.
However, they do not explain why some are far more effective at marketing
their message than others. Several factors, including their financial
resources, the number and quality of their staff, the strong connections
some think tank directors have to policy-makers, and their ability to convey
their ideas to multiple audiences may influence how much or how little
impact think tanks have.
The willingness of office-holders to embrace the ideas of certain think
tanks is also important in explaining why some enjoy tremendous visibility
while others languish in obscurity. As chapter 6 revealed, several
presidential candidates, particularly those regarded as Washington
outsiders, have helped to elevate the profile of several think tanks.
Similarly, in Canada, there have been periods when the visibility and
prominence of some think tanks has either been significantly enhanced or
greatly diminished. As chapter 7 demonstrated, at no other time have
Canadian think tanks generated as much public attention as during the
constitutional conferences in the winter of 1992. Ironically, less than two
weeks after the last constitutional conference organized by a think tank
ended, several other think tanks in the policy research community were
forced to close their doors.
While it is not difficult to observe where in the policy cycle think tanks
in the United States and Canada appear to be most active, determining how
influential they are at different stages of policy-making remains
problematic, since several methodological barriers must be overcome to do
so. One major barrier is how to measure policy influence, a subject that is
explored in considerable detail in my recent book, Northern Lights. Should
influence be measured by recording media citations, tracking the number of
website hits, monitoring appearances before legislative committees, the
number of publications, or the number of staff appointed to high-level
positions in the government? Or are there other tangible and intangible
indicators that should be considered? Do some indicators provide a more
accurate measurement of policy influence than others?
Although data on each indicator may provide insight into the amount of
exposure think tanks and their staff generate, they cannot confirm how
much or how little influence they have in shaping public opinion and the
preferences and choices of policy-makers. For instance, several think tanks
tally how often their organizations are referred to in the media and the
number of times their staff are called on to testify before legislative
committees. But what conclusions can be drawn from these data? Not
surprisingly, think tanks that register the most media citations and
appearances before committees conclude that they are the most influential.
Those studying these institutions must, however, be a bit more circumspect.
They should also be careful when considering global rankings of think
tanks, which are also highly problematic. Data on media citations may tell
us which institutes are effective at making the news, yet they tell us little
about whether their views have helped shape, reinforce, clarify, or change
the minds of policy-makers and the public. It cannot be assumed that
policy-makers or members of the general public are even familiar with what
certain think tanks have stated in the media. Similarly, when think tanks
testify before legislative committees, we cannot be certain that their
statements made a difference in how policy-makers approached particular
issues. At times their testimony may influence the views of some policy-
makers; at other times, however, their input may simply reinforce the views
of policy-makers or, as is often the case, experts from think tanks might
simply be ignored. Other indicators, such as the number of their
publications or how many of their staff receive high-level appointments,
may reveal even less about their influence in policy-making. It is thus
virtually impossible to assign a numerical value to the amount of influence
think tanks wield. We cannot, for instance, conclude that think tanks have
influence 20 per cent or 50 per cent of the time. We cannot even say for
certain how much impact specific think tanks have had at particular stages
of policy debates or whom exactly they have influenced. At best, by
assessing their involvement in specific policy areas, we can obtain a better
sense of how relevant or irrelevant they were.
In addition to considering how to measure policy influence or whether,
in fact, it can be measured at all, other obstacles must be overcome to
evaluate the impact of think tanks: for instance, determining how to isolate
the views of think tanks from dozens of other individuals and governmental
and non-governmental organizations that actively seek to influence public
policy. As the policy-making community becomes increasingly congested,
tracing the origin of an idea to a particular individual or organization creates
its own set of problems.
Examining the organizations and individuals who coalesce around
particular policy issues or who congregate at a certain stage in the policy
cycle can offer a useful point of departure for studying the interaction
between policy-makers and representatives of non-governmental
organizations in specific policy communities.1 In addition to identifying the
organizations and individuals most actively involved in discussing a
particular policy concern with government officials, interviews and surveys
can often be used to identify the views that generated the most attention
more clearly. Yet, unless policy-makers acknowledge that their policy
decisions were based primarily on recommendations from a particular
individual or organization or heavily influenced by them, something they
are rarely inclined to do, it is difficult to determine how much influence
participants in the policy process were able to wield.
Since it is unlikely that these and other methodological obstacles will be
overcome, it may be more appropriate to discuss the relevance of think
tanks in the policy-making process than to speculate about how much
policy influence they exercise. In other words, rather than trying to state
categorically on the basis of a handful of indicators that some think tanks
are more influential than others, it should be determined if, when, and under
what conditions they can and have contributed to specific public policy
discussions and to the broader policy-making environment. At the very
least, scholars studying these institutions should acknowledge that, given
their tremendous diversity, all think tanks do not possess the resources,
expertise, or desire to become embroiled in every policy debate. They
should also concede that think tanks assign different priorities to becoming
involved at different stages of the policy-making process. Thus, while some
think tanks may play an active role in discussing the implications of a
specific government policy with the media, others may be trying to convey
their views to policy-makers through less visible channels.
However, the organizations themselves will remain committed to relying
on the most effective ways to distinguish themselves in the policy-making
community. For some think tanks intent on convincing various stakeholders
that their ideas do matter, this will mean generating as much media
exposure as possible. For others, more subtle and less visible channels to
communicate their ideas to policy-makers will remain a preferred strategy.
This may help to explain why a select group of think tanks in Canada and in
the United States continue to enjoy a disproportionate amount of media
exposure, a subject to which we now turn.
TA K E T H R E E : T H I N K TA N K S AT WO R K
The patterns that were identified in think tank visibility in Canada and in
the United States before 2000 have, with few exceptions, remained the
same over the past several years. As discussed below, although more think
tanks have entered the marketplace of ideas, for the most part the same
institutions continue to attract the lion’s share of media attention and are the
ones most frequently called upon to testify before legislative committees.
The many new tables and charts in Appendices 3 to 7 make it possible for
readers to compare how much ground think tanks have made in raising their
public profile. While the data sets can be subjected to various statistical
tests, the findings on which think tanks attract the most public attention are
clear.
In Canada, the Fraser Institute, the Conference Board of Canada, and the
C.D. Howe Institute continue to generate the most visibility (see Appendix
4). During the period between 2009 and 2016, their scholars and
publications were cited more often on national radio (C B C), on television
(C B C and C T V), and in newspapers than most of their competitors.
Indeed, with the exception of the Canada West Foundation, the Pembina
Institute, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, and I R P P, the
remaining think tanks included in this study have very modest public
profiles. As indicated in Appendix 4, Table A4.1.1, which tracks the
percentage of total media exposure of Canadian think tanks, the Fraser
Institute (18 per cent), the Conference Board of Canada (17 per cent), and
C.D. Howe (14 per cent) account for just under half the media exposure (49
per cent) paid to think tanks in the country. Interestingly, the Pembina
Institute, which attracted 7 per cent of total media exposure, surpassed C.D.
Howe in combined television exposure (C B C and C T V) and immediately
followed the top-ranked Fraser Institute in the number of references made
to it on selected C B C national radio programs. In table A4.1.1 in the ten
Canadian newspapers for which data on think tank references were
obtained, Fraser ranked first with 5,904 references, followed closely by the
Conference Board (5,586), C.D. Howe (4,736), Canada West (3,870), and
Pembina (2,213). Similar results were found in tracking the exposure of
selected Canadian think tanks in five leading US newspapers (The
Washington Post, The New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, Wall
Street Journal, and The Boston Globe). Between 2009 and 2016, the Fraser
Institute was referred to 74 times, followed by the Pembina Institute (67),
the Conference Board of Canada (52), C.D. Howe (17), and the Public
Policy Forum (13). The vast majority of other Canadian think tanks were
barely mentioned.
However, the results are very different when the annual budgets of think
tanks are taken into consideration. Ranked first in total media exposure,
Fraser’s budget of approximately $10 to $11 million amounts to
approximately 25 per cent of the money available to the Conference Board
($40 million) but is almost three times more than the operating budgets of
C.D. Howe, Canada West, and Pembina. In other words, compared with the
Conference Board of Canada, the amount of media exposure Fraser enjoys
is staggering, but its public profile is less impressive when compared with
C.D Howe, Canada West, and Pembina, which have far fewer financial
resources on which to draw.
In the same period, a select group of Canadian think tanks also made
their presence felt before several parliamentary committees and in various
policy debates in the House of Commons and in the Senate. But unlike the
initial findings presented in the first edition, which confirmed that between
1980 and 1999 the now defunct Economic Council of Canada ranked first
in total number of appearances before parliamentary committees, in the last
eighteen years (see chapter 5 and appendix 6) policy experts from the
Conference Board have appeared more often than their competitors. In the
absence of the Economic Council of Canada and other government-funded
think tanks – casualties of the 1992 federal budget – it is conceivable that
the Conference Board is being asked to provide expertise once offered by
others. For example, between 1999 and 2008, experts from the Conference
Board testified 143 times, followed by C.D. Howe (98), Fraser (73), the
Canadian Council on Social Development (47), the Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives (46), and the Caledon Institute (35). In the most recent
period for which data have been collected (2009–2016), experts from the
Conference Board testified 399 times, followed by individuals identified
with a previous affiliation to the Economic Council of Canada (341), the
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (307) which folded its operations
into the Canadian International Council in 2008, and the Fraser Institute
(207). The results also confirm an earlier observation that the ideological
orientation of Canadian think tanks does not appear to be a decisive factor
in determining whether experts from think tanks will be invited as witnesses
before parliamentary committees. Conservative think tanks, including the
Fraser Institute and C.D. Howe, have testified before committees during
Liberal governments as often, and at times more often, than when the
Conservatives are in power. The size of a think tank’s budget can make a
significant difference in the number of appearances think tanks make before
parliamentary committees. Given the amount of time and resources that are
invested in helping experts prepare testimony, it is not entirely surprising
that, with few exceptions (Canadian International Council), think tanks with
the largest budgets are also those that testify most often. This is not to
suggest that this is the primary reason why some think tanks are invited to
appear before legislative committees more than others, but it does help to
explain the willingness of some institutes to employ their limited resources
for these purposes.
A similar pattern emerges when tracking the number of references made
to think tanks in debates taking place in the House of Commons and in the
Senate (see Appendix 6). In the House of Commons between 1999 and
2008, the Conference Board was referred to 266 times, just slightly more
than Fraser (259) and almost twice as often as C.D. Howe (136). In the
upper chamber, the Conference Board also ranked first with 115 references.
C.D. Howe followed with 48 and Fraser with 33. Not surprisingly, many of
the references made to think tanks in House and Senate debates refer to
remarks they made to parliamentary committees. In the most recent period
(2009 to 2016) for which data in this category has been collected, the
Conference Board of Canada once again held onto its first place ranking
with 358 references, followed by the Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives with 185 and Fraser 140.
In the United States, the storyline is virtually identical. Over the past ten
years, the same group of think tanks have continued to receive tremendous
exposure in American newspapers, current affairs magazines, and on
mainstream television networks (see Appendix 3), although there has been
some movement in the rankings. Topping the list in the last period (1998 to
2008) was the Brookings Institution, which was referred to more often than
any of its competitors in every category. In this ten-year span, Brookings
received a total of 9,184 citations. The American Enterprise Institute was a
distant second with 4,936, and the Heritage Foundation collected 4,568.
More recently, (2009 to 2016), R A N D has taken top spot in media
citations with 22,151 hits, almost twice as many as Brookings (12,310), and
close to three times as many as A E I (7497).
As in Canada, three organizations (Brookings (26 per cent), A E I (14 per
cent) and Heritage (13 per cent) accounted for approximately half (53 per
cent) of the media attention paid to US think tanks (53 per cent). In the
same period (2009 to 2016) R A N D received the most coverage on
television (215) from C N N (76 times), followed by A B C News (59),
N B C News (48), and C B S News (32). Data on appearances by think tank
experts or references to their work on Fox News were not available for this
period. In most instances, these figures represent the number of on-air
appearances made by experts affiliated with a particular think tank.
However, periodically the data also include references to institute studies or
to other news related to the work being conducted at think tanks. According
to the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive, which collects data
on how often think tanks are referred to on network newscasts, the Center
for Strategic and International Studies (C S I S) ranked second with 55
mentions, followed by Brookings (51), the Heritage Foundation (34), and
the Carnegie Endowment on International Peace (26). As the tables
detailing the number of references made to selected think tanks on network
newscasts reveal, the think tanks included in the study generated far more
coverage on some networks than others. For instance, R A N D generated
more than twice the amount of coverage on C N N than on C B S. Similarly,
Heritage received over eight times as much exposure on C N N as on C B S.
Similarly, C S I S and R A N D enjoyed considerably more exposure than
Brookings on A B C. A number of factors, including the ideological
orientation of television networks, the personal contacts between network
producers and think tank scholars, and the availability of scholars to
respond quickly to media requests could account for these findings.
The number of references R A N D received in several national
newspapers in the US was even more impressive, a considerable
improvement over where it found itself in the previous period (1998 to
2008). In the nine newspapers for which data were collected between 1998
and 2008, Brookings was cited 8,361 times. The American Enterprise
Institute secured a second-place ranking with 4,591 references, followed by
Heritage (4,223), the Cato Institute (3,023), and C S I S (2,983). Once again,
the findings revealed significant variations in the amount of coverage think
tanks received in each newspaper. Moreover, with few exceptions, this
pattern was repeated in five national magazines and in a broad sample of
Canadian and other international newspapers. In short, the same group of
think tanks that ranked high in television coverage also found themselves at
the top of the list in newspaper and magazine citations. In the most recent
period (2009 to 2016), it was R A N D, with few exceptions, that took top
billing. In the same nine US newspapers for which data had been collected
in the previous period, R A N D generated 21,625 hits, almost twice as many
as Brookings (12,154). These two powerhouses were followed by A E I
(7,416), Heritage (5,258), C S I S (4,121), and Cato (3,260) There is little
doubt that the budgets of US think tanks can significantly influence how
much media exposure they generate. As discussed, for some think tanks,
including Brookings, A E I, and Heritage, generating media exposure is a
key priority. As a result they invest millions of dollars each year promoting
their work. By contrast, several other think tanks with different priorities
but comparable or larger budgets attract a fraction of the media attention
Brookings and other media-savvy think tanks enjoy.
A slightly different picture unfolds when tracking the number of
references made to selected American think tanks in the US Congress (see
Appendix 5). From 1999 to 2008, no think tank was referred to more often
during debates in the US Senate and in the US House of Representatives
than the Heritage Foundation. According to the Congressional Record,
Heritage generated more references in Congress and in two congressional
publications – Extension of Remarks and The Daily Digest – than any of its
rivals. Heritage ranked first with 607 references, close to 200 more than
Brookings (427) and twice as many as R A N D (301). C S I S, which ranked
first among citations in The Daily Digest, ranked fourth in total number of
citations with 243, followed by the Urban Institute (234) and A E I (192).
The three top-ranked think tanks (Heritage 22 per cent, Brookings 17 per
cent, and R A N D (12 per cent) accounted for slightly over half (51 per
cent) of all references to think tanks in Congress. However, these rankings
change when we look at how often policy experts from think tanks are
invited to testify before congressional committees. During the same period,
experts from A E I appeared before congressional committees more often
than their colleagues at other Washington, DC-based think tanks (264
times). C S I S policy experts ranked second with 221 appearances, followed
by Heritage (208), Cato (178), and R A N D (152).
Brookings scholars ranked eighth with 42 appearances, just behind their
colleagues from the Hoover Institution (46). Taken together, the top five
ranked think tanks in this category accounted for 77 per cent of all
appearances by think tank experts before Congress, a finding consistent
with Rich and Weaver’s earlier observation that conservative think tanks are
more likely to be invited to testify before Congress when the Republicans
are in power. How do these figures compare with data collected from 2009
to 2016? The data on media visibility and on think tank
references/appearances in Congress thus confirm that an elite group of think
tanks dominates the national media and in the federal legislature. The data
sets also confirm that, with few exceptions, think tanks with the largest
budgets are more likely to attract the lion’s share of attention from
journalists and policy-makers.
WH AT N E X T ? T H E F U T U R E O F T H I N K TA N K S :
A V I E W F R O M C A N A D A , T H E U N I T E D S TAT E S ,
A N D T H E G L O B A L C O MMU N I T Y
Unlike elite think tanks in the United States, the majority of policy institutes
in Canada cannot impress policy-makers with high-profile staffers or
multimillion-dollar budgets, nor will they likely have the resources to do so
in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, as this study has shown, think tanks
do not require millions of dollars or dozens of staff to convey their ideas.
As Ken Battle of the Caledon Institute and Brian Lee Crowley of the
Macdonald-Laurier Institute, among others, have demonstrated, using some
ingenuity and creativity to communicate ideas to policy-makers and to other
stakeholders can go a long way in helping think tanks become more
relevant players in policy-making.
In the coming years, Canadian think tanks will face important
challenges, not the least of which is securing access to sufficient funds to
allow them to engage in rigorous research (should they elect to do so), and
to strengthen their ties to multiple target audiences. To remain competitive,
or indeed to become more competitive in the marketplace of ideas, some
institutes may have to merge or occasionally pool their resources with other
think tanks, as the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies and the Canadian
Centre for Philanthropy have done. This may be the only way a number of
smaller think tanks can remain afloat, particularly during times of austerity.
Others, like the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, may rebrand
themselves to enhance their overall profile. Still, unless philanthropic
foundations and affluent donors in Canada become as enamoured with think
tanks as several leading philanthropists in the United States and Germany
have, it is unlikely that many Canadian policy institutes will enjoy financial
security.
Besides constant funding concerns, think tanks in Canada will have to
give serious thought to what their mission is and how it can best be
achieved. If think tanks are truly committed to improving public policy, as
they often claim, they should provide policy-makers with what they require
most – long-term strategic thinking about key domestic and foreign policy
issues. On the other hand, if they are more interested in advancing a
particular ideological agenda than in supplementing the policy needs of
government, they should pay closer attention to the strategies pursued by
more advocacy-oriented institutes in the United States. Although several
think tanks in Canada have adopted this mode, there remains a glimmer of
hope for some institutes that serious policy research can and should be
pursued.
The tendency of think tanks in the United States and around the globe to
become more advocacy-oriented will, in all likelihood, continue. After all,
why would policy institutes forgo a strategy that often pays handsome
dividends? As more institutes enter the already crowded policy-research
community, they will rely on a wide range of strategies to capture the
attention of the public, the media, policy-makers, and other interested
parties. Moreover, if the Democratic and Republican parties, not to mention
the country itself, become even more polarized in the coming years,
members of Congress will likely be even more willing to listen to those
think tanks whose views strike a responsive chord with their constituents.
However, the ever watchful eye of the Internal Revenue Service could
interfere with the efforts of advocacy think tanks to achieve their goals. If
the I R S revoked the tax-exempt status of a high-profile think tank for
engaging in inappropriate political activities, it would send a strong
message to other think tanks to curtail some of their more aggressive
marketing techniques.
Although the I R S will pay closer attention to the activities of think
tanks, there is little to suggest that the growth rate of policy institutes in the
United States will come to a halt. Think tanks have continued to spring up
throughout the country and have continued to spawn throughout the
international community. As long as there are policy entrepreneurs willing
to create them, and philanthropists prepared to fund them, there is no reason
to believe that the proliferation of policy institutes witnessed over the past
three decades will fizzle out. The mortality rate among think tanks, other
than those that have become casualties of government cutbacks, remains
low. However, while a handful of think tanks in the United States will likely
continue to dominate the headlines, it must be remembered that the majority
of American think tanks closely resemble, in size and scope, those that
populate the Canadian think tank landscape. As is the case with the majority
of Canadian think tanks, those in the United States will have to think more
strategically and methodically about how to carve out their niche in the
policy research community, a challenge made even more difficult by the
presence of several institutes with multimillion-dollar endowments.
The proliferation and evolution of think tanks in Canada and the United
States will provide those engaged in the study of comparative political
institutions and international relations with much to think about in the
coming years. As they have over the past decade, scholars interested in
think tanks will pay even closer attention to the role and impact of policy
institutes on the world stage. Recently, the Shanghai Academy of Social
Sciences, L’Observatoire des think tanks in Paris, and other organizations
devoted to the study of think tanks have sponsored several conferences and
workshops to help think tanks in both developing and advanced
industrialized countries to consider the most effective ways to promote
social, political, and economic change. Moreover, scholars who study think
tanks are no longer confining their research to what takes place in the
United States and in other western democracies. The explosion of think
tanks in the global community, not to mention the willingness of various
international and regional organizations to support their work, has
convinced scholars to reflect more critically on how different political
systems facilitate or impede the spread of ideas. This research is resulting in
very interesting findings that will have profound implications on how
political scientists, historians, sociologists, and economists study the impact
of ideas on policy-making.
The growing involvement of think tanks in the policy-making process at
the national and international levels will give rise to a new set of intriguing
questions. Undoubtedly one that will be asked is, do think tanks matter?
Judging by this analysis of Canadian and American think tanks, it is
unlikely that a simple answer will be found. At the very least, as the
literature on think tanks continues to grow, scholars must keep abreast of
what ground has been covered and what still needs to be studied. While
much has been written about the think tank landscape in many industrial
and developing nations, we still need to know more about the internal
workings of think tanks and how they assess their own impact in the policy-
making community. These answers cannot be gleaned from global think
tank rankings, which tend to be driven more by the reputations of top-tier
think tanks than the value of work they produce. As difficult as it is for
scholars to arrive at some consensus about how to measure policy
influence, think tank directors and presidents continue to struggle over how
to evaluate their performance. For those in administrative positions who
must explain to their boards of directors and donor agencies how their
resources are being spent and what results they have achieved, providing
accurate and worthwhile performance indicators is not merely an academic
exercise. Unfortunately, for these and other individuals, it has become a
marketing exercise. In the absence of a more scientific way to measure
influence, think tank leaders have resorted to constructing a narrative
around the impact they believe their organizations have had in shaping both
policy decisions and the policy-making environment.
The reality facing think tank directors and those who study their
institutions is that there is no single performance indicator that will provide
an accurate assessment of what they have achieved relative to other
institutes in the policy-making community, an observation consistent with
the findings in chapter 5. Under ideal conditions we could assume that all
think tanks agree on the same set of indicators or metrics and allocate a
roughly equal percentage of their budgets to enhancing their performance in
each category. After adjusting for differences in revenues and expenditures,
scholars could then provide an annual ranking of institutes, perhaps similar
to the Maclean’s ranking of Canadian universities and colleges, which could
in turn be passed on to think tanks. The job of think tank directors would
then be done. Or would it? What directors of think tanks would be left with
is some indication of where they ranked relative to other institutes – for
instance, in media citations generated or testimonies given. Unfortunately,
while some think tanks might find comfort in these numbers, others would
still be left with the lingering question of how much difference their
institutes really made.
A potential solution to this nagging question would be for think tanks
not to compare themselves with other policy institutes, despite external and
internal pressures to do so, but to set out their own measurements of
success. By reviewing their mission statements, think tanks could begin the
process of identifying what policy issues they believed were important to
study and the various channels they needed to rely on to convey their
insights to selected target audiences. Once they had done this, they could
then set out the performance indicators that would provide them with some
insight into whether they were making progress toward achieving their
specific objectives.
In examining the internal workings of think tanks, future researchers in
this field will undoubtedly discover that policy institutes will rely on very
different benchmarks for success. Some will continue to emphasize the
importance of enhancing their media exposure and will closely monitor the
number of media citations they receive. Others, however, will likely focus
on less visible but potentially more influential channels, such as meetings
and conferences with key policy-makers. What will be interesting to
discover is how think tanks seek to implement their goals while constantly
confronting the financial pressures of staying open.
Scholars should also pay more attention to what policy-makers think
about the contribution think tanks have made at different stages of the
policy-making process. They could do so either through interviews with, or
through surveys distributed to policy-makers throughout government. A
comprehensive survey of the attitudes of policy-makers and journalists
toward US think tanks was conducted by Andrew Rich, but a similar survey
has yet to be released in Canada.2 Although some policy institutes have
apparently commissioned private polling firms to survey Canadians about
their views of think tanks, a more extensive survey of policy-makers is
needed. The obvious benefit of a survey is that policy-makers can be asked
specifically which think tanks have contributed to public policy and in what
ways. They can also be asked to give examples of where think tanks may
have made a difference. Among other things, those examples would allow
scholars to develop more complete case studies.
In the case studies included in this book we are left with the impression
that by virtue of participating in presidential campaigns some think tanks in
the United States have become firmly entrenched in the policy-making
process. While this is certainly true for a handful of institutes, the vast
majority have not had the privilege of establishing such close ties to
government. We are also left with the impression that unlike their American
counterparts, think tanks in Canada have rarely played a critical role in
policy development. Although this finding is consistent with the
observations made in chapters 7 and 8, there are countless other policy
issues in which Canadian policy institutes may have played a more decisive
role. A survey of policy-makers would go a long way toward identifying
these areas.
For those looking for a definitive answer to the question posed at the
beginning of this book, the conclusion that I have reached may be
disappointing, but I am convinced it is the right one. As in other avenues of
scholarly inquiry, we are often left with far more questions than answers.
That is why we engage in the pursuit of knowledge. Think tanks are
interesting, incredibly diverse, and highly eclectic organizations worthy of
further scholarly attention. As their visibility continues to grow, more
people will question how much impact they have. I suspect this is a
conversation that will continue for some time.
APPENDIX ONE
A Profile of Selected American Think Tanks
• The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

• The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
• The Council on Foreign Relations
• The Center for Strategic and International Studies
• The Institute for Policy Studies
• The Urban Institute
• The Cato Institute
• The Manhattan Institute for Policy Research
• The Progressive Policy Institute
T H E C A R N E G I E E N D O WME N T F O R
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E A C E
Located adjacent to the Brookings Institution on Washington’s

Massachusetts Avenue, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(C E I P) has become one of America’s premier foreign policy think tanks.
With a $10 million endowment, the C E I P was established by Andrew
Carnegie in 1910 as a nonpartisan institute to educate the public about
peace, “to spread arbitral justice among nations and to promote the comity
and commerce of the world without the dangers of war.”1 Acting on the
advice of several leading pacifists, including then secretary of state Elihu
Root, Carnegie stated that the annual income derived from the endowment
should be used in any way “appropriate to hasten the abolition of war.”
Moreover, he directed that when “the establishment of peace is attained …
the revenue shall be devoted to the banishment of the next most degrading
evil or evils, the suppression of which would most advance the progress,
elevation and happiness of man.”2
In accordance with the wishes of its founder, over 200 researchers and
staff, drawing upon a budget in excess of $40 million, examine a wide
range of issues that fall under ten main programs, including: Asia, Europe,
cyber policy, nuclear policy, and Russia/Eurasia. For many years (1970–
2008), the institute was best known for its quarterly journal, Foreign Policy,
which was purchased by the Washington Post in 2008. Along with dozens
of other publications, and the many seminars and workshops the C E I P
conducts, the organization is committed to stimulating debate among
leading foreign-policy-makers. The Carnegie Endowment also relies on
other channels to convey its ideas. Staff from the institute frequently submit
articles to major newspapers and regularly appear as guests on American
television networks.
In 1993 the Carnegie Endowment decided to expand its reach even
further by creating a public policy research centre in Moscow. Designed “to
promote intellectual collaboration among scholars and specialists in the
United States, Russia, and other post-Soviet states,” the Carnegie Moscow
Center sponsors workshops, seminars, and study groups that bring together
academics, journalists, and representatives from the private, public, and
non-profit sectors to exchange views. The centre also provides a forum for
international leaders to discuss various issues with audiences in Moscow. In
2006, Carnegie, which has branded itself the first global think tank, has
opened four other research centres in New Delhi, Beijing, Beirut, and
Brussels.
T H E H O O V E R I N S T I T U T I O N O N WA R ,
REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Known for its commitment to pursuing traditional conservative principles,

the Hoover Institution at Stanford University has rarely strayed from the
mission its founder laid out for the institute decades ago. Established in
1919 by Herbert Hoover to protect and house valuable historical records
acquired during the First World War, the Hoover Institution’s primary
mission has been to reduce the role of government in economic and social
affairs and to promote the national security interests of the United States.3
As Herbert Hoover noted in founding the institute,
The Institution supports the Constitution of the United States, its Bill
of Rights and its method of representative government. Both our
social and economic systems are based on private enterprise from
which springs initiative and ingenuity … Ours is a system where the
Federal Government should undertake no governmental, social or
economic action, except where local government, or the people,
cannot undertake it for themselves… The overall mission of this
Institution is, from its records, to recall the voice of experience
against the making of war, and by the study of these records and their
publication, to recall man’s endeavors to make and preserve peace,
and to sustain for America the safeguards of the American way of
life. This institution is not, and must not be, a mere library. But with
these purposes as its goal, the Institution itself must constantly and
dynamically point the road to peace, to personal freedom, and to the
safeguards of the American system.4
With an initial donation of $50,000 from Herbert Hoover, the institute has
evolved into a leading centre for research and analysis on domestic and
foreign policy. Scholars at Hoover focus their attention in nine major
research areas, including: economic policy, education, health care, foreign
affairs and national security, and values and social policy. The Hoover
Institution’s active research program results in the publication of several
books and public policy essays each year.
Relying on a budget larger than $60 million, the Hoover Institution has
assembled a talented staff consisting of over 150 scholars, including several
former high-level policy-makers and Nobel prize-winners. However,
despite the contributions many of its scholars have made to the fields of
economics, history, and political science, the institute has had a stormy
relationship with Stanford faculty and administrators for years. The
turbulent relationship between Hoover and Stanford is in large part fueled
by the active role Hoover scholars have played in assisting several
Republican presidential candidates to win office, a subject that was
explored in chapter 6. The presence of what has been perceived by several
faculty at Stanford as an openly conservative think tank at a predominantly
liberal university has resulted in several heated exchanges between the two
bodies.
Like many think tanks based in Washington, Hoover relies on several
strategies to communicate its research to policy-makers, including
organizing workshops and seminars for elected officials and scholars to
debate various policy issues. Yet, unlike some think tanks located outside
the Beltway, including the Hudson Institute and R A N D, Hoover has
resisted the temptation to open a Washington office. Concerned that such a
move would distract the institute from pursuing its research agenda, Hoover
prefers to remain somewhat detached from the vicissitudes of Washington
politics. Nonetheless, Hoover, like many think tanks, relishes the attention it
receives in the media. It is particularly fond of quoting from a 1991 article
in the Economist, which noted in its evaluation of think tanks that “The
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace is hard to match for sheer
intellectual firepower.” Hoover might be less willing to acknowledge that in
the 2016 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, it ranked 151st among US
and non-US think tanks.5
T H E C O U N C I L O N F O R E I G N R E L AT I O N S
The origin of the New York–based Council of Foreign Relations (C F R) can

be traced to an elite monthly dinner club that was established in the spring
of 1918 to discuss various aspects of foreign affairs. Headed by Elihu Root,
who had played an important role in convincing Andrew Carnegie to create
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the distinguished group of
thirty participants created a forum in which leaders from finance, industry,
education, government, and science could share their thoughts on pressing
international issues. However, it was not until 1921 that the monthly dinner
club was transformed into a permanent institution committed to the study of
foreign affairs.
The idea of creating an organization dedicated to an “improved
understanding of American foreign policy and international affairs”
emerged when twenty-one members of a select group called the Inquiry
were invited to accompany Woodrow Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919. Frustrated by Wilson’s refusal to accept their advice and
disillusioned with several of the provisions in the Treaty of Versailles,
members of the American delegation began to discuss the prospects of
creating a transatlantic research organization with their British counterparts.
Despite their initial enthusiasm for the joint venture, however, the American
and British delegates made little progress in achieving their goals over the
next two years. Indeed, after it appeared that the venture would not move
forward, two members of the American delegation approached Root and
asked if he would be prepared to merge his Council of Foreign Relations
with the body the American delegates had established at the Paris Peace
Conference. With Root’s consent, the two groups consolidated and
incorporated the Council on Foreign Relations on 29 July 1921.6
The primary mission of the Council on Foreign Relations is “to foster
America’s understanding of other nations – their peoples, cultures, histories,
hopes, quarrels, and ambitions – and thus to serve our nation through study
and debate.” It seeks to accomplish this mission by pursuing three goals:
improving understanding of world affairs and providing new ideas for US
foreign policy, transforming the council into a truly national organization,
and finding and nurturing the next generation of foreign policy leaders and
thinkers.7
The Council on Foreign Relations publishes the quarterly journal
Foreign Affairs, as well as a wealth of studies on various aspects of world
affairs. Yet it is perhaps best known for its distinguished and exclusive
group of members. Among its 3,500 members nationwide (they must be
nominated before they can join) are former presidents, secretaries of state,
and other high-level policy-makers. At its headquarters in New York and at
its several branches throughout the United States, prominent policy-makers
and scholars are regularly invited to present lectures before members.
Although the Council on Foreign Relations has cultivated a reputation as an
elite club for policy-makers, throughout its distinguished history, it has
developed a wide-ranging research program. Over 200 researchers and staff
work at the C F R and conduct research in several areas, including Asia,
Africa, peace and conflict, science and technology, trade, immigration,
security, and international economics.
T H E C E N T E R F O R S T R AT E G I C A N D
I N T E R N AT I O N A L S T U D I E S
The directory of scholars at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (C S I S) reads like a who’s who in Washington’s foreign-policy-
making community. Home to several former ambassadors, secretaries of
defense, and national security advisers, C S I S is among the most respected
defence and foreign policy think tanks in the United States. Founded in
1962 by David Abshire, former assistant secretary of state for congressional
affairs, and by Arleigh Burke, former chief of naval operations, C S I S’s
mission is “to inform and shape selected policy decisions in government
and the private sector by providing long-range, anticipatory, and integrated
thinking over a wide range of policy issues.”8
With over 220 staff, including research fellows, administrative staff,
directors, chairs, and advisers, and with a budget in excess of $40 million,
C S I S, from its state of the art compound on Rhode Island Ave. N W, is
well-placed to put its mission statement into action. Each year the
organization convenes hundreds of meetings, seminars, and conferences
with policy-makers and scholars in the United States and abroad and
generates a steady stream of media appearances. C S I S also publishes
several books, journals, and conference papers. Its marquee publication is
the Washington Quarterly.
Over the years C S I S has developed an extensive research program that
covers every region of the world and has established specific initiatives
within regions that address issues of current relevance. Examples include or
have included the Human Space Exploration Initiative, the International
Security Program, Global Aging Initiative, Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative, China Power, Defense Industrial Initiatives Group, and the Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Project.
THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES
Often regarded as Washington’s think tank of the left, the Institute for
Policy Studies was founded by Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnett, two
former staffers in the Kennedy administration. Convinced that steps had “to
be taken to combat the over-militarized ways of thinking in foreign and
national policy,”9 Raskin and Barnett decided to establish their own
institute, and with $200,000 in grants, the IPS opened its doors in October
1963.10
The fundamental purpose of the I P S is to provide the country’s most
important social movements with the intellectual ammunition they require
to transform “their moral passion into a sensible public policy.” To this end,
the I P S has developed five principal programs that are intended to
stimulate public debate and to help social movements succeed: global
economic justice, sustainable communities, economic and social rights, real
security, and culture.
The I P S, like other advocacy-oriented think tanks, relies on several
channels to influence political change. In addition to conveying its ideas to
policy-makers and the public through the media, the institute has
established links to several members of Congress and individuals in the
executive branch. It has also advised several presidential candidates,
including George McGovern, Jesse Jackson, Bob Kerrey, and Tom Harkin.
The I P S relies on several strategies to extend its reach to various civil
society actors, and over the years has maintained a strong and passionate
commitment to issues of social justice. The I P S also works closely with
dozens of national and transnational social organizations to mobilize
opposition to various public policies, including many being advanced by the
Trump administration. With a budget of $4 million and approximately
forty-five staff members, the I P S does not enjoy the visibility of
Washington’s larger and better-funded think tanks. Nonetheless, because of
its publications and networks with other non-governmental organizations,
its views have not been ignored.
THE URBAN INSTITUTE
The Urban Institute, according to Paul Dickson, “had a typically long

bureaucratic birth.”11 Although its conception can be traced to the Kennedy
administration, it was not until President Johnson put his weight behind the
initiative that the prospect of creating a think tank that could address the
many domestic problems plaguing the United States during the 1960s
gained momentum. As noted in its annual report of 1998, “the Urban
Institute got its start in 1968 as the brainchild of a blue-ribbon panel set up
by President Lyndon Johnson to monitor and evaluate the Great Society
Initiatives that sprang from some 400 laws that had been passed since
1964.”12 President Johnson believed that the Urban Institute could bridge
“the gulf between the scholar in search of truth and the decision-maker in
search of progress.”13 Or as Sarah Rosen Wartell, president of the Urban
Institute, noted in the organization’s 2015 Annual Report, “The Urban
Institute’s charge from President Johnson in 1968 was “to help solve the
problem that weighs heavily on the hearts and minds of all of us: the
American city and its people.”14
Answering the need “for independent analysis of government
performance and for data-driven research on America’s cities and their
residents in the wake of widespread urban unrest,” the Urban Institute
devoted its early years to examining persistent domestic problems such as
poverty, education finance, unemployment, urban housing shortages and
decay, urban transportation gaps, and the need for welfare reform.15 Since
then it has greatly expanded its research program. With over 450 staff
members and a budget exceeding $95 million, the Urban Institute conducts
research in several areas, including education, population, health, and
human resources, housing and poverty. It is also home to eleven policy
research centers, and engages in strategic research partnerships with
organizations throughout the US and the international community. Although
approximately 90 per cent of its research agenda is financed by public
agencies and foundations, the Urban Institute has made a concerted effort to
broaden its base of support over the years. It lists dozens of private
supporters as contributors. Moreover, the Urban Institute’s multimillion
endowment provides added financial security.
The Urban Institute, like many think tanks created during the
Progressive Era, jealously guards its institutional independence. Despite
relying heavily on government support, the institute has been able to
insulate itself from outside interference. According to its former president,
William Gorham, the government has largely refrained from interfering in
work that it has funded.16 The Urban Institute continues to publish dozens
of studies each year, and its staff members are often quoted in the
mainstream media.
T H E C ATO I N S T I T U T E
Founded in 1977 by Edward Crane, former national chair of the Libertarian

