THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER

The Chernobyl disaster was a nuclear accident that occurred on Saturday 26 April 1986, in
the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, near the city of Pripyat in the north of the Ukrainian SSR in
the Soviet Union. A nuclear meltdown in No.4 reactor caused a fire that sent a plume of radioactive
fallout that eventually spread all over Europe. It is considered the worst nuclear disaster in history
both in terms of cost and casualties. To investigate the causes of the accident the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) used two reports submitted by the International Nuclear Safety
Advisory Group (INSAG). Both reports identified an inadequate "safety culture" at all managerial
and operational levels as a major underlying factor of different aspects of the accident. This was
stated to be inherent not only in operations but also during design, engineering, construction,
manufacture and regulation.

Figure 1: Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant before and after disaster

Figure 2: Radiation fallout map of Chernobyl disaster

Cause of the Accident

The reactor unit 4 was to be shut down for routine maintenance on 25 April 1986. But it
was decided to take advantage of this shutdown to determine whether, in the event of a loss of
station power, the slowing turbine could provide enough electrical power to operate the main core
cooling water circulating pumps, until the diesel emergency power supply became operative. The
aim of this test was to determine whether cooling of the core could continue in the event of a loss
of power. Due to the misconception that this experiment belonged to the non-nuclear part of the
power plant, it was carried out without a proper exchange of information between the testing
department and the safety department. Hence the test started with inadequate safety precautions
and the operating personnel were not alerted to the nuclear safety implications of the electrical test
and its potential danger. Therefore, views of the main causes in both INSAG reports were heavily
lobbied by different groups, including the reactor's designers, power plant personnel, and the
Soviet and Ukrainian governments. This was due to the uncertainty about the actual sequence of
events and plant parameters.

Negligence by high-ranking Officials

Alexander P. Kovalenko, director of information for the enterprise overseeing operations

at the Chernobyl nuclear complex, stated three officials - the former plant director, chief engineer
and his deputy were responsible for the accident and being investigated. In his statement these
three defendants were responsible for the accident because they allowed unsanctioned experiments
to be carried out by workers without sufficient training. Addition to that Soviet officials found
safety systems were shut off during the experiments, leading to an explosion and fire that spewed
out radiation. Soviet criminal trial 1987 finally took place on 30 July 1987 and five plant
employees (Anatoly S. Dyatlov- the former deputy chief engineer, Viktor P. Bryukhanov- the
former plant director, Nikolai M. Fomin- the former chief engineer, Boris V. Rogozhin- the shift
director of Reactor 4 and Alexandr P. Kovalenko- the chief of Reactor 4) and Yuri A. Laushkin
(Gosatomenergonadzor [USSR State Committee on Supervision of Safe Conduct of Work in
Atomic Energy] inspector) were sentenced to ten, ten, ten, five, three, and two years respectively
in labor camps. Poor quality of operating procedures and instructions given, their conflicting
character, putting a heavy burden on the operating crew proved their tort of negligence.

Figure 3: Bryukhanov, Dyatlov and Fomin on trial after the disaster

Issues for Discussion

The Chernobyl disaster changed the scientific view of the world. Consequently, problems
of technological risks were discussed not only by scientists but also by the general public. The
very way of discussion of safety problems concerning nuclear reactors is changed. The
responsibility of engineers, designers, and operators as well as scientists became to be taken into
account. Here engineers, who made a mistake in the design of the nuclear reactor, were recognized
guilty in the accident as they violated the code of ethics, particularly, the morality the engineering
profession resulting in harm to society.
The growth of technical and technological capacities of humanity creates the entirely new
ethical situation that requires not only evaluation of the exploitation of techniques but also the
possibility to anticipate disasters, prevent, or, at least, minimize it. As shown by the accident at the
Chernobyl, nuclear power technology development does not make people’s lives safer. It goes
without saying that such consequences of nuclear energy as the Chernobyl disaster cannot be
predicted. Nevertheless, engineers should try to do it in relation to new projects conducting
relevant researches and listening to the views of the opposition.
It is expected that the technical work would always contain a necessary component of the
assessment of the technology, and not everything that is technically feasible should be necessarily
be created. In the framework of utilitarianism ethical theory, the principal task of the engineer is
not only to measure the space but also create the safe environment based on ethical and social
responsibility. People are more significant than technology. Therefore, the latter should satisfy
requirements of a variety of values, namely, criteria of economy, improvement of living standards,
safety, health, environmental quality, and social environment.

References

• https://apnews.com/article/5f8a95efd226f44acfa4a46c00b2a8a0

• https://studycorgi.com/chernobyl-disaster-and-engineering-ethics/

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster#Investigations_and_the_evolution_of_i
dentified_causes