Party, who served as Cato’s president until the fall of 2012, the Cato
Institute has become something of an anomaly in Washington. Named for
“Cato’s Letters, libertarian pamphlets that helped lay the philosophical
foundation for the American Revolution,”17 the institute, which moved
from San Francisco to Washington in 1981, promotes an odd mix of
conservative and liberal ideas. On the one hand, Cato recommends
scrapping the social-security system in favour of a private retirement
program, a suggestion embraced by many Republicans. On the other hand,
it supports gay rights and the legalization of marijuana, and it takes a liberal
view of pornography, positions generally held by the Democratic left.18
What Cato consistently opposes, however, is virtually all forms of
government intervention.
Initially bankrolled by Kansas oil baron Charles Koch, a steadfast
contributor to libertarian causes who has periodically found himself at odds
with the organization,19 Cato has since broadened its base of financial
support to include many foundations, corporations and private donors.
Although some of its donors withdrew their funding after Cato criticized the
US role in the Gulf War, it has since found support among several powerful
corporations, including Google, Facebook, Whole Foods Market, and the
American Bankers Association.19 In 2016 Cato’s budget was approximately
$30 million, all of which was raised from private sources. It does not accept
any government funding.
Cato has grown considerably since its founding. It now has
approximately 150 researchers and staff. Among its many publications are
the Cato Journal, published three times a year, and several policy briefs,
working papers and commentaries. In addition to holding conferences on a
regular basis, Cato staff frequently convey their views to the media. Cato
maintains detailed records of how often its staff generate media exposure.
T H E MA N H AT TA N I N S T I T U T E F O R P O L I C Y
RESEARCH
Located on Vanderbilt Avenue near Grand Central Terminal in the heart of
Manhattan, the Manhattan Institute was often referred to as former mayor
Rudolph Giuliani’s favourite think tank. Created in 1978 by the late
William Casey, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency under
President Reagan, the free-market institute had been credited with helping
Giuliani sell his conservative agenda in a city known for its liberal
leanings.20
The Manhattan Institute’s conservative credentials are well deserved. In
1980 it helped launch George Gilder’s Wealth and Poverty, “a paean to tax
cuts and freewheeling capitalism,” and four years later it aggressively
promoted Charles Murray’s study Losing Ground, “a tough-minded attack
on social welfare programs.”21 Murray would attract even more attention
later with his best-selling and controversial co-authored book, The Bell
Curve, which examined the relationship between class and intelligence.
During its forty-year history, the Manhattan Institute has advocated a
number of policies intended to move New York more to the right. Among
other things it has supported the privatization of hospitals and actively
promoted school choice. It has also spoken out against rent control. The
institute uses several channels to market its ideas. In addition to its quarterly
magazine, City Journal, it publishes books and articles and holds lavish
lunches several times a month at the Harvard Club with journalists,
politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders.
The institute’s staff of approximately fifty-five senior fellows and
adjunct fellows draw upon the organization’s $16 million budget to engage
in a large number of research projects. Among other things, institute staff
conduct research on a wide range of municipal issues of interest to officials
both in New York and in other cities throughout the United States.
THE PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE
Created as an offspring of the Democratic Leadership Council (D L C) in

1989, the Progressive Policy Institute (P P I) did not have to wait long to
attract the attention of policy-makers in Washington. When Bill Clinton,
former chair of the D L C, decided to run for the presidency in 1992, the
P P I found the right messenger to deliver its progressive message. Indeed,
when president-elect Clinton endorsed the P P I’s blueprint, Mandate for
Change, a comprehensive study of how to reform government, it became
clear to many journalists covering Washington politics, that the P P I’s views
would be well received in key policy-making circles. As Thomas Friedman
of the New York Times stated, “Mandate for Change is as good a crib sheet
as any for Mr Clinton’s first State of the Union Message, and the
recommendations are expected to become standard-issue bedtime reading
for the ‘new kind of Democrats’ about to take over Washington.”22
Several ideas that the P P I helped to formulate made their way onto
Clinton’s political agenda, including national service in exchange for
college loans. Moreover, several other issues that the P P I explored,
including crime prevention, health care, educational excellence, and
environmental safety, found a receptive audience in the Clinton White
House, which had become home to a handful of former P P I staffers.23
The P P I’s research continues to advocate a new progressive politics for
the United States. Among other things, the P P I believes in restoring the
American dream by accelerating economic growth, expanding opportunity,
and enhancing financial and personal security. It also maintains that global
order can be sustained by building new international structures based on
economic and political freedom. With approximately one dozen staff
members and a budget between $1 million and $2 million, the P P I has
attempted to model its marketing strategy on the strategies employed by the
Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute.24
APPENDIX TWO
A Profile of Selected Canadian Think Tanks
• The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

• The Atlantic Institute for Market Studies
• The Canada West Foundation
• The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
• The C.D. Howe Institute
• The Centre for International Governance Innovation (C I G I)
• The Conference Board of Canada
• The Institute for Research on Public Policy
• The Macdonald-Laurier Institute
• The Montreal Economic Institute
• The Mowat Centre
• The Public Policy Forum
T H E A S I A PA C I F I C F O U N D AT I O N O F C A N A D A
Established by an Act of Parliament, the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada

Act, the Vancouver-based not-for-profit institute, is the country’s premier
think tank on Canada-Asia relations. With a mandate to “raise awareness
and foster informed decision-making” about Canada’s ties to this critically
important region, the foundation works closely with public and private
sector institutions on a wide range of policy issues. Drawing on the
expertise of approximately thirty staff and a budget hovering around $6
million, the Asia Pacific Foundation seeks to develop and nurture networks
among individuals and organizations committed to establishing a stronger
Canadian presence in Asia.
According to the Act, which gave birth to the organization and defined
its mission, the Asia Foundation is responsible for: (a) promoting mutual
awareness and understanding of the cultures, histories, religions,
philosophies, languages, life styles and aspirations in the Asia Pacific
region and Canada and their effects on each other’s societies;
• “(a.I) promoting dialogue on, and understanding of, foreign policy issues
as they relate to Canada and the Asia-Pacific region, an additional goal
articulated in 2005;
• (b) supporting development cooperation between organizations,
institutions and associations in Canada and in the Asia-Pacific region;
• (c) promoting collaboration among organizations, institutions and
associations in private and public sectors in Canada and in the Asia-
Pacific region;
• (d) promoting closer economic and commercial ties between Canada and
the Asia-Pacific region;
• (e) promoting, in Canada, scholarship in and expertise on economic,
cultural, social and other subjects relating to the Asia-Pacific region, and
in the Asia-Pacific region, scholarship in and expertise on economic,
cultural, social and other subjects relating to Canada; and
• (f) collecting information and ideas relating to Canada and the Asia-
Pacific region and disseminating such information and ideas within
Canada and the Asia-Pacific region.”1
In August 2014, Yuen Pau Woo, an authority on China who served as the
Foundation’s president and C E O for nine years and holds the title of
Distinguished East Asia Fellow, was succeeded by Stewart Beck, Canada’s
former High Commissioner to India and Ambassador to Nepal and Bhutan.
The Foundation is governed by a board of directors which includes the
president and C E O, four other directors appointed by the Governor in
Council and up to eighteen additional directors. The board is chaired by
John H. McArthur, Dean Emeritus, Harvard Business School. Among its
directors are: Colin Dodds, president, Saint Mary’s University; Kevin
Lynch, vice chair, B MO Financial Group; and Indira Samarasekera,
president and vice-chancellor, University of Alberta.
The Asia Pacific Foundation’s funding is drawn primarily from an
endowment provided by the Government of Canada and by corporate and
individual donors. In recent years, donors who have provided $100,000 or
more included: B MO Financial Group, Shell Canada, Manulife Financial,
and Teck Resources Limited. Sizeable donations in amounts up to $99,999
were also made by H S B C Canada, Port Metro Vancouver, Air China,
Blake, Cassels & Graydon L L P, Canadian Association of Petroleum
Producers, Canadian Pacific, Cathay Pacific Airways, Deloitte, Fiera
Capital, Husky Energy, Port of Halifax, T E L U S, Vancouver Airport
Authority, Westport Innovations Inc., Encana Corporation, Five Stars Travel
Limited, Harvest Operations Corporation, The Japan Foundation, New
Routes to the Future Ecological Foundation, P O S C O Canada, Province of
Alberta, Salley Bowes Harwardt LC, United Way of Canada, and The
University of British Columbia.
The Foundation’s current research focuses on four themes: promoting
trade, investment, and innovation; building skills and competencies;
mobilizing energy assets; and understanding Asia. It maintains an active
publications program overseen by an editorial team, and experts, both at the
Foundation and those contracted to undertake research on its behalf, publish
a steady stream of research papers, blogs, surveys, and analyses for various
audiences on a wide range of social, economic and political issues affecting
Canada’s relations in Asia. With extensive expertise on the countries of
Asia and Canada’s ties to them, experts from the Asia Pacific Foundation
are called upon regularly to share their insights with the media. In addition,
the Foundation offers post-graduate and research fellowships to academics
to produce policy papers. Moreover, to further generate and disseminate its
findings, the Foundation engages in the following activities:
• Forum of Discussion – “Disseminating knowledge and raising public

awareness through roundtables, panel discussions and speaking
engagements.
• Research and Analysis – “Promoting informed discussion on Canada-
Asia relations through research reports, publications and opinion
editorials.”
• Special Research Projects – “Identifying and filling knowledge gaps on
issues affecting Canada-Asia Relations.”
• Track Two Diplomacy – “Supporting government-to-government
processes to encourage and pave the way for new strategic
developments.”
• Grants and Fellowship Programs – “Providing new-generation
researchers and journalists with the opportunity to engage in policy
research and media coverage of Asia.”2
T H E AT L A N T I C I N S T I T U T E F O R MA R K E T
STUDIES
With a generous start-up grant from the Donner Foundation, a group of

Atlantic Canadians set out to create an organization that would encourage
policy analysts to address the unique challenges and opportunities facing
the region. The result was the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies
(A I MS), a think tank committed to broadening “the debate about realistic
options available to build [the Atlantic].”3 To fulfill its mandate, A I MS
pursues four main objectives: initiating and conducting research that
identifies current and emerging economic and social issues confronting
Atlantic Canada; investigating a full range of options for public and private
responses to these issues; communicating its research to regional and
national audiences in a non-partisan manner; and sponsoring seminars,
lectures, and training programs.
Reflecting on the need to create a think tank in Atlantic Canada that
examines current and emerging policy issues in the region, Brian Lee
Crowley, founding president of A I MS who, since 2010, has been
managing director of the Ottawa-based Macdonald-Laurier Institute,
remarked:
There are other national think-tanks that aim to stimulate people to

think in new and better ways about economic and social policy, to
take the long strategic view, to speak out on controversial issues …
The C.D. Howe Institute, the Fraser Institute, the Institute for
Research on Public Policy and the [Canadian] Centre for Policy
Alternatives spring to mind. But these national organisations can
devote little of their time and effort to the particular challenges and
circumstances of Atlantic Canada … regionally, there are other
groups, like the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, that gather
and publish the most complete and up-to-date economic data on
Regional Development, public academic treatises … A I MS seeks to
do more than provide useful factual information on what’s going on
in the economy today … rather, A I MS exists to offer a platform for
the best and brightest to put forward their own thoughts and analysis
about what to do about our challenges and opportunities, about how
we can think and act strategically, and for the long term, to build a
more prosperous future for the region.4
A I MS relies on several channels to convey its ideas on how best to

confront the many challenges in Atlantic Canada. In addition to producing a
quarterly newsletter, the Beacon, and several other publications, including
blogs that are targeted to university students, A I MS regularly holds
conferences and seminars to promote exchanges between policy-makers,
academics, and leaders from the private and non-profit sectors. Moreover,
A I MS actively engages the media and encourages its scholars to share
their insights with journalists. Funded by foundations, corporations, and
individual donors, A I MS maintains an extensive research program that
covers a wide range of topics: education, energy, healthcare, security and
defence, regional development, and urban affairs. The president of A I MS,
Marco Navarro-Génie, a scholar of Latin American politics, society, and
culture, is supported by a large board of directors representing several large
companies in Canada.
T H E C A N A D A WE S T F O U N D AT I O N
The Canada West Foundation traces its origins to the One Prairie
Conference held in Lethbridge in 1970. A consensus developed at the
conference that research on Western Canadian concerns should not only
continue, but be expanded. This decision led to the formation of the Canada
West Council, which in turn developed the mandate for the Canada West
Foundation. The Canada West Foundation is governed by the Canada West
Council, “which provides direction on the current and future education and
research activities of the Foundation.”5 The Foundation’s budget of
approximately $2 million is drawn from several sources, including the
interest generated from an endowment created in 1996 which, in 2013, was
valued in excess of $8.5 million.6
The Foundation pursues three main objectives: “to initiate and conduct
research into the economic and social characteristics and potentials of the
West and North within a national and international context; to educate
individuals regarding the West’s regional economic and social contributions
to the Canadian federation; and to act as a catalyst for informed debate.”7
Its mandate is “to explore public policy issues of particular interest to
western Canadians, to test national policies against regional aspirations and
to ensure an effective regional voice in national policy discussions and the
national political process.”8
Canada West maintains an active research program, and in 2013, added
three new policy research centres focusing on trade and investment; natural
resources; and human capital.9 Since its inception, the organization has
published hundreds of studies on issues ranging from the effects of free
trade on the western economy to the regulation of charities in Alberta to
investment opportunities for the western provinces in Mexico. It also
publishes a quarterly magazine, Window on the West, which explores a wide
range of social, economic, environmental, and political issues of interest to
Western Canada. A passionate advocate for greater western representation
in Parliament, the Foundation has sponsored publications and conferences
that have focused on the prospects for constitutional reform in Canada.
However, in recent years, Canada West has diversified its research program
by moving beyond the West’s role in the Canadian federation. Supported by
a large board of directors with representatives from Alberta, British
Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, Canada West actively engages key
stakeholders to advance its mission. In addition to participating in
workshops and conferences, researchers at Canada West interact regularly
with the media.
THE CANADIAN CENTRE FOR POLICY

A LT E R N AT I V E S
The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives was founded by a group of
academic and labour economists, including Steven Langdon, Peter Findlay,
and Robert Clarke, who, along with a cross-section of representatives from
labour unions and left-leaning political organizations, “saw the need for an
independent progressive research agency to counterbalance the right-wing
Fraser and C.D. Howe Institutes.”10 Unlike the free-market-oriented C.D.
Howe and Fraser Institutes, the C C PA believes that “social and economic
issues … are not something to be left to the marketplace or for governments
acting alone to decide.” The Centre “is committed to putting forward
research that reflects the concerns of women as well as men, labour as well
as business, churches, cooperatives, and voluntary agencies as well as
governments, minorities, and disadvantaged people as well as fortunate
individuals.”11
Since its inception in 1980, the C C PA has published hundreds of peer-
reviewed reports, studies, and books on a wide range of social, political,
and economic policy issues. Among the many topics it has examined are
sexism and gender inequality, trade, poverty, and human rights. In 1994, it
also launched a monthly journal, The Monitor, which may undergo
significant change as the new editorial team looks to expand the journal’s
reach. Since 1995, it has released the Alternative Federal Budget, an edited
collection of articles that, as the book’s title implies, suggests different ways
the government could spend its revenue. In addition to conveying its ideas
through its many publications, the C C PA often works closely with policy-
makers and representatives from unions and other nongovernmental
organizations to advance its agenda. It also recognizes the importance of
maintaining strong ties to the media and, according to its own findings,
ranks among the most widely cited think tanks in the country. C C PA
closely tracks the exposure it generates in newspapers, on radio and
television, and in social media.12
The C C PA’s budget of slightly over $5.5 million is generated primarily
from the contributions of its over 12,000 organizational and individual
donors.13 Close to half of its resources are allocated for research. The
institute performs contract work for various governmental and
nongovernmental organizations as well. The C C PA’s national headquarters
is based in Ottawa, where it has more than dozen staff members. In 1997, it
expanded its operations beyond the nation’s capital by opening branch
offices in Manitoba, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan.
The C C PA also has a regional office in Toronto.
T H E C .D . H O WE I N S T I T U T E
Few think tanks in Canada have attracted more attention in the media and in
policy-making circles than the Toronto-based C.D. Howe Institute, an
organization with a mandate to help improve living standards in Canada
through sound economic and social policy.14 Named after the Liberal
cabinet minister Clarence Decatur Howe (1886–1960), who served in the
governments of Prime Ministers William Lyon Mackenzie King and Louis
St Laurent continuously from 1935–1957, the institute’s origins can be
traced to the Private Planning Association of Canada (P PA C), established
in 1958 “by business and labor leaders to undertake research and
educational activities on economic policy issues.”15 In 1973 the P PA C
merged with the C.D. Howe Memorial Foundation (1961) to become the
C.D. Howe Research Institute (H R I). Eight years later, when the H R I
dissolved, the “Foundation again became a separate entity and the
reconstituted P PA C was renamed the C.D. Howe Institute.”16
Known for its expertise on Canadian economic, social, and trade policy,
C.D. Howe has published hundreds of studies and sponsored countless
conferences and workshops on virtually every major policy initiative upon
which the federal and provincial governments have embarked. In 2013, the
institute held “a record 60 policy events and published] a record of 55
research studies.”17 Many of these studies have been written by its small
staff of in-house experts, including C.D. Howe’s president William Robson
and Wendy Dobson, and cover topics ranging from energy and
transportation policy and healthcare to payment technology and governance
and tax rates and credits.18 Countless others have been contracted out to
some of the country’s leading economists and political scientists, including
David Laidler, Judith Maxwell, and Thomas Courchene, Robert Young,
Michael Hart, Sylvia Ostry, and Michael Trebilcock.19 The institute, which
devotes approximately 90 per cent of its budget to research and related
expenses, and prides itself on publishing high quality, peer-reviewed
studies, does not try to overwhelm readers with monographs of several
hundred pages, but relies on brief studies or commentaries to highlight the
implications of particular government policies.
The C.D. Howe Institute, unlike many other think tanks, does not assess
its influence solely by the number of publications it produces or by the
many prominent business leaders who serve on its board of directors.
Rather, it evaluates its impact by the contribution it makes to stimulating
informed public debate. According to one of its annual reports, “The
Institute monitors whether its output measures up to the high standards of
its members, the media, policy-makers, and the public. Key indicators of
success are strong attendance at Institute meetings, wide news coverage of
Institute publications, an improved quality of public debate, and, ultimately,
the willingness of policy-makers to listen.”20
The C.D. Howe Institute follows a simple formula to ensure that policy-
makers listen: it outfits “influential decision-makers with concrete research,
[and] provide[s] a forum in which they can interact, and mix vigorously.”21
This formula seems to have paid off. Over the years, C.D. Howe has
received dozens of endorsements from policy-makers, journalists, and
business leaders who have acknowledged the valuable work of the institute.
They also continue to enjoy the support of several major donors, including
the Donner Foundation, Aurea Foundation, Max Bell Foundation, Lotte &
John Hecht Memorial Foundation, and Pfizer Canada Inc. In addition, the
Institute receives funding from several corporations and private donors.
Although the institute takes great pride in the research it generates, it
pays close attention to how often its studies and conferences are quoted in
the press, and how much traffic is generated on its website. According to its
2013 annual report, “C.D. Howe received a total of 1,466 citations across
Canadian and international media in 2013 – a 46 percent increase since
2010 … Online, cdhowe.org surpassed 15,000 monthly visits for the first
time.”22 In its 2016 Annual Report, C.D Howe provides even more detailed
figures on its media exposure, and the various activities in which it has been
engaged on Parliament Hill and in other important venues.
C E N T R E F O R I N T E R N AT I O N A L G O V E R N A N C E
I N N O VAT I O N (C I G I )
With a budget and endowment23 that most think tanks in North America
and Europe could only dream of, C I G I is, in many respects, in a class by
itself. Founded by Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis of the Waterloo-based
telecommunications firm Research in Motion (R I M), the manufacturers of
Blackberry, with a $30 million endowment ($20 million from Balsillie and
$10 million from Lazaridis), and “with more or less matching grants from
the Canadian and Ontario governments,”24 C I G I was created as “an
independent, non-partisan think tank on international governance.”25 In
addition to C I G I, which Michael Valpy of The Globe and Mail describes as
“the jewel of [Balsillie’s] global endeavour,”26 the Waterloo-based
entrepreneur has invested millions of dollars to build the Balsillie School of
International Affairs, the Balsillie Centre for Excellence, the Canadian
International Council, and the International Governance Leaders and
Organizations Online (I G L O O). All told, Balsillie has spent over $100
million to secure a foothold in the international relations community.
Allegations surround Balsillie’s involvement in the academic affairs of
C I G I and the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and his efforts to
create programs jointly supported by C I G I and other universities in
Canada have not been without controversy. Indeed, in 2012, York
University faced a rare censure from the Canadian Association of
University teachers (C A U T) for considering establishing a school in
international law with C I G I.27
According to its website, “C I G I supports research, forms networks,
advances policy debate and generates ideas for multilateral governance
improvements. Conducting an active agenda of research, events and
publications, C I G I’s interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with
policy, business and academic communities around the world.”28 Since
2001, C I G I has made a concerted effort to recruit many of the top
international affairs scholars around the globe. Its extensive listing of
research fellows, which currently exceeds eighty, boasts several
distinguished experts, including David Welch, Thomas Homer-Dixon, Fen
Osler Hampson, Simon Dalby, and James Blight. With considerable
expertise upon which to draw and the financial resources to sustain its
work, C I G I has established a number of important research programs.
These include: global economy, global security, environment and energy,
and global development. Many of these initiatives are supported by
municipal, federal, and provincial government departments, ministries, and
agencies. C I G I also receives funding from some international government
agencies such as the Geneva Centre for the Public Control of Armed Forces
and the United Kingdom Department for International Development.29
C I G I’s research output of books, policy papers, briefs, and other
publications has been impressive. Indeed, by 2010, the institute was
generating over 100 publications annually, and the organization’s output
continues to increase. C I G I is conscious of raising its public profile;
however, being situated in Waterloo, Ontario instead of in a major urban
centre, has limited the amount of national exposure it generates.
THE CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA
The Conference Board of Canada is the largest policy research institution in

Canada, but despite its visibility, the Board’s origins can be traced to the
United States. In 1916, the Conference Board was established in New York
to “facilitate a cross-fertilization of facts and ideas in industry as a way of
identifying and solving its problems and enhancing the public’s
understanding of these problems.”30 Like many other think tanks created
during the Progressive Era, the founder of the Conference Board insisted
that the organization engage in “unbiased fact finding” and “refrain from all
political activity.”31
During the decades following its founding, the Conference Board
established itself as a highly credible and competent research organization
that proved capable of addressing the needs of both American and Canadian
companies. Indeed, as Lindquist points out, “With 40 large Canadian
companies alone participating in the US-based organization, the creation of
a Canadian office seemed a natural step.”32 In 1954, the Conference Board
opened a small office in Montreal to respond to an expanding number of
Canadian companies, Canadian-based US subsidiaries, and US companies
interested in obtaining more information about Canada.33
The Conference Board of Canada has created a well-defined niche in the
policy-making community. Unlike many smaller think tanks that attempt to
influence public debates through their various publications and exchanges
with policy-makers and journalists, the Conference Board specializes in
providing knowledge in key areas to its members in the public and private
sectors. In exchange for a membership fee, the Conference Board “[helps
its] members anticipate and respond to the increasingly changing global
economy … through the exchange of knowledge about organizational
strategies and practices, emerging economic and social trends and key
public policy issues.”34 Its primary goal is to help its members become
better prepared to adapt to changes in the marketplace.
As well as providing members with access to its publications and
conferences, the Conference Board undertakes contract research. Known
for its expertise in economic forecasting and analysis, the board also
specializes in several other areas, including corporate social responsibility,
human resource management, public sector management, and information
and innovation and technology.35
Given its size and the breadth of its research expertise, it is not
surprising that the Conference Board attracts more media attention than any
other policy institute in Canada, a finding that the organization showcases
in its annual reports.36 To better assess its reach and impact, it also
monitors, among other things, the hundreds of research reports it has
published, the number of tweets it has posted, how many followers it has on
Twitter, and the frequency with which it issues news releases and
advisories.37 When it comes to determining which performance indicators
to consider in evaluating their impact, the Conference Board leaves few
stones unturned.
THE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC

POLICY
The Institute for Research on Public Policy (I R P P) is unique among

Canadian think tanks. To begin with, with the exception of C I G I and a
handful of other think tanks, it is one of the few policy institutes in the
country whose financial security has been guaranteed by a sizeable
endowment. With a current market value of close to $40 million, I R P P’s
“endowment fund was built up in the 1970s and 1980s by $10 million from
the private sector and provincial governments, matched by $10 million from
the federal government.”38 Since the interest earned from the endowment
covers most of I R P P’s operating expenses, the I R P P, unlike other think
tanks in Canada, does not have to mount annual fund-raising campaigns.
I R P P is also unique because it is among the few independent English-
language public-policy research institutes in Quebec. After I R P P opened
its doors in Montreal in 1972, its head office moved to several cities,
including Ottawa, Halifax, and Victoria, before relocating to Montreal in
1991.
The I R P P’s creation was inspired by the eminent Canadian economist
Ronald Ritchie, who was commissioned by Prime Minister Trudeau in 1968
to examine the feasibility of creating an independent multidisciplinary
research institute in Canada. After surveying the think tank landscape in
several countries, including the United States, and after interviewing dozens
of think tank directors and policy-makers, Ritchie recommended that an
institute similar to the Brookings Institution be established in Canada to
provide long-term strategic analysis. Although Ritchie’s report did not
result in the creation of a think tank on the scale of the Brookings
Institution, it did lead to the founding of the I R P P and several other policy
research institutes.
Remaining loyal to Ritchie’s vision of an institute conducting
independent policy analysis, I R P P has undertaken a “measured approach
to public policy, which revolves around informing policy debates rather
than advancing a particular ideological position.”39 It seeks to inform and
educate policy-makers and the public, primarily through its magazine
Policy Options and through its book-length studies. While staff members
from the institute have also testified before parliamentary committees and
submitted op-ed articles to Canadian newspapers, I R P P has claimed in the
past that enhancing its media profile is not a priority. However, this position
appears to have changed as the institute, mirroring other think tanks, pays
close attention to its “impact” in the public arena. Indeed, on the first page
of its 2014 annual report, I R P P summarizes its impact by highlighting in
bold blue that in the past year, it recorded: 370,322 website page views,
111, 280 website visitors, 2,440 Twitter followers, 332 Facebook likes, 615
stories in the media, 17 publications, 16 events, and published 6 issues of
Policy Options.40 And according to its 2016 annual report, I R P P’s
exposure continues to grow. In that year it recorded: 1,045 references in the
media, 14 op-ed articles, 763,891 website visitors, 21,366 downloads, 5,975
Twitter followers, and 676 Facebook likes.41
Despite allocating the bulk of its $2 to 2.5 million budget to research,
the I R P P has not developed significant in-house expertise. Indeed, rather
than hiring several researchers, the institute, like C.D. Howe, relies on its
small staff to coordinate research projects that are undertaken largely by
academics at various universities. I R P P’s current research activity focuses
on several areas, including: skills and labour market policy, international
trade and global commerce, faces of aging, income inequality, and health
and public policy.
T H E MA C D O N A L D - L A U R I E R I N S T I T U T E
Named in honour of two of Canada’s most beloved prime ministers (a die-

hard conservative and a passionate liberal) the Macdonald-Laurier Institute
(ML I) burst onto the think tank scene in 2010 with a mission to “make
poor quality public policy unacceptable in Ottawa.”42 To achieve this, the
ML I is committed to “proposing thoughtful alternatives to Canadians and
their political and opinion leaders through non-partisan and independent
research and commentary.”43 Founded by Brian Lee Crowley, former
founding president of the A I MS, the small but dynamic institute, with
markedly conservative leanings, has made its presence felt in key policy-
making circles. No stranger to the world of think tanks, Crowley has
assembled an impressive cohort of research fellows to weigh in on several
formidable policy challenges in several policy areas, including national
defence and security, foreign affairs, Aboriginal issues, energy, justice, and
immigration. He has also paid close attention to the many channels upon
which the ML I can rely to convey its ideas to key stakeholders. In addition
to showcasing several books and studies authored by scholars affiliated with
the ML I, the institute publishes a magazine, Inside Policy, published six
times a year. It also releases a steady stream of policy commentaries and a
report entitled The ML I Leading Indicator which tracks recent trends in the
economy. To further enhance its presence in the nation’s capital and around
the country and to highlight the importance of domestic and foreign policy
challenges confronting Canadians, the Institute sponsors several
conferences, seminars, and debates that have featured many prominent
policy-makers, journalists, and academics.
Well aware of the difficulty think tanks have in measuring their impact,
the ML I, like many of its competitors, relies on several performance
indicators and rankings from the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report to
assess its standing. In its 2013 Annual Report, the ML I points out that,
according to the 2013 edition of the think tank index, “it ranked third in the
world in the category of best young institute,” and indeed with “great policy
products, it also managed to rank ahead of other older think tanks.”44 In the
2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, the ML I ranked 10th among
the top think tanks in Canada and Mexico.45 The ML I also keeps tabs of
how often it is referenced by the national media and how many followers it
has on Twitter and Facebook. In its annual report, it also references the
number of visitors that access its website annually. However, unlike most
think tanks that offer little more than statistics to convince readers how
much influence they ostensibly wield, the ML I provides information about
how and why it believes it was able to help shape policy discussions.
Indeed, in the section devoted to “Impact and Public Policy” in its annual
report, the ML I makes a concerted effort to demonstrate the similarities
between its policy recommendations and legislation adopted by policy-
makers.46 Although far more research must be undertaken to confirm its
findings, the ML I at least recognizes the importance of offering more than
mere statistics about the influence it exercises.
MO N T R E A L E C O N O MI C I N S T I T U T E
“When he launched the ME I’s operations in 1999, our current President

and C E O Michel Kelly-Gagnon, had at his disposal a staggering budget of
$15,000, and his office equipment consisted of a telephone and a fax
machine set up in one corner of his apartment,” recalls Hélène Desmarais,
chair of ME I’s Board in the organization’s 2014 annual report.47 But a year
later, with the backing of a small group of supporters, the free-market-
oriented ME I was able to escape obscurity in its journey toward occupying
a visible presence on Quebec’s public policy landscape. Its goal is clear: “to
stimulate debate on public policies in Quebec and across Canada by
proposing wealth-creating reforms based on market mechanisms.”48 With a
budget of little more than $2 million, raised primarily from individual
donors, businesses, and foundations (no government money is accepted),
the ME I has established itself as a strong and assertive voice on provincial
and federal policy initiatives. Critical to ME I’s success has been its ability
to engage the media and other key stakeholders. As Michel Kelly-Gagnon
acknowledges, “The evolution of the ME I’s status to that of a privileged
media partner was confirmed in 2014. Never worried about stirring things
up and ruffling a few feathers, the ME I’s researchers are still ready and
willing to challenge preconceptions. But they are now increasingly cited for
their original research, referenced as representative of one of the main
positions in a debate, and invited to clarify a complex policy issue.”49
ME I’s research focus is wide-ranging and includes studies on
agriculture, energy, health care, housing, labour, and taxation. In addition to
the many studies and policy briefs it has published, the institute encourages
its scholars to interact with the media. According to its findings in 2013–14,
the ME I was referenced by the media over 4,387 times, had 2,307
followers on Facebook, 3,590 followers on Twitter, and 24,401 views on
You Tube.50 Two years later, its exposure had risen dramatically, with 8,073
media mentions, 4,326 Facebook followers, 4,064 followers on Twitter, and
53,540 views on You Tube.51 And, like the ML I, the ME I has taken steps
to explain how it has made a difference in various public policy debates.
There is little doubt that it has made great strides since its humble
beginnings.
MO WAT C E N T R E
Housed in the School of Public Policy & Governance at the University of

Toronto, the Mowat Centre, named in honour of Sir Oliver Mowat (1820–
1903), Ontario’s third and longest-serving premier (1872–96), has as its
mission to “provide an independent Ontario voice on public policy by
conducting and communicating analytically-rigorous, evidence-based
public policy research that has meaningful impact, actionable
recommendations and strengthens Ontario in a rapidly changing world.”52
With a grant of $900,000 from the Government of Ontario, the Mowat
Centre conducts research in four main areas: intergovernmental economic
and social policy, government transformation, the not-for-profit sector, and
energy. In carrying out its research, the Centre sees itself as performing
three main roles: as an idea generator capable of identifying and
disseminating information on key policy issues; as a convenor that holds
seminars, workshops, and conferences, and engages in informal
conversations with various target audiences; and as a communicator who,
through its research and gatherings, is constantly “developing and
leveraging relationships among stakeholders, influencers (a term you won’t
find in the Oxford Dictionary), leaders, and decision-makers.”53
Unlike many think tanks that take for granted that their ideas permeate
key decision-making circles, the Mowat Centre pays close attention to the
“impact” its research has on constituent groups. In its 2016 annual report,
the Centre provides an “Impact-Performance Indicators Legend” which
outlines the different kinds of impact and reach it could achieve. These
include: references/citations in official government reports and documents
and legislative debates; media mentions; published op-eds; references in
research studies; and website activity. Alongside each publication listed in
its annual reports, the Centre references these and other indicators to
highlight the study’s impact. Although keeping track of how often the
Centre was cited in research studies or in the Ontario legislature may speak
to how engaged Mowat researchers are in various public debates, and may
go a long way in impressing potential donors, outputs are not outcomes. As
noted, visibility does not guarantee policy influence, an observation not
highlighted in its annual reports. Aware that these and similar indicators
may not go far enough in documenting how much of an impact it has, the
Centre goes one step further by tracking the level and frequency of access
its staff have secured to policy-makers at different levels and branches of
municipal, provincial, federal, and foreign governments.54 While the nature
and result of their interactions with policy-makers is difficult to quantify,
the Mowat Centre is clearly aware of the importance of portraying itself as
an active participant in the policy research community. How much of an
impact the organization has had is debatable. Still, there is little doubt that
in a short period of time, it has filled an important niche in the Canadian
think tank community by becoming a leading voice on critical issues facing
the province of Ontario.
PUBLIC POLICY FORUM
Located a few blocks from Parliament Hill, the roots of the Public Policy
Forum (P P F) can be traced to “a formative meeting in Calgary [in 1987]
with federal deputy ministers and private sector leaders.”55 At that meeting,
“a strong consensus emerged regarding the need to create an independent
space where leaders from the private and public sectors could meet
regularly to discuss governance and public policy.”56 As the P P F points out
in its brief history of the organization, “Since that time, the Forum’s
membership has grown to include more than 180 leading organizations
from business, federal, provincial and territorial governments, academic
institutions, unions, and the voluntary and not-for-profit sectors.”57 The
P P F does not regard itself as an advocacy think tank that seeks to impose
its agenda on policy-makers. Indeed, in its promotional literature, the
institute emphasizes that it does not take positions on any policy issues. As
noted, it was founded not to advance a particular set of ideological goals,
but “to provide a neutral venue where the private sector and the public
sector could meet to learn from one another.”58 According to the P P F, “In
the 1980s, it became clear that, in the global arena where the quality of
government directly affected the competitiveness of the nation, Canada
suffered from the isolation of government from the private sector.”59 To
remedy this problem, the P P F’s former president David Zussman, noted,
“we help to bridge the gap between the two solitudes – government and the
private sector – in order to deal more effectively with issues of common
concern.”60 For many years, the organization has also included
representatives from the voluntary, or “third,” sector in its policy forums.
The P P F’s emphasis on organizing conferences and workshops for
policy-makers and representatives from the private and non-profit sectors is
reflected in the allocation of its resources. Approximately 60 per cent of the
institute’s operating budget of $3.5 to 4 million, raised almost entirely from
membership donations, is set aside for this purpose. Among its more than
100 members are the Bank of Montreal, Bell Canada, Canada Post
Corporation, and several provincial governments. Only 20 to 25 per cent of
its budget is allocated for research, a function to which the P P F has begun
to devote more attention. The Forum, which has done considerable work in
economic, social and trade policy, has identified three themes in its 2013–
16 Strategic Plan, which fall under the broad categories of public service &
governance, economy and competitiveness, and human capital.
APPENDIX THREE
Media Citations for Selected American Think

Tanks, 1998–2008; 2009–2016
Table A3.1
References to Selected American Think Tanks in National Media
(television, newspapers, and magazines), 1998–2008
Sources: Vanderbilt University Television News Archive / Factiva.com / LexisNexis.com.

Figure A3.1
References to Selected American Think Tanks in National Media
(television, newspapers, and magazines), 1998–2008
Table A3.1.1
References to Selected American Think Tanks in National American Media,
2009–2016
Figure A3.1.1
References to Selected American Think Tanks in National American Media,
2009–2016
Table A3.2
References to Selected American Think Tanks on American Television
News, 1998–2008
Figure A3.2
News, 1998–2008
Table A3.2.1
News, 2009–2016
Figure A3.2.1
News, 2009–2016
Table A3.3
News by Network, 1998–2008
Figure A3.3
Table A3.3.1
Figure A3.3.1
Table A3.4
References to Selected American Think Tanks on A B C News, 1998–2008
Figure A3.4
Table A3.4.1
Figure A3.4.1
Table A3.5
References to Selected American Think Tanks on N B C News, 1998–2008
Figure A3.5
Table A3.5.1
Figure A3.5.1
Table A3.6
References to Selected American Think Tanks on C B S News, 1998–2008
Figure A3.6
Table A3.6.1
Figure A3.6.1
Table A3.7
References to Selected American Think Tanks on C N N, 1998–2008
Figure A3.7
Table A3.7.1
Figure A3.7.1
Table A3.8
References to Selected American Think Tanks on Fox News, 1998–2008
* Data only available from 2004.

Figure A3.8
References to Selected American Think Tanks on F O X News, 1998–2008
Table A3.8.1
References to Selected American Think Tanks on F O X News, 2009–2016

N O T E : F O X no longer indexed on Vanderbilt TV News archive after 2008.
Table A3.9
References to Selected American Think Tanks in National Newspapers,
1998–2008
Source: Factiva.com and LexisNexis.com.
Figure A3.9
1998–2008
Table A3.9.1
2009–2016
Source: Factiva.com and LexisNexis.com.

*N O T E : Dallas Morning News and Washington Times indexed, but not populating search results.
Figure A3.9.1
2009–2016
Table A3.10
References to Selected American Think Tanks in National Magazines,
1998–2008
Source: Factiva.com.
Figure A3.10
1998–2008
Table A3.10.1
2009–2016
N O T E : Time Magazine discontinued as of 01/2008; Business Week discontinued as of 07/2001;
Fortune indexed as of 06/2016 on Factiva.com. None of these sources are available on
LexisNexis.com.
* Source: Factiva.com.
** Source: LexisNexis.com.
Figure A3.10.1
2009–2016
Table A3.11
References to Selected American Think Tanks in Canadian and
Figure A3.11
Table A3.11.1
Figure A3.11.1
Table A3.12
References to Selected American Think Tanks in Canadian Newspapers,
1998–2008
Figure A3.12
1998–2008
Table A3.12.1
2009–2016
Figure A3.12.1
2009–2016
Table A3.13
References to Selected American Think Tanks in International Newspapers,
1998–2008
Figure A3.13
1998–2008
Table A3.13.1
2009–2016
* Source: LexisNexis.com.
Figure A3.13.1
2009–2016
Table A3.14
Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of National Media References
Figure A3.14
Table A3.14.1
Figure A3.14.1
Table A3.15
Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of International Media
References for Selected American Think Tanks, 1999–2008
Figure A3.15
Table A3.15.1
Figure A3.15.1
APPENDIX FOUR
Media Citations for Selected Canadian Think

Tanks, 2000–2008; 2009–2016
Table A4.1
Media Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks (radio, television, and
newspaper), 2000–2008
Sources: Proquest / Lexis Nexis / C B C Radio Archives / Virtual News Library (C B C and C T V
National Evening News).
Figure A4.1
Table A4.1.1
Media Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks (radio, televsion, and
Source: Eureka.cc, LexisNexis.com, Factiva.com and Virtual News Library.
Figure A4.1.1
Table A4.2
Television Citations for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 2000–2008
Figure A4.2
Table A4.2.1
Source: Eureka.cc.
Figure A4.2.1
Table A4.3
Tanks, 2000–2008
Search from: C B C T V Saturday Report, Sunday Night, The National.
Source: Virtual News Library.
Figure A4.3
Tanks, 2000–2008
Table A4.3.1
Tanks, 2009–2016
Source: Eureka.cc.
Figure A4.3.1
Tanks, 2009–2016
Table A4.4
Tanks, 2000–2008
Search from: C T V Canada A M , C T V News.
Figure A4.4
Tanks, 2000–2008
Table A4.4.1
Tanks, 2009–2016
Figure A4.4.1
Tanks, 2009–2016
Table A4.5
References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks on C B C Radio, Oct. 2004–
2008
Source: C B C Radio Archives.
Figure A4.5
References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks on C B C Radio, Oct. 2004–
2008
Table A4.5.1
Source: Eureka.cc.
Figure A4.5.1
Table A4.6
Source: ProQuest.
* Source: LexisNexis.
Search parameters: 1 January 2000–4 July 2008.
Figure A4.6
Table A4.6.1
*Souce: LexisNexis.com.
Figure A4.6.1
Table A4.7
References to Selected Canadian Think Tanks in American Newspapers,
1998–2008
Figure A4.7
1998–2008
Table A4.7.1
2009–2016
Figure A4.7.1
2009–2016
Table A4.8
for Selected Canadian Think Tanks
Figure A4.8
for Selected Canadian Think Tanks
Table A4.8.1
for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 2009–2016
Figure A4.8.1
for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 2009–2016
APPENDIX FIVE

the US Congress, 1999–2008; 2009–2016
Table A5.1
Total References to Selected American Think Tanks in the US Congress
(Senate, House of Representatives, Extension of Remarks, and Daily
Digest), 1999–2008
Source: Congressional Record.
Figure A5.1
(Senate, House of Representatives, Extension of Remarks, and Daily
Digest), 1999–2008
Figure A5.1.1
(Senate, House of Representatives, Extension of Remarks, and Daily Digest,
2009–2016
Table A5.1.1
(Senate, House of Representatives, Extension of Remarks, and Daily Digest,
2009–2016
Table A5.2
References to Selected American Think Tanks in the US Senate, 1999–2008
Figure A5.2
Figure A5.2.1
Table A5.2.1
Table A5.3
References to Selected American Think Tanks in the US House of
Representatives, 1999–2008
Figure A5.3
Figure A5.3.1
Table A5.3.1
Table A5.4
References to Selected American Think Tanks in the US Congress
(Extension of Remarks), 1999–2008
Figure A5.4
Figure A5.4.1
Table A5.4.1
Table A5.5
References to Selected American Think Tanks in the US Congress (Daily
Digest), 1999–2008
Figure A5.5
Digest), 1999–2008
Figure A5.5.1
Digest), 2009–2016
Table A5.5.1
Digest), 2009–2016
Table A5.6
Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of References in the US
Congress for Selected American Think Tanks
Figure A5.6
Congress for Selected American Think Tanks
Table A5.6.1
Congress for Selected American Think Tanks, 2009–2016
Figure A5.6.1
Congress for Selected American Think Tanks, 2009–2016
Table A5.7
Appearances by Selected American Think Tanks before Congressional
Information obtained from think tank websites and through email correspondence.
Figure A5.7
Table A5.7.1
Source: Congressional Report.
N O T E : Committee reports database amalgamates all data under pairs of years. Search results not
viewable per session, nor are they viewable by year.
Figure A5.7.1
Table A5.8
Committees, United States Senate and House of Representatives
Source: US Government Printing Office.
APPENDIX SIX
References to Selected Think Tanks in

Parliamentary Committees, 1999–2008; 2009–
2016
Table A6.1
Appearances by Selected Canadian Think Tanks before Parliamentary
Source: Canadian Library of Parliament, http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Library.asp.

Figure A6.1
Appearance by Selected Canadian Think Tanks before Parliamentary
Figure A6.1.1
Appearances by Selected Canadian Think Tanks before Senate Committees,
2008–2016
Table A6.1.1
2008–2016
N O T E : No data for 36th Parliament session avaialble on Parliamentary database.
N O T E : Senate of Canada website database no longer offers data prior to 40th Parliament, 3rd
session – existing data above is a reflection of previous research on select institutes
https://sencanada.ca/en/In-The-Chamber/Debates/Search?k=%22fraser+institute%22.
Table A6.2
1999–2008
Source: Library of Parliament, http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Library.asp.
Figure A6.2
1999–2008
Figure A6.2.1
2009–2016
Table A6.2.1
2009–2016
N O T E : Senate of Canada website database no longer offers data prior to 40th Parliament, 3rd
session – existing data above is a reflection of previous research on select institutes
https://sencanada.ca/en/In-The-Chamber/Debates/Search.
Table A6.3
Appearances by Selected Canadian Think Tanks before the House of
Commons, 1999–2008
Figure A6.3
Commons, 1999–2008
Figure A6.3.1
Commons, 2009–2016
Table A6.3.1
Commons, 2009–2016

Table A6.4
References to Selected Think Tanks during Debates in the House of
Commons, 1994–2008
Figure A6.4
Commons, 1994–2008
Figure A6.4.1
Commons, 2009–2016
Table A6.4.1
Commons, 2009–2016
Table A6.5
References to Selected Think Tanks during Debates in the Senate, 1994–
2008
Figure A6.5
2008
Table A6.5.1
2016
N O T E : Senate debate information only available since the beginning of the 40th Parliament, 3rd
Session (2010–03–03), nothing available prior.
Figure A6.5.1
2016
Table A6.6
Comparison of Annual Budget to Number of Appearances before
Parliamentary Committees for Selected Canadian Think Tanks, 1994–2008
Figure A6.6
Table A6.6.1
N O T E : ‘Appearances’ amalgamated from tables 5.14.1 and 5.13.1.
Figure A6.6.1
APPENDIX SEVEN
Documents Related to Keystone XL Pipeline
Table A7.1
Public Exposure of Selected American Think Tanks in Relation to Keystone
XL
Figure A7.1
Newspaper Coverage of Selected Canadian Think Tanks in Relation to
Keystone X L
Figure A7.2
Keystone X L
Table 7.2
Keystone X L
Notes
INTRODUCTION
1 See McGann, 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report.

2 For a detailed comparison of American and British think tanks see Stone, Capturing the
Political Imagination, and Higgott and Stone, “The Limits of Influence.” On some of the
fundamental differences between Canadian and American think tanks, see Abelson and
Carberry, “Following Suit?” For detailed analyses of think tanks in several different countries
and regions see Abelson, Brooks and Hua, Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-Politics;
Stone, Denham, and Garnett, Think Tanks across Nations; McGann and Weaver, Think Tanks
and Civil Societies; and Langford and Brownsey, Think Tanks. On British and German think
tanks, see Pautz, Think Tanks, Social Democracy.
3 Abelson and Carberry, “Following Suit?,” 525–6.
4 For instance, Ernst suggests that the C.D. Howe Institute played a critical role in reinforcing and
advancing the Conservative government’s free trade agenda during the 1980s. See his article
“Liberal Continentalism.” Moreover, Brodie and Jenson have noted that several Canadian think
tanks, including the Fraser Institute, C.D. Howe Institute, and the Economic Council of Canada,
have contributed to the new “neoliberal” orthodoxy. See Crisis, Challenge and Change, 312.
5 Several scholars studying think tanks in the United States have attempted to show how think
tanks shape policy issues and legislation as diverse as the Strategic Defence Initiative (S D I , or
Star Wars Project) and the creation of a national budget system. For a discussion of the
contribution of the Heritage Foundation to the debate over S D I , see Edwards, The Power of
Ideas. A broader discussion about conservative think tanks and their contribution to policy
debates can be found in Stahl, Right Moves. On the impact of the Brookings Institution in
helping to create a national budget system see Critchlow, The Brookings Institution, and Smith,
Brookings at Seventy-Five. By contrast, the handful of scholars studying Canadian think tanks
have provided a less than enthusiastic endorsement of the impact of policy institutes on key
policy debates. See, for instance, Lindquist, Behind the Myth, and Tupper, “Think-Tanks.”
6 Some commentators have suggested that the sheer number of think tanks, interest groups, and
other organizations committed to influencing public policy in the United States may constitute a
constraint. See, for example, Denham and Garnett, British Think-Tanks, 19. However, since not
all think tanks have comparable resources, it is questionable how much constraint the think tank
population imposes on these organizations. If, for instance, there were dozens of think tanks on
the scale of the Brookings Institution, then perhaps this argument would be more persuasive.
Yet, as this study demonstrates, the Brookings Institution and the handful of other think tanks in
the United States that possess comparable resources face little competition from the majority of
much smaller policy institutes.
7 In his assessment of the impact of societal groups on Canadian foreign policy, Nossal draws a
distinction between influencing policy-making and the policy-making environment. See
Canadian Foreign Policy, 117. This distinction is important when one is evaluating the impact
of think tanks. As Pal notes, while think tanks in Canada “have enlarged the terms of political
discourse,” it is important not to exaggerate their impact on policy-making. See his Public
Policy Analysis, 92–4.
8 See, for instance, Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures,” 57–85, and Kriesi et al., “New
Social Movements.”
9 Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, 38–52.
10 For examples of how scholars have attempted to assess the impact of ideas on policy-making
see Yee, “Causal Effects of Ideas”; Campbell, “Institutional Analysis”; and Goldstein and
Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy.
11 The media coverage a select group of American think tanks has generated and the various
factors that account for their visibility are examined by Rich and Weaver, “Think Tanks.”
Useful data on how often American think tanks testify before Congressional committees are
provided by Rich, “Think Tanks.” For a discussion of the relationship between the public
visibility of a cross-section of Canadian think tanks and their relevance in policy-making, see
Abelson, “Public Visibility.”
12 Jérôme-Forget, “Institute for Research on Public Policy,” 99.
13 Several books and articles have documented the 2016 US presidential election. See, for
example, Dowd, The Year of Voting Dangerously, and Stone, The Making of the President 2016.
14 For a discussion of the events surrounding the resignation of Jim DeMint, see Dumain and
Byrd, “Jim DeMint Out as President of Heritage Foundation”; Cook et al., “DeMint Set to Be
Ousted”; Bolton, “DeMint Expected to Step Down”; Peters and Haberman, “Jim DeMint Is Said
to Be Out”; Hart, “The Political Assassination of the Heritage Foundation’s Jim DeMint”; and
Balan, “Trump Thanks Jim DeMint.” An email was also sent by Thomas Saunders, chair of the
Board of Trustees at Heritage on 2 May 2017 explaining the events leading up to DeMint’s
resignation. Kay Coles James, a senior advisor on Trump’s transition team, became president of
the Heritage Foundation on 1 January 2018.
15 For a discussion of the controversy surrounding Balsillie’s involvement in C I G I , see Brean,
“York University Teaches Jim Balsillie Hard Lesson.”
16 Interview with author, 16 December 1998.
17 Smith, The Idea Brokers; Stone, Denham, and Garnett, Think Tanks across Nations. Also see
Medvetz, Think Tanks in America; Abelson, Brooks and Hua, Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and
Geo-Politics; and Drezner, The Ideas Industry.
18 For more on the controversy surrounding the N P I , see Link, “Richard Spencer’s Nonprofit,
Pro-hate N P I Lost Its Tax-Exempt Status,” 14 March 2017.
19 McGann, Competition for Dollars, 9. For a detailed discussion of the defining characteristics of
think tanks, see Abelson, Northern Lights, chap. 1.
20 For more on the role of public think tanks such as the Congressional Research Service see
Robinson, “Public Think-Tanks.”
21 For more on the restrictions placed on the political activities of charitable organizations in
Canada see Revenue Canada, Information Circular 87–1: Registered Charities – Ancillary and
Incidental Political Activities. A detailed examination of the many challenges facing non-
profit/charitable organizations in Canada can be found in Mulé and DeSantis (eds), The Shifting
Terrain. For information on restrictions on registered charities in the United States see Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, 1077–96. Also see Abelson, Northern Lights, ch. 1. President Trump
has vowed to destroy the Johnson Amendment, proposed by then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson in
1954, which places limits on the kinds of partisan activities in which religious institutions and
other 501 c. 3 charitable organizations are able to take part. See Green, “Trump Wants to Make
Churches the New Super PA C s”; Benko, “Trump’s Promise”; and Peters, “The Johnson
Amendment.” Some think tanks in Canada and the US are becoming more transparent about the
sources of their funding. An organization called Transparify assigns ratings to think tanks based
on how transparent they are regarding their funding. For more on this see Abelson, Northern
Lights. Although think tanks registered as 501 c. 3 organizations are not required by law to
disclose who makes donations and gifts to them, the US Congress requires scholars from think
tanks who testify before various congressional committees to reveal who has funded the
research project on which the information they are providing is based.
22 For more on Jane Addams and Hull House, see Ross, The Origins of Social Science.
23 Sundquist, “Research Brokerage.”
24 Peschek, Policy Planning Organizations, 7.
25 See, for instance, McGann and Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies; Stone, Political
Imagination; Stone, Denham, and Garnett, Think Tanks across Nations; Smith, The Idea
Brokers; and Abelson, American Think Tanks.
26 A somewhat dated, though extensive, directory of American think tanks is Hellebust, Think
Tank Directory. A more up to date listing is available in the 2016 Global Go To Think Tank
Index Report and in the database housed by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies program at the
University of Pennsylvania. For a listing of conservative, or classical liberal, think tanks, see
Atwood and Mead, Directory of Public Policy Organizations. While no comprehensive
directory of Canadian think tanks has been produced (the Global Go To Think Tank Index
Reports can be referenced), there are some international directories that should be consulted.
The National Institute for Research Advancement’s (N I R A ) World Directory of Think Tanks is
the most extensive. On think tanks specializing in defence and security issues see Van Der
Woerd, World Survey of Strategic Studies Centres. For an assessment of the various global
rankings of think tanks that have been undertaken in recent years, see Abelson, Northern Lights,
chapter 7.
27 Peschek, Policy Planning Organizations. Also see Domhoff and Dye, Power Elites; and
Saloma, Ominous Politics. Several other studies have examined think tanks from an elite theory
perspective. Among them are Silk and Silk, The American Establishment; Shoup and Minter,
Imperial Brain Trust; Shoup, Wall Street’s Think Tank; and Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis.
28 Heclo, “Issue Networks,” and Lindquist, “Think-Tanks?”
29 See Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures”; Kriesi et al., “New Social Movements.”
30 For a discussion on the limitations of relying on single case studies, see Baumgartner and
Leech, Basic Interests, 146.
CHAPTER ONE
1 Smith, Idea Brokers.

2 See McGann, 2016 Global Go To Think Tanks Index Report. Also see his recent study, The Fifth
Estate.
3 Only a handful of think tanks in the US have budgets in excess of $40 million. The vast
majority have operating revenue in the $1 to 5 million range.
4 For a discussion of the various think tank typologies that have been constructed, see Abelson,
Northern Lights, chap. 1.
5 Weaver, “Changing World,” 564.
6 Ibid., 567.
7 Lindquist, “Think Tanks?,” 576.
8 See MacDonald and Moss, “Building a Think-and-Do Tank.”
9 For more on the role of think tanks during the Progressive Era, see Smith, The Idea Brokers;
Critchlow, The Brookings Institution.
10 Several scholars have argued that philanthropists often support research institutions to advance
their own political and ideological interests. See, for example, Sealander, Private Wealth, and
Culleton Colwell, Private Foundations.
11 For a more complete chronological listing of think tanks created during this period see McGann,
“Academics to Ideologues,” 739–40.
12 See Abelson, American Think Tanks, especially chapter 2, and “From Policy Research to
Political Advocacy.” For more on the political agendas of philanthropic donors see Freund,
Narcissism and Philanthropy.
13 For more on this investigation, see Abelson, Northern Lights, 52, 97 and 116. In Canada, some
concerns have also been raised about sizeable donations to the Mulroney Institute of
Government. See Dubinsky, “New Mulroney Institute”; Bundale, “Professor Criticizes N S
University”; and Cribb and Chown Oved, “Honorary Degrees for Brian Mulroney’s Billionaire
Friends.”
14 Silverstein, “Pay for Play.”
15 Abelson, American Think Tanks, 35.
16 Among the many factors that could account for the fact that Canada, unlike the United States,
did not develop several prominent research institutions during the early 1900s is the absence of
large-scale philanthropic foundations dedicated to social science research. For more on this see
Richardson and Fisher, The Development of the Social Sciences, especially the introduction.
17 Lindquist employs the term “club” to describe the goals and functions of many Canadian policy
institutes. See his “Think Tanks?”
18 For more on the early history of these organizations see Manny, “The Canadian Institute of
International Affairs”; Osendarp, “A Decade of Transition”; Holmes, “The C I I A , ” 9–10;
Demson, “Canadian Institute of International Affairs”; and Greathead, “Antecedents and
Origins.” The history of the C C S D is examined in Splane, 75 Years of Community Service.
19 The R A N D Corporation is now referred to simply as R A N D . Several other institutes,
including the Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for Defense Analyses, advise the US
government on defence issues. In recent years R A N D has expanded its research program to
include, among other things, health care reform. R A N D also offers a joint graduate program
with the University of California at Los Angeles, and it maintains a smaller office in
Washington, DC. For a detailed analysis of R A N D , see Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon;
Abella, Soldiers of Reason; and Samaan, The Rand Corporation.
20 The Hudson Institute was founded by Kahn and a handful of his former colleagues at R A N D
in 1961. Although originally based in Westchester County, New York, Hudson moved to
Indianapolis following Kahn’s death in 1984. See Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman
Kahn. It also maintains an office in Washington, DC. The Hudson Institute’s major clients
include the Departments of Defense (including the US Navy), Labor, State, and Commerce.
Former vice president Dan Quayle and Elliot Abrams, former assistant secretary of state for
human rights, took up residence at Hudson after leaving public office. The Urban Institute was
created in 1968 at the request of President Lyndon B. Johnson and his domestic policy advisers.
It was originally conceived as the domestic policy equivalent of R A N D . From its inception,
the Urban Institute has relied extensively on government contracts from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (H U D ), the Department of Transportation, and several other
departments and agencies at the state and federal level. It also receives financial support from
various private donors and philanthropic foundations.
21 For more on C S I S see Smith, Strategic Calling.
22 Several studies have been written on the Institute for Policy Studies. See, for instance, Powell,
Covert Cadre; Muravchik, “The Think-Tank of the Left”; and Yoffe, “I P S Faces Life.”
23 C.D. Howe Institute, home page (www.cdhowe.org), “A History of the Institute.”
24 Vanier Institute of the Family, www.familyforum.com.
25 For a discussion of how task forces and royal commissions have been used as sources of policy
expertise for the Canadian government, see Bradford, Commissioning Ideas, and Jenson,
“Commissioning Ideas.”
26 The Economic Council of Canada was formerly known as the National Productivity Council,
created in 1961.
27 Abelson and Lindquist, “Think Tanks in North America.”
28 Ibid.
29 As noted, the Economic Council and the Science Council were disbanded following the
February 1992 federal budget. Other victims of budget constraints included the Canadian
Institute for International Peace and Security and the Law Reform Commission. On the demise
of the Science Council of Canada, see De La Mothe, “A Dollar Short,” 873–86. For budget cuts
that led to the closure of the North-South Institute and the National Council of Welfare, see
Abelson, Northern Lights.
30 For more on the P R I , see Anderson, “The New Focus.”
31 On the A E I ’s influence on Heritage see Abelson, American Think Tanks, 54–5.
32 On the strategies of advocacy think tanks, see Abelson, “In Search of Policy Influence,” “Policy
Experts and Political Pundits,” and “Think Tanks in the United States.” For a detailed analysis
of the Heritage Foundation, see Edwards, Leading the Way and The Power of Ideas and
Abelson, “Feulner’s Pendulum.”
33 For more on the involvement of the Heritage Foundation during the 1980 presidential campaign
and the transition period that followed see Abelson, American Think Tanks.
34 See Weaver, “The Changing World,” 567.
35 Abelson and Lindquist, “Think Tanks in North America.” See Ritchie, An Institute for Research
on Public Policy.
36 Ibid. The Private Planning Association of Canada was created in 1957 as the Canadian
counterpart to the US National Planning Association; its creation was a condition for receiving
foundation support to establish the Canadian-American Committee (C A C ), a council of 100
private sector leaders and representatives who were to meet two or three times a year to discuss
common problems, sponsor research, and develop consensus positions. For some additional
information on the C.D. Howe Institute, see Beigie, “Economic Policy Analysis,” and Ernst,
“Liberal Continentalism.”
37 Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, www.ccp.ca. Now part of Imagine Canada at
www.imaginecanada.ca.
38 In addition to pursuing its research program, the Fraser Institute has found innovative ways to
promulgate its values: the widely reported Tax Freedom Day and its blog, the Fraser Forum,
are just some of the methods Fraser uses to convey its ideas.
39 The term vanity think tank was coined by Landers in “Think-Tanks.”
40 Chisolm, “Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream.”
41 As a result of a growing controversy over the legality of creating an organization that on the
surface appeared to be used to circumvent campaign finance laws, Dole pulled the plug on this
project. For more on this see Melton, “Closing of Dole’s Think Tank.”
42 On the Progress and Freedom Foundation see Regan, “A Think Tank with One Idea”;
Dickerson, “Newt Inc.”; Weisskopf, “New Political Landscape”; and Simpson, “New Addition.”
After resigning his position as speaker of the house, Newt Gingrich decided that in addition to
undertaking some consulting work, he would strengthen his ties to conservative think tanks. He
is currently a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a distinguished visiting
fellow at the Hoover Institution.
43 For more on the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, see Lee, “Beyond
Consultations.”
44 See, for instance, Abelson and Lindquist, “Who’s Thinking about International Affairs?”
45 Abelson and Lindquist, “Think Tanks in North America,” 45.
46 For a history of the Brookings Institution see Critchlow, The Brookings Institution; Saunders,
The Brookings Institution; and Smith, Brookings at Seventy-Five.
47 Robert S. Brookings’s extraordinary life is chronicled in Hagedorn, Brookings.
48 Brookings Institution, Annual Report 2016.
49 Orlans, The Nonprofit Research Institute, 19.
50 On the removal of Project R A N D from Douglas Aircraft, see Smith, The R A N D Corporation,
51–74.
51 Orlans, The Nonprofit Research Institute, 21.
52 R A N D ’s contribution to America’s nuclear strategy is examined in Kaplan, Wizards of
Armageddon and in Abella, Soldiers of Reason.
53 Budget sources are based on 2016 figures. R A N D has also received funding from the
Department of Health and Human Services/National Institutes of Health, other federal and
government agencies, private firms, associations and international agencies, foundations, and
individuals. It also draws on its sizeable endowment to support its research. See publication by
R A N D entitled An Introduction to R A N D .
54 Peschek, Policy-Planning Organizations, 28. Also see Peschek’s study, “Free the Fortune 500!,”
165–80. For additional information on the history of A E I , see Ford, “American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research,” 29–47.
55 Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment, 39.
56 Ibid., 38.
57 Ibid., 39.
58 Ibid.
59 Linden, “Powerhouses of Policy,” 102.
60 Ibid.
61 Melvin Laird was secretary of defense in the Nixon administration from 1969–73.
62 Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment, 43–4.
63 For additional information on the mismanagement of the A E I under William Baroody Jr see
the following: Blumenthal, “Think Tank Adrift in The Centre”; Emery, “New Troubles for an
Old Think Tank”; and Goode and Hallow, “Struggling Institute Fights to Survive.”
65 On the firing of William Baroody Jr and the appointment of Christopher C. DeMuth, see
Balzano Jr, “The Sacking of a Centrist”; DeMuth, “President’s Report: A E I ’s Mission,”
Memorandum, 1987: 2; Seabrook, “Capital Gain,” 71–9 and Sussman, “Conservative Think
Tank Comes Back from Brink.”
67 Matlack, “Marketing Ideas,” 1553.
68 2015 A E I Annual Report, 29.
69 Remarks made by Dr Jeffrey Gedmin at the Conference on Think Tanks in the U S A and
Germany: Democracy at Work; How and Where Do Public Decision-Makers Obtain Their
Knowledge?, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA , 18–20 November 1993.
70 See Abelson, A Capitol Idea.
71 Blumenthal, The Rise of the Counter-Establishment, 45. Pines resigned his position at the
Heritage Foundation on 13 April 1992. See Hallow, “Pines Quits as Heritage Senior VP.”
72 Tyman, “A Decade-Long Heritage.”
73 For an interesting history of the Heritage Foundation, see Edwards, Power of Ideas. Also see
Abelson, “Feulner’s Pendulum,” in Abelson et al., Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-
Politics.
74 Taken from the Heritage Foundation’s mission statement.
75 Quoted in McCombs, “Building a Heritage.” For more on Heritage’s goals, see Feulner,
“Heritage Foundation.”
76 2016 Heritage Foundation Annual Report.
77 Kaiser and Chinoy, “Scaife’s Money,” A 0 1 . For more on the financing of conservative
foundations and think tanks see report by the Washington-based National Committee for
Responsive Philanthropy entitled $1 Billion for Ideas; and Covington Colwell, Moving a Public
Policy. In addition, see Stefancic and Delgado, No Mercy.
78 Incident described by Heritage Foundation president Jim DeMint in an email sent on 25 April
2017 to those on Heritage’s email distribution list.
79 Interview with Gary Schmitt, 19 May 2004.
80 See Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.”
81 P N A C ’s Statement of Principles. View at www.newamericancentury.org.
82 See Abelson, A Capitol Idea, ch. 9 and Woodward, State of Denial.
83 Demson, A Brief History, 1.
84 Ibid., 2.
85 Lindquist, “Think Tanks?”
86 Conference Board of Canada, “Who We Are.”
87 The Conference Board of Canada admitted to plagiarizing material from a US report in March
2009. See Abelson, Northern Lights, 92–3.
88 Vanier Institute of the Family, “About Us – Our History,” www.vanierinstitute.ca.
89 Ibid.
90 Vanier Institute of the Family, 2013 Annual Report, 1.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 16.
93 Ibid.
94 Fraser Institute, Challenging Perceptions, 2.
95 Ibid., 3.
96 Ibid., 4.
97 Ibid., 8.
98 See the Fraser Institute’s 2016 Annual Report.
99 For more on Michael Walker and his impressions of the work of the Fraser Institute, see his
“What’s Right, Who’s Left?” and Lorinc, “Hold the Fries,” 11–15, 61.
100 Interview with Ken Battle, 16 December 1998.
101 Ibid.
102 Caledon Institute of Social Policy, An Overview, www.caledoninst.org.
103 Interview with Ken Battle.
104 Abelson, “Public Visibility and Policy Relevance.”
105 Parkland Institute, home page “About the Parkland Institute,” www.parklandinstitute.ca.
106 Parkland Institute, “Self-Study,” www.parklandinstitute.ca.
107 Ibid., 4.
108 Ibid., 2.
109 Ibid., 15–17.
C H A P T E R T WO
1 Mills, The Power Elite.

2 Much has been written about Eisenhower’s farewell address and concerns about the military-
industrial complex. See Smith, Eisenhower.
3 Altman, “Is Syria a Pay-to-Play Conflict?”
4 See Bentley, The Process of Government and Truman, The Governmental Process.
5 Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In and Krasner, Defending the National Interest.
6 For example, see Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Stairs, “Public Opinion.”
7 See Peschek, Policy Planning Organizations; Dye, Who’s Running America?; Domhoff and
Dye, Power Elites and Organizations; Saloma, Ominous Politics; and Shoup, Wall Street’s
Think Tank.
8 See Lipton, Williams and Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks”; and
Williams, Lipton and Parlapiano, “Foreign Government Contributions to Nine Think Tanks.”
For a response the findings presented in these articles, see Bruckner, “Fund a Think Tank,” and
Mendizabal, “Think Tank Accountability.” The relationship between donors and think tanks has
come under even closer scrutiny in recent months with the revelation that Google’s support for
the New America Foundation resulted in the termination of one of the think tank’s scholars who
published studies critical of the tech giant. For more on this, see Clemmitt, “Think Tanks in
Transition”; Rosen, “The Do-Not-Think Tank”; Breland, “Google Faces Blowback”; Rushe,
“Google-Funded Think Tank Fired Scholar”; and Vogel, “Google Critic Ousted from Think
Tank.” On the funding of think tanks with interests in the Gulf states, see Grim, “Gulf
Government Gave Secret $20 Million”; and Pecquet, “Gulf-Funded Think Tank.”
9 A Gramscian approach to the study of think tanks is provided by Gill in American Hegemony
and the Trilateral Commission. On the various streams of Marxism, see Kolakowski, Main
Currents of Marxism.
10 Quoted in Lipton, Williams, and Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks.”
11 Mendizabal, “Think Tank Accountability.”
12 Quoted in Lipton, Williams, and Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks.”
13 Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State.
14 Newsom, The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy, 141–62.
15 The American pluralist tradition is strongly rooted in the belief that society is composed of
individual groups that compete for power and status in the policy-making community. Two
studies in particular have had a major impact on shaping this perspective; Bentley, The Process
of Government; and Truman, The Governmental Process.
16 Pal and Weaver (eds), The Government Taketh Away.
17 See Davidson, Foreign Policy Inc., and Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby.
18 See Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In and Krasner, Defending the National Interest.
19 Steelman, Review of Do Think Tanks Matter?
20 Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 11.
21 Steelman, Review of Do Think Tanks Matter?, 165.
22 For more on the relationship between Richard Nixon and the US Congress, see Schlesinger, The
Imperial Presidency.
23 See Smith, George Bush’s War.
24 On the relationship between the Executive and Congress in US foreign policy, see Hinckley,
Less Than Meets the Eye.
25 See Maraniss, First in His Class and Abelson, “Changing Minds.”
26 See Critchlow, The Brookings Institution; Edwards, The Power of Ideas; Abella, Soldiers of
Reason; and Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs.
27 On the rise of think tanks in the United States and around the globe, see McGann and Weaver
(eds), Think Tanks & Civil Societies; and Stone and Denham (eds), Think Tank Traditions.
28 For example see Haas (ed), Knowledge, Power.
29 See Heclo, “Issue Networks”; Lindquist, “Think Tanks?”; and Stone, Capturing the Political
Imagination.
30 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Stairs, “Public Opinion.”
CHAPTER THREE
1 For more on this, see Weiss, Organizations for Policy Analysis; Stone, Political Imagination,
especially chap. 3; and Weaver, “Changing World.”
2 On the role of backroom strategists, see Craft, Backrooms and Beyond.
3 Interview with David Zussman, 14 September 1999.
4 Stone, Political Imagination.
5 See Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures.”
6 For an interesting examination of the involvement of think tanks in several government
departments and agencies during the Reagan-Bush years, see Burch, Research in Political
Economy.
7 The Rutherford Institute’s support of Paula Jones in her case against President Clinton is an
example of a think tank trying to influence the judicial process. The chair of the Rutherford
Institute, John Whitehead, has appeared on several American talk shows and newscasts
supporting Jones’s legal actions. For a more detailed discussion of the ties between think tanks
and the judiciary, see Burch, Research in Political Economy.
8 Several articles have been written on think tanks specializing in state politics. See, for instance,
Scott, “Intellectuals Who Became Influential,” and Moore, “Local Right Thinkers.”
9 For a comprehensive discussion of the many factors that have contributed to the rise of think
tanks, see Weiss, Organizations for Policy Analysis.
10 In addition to 100 senators and 435 elected members of the US House of Representatives, there
are 3 nonvoting members representing the District of Columbia who sit in the House. The
District of Columbia is currently waging a campaign to become the 51st state of the union.
Should this happen, the number of representatives it would have in the House would be based
on population determined by a decennial census.
11 For more on this, see Abelson, “Think Tanks in the US”
12 On the Congressional Policy Advisory Board, see the House Policy Committee, “Congressional
Policy Advisory.”
13 Ibid.
14 The role of think tanks and party foundations in Germany is examined in Gellner, “Think Tanks
in Germany.” Also see Pautz, Think Tanks, Social Democracy, and Social Policy; and Braml,
“Germany: The Think and the Tank,” in Abelson et al., Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-
Politics.
15 The role and function of public think tanks is the focus of Robinson’s paper “Public Think
Tanks in the US”
16 See Abelson, American Think Tanks.
17 Ibid.
18 On the role of advisers in the Bush campaign, see Van Slambrouck, “California Think Tank”;
Hager, “Bush Shops for Advice”; Swanson, “Brain Power”; Schmitt, “Foreign Policy Experts”;
and Abelson, “What Were They Thinking?”
19 Abelson, American Think Tanks.
20 See Abelson, “Changing Minds, Changing Course.”
21 With the Canada Elections Act of 1996 the minimum election period was shortened from forty-
seven to thirty-six days. A sitting government may run a longer election period, but politically it
has rarely been in its interest to do so. A longer election period provides opposition parties with
more time to criticize government policies.
22 See Abelson, Northern Lights, 126.
23 For more on this see Baier and Bakvis, “Think Tanks and Political Parties”; and Craft,
Backrooms and Beyond.
24 Guy, People, Politics and Government, 215.
25 For more on the use of royal commissions and commissions of inquiry, see Bradford,
Commissioning Ideas, and Jenson, “Commissioning Ideas.”
26 Think tanks in Canada are registered as tax-exempt organizations under the Income Tax Act.
This tax privilege is conferred by Revenue Canada on organizations that perform educational
functions, but it is extended with certain limitations. Think tanks are prohibited from engaging
in certain political activities, including supporting or opposing political parties and their
members and furthering the political platforms of parties. See Abelson, Northern Lights, 20–6.
Similar limitations are placed on think tanks in the United States by the Internal Revenue
Service. Think tanks in the United States are also concerned about the potential political
repercussions of being too closely linked to one party. Not only might such an association
threaten a think tank’s tax-exempt status but it would likely undermine its ability to engage in
objective scholarly analysis. For more on this see Morin and Deane, “The Ideas Industry,” 8
June 1999.
27 For more on the ties between the Harper government and the Fraser Institute, see Gutstein,
Harperism.
30 In the fall of 1999 the P P F began a research project on managing transitions. The P P F was
created in 1987 to strengthen the dialogue between government and the private and nonprofit
sectors in the hope of improving public-policy decision-making. Information obtained during
interview with David Zussman, president of P P F , 14 September 1999.
31 This point is reinforced by Lindquist in “Transition Teams and Government Succession,” 49.
32 Guy, People, Politics and Government, 215.
33 The directors of the research offices of Canada’s five political parties are well aware of the work
being conducted by the country’s leading think tanks. In interviews with the author on 14, 15,
and 17 December 1998, all the directors indicated that they regularly receive publications from
Canadian policy institutes and occasionally meet with some of their staff.
34 Interview with author, 16 December 1998. Several independent sources, including Jonathan
Murphy, director of the National Liberal Caucus Research Bureau (interview with author, 14
December 1998), have acknowledged Battle’s access to cabinet and his significant impact in
helping shape legislation on several social policy issues. For more on Battle’s influence in key
Liberal policy circles, see Greenspan and Wilson-Smith, Double Vision, especially chap. 9.
35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Figures obtained from C M E website. Information also available from Association Canada
2017.
39 For more on the role of the Conference Board of Canada, see Lindquist, Behind the Myth.
40 US data appears in US Department of Education, “Degrees and other formal awards conferred.”
Data on social science PhDs in Canada appears in Statistics Canada, “Earned Doctorates, by
Field of Study and Sex.”
41 National Science Foundation, “2014 Doctorate Recipients.”
42 Interview with author, 14 September 1999. On the closure of the North-South Institute, see
Abelson, Northern Lights.
43 For more on the role of foundations in the United States, see Berman, Influence, and Sealander,
Private Wealth. On the Koch Foundation, see Mayer, Dark Money and Schulman, Sons of
Wichita.
44 The A E I ’s financial crisis during the mid-1980s was also a result of poor management. See
Abelson, American Think Tanks, 53–4.
45 Morgan, “Think Tank or Hired Gun?” For more on the relationship between think tanks and
corporate donors, see Stefancic and Delgado, No Mercy.
46 Abelson and Carberry, “Following Suit?,” 546–7.
47 Kingdon, Agendas, 129.
48 Ibid., 130.
49 Harrison and Hoberg, “Setting the Environmental Agenda.”
50 Abelson and Carberry, “Following Suit?,” 547. For more on theories of entrepreneurship, see
Schneider and Teske, “Political Entrepreneur.” On the role of institutional structures in
influencing policy entrepreneurship, see Checkel, Ideas.
51 Ibid., 548.
52 For more on the origins of the Fraser Institute, see Lindquist, Behind the Myth, 377–80.
53 Drawing on their extensive service in the public sector, Kirby and Pitfield played an important
role in recognizing the need for policy-makers to draw on policy expertise both inside and
outside government. Pitfield served as deputy secretary to the Cabinet (Plans) and deputy clerk
of the Privy Council (1969–73). He also served as clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to
Cabinet (1975–79). Kirby was assistant secretary to the prime minister (1974–76), secretary to
the Cabinet for federal-provincial relations (1980–82), and deputy clerk of the Privy Council
Office (1981–82). On the contribution of senior civil servants to think tank development, see
Lindquist, Behind the Myth.
54 Abelson and Carberry, “Following Suit?,” 548.
55 Ibid.
56 Gray, “Think Tanks.”
57 Lipset, “Canada and the US,” 110. For other treatments of US-Canadian comparisons, see
Presthus, Cross-National Perspectives, and Merelman, Partial Visions.
58 Lipset, Continental Divide, 136.
59 The Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy (S I P P ), based in Regina, was created “to engage
the academic, government, private business, and nonprofit sectors in meeting the public policy
challenges of our time.”
60 See Abelson, American Think Tanks; “What Were They Thinking?”; and “Changing Minds,
Changing Course.”
61 For a detailed examination of the types of presidential candidates most inclined to rely on
advocacy think tanks, see Abelson and Carberry, “Policy Experts in Presidential Campaigns.”
62 Data on the educational and professional experience of researchers at think tanks was obtained
from current annual reports. Some think tanks are able to recruit and retain more PhDs than
others. Moreover, the majority of experts at C.D. Howe possess PhDs. The same, however,
cannot be said of several other think tanks, including the Institute for Research on Public Policy,
the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, and the Mackenzie Institute. Not surprisingly, think
tanks based at universities are heavily populated with PhDs.
63 There are some exceptions to this trend. For instance, Gordon Robertson, who held several
important government positions, including clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to Cabinet
(1963–75) and secretary to Cabinet for provincial-federal relations (1975–79), was president of
the Institute for Research on Public Policy from 1980 to 1984 and remained as a fellow in
residence until 1990. Another exception is Hugh Segal, a former staff member of Ontario
Premier Bill Davis and federal Conservative leaders Robert Stanfield and Brian Mulroney, who
became president of the I R P P in 1999. He went on to serve in the Canadian Senate and held
the post of the fifth Master of Massey College, University of Toronto.
64 Interview with David Zussman, 14 September 1999.
65 Lindquist, Behind the Myth. A similar sentiment is expressed by Tupper in his assessment of the
contribution of a select group of Canadian think tanks to the debate on public debt in Canada.
See his “Think Tanks.”
66 On the growing population of think tanks in China, see Hua, “Chinese Think Tanks’ Influence,”
in Abelson et al. (eds), Think Tanks, Foreign Policy and Geo-Politics.
67 Quoted in Stone, Political Imagination, 43.
CHAPTER FOUR
1 For more on the increased competition among think tanks, see McGann, Competition for
Dollars.
3 Ibid.
4 Some presidents have relied far more heavily on scholars from think tanks to serve on
presidential advisory boards than others. For instance, President Reagan invited several scholars
from the Hoover Institution to sit on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(P F I A B ). Conversely, of the eleven members P F I A B appointed by President Clinton and
chaired by Warren Rudman, none had permanent positions at a think tank. For more on the role
of these boards, see Abelson, American Think Tanks, 75–9.
5 See Stewart, Chong, and Simms (eds), Turning Parliament Inside Out.
8 Fraser Institute, Challenging Perceptions, 12.
9 See the 2015 Annual Reports of the Heritage Foundation, A E I , and the Brookings Institution.
10 Heritage Foundation, 2007 Annual Report. Also see 2015 Annual Report.
11 Heritage Foundation, 2007 Annual Report.
12 Crowley, “How Can Think Tanks Win Friends?”
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 86.
16 Ibid.
17 Abelson, “Public Visibility and Policy Relevance,” 241
18 See Abelson, Northern Lights, chap. 7.
19 Quotations drawn from Fraser Institute promotional material. Before assuming office, Margaret
Thatcher helped establish the Centre for Policy Studies, in London. For more on this and other
British think tanks, see Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination, and Denham and Garnett,
British Think Tanks.
20 See Abelson, Northern Lights, chap. 7.
CHAPTER FIVE
1 Some think tanks consider these and other indicators in assessing their own performance.
However, for the purposes of this chapter, they will not be included.
2 Weaver and Rich, “Think Tanks.”
3 Rich, “Perceptions of Think Tanks.”
4 There is no consensus, nor, for that matter, are there many reliable estimates, on how many
think tanks exist in Canada. Lindquist has estimated that there are likely a hundred, although
this number may vary, depending on one’s definition of a policy institute. This study focuses on
approximately two dozen think tanks, a sizeable cross-section of the think tank population.
A think tank receives one citation per article even if several references are made to it.
English-language newspapers were selected for their broad national and regional coverage of
domestic and foreign policy issues. Since an index listing individuals and organizations who
have appeared before various parliamentary committees and subcommittees has yet to be
produced, the names of witnesses were taken from each committee report. A complete list of the
committees covered in this study is included in table 5.11. Data are from the parliamentary
sessions from 1980 to 1999, a period closely corresponding to the time when media data
became available, were used, along with the federal government’s report on policy consultants.
5 Weaver and Rich, “Think Tanks,” 1.
6 Despite including twenty-two think tanks not based in the District of Columbia in their study,
Weaver and Rich did not examine how much media attention regional newspapers devoted to
think tanks.
7 Although the Hoover Institution generates far less media coverage than several D C – based
think tanks, it received the highest overall score from the Economist in its ranking of think
tanks. Interestingly enough, the Economist did not refer to Hoover’s media visibility in
evaluating its performance. Several other factors, including its funding, library, and high-profile
staff, helped the magazine to make its assessment. See “The Good Think-Tank Guide.”
8 Ibid., 23.
9 The conservative Washington Times quotes scholars from the Heritage Foundation, the
American Enterprise Institute, C S I S , and the Cato Institute far more than any other newspaper
in Rich and Weaver’s study.
10 Rich and Weaver, “Advocates and Analysts,” 249. See also Rich, “Think Tanks as Sources of
Expertise.”
11 Ibid. See also Rich, “Perceptions of Think Tanks.”
12 Data on the size and budget of the Conference Board was obtained from Associations Canada
2017.
13 See Abelson, Northern Lights, Appendix One.
14 Data on the size of these institutes was obtained primarily from annual reports made available
on think tank websites, from Associations Canada 2017, and through personal correspondence.
15 Ibid.
16 See Kingdon, Agendas.
17 For background information on the creation of this task force, see Anderson, “The New Focus.”
18 This finding is not surprising, since six federal government departments fund C P R N , Inc.
19 Individuals not invited to testify before a parliamentary committee may request to appear by
contacting the clerk of the appropriate committee. For guidelines on how individuals are
selected to testify, see Dawson, Government of Canada, 348–51. For a more recent examination
of the rules and procedures of parliamentary committees, see Docherty, Mr. Smith.
20 With few exceptions, majority and minority members of congressional committees and
subcommittees have the authority to call witnesses to testify. However, in practice the party in
power will have more input into which individuals and organizations will appear to comment.
21 Remarks made to author by staff members of the Canadian Tax Foundation, 7 April 1998.
22 A Spearman Correlation is a nonparametric correlation coefficient based on the ranks of data
rather than the actual values. Values of the coefficient range from -1 to +1. The absolute
correlation coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship between the variables, and the
sign of the coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. Definition obtained from
S P S S for Windows Release 6.1 (24 June 1994).
23 Pal, Public Policy Analysis, 92–4.
CHAPTER SIX
1 Van Slambrouck, “California Think Tank.”

2 Swanson, “Brain Power.”
3 Judis, “Taking Care of Business.”
4 Interview with Dr Martin Anderson, 19 March 1990.
5 While presidential candidates must raise their own funds during the primaries, the nominees
selected by each party can, should they elect to, draw on public funds for the general election. If
presidential nominees accept public funding, they cannot draw on any private sources of money.
6 Abelson and Carberry suggest that two characteristics of presidential candidates – their status as
Washington insiders or outsiders and the strength of their ideological views as approximated by
voter election studies – can help to explain the recruitment patterns of think tanks by candidates.
See their article “Policy Experts.”
7 Swanson, “Brain Power.” Think tanks have different policies for staff who advise presidential
candidates. Some, such as the Cato Institute, actively discourage staff from becoming too
closely associated with particular candidates, preferring them to make their advice available to
any candidate who wants it. Others, like the Center for National Policy, which are more
concerned about keeping the Internal Revenue Service (I R S ) at bay, insist that scholars take a
leave of absence if they decide to work on a campaign. The I R S expressly forbids nonprofit
organizations from participating in political campaigns. For more on this, see Morin and Deane,
“The Ideas Industry,” 8 June 1999.
8 For an analysis of the 1976 presidential campaign, see Schram, Running for President, and
Witcover, Marathon.
9 Shoup, The Carter Presidency, 39.
10 Ibid., 43.
11 For a detailed examination of the Trilateral Commission, see Gill, American Hegemony, and
Sklar, Trilateralism. For more information on how Carter was selected to become a member of
the Trilateral Commission, see Gerard Smith’s Personal Files, “Memorandum from George
Franklin to Gerard Smith on the Circumstances of Carter Coming with the Commission,” Box
4, 1/1/76–6/3/77, Jimmy Carter Library.
12 Perloff, The Shadows of Power, 156.
13 Ibid.
17 Carter, Why Not the Best?, 164. Although Carter acknowledges the benefits of participating on
the Trilateral Commission in his autobiography, he does not even mention the commission in his
memoirs, Keeping Faith.
18 Contrary to Brzezinski’s assertions that the Trilateral Commission did not advise Carter,
Brzezinski did discuss several foreign policy issues with Carter in his capacity as director of the
Commission. See, for instance, Brzezinski’s Personal Files on the Trilateral Commission, Box
8, 7/1/75–8/31/75, and Box 5, 1/1/75–1/31/75, Jimmy Carter Library.
19 Interview with Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, 30 May 1991.
20 There appears to be little agreement on the exact number of Trilateral Commission members
who served in the Carter administration. Figures range from a low of eighteen to a high of
twenty-five.
22 A majority of the trilateral commissioners who served in the Carter administration were also
members of the Council on Foreign Relations. For a list of individuals who participated in both
organizations, see Shoup, The Carter Presidency, 105.
23 Robert Pastor, Carter’s Latin American specialist on the National Security Council, claims that
the president’s foreign policy toward Latin America was significantly influenced by two reports
issued by the Commission on US-Latin American Relations; The Americas in a Changing
World and The US and Latin America. The commission, chaired by Ambassador Sol Linowitz,
was a bipartisan group of approximately twenty-five leaders from universities, think tanks, and
corporations. Pastor, who served as executive director of the commission before joining the
National Security Council, states that “The reports helped the administration define a new
relationship with Latin America, and twenty-seven of the twenty-eight specific
recommendations in the second report became US policy.” For additional information on the
background of the Linowitz Commission and its contribution to US foreign policy in Latin
America, see Pastor, “The Carter Administration and Latin America,” 62–5.
24 Reagan was governor of California from 1967 to 1975.
25 Anderson, Revolution, 47.
26 The various factors influencing Reagan’s decision to leave the Democratic Party are discussed
in his autobiography, An American Life, 132–6.
27 The term “ideas move nations” was coined by Easterbrook and is used as the title of his article
on the rise of conservative think tanks, which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly, January 1986.
28 Anderson, Revolution, 8. Anderson has apparently changed his mind about universities serving
as reservoirs for policy ideas. In his book Impostors in the Temple Anderson claims that many
universities have become inundated by academic frauds and thus are unable to maintain
acceptable scholarly standards.
30 It is not uncommon for policy task forces to be created during presidential campaigns to provide
candidates with information and advice. Several presidents, including John F. Kennedy, have
relied on them. For more on this see Campbell, Managing the Presidency, and Hess, Organizing
the Presidency.
32 Seventy-four economists participated on the economic policy task forces. Six chaired issue task
forces in various areas of economic policy: Arthur F. Burns (task force on international
monetary policy); Alan Greenspan (task force on budget policy); Paul McCracken, former chair
of the Council of Economic Advisers (task force on inflation); Charles E. Walker, former deputy
secretary of the treasury (task force on tax policy); Murray L. Weidenbaum (task force on
regulatory reform); and Caspar Weinberger (task force on spending control). The other members
of the coordinating committee were Milton Friedman; Michel T. Halbouty, former president of
the American Association of Petroleum Geologists and chair of the task force on energy policy;
Jack Kemp; James T. Lynn, former director of the Office of Management and Budget; William
E. Simon, former secretary of the treasury, and Walter Wriston, chair of Citi-bank/Citicorp.
33 Interview with Mr Richard V. Allen, 29 May 1991. For a more detailed discussion of the role
and function of policy task forces during the 1980 campaign, see Wood, Whatever Possessed
the President?, 140–3.
35 Meese, With Reagan, 59.
37 Meese, Transition, 11.
39 The Institute for Contemporary Studies (I C S ) in San Francisco was established by Caspar
Weinberger and Edwin Meese III as a nonprofit organization in 1972. The ICS and its affiliated
institutes publish studies on economic, social, and foreign policy issues. For an interesting
analysis on the founding of the ICS, see Beers, “Buttoned-Down Bohemians.”
40 Background information on these and other members of the Reagan administration can be found
in Brownstein and Easton, Reagan’s Ruling Class.
41 Since some scholars belonged to one or more think tanks before joining the Reagan
administration, I have provided an approximate figure only.
42 A list of members of the Committee on the Present Danger who served in the Reagan
administration can be found in Saunders, Peddlers of Crisis, 287–8. According to Eric
Alterman, the Committee on the Present Danger eventually furnished fifty-nine members to the
Reagan national security team. See his book Sound and Fury, 80. For additional information on
the Committee on the Present Danger see Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War.
43 Figures for the A E I , the C S I S , and the Heritage Foundation are quoted in Blumenthal,
Counter-Establishment, 35–8.
44 Weinraub, “Conservative Group’s Blueprint for Reagan.”
45 Omang, “Heritage Report.”
46 Heatherly, Mandate for Leadership. In preparation for the 1984 and 1988 presidential
campaigns, the Heritage Foundation produced similar volumes that examined a wide range of
domestic and foreign policy issues. See Butler et al., Mandate for Leadership II, and Mandate
for Leadership III. The Heritage Foundation also issued an interim report during the first term
of the Reagan administration. See Holwill, Agenda ’83. The Heritage Foundation was not the
first think tank to produce detailed “blueprints” for the executive and Congress. Since 1971 the
Brookings Institution has published an annual series entitled Setting National Priorities, which
provides policy-makers and scholars with in-depth analyses of domestic and foreign policy
issues. Moreover, following the 1992 campaign Will Marshall and Martin Schram of the
Progressive Policy Institute produced a blueprint for the Clinton administration entitled
Mandate for Change, a title apparently borrowed from the Heritage Foundation’s series
Mandate for Leadership.
47 In an interview with the author on 29 May 1991, Richard Allen, President Reagan’s first
national security advisor, confirmed that Feulner presented Meese and Allen with a copy of
Mandate for Leadership in mid-November. Allen added that the study “was immediately
reproduced and distributed to our entire transition team.” It is not surprising that Allen was
willing to accept and reproduce Feulner’s study. The two had established close ties as early as
1965 through the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, the first national conservative student
organization in the United States. Eventually, through Allen, Feulner became a Hoover
Institution Fellow. For a discussion on the relationship between Feulner and Allen see
Blumenthal, Counter-Establishment, 46–8.
48 Omang, “The Heritage Report.”
49 Knickerbocker, “Heritage Foundation’s Ideas.” Meese also acknowledged receiving studies
from the National Academy of Public Administration and from the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard. When asked if he had received a study from the Hoover Institution,
Meese remarked, “I don’t think so. There’s nobody left there; they’re all here in Washington
working with us, helping out.” See Meese, Transition, 7.
50 Meese, With Reagan, 60.
51 Ibid. On two occasions, Edwin Feulner took leave of the Heritage Foundation to serve as a
special consultant in the White House on specific strategic planning projects and throughout the
two terms was an informal advisor to President Reagan and members of his cabinet.
52 Ibid. For a discussion of which policy recommendations in the Heritage study were adopted by
the Reagan administration during the early 1980s, see Horwill, Agenda ’83.
53 Duignan and Rabushka, The US in the 1980s. Interview with author, 2 May 1990. Campbell
added that when Edwin Feulner was a public affairs fellow at the Hoover Institution, he
admitted to Campbell that he was “a retailer not a wholesaler of ideas.” Campbell remarked
jokingly that he would “buy a used idea from Feulner anytime.”
54 Richard Allen resigned as National Security Adviser in early 1981 amidst allegations of
wrongdoing and was replaced by Judge William Clark. Clark left the National Security Council
(N S C ) in October 1983 to become secretary of the interior and was replaced by the deputy
national security adviser, Robert “Bud” McFarlane. For background information on the transfer
of power in the N S C , see Menges, National Security Council.
56 Weinraub, “Conservative Group’s Blueprint for Reagan.”
57 Knickerbocker, “Heritage Foundation’s Ideas.”
58 Quoted in Wheeler, “Heritage Chiefs.”
59 Interview with Dr Anderson, 19 August 1996. Richard Allen agrees that President Bush went to
great lengths to distance himself from the Reaganites. Allen stated that by doing so, President
Bush cut himself off from some of America’s most important and influential policy experts.
Interview with the author, 6 September 1996.
60 For an interesting analysis of president Bush’s reaction to public opinion polls during the Gulf
War, see Brace and Hinckley, Follow the Leader.
61 Interview with Martin Anderson, Hoover Institution, 19 March 1990.
62 Heatherly, Mandate for Leadership.
63 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Citizens Transition Project, and the
American Enterprise Institute were among the many organizations that outlined a series of
domestic and foreign policy recommendations. See Rosenbaum, “Torrent of Free Advice.”
64 David Osborne, a fellow at the P P I and co-author of Reinventing America, helped introduce
Clinton to the think tank set. See Fineman, “Clinton’s Team.”
65 Several books have been written on the 1992 presidential election, including Allen and Portis,
The Comeback Kid; Brummett, High Wire; Germond and Witcover, Mad As Hell; Goldman et
al., Quest for the Presidency; Hohenberg, Bill Clinton Story; and Moore and Ihde, Clinton.
66 Clinton resigned as chair of the D L C shortly before announcing his candidacy for the
presidency. The D L C is currently chaired by Louisiana senator John Breaux. Al From is the
organization’s president and executive director. The D L C currently has a staff of over twenty
people and an annual budget of approximately $2.5 million, which is raised from private
philanthropists, corporate donors, and grass-roots organizations.
67 The D L C has approximately 3,000 members, including about 750 elected officials nationwide,
with 32 US senators and 142 current and former House members. It also has chapters in twenty-
eight states in every region of the country. For more on the D L C ’s membership, see Barnes,
“Will D L C Be a Lobbying Heavyweight?”; Grove, “Steering His Party”; and Towell, “D L C
Moves into Driver’s Seat.”
68 Achenbach, “Wonk If You Love Clinton.”
69 Although Clinton appeared to draw heavily on the P P I ’s study Mandate for Change, only a few
members from the P P I and the D L C received appointments in the Clinton administration.
Bruce Reed and Bill Galston received positions in the domestic policy office. Reed was issues
director in the campaign and deputy director of the transition for domestic policy. He was later
appointed as White House domestic policy advisor. Will Marshall, Al From, and Robert
Shapiro, the P P I ’s vice-president (who later resigned over the Whitewater scandal), were
Clinton campaign advisers. From also served in the transition. For more on Clinton’s inner
circle of policy advisers, see Fineman, “Clinton’s Team”; Weisberg, “Clincest”; and Bandow,
“New Democrats.”
70 Marshall and Schram, Mandate for Change. In addition to providing Clinton with several policy
ideas to consider during the campaign, the D L C engaged in an active lobbying campaign to
support some of the president’s policies. For instance, the D L C devoted considerable resources
to convincing members of Congress to ratify the North American Free Trade Agreement
(N A F TA ). For more on this, see Barnes, “Will D L C Be a Lobbying Heavyweight?”
71 For a complete text of the Clinton-Gore Economic Conference, including the list of presenters,
see President Clinton’s New Beginning.
72 Philip Lader, a South Carolina businessman, was the founding father of the annual Renaissance
Weekend, which began in 1980. The purpose of the Renaissance Weekend is to provide leaders
from various careers with an opportunity to share ideas in an informal setting. Seminars are held
during the retreat, and journalists are prohibited from commenting on the proceedings. Bill and
Hillary Clinton have attended the Renaissance Weekends since the mid-1980s. For more on
Clinton’s involvement in the Renaissance Weekend, see two articles by Maraniss, “Letter from
Never-Never Land” and “A Weekend With Bill and Friends.” Also see Jehl, “Thinking Party,”
and Baer, “Network for the Nineties.”
73 For more on George W. Bush’s career as Texas governor, see Ivins and Dubose, Shrub;
Mitchell, Bush Dynasty; and Minutaglio, First Son.
74 Russo, “Brain Power.” Also see Daalder and Lindsay, “Bush.”
75 For more on the relationship between George W. Bush and the Hoover Institution, see Hager,
“Bush Shops for Advice,” and Healy and Hebel, “Academics.”
76 Lindsey also served as an adviser to President George Bush. For more on Lindsey’s
background, see Kessler, “Economic Adviser.”
77 Maggs, “Tax Cuts,” 2236.
78 Gorman, “Bush’s Lesson Plan,” 2230–2.
79 Kitfield, “Periphery Is Out,” 2293.
80 For more on Rice’s background see Mufson, “Daunting Challenge.”
81 For more on Zoellick’s appointment see Babington, “Bush Names Zoellick.”
82 See Abelson, A Capitol Idea.
83 See two studies by Abelson: A Capitol Idea and “In the Line of Fire: US Think Tanks” in
Richard Higgott and Ivona Malbasic (eds), The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism:
44–57.
84 Kitfield, “Periphery Is Out.”
85 For more on Jeb Bush’s fascination with policy development, see Minutaglio, First Son.
86 Greenberger, “Campaign 2000.”
87 The majority of think tanks in the United States are registered as chapter 501(c) tax-exempt
educational institutes under the Internal Revenue Code. To qualify, they must agree not to
engage in certain types of political activities. According to chapter 501(c), subsection 3 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, “no substantial part of the activities of [registered organizations
can carry] on propaganda, or otherwise attempt, to influence legislation (except as otherwise
provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
to) any candidate for public office.” It is this last statement, the inability of registered
organizations to participate in political campaigns, that has resulted in I R S audits of some think
tanks.
Think tanks like the Hoover Institution, which is located on a university campus, are
particularly vulnerable to losing credibility by being perceived as spokespersons for a particular
candidate. When several of its staff advised Reagan in the 1980 campaign, the Hoover
Institution discovered that close ties with politicians can lead to serious tensions with university
faculty. Tensions between Hoover and Stanford arose once again as a result of the involvement
of Hoover scholars in the Bush campaign. For more on this controversy, see Manley and
Rebholz, “Hoover Institution,” and Abelson, American Think Tanks, 41–3.
88 Several articles have been written about McCain’s close ties to think tanks. See, for example,
U S A Today, “Senator McCain Announces Economic Advisors,” and Fred Barnes, “How Bush
Decided on the Surge.”
89 See Sweet, “Obama Taps Influential Foreign Policy Experts”; and Garekar, “The Gurus.”
90 The Washington Post, “The War over the Wonks”; and Bumiller, “Research Groups Boom in
Washington.”
91 Nye, “Scholars on the Sidelines.”
92 Bumiller, “Cast of 300.”
93 The Washington Post, “Transition Team Profiles.”
94 Crowley, “The Shadow President”; Savage, “Shepherd of a Government in Exile”; and Mann,
Rise of the Vulcans.
95 Murray and Leonnig, “Obama Teams Are Scrutinizing Federal Agencies.”
96 Dreazen, “Obama Dips into Think Tank for Talent.”
97 Ackerman, “Obama’s Pentagon-in-Waiting”; and Pincus, “‘Experts’ Report.”
98 Abelson and Carberry, “Policy Experts in Presidential Campaigns.”
99 Rogin, “Trump Could Cause ‘the Death of Think Tanks as We Know Them.’”
100 Ibid.
101 National Review, “Against Trump.”
102 Gunter, “Trump’s ‘Muslim Lockdown.’” For more on Trump and the Center for Security Policy
see Colvin, “Center for Security Policy.” Other think tanks, including the libertarian C AT O
Institute, lashed out against Trump’s travel ban. See Bier, “Trump’s Immigration Ban Is Illegal.”
103 Ibid.
104 For more on Rubio’s ties to think tanks, see Smith, “Why Marco Rubio Might Be the G O P ’s”;
and Matthews, “Marco Rubio.”
105 Much has been written about Ted Cruz and his cozy ties with the Heritage Foundation. See
Deace, “Ted Cruz Gets Heritage Foundation ‘Endorsement’”; and Shimshock, “Cruz, Rubio,
Paul.”
106 On the ties between Donald Trump and the Heritage Foundation, see Think Tank Watch,
“Trump Consulting with Think Tanks”; Heritage Foundation, “Donald Trump Turns to Heritage
for Policy Guidance”; Kopan, “Meet Donald Trump’s Think Tank”; Shephard, “The D.C. Think
Tank behind Donald Trump”; Fuller, “Donald Trump and the Heritage Foundation”; and
Wegmann, “Heritage Foundation Takes Risk and Wins Big with Trump.”
107 Think Tank Watch, “Has Heritage Just Released Donald Trump’s Bible?” Also see the Heritage
Foundation, “Blueprint for Reform.”
108 See Balan, “Trump Thanks Jim DeMint”; and Wagner, “Trump Praises Jim DeMint.”
109 Van Slambrouck, “California Think Tank.”
110 For more on this, see Woodruff, “Donald Trump’s Favorite Think Tank.”
CHAPTER SEVEN
1 Lindquist, Behind the Myth, 227.
2 Tupper, “Think Tanks,” 532.
3 Several journalists covering the constitutional conferences reported favourably on their role in
stimulating public discussion. For instance, Jeffrey Simpson commented that “Against the odds,
these gatherings in Halifax, Calgary, Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver worked splendidly.
Indeed, they rescued constitutional reform, at least temporarily … Instead of the usual shouting
and insinuation, the discussions were civil and constructive, a rediscovery of the much-
ballyhooed but infrequently observed Canadian compromise and tolerance.” Quoted by Milne in
“Innovative Constitutional Processes,” 38.
4 Kroeger, “Constitutional Conferences,” 2.
5 Ibid.
6 Shaping Canada’s Future Together, iii.
7 This was not the first attempt by the federal government to generate public discussion on
constitutional reform following Meech Lake. The Spicer Commission, formally known as the
Citizens’ Forum on Canada’s Future, was established in November 1990 to give Canadians an
opportunity to speak out on the future of Canada. For more on this, see Russell, Constitutional
Odyssey, 154–89.
8 Kroeger, “The Constitutional Conferences,” 1.
9 Milne, “Innovative Constitutional Processes,” 29.
10 Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, 175.
11 Milne, “Innovative Constitutional Processes,” 29.
12 See Russell, Constitutional Odyssey.
13 Harrison, Constitutional Conferences Secretariat, 1.
14 Ibid.
15 Kroeger, “Constitutional Conferences,” 2; President of the Privy Council, News Release.
16 Department of Finance, Supplementary Estimates.
17 President of the Privy Council, News Release, 2.
18 A series of background papers on the various themes explored in Shaping Canada’s Future
Together were released by the Federal-Provincial Relations Office (F P R O ) before the
constitutional hearings began in the fall of 1991. They were edited by Ronald Watts, director of
the Institute for Intergovernmental Relations at Queen’s University, who had been seconded to
the F P R O in April 1991, and they were intended to provide additional information and insights
into the constitutional reform proposals outlined by the federal government. Among the titles
released were Responsive Institutions for a Modern Canada, Canadian Federalism and
Economic Union, and Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government, and Constitutional Reform.
19 This observation is confirmed by Harrison, who stated that “If the conferences were to be based
on openness, then it was paramount that the process used to develop them be as neutral as
possible. A key decision in this regard was the decision to invite five independent institutes to
sponsor the first four conferences … It could be argued that the only way in which potential
concerns about ‘manipulation’ could be minimized was by handing considerable authority to
these outside bodies.” See Constitutional Conferences Secretariat, “Constitutions Conference,”
5.
20 See chapter 5.
21 Discussion with Ron Watts, 27 July 1999. David Elton, president of the Max Bell Foundation
and former president of the Canada West Foundation made similar remarks to me regarding the
selection criteria for think tanks (25 July 1999).
22 Information about mission statement obtained from A P E C ’s home page at www.apec-econ.ca.
23 Correspondence with Patrick Brannon, research analyst, A P E C .
24 Canada West Foundation, Annual Report 1997, 6.
25 Interview, 24 November 2000.
26 Niagara Institute, www.niagarainstitute.com.
27 The origins of the C.D. Howe Institute can be traced to the creation, in 1958, of the Private
Planning Association of Canada (P PA C ), which was established “to undertake research on
educational activities and economic policy issues.” In 1973 the P PA C merged with the C.D.
Howe Memorial Foundation to become the C.D. Howe Research Institute (H R I ). In 1981 the
H R I was dissolved and the reconstituted P PA C became the C.D. Howe Institute. See the C.D.
Howe Institute home page, “A History of the Institute,” www.cdhowe.org.
28 See chapter 5.
29 The responsibilities varied according to each institute. See Harrison, The Constitutional
Conferences Secretariat, figure 2, and President of the Privy Council, News Release.
30 Ibid., 3.
31 Ibid., 4.
32 Ibid., 5.
34 Canada West Foundation, Renewal of Canada, 1.
35 According to Milne, shortly after Clark invited the institutes to participate in the conferences,
the heads of the institutes met and insisted that their involvement would depend on maintaining
their “own independence and control over the organization, management, and final report of the
Conferences, including the manner in which participants would be selected.” Milne, “Innovative
Constitutional Processes,” 30. While the institutes developed their own models for recruiting
participants, they still had to satisfy the government’s selection criteria.
36 See Abelson, “New Channel of Influence,” 849–72.
38 Atlantic Province’s Economic Council, Annual Report 1992. In 1998 A P E C ’s entire budget
was $593,722.
39 Figures quoted in a press release, “Constitutional Conference Costs,” issued by the
Constitutional Conferences Secretariat.
40 Martha Hall Findlay is currently C E O and president of the Canada West Foundation.
41 For more on the handling of these conferences, see Lindquist, “Citizens, Experts and Budgets.”
42 Ibid., 113.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1 For more on the relationship between presidents and prime ministers, see Martin, The
Presidents and the Prime Ministers.
2 Harper’s frustration with Obama over Keystone X L is covered by Ibbitson in Stephen Harper.
Also see Harris, Party of One. For a full timeline of the Keystone X L Pipeline, see Global
News, “A Timeline of Important Dates in Keystone X L Pipeline History,” and C B C , “A
Chronological History of Controversial Keystone X L Pipeline Project.”
3 Several books and articles have been written on Canada-US relations. See Azzi, Reconcilable
Differences; Bothwell, Your Country, My Country; Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan
Challenge; and Anderson and Sands, Forgotten Partnership Redux.
4 Ibid.
5 See Alexandrov et al., “Request for Arbitration.”
6 Financial Post, “Strong Case for US to Approve Keystone X L . ”
7 Egan, “Keystone X L pipeline.” Also see Marsh and Isidore, “Keystone Pipeline: How Many
Jobs.”
8 Ibbitson, Stephen Harper, 336.
9 Mandel, “Obama Rejects Keystone X L .”
10 McCarthy, “Harper Optimistic Keystone Pipeline Will Proceed after Obama Leaves Office.”
11 For a discussion of the role of environmental groups during the N A F TA , see Abelson,
“Environmental Lobbying,” and Abelson and Lusztig, “The Consistency of Inconsistency.”
12 Fontaine, “A Perilous Pipeline.”
13 Ibid.
14 For example, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (C C PA ) has maintained close ties to
the N D P , while the Fraser Institute is often portrayed as a staunch ally of the Conservative
Party and conservative ideology, a label to which the Fraser Institute’s president, Neils Vedhuis,
objects. He maintains that the institute’s work is “not value-based, it’s driven by data.” See his
comments in MacCharles, “Think-Tank Says It Was Targeted.” Notwithstanding Veldhuis’s
remarks, Stephen Tapp of the Institute for Research on Public Policy (I R P P ) has used data
from Twitter to make a series of assumptions about the ideological orientation of several
Canadian think tanks. See his blog, “What Can a Little Birdie (Twitter) Tell Us?”
15 On the role of think tanks in Germany, see Thunert, “Expert Policy Advice”; Braml,
“Determinants of German Think Tanks”; and Pautz, Think-Tanks, Social Democracy.
16 For more on how the Ontario N D P government of Bob Rae relied on think tanks and other
N G O s to mobilize opposition to the N A F TA , see Abelson, “Environmental Lobbying or
Political Posturing?,” and Abelson and Lusztig, “The Consistency of Inconsistency.”
17 The phenomenon of growing apathy among voters in the United States is examined by
Davidson in Foreign Policy, Inc. and by Putnam in Bowling Alone.
18 For a thorough discussion on the PAT R I O T Act, see Crotty, The Politics of Terror; Brookings
Institution, Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis and Protecting the
American Homeland: One Year On; and Bremer and Meese, Defending the American
Homeland. Many of the concerns raised by Americans regarding the extent to which the
PAT R I O T Act would encroach on civil liberties are similar to those being flagged by
Canadians in reaction to the Canadian government’s efforts to pass Bill C-51, commonly known
as the “Anti-Terrorism Act.” See an article by the Canadian Association of University Teachers
(C A U T ), entitled “Critics Fear Bill C-51.” For a thoughtful exploration of the tension between
national security and civil liberties, see Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada.
19 See Abelson, A Capitol Idea, chapter 9.
20 See Edwards, Leading the Way.
21 Abelson, “Thinking Out Loud.”
22 The Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation and C S I S , are among the handful of think
tanks inside the Washington Beltway that have their own television and radio facilities.
23 Abelson, “Thinking Out Loud.”
24 Abelson, “It Seemed Like a Good Idea.”
25 According to the Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports, Chatham House consistently ranks
among the world’s top think tanks.
26 Personal correspondence with media relations personnel at Chatham House.
27 Comments made by Neils Veldhuis, president of the Fraser Institute at the 2014 Manning
Networking Conference.
28 On the evolution of I R P P , see Ritchie, An Institute for Research on Public Policy and Dobell,
I R P P . For a history of the Brookings Institution, see Critchlow, The Brookings Institution.
29 Parmar, Foundations of the American Century.
30 Lipton, Williams, and Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks.”
31 Talbott, “A Message from Strobe Talbott.”
32 Abelson, American Think Tanks, 52–5.
33 McGann, The Competition for Scholars.
34 See Stone, Banking on Knowledge.
35 Krugel, “Report Says Pipeline Squeeze.”
36 Ibid.
37 See Cleland et al., “A Matter of Trust.”
38 See Abelson, “Environmental Lobbying and Political Posturing.”
39 Green and Jackson, “Pipelines Are the Safest Way to Transport Oil and Gas”; and “Pipelines
Are Safer, Cheaper and Greener.” Also see Hoberg, “The Battle Over Oil Sands Access to
Tidewater.”
40 Parkland Institute, home page, “About the Parkland Institute,” www.parklandinstitute.ca.
41 Parkland Institute, “Self-Study,” www.parklandinstitute.ca.
42 Pembina Institute, “About – Institute Story,” www.pembina.org.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Halperin, “Keystone Pipeline Not a Big Deal.”
47 McCarthy, “Influential US Think Tank.”
48 Knappenberger, “Keystone X L Pipeline.”
49 Most recently, Nebraska held hearings on Keystone X L beginning in August 2017 to, among
other things, question representatives from TransCanada Corp about three specific concerns: the
depth at which the pipeline going through Nebraska would be buried; the strategies in place to
deal with potential spills and/or leaks; and whether TransCanada Corp or another entity would
have the right to replace stretches of pipeline in the future, an economic benefit that could run
into the billions. For a discussion of these and other concerns, as well as strategies to oppose the
construction of the pipeline, see Sisson, “To Fight Keystone X L ,” and Slav, “Has Keystone X L
Become Obsolete?”
CHAPTER NINE
1 See, for instance, Heclo, “Issue Networks.”

2 Rich, “Perceptions of Think Tanks.” A survey was sent to the heads of government departments
in Canada as part of the Policy Research Initiative, but a more comprehensive survey has not
yet been distributed.
APPENDIX ONE
1 Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 898.
2 Ibid.
3 For a history of the Hoover Institution see Duignan, Hoover Institution.
4 Mission statement of the Hoover Institution. Available on institute’s home page at
www.hoover.stanford.edu.
5 Quoted in “The Good Think-Tank Guide.” Also see McGann, 2016 Global Go To Think Tank
Index Report.
6 Several studies have been written on the history of the Council on Foreign Relations. See, for
example, Schulzinger, Wise Men; Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust; Silk and Silk,
American Establishment; Perloff, Shadows of Power; Council on Foreign Relations, Twenty-
Five Years; Grose, The Inquiry; Santoro, Diffidence and Ambition; and Wala, Council on
Foreign Relations. For a conspiratorial interpretation of the role of the C F R by members of the
conservative John Birch Society, see Courtney and Courtney, Council on Foreign Relations.
7 Council on Foreign Relations home page at www.cfr.org.
8 C S I S mission statement. For a detailed history of the organization see Smith, Strategic
Calling.
10 Several articles have been written on the I P S . For example, see Muravchik, “Think-Tank of the
Left”; Yoffe, “I P S Faces Life”; and Powell, Covert Cadre.
11 Dickson, Think Tanks, 222–3.
12 The Urban Institute, Urban Institute, 7.
13 Ibid., 9.
14 Urban Institute 2015 Annual Report.
15 The Urban Institute, Urban Institute, 7.
16 Ibid., 3.
17 Cato Institute home page, www.cato.org.
18 For more on the often stormy relationship between Charles Koch and the Cato Institute, see
Mayer, Dark Money, and Schulman, Sons of Wichita.
19 Cato Institute 2015 Annual Report.
20 O’Connor and Cohn, “A Baby Boomers’ Think Tank.” For more on the Manhattan Institute’s
ties to Mayor Giuliani, see Scott, “Intellectuals.”
21 Fialka, “Cato Institute’s Influence Grows.”
22 Friedman, “Institute Tied to Clinton.”
23 Fineman, “Clinton’s Team.”
24 Balz, “Moderate, Conservative Democrats.”
A P P E N D I X T WO
1 Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada Act, R.S.C., 1985, C.A. 13.

2 Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada home page, www.asiapacific.ca. Also see the 2014 Annual
Report.
3 Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, “Introduction,” 1995–1996 Annual Report.
4 Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, “President’s Message,” 1995–1996 Annual Report.
5 Canada West Foundation, 1997 Annual Report, 1.
8 Ibid.
10 Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Annual Report 2014, 26.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 42.
13 Ibid.
14 C.D. Howe home page, www.cdhowe.org.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid. For a detailed discussion of the C.D. Howe Institute and its various incarnations, see Ernst,
“From Liberal Continentalism.”
17 C.D. Howe Institute, 2013 Annual Report, 1.
18 In its 2013 Annual Report, 33, C.D. Howe lists 7 fellows-in-residence; 49 senior fellows; 11
research fellows; and 12 international fellows.
19 Ibid.
20 C.D. Howe Institute, 2007 Annual Report.
21 Ibid.
22 C.D. Howe Institute, 2013 Annual Report, 5.
23 According to its 2014 Financial Statements, C I G I had revenues in excess of $27 million and a
long-term endowment valued over $55 million. Its revenues now exceed $40 million. See
C I G I , 2014 Financial Statements and its 2014 Annual Report.
24 Valpy, “Balsillie’s Disappointing Foray into Global Affairs.”
25 C I G I website, www.cigionline.org.
26 Valpy, “Balsillie’s Diappointing Foray into Global Affairs.”
27 For more on this, see Hopper, “York University Rejects R I M Co-founder.” Additional
information on Balsillie’s involvement in C I G I and the Balsillie School of International
Affairs can be found in the Canadian Association for University Teachers, Open for Business.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Lindquist, “Behind the Myth,” 347.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Conference Board of Canada, “About Us,” home page, www.conferenceboard.ca.
35 Ibid.
36 Conference Board of Canada, 2014 Annual Report, 4.
37 Ibid., 4–5.
38 Jérôme-Forget, “Institute for Research on Public Policy,” 92. For more on the I R P P , see
Dobell, I R P P , and Mackinnon, “The Canadian Think Tank Scene.”
39 Ibid., 87.
40 Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2014 Annual Report, 1.
41 Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2016 Annual Report.
42 Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy, “Who We Are,” home page,
www.macdonaldlaurier.ca.
43 Ibid.
44 Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy, 2013 Annual Report, 1.
45 McGann, 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report.
46 Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy, 2013 Annual Report, 10–11.
47 Montreal Economic Institute, 2014 Annual Report, 3.
48 Montreal Economic Institute, “About – Who We Are,” home page, www.iedm.org.
49 Montreal Economic Institute, 2014 Annual Report, 4.
50 Ibid., 5.
51 Montreal Economic Institute, 2016 Annual Report.
52 Mowat Centre, 2014 Annual Report, 1.
53 Ibid.
54 Mowat Centre, 2016 Annual Report.
55 Public Policy Forum, “About” home page, www.ppforum.ca. The P P F has a second office in
Toronto.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Abelson, Northern Lights, 262.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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SELECTED PUBLICATIONS OF THINK TANKS
American Think Tanks
T H E A ME R I C A N E N T E R P R I S E I N S T I T U T E M
Antos, Joseph, James C. Capretta, Lanhee J. Chen, Scott Gottlieb, Yuval
Levin, Thomas P. Miller, Ramesh Ponnuru, Avik Roy, Gail R. Wilensky,
and David Wilson. Improving Health and Health Care: An Agenda for
Reform. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute, 2015.
Aron, Leon. Putin’s Agenda and Medvedev’s Dilemma. Washington, D C:
American Enterprise Institute, 2010.
Bate, Robert. The Market for Inferior Medicines: Comparing The Price of
Falsified and Substandard Products With the Legitimate Medicines in
Emerging Markets. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute,
2011.
– Phake: The Deadly World of Falsified and Substandard Medicines.
Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2012.
Bauer, Katherine. Beyond Syria and Iraq: Examining Islamic State
Provinces. Washington, D C: Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
2016.
Biggs, Andrew G. The Multiplying Risks of Public Employee Pensions to
State and Local Government Budgets. Washington, D C: American
Enterprise Institute, 2013.
Bolton, John R. The Key to Changing the United Nations System.
Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute, 2010.
Bowen, Daniel H. Politics and the Scoring of Race to the Top Applications.
Bowman, Karlyn, and Andrew Rugg. Attitudes toward the Tea Party over
Time: An American Enterprise Institute Compilation. Washington, D C:
Broda, Christian and David E. Weinstein. Prices, Poverty and Inequality:
Why Americans are Better off than You Think. Washington, D C:
American Enterprise Press, 2008.
Calfee, John E. Prices, Markets, and the Pharmaceutical Revolution.
Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2000.
Cheney, Lynne V. We the People: The Story of the Constitution. New York,
N Y: Simon and Schuster, 2008.
Columbus, Rooney. Report and Disclose: State Oversight of Institutional
Performance in Higher Education. Washington, D C: Center on Higher
Education Reform – American Enterprise Institute, 2016.
Eaglen, Mackenzie, and Douglas A. Birkey. Nearing Coffin Corner: US Air
Power on the Edge. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute,
2012.
– Trends in Military Compensation: A Chartbook. Washington, D C:
Eberstadt, Nicholas. China’s New ‘Two-Child Policy’: Still Coercive.
Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute – Testimony before the
US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2015.
– The Poverty of “The Poverty Rate”: Measure and Mismeasure of Want in
Modern America. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Press, 2008.
Gingrich, Newt, and Vince Haley. Drill Here, Drill Now, Pay Less: A
Handbook for Slashing Gas Prices and Solving Our Energy Crisis.
Washington, D C: Regnery, 2008.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Joseph Gyourko. Rethinking Federal Housing
Policy: How to Make Housing Plentiful and Affordable. Washington,
D C: American Enterprise Press, 2008.
Gottlieb, Scott. Will Regulation Thwart the Personalization of Medicine?
Molecular Diagnostics and the Expanding Role of the F D A.
Green, Kenneth P. Managing Flood Risk. Washington, D C: American
Hess, Frederick M. The Future Of Educational Entrepreneurship:
Possibilities Of School Reform. Cambridge, MA : Harvard Education
Press, 2008.
Hess, Frederick M., and Taryn Hochleitner. College Rankings Inflation: Are
You Overpaying for Prestige? Washington, D C: American Enterprise
Institute, 2012.
Kelly, Andrew P., K.C. Deane, and Taryn Hochleitner. Staying on Target for
College: How Innovation Can Improve the Pipeline to Higher
Education. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute, 2014.
Lohaus, Phillip. Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An
Operational Framework for Employing Special Operations Forces in
the Space Between War and Peace. Washington, D C: American
Makin, John H. Is China Slowing Down? Washington, D C: American
Meyer, Bruce D., and James X. Sullivan. The Material Well-Being of the
Poor and Middle Class Since 1980. Washington, D C: American
Miller, Thomas P. Beyond Makers and Takers: Retargeting Entitlement
Reform. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute, 2015.
Noriega, Roger F., and José Javier Lanza. Honduras Under Siege.
Parente, Stephen T. Harnessing Health Information in Real Time: Back to
The Future for a More Practical and Effective Infrastructure.
Philipson, Tomas J., and Anupam B. Jena. Innovation and Technology
Adoption in Health Care Markets. Washington, D C: American
Enterprise Press, 2008.
Russo, Alexander. How ‘Waiting for Superman’ (Almost) Changed the
World. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute, 2014.
Satel, Sally, ed. When Altruism Isn’t Enough: The Case for Compensating
Kidney Donors. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Press, 2009.
Schmitt, Gary J. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic: The Security
Record of “New Europe.” Washington, D C: American Enterprise
Institute, 2016.
Shearer, Andrew. Australian Defense in the Era of Austerity: Mind the
Expectation Gap. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute,
2013.
Shober, Arnold F. From Teacher Education to Student Progress: Teacher
Quality since N C L B. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute,
2012.
Smith, Vincent H., and Barry K. Goodwin. The A C R E Program: A
Disaster in Waiting. Washington, D C: American Enterprise Institute,
2011.
Strain, Michael R., and Douglas A. Webber. High School Experiences, the
Gender Wage Gap, and the Selection of Occupation. Bonn, Germany:
I Z A – Institute of Labor Economics, 2015.
Valant, Jon. Better Data, Better Decisions: Informing School Choosers to
Improve Education Markets. Washington, D C: American Enterprise
Institute, 2014.
Viard, Alan D., and Ryan Lirette. State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
and Income Flows: The Economics of Neutrality. Washington, D C:
Wallison, Peter J., Alex J. Pollock, and Edward J. Pinto. Taking the
Government out of Housing Finance: Principles for Reforming the
Housing Finance Market. Washington, D C: American Enterprise
Institute, 2016.
Wilcox, W. Bradford, Joseph Price, and Robert I. Lerman. Strong Families,
Prosperous States: Do Healthy Families Affect the Wealth of States?
Zimmerman, Katherine. Al-Shabaab and the Challenges of Providing
Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia. Washington, D C: American
Enterprise Institute – Critical Threats, 2011.
– A Q A P’s Role in the al Qaeda Network. Washington, D C: American
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Aaron, Henry J. How to Think About the US Budget Challenge.
Washington, D C: The Brookings Institution, 2010.
Alinikoff, Emily, and Ted Piccone. Rising Democracies and the Arab
Awakening: Implications for Global Democracy and Human Rights.
Washington, D C: Report, The Brookings Institution, 2012.
Bradley, Megan. Rethinking Return: Defining Success in Refugee
Repatriation. Washington, D C: Article, The Brookings Institution,
2013.
Chingos, Matthew M., and Kristin Blagg. Making College Earnings Data
Work for Students. Washington, D C: Report, The Brookings Institution,
2016.
Danchenko, Igor, Erica Downs, and Fiona Hill. One Step Forward, Two
Steps Back? The Realities of a Rising China and Implications for
Russia’s Energy Ambitions. Policy Paper. Washington, D C: The
Daniel, Gregory W., Derek Griffing, and Sophie Mayer. Antimicrobial
Resistance: Antibiotics Stewardship and Innovation. Washington, D C:
Article, The Brookings Institution, 2014.
Elliott, Douglas J. The Significance of the Bank Stress Tests in Europe.
Washington, D C: The Brookings Institution, 2010.
Friedman, Allan A., Patrick Crowley, and Darrell M. West. Online Identity
and Consumer Trust: Assessing Online Risk. Washington, D C: The
Galston, William A. Thoughts on a Center-Left Entitlements Strategy: How
We Might Shape Social Security and Medicare for the Future.
Washington, D C: Article, The Brookings Institution, 2014.
Goodby, James E., and Markku Heiskanen. A New Day in Northeast Asia?
Hamilton, James, Ethan Harris, Jan Hatzius, and Kenneth West. The
Equilibrium Real Funds Rate: Past, Present, and Future. Washington,
D C: Working Paper #16, Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy
at Brookings, 2015.
Gustafsson-Wright, Emily, Sophie Gardiner, and Katie Smith. Ensuring
Effective Outcome-Based Financing in Early Childhood Development:
Recommendations to the International Commission on Financing
Global Education Opportunity. Washington, D C: Background Paper,
The Center for Universal Education at the Brookings Institution, 2016.
Hill, Fiona, and Clifford G. Gaddy. Putin and the Uses of History in Russia.
Hrdinová, Jana, and Natalie Helbig. Designing Social Media Policy for
Government. Washington, D C: Report, The Brookings Institution,
2011.
Kocot, S. Lawrence, and Mark B. McClellan. Achieving Better Chronic
Care at Lower Costs across the Health Care Continuum for Older
Americans. Washington, D C: Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform
at The Brookings Institution, 2010.
Kohn, Donald. Comments on “The Most Dangerous Idea in Federal
Reserve History: Monetary Policy Doesn’t Matter.” Washington, D C:
The Brookings Institution, 2013.
Levy, Santiago. Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality
and Economic Growth in Mexico. Washington, D C: Brookings
Institution Press, 2008.
Loveless, Tom. The 2010 Brown Center Report on American Education:
How Well Are American Students Learning? An Early Release of Part
III. Washington, D C: The Brookings Institution, 2011.
Mathur, Aparna, and Adele Morris. A US Carbon Tax and the Earned
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Sachdeva, Gulshan. India in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Foreign Economic
and Security Interests. Washington, D C: C S I S Report, 2016.
Santoro, David, and Brad Glosserman. Building Toward Trilateral
Cooperation on Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia: The First US-
R O K-Japan Extended Deterrence Trilateral Dialogue. Washington,
D C: C S I S Issues & Insights vol. 13 - No. 14 Report, 2013.
Stash, Sharon, Jennifer Cooke, Matt Fisher, and Alisha Kramer. Competing
Pressures for US P E P FA R in Botswana: Rising Ambitions, Declining
Resources. Washington, D C: C S I S Report, 2012.
Todman, Will. Gulf States’ Policies on Syria. Washington, D C: C S I S Gulf
Analysis Paper, 2016.
Twigg, Judith. US-Russia Health Engagement: Still on the Agenda.
Zikibayeva, Aigerim, Serge Korepin, and Shalini Sharan. What Does the
Arab Spring Mean for Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus?
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Amend, Kurt. Counterinsurgency Principles for the Diplomat. Philadelphia,
PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis vol. 54, Issue 2, 215–31,
2010.
Berti, Benedetta. How Does the Syrian Civil War End for Hezbollah?
Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, 2016.
– Why Humanitarian Aid Workers Are Under Attack. Philadelphia, PA :
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Outside Publications, Originally
Published by The National Interest, 2016.
Bolgiano, David G. A Nationalist’s View of Lawfare. Philadelphia, PA :
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis vol. 54, Issue 3, 387–99, 2010.
Caldwell, William B., Derek S. Reveron. Beyond the Tenth Year in
Afghanistan: Security Force Assistance and International Security.
Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, 2011.
Chang, Felix K. A Salutation to Arms: Asia’s Military Buildup, Its Reasons,
and Its Implications. Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research
Institute, E-Notes, 2013.
Charai, Ahmed. Soft Power, Hard Results in North Africa. Philadelphia,
PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, 2013.
– Is Political Islam Compatible with Democracy? Philadelphia, PA :
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Outside Publications, originally
published by The National Interest, 2016.
Cook, James L. Military Alliances in the 21st Century: Still Relevant after
all These Years? Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute,
Orbis vol. 57, Issue 4, 559–73, 2013.
DeLise, Jacques. Taiwan’s Quest for International Space: Ma’s Legacy,
Tsai’s Options, China’s Choices, and US Policy. Philadelphia, PA :
Dueck, Colin. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Obama. Philadelphia, PA :
Foust, Joshua. What It’s Like to Be Gay in the Ultra-Masculine NatSec
Community. Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute,
Outside Publications, 2015.
Garfield, Andrew. The Afghan Elections: Is Abdullah Right That He Was
Wronged (Twice)? Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute,
E-Notes, 2014.
Garfinkle, Adam. US Influence Drip-Dripping Away. Philadelphia, PA :
Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, 2014.
Granieri, Ronald J. More Faith, Less Fear: Islam, Islamism, and the Future
of the West. Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-
Notes, 2014.
Green, Michael. China’s Periphery: Implications for US Policy and
Interests. Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis
vol. 56, Issue 3, 357–69, 2012.
Grygiel, Jakub. Emperor Nero’s Lesson on Ukraine, Philadelphia, PA :
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Outside Publications, Originally
Published by The American Interest, 2015.
Hodge, Carl C. The Pivot in Perspective: American Naval Power, Then and
Now. Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis vol.
58, Issue 4, 392–412, 2014.
Hoffman, Frank G., and Evan Kalikow. To Drone or Not to Drone.
Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes, 2013.
Horowitz, Irving Louis. Quo Vadis Fidel? Where are You Going?
Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note, 2010.
Jones, David T. The Summer of Canadian Content – 2011. Philadelphia,
PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note, 2011.
Masse, Todd. Nuclear Terrorism Redux: Conventionalists, Skeptics, and the
Margin of Safety. Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute,
Orbis vol. 54, Issue 2, 302–19, 2010.
Noonan, Michael P. American Geostrategy in a Disordered World.
Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis vol. 59,
Issue 4, 600–12, 2015.
Rubel, Robert C. Getting a Grip on Tailored Deterrence: The World of
Conflict Management. Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research
Institute, Orbis vol. 56, Issue 4, 676 – 91, 2012.
Sicherman, Harvey. Saddam Hussein, Stalin on the Tigris. Philadelphia,
PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis vol. 55, Issue 3, 489–97,
2011.
Siddiqi, Toufiq. Pakistan, India, China, and the United States: Energy,
Climate Change, and National Security. Philadelphia, PA : Foreign
Policy Research Institute, Orbis vol. 57, Issue 4, 615–26, 2013.
Simons, Anna. Sovereignty – The Ultimate States’ Rights Argument.
Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute Telegram, Temple
University, 2011.
Spechler, Martin C., and Dina R. Spechler. Is Russia Succeeding in Central
Asia? Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis vol.
54, Issue 4, 615–29, 2010.
Sucherman, Harvey. Hafez Al-Assad: The Man Who Waited Too Long.
Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis vol. 55,
Issue 3, 46–71, 2011.
Tadros, Samuel. The Muslim Brotherhood and Washington: Courtship and
Its Discontents. Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-
Notes Middle East Media Monitor, 2012.
Zakheim, The Hon. Dov S. Did Donald Trump’s Presidential Luck Just Run
Out? Philadelphia, PA : Foreign Policy Research Institute, Outside
Publications, 2015.
T H E H O O V E R I N S T I T U T I O N O N WA R , R E V O L U T I O N ,
AND PEACE
Anderson, Terry L., and Laura E. Huggins. Greener than You: Are You
Really an Environmentalist? Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution,
2008.
– If Hayek and Coase Were Environmentalists: Linking Economics and
Ecology. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Economic Working
Papers, 2015.
– Why It’s Safer to Drill in the Backyard. Stanford, C A: The Hoover
Institution, The Hoover Digest, 2010.
Atlas, Scott W. In Excellent Health: Setting the Record Straight on
America’s Health Care. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Press,
2012.
Becker, Gary S. You’re Hired! Eventually… Stanford, C A: The Hoover
Institution, The Hoover Digest, 2010.
Carl, Jeremy, ed. Distributed Power in the United States: Prospects and
Policies. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Press, 2013.
Carl, Jeremy, and David Fedor. For California’s A B 32: Cap-and-Trade-
and-Cash Back, Not Cap-and-Trade-and-Tax. Stanford, C A : The
Hoover Institution Analysis, 2014.
– More Simplicity, Less Charisma: Improving the Effectiveness, Cost, and
Fairness of California’s Climate Agenda. Stanford, C A: The Hoover
Institution Analysis, 2014.
Carl, Jeremy, Dian Grueneich, and Cara Goldenberg. Renewable and
Distributed Power in California: Simplifying the Regulatory Maze –
Making the Path for the Future. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution
Analysis, 2012.
Chen, Lanhee J. Hearing on the Impact of the Affordable Care Act (A C A )
Employer Mandate’s Definition of Full-Time Employee on Jobs and
Opportunities. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Economic
Working Papers, 2014.
Cobbs, Elizabeth. American Umpire. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution
Press, 2013.
Cogan, John F., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Daniel P. Kessler. The Effect of
Massachusetts’ Health Reform on Employer-sponsored Insurance
Premiums. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Economic Working
Papers, 2010.
– The Effect of Tax Preferences on Health Spending. Stanford, C A: The
Hoover Institution Economic Working Papers, 2011.
– Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise: Five Steps to a Better Health Care System,
Second Edition. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Press, 2012.
Epstein, Richard A. The Blue State Model Has Failed. Stanford, C A: The
Hoover Institution, Defining Ideas, 2016.
Gregory, Paul R. Lenin’s Brain and Other Tales from the Secret Soviet
Archives. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution, 2009.
Jackson, Thomas, Kenneth E. Scott, Kimberly Anne Summe, and Mark
Moyar. The White House’s Seven Deadly Errors. Stanford, C A: The
Nash, George H. Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s Secret History of the
Second World War and Its Aftermath. Stanford, C A: The Hoover
Rauh, Joshua D. Why City Pension Problems Have Not Improved, and a
Roadmap Forward. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Economic
Working Papers, 2015.
Roberts, Rus. The Human Side of Trade. Stanford, C A: The Hoover
Institution, 2016.
Schake, Kori. Managing American Hegemony: Essays on Power in a Time
of Dominance. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution, 2009.
Scott, Kenneth E. Designing a Better Bankruptcy Resolution. Stanford,
C A: The Hoover Institution Economic Working Papers, 2013.
– Designing a Better Bankruptcy Resolution. Stanford, C A: The Hoover
Institution Economic Working Papers, 2015.
Shultz, George P., Jeremy Carl, and David Fedor. The State Clean Energy
Cookbook: A Dozen Recipes for State Action on Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Analysis,
2014.
Shultz, George P., Steven P. Andreasen, Sidney D. Drell, and James E.
Goodby, eds. Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of
Nuclear Weapons: Complete Report of 2007 Hoover Institution
Conference. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution, 2008.
Sowell, Thomas. “Trickle Down Theory” and “Tax Cuts for the Rich”.
Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Analysis, 2012.
Sweeney, James L. The Energy Revolution. Stanford, CA: The Hoover
Institution, Defining Ideas, 2016.
Taylor, John B. Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and
Interventions Caused, Prolonged and Worsened the Financial Crisis.
Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution, 2009.
– Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Orderly Liquidation Authority
and a New Chapter 14. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Analysis,
2011.
Thornton, Bruce. NATO, Brexit, And America’s Security. Stanford, C A: The
– Obama Wants to Create More Victims of White Privilege: More Phony
Racial “Identities” – For More Racial Conflict. Stanford, C A: The
Hoover Institution, Front-page Mag, 2016.
– The Wages of Appeasement: Ancient Athens, Munich, and Obama’s
America. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Press, 2011.
Warsh, Kevin. The Conduct of Monetary Policy. Stanford, C A: The Hoover
Institution Analysis, 2013.
West, Bing. How We Fight in the Twenty-First Century: Winning Battles
While Losing Wars. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Analysis,
2015.
Whitehurst, Grover J. American Education in 2030: Curriculum Then and
Now. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution Analysis, 2010.
Williams, Walter. Liberty versus the Tyranny of Socialism: Controversial
Essays. Stanford, C A: The Hoover Institution, 2008.
T H E H E R I TA G E F O U N D AT I O N
Abbott, Alden, and John Malcolm. A Measured Approach to Patent Reform
Legislation. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2015.
Addington, David. What Is the Proper Role of the Courts? Washington,
D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2012.
Bradley, Gerard V. Religious Liberty in the American Republic.
Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2008.
Chen, Lanhee. How Obamacare Burdens Already Strained State Budgets.
Dodge, Michaela, Lisa Curtis, and Jessica Zuckerman. Eleven Years Later:
US Should Not Lose Momentum in the War on Terrorism. Washington,
Enos, Olivia. US Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan Fail to Deliver.
Feulner, Edwin J., and Doug Wilson. Getting America Right: The True
Conservative Values Our Nation Needs Today. Washington, D C: The
Heritage Foundation, 2008.
Florance, Charlotte, James Phillips, James Carafano, Steven Bucci, and
Peter Brookes. Kenya Attack: Vigilance Required to Combat al-
Shabaab’s Resurgence. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation,
2014.
Gattuso, James. Adjusting the Picture: Television Regulation for the 21st
Century. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2012.
– Can the Postal Service Have a Future? Washington, D C: The Heritage
Foundation, 2013.
– Joblessness and Regulation: The “Mass Layoff” Fallacy. Washington,
Gattuso, James, Stephen Keen, and Diane Katz. Red Tape Rising: Obama’s
Torrent of New Regulation. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation,
2010.
Grossman, Andrew. Evenwel v. Abbott: What Does One Person, One Vote
Really Mean? Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2015.
Groves, Steven, James Roberts, and Brett Schaefer. Why the US Should
Oppose the Creation of an International Anti-Corruption Court.
Haislmaier, Edmund. 2015 Health Insurance Enrollment: Net Increase of
4.8 Million, Trends Slowing. Washington, D C: The Heritage
Foundation, 2016.
Hayden, General Michael. Protecting America and Winning the Intelligence
War. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2010.
Holmes, Kim R. Liberty’s Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st
Century. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2009.
Inserra, David. A Dangerous Executive Precedent on Immigration.
Katz, Diane. C A F E Standards: Fleet-Wide Regulations Costly and
Unwarranted. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2011.
– Obama’s Regulatory Agenda: Calm Before the Superstorm. Washington,
Kronquist, Amanda. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: History and
Reau-thorization Issues for 2012. Washington, D C: The Heritage
Foundation, 2011.
Larkin, Paul. Reasonably Construing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to
Avoid Overcriminalization. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation,
2013.
Larkin, Paul, David Bernstein, Randy Barnett, and Clark Neily. Economic
Liberty and the Constitution: An Introduction. Washington, D C: The
Heritage Foundation, 2014.
Meese, Edwin, Matthew Spalding, and David F. Forte. The Heritage Guide
to the Constitution. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2009.
Miller, Terry, and Kim R. Holmes. The 2009 Index of Economic Freedom:
The Link Between Economic Opportunity and Prosperity. Washington,
O’Shea, John. Reforming Veterans Health Care: Now and for the Future.
Phillips, James. Gaza Crisis: US Should Press Egypt to Rein in Hamas.
Phillips, James, and Ladan Archin. More International Pressure Needed to
Advance Freedom in Iran. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation,
2011.
Policy Experts. The Insider Guide to Public Policy Experts and
Organizations 2008–2009. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation,
2009.
Rector, Robert, and Jamie Hall. National Academy of Sciences Report
Indicates Amnesty for Unlawful Immigrants Would Cost Trillions of
Dollars. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2016.
Rosenzweig, Paul. Government Cyber Failures Reveal Weaknesses of
Regulatory Approach to Cybersecurity. Washington, D C: The Heritage
Foundation, 2013.
Rosenzweig, Paul, James Carafano and Jena Baker McNeill. Using the
SA F E T Y Act to Build a Stronger US–Israeli Terrorism-Fighting
Partnership. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2010.
Schreiber, Mark, and Elizabeth Fender. Majority Say I S I S Strategy
Unsuccessful, US at Risk of Attack. Washington, D C: The Heritage
Foundation, 2016.
Slattery, Elizabeth, Stephanos Bibas, Richard Garnett, and Josh Blackman.
The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia: Remembering a Conservative
Legal Titan’s Impact on the Law. Washington, D C: The Heritage
Foundation, 2016.
Von Spakovsky, Hans A. Sanctuary Cities Put Law-Abiding Citizens at
Risk. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2015.
Wainstein, Kenneth. The Changing Nature of Terror: Law and Policies to
Protect America. Washington, D C: The Heritage Foundation, 2013.
Walters, Riley. The 75th Terrorist Plot on the United States. Washington,
HUDSON INSTITUTE
Adelman, Carol. Emerging Economies Bring New Life to Philanthropy.
Washington, D C: The Hudson Institute, 2013.
Adelman, Carol, Jeremiah Norris, Yulya Spantchak, and Kacie Marano. The
Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2010. Washington, D C:
The Hudson Institute, 2010.
Avery, Dennis T. What Really Triggers a Resource Crisis? Washington,
D C: The Hudson Institute, 2012.
Cardello, Hank. We’re Going Back to Counting Calories … And Here’s Why
That’s a Good Thing.
– Why the A MA ’s Obesity Ruling Is Bad Medicine. Washington, D C: The
Hudson Institute, 2013.
Cardello, Hank, and Jeffrey Wolfson. Lower-Calorie Foods and Beverages
Fuel Growth at Healthy Weight Commitment Foundation Companies.
Cardello, Hank, Jeffrey Wolfson, and Lauren Warren. How Supermarkets
Are Shaping Up and Growing Their Lower-Calorie Products: An
Analysis of the Fence Sitter Consumer Segment. Washington, D C: The
Cropsey, Seth, and Eric B. Brown. Energy: The West’s Strategic
Opportunity in the Eastern Mediterranean. Washington, D C: The
Feith, Douglas J. A Responsibility to Explain Why Iraq Matters.
Haqqani, Husain. A Doomed Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
– Inclusive Security for the Muslim World. Washington, D C: The Hudson
Institute, 2016.
Herman, Arthur. From G I Joe to Trader Joe’s. Washington, D C: The
Hudson Institute. Stuffed at Thanksgiving: A New Corporate Solution to the
Obesity Crisis. Washington, D C: The Hudson Institute, 2011.
Marlowe, Ann. Pets Later! Washington, D C: The Hudson Institute, 2010.
Marshall, Paul. Kenya, Pakistan, Egypt – It Is Now Open Season on
Christians. Washington, D C: The Hudson Institute, 2013.
Mead, Walter Russell. Why the EU Is in Trouble: The EU’s Trade Deal with
Canada is on life Support. Washington, D C: The Hudson Institute, Wall
Street Journal, 2016.
Murray, David W. Mexican Heroin Surge Revealed by the White House.
Natsios, Andrew. Foreign Aid Programs are Important for American
National Security. Washington, D C: The Hudson Institute, 2011.
Polin, Justin. Toward a Smarter Power: Moving Beyond the Rhetoric.
Poole, Robert W., Jr. Organization and Innovation in Air Traffic Control.
Sands, Christopher. Like Father, Like Son. Washington, D C: The Hudson
Institute, 2015.
– Mexico: Nice Place to Visit but Wouldn’t Want to Trade There.
– What Prevented the Detroit Bridge? Stubborn Waters. Washington, D C:
The Hudson Institute, 2012.
– Will Khadr Come Between Canada and the United States? Washington,
D C: The Hudson Institute, 2012.
Sands, Christopher, and Jesse N. Barnett. The Problem with One Customer.
Sands, Christopher, and Thomas Klier. The Federal Role in Supporting
Auto Sector Innovation. Washington, D C: The Hudson Institute, 2010.
Simcox, Robin. A Q A P’s Ideological Battles at Home and Abroad.
Stelzer, Irwin M. The Times and the Post Take a Peculiar Line on Israel.
Tadros, Samuel. Mapping Egyptian Islamism. Washington, D C: The
T H E I N S T I T U T E F O R C O N T E MP O R A RY S T U D I E S
Gilder, George. Recapturing the Spirit of Enterprise. Richmond, C A: The
Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 2008.
Glenn, Charles L. Jr. The Myth of the Common School. Richmond, C A: The
Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 2008.
Hickell, Walter J. Crisis in The Common: The Alaska Solution. Richmond,
C A: The Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 2008.
Nisbet, Robert. The Quest for Community: A Study in Ethics in Order and
Freedom. Richmond, C A: The Institute for Contemporary Studies
Press, 2008.
Richards, John F. Land, Property, and the Environment. Richmond, C A:
The Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 2008.
Wilson, James Q., and Joan Petersilia, eds. Crime: Public Policies for
Crime Control. Richmond, C A: The Institute for Contemporary Studies
Press, 2008.
THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES

Alperstein, Olivia. When Children Hurt, Schools Can Help: Nobody Should
Lose Out on a Good Education Because of a Bad Experience.
Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2015.
Anderson, Sarah. Memo to US: Only Fools Rush In. Washington, D C:
Institute for Policy Studies, 2010.
– Retirement Divide: 100 CEOs v. the Rest of Us. Washington, D C:
Institute for Policy Studies, 2016.
– The Trojan Horse in the Debt Debate. Washington, D C: Institute for
Policy Studies, 2012.
Anderson, Sarah, Marjorie Wood, Sam Pizzigati, and Leslie Garvey.
Infographic: The Obamacare Benefit You’ve Never Heard of.
Asante-Muhammed, Dedrick, Karen Dolan, Daphne Wysham, Phyllis
Bennis, Sarah Anderson, and John Feffer. Barely Making the Grade:
Obama’s First Year. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies,
2010.
Baraka, Ajamu. The Assassination of Sandra Bland and the Struggle
against State Repression. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies,
2015.
Bennis, Phyllis. Understanding the US-Iran Crisis: A Primer. Washington,
D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2008.
Broad, Robin, and Chuck Cavanagh. Development Redefined: How the
Market Met Its Match. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies,
2008.
Broad, Robin, and John Cavanagh. The Age of Vulnerability: How the 2008
Financial Crash Redefined What It Means to be Economically
Vulnerable. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2011.
Bruun, Jonas, Lauren Gifford, and Robbie Watt. What’s Hot and What’s Not
at COP19 in Warsaw. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies,
2013.
Cavanagh, John. Heroes Fighting to Save the Middle Class: Wisconsin’s
Progressives. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2010.
Collins, Chuck. Racial Wealth Inequality and the Dream Deferred.
Collins, Chuck, and Nick Thorkelson. The Economic Meltdown Funnies.
Dolan, Karen. Beyond the Jobs Report: A Call for a Transformational
Economy. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2012.
Feffer, John. Recognizing Palestine: As More European Governments Line
Up to Recognize a Palestinian state, Israel (and the US) Look More
Isolated Than Ever. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2014.
Glover, Danny. Danny Glover’s Letelier-Moffitt Award Speech. Washington,
Hartman, Chester. Mandate for Change: Policies and Leadership for 2009
and Beyond. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2009.
Hartung, William D., and Miriam Pemberton. Lessons from Iraq: Avoiding
the Next War. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2008.
Klinger, Scott. Five Taxpayer-Supported Corporations that Paid Their
C E Os More than Uncle Sam. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy
Studies, 2016.
Klinger, Scott, Sam Pizzigati, Chuck Collins, and Sarah Anderson. A
Response to Disputes by Corporations over Our Methodology.
Klinger, Scott, Sarah Anderson, and Brent Soloway. A Pension Deficit
Disorder: The Massive C E O Retirement Funds and Underfunded
Worker Pensions at Firms Pushing Social Security Cuts. Washington,
Perez-Rocha, Manuel. Peoples Sovereignty vs. Impunity Inc.:
Counterpower and Struggles for Justice. Washington, D C: Institute for
– Urging Presidents Obama and Calderon to Address Human and Workers’
Rights Issues. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2010.
Pizzigati, Sam. Paying for Poor Performance. Washington, D C: Institute
for Policy Studies, 2013.
Redman, Janet, and Oscar Reyes. Gates Funding Welcome, but No
Substitute for Finance Commitments in Paris Climate Agreement.
Redman, Janet, and Sarah Anderson. Activists in More than 20 Countries
Urge G20 Leaders to Tax Speculators. Washington, D C: Institute for
Reyes, Oscar. California’s Cap and Trade Policy Is Actually Working
against Its Climate Action Targets. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy
Studies, 2016.
Shih, Kevin, and Sarah Anderson. Tax Wall Street to Pay for Jobs.
Slaughter-Johnson, Ebony. Mother’s Day Is Another Day to Struggle for
Justice When Your Child Is behind Bars. Washington, D C: Institute for
Villeda, Krysta. World Bank Energy Lending Still Veering in Wrong
Direction. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2014.
Williams. Tiffany. Domestic Workers Deserve Protection: Hold Diplomats
Like Khobragade to Account. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy
Studies, 2013.
– What Immigration Reform Means for Women. Washington, D C: Institute
for Policy Studies, 2013.
Woods, Emira. New Policy Statement: A New Direction for US Policy on
Africa. Washington, D C: Institute for Policy Studies, 2013.
Canadian Think Tanks
AT L A N T I C I N S T I T U T E F O R MA R K E T S T U D I E S
Amir Attaran, Rosario, and Taylor Andree Cartagena. The Effectiveness of
the Common Drug Review in Canada’s National Drug Strategy.
Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2011.
Audas, Rick, Charles Cirtwill, and Jaime Newman. 2nd Annual Report
Card on Western Canadian High Schools. Halifax, N S: Atlantic
Institute for Market Studies, 2012.
Bennett, Paul W. Building a Bigger Tent: Serving All Special Needs
Students in New Brunswick’s Inclusive Education System. Halifax, N S:
– Reclaiming At-Risk Children and Youth: A Review of Nova Scotia’s
SchoolsPlus (I S D ) Initiative. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market
Studies, 2013.
– E-Learning in K-12 Schools. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market
Studies, 2016.
Bennett, Paul W., and Derek M. Gillis. Education on Wheels, Seizing Cost
and Energy Efficiency Opportunities in Student Transportation. Halifax,
N S: Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2015.
Bennett, Paul W., and Karen Mitchell. Maintaining “Spotless Records:”
Professional Standards, Teacher Misconduct and the Teaching
Profession. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2014.
Eisen, Ben, and Shaun Fantauzzo. The Size and Cost of Atlantic Canada’s
Public Sector. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2014.
Fantauzzo, Shaun. Reforming Atlantic Fisheries, Lessons from Iceland.
Halifax, N S: Atlantic Institute for Market Studies and Frontier Centre
for Public Policy, 2014.
Flanagan, Tom, and Lee Harding. Seven Habits of Highly Effective First
Nations. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Markey Studies, 2016.
Freehan, James. Electricity Market Integration, Newfoundland Chooses
Monopoly and Protectionism. Halifax, N S: Atlantic Institute for Market
Studies, 2013.
Hebb, Barrie B.F., and Charles Cirtwill. What You Don’t Know Can Hurt
You: Where Does All the Money Go? Halifax, N S: Atlantic Institute for
Market Studies, 2010.
Lucani, Patrick. Is the Obesity-Industry-Complex Making Us Fat? Halifax,
N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2013.
Mansur, Salim. The Muddle of Multiculturalism: A Liberal Critique.
McDonald, Meredith. The Road Ahead, Options for Reforming Registry
Service Delivery. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies,
2015.
McIver, Don. Who Could Have Seen T H AT Coming? The History and
Consequences of a Global Crisis. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for
– Nova Scotians without Borders: Why Economic and Industrial
Development Strategies Should Refocus on People Rather Than
Regions. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2011.
Munro, Ian. Signal Strength: Setting the Stage for Canada’s Wireless
Industry in the Next Decade. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market
Studies, 2010.
– Crisis? What Crisis? Understanding Child Care Shortages in Nova
Scotia. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2013.
– Radio Free Canada, Ending Protectionism in Canada’s Communications
Industries. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2013.
– Checking the Math on Childcare. Halifax, N S: Atlantic Institute for
Murrell, David, and Shaun Fantauzzo. New Brunswick’s Debt and Deficit, A
Historical Look. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies,
2014.
Pavel, Jan. E-Government in the Atlantic Provinces: Review on Future
Trends. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, 2016.
Pickford, Andrew. Gas Opportunities for Atlantic Canada. Halifax, N S:
Roach, Robert, Jeff Collins, and Marco Navarro-Génie. A Good Problem to
Have, Lessons for Atlantic Canada from Alberta’s Experience with
Natural Resource Revenue. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market
Studies, 2015.
Spencer, Juanita. Putting our Money Where Our Mouths Are: Why Local
Governments Should Support Equalization of People, Not Provinces.
– This Rose, by Any Other Name, Stinks: Property Taxes Are Just a Badly
Designed Income Tax and Should Be Replaced with a Better One.
Weil, Gordon L. Atlantic Canada and the US Electricity Market: Projects
and Perspectives. Halifax, N S : Atlantic Institute for Market Studies,
2015.
Weil, Gordon L., Ed Martin, and Ben Eisen. Muskrat Falls, Opportunities
to Reduce Risk and Enhance Benefits. Halifax, N S: Atlantic Institute
for Market Studies, 2014.
Zawai, Ma’n, Brian Van Ness, and Bartha Maria Knoppers. Incidental
Findings in Genomic Research: A Review of International Norms.
Zitnet, David, and Dianne Kelderman. A Third Option for the Health Care
Debate: Think Community and Courage. Halifax, N S: Atlantic Institute
for Market Studies, 2010.
THE CALEDON INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL POLICY

Battle, Ken. Caring for Caregivers. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2009.
– Child Benefits and the 2015 Federal Budget. Ottawa: The Caledon
Institute, 2015.
– Community Roles in Policy. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2009.
– Restoring Minimum Wage in Canada. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute,
2011.
– Trends in Canada’s Payroll Taxes. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2011.
Battle, Ken, and Sherri Torjman. If You Don’t Pay, You Can’t Play: The
Children’s Fitness Tax Credit. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2014.
Battle, Ken, Sherri Torjman, and Michael Mendelson. As the Fiscal Chill
Thaws: Social Policy Ideas for the Medium Term. Ottawa: The Caledon
Institute, 2013.
– The Forgotten Fundamental. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2008.
– The No-Budge Budget. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2012.
– Old Age Insecurity? Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2012.
– Policy Agenda in Search of a Budget. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute,
2011.
– The Skilled Budget. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2013.
– The 2015 Deficit-of-Ideas Budget. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2015.
Hayes, Brigid. What You Need to Know about the Canada Job Fund.
Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2014.
Jai, Julie. The Journey of Reconciliation: Understanding our Treaty Past,
Present and Future. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2014.
Kent, Tom. Immigration: For Young Citizens. Ottawa: The Caledon
Institute, 2010.
Loewen, Garry, and Anne Makhoul. When Collaboration Stumbles: The
Opportunities Niagara Story. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2009.
Makhoul, Anne. Bold Solutions for Tackling Poverty in Waterloo Region.
– Effecting Policy Change: Lessons from the Canadian Caregiver
Coalition. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2011.
– New Brunswick’s “Overcoming Poverty Together” Plan Earns Praise and
Creates Hope. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2010.
Makhoul, Anne, and Sherry Torjman. Assessing the Benefits of Community
Human Services. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2012.
Makhoul, Anne, Jean-François Aubin, Caroline Lachance, and Dal
Brodhead. LaDémarche: Revitalizing Neighbourhoods in Trois-Rivières.
Mendelson, Michael. Federal Election – Politicians Refuse to Admit that
Deficits Are Inevitable. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2008.
– Options for a Refundable Disability Tax Credit for ‘working age’ persons.
Mendelson, Michael, and Ken Battle. Fixing the Hole in EI: Temporary
Income Assistance for the Unemployed. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute,
2011.
Mendelson, Michael, Ken Battle, Sherri Torjman, and Ernie Lightman. A
Basic Income Plan for Canadian with Severe Disabilities. Ottawa: The
Caledon Institute, 2010.
Mendelson, Michael, Sherri Torjman, and Ken Battle. Canada Pension
Plan: The New Deal. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2016.
Metallic, Naiomi, and Sébastian Grammond. Ensuring Real Accountability
on First Nation Reserves. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2016.
Notten, Geranda, and Michael Mendelson. Using Low Income and Material
Deprivation to Monitor Poverty Reduction. Ottawa: The Caledon
Institute, 2016.
Torjman, Sherri. Disability Policy Highlights. Ottawa: The Caledon
Institute, 2014.
Torjman, Sherri, and Anne Makhoul. Knowledge Exchange for Mental
Health. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2013.
Torjman, Sherri, Ken Battle, and Michael Mendelson. Counsel for the
Council. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2012.
– Disability Supports: Missing on the Policy Radar. Ottawa: The Caledon
Institute, 2015.
– Ensuring the Welfare of ‘Welfare Incomes.’ Ottawa: The Caledon
Institute, 2013.
– Financing Long-Term Care: More Money in the Mix. Ottawa: The
Caledon Institute, 2013.
– How Did the Just Society Become Just Don’t Care? Ottawa: The Caledon
Institute, 2010.
– Poverty Reduction in Québec: The First Five Years. Ottawa: The Caledon
Institute, 2010.
– Recreation and Resilience. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2012.
Tweddle, Anne, Ken Battle, and Sherri Torjman. Welfare in Canada.
– Welfare in Canada, 2014. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2015.
Wood, Donna E. Strengthening Canada’s Public Employment Service Post-
Devolution. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2016.
Zuker, Richard. Some Implications of the Liberal Government’s Tax
Changes. Ottawa: The Caledon Institute, 2016.
C A N A D I A N G L O B A L A F FA I R S I N S T I T U T E ( F O R ME R LY
C A N A D I A N D E F E N C E & F O R E I G N A F FA I R S I N S T I T U T E )
Boudreau, Brett. Preparing for Contemporary Operations in a Strategic
Communications World. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs
Institute, 2016.
Bow, Brian. Getting Past the Bilateral-Trilateral Debate: A Pragmatic
Functionalist Approach to North America. Calgary, A B : Canadian
Global Affairs Institute, 2011.
Brodie, Ian. After America, Canada’s Moment? Calgary, A B : Canadian
Cooper, Barry. What makes the Middle East Such a Difficult Place?
Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2014.
Coulon, Jocelyn. Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping? The Future of a
Tradition. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2010.
D’Aquino, Thomas. Security and Prosperity in the Canada-United States
Relationship Two Sides of the Same Coin: An Address to the Conference
of Defence Associations and the C D A Institute 2011 Conference on
Defence and Security. Calgary, A B: Canadian Global Affairs Institute,
2011.
De Kerckhove, Ferry. Canada and International Organizations: Time for a
Review. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2013.
Diebert, Robert. Distributed Security as Cyber Strategy: Outlining a
Comprehensive Approach for Canada in Cyberspace. Calgary, A B :
Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2012.
Ferris, John. Personal Privacy and Communications Security from the
Telegraph to the Internet. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs
Institute, 2014.
Godefroy, Andrew. The Ghost of General Otter: Putting the Canadian
Forces Report on Transformation 2011 in Context. Calgary, A B :
Granatstein, J.L. Is N ATO Still Necessary for Canada? Calgary, A B :
Grinius, Marius. Canada and Asia: Prosperity and Security. Calgary, A B :
Hage, Robert. Canada-EU Free Trade: The End or Future of Trade
Liberalization. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2016.
Lindley-French, Julian. N ATO : Countering Strategic Maskirovka. Calgary,
A B : Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2015.
Matthews, Kyle. Jihad versus R2P: The Future of Atrocity Prevention.
Morese, Eric, and Stéfanie von Hlatky. Sovereignty Collapse: Daesh and
the Return of Bandit Kings. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs
Institute, 2016.
Perry, David. 2015 Status Report on Major Defense Equipment
Procurements. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2015.
Plouffe, Joël. Towards a North American Arctic Region. Calgary, A B:
Rebien, Sven Tommi. Canada’s New Defense Procurement Strategy: Has
the Pendulum Swung Too Far? Calgary, A B: Canadian Global Affairs
Institute, 2014.
Robertson, Colin. ‘Now for the Hard Part’: A User’s Guide to Renewing the
Canadian-American Partnership. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global
Affairs Institute, 2011.
– A Canadian Primer to the G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico. Calgary,
A B : Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2012.
– A Canadian Agenda for the U S A : Obama and Beyond. Calgary, A B:
Segal, Hugh, and Jessica McLean. Exigencies of Future Deployments: What
Canada Must Exact from its Military Partners. Calgary, A B : Canadian
Soroka, Gary. Crisis – Order – Europe: Germany Steps Up. Calgary, A B:
Stairs, Denis. Being Rejected in the United Nations: The Causes and
Implications of Canada’s Failure to Win a Seat in the U N Security
Council. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2011.
Sutherland, Peter. Philippines. Calgary, A B : Canadian Global Affairs
Institute, 2012.
Wallace, Ron. Redefining Security in the Post-Afghanistan Era: The Future
of Canadian Military Policy in an Uncertain World. Calgary, A B :
– Unstoppable Momentum: The Real Meaning and Value Behind Operation
Nunavilut 10. Calgary, A B: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2010.
Westdal, Christopher. A Way Ahead With Russia. Calgary, A B : Canadian
– N ATO Summit: Making Peace with Russia, Canada Notwithstanding.
T H E C A N A D A WE S T F O U N D AT I O N
Ascah, Bob, Ted Chambers, Satya Das, John Kolkman, Dan Holinda, Mel
McMillan, and Robert Roach. Becoming Alberta’s Next Premier: Policy
Ideas for Leadership Candidates. Calgary, A B: Canada West
Foundation, 2011.
Bandali, Farahnaz. Shedding Light on the T F W Program. Calgary, A B:
Canada West Foundation, 2014.
Berdhal, Loleen. Whither Western Alienation?: Shifting Patterns of Western
Canadian Discontent with the Federal Government. Calgary, A B:
Berdahl, Loleen, and Brett Gartner. Competitive Mindset: Are Western
Canadians Ready to “Go for Gold?” Calgary, A B : Canada West
Foundation, 2008.
Cameron, Anna, and Trevor McLeod. Patchwork Pollution Solution:
Stitching Together a Canadian Climate Plan. Calgary, A B : Canada
West Foundation, 2015.
Chendong Li, and Naomi Christensen. Canada – Korea Free Trade
Agreement. Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2015.
Cleland, Michael. From the Ground Up: Earning Public Support for
Resource Development. Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2014.
– Let’s Talk Energy: A Continuing Dialogue. Calgary, A B : Canada West
Foundation, 2012.
– Unpacking Social License: Toward Framework for Addressing the Social
License Challenge Facing the Natural Resource Sector. Calgary, A B:
Cleland, Michael F., and Len Coad. Engine of Growth: A Western Canadian
Energy Policy Framework. Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation,
2013.
Cleland, Michael F., Anastasia Comumbos, and Him Hume. Seismic Shifts:
The Changing World of Natural Gas. Calgary, A B : Canada West
Foundation, 2011.
Cleland, Michael, and Roger Gibbins. Western Leadership for a Canadian
Energy Strategy. Calgary, A B: Canada West Foundation, 2010.
Cleland, Michael, Roger Gibbins, and Robbie Rolfe. Climate Change?
Reflections on the 20th Anniversary of the 1992 Rio Conference.
Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2012.
Coad, Len. Managing Expectations: Assessing the Potential of B C’s Liquid
Natural Gas Industry. Calgary, A B: Canada West Foundation, 2013.
Coffin, Victoria, David W. Poulton, and Casey Vander Ploeg. Our Water
and N A F TA : Implications for the Use of Market-Based Instruments for
Water Resource Management. Calgary, A B: Canada West Foundation,
2011.
Dade, Carlo. The Business Case for an Alberta International Development
Office. Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2014.
– The Pacific Alliance: Why It’s Important for Western Canada. Calgary,
Dade, Carlo, and Shafka Sajid. The T P P : The West Wants In. Calgary, A B :
Gibbins, Roger. An Extraordinary Future: A Strategic Vision for Western
Canada. Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2010.
Gibbins, Roger, Jacques Marcil, and Robert Roach. Taking Action on the
Economy. Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2008.
Gibbins, Roger, and Robert Roach. Taking Stock of the Federation. Calgary,
Harder, Catherine, Geoff Jackson, and Janet Lane. Talent Is Not Enough:
Closing the Skills Gap. Calgary, A B: Canada West Foundation, 2014.
Holden, Michael. Pipe or Perish: Saving an Oil Industry at Risk. Calgary,
A B: Canada West Foundation, 2013.
Lane, Janet, and Jeff Griffiths. Building Block: Modular Credentials for
Canada’s Trades. Calgary, A B: Canada West Foundation, 2016.
Lane, Janet, and Naomi Christensen. Competence is the Best Credential.
– Know, Do, Understand: Development of Competencies in Canada’s
Schoolchildren. Calgary, A B: Canada West Foundation, 2016.
Lane, Janet, and T. Scott Murray. Smarten Up: It’s Time to Build Essential
Skills. Calgary, A B: Canada West Foundation, 2015.
Marcil, Jacques. Well Balanced: Manitoba Economic Profile and Forecast.
McKenzie, Kenneth. Business Taxation in Western Canada: Settling for a
Personal Best? Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2009.
McLeod, Trevor. Walkin’ The Walk: Five Steps Toward Efficient Cities.
Miris, Rolf, and Chris Ryan. Western Canada’s Exports: Causes and
Implications of Changing Competiveness in Key Markets. Calgary, A B:
Nourallah, Laura, and Stewart Fast. Fair Enough: Assessing Community
Confidence in Energy Authorities. Calgary, A B: Canada West
Foundation, 2016.
Roach, Robert. State of the West 2010: Western Canadian Demographic
and Economic Trends. Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2010.
Sommerfeld, Larissa. Stress Points: An Overview of Water & Economic
Growth in Western Canada. Calgary, A B: Canada West Foundation,
2012.
Sommerfeld, Larissa, and Dave Hume. Northern Voices, Southern Choices:
Water Policy Lessons for Alberta. Calgary, A B : Canada West
Foundation, 2011.
St. Louis, Liam, and Janet Lane. Start ’Em Up: Incubating NextGen
Innovators. Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2016.
Stirrett, Shawna. The Missing Link: Constructive Ideas for Improving
Urban Environmental Performance in Western Canada. Calgary, A B :
Stirrett, Shawna, and Stephanie Shewchuck. Bright Spots: Urban
Development Initiatives in Western Canada. Calgary, A B : Canada West
Foundation, 2012.
Vander Ploeg, Casey. Problematic Property Tax: Why the Property Tax
Fails to Measure Up and What to Do about It. Calgary, A B: Canada
West Foundation, 2008.
– From H2O: Turning Alberta’s Water Headache into Opportunity. Calgary,
Vander Ploeg, Casey G., and Larissa Sommerfeld. Charging for Water Use
in Canada: A Workbook of the Central Principles, Key Questions, and
Initial Steps. Calgary, A B : Canada West Foundation, 2011.
T H E C A N A D I A N C E N T R E F O R P O L I C Y A LT E R N AT I V E S
A Network of N G Os, Trade Unions and Independent Experts. Progress on
Women’s Rights: Missing in Action – A Shadow Report on Canada’s
Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.
Ottawa: C C PA, 2014.
Adekunle, Bamidele, Jaime Cidro, and Glen Filson. The Political Economy
of Culturally Appropriate Foods in Winnipeg: A Case of Refugee Path
Immigrants (R P I S). Winnipeg: C C PA, 2015.
Angus, Murray, and Morley Hanson. The New “Three R’s”: An Award-
Winning College Program for Inuit Youth Shows the Benefits of a Small
Learning Environment and Culturally-Relevant Curriculum. Ottawa:
C C PA, 2011.
Baines, Donna, and Pat Armstrong. Promising Practices in Long Term
Care: Ideas Worth Sharing. Ottawa: C C PA, 2015.
Bigland-Pritchard, Mark. Plugging the Gap: Sustainable Power Options to
Complement Wind and Solar. Regina: C C PA, 2011.
Brodsky, Gwen, and Shelagh Day. Strengthening Human Rights: Why
British Columbia Needs a Human Rights Commission. Vancouver:
CCPA, 2014.
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: B C Office – B C Commentary: A
Review of Provincial Social and Economic Trends. Ottawa: C C PA,
2009.
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: National Office. Quel type de
measures: Des critères pour évaluer le budget fédéral. Ottawa: C C PA,
2009.
– What Kind of Stimulus: Tests for Assessing the Federal Budget. Ottawa:
C C PA, 2009.
– Alternative Federal Budget 2009: Beyond the Crisis: A Budget for a
Strong and Sustainable Future. Ottawa: C C PA, 2009.
– Leadership des temps difficiles: Alternative budgétaire pour le
gouvernement fédéral: Programme de stimulation fiscal. Ottawa:
C C PA, 2009.
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: Ont Office – O N. Maps You’ll
Never Find at the Gas Station: Ontario’s Working Poor. Toronto:
C C PA, 2016.
Curran, Amelia, Evan Bowness, and Elizabeth Cormack. Meeting the Needs
of Youth: Perspectives from Youth – Serving Agencies. Winnipeg:
C C PA, 2010.
Daub, Shannon, and Heather Whiteside. Election Chill Effect: The Impact
on B C’s New Third Party Advertising Rules on Social Movement
Groups. Vancouver: C C PA, 2010.
Dutt, Monika. Affordable Access to Medicines: A Prescription for Canada.
Ottawa: C C PA, 2014.
Erdmann, Jen. Lived Experiences and Perspectives: Women, Mental Health,
and Housing in Winnipeg. Winnipeg: C C PA, 2015.
Fairey, David, John Calvert, and Wayne Peppard. Building a Safer Work
Environment for B C Construction Workers. Ottawa: C C PA, 2009.
Fernandez, Lynne. It’s Time to Give Back to Manitoba’s North. Winnipeg:
CCPA, 2016.
Foster, Karen. Youth Employment and Un(der) Employment in Canada:
More Than a Temporary Problem? Ottawa: C C PA, 2012.
Frank, Lesley. The Nova Scotia Child Poverty Report Card 2010: 1989 –
2008. Halifax: C C PA, 2010.
Himelfarb, Alex, and Trish Hennessey. Basic Income: Rethinking Social
Policy. Ottawa: C C PA, 2016.
Ivanova, Igilka. The Cost of Poverty in B C. Vancouver: C C PA, 2011.
Jamasi, Zohra, and Trish Hennessey. Nobody’s Business: Airbnb in Toronto.
Ontario: C C PA, 2016.
Jarosiewicz, Scott. A Family Living Wage for Manitoba: 2013 Update.
Winnipeg: C C PA, 2013.
Lee, Marc, and Amanda Card. Who Occupies the Sky? The Distribution of
G H G S in Canada. Ottawa I Vancouver: C C PA, 2011.
Lee, Marc, and John Calver. Clean Electricity, Conservation and Climate
Justice in B C : Meeting Our Energy Needs in a Zero – Carbon Future.
Vancouver: C C PA, 2012.
Lee, Marc, Herb Barbolet, Tegan Adams, and Matt Thomson. Every Bite
Counts: Climate Justice and B C’s Food System. Vancouver: C C PA,
2010.
Lexchin, Joel. Canada and Access to Medicines in Developing Countries:
Intellectual Property Rights First. Ottawa: C C PA, 2013.
Macdonald, David, and Erika Shaker. Eduflation and the High Cost of
Learning. Ottawa: C C PA, 2012.
Macdonald, David, and Kayle Hatt. At What Cost? The Impacts of Rushing
to Balance the Budget. Ottawa: C C PA, 2014.
McInturff, Kate. The Gap in the Gender Gap: Violence Against Women in
Canada. Ottawa: C C PA, 2013.
Ontario’s Gender Gap: Women and Jobs Post – Recession. Toronto:
C C PA, 2014.
McInturff, Kate, with The Canadian Research Institute for the
Advancement of Women. The Best and Worst Places to be a Woman in
Canada 2016: The Gender Gap in Canada’s 25 Biggest Cities. Ottawa:
C C PA, 2016.
Partiff, Ben. Counting Every Drop: The Case for Water Use Reporting in
B C. Vancouver: C C PA, 2013. Posen, Andrew, Arjumand Siddiqi, and
Clyde Hertzman. Nurturing Early Childhood Development in Times of
Austerity in B C. Vancouver: C C PA, 2015.
Prebble, Peter, and Ann Coxworth. SaskNotes: The Government of
Canada’s Legacy of Contamination in Northern Saskatchewan
Watersheds. Regina: CCPA, 2013.
Rao, Govind C. The Great Equalizer: The Case for Investing in the Toronto
Public Library. Toronto: C C PA, 2012.
Smith, Charles C. Pluralism in the Arts in Canada: A Change Is Gonna
Come. Ottawa: C C PA, 2012.
Social Research and Planning Council Living Wage Advisory Committee.
Calculating a Living Wage for Perth and Huron Counties. Toronto:
C C PA, 2015.
Townson, Monica. Pension Breakdown: How the Finance Ministers
Bungled Pension Reform. Ottawa: C C PA, 2011.
White, Robert G. Corporate Social Responsibility and a Living Wage.
Toronto: CCPA, 2012.
Yalnizyan, Armine. The Rise of Canada’s Richest 1%. Ottawa: C C PA,
2010.
T H E C .D . H O WE I N S T I T U T E
Ambler, Steve. Ripple Effects: Oil Prices Shocks and Monetary Policy.
Toronto: C.D Howe Institute e-brief, 30 August 2016.
– Putting Money to Work: Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate
Environment. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute e-brief, 3 November 2016.
Ambler, Steve, and Craig Alexander. One Percent? For Real? Insights from
Modern Growth Theory about Future Investment Returns. Toronto: C.D.
Howe Institute e-brief, 7 October 2015.
Bergevin, Phillippe, and Colin Busby. Core, What Is It Good For? Why the
Bank of Canada Should Focus on Headline Inflation. Toronto: C.D.
How Institute E-Brief, 29 September 2011.
Bergevin, Phillippe, and William B.P. Robson. More R R Bs, Please! Why
Ottawa Should Issue More Inflation – Indexed Bonds. Toronto: C.D.
How Institute Commentary 363, September 2012.
Blomqvist, Åke, and Colin Busby. Better Value for Money in Healthcare:
European Lessons for Canada. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute
Commentary 339. January 2012.
– Paying Hospital-Based Doctors: Fee for Whose Service? Toronto: C.D.
How Institute Commentary 392, October 2013.
Busby, Colin, William B.P. Robson, and Aaron Jacobs. Delivering
Healthcare to an Aging Population: Nova Scotia’s Fiscal Glacier.
Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute e-brief, 7 January 2016.
Busby, Colin, and Alexandre Laurin. The 8 Percent Solution: A Sensible
Tax Compromise for Albertans. Toronto: C.D. How Institute E-Brief, 4
July 2013.
Busby, Colin, and William B.P. Robson. A Social Insurance Model for
Pharmacare: Ontario’s Options for a More Sustainable, Cost Effective
Drug Program. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 326, April
2011.
Busby, Colin, William B.P. Robson, and Aaron Jacobs. Managing the Costs
of Healthcare for an Aging Population: How Alberta Can Confront its
Fiscal Glacier. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute e-brief, 18 December
2014.
Dachis, Ben, Gilles Duranton, and Matthew A. Turner. Sand in the Gears:
Evaluating the Effects of Toronto’s Land Transfer Tax. Toronto: C.D.
Howe Institute Commentary no. 277, December 2008.
Dachis, Benjamin, and William B.P. Robson. Holding Canada’s Cities to
Account: An Assessment of Municipal Fiscal Management. Toronto:
C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 145, November 2011.
Dachis, Benjamin, William B.P. Robson, and Aaron Jacobs. A Crisis of
Capital: Canadian Workers Need More Tools, Buildings and
Equipment. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute e-brief, 16 December 2015.
Dachis, Benjamin, William B.P. Robson, and Nicholas Chesterley. Capital
Needed: Canada Needs More Robust Business Investment. Toronto:
C.D. Howe Institute e-brief, 17 July 2014.
Dachis, Benjamin. Picking Up Savings: The Benefits of Competition in
Municipal Waste Services. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
308, September 2010.
– Full Throttle: Reforming Canada’s Aviation Policy. Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 398, January 2014.
Freehan, James P. Newfoundland’s Electricity Options: Making the Right
Choice Requires an Efficient Pricing Regime. Toronto: C.D. How
Institute E-Brief, 11 January 2012.
Goulding, A.J. A New Blueprint for Ontario’s Electricity Market. Toronto:
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 389, September 2013.
Gray, David, and Colin Busby. Making Sense of EI Eligibility Rules and
How to Improve Them. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 450,
May 2016.
Gros, Barry. Ontario Pension Policy 2013: Key Challenges Ahead. Toronto:
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 386. August 2013.
Hale, Geoffrey, and Yale Belanger. From “Social License” to “Social
Partnership”: Promoting Shared Interests for Resource and
Infrastructure Development. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
440, December 2015.
Herman, Lawrence L. Trend Spotting: N ATA Disputes After Fifteen Years.
Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 133, July 2010.
– Who Else Benefits from C E TA ? Some Implications of “Most Favoured
Nation” Treatment. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute e-brief, 19 December
2013.
Krzepkowski, Matt, and Jack Mintz. Squeaky Hinges: Widening the Door to
Canadian Cross-border Investment. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute e-
brief, 27 November 2008.
Laidler, David, and Robin Banerjee. Unstable Foundations: Asset Markets,
Inflation Targets, and Canada’s 2011 Policy Choices. Toronto: C.D.
Howe Institute Commentary No. 278, December 2008.
Longworth, David. Combatting the Ganders Lurking in the Shadows: The
Macroprudential Regulation of Shadow Banking. Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary 361, September 2012.
Melino, Angelo, and Michael Parkin. Greater Transparency Needed.
Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute E-Brief, 14 July 2010.
Mysicka, Robert. Who Watches the Watchmen? The Role of the Self-
Regulator. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 416, October
2014.
Parkin, Andrew. Underperforming Adults? The Paradox of Skills
Development in Canada. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute e-brief, 16
September 2015.
Parkin, Michael. What Is the Ideal Monetary Policy Regime? Improving the
Bank of Canada’s Inflation-targeting Program. Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary No. 279, January 2009.
Pedde, Richard, and Al Loyns. Pulling the Plug on Monopoly Power:
Reform for the Canadian Wheat Board. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute E-
Brief. 23 June 2011.
Richards, John, Jennifer Hove, and Kemi Afolabi. Understanding the
Aboriginal/ Non-Aboriginal Gap in Student Performance: Lessons from
British Columbia. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 276,
December 2008.
Robson, William B.P. Bending Canada’s Healthcare Cost Curve: Watch Not
What Governments Say, But What They Do. Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute e-brief, 2 October 2014.
– Boomer Bulge: Dealing with the Stress of Demographic Change on
Government Budgets in Canada: Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute e-brief,
13 January 2009.
– What to do About Seniors’ Benefits in Canada: The Case for Letting
Recipients Take Richer Payments Later. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute
E-Brief, 13 March 2012.
Spicer, Zachary, and Adam Found. Thinking Regionally: How to Improve
Service Delivery in Canada’s Cities. Toronto: C.D Howe Institutue
Commentary 458, October 2016.
Stabile, Mark, and Sevil N-Marandi. Fatal Flaws: Assessing Quebec’s
Failed Health Deductible Proposal. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute
Social Policy, September 2010.
VanDuzer, Tony. Investor–State Dispute Settlement in C E TA L : Is it the
Gold Standard? Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 459,
October 2016.
T H E C E N T R E F O R I N T E R N AT I O N A L G O V E R N A N C E
I N N O VAT I O N
Alexandroff, Alan S. China the Part-Time Global Leader. Waterloo: Centre
for International Governance Innovation, June 2010.
Bernes, Thomas A. I MF Legitimacy and Governance Reform: Will the
G20 Help or Hinder? Waterloo: Centre for International Governance
Innovation, October 2010.
Blustein, Paul. Off Balance: The Travails of Institutions that Govern the
Global Financial System. Waterloo: Centre for International
Governance Innovation, October 2013.
Burch, Sarah. Will Ontario’s Climate Change Action Plan Trap
Communities? Waterloo: Centre for International Governance
Innovation Policy Brief No. 90, October 2016.
Centre for International Governance Innovation. Can Think Tanks Make a
Difference? Conference Report. Waterloo: Centre for International
Governance Innovation, September 2011.
Chertoff, Michael, and Tobby Simon. The Impact of the Dark Web on
Internet Governance and Cyber Security. Waterloo: Centre for
International Governance Innovation Paper Series No. 6, February
2015.
Curtis, John M. Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade: An
Overview. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Paper Series No. 3, May 2012.
DeNardis, Laura. Internet Points of Control as Global Governance.
Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation Internet
Governance Papers No. 2, August 2013.
Findlay, Trevor. Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and
Reform of the I A E A. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance
Innovation, June 2012.
Giustozzi, Antonio. The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns. Waterloo: Centre for
International Governance Innovation Afghanistan Paper No. 5, July
2010.
Haley, James A. The Short View: The Global Conjuncture and the Need for
Cooperation. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Papers No. 14, March 2013.
Hochstetler, Kathryn. Infrastructure and Sustainable Development Goals in
the B R I CS-Led New Development Bank. Waterloo: Centre for
International Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 46, 2014.
Ibbitson, John. Bootstrap Immigrants: Assessing the Conservative
Transformation of Canada’s Immigration Policy. Waterloo: Centre for
International Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 52, December
2014.
Jardine, Eric. The Dark Web Dilemma: Tor, Anonymity, and Online
Policing. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation
Paper Series No. 21, September 2015.
Jepsen, Henrik. Policy Options Could Increase Ambition in the 2015
Climate Agreement. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance
Innovation, Fixing Climate Governance Series 1, April 2015.
Lawrence, Michael. Towards a Non-State Security Sector Reform Strategy.
Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation S S R Issue
Paper No. 8, May 2012.
Lebond, Patrick. A Transatlantic Perspective on C E TA. Waterloo: Centre
for International Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 89, October
2016.
Maclean, Jesse, Andrew Mccauley, and Emily Newcombe. Disasters and
Dividends: An Asia-Pacific Strategy for Canada. Waterloo: Centre for
International Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 17, October
2014.
Medhora, Rohinton P. The G20’s “Development” Agenda: Fundamental,
Not A Sidebar. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance
Innovation Policy Brief No. 80, June 2016.
Momani, Bessma. Where Was the Fight for I MF Leadership? Waterloo:
Centre for International Governance Innovation, June 2011.
Rustomjee, Cyrus. Vulnerability and Debt in Small States. Waterloo: Centre
for International Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 83, July 2016.
Schadler, Susan. Ukraine: Stress at the I MF. Waterloo: Centre for
International Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 49, October
2014.
– Ukraine and the I MF’s Evolving Debt Crisis Narrative. Waterloo: Centre
for International Governance Innovation Policy Brief No. 68, November
2015.
Schwanen, Daniel. The G20 Battens Down the Hatches. Waterloo: Centre
for International Governance Innovation, November 2011.
Siklos, Pierre. Another Fine Mess: Repairing the Governance of
International Financial Regulation. Waterloo: Centre for International
Governance Innovation C I G I Papers No. 12, January 2013.
Tesi. Moses. Global Warming and Health: The Issue of Malaria in Eastern
Africa’s Highlands. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance
Innovation African Initiative Discussion paper Series No. 2, August
2011.
Thompson, Andrew S., and David A. Welch. Responding to Disaster:
Neglecting Dimensions of Preparedness and Their Consequences.
Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation Policy Brief
No. 1, July 2012.
Whalley, John, Manmohan Agarwal, and Yao Li. Approaches to Fostering
Productivity Growth in Brazil, China, and India. Waterloo: Centre for
International Governance Innovation Working Paper No. 47, April
2010.
THE CONFERENCE BOARD OF CANADA

Bostjancic, Kathy. United States: A Need to Bridge the Political Divide.
Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. August 2013.
Brender, Natalie. Across the Sea with C E TA : What New Labour Mobility
Might Mean for Canadian Business. Ottawa, O N : The Conference
Board of Canada. July 2014.
Brichta, Jessica, and Michelle Parkouda. Developing Partnership Capacity:
The Rewards of Effective Business-Aboriginal Partnerships. Ottawa,
O N : The Conference Board of Canada. October 2015.
Chenier, Louise. Disability Management in Practice – Ottawa-Carleton
District School Board: Unleashing Employee Potential. Ottawa, O N :
The Conference Board of Canada. December 2013.
Chenier, Louise, and Elise Wohlbold. Women in Senior Management:
Where Are They? Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada.
August 2011.
Chenier, Louise, et Karla Thorpe. Créer des milieux de travail propices à la
santé mentale: points de vue des employés et des gestionnaires. Ottawa,
O N : The Conference Board of Canada. October 2011.
Coad, Len. Finding the Mix: The Choice of Generation Technologies in
Canada. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. September
2015.
Crawford, Todd A. Index of Consumer Confidence: December 2010.
Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. December 2010.
Edge, Jessica. Public Affairs Reputation Management: Benchmarking
Report. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. October 2015.
Grant, Michael. Learning in the Digital Age. Ottawa, O N : The Conference
Board of Canada. October 2016.
Grant, Michael, James Knowles, and Vijay Gill. Seeds for Success: The
Value of Seed Treatments for Ontario Growers. Ottawa, O N : The
Conference Board of Canada. July 2014.
Hallock, Kevin, and Judit Torok. Top Executive Compensation in 2008.
Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada, January 2009.
Hawkins, Naoko. Overcoming Barriers to Leadership for Young Women.
Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. December 2013.
Hodgson, Glen. The Endgame for the Euro: Fresh Insights, but the Options
Remain the Same. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada.
October 2012.
Iacobacci, Mario. Shared Corridors, Strange Bedfellows: Understanding
the Interface Between Freight and Passenger Rail. Ottawa, O N : The
Conference Board of Canada. September 2010.
Kabilan, Satyamoorthy. Evolving Skills Needs for Emergency Management.
Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. August 2014.
Martin, Heidi, and Katie O’Brien. Helping CEOs Drive Value: The Role of
the Chief Operating Officer. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of
Canada. August 2014.
McIntyre, Jane. Metropolitan Monthly Monitors: Metropolitan Housing
Starts November 2012. Ottawa, O N : November 2012.
McKean, Matthew. Beyond Citations: Knowledge Mobilization, Research
Impact, and the Changing Nature of Academic Work. Ottawa, O N. The
Conference Board of Canada. October 2016.
O’Byrne, Stephen. Achieving Pay for Performance. Ottawa, O N : The
Conference Board of Canada. December 2012.
Robins, Allison, James Knowles, Len Coad. A Long, Hard Road: Reducing
G H G Emissions in Canada’s Road Transportation Sector by 2050.
Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. November 2015.
Robins, Allison, Prince Owusu, Dan Munro, and Len Coad. A Changing
Tide: British Columbia’s Emerging Liquefied Natural Gas Industry.
Ottawa, O N. The Conference Board of Canada. February 2016.
Rosner, Laura, and Mary B. Young. The Strategic Workforce Planning
Leader’s Bookshelf. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada.
November 2011.
Stewart, Nicole. Disability Management in Practice – Encana: Fitness for
Work. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. October 2013.
The Canadian Tourism Research Institute. Travel Exclusive: Key trends for
the Travel Industry July – August 2012. Ottawa, O N : The Conference
Board of Canada. August 2012.
Conference Board of Canada. Canadian Outlook Economic Forecast:
Winter 2009. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada, January
2009.
– Public Sector Transformation: Leading, Managing and Sustaining
Change. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada: Conference e-
proceedings, January 2009.
– 2008 Workplace Diversity and Inclusiveness Forum. Ottawa, O N : The
Conference Board of Canada: Conference e-proceedings, January 2009.
– Private Ordering and Proxy Access Rules: The Case for Prompt
Attention. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. December
2010.
– Risk Watch: Thought Leadership in Risk and Governance – December
2010. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. December 2010.
– Air Transportation Industry: Industrial Outlook, Summer 2011. Ottawa,
O N : The Conference Board of Canada. September 2011.
– Whose Job is Diversity Anyway? Transforming Diversity Through Co-
Accountability. Ottawa, O N : The Conference Board of Canada. August
2012.
– Canadian Outlook Long-Term Economic Forecast: 2016 Mid-Year
Update. Ottawa, O N. The Conference Board of Canada. September
2016.
Zarnowitz, Victor. A Crisis of Confidence. Ottawa, O N : The Conference
Board of Canada, January 2009.
THE FRASER INSTITUTE

Barua, Bacchis, Nadeem Esmail, and Taylor Jackson. The Effect of Wait
Times on Mortality in Canada. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2013.
Barua, Bacchus, and Feixue Ren. The Private Cost of Public Queues for
Medically Necessary Care, 2015 Edition. Vancouver: The Fraser
Institute, 2015.
– Waiting Your Turn: Wait Times for Health Care in Canada, 2016 Report.
Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2016.
Barua, Bacchus, and Nadeem Esmail. For-Profit Hospitals and Insurers In
Universal Health Care Countries. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute,
2015.
Barua, Bacchus, Ingrid Timmermans, Matthew Lau, and Feixue Ren.
Leaving Canada for Medical Care, 2016. Vancouver: The Fraser
Institute, 2016.
Clemens, Jason. Wait Lists for Independent Schools in British Columbia’s
Lower Mainland. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2012.
Clemens, Jason, Charles Lammam, and Matthew Lo. The Economic Costs
of Capital Gains Taxes in Canada. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute,
2014.
Cross, Phillip. Evaluating the Proposed Ontario Pension Plan. Vancouver:
The Fraser Institute, 2013.
Dawson, Laura. Toward Free Trade in Canada: Five Things the Federal
Government Can Do to Open our Market. Vancouver: The Fraser
Institute, 2015.
Esmail, Nadeem. Health Care Lessons from the Netherlands: Lessons from
Abroad A Series on Health Care Reform. Vancouver: The Fraser
Institute, 2013.
Gibson, Gordon. A New Look at Canadian Indian Policy. Vancouver: The
Fraser Institute, 2009.
Globerman, Steven, and Kristina M. Lybecker. The Benefits of Incremental
Innovation: Focus on the Pharmaceutical Industry. Vancouver: The
Globerman, Steven, Kristina Lybecker, Christopher Sands, and Izumi,
Lance, Fraxier Fathers, and Jason Clemens. Technology and Education:
A Primer. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2013.
Lammam, Charles, Milagros Palacios, Amela Karabegović, and Niels
Veldhuis. Measuring the Fiscal Performance of Canada’s Premieres.
Lammam, Charles, and High MacIntyre. The Practical Challenges of
Creating a Gurainteed Annual Income in Canada. Vancouver: The
Miljan, Lydia, John Pepall, Jason Clemens Taylor Jackson, Steve LaFleur,
Joel Emes, and Patrice Dutil. Counting Votes: Essays on Electoral
Reform. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2016.
Milke, Mark. Corporate Welfare: Now a $182 Billion Addiction.
– Corporate Welfare Bargains at Industry Canada. Vancouver: The Fraser
Institute, 2012.
– Ontario’s Corporate Welfare Bill: $27.7 billion. Vancouver: The Fraser
Institute, 2011.
Moens, Alexander, and Nachum Gabler. Measuring the Costs of the
Canada – US Border. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2012.
– What Congress Thinks of Canada: Studies in Canada – US Relations.
Mohindra, Neil. Should the Canada Pension Plan Be Enhanced? Vancouver
Murphy, Robert P., Jason Clemens, Joel Emes, and Niels Veldhuis. Ontario
vs. the US “Rust Belt”: Coping with a Changing Economic World.
Palacios, Milagros, and Niels Veldhuis. Taxes versus the Necessities of Life:
The Canadian Consumer Tax Index. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute,
2012.
Philipson, Tomas J. Intellectual Property Rights and the Promotion of
Biologics, Medical Devices, and Trade in Pharmaceuticals. Vancouver:
Rawson, Dr. Nigel. Has pC O D R Improved Access to Oncology Drugs?
Timeliness and Provincial Acceptance of Pan-Canadian Oncology Drug
Review Recommendations. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2014.
Skiner, Brett J., and Mark Rovere. Access Delayed, Access Denied: Waiting
for New Medicines in Canada 2010. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute,
2010.
– Canada’s Drug Price Paradox, 2010. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute,
2010.
– Value for Money from Health Insurance Systems in Canada and the
O E C D. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2010.
– The Misguided War Against Medicines 2011. Vancouver: The Fraser
Institute, 2011.
Vaillancourt, François. The Cost to Canadians of Complying with Personal
Income Taxes. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2010.
Vaillancourt, François, Marylène Roy, and Charles Lammam. Measuring
Tax Complexity in Canada. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2015.
Veldhuis, Niels, Milagros Palacious, and Keith Godin. Canadian Provincial
Investment Climate: 2008 Report. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute,
2008.
Veldhuis, Niels, and Keith Godin. The Economic Effects of Increasing
British Columbia’s Minimum Wage. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute,
2009.
Veldhuis, Niels, Charles Lamman, and Alex Gainer. Generosity in Canada
and the United States: The 2008 Generosity Index. Vancouver: The
Veldhuis, Niels, Jason Clemens, and Milagros Palacios. Budget Blueprint:
How Lessons from Canada’s 1995 Budget Can Be Applied Today.
Walker, Michael, and Nadeem Esmail. How Good is Canadian Health
Care: 2008 Report? Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2008.
Wood, Karina, and Niels Veldhuis. The 2008 Non-Profit Performance
Report. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2009.
THE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC POLICY

Assache, Ari Van, with commentary by Todd Evans. Global Value Chains
and Canada’s Trade Policy. Montreal: The Institute for Research on
Public Policy, 2012.
Assaf, Dany H., and Rory A. McGillis. Foreign Direct Investment and the
National Interest: A Way Forward. Montreal: The Institute for Research
Atanackovic, Jelena, and Ivy Lynn Bourgeault. Economic and Social
Integration of Immigrant Live-in Caregivers in Canada. Montreal: The
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2014.
Bédard, Michel, et Pierre Fortin. Onze propositions pour un meilleur
régime d’assurance – emploi. Montreal: The Institute for Research on
Brown, Robert L., and Tyler Meredith. Pooled Target-Benefit Pension
Plans: Building on P R P PS. Montreal: The Institute for Research on
Charters, David. The (Un) Peaceable Kingdom: Terrorism and Canada
before 9/11. Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy,
2008.
Cleveland, Gordon. New Evidence about Child Care in Canada: Use
Patterns, Affordability and Quality. Montreal: The Institute for
Research on Public Policy, 2008.
Corak, Miles. Immigration in the Long Run: The Education and Earnings
Mobility of Second Generation Canadians. Montreal: The Institute for
Côté-Boucher, Karine. Round Table on EU-Canada Cooperation on Anti-
Terrorism and Human Rights. Montreal: The Institute for Research on
Public Policy and University of Toronto, 2008.
Deeper Continental Integration or Diversification? Montreal: The Institute
for Research on Public Policy, 2010.
Derwing, Tracey M., and Erin Waugh. Language Skills and the Social
Integration of Canada’s Adult Immigrants. Montreal: The Institute for
Drewes, Torben, and Tyler Meredith. If at First You Don’t Succeed: Toward
an Adult Education and Training Strategy for Canada. Montreal: The
Drummond, Don. Wanted: Good Canadian Labour Market Information.
Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2014.
Finnie, Ross, and David Gray. Labour Force Participation of Older
Displaced Workers in Canada: Should I Stay or Should I Go? Montreal:
The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2011.
Georges, Patrick, and Michael Mérrette. Canada’s Strategic Trade Policy
Options. Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2010.
Golant, Stephen M. Age-Friendly Communities: Are We Expecting Too
Much? Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2014.
Goldring, Luin and Patricia Landolt. The Impact of Precarious Legal Status
on Immigrants’ Economic Outcomes. Montreal: The Institute for
Halliwell, Cliff. No Shortage of Opportunity: Policy Ideas to Strengthen
Canada’s Labour Market in the Coming Decade. Montreal: The
Hejazi, Walid. Dispelling Canadian Myths about Foreign Direct
Investment. Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2010.
Hicks, Bruce, and Andre Blais. Restructuring the Canadian Senate through
Elections. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2008.
Hicks, Peter. The Enabling Society. Montreal: The Institute for Research on
– The Next Boomer Shift? Our Policy Assumptions. Montreal: The Institute
Japel, Christa. Factors of Risk, Vulnerability and School Readiness among
Preschoolers: Evidence from Quebec. Montreal: The Institute for
Keefe, Janice M. Supporting Caregivers and Caregiving in an Aging
Canada. Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2011.
Kukucha, Christopher J. Provincial / Territorial Governments and the
Negotiation of International Trade Agreements. Montreal: The Institute
Lazar, Harvey. Many Degrees of Policy Freedom: The Federal
Government’s Role in Care for Seniors? Montreal: The Institute for
Lewis Steven, and Terrence Sullivan. How to Bend the Cost Curve in
Health Care. Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy,
2013.
Macklin, Audrey and François Crépeau. Multiple Citizenship, Identity and
Entitlement in Canada. Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public
Policy, 2010.
Meredith, Tyler. The Risk We All Face But Aren’t Talking About. Montreal:
Morgan, Steven G., Jamie R. Daw and Michael R. Law. Are Income-Based
Public Drug Benefit Programs Fit for an Aging Population? Montreal:
Nakache, Delphine, and Paula J. Kinoshita. The Canadian Temporary
Foreign Worker Program: Do Short-Term Economic Needs Prevail over
Human Rights Concerns? Montreal: The Institute for Research on
Newhouse, David. Indigenous Peoples, Canada and the Possibility of
Reconciliation. Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy,
2016.
Picot, Garnett and Arthur Sweetman. Making It in Canada: Immigration
Outcomes and Policies. Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public
Policy, 2012.
Prince, Michael J. Inclusive Employment for Canadians with Disabilities.
Snoddon, Tracy, and Debora Van Nijnatten. Carbon Pricing and
Intergovernmental Relations in Canada. Montreal: The Institute for
Wolfson, Michael. Not-So-Modest Options for Expanding the C P P /Q P P.
MA C D O N A L D - L A U R I E R I N S T I T U T E
Ajzenstat, Janet. Canada’s Founding Ideas: Confederation and Individual
Liberty. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2010.
Blue, Ian A. Free Trade within Canada: Say Goodbye to Gold Seal. Ottawa,
O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2011.
Chapin, Paul H. To Stand on Guard. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier
Institute, 2010.
Clemens, Jason, and Brian Lee Crowley. Canada’s Looming Fiscal
Squeeze: Collected Essays on Solutions. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-
Laurier Institute, 2012.
Clemens, Jason, and Nadeem Esmail. First, Do No Harm: How the Canada
Health Act Obstructs Reform and Innovation. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-
Coates, Ken S., Greg Finnegan, Craig J. Hall, And Kelly J. Lendsay.
Unearthing Human Resources: Aboriginal Skills Development and
Employment in the Natural Resource Sector. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-
Cross, Philip. Six Myths Surrounding the Development of Canada’s Natural
Resources. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2013.
Crowley, Brian Lee, and Sean Speer. A Home for Canada’s Middle Class: A
Plan for Housing Affordability and Opportunity in Canada. Ottawa,
O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2016.
Crowley, Brian Lee, Robert Knox, and John Robson. Citizen of One,
Citizen of the Whole: How Ottawa Can Strengthen Our Nation by
Eliminating Provincial Trade Barriers with a Charter of Economic
Rights. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2010.
Daudelin, Jean, Stephanie Soiffer, and Jeff Willows. Border Integrity, Illicit
Tobacco, And Canada’s Security. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier
Institute, 2013.
Favel, Blaine, and Ken S. Coates. Understanding Undrip: Choosing Action
on Priorities over Sweeping Claims about the United Nations
‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.’ Ottawa, O N :
Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2016.
Graham, Andrew. Canada’s Critical Infrastructure: When Is Safe Enough
Safe Enough? Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2011.
Hataley, Todd, and Christian Leuprecht. Organized Crime Beyond the
Border. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2013.
Laporte, Audrey. How Markets Can Put Patients First: Economics Before
Politics in Canadian Health Care Delivery. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-
Leuprecht, Christian. The Blue Line or the Bottom Line of Police Services
in Canada? Arresting Runaway Growth in Costs. Ottawa, O N :
– Smoking Gun: Strategic Containment of Contraband Tobacco and
Cigarette Trafficking in Canada. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald – Laurier
Institute, 2016.
Leuprecht, Christian, and Conrad Winn. What Do Muslim Canadians Want?
The Clash of Interpretations and Opinion Research. Ottawa, O N :
Londerville, Jane. Mortgage Insurance in Canada: Basically Sound but
Room for Improvement. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute,
2010.
Lundbäck, Mattias. A European Flavour for Medicare: Learning from
Experiments in Switzerland and Sweden. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-
Murphy, Robert P. The Carbon Tax Win-Win: Too Good to Be True? The
Tax Interaction Effect and Political Realities. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-
Newark, Scott. Why Canadian Crime Statistics Don’t Add Up: Not the
Whole Truth. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2011.
Newman, Dwight. Is the Sky the Limit? Following the Trajectory of
Aboriginal Legal Rights in Resource Development. Ottawa, O N :
Noble, Bram. Learning to Listen: Snapshots of Aboriginal Participation in
Environmental Assessment. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute,
2016.
Noble, Bram, and Aniekan Udofia. Protectors of the Land Toward an E A
Process That Works for Aboriginal Communities and Developers.
Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2015.
Peng, Ito, and James Tiessen. An Asian Flavour for Medicare: Learning
from Experiments in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Ottawa, O N :
Perrin, Benjamin. The Supreme Court of Canada: Policy-Maker of the Year.
Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2014.
Perry, Dave. Putting The ‘Armed’ Back into the Canadian Armed Forces:
Improving Defence Procurement in Canada. Ottawa, O N : C D A
Institute Vimy Paper in cooperation with Macdonald-Laurier Institute,
2015.
Schmidt, Claudia, Al Mussell, Janalee Sweetland, and Bob Seguin. The
Greening of Canadian Agriculture: Policies to Assist Farmers as
Stewards of the Environment. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier
Institute, 2012.
Sheikh, Munir A. Estimating the True Size of Government: Adjusting for
Tax Expenditures. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2014.
Thayer Scott, Jacquelyn. An Atlantic Fishing Tale 1999–2011. Ottawa, O N :
Watts, Michael. Debunking the Myths: A Broader Perspective of the
Canada Health Act. Ottawa, O N : Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 2013.
Wilner, Alex. From Rehabilitation to Recruitment. Ottawa, O N :
MO WAT C E N T R E F O R P U B L I C P O L I C Y
Bednar, Vass, and John Stapleton. Trading Places: Single Adults Replace
Lone Parents as The New Face of Social Assistance in Canada.
Toronto, O N : Mowat Centre, 2011.
Bitran, Maurice, and Serene Tan. Diaspora Nation: An Inquiry into the
Economic Potential of Diaspora Networks in Canada. Toronto, O N :
Mowat Centre, 2013.
Canada West Foundation – The Federal Idea, The Mowat Centre, The
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council. Canada and Its Natural
Resources. Toronto, O N : Mowat Centre, 2013.
Carlson, Richard, and Eric Martin. Re-energizing the Conversation:
Engaging the Ontario Public on Energy Issues. Toronto, O N : Mowat
Centre, 2014.
Carlson, Richard, Rob Dorling, Peter Spiro, and Mike Moffatt. A Review of
the Economic Impact of Energy East on Ontario. Toronto, O N : Mowat
Centre, 2015.
Choudhry, Sujit, and Michael Pal. The Impact of Regionally Differentiated
Entitlement to EI on Charter-Protected Canadians. Toronto, O N :
Mowat Centre, 2011.
Dorling, Rob, and Kyle Hanniman. Restoring Water Levels on Lake
Michigan – Huron: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. Toronto, O N : Mowat
Centre, 2016.
Galley, Andrew. Employment Skills Training. Toronto, O N : Mowat Centre,
2015.
Galley, Andrew, and Jill Shirey. Brokering Success: Improving Skilled
Immigrant Employment Outcomes through Strengthened Government-
Employer Engagement. Toronto, O N : Mowat Centre, 2014.
Gold, Jennifer. Integrating Human Services in an Age of Fiscal Restraint: A
Shifting Gears Report. Toronto, O N : Mowat Centre, 2012.
– International Delivery: Centres of Government and the Drive for Better
Policy Implementation. Toronto, O N : Mowat Centre, 2014.
Gold, Jennifer, Josh Hjartarson, and Matthew Mendelsohn. Fiscal
Sustainability and the Future of Public Spending: A Shifting Gears
Progress Report. Toronto, O N : Mowat Centre, 2011.
Hering, Martin and Thomas R. Klassen. Is 70 the New 65? Raising the
Eligibility Age in the Canada Pension Plan. Toronto, O N : Mowat
Centre, 2010.
Hughes, James. Homelessness: Closing the Gap Between Capacity and
Performance. Toronto, O N : Mowat Centre, 2012.
Jarvis, Mark. Creating a High-Performing Canadian Civil Service against a
Backdrop of Disruptive Change. Toronto, O N : Mowat Centre, 2016.
Johal, Sunil, Andrew Galley, and Melissa Molson. Reprogramming
Government for the Digital Era. Toronto, O N : Report, Mowat Centre,
2014.
Johal, Sunil, Matthew Mendelsohn, and Noah Zon. Let’s Talk: Coordinating
Economic Development Spending in Canada. Toronto, O N : Book
Chapter, Mowat Centre, 2013.
Johal, Sunil, Noah Zon, Jordann Thirgood, and Jane Stacey. Policies for the
Tourism Sharing Economy. Toronto, O N : Book Chapter, Mowat
Centre, 2016.
Keller, Tony, and Neville McGuire. The New Economics of the N H L : Why
Canada Can Support 12 Teams. Toronto, O N : Report, Mowat Centre,
2011.
Lalande, Lisa, Joanne Cave, and Rajesh Sankat. Unpacking Impact:
Exploring Impact Measurement for Social Enterprises in Ontario.
Toronto, O N : Report, Mowat Centre, 2016.
Lecours, André, and Daniel Béland. Equalization at Arm’s Length. Toronto,
O N : Report, Mowat Centre, 2012.
Matthews, J. Scott, and Matthew Mendelsohn. The New Ontario: The
Shifting Attitudes of Ontarians toward the Federation. Toronto, O N :
Report, Mowat Centre, 2010.
Mendelsohn, Matthew, and Richard Carlson. The Politics of Pipelines:
Ontario’s Stake in Canada’s Pipeline Debate. Toronto, O N : Report,
Mowat Centre, 2013.
Pal, Michael, and Melissa Molson. Moving Toward Voter Equality: Mowat
Centre Report on the Proposed Federal Electoral Boundaries for
Ontario. Toronto, O N : Report, Mowat Centre, 2012.
Sancton, Andrew. The Principle of Representation by Population in
Canadian Federal Politics. Toronto, O N : Report, Mowat Centre, 2010.
Seidle, F. Leslie. The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement: Assessment
and Options for Renewal. Toronto, O N : Report, Mowat Centre, 2010.
Van Ymeren, Jamie. An Open Future: Data Priorities for the Not-For-Profit
Sector. Toronto, O N : Report, Mowat Centre, 2015.
Vosko, Leah F. The Challenge of Expanding EI Coverage: Charting
Exclusions and Partial Exclusions on the Bases of Gender, Immigration
Status, Age, and Place of Residence and Exploring Avenues for
Inclusive Policy Redesign. Toronto, O N : Report, Mowat Centre, 2011.
Zon, Noah. Access to Affordable Housing. Toronto, O N : Report, Mowat
Centre, 2015.
PA R K L A N D I N S T I T U T E
Barnetson, Bob. Illegal and Injurious: How Alberta Has Failed Teen
Workers. Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland Institute, 2015.
Boychuk, Regan. Misplaced Generosity: Extraordinary Profits in Alberta’s
Oil and Gas Industry. Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland Institute, 2010.
Campanella, David. A Profitable Brew: A Financial Analysis of the S L G A
and Its Potential Privatization. Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland
Institute, 2014.
– Losing Ground: Alberta’s Residential Elder Care Crisis. Edmonton, A B :
Report, Parkland Institute, 2016.
Campanella, David, and Greg Flanagan. Impaired Judgement: The
Economic and Social Consequences of Liquor Privatization in Western
Canada. Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland Institute, 2012.
Campanella, David, and Shannon Stunden Bower. From Bad to Worse:
Residential Elder Care in Alberta. Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland
Institute, 2013.
Clements, Jill, and Diana Gibson. Delivery Matters: The High Costs of For-
Profit Health Services in Alberta. Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland
Institute, 2012.
– Delivery Matters: Cyber Charter Schools and K-12 Education in Alberta.
Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland Institute, 2013.
Evan, Bowness, and Mark Hudson. Directly and Adversely Affected: Public
Participation in Tar Sands Development 2005–2014. Edmonton, A B:
Fact Sheet, Parkland Institute, 2014.
Foster, Jason, and Bob Barnetson. Buried and Forgotten: Newspaper
Coverage of Workplace Injury and Death in Alberta. Edmonton, A B:
Gibson, Diana. Delivery Matters: Infrastructure Privatization and
Accountability. Edmonton, A B : Fact Sheet, Parkland Institute, 2012.
– A Social Policy Framework for Alberta: Fairness and Justice for All.
Gibson, Diana, and Colleen Fuller. Fixing What’s Broken: Fair and
Sustainable Solutions to Alberta’s Revenue Problems. Edmonton, A B :
– The New Alberta Health Act: Risks and Opportunities Report 1.
Edmonton, A B : Parkland Institute, 2010.
– The New Alberta Health Act: Risks and Opportunities Report 2.
Edmonton, A B : Parkland Institute, 2010.
Hughes, David J. Can Canada Expand Oil and Gas Production, Build
Pipelines and Keep Its Climate Change Commitments? Edmonton, A B:
Krahn, Harvey, and Trevor Harrison. Less Exclusion, More Engagement:
Addressing Declining Voter Turnout in Alberta. Edmonton, A B :
Lahey, Kathleen. Equal Worth: Designing Effective Pay Equity Laws for
Alberta. Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland Institute, 2016.
Loxley, John. Wrong Turn: Is a P3 the Best Way to Expand Edmonton’s
L R T ? Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland Institute, 2013.
Mcmillan, Melville. Hard Math, Harder Choices: Alberta’s Budget Reality.
Parkland Institute. As Long as the Rivers Flow: Athabasca River
Knowledge, Use and Change. Edmonton, A B: Report, Parkland
Institute, 2010.
Parkland Institute. Unpacking Alberta’s Infrastructure Spending: Real
Increases Have Been Moderate. Edmonton, A B : Fact Sheet, Parkland
Institute, 2011.
Roy, Jim. Billions Forgone: The Decline in Alberta Oil and Gas Royalties.
Edmonton, A B: Fact Sheet, Parkland Institute, 2015.
Schmidt, Jeremy. Alternative Water Futures in Alberta. Edmonton, A B:
Stunden Bower, Shannon. Sick of Inequality: The Case for Action by the
Government of Alberta on the Social Determinants of Health.
– Smoke Screen: Results-based Budgeting, Privatization, and Public Sector
Cuts in Alberta. Edmonton, A B: Report, Parkland Institute, 2013.
Thompson, David. No Free Lunch: Financing the Priorities of Calgarians.
Weber, Barret. Ending Pay to Play: The Need for Political Reform in
Alberta. Edmonton, A B: Fact Sheet, Parkland Institute, 2015.
Weber, Barret, and Trevor Harrison. Neoliberalism and the Non-Profit
Social Services Sector in Alberta. Edmonton, A B : Report, Parkland
Institute, 2015.
P E MB I N A I N S T I T U T E
Anderson, Kristi, Arne Jungjohann, and Tim Weis. Harvesting Clean
Energy on Ontario Farms: A Transatlantic Comparison. Washington,
D C: Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Climate Action Network Canada,
and Pembina Institute, 2011.
Bramley, Matthew. Evaluation of the Government of Canada’s Greenhouse
Gas Reduction Policies: Prepared for the Climate Change Performance
Index 2011. Drayton Valley, A B : The Pembina Institute, 2010.
Burda, Cherise. Priced Out: Understanding the Factors Affecting Home
Prices in the G TA. Toronto, O N : Report, R B C and The Pembina
Institute, 2013.
Burda, Cherise, Travis Allan, Burgandy Dunn, Anastasia Lintner, Theresa
McClenaghan and Laura Zizzo. Live Where You Go: Encouraging
Location-Efficient Development in Ontario. Drayton Valley, A B :
Report, The Pembina Institute, 2012.
Demerse, Clare. Fighting Climate Change in Mexico: Facing the Climate
Challenge: Mexico Opportunities Fact Sheet. Drayton Valley, A B: Fact
Sheet, The Pembina Institute, 2010.
– Getting on Track for Canada’s Climate Target: Designing a Technology
Fund That Works for 2020: Part of the Green Budget Coalition
Recommendations for Federal Budget 2014. Vancouver, B C : Fact
Sheet, The Pembina Institute, 2013.
Dyer, Simon, Matthew Bramley, Marc Huot, and Matt Horn. Responsible
Action? An Assessment of Alberta’s Greenhouse Gas Policies.
Vancouver, B C : Report, The Pembina Institute, 2015.
Flanagan, Erin, Dianne Zimmerman, Matt Horne and Tom-Pierre Frappé-
Sénéclauze. Race to the front: Tracking pan-Canadian climate progress
and where we go from here. Vancouver, B C : Report, The Pembina
Institute, 2015.
Frappé-Sénéclauze, Tom-Pierre, and Josha MacNab. Evolution of Energy
Efficiency Requirements in the B C Building Code. Victoria, B C :
Report, Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions and The Pembina
Institute.
Frappé-Sénéclauze, Tom-Pierre, and Karen Tam Wu. Pathways to Net-Zero
Buildings in B.C.: Policy Proposal: Getting New Part 3 Buildings Net-
Zero Ready. Vancouver, B C : Policy Proposal, The Pembina Institute,
2015.
Frappé-Sénéclauze, Tom-Pierre, Dylan Heerema, and Karen Tam Wu.
Accelerating Market Transformation for High-Performance Building
Enclosures State of Market, Policy Developments, and Lessons Learned
from the Passive House Movement. Calgary, A B: Report, The Pembina
Institute, 2016.
Frappé-Sénéclauze, Tom-Pierre, Josha MacNab, Ellen Pond, Claire
Beckstead, Benjamin Thibault. Home Energy Labelling Requirement at
Point of Sale: Pilot Program Design. Drayton Valley, A B : Report, The
Pembina Institute, 2012.
Grant, Jennifer, Simon Dyer, Marc Huot, and Danielle Droitsch. Solving the
Puzzle: Environmental Responsibility in Oilsands Development.
Drayton Valley, A B : Report, The Pembina Institute, 2011.
Guilbeault, Steven, Sarah Dobson, and Nathan Lemphers. Booms, Busts
and Bitumen: The Economic Implications of Canadian Oilsands
Development. Calgary, A B : Report, The Pembina Institute, 2013.
Horne, Matt, and Josha MacNab. Liquefied Natural Gas and Climate
Change the Global Context. Victoria, B C: Report, Pacific Institute for
Climate Solutions and The Pembina Institute.
Horne, Matt, E MR G, and P.J. Partington. British Columbia’s Carbon Tax:
Exploring Perspectives and Seeking Common Ground. Drayton Valley,
A B : Report, The Pembina Institute, 2012.
Israel, Benjamin, and Erin Flanagan. Out with the Coal, in with the New:
National Benefits of an Accelerated Phase-Out of Coal-Fired Power.
Calgary, A B : Report, The Pembina Institute, 2016.
Jeyakumar, Binnu, Bora Plumptre, Erin Flanagan. Canada and Coal at
COP22: Tracking Global Momentum to End Coal-Fired Power — and
Why Canada Should Lead the Way. Vancouver, B C: Backgrounder, The
Laufenberg, Katie, Graham Haines, Cherise Burda, and Alison Bailie.
Behind the Wheel: Opportunities for Canadians to Drive Less, Reduce
Pollution and Save Money. Drayton Valley, Alberta: Report, The
Pembina Institute. Pembina Institute Annual Financial Report 2013. The
Read, Andrew. Climate Change Policy in Alberta. Calgary, A B :
Backgrounder, The Pembina Institute, 2014.
Sauve, Josha, Josha MacNab, Steven Cretney, Matt Horne. Is B.C. L N G
Really a Climate Change Solution? Vancouver, B C: Infographic, The
Srivastava, Lorie, and Cherise Burda. Fare Driving: Exploring the Benefits
of Traffic Pricing in Toronto and the G TA. Toronto, O N : Report, The
Tam Wu, Karen. Vancouver’s Zero Emissions Building Plan Will Take Key
Step Forward with Rezoning Policy Updates: Letter to Mayor Gregor
Robertson on Green Buildings Policy for Rezonings. Vancouver, B C:
Letter, The Pembina Institute, 2016.
Vijayakumar, Nithya and Cherise Burda. Cycle Cities Supporting Cycling in
Canadian Cities. Vancouver, B C : Report, The Pembina Institute, 2015.
Weis, Tim, Kristi Anderson, and Alex Doukas. Landowners’ Guide to Wind
Energy in Alberta. Drayton Valley, A B : Report, The Pembina Institute,
2010.
Weis, Tim, Paul Gipe, Shine Ontario, and Green Energy Act Alliance.
Ontario Feed-in-Tariff 2011 Review. Drayton Valley, A B : Report, The
Weis, Tim, Shawn-Patrick Stensil, and Jeff Harti. Renewable is Doable:
Affordable and Flexible Options for Ontario’s Long-Term Energy Plan.
Toronto, O N : Report, The Pembina Institute, 2013.
Index
The index that appeared in the print version of this title was intentionally
removed from the eBook. Please use the search function on your eReading
device for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the
print index are listed below.
Abelson, Donald E., 33, 83, 175

Allan MacEachen Institute, 25, 38
Allen, Richard, 76; and Ronald Reagan, 159, 161, 438n47, 438n54, 439n59
American Enterprise Institute (A E I), 3–4, 13, 15, 49, 63, 76, 83, 92, 97,
150, 161, 164, 167–70, 172, 177, 208, 214, 423n42, 430n44, 439n63;
and congressional testimony, 114, 139; history of, 43–7; and media
visibility, 109, 122, 232–4, 433n9
Anderson, Martin, 75; and Ronald Reagan, 76, 150, 159–61
Armacost, Michael, 42
Arnold, H.H., 42
Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (A I MS), 15, 38–9, 262, 431n62; and
media visibility, 100; profile of, 253–5
Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (A P E C), 33, 254; and 1994 budget
consultations, 195; and constitutional conferences, 182, 187–9
Balsillie, Jim, 9, 39, 258–9

Bannon, Steve, 9, 176
Barnett, Richard, 32, 246
Baroody, William, Jr, 45–6, 83
Battle, Ken, 38, 54, 80, 87–8, 196, 234, 430n34
Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee, 186–9
Bennett, William, 38
Better America, 38
Bipartisan Policy Center, and Keystone XL, 200, 217, 221, 223
Boskin, Michael, 150
Boyle, T. Patrick, 53, 84
British Institute of International Affairs (B I I A), 28
Broadbent, Alan, 55
Broadbent Institute, 24, 38, 208
Brodie, Bernard, 43
Brookings, Robert, 13, 27, 41, 44
Brookings Institution, 3–4, 6, 11, 21, 23, 26, 28, 35, 79, 81, 86, 96, 153,
205, 212–14, 220–1, 261, 418n6, 437n46; congressional testimony, 91,
114–15; history of, 27, 41–2, 68; media visibility, 62, 91–2, 99, 101,
109–10, 112, 122, 232–4, 446n22; and Barack Obama, 170–1
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 96, 171; and Jimmy Carter, 32, 154–6, 435n18
Buchanan, Pat, 35
Budget and Accounting Act (1921), 28
Bush, George, 67, 126, 164, 167–8
Bush, George W., 14, 47, 68, 175, 199; and Hoover Institution, 76, 150,
167; and think tanks, 4, 95, 151–2, 167–9, 179
Caledon Institute of Social Policy, 4, 9, 15, 40, 82, 87, 196, 234; and
consultations with government, 98, 135, 231; history of, 38, 54–5; media
exposure, 80, 89, 107, 122–3, 145
Campbell, Bruce, 78
Campney, Alan F., 99
Canada 2020, 9, 15, 39
Canada West Foundation, 36; and constitutional conferences, 182, 185,
188–9, 192–3; and Keystone X L, 200, 217–18; media exposure, 116–
17, 123; and 1994 budget consultations, 195; research mandate, 123;
profile of, 255–6
Canadian Alliance (Party), 78
Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (C C A C D), 38
Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (C C F P D), 38
Canadian Centre for Global Security, 38
Canadian Centre for Management and Development (C C MD ), 132
Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, 36, 235
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (C C PA), 4, 36, 63, 78, 254,
445n14; contributions to public policy, 181, 185, 206, 231–2; and
Keystone X L, 200, 217–19; media exposure, 116, 230; profile of, 256–7
Canadian Council for International Peace and Security (C C I P S), 38
Canadian Council on Social Development (C C S D), 29, 35, 55, 78;
consultations with government, 78, 91, 135; media exposure, 116–7,
145; parliamentary testimony, 136, 231
Canadian Institute for Economic Policy, 36, 38
Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (C I I P S), 34, 36;
budget of, 40, 422n29
Canadian Institute of International Affairs (C I I A), 92; budget of, 235;
history of, 28, 36
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (C I S S), 35, 235; consultations with
government, 135; media exposure, 116–17, 126; policy expertise, 135–6,
231
Canadian International Council (C I C), 36, 92, 117, 119, 135, 231–2, 258
Canadian International Development Agency (C I D A), 24, 35
Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters (C ME), 81
Canadian Policy Research Networks, Inc. (C P R N), 10, 38, 40, 80; budget
of, 24, 434n18; consultations with government, 87, 107, 135
Canadian Tax Foundation (CTF), 32, 35, 119; media exposure, 116–17;
parliamentary testimony, 141
Canadian Welfare Council, 35
Carberry, Christine, 83, 175
Carnegie, Andrew, 13, 27, 44, 84, 241, 244
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 3, 13, 27, 46, 97, 244,
439n63; and media visibility, 62, 109, 112, 233; profile of, 241–2
Carnegie Foundations, 82, 212
Carter, Jimmy, 153–4; and Brookings Institution, 157; and the Council on
Foreign Relations, 156–7; and think tanks, 151–2, 154, 179; and
Trilateral Commission, 154–7
Carter Center, 24, 37
Castonguay-Dobbie Committee, 186–9
Cato Institute, 35, 145, 249, 435n7, 442n102; and congressional testimony,
114, 139, 224, 234; and media exposure, 112, 233, 248, 433n9; and
Keystone X L, 200, 217, 221, 223; profile of, 247–8
C.D. Howe Institute, 4, 15, 35, 38, 115, 215, 219, 254, 256, 262, 431n62,
444n27; budget of, 119, 231; and consultations with government, 135;
and constitutional conferences, 182, 185, 188, 190, 193; and
contributions to public policy 63, 79, 88, 181, 196, 417n4; media
exposure, 56–7, 101, 107, 116–17, 122–3, 230; and parliamentary
testimony, 136, 231–2; profile of, 257–8
Center for American Progress (C A P), 9, 40, 170–1, 173; and Keystone
X L, 200, 217, 221
Center for Global Development, 25, 61
Center for a New American Security (C N A S), 39–40, 86, 171, 173–4
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 32, 100–1, 150, 161,
163, 168, 171, 173, 176; and media exposure, 126, 233–4, 433n9,
446n22; and presidential elections, 153, 170; profile of, 245–6
Centre for International Governance Innovation (C I G I), 9, 11, 23, 39, 82;
profile of, 258–9
Centre for the Study of Living Standards, 38
Charlottetown Accord, 19, 182, 185
Cheney, Dick, 50, 168
Chrétien, Jean, 34, 139, 199
Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation (C S E), 38, 83
Clark, Joe, and constitutional conferences, 182, 188, 193
Climate Institute, 21
Clinton, Bill, 167, 171, 173–4, 199, 439n66, 440n72, 440n70; and think
tanks, 151–2, 164–6, 179, 249, 428n7, 432n4, 437n46, 439n69
Clinton, Hillary, 8, 40, 172, 174–5, 207, 440n72; and think tanks, 170
Collbohm, Frank, 42–3
Committee on the Present Danger, 161, 163, 437n42
Competitive Enterprise Institute (C E I), 8–9, 177; and Keystone X L, 177,
200, 217, 222; and Paris Climate Agreement, 9, 177
Conference Board (US), 27, 32, 35, 51, 259–60
Conference Board of Canada, 11, 23, 25–6, 81, 425n87; and budget of, 51;
and history of, 32, 51–2; and media exposure, 107, 116–17, 230–2; and
Niagara Institute, 190; and parliamentary testimony, 91, 136, 140
Congressional Budget Office, 12, 161
Congressional Policy Advisory Board, 75
Congressional Research Service, 12, 76
Coors, Joseph, 47, 49
Council of Canadians, 37
Council on Foreign Relations, 27, 68, 92, 97, 153–5, 157, 170, 436n22; and
Keystone X L, 200, 202, 217, 222–4; profile of, 244–5
Crowe, William, 32
Crowley, Brian Lee, 39, 100–1, 234, 254, 262
Culpeper, Roy, 82
DeMint, Jim, 8, 94, 177

Democratic Leadership Council (D L C), 165–6, 249, 439n66–7, 439n69,
440n70
Domhoff, William, 16, 61, 63
Donaldson, Sam, 101–2
Donovan, Hedley, 154
Douglas Aircraft Company, 42
Dye, Thomas, 16, 61
Ebell, Myron, 8–9, 177
Economic Council of Canada, 24, 33, 38, 85, 417n4, 422n26, 422n29;
budget of, 34, 40; media exposure, 116–17; parliamentary testimony,
136, 231 elite theory, 17, 58–9, 71
Empower America, 38
Executive Office of the President (E O P), 76, 205
Federal-Provincial Relations Office (F P R O), 183, 191, 443n18

Feulner, Edwin, 8, 47–8, 84, 161–3, 177–8, 438n47, 438n53; and Ronald
Reagan, 93, 102–3, 162, 438n51
Fisher, Sir Antony, 53, 84
Foreign Policy Initiative, 49
Fraser Institute, 4, 13, 15, 25–6, 63, 77–8, 84, 105, 145, 254, 256, 417n4,
445n14; budget of, 119; consultations with government, 103, 135, 185;
history of, 36, 53–4; Keystone X L, 200, 217–19, 223; media exposure,
56–7, 79, 88–9, 92, 98–9, 101, 107, 116–17, 122–3, 126–7, 212, 230;
parliamentary testimony, 136, 139–40, 231; and Tax Freedom Day, 123,
423n38
Friedman, Milton, 44, 103, 159, 436n32
General Accounting Office (G A O), 76

Gingrich, Newt, 14, 38, 47, 92, 423n42
Goldwater, Barry, 155
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 163
Gordon, Walter, 36
Gorsuch, Neil, 8, 175, 177
Gray, Colin, 85, 88
Haddad, Tammy, 102

Hajdú, Csaba, 53
Harper, Stephen, 40, 77, 82, 140; and Keystone X L, 197–9, 200–2, 208,
222–3
Harrison, Kathryn, 84
Harrison, Peter, 191, 443n19
Heclo, Hugh, 17, 69
Heritage Foundation, 3–4, 13–15, 21, 25–6, 28, 47, 49, 54, 78, 97, 122, 173,
437n46; congressional testimony, 114–15, 139, 234; history of, 139;
media visibility, 89, 91–3, 99, 101, 109–10, 126, 232–3, 433n9, 446n22;
perceived influence of, 63, 72, 76, 87, 94–6, 98, 105, 205, 208, 213; and
Ronald Reagan, 102–3, 151, 161–3; and Donald Trump, 8, 77, 175, 177
Hess, Stephen, 157
Hoberg, George, 84
Hoover, Herbert, 13, 27, 242–3
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 4, 14, 21, 23, 27, 75, 86,
212, 423n42, 441n87; and congressional testimony, 234; and George
Bush, 164, 167–8; and media exposure, 62, 81, 99, 109, 122, 433n7; and
presidential elections, 76, 78, 150, 172, 178; profile of, 242–4; and
Reagan administration, 151, 159–61, 163, 432n4; and Trump
administration, 176; and Washington seminars, 96–7
Hudson Institute, 29, 32, 220, 243, 422n20
Income Tax Act, 12, 62, 429n26

Institute for Government Research, 27–8, 41
Institute for International Economics, 11, 40
Institute for Policy Studies (I P S), 32, 63; profile of, 246
Institute for Research on Public Policy (I R P P), 7, 35–6, 39, 82, 84–5, 184,
212, 215, 254, 431n62–3; 1994 budget consultations, 195; and
constitutional conferences, 182, 188, 190, 193; consultations with
government, 135; and media exposure, 91–2, 117, 122, 230; and
parliamentary testimony, 136; profile of, 260–2
Institute of Economic Affairs, 53
Institute of Economics, 27, 41
Institute of Pacific Relations, 28
Institute on Governance, 36
interest groups, 11, 14-16, 64–6, 72, 134, 165, 169, 202, 204, 206, 216,
418n6; and Keystone X L, 224
Internal Revenue Code, 12, 49, 62, 178, 419n21, 441n87
Internal Revenue Service, 11, 178, 235, 429n26, 435n7
Jérôme-Forget, Monique, 7
Johnson, Lyndon B., 29, 32, 199, 246–7, 419n21, 422n20
Kagan, Robert, 50
Kahn, Herman, 29, 43, 422n20
Kansas Policy Institute, 92, 210
Kemp, Jack, 38, 436n32
Keystone XL Pipeline, 8, 197; and First Nations, 203, 218; and Harper
government, 8, 197–9, 200, 222; history of, 201–3; and Obama
administration, 8, 197–9, 200, 222; and think tanks, 19, 149, 196, 200,
203–7, 217–24; and Trudeau government, 199, 201, 222; and Trump
administration, 8, 177, 201, 207, 222
Kingdon, John, 70–1, 84
Kirby, Michael, 85, 430n53
Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 38, 44, 95, 164
Kissinger, Henry, 86
Koch, Charles, 248
Koch brothers, 92, 221
Koch Foundation, 82
Krasner, Stephen, 66–7, 71–2
Kristol, William, 49–50
Kroeger, Arthur, 183, 186–7
Kurtz, Howard, 100
Law Reform Commission of Canada, 33–4, 40, 422n29

Libby, Lewis “Scooter,” 50
Linden, Patricia, 44, 98
Lindquist, Evert, 17, 25, 33, 51, 69, 87, 180–1, 195–6, 260, 433n4
Lindsey, Lawrence, 47, 95, 440n76; and George W. Bush, 150, 167
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 85
MacDonald-Laurier Institute, 39, 100, 235, 254; profile of, 262–3

Mackenzie Institute, 12, 36, 431n62; and media exposure, 116; and
parliamentary testimony, 140
Manhattan Institute, 75, 168; profile of, 248–9
Manning, Preston, 24, 37
Manning Centre, 24, 37–8, 84–5, 208
Manning Foundation, 24, 37–8, 84–5
Martin, Paul, 80, 195
Maxwell, Judith, 9, 38, 80, 87, 257
Maytree Foundation, 38, 55
McCain, John, 170–1, 173
McGann, James G., 3, 11–2, 22
Meech Lake Accord, 185–6, 193–4, 442n7
Meese, Edwin, 93, 160, 162, 437n39, 438n47, 438n49
Mendelson, Michael, 56
Milne, David, 186
Mondale, Walter, 156, 165
Montreal Economic Institute (ME I), 15, 39–40; profile of, 263–4
Mowat Centre, 23, 39; profile of, 264–5
Mullins, Mark, 54
Mulroney, Brian, 34, 40, 55, 126, 139, 199, 431n63; and constitutional
conferences, 182, 184–7
Mulroney Institute of Government, 25, 38
National Anti-Poverty Organization, 78

National Bureau of Economic Research, 11, 27
National Center for Charitable Statistics, 93
National Council of Welfare, 24, 33, 38, 40, 55, 78, 83, 422n29; media
exposure, 116; parliamentary testimony, 136, 140
National Institute for Public Policy, 85
National Planning Association (N PA), 33, 423n36
National Policy Institute, 11, 175
National Rifle Association (N R A), 14
National Security Council, 76, 168, 436n23, 438n54
New Democratic Party (NDP) 25, 78, 206, 445n14, 445n16
Newsom, David, 64
Niagara Institute: and constitutional conferences, 182, 187-90, 193
Nixon, Richard, 45, 67, 153, 159, 199
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, 24, 37
North American Free Trade Agreement (N A F TA), 183, 197, 203, 206,
218, 220, 440n70
North-South Institute (NSI), 35, 82, 212, 422n29; and budget of, 24; and
media exposure, 119; and parliamentary testimony, 136
Obama, Barack, 40, 68, 72, 151; and Keystone X L, 8, 198–203, 218, 221–
3; and think tanks, 4, 39, 77, 86, 95, 170–4
Obamacare, 8, 49, 69; as Affordable Care Act, 8
Office of Management and Budget (O MB), 42, 76, 161, 436n32
Olin Foundation, 46, 83
Ontario Federation of Labour, 81
Paris Climate Agreement, 8–9, 175, 177, 222

Paris Peace Conference, 244
Parkland Institute, 39, 56–7, 63; and Keystone X L, 200, 217, 219, 223
Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs, 33, 123; budget of, 119; media
exposure, 117
Pearson-Shoyama Institute, 38, 123; media exposure, 118–21
Pembina Institute, 36; and budget of, 231; and Keystone X L, 200, 217,
219–20; and media exposure, 117, 230
Perot, Ross, 38
Peschek, Joseph, 16, 61
philanthropic foundations, 41, 61–2, 82–3, 212–13, 235, 421n16, 422n20
Pipes, Sally, 53, 84
Pitfield, Michael, 85, 430n53
pluralism, 16–17, 58, 60, 64–5, 69, 71, 427n15
Podesta, John D., 40, 173
policy communities, 17, 48, 68–70, 77, 229
policy cycles, 4, 6–7, 10, 17–18, 57, 63, 70–3, 79, 116, 145, 182, 195, 201,
225, 227, 229
policy entrepreneurship, 37, 44, 83–5, 208, 236
policy research capacity, 15, 17
Policy Research Initiative (P R I), 34
President’s Economic Policy Advisory Board (P E PA B), 95
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (P F I A B), 95, 432n4
Prime Minister’s Office (P MO), 77, 205, 227
Private Planning Association of Canada (PPAC), 33, 35, 257, 423n36,
444n27
Privy Council Office (P C O), 34, 79, 205, 227, 430n53
Progress and Freedom Foundation, 38
Progressive Policy Institute (P P I), 164–5, 437n46; profile of, 249
Project for a New American Century (P N A C), 49–51, 168–9, 208
Pruitt, Scott, 9
Public Policy Forum, 9, 15, 36, 74, 78, 87, 145; 1994 budget consultations,
195; consultations with government, 98, 135; and media exposure, 89,
122, 231; profile of, 265–6
R A N D, 6, 11-12, 21, 23, 32, 47, 63, 68, 81, 97, 108–9, 112, 145, 153, 161,
234, 243, 421n19, 422n20, 424n53; history of, 29, 42–3; and media
exposure, 232–3
Raisian, John, 178
Randall, Judy, 78
Raskin, Marcus, 32, 246
Rawson, Garry, 189–90
Raybould, John, 53
Raymond, Arthur, 42
Reader’s Digest Foundation, 83
Reagan, Ronald, 46, 48, 76, 126, 150, 167, 169, 199, 248; and Heritage
Foundation, 93–4, 102–3, 162–3, 208; and think tanks, 86, 151–2, 158–
61, 164, 166, 179, 432n4, 441n87
Renewal of Canada initiative, 149, 182–3, 185, 189, 193–4
Rice, Condoleezza, 14, 168
Rice, Susan, 170–2, 174
Rich, Andrew, 106, 108–9, 114–15, 117, 234, 238
Ritchie, Ronald, 35, 261
Rivlin, Alice, 42
Robert S. Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government, 27,
41
Rockefeller, David, 154–5
Rockefeller Foundation, 82, 212
Round Table Movement, 28
Royal Commission on Taxation, 35
Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), 28, 211
Rumsfeld, Donald, 14, 50
Russell, Peter, 186
Russell Sage Foundation, 27
Sage, Margaret Olivia, 27

Saloma, John, 16, 61
Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, 39–40, 431n59
Scaife, Richard Mellon, 49
Schlesinger, James, 32
Schmitt, Gary, 50
Schultze, Charles, 42
Science Council of Canada, 24, 33–4, 40, 85, 422n29; and media exposure,
116; parliamentary testimony, 136
Scowcroft, Brent, 86
Shoup, Laurence, 154–5
Shultz, George, 14, 86, 150, 161, 163, 168
Skocpol, Theda, 66
Smith, James, 10, 21
Spencer, Richard, 11
Stairs, Denis, 70
state theory, 58, 60, 65–8, 71–2, 85
Steelman, Aaron, 66
Stone, Diane, 69, 74
Strategic Defence Forum (SDF), 12
Talbott, Strobe, 28, 42, 86, 213–14

Taylor, William J., Jr, 100
Thatcher, Margaret, 103, 432n19
think tanks: appearances before legislative committees, 137–44, 146–8;
assessing influence of, 94–5, 102–4, 418n7; barriers to policy-making
process, 74, 81–6; and Bush administration, 14, 47, 49, 95, 168–9, 208;
and Carter administration, 151–2, 154, 436n22; and channels of
influence, 90–6; and Clinton administration, 42, 151–2, 166, 437n46,
439n69; conceptual frameworks for 17–18, 58–72; concerns of Internal
Revenue Service, 11, 429n26; and donors, 91, 93–4, 102, 153, 178, 210–
14, 217, 223, 235; evolution of, 27–41; and government consultations,
133–8; involvement in policy-making, 86–8, 105, 132; involvement in
policy research initiative, 203–4; and the media, 98–102, 110–16, 118–
31, 209–12; participation in constitutional conferences, 182–4, 187–96;
and presidential candidates, 150–3, 179; and Obama administration, 8,
39, 72, 86, 95, 173–4, 218, 221; and Reagan administration, 46, 102,
151–2, 161–4, 166, 437n46; role of, 14–16; selected profiles of, 41–57,
241–9, 251–66; and ties to policy-makers, 17, 89, 204–7, 229; and
Trump administration, 8, 19, 49, 175–6, 179, 246; typologies of, 22–6;
and World Bank, 47, 168
Torjman, Sherri, 55
Trudeau, Justin, 39, 80, 208, 222; and Keystone X L, 199, 201
Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, 35, 53, 199, 261
Truluck, Phillip, 48
Trump, Donald, 7, 37, 69, 174, 207–8, 220, 419n21; and Heritage
Foundation, 101, 151–2, 175, 177; and Keystone X L, 8, 199, 201, 203,
222; and Paris Climate Agreement, 8–9, 222; and think tanks, 4, 8, 11,
19, 49, 77, 95, 98, 151, 175–7, 179, 246
Tupper, Allan, 180–1, 195–6, 432n65
Urban Institute, 11, 23, 29, 32, 93, 109, 234, 422n20; profile of, 246–7
US Department of State, 42, 66–7, 97, 159, 168, 171–2, 174; and Keystone
X L, 202, 222, 225
Vanier Institute of the Family, 33, 52–3, 122

Veldhuis, Niels, 54, 103
Volcker, Paul, 156
Walker, Michael, 53–4, 84, 103

Warnke, Paul, 156
Watts, Ron, 188, 193, 443n18
Weaver, R. Kent, 11, 22, 24, 76, 106, 108–9, 114–15, 117, 234
Western Centre for Economic Research, 181
Weyrich, Paul, 47, 84
Williams, Brooke, 28, 94, 213
Wilson, Paul, 78
Wolfowitz, Paul, 47, 50, 168
World Bank, 47, 168
Zoellick, Robert, 95; and George W. Bush, 150, 168

Zussman, David, 74, 80, 265

Do Think Tanks Matter Assessing The Impact of Public Policy Instit

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Do Think Tanks Matter?

Do Think Tanks Matter?

Third Edition, Revised and Expanded

McGill-Queen’s University Press

ISBN 978-0-7735-5324-8 (cloth)

Legal deposit fourth quarter 2018

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Abelson, Donald E., author

Includes bibliographical references and index.

I S B N 978-0-7735-5324-8 (cloth). – I S B N 978-0-7735-5325-5 (paper). – I S B N 978-0-7735-

1. Policy sciences. 2. Research institutes. 3. Research institutes – Canada. 4. Research institutes –

This book was typeset by Marquis Interscript.

Tables and Figures

Appendix One: A Profile of Selected American Think Tanks

1.1 Selected Profiles of American Think Tanks

References to Selected American Think Tanks in National

AEI American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

According to the 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, an annual

Surveying the Think Tank Landscape in the

Since there is no consensus about what constitutes a think tank, several

Universities without Students

Universities without students, the first category of think tanks identified by

What distinguishes government contractors from the preceding category is

Advocacy Think Tanks

Classifying generations, or waves, of think tanks according to specific

The Second Wave, 1946–70

These organizations received government funding in amounts that

Although they operated at arm’s length from their employers, tensions

The Third Wave, 1971–89

The second wave of think tank development – the emergence of

The Fourth Wave? 1990–2017

The Brookings Institution

The Brookings Institution, which claims to be guided by “Quality,

Unlike the Brookings Institution, R A N D does not owe its existence to a

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy

Established in 1943 by Lewis H. Brown, president of the Johns-Mansville

In 1978, after devoting more than twenty years to transforming A E I into

I make no bones about marketing … We pay as much attention to the

Baroody’s preoccupation with marketing A E I and its products to policy-

The Heritage Foundation

Just as R A N D served as a prototype for other government contractors, the

Weyrich and I were having lunch together and he showed me a study

The Project for the New American Century (P N A C )

American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have

A VIEW FROM CANADA

The Conference Board of Canada

In many respects, the Conference Board of Canada is unique among

Established under the patronage of Their Excellencies, Canada’s Governor

• Build public understanding of important issues and trends affecting the

The Fraser Institute

Well before Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced in his Christmas

The Caledon Institute of Social Policy

Located in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Alberta, with a second

• “To [provide] top quality policy research focussing on Canadian energy

Thinking about Think Tanks:

For some scholars, including Joseph Peschek, Thomas Dye, William

THE PLURALIST TRADITION: ONE VOICE

As multinational corporations, media conglomerates, and powerful special

POLICY CYCLES AND POLICY INFLUENCE: A

There are few parts of the policy-making process or a branch or department

CONSTRAINING IDEAS: DO CANADIAN AND

Different types of political systems impose different types of constraints on

Competing in the Marketplace of Ideas: