GLOBAL

TERRORISM
INDEX
2022
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

Institute for Economics & Peace

Myanmar was redacted from this report on May 10, 2022 in response to community feedback.
IEP is assessing the situation in Myanmar for future publications.

Quantifying Peace and its Benefits

The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated
to shifting the world’s focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being
and progress.

IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing
metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as
well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.

IEP is headquartered in Sydney, with offices in New York, The Hague, Mexico City, Brussels and Harare. It
works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organisations
on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

For more information visit www.economicsandpeace.org

Please cite this report as:

Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2022: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney,
March 2022. Available from: http://visionofhumanity.org/resources (accessed Date Month Year).

The GTI uses Dragonfly’s TerrorismTracker database, which contains detailed and structured
event records of every terrorist incident reported in open sources since January 2007. Dragonfly
is a leading risk intelligence and data company that specialises in global security, geopolitics,
crises and instability.

TerrorismTracker is the most comprehensive, current and methodologically robust dedicated

open-source terrorism incidents database available. It is widely used for professional applications
in countering terrorism, by law enforcement, government, military, in the private sector, in
academia, and among insurers.

Further information about Dragonfly is available at www.dragonflyintelligence.com

Contents
Executive Summary & Key Findings 2
About the Global Terrorism Index 6

Section 1: Results 8
Global Terrorism Index Map 8
Terrorist Incidents Map 10
Terrorism in 2021 12
Covid-19 and Terrorism 14
Terrorist Groups 14
Ten Countries Most Impacted by Terrorism 19

Section 2: Trends in Terrorism 29

Ideological Trends In The West 32
Regional Trends 36

Section 3: Terrorism in the Sahel 45

Terrorism in the Sahel: Context 48
Ecological Threats and Terrorism in the Sahel 52
Regional Case Studies 58

Section 4: Terrorism and Conflict 60

Terrorism and Insurgency 62
Correlates of Terrorism 64
Disrupting Terrorist Groups and Networks 65

Expert Contributions 71
• The Technology of Terror: From Dynamite to the Metaverse 72
Dr Christina Schori Liang, Head, Terrorism and Preventing Violent Extremism,
Geneva Centre for Security Policy
• Why Morocco’s Counterterrorism Evolution Matters to Africa 76
Cesar Alvarez Velasquez, Programme Management Officer, Bureau de Programme de Rabat,
Lutte contre le Terrorisme et Formation en Afrique
• Sub-Saharan Africa at a Crossroad 79
Dr Isaac Kfir, IEP Research Fellow

Appendices 83
Endnotes 90

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 1

Executive
Summary
This is the ninth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive
summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last decade. The calculation
of the GTI score takes into account not only deaths, but also incidents, hostages, and injuries
from terrorism, weighted over a five-year period. The GTI report is produced by the Institute for
Economics & Peace (IEP) using data from TerrorismTracker and other sources. TerrorismTracker
provides event records on terrorist attacks since 1 January 2007. The dataset contains over 60,500
terrorist incidents for the period 2007 to 2021.

In 2021, deaths from terrorism fell by 1.2 per cent to 7,142
deaths and are now a third of what they were at their peak
in 2015. The minor fall in deaths was mirrored by a reduction
in the impact of terrorism, with 86 countries recording an
improvement, compared to 19 that deteriorated. However, the
number of attacks globally increased by 17 per cent to 5,226.
As such, the lethality of attacks decreased from 1.6 deaths
per attack to 1.4 deaths per attack over the 12-month period.
Russia and Eurasia had the largest regional improvement.
State (IS) affiliates led to a surge in terrorism in many countries
in the Sahel. Highlighting the magnitude of the problem,
terrorism deaths have risen by over one thousand per cent
between 2007 and 2021 in the Sahel. Terrorism deaths in Niger
more than doubled in 2020, rising to 588. Deaths attributed to
Islamic extremist groups such as Islamic State in West Africa
(ISWA), Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Boko Haram
and Al-Shabaab recorded deaths as far south as Mozambique,
with 43 per cent occurring in the Sahel.

The number of countries experiencing at least one death from
terrorism in the past year was 44, a slight increase compared
with the 43 countries in 2020. Another 105 countries had no
deaths or attacks from terrorism in 2021. This is the highest
number of countries since 2007.
The data shows a shift in the dynamics of terrorism, with
it becoming more concentrated in regions and countries
suffering from political instability and conflict, such as the
Sahel, Afghanistan. Violent conflict remains a primary driver
of terrorism, with over 97 per cent of terrorist attacks in 2021
taking place in countries in conflict. All of the ten countries
most impacted by terrorism in 2021 were involved in an armed
conflict in 2020.1 Attacks in countries involved in conflict are
six times deadlier than attacks in peaceful countries.
There were serious deteriorations in many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), especially the Sahel. Forty-eight per
cent, or 3,461, of all terrorism deaths globally occurred in
SSA with four of the ten countries with the largest increases
in deaths from terrorism residing in SSA: Burkina Faso, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Niger. Three of
these countries are in the Sahel.
On a more positive note, there was a ten per cent
improvement in terrorism deaths in SSA. The improvement
can be attributed to the successful counter insurgency
operations targeting Boko Haram where deaths caused by
the group declined by 72 per cent between 2020 and 2021
from 629 deaths to 178 deaths. Nigeria recorded the second
biggest reduction in deaths. This is more than the overall
decrease in terrorism deaths in SSA. Attacks by the group
also significantly deceased, halving from the prior year to 64
attacks.
The Sahel is of serious concern. The expansion of Islamic
The situation in the Sahel is rapidly deteriorating, with eight
attempted coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea and Chad
in the last eighteen months. The underlying drivers are
complex and systemic, including poor water utilisation, lack
of food, malnutrition, strong population growth, and weak
governments, with most of the terrorist activity occurring
along borders where government control is weakest. Adding
to the complexity, many criminal organisations increasingly
represent themselves as Islamic insurgents.
JNIM is the fastest growing group globally, recording the
largest increase in the number of attacks and deaths in 2021.
It was responsible for 351 deaths in 2021, an increase of 69 per
cent. In contrast ISWA is the most lethal group in the Sahel,
with the group responsible for on average 15.2 deaths per
attack in Niger.
In the West, the number of attacks has fallen substantially over
the last three years, with successive falls each year. Fifty-nine
attacks and ten deaths were recorded in 2021, a decrease of 68
and 70 percent respectively since the peak in 2018. In Europe,
Islamist extremists carried out three attacks in 2021. Attacks in
the US also dropped to the lowest level since 2015, with only
seven attacks recorded in 2021. None were attributed to any
known terrorist group. Fatalities in the US increased slightly,
from two to three between 2020 and 2021.
Politically motivated terrorism has now overtaken religiously
motivated terrorism, with the latter declining by 82 per cent
in 2021. In the last five years, there have been five times more
politically motivated terrorist attacks than religiously motivated
attacks. There are now noticeable similarities between far-
left and far-right extremist ideologies, with both targeting
government and political figures. Since 2007, 17 per cent of
terrorist attacks by these groups have targeted this category.
Additionally, while the motivation can be inferred, most attacks

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 2

attributed to left or right ideologies are perpetrated by
individuals or groups with no formal affiliation to a recognised
organisation, with many of the underlying motivational factors
being similar.

IS remained the deadliest terror group globally, recording

the most attacks and deaths of any group in 2021. However,
globally 52 per cent of all terrorist incidents are not ascribed
to a group. Despite this, the strength and influence of IS and
its affiliate groups, Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP),
Islamic State - Sinai Province (ISSP) and ISWA, are showing
signs of decline. Twenty countries experienced a death from
terrorism caused by IS in 2021, a decrease from 26 countries
the year prior. Deaths attributed to IS also declined in 2021,
falling by 1.6 per cent to 2,066.

Deaths in The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) dropped

by 14 per cent to 1,139 fatalities, the lowest since 2007,
although attacks remained steady at 1,271. Therefore, terrorist
attacks are becoming less deadly in the region, with less than
1 person killed on average per terrorist attack in 2021, the
lowest lethality rate in the last decade. In contrast, SSA and
South Asia recorded more deaths than MENA.
The report also looks at the relationship between insurgency,
conflict and terrorism as well as the application of systems
thinking to better understand the dynamics of terrorism and
its impact on society. Once groups exist for more than 12
years they are very hard to stop. In contrast to this, over half
of all terrorist groups do not survive beyond three years. This
emphasises the need to focus counter-terrorism operations
while the groups are still nascent.
Niger recorded the largest increase in terrorism deaths,
increasing by 129 per cent to 588 while attacks remained
consistent. The increased lethality is largely driven by the
growing sophistication and organisational capabilities of
ISWA.
development of a country. Political terror and acceptance of
basic rights are common globally. For OECD countries there
are two statistical clusters. They are measures associated with
social equity and acceptance of violence within a society. The
latter being associated with political terror, access to weapons
and militarisation. For less economically developed countries
the statistical clusters are weak institutions and societal
fractionalisation. The two strongest correlations for this group
were Political Terror Scale and Group Grievances.
The decline is terrorism in the West coincided with the
COVID-19 pandemic. Restrictions on freedom of movement,
public gatherings, travel and an immediate threat to personal
health may help to explain some of this fall. Once the
emergency measures are removed and societies begin to live
with COVID-19, there is the possibility of an uptake in terrorism
activity. This would require addressing the underlying issues
of alienation.

Mozambique recorded the largest drop in terrorism deaths

with 414 fewer deaths in 2021, an 82 per cent decrease from "Political terrorism has
the previous year. The fall was driven by successful counter- now overtaken religious
terrorism measures against IS performed by the Mozambican
forces in conjunction with Rwanda and the Southern African terrorism in the West,
Development Community.2 with religiously motivated
South Asia remains the region with the worst average GTI attacks declining 82 per
score in 2021, with the region recording 1,829 deaths from
terrorism in 2021, an increase of eight per cent or 137 deaths.
cent in 2021."
Pakistan remains one of the ten most affected countries in
2021. Terrorism deaths in Pakistan rose slightly to 275, a five
per cent increase from 263 deaths in 2020. There have been
no terrorist attacks or deaths in Sri Lanka for the second year.
The worst year for terrorism was 2019 when 197 people were
killed in 11 attacks.

As new technologies have become more pervasive, so has

their use by terrorist organisations. The advent of the IED
in Iraq is a good example, and resulted in more than 70 per
cent of US forces deaths in the five years from 2001. Smart
phones using GPS systems are capable of guiding cheap
drones with deadly precision, with attacks by missiles and
drones becoming more common. Advancements, such as
AI, 3D printing or autonomous vehicles may in the future be
weaponised. These new risks will drive future advancements
in counter-terrorism tactics.

The factors that are most closely statistically associated

with terrorism vary depending on the socio-economic

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 3

Key Findings
Results
à Deaths from terrorism fell to 7,142 deaths in 2021,
representing a 1.1 per cent decrease from the prior
year.
à However, attacks increased by 17 per cent to 5,226 in
2021, largely due to violence in the Sahel region and
instability in country such as Afghanistan.
à Seven of the ten countries most impacted by
terrorism deteriorated in 2021. MENA, Europe, Russia
and Eurasia, South America and sub-Saharan Africa
regions all recorded falls in deaths from terrorism of
at least ten per cent.
à Three of the ten most impacted countries by
terrorism in 2021 were in the Sahel region. Niger, Mali
and Burkina Faso recorded substantial increases in
terrorism deaths of 81, 174 and 74 respectively.
à Afghanistan remains the country with the highest
impact from terrorism for the third year followed by
Iraq and Somalia. Deaths increased by 14 per cent to
1,426.
à The deadliest attack of 2021 occurred when an
Islamic State (IS) suicide bomber detonated two
suicide bombs at Afghanistan’s Kabul International
Airport, resulting in 170 deaths and over 200 injuries.
It was the deadliest attack in Afghanistan since 2007.
à The Taliban were overtaken by IS as the world’s
deadliest terrorist group in 2021, despite deaths
attributed to the group and its affiliates slightly
declining from 2,100 to 2,066 deaths.
à Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) is
the fastest growing terrorist organisation and was
responsible for 351 deaths in 2021, a 69 per cent
increase.
à Of the 5,226 terrorist attacks recorded in 2021 only
52 per cent were attributed to a group
à COVID-19 has affected the tactics used by
terror groups to spread their ideology and their
radicalisation and recruitment processes.1
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 4
Trends in Terrorism
à Deaths from terrorism have fallen by over a third
since the peak in 2015, with two of the largest
decreases occurring in Iraq and Pakistan.
à 44 countries recorded at least one death from
terrorism. This is down from the peak of 55 countries
in 2015.
à Of the 163 countries included in the analysis, nearly
two thirds or 105 recorded no attacks or deaths from
terrorism in 2020 and 2021, the highest number
since 2007.
à Terrorist activity has been concentrated in South Asia
and sub-Saharan Africa with both regions recording
more terrorism deaths than MENA for the last three
years.
à In MENA deaths from terrorism have fallen by 39 per
cent in the last three years.
à As the conflict in Syria subsided, IS and its affiliates
have shifted their focus to sub-Saharan Africa and
the Sahel region in particular.
à Deaths in the Sahel region account for 35 per cent of
global terrorism deaths in 2021, compared with just
one per cent in 2007.
à In most regions, the weapon used in the majority of
attacks was firearms, followed by explosives.
à After many years of improvement, Iraq recorded
more deaths in 2021 than the prior year, with an
increase of 15 per cent to 524 terrorism deaths.
Attacks increased by a third, driven by an increase in
activity by Islamic extremists.
à There were three attacks by Islamic extremists in
Europe. This is the lowest level since 2012. In total
there were 113 attacks in Europe in 2021.
à The US recorded a significant improvement in the
impact of terrorism in 2021, recording its lowest GTI
score since 2015. In 2021, there were seven attacks
and three deaths in the US.
à Terrorist attacks in the West have fallen every year
since 2018 and decreased by 68 per cent. In 2021
there were only 59 attacks.
à Political terrorism has now overtaken religious
terrorism in the West, with religiously motivated
attacks declining 82 per cent in 2021. There were
40 politically motivated attacks, compared with just
three religiously motivated attacks.
à Eight countries in the West experienced at least one
 instance of political terrorism in 2021, with Germany
recording 19 attacks, the highest of any Western
country, followed by Italy who recorded six attacks.
à While the motivation can be inferred, most attacks
driven by a left or right ideology are perpetrated by
individuals or groups with no formal affiliation to a Terrorism and Conflict
recognised organisation.
à In 2020, 97.6 per cent of deaths from terrorism
occurred in conflict affected countries.
à 80 per cent of all terrorist incidents have occurred
within 50 kilometres of a zone where a conflict is
taking place.
à As the intensity of conflict increases, so does the
lethality of terrorist actions. Terrorist attacks in
Terrorism in the Sahel conflict countries are more than six times deadlier
than attacks in peaceful countries.
à The Sahel has become increasingly more violent
à In armed conflicts, the intensity of terrorist activity in
over the past 15 years, with deaths rising by over
a given year is proportional to the number of battle
one thousand per cent between 2007 and 2021. The
deaths. On average, every 4.7 per cent increase in
increase in violence shows no sign of abating.
battle deaths is associated with a ten per cent rise in
à The underlying drivers are complex and systemic, terrorist attacks.
including poor water utilisation, lack of food,
à Terrorism appears to be contracting into conflict
malnutrition, strong population growth, and weak
areas with a higher percentage of attacks happening
governments.
in conflict areas.
à Ten per cent or more of young males suffer from very
à On average, terrorist groups that are classified as
high levels of thinness in eight of the ten countries in
insurgent groups remain active for 11.8 years.
the Sahel.
à Once a terrorist organisation has operated for 12
à In conflict environments terrorists groups prefer to
years or more they are difficult to eradicate.
target police, military and domestic government.
à Half of all terrorist groups cease to exist in three
à Water and food utilities and/or infrastructure are the
years. Of the 84 active terrorist groups studied in
preferred targets of terrorist groups in non-conflict
2015, only 32 were active in 2021.
environment.
à The factors that correlate with terrorism are distinctly
à Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) is the most lethal
different for OECD countries and less developed
group in the Sahel. In Niger it was responsible 23
countries, highlighting that different approaches are
attacks killing on average 15.2 people per attack.
needed depending on the situational context of a
à The increase in terrorist activity in Niger is part of a particular country.
larger increase across the Sahel region, with similar
à For OECD countries there are two statistical factors
surges seen in Mali and Burkina Faso over the past
associated with terrorism - social equity and
few years.
acceptance of violence within a society. The latter
à Most terrorist activity is in border regions where being higher levels of political terror, access to
government activities are at a minimum. weapons, and militarization.
à There is a strong statistical relationship between à The factors that correlated the strongest for the
criminal activity and terrorism in the Sahel. Rest of the World could loosely be classified as weak
institutions and societal fractionalisation. The two
strongest correlations were political terror scale and
group grievances.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 5

About the
Global Terrorism Index
The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study analysing the impact of terrorism for 163
countries and which covers 99.7 per cent of the world’s population.

Given the significant resources committed to counter terrorism

by governments across the world, it is important to analyse and
aggregate the available data to better understand its various
properties.
Examples of the information contained in this study are:
• The differing socio-economic conditions under which it
occurs.
• The longer term trends and how terrorism changes over
time.
• The geopolitical drivers associated with terrorism and
ideological aims of terrorists groups.
• The types of strategies deployed by terrorists, their tactical
targets and how these have evolved over time.
In this context, one of the key aims of the GTI is to examine
these trends. It also aims to help inform a positive practical
debate about the future of terrorism and the required policy
responses.
The GTI is based on data compiled by TerrorismTracker and
uses the 31st of December 2021 as the cut-off date. Incidents
are only included in the dataset if they are consistent with
TerrorismTracker’s definition of terrorism which means recorded
incidents may vary from other databases.
Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no
single internationally accepted definition of what constitutes
terrorism and the terrorism literature abounds with competing
definitions and typologies. IEP accepts the terminology and
definitions agreed to by TerrorismTracker.
The GTI therefore defines terrorism as ‘the systematic threat
or use of violence, by non-state actors, whether for or in
opposition to established authority, with the intention of
communicating a political, religious or ideological message to
a group larger than the victim group, by generating fear and
so altering (or attempting to alter) the behaviour of the larger
group.’1
In line with this definition, TerrorismTracker does not include
the following as acts of terrorism:
• Acts of warfare, either irregular or conventional
• Criminal violence orientated exclusively for profit, even if
they emulate terrorist tactics such as car bombings and
beheadings.
• Violent anti-social behaviour
• Civil unrest
• Isolated acts of violence by unbalanced individuals such as
active shooter incidents, unless there is clear evidence the
motives of the attack are consistent with our definition of
terrorism.2

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 6

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 7
 2022
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
INDEX
MEASURING THE IMPACT
OF TERRORISM
THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM
VERY HIGH HIGH MEDIUM LOW VERY LOW NO IMPACT NOT INCLUDED

10 8 6 4 2 0

RANK RANK RANK

RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE

1 Afghanistan 9.109 Arrows-alt-h United States of 56 Ecuador 2.766 long-arrow-alt-up 2

28 4.961 long-arrow-alt-up 2
America
2 Iraq 8.511 Arrows-alt-h 57 Argentina 2.657 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 9
29 Greece 4.849 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 10
3 Somalia 8.398 Arrows-alt-h 58 Jordan 2.594 long-arrow-alt-up 5
30 Israel 4.778 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 4
4 Burkina Faso 8.270 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 59 Switzerland 2.522 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3
31 United Kingdom 4.770 Arrows-alt-h
5 Syria 8.250 Arrows-alt-h 60 Australia 2.438 long-arrow-alt-up 2
32 Palestine 4.736 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1
6 Nigeria 8.233 long-arrow-alt-up 2 61 Mexico 2.428 long-arrow-alt-up 4
33 Germany 4.729 long-arrow-alt-up 1
7 Mali 8.152 Arrows-alt-h 62 Ukraine 2.304 long-arrow-alt-up 3
34 Nepal 4.693 long-arrow-alt-up 4
8 Niger 7.856 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 4 63 Malaysia 2.247 long-arrow-alt-up 2
35 France 4.562 long-arrow-alt-up 6
10 Pakistan 7.825 long-arrow-alt-up 2 64 Paraguay 2.194 long-arrow-alt-up 4
36 Tanzania 4.530 Arrows-alt-h
11 Cameroon 7.432 Arrows-alt-h 65 Bahrain 2.145 long-arrow-alt-up 2
37 Peru 4.471 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 18
12 India 7.432 long-arrow-alt-up 2 66 Netherlands 2.077 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 7
38 Tunisia 4.447 long-arrow-alt-up 1
13 Mozambique 7.432 long-arrow-alt-up 4 67 China 1.863 long-arrow-alt-up 3
39 Algeria 4.432 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 4
14 Colombia 7.068 Arrows-alt-h 68 Belgium 1.745 long-arrow-alt-up 17
40 Bangladesh 4.411 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1
15 Egypt 6.932 long-arrow-alt-up 2 69 Sweden 1.660 long-arrow-alt-up 2
41 New Zealand 4.376 long-arrow-alt-up 6
16 Philippines 6.790 long-arrow-alt-up 1 70 Senegal 1.580 long-arrow-alt-up 2
42 Cote d' Ivoire 4.310 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2
Democratic Republic 71 Japan 1.460 long-arrow-alt-up 1
17 6.733 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 5 43 Burundi 4.271 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 13
of the Congo 72 Uruguay 1.322 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1
18 Chile 6.496 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 5 44 Russia 4.219 long-arrow-alt-up 6
=73 Rwanda 1.243 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3
19 Chad 6.379 long-arrow-alt-up 3 45 Uganda 4.106 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 59
=73 South Africa 1.243 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3
20 Kenya 6.166 long-arrow-alt-up 2 46 Venezuela 4.005 Arrows-alt-h
=73 Togo 1.243 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 31
21 Yemen 5.870 long-arrow-alt-up 1 47 Tajikistan 3.988 long-arrow-alt-up 7
76 Morocco 1.156 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2
22 Thailand 5.723 long-arrow-alt-up 3 48 Canada 3.882 Arrows-alt-h
77 Norway 1.109 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2
49 Ethiopia 3.759 long-arrow-alt-up 7
23 Turkey 5.651 long-arrow-alt-up 6 =78 Ireland 1.060 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2
50 Italy 3.687 long-arrow-alt-up 3
24 Indonesia 5.500 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 4 =78 Romania 1.060 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3
51 Lebanon 3.566 long-arrow-alt-up 6
25 Sri Lanka 5.445 long-arrow-alt-up 4 80 Finland 1.007 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2
52 Austria 3.261 long-arrow-alt-up 2
26 Libya 5.100 long-arrow-alt-up 1 81 Brazil 0.951 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2
53 Benin 3.164 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 19
27 Iran 5.015 Arrows-alt-h 82 Cyprus 0.922 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2
54 Saudi Arabia 3.110 long-arrow-alt-up 5
55 Spain 2.861 long-arrow-alt-up 3

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 |­ 8

 RANK RANK RANK
RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE

83 Lithuania 0.827 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 =93 Equatorial Guinea 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Namibia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
84 Mauritania 0.509 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3 =93 Eritrea 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Nicaragua 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
85 Vietnam 0.407 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3 =93 Estonia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 North Korea 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=86 Angola 0.291 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3 =93 Georgia 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1 =93 Oman 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=86 Czech Republic 0.291 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3 =93 Ghana 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Panama 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=86 Denmark 0.291 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3 =93 Guatemala 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Papua New Guinea 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=86 Gabon 0.291 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3 =93 Guinea 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Poland 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 5
=86 Kosovo 0.291 Arrows-alt-h =93 Guinea-Bissau 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Portugal 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=86 Sudan 0.291 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3 =93 Guyana 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Qatar 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
92 Taiwan 0.227 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 4 =93 Haiti 0.000 Arrows-alt-h Republic of the
=93 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
Congo
=93 Albania 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Honduras 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Serbia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Armenia 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 =93 Hungary 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 4
=93 Sierra Leone 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Azerbaijan 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 =93 Iceland 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Singapore 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Belarus 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Jamaica 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Slovakia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Kazakhstan 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 18
=93 Bhutan 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Slovenia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Kuwait 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
=93 Bolivia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 South Korea 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
Bosnia and =93 Kyrgyz Republic 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1
=93 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 South Sudan 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
Herzegovina =93 Laos 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 22
=93 Swaziland 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Botswana 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Latvia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 The Gambia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Bulgaria 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Lesotho 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Timor-Leste 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Cambodia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h =93 Liberia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
Central African =93 Trinidad and Tobago 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 28 =93 Macedonia (FYR) 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
Republic =93 Turkmenistan 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Costa Rica 0.000 =93 Madagascar 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 24
Arrows-alt-h =93 United Arab Emirates 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Croatia 0.000 =93 Malawi 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
Arrows-alt-h =93 Uzbekistan 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Cuba 0.000 =93 Mauritius 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
Arrows-alt-h =93 Zambia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Djibouti 0.000 =93 Moldova 0.000 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
Arrows-alt-h =93 Zimbabwe 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
=93 Dominican Republic 0.000 =93 Mongolia 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
Arrows-alt-h
=93 El Salvador 0.000 =93 Montenegro 0.000 Arrows-alt-h
Arrows-alt-h

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 9

TERRORIST
INCIDENTS
Top 18 deadliest attacks of 2021

All attacks in 2021 scaled by number of fatalities

Worst attacks in 2021

DESCRIPTION

1 COUNTRY AFGHANISTAN PROVINCE KABUL DEATHS 170 A suicide bomber killed at least 170 people and injured at least 200 others when he
detonated his explosives at Kabul International Airport. The attack was followed by
ISLAMIC STATE -
another suicide bomb nearby, with reports of gunfire. Islamic State - Khorasan Province
DATE 26/8/21 GROUP KHORASAN
claimed responsibility for the attack.
PROVINCE

2 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO PROVINCE YAGHA DEATHS 160 Gunmen killed at least 160 people and wounded at least 40 others in Solhan village in
the Sahel region. The assailants first attacked members of a volunteer defence force
militia before attacking civilians and burning down houses and a market. No group had
DATE 5/6/21 GROUP UNKNOWN
claimed responsibility for the attack but jihadists operate in the area.

3 COUNTRY NIGER REGION TAHOUA DEATHS 137 Gunmen killed 137 civilians in three coordinated attacks in the Tahoua region. Islamic
State West in Africa (ISWA) claimed responsibility, saying they targeted pro-government
ISLAMIC STATE IN
DATE 21/3/21 GROUP militia members.
WEST AFRICA (ISWA)
Gunmen killed at least 100 civilians they forced from their homes in Kandahar
4 COUNTRY AFGHANISTAN PROVINCE KANDAHAR DEATHS 100
province. The Ministry of Interior Affairs said that at least another 200 people remained
unaccounted for. The Ministry said the Taliban was responsible, although the group
DATE 22/7/21 GROUP TALIBAN
denied it had carried out the attack.
A series of three bombs killed at least 86 civilians, most of them students, and wounded
5 COUNTRY AFGHANISTAN PROVINCE KABUL DEATHS 86 150 others at a high school in Kabul province. A car bomb initially exploded, followed
by two others of unspecified type that detonated as students fled outside. No group
had claimed responsibility for the attack, but based on location and tactic jihadists were
DATE 8/5/21 GROUP UNKNOWN probably responsible. The Taliban issued a statement denying responsibility for the
attack.

6 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO REGION SAHEL DEATHS 80 Gunmen killed 59 civilians, 15 security forces personnel and six pro-government
militiamen, and wounded 19 others, in an attack on a military convoy that was escorting
JAMAAT NUSRAT
civilians on the road between Arbinda and Gorgadji in the Sahel region. Jamaat Nusrat
DATE 18/8/21 GROUP AL-ISLAM WAL
Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed responsibility for the attack.
MUSLIMEEN (JNIM)

7 COUNTRY NIGER REGION TILLABERI DEATHS 70 Gunmen on motorbikes killed around 70 civilians and wounded around 17 others in
the village of Tchombangou. Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) claimed responsibility,
ISLAMIC STATE IN
DATE 2/1/21 GROUP saying they targeted pro-government militia members.
WEST AFRICA (ISWA)
8 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO REGION SAHEL DEATHS 53 Gunmen killed at least 49 police officers and four civilians at a police post near an
abandoned mine in the Sahel region at around 0500hrs on 14 November. No group
JAMAAT NUSRAT
had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing, but local media outlets
DATE 14/11/21 GROUP AL-ISLAM WAL
reported that Jamaat Nustrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) was probably responsible.
MUSLIMEEN (JNIM)

9 COUNTRY AFGHANISTAN PROVINCE KUNDUZ DEATHS 50 A suicide bomber detonated explosives during Friday prayers in a Shia mosque in the
Kunduz province. Local officials reported that at least 50 civilians were killed and 140
ISLAMIC STATE -
DATE 8/10/21 GROUP more wounded. Islamic State - Khorasan Province claimed responsibility.
KHORASAN PROVINCE
Four suicide bombers killed at least 47 people and injured at least 80 others in an attack
10 COUNTRY AFGHANISTAN PROVINCE KANDAHAR DEATHS 47
on a Shia mosque in Kandahar province. Two suicide bombers detonated explosives at
ISLAMIC STATE - the entrance to the mosque, followed by two further detonations inside the mosque.
DATE 15/10/21 GROUP
KHORASAN PROVINCE Islamic State - Khorasan Province claimed responsibility for the attack.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 10

 DESCRIPTION

11 COUNTRY AFGHANISTAN PROVINCE KANDAHAR DEATHS 47 Four suicide bombers killed at least 47 people and injured at least 80 others in an attack
on the Imam Bargah Shia mosque in Kandahar, Kandahar province at around 1300hrs on
ISLAMIC STATE - 15 October. Two suicide bombers detonated their vests at the entrance to the mosque,
DATE 15/10/21 GROUP KHORASAN followed by two further detonations inside the mosque. Islamic State - Khorasan
PROVINCE Province claimed responsibility for the attack.

12 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO REGION NORD DEATHS 41 Gunmen killed at least 41 civilians, including members of the Volontaire pour la Defense
de la Patrie (VDP) militia, in an attack on a convoy of market traders under escort in
JAMAAT NUSRAT the Nord region. Among the VDP casualties was a senior commander. Supporters of
DATE 23/12/21 GROUP AL-ISLAM WAL Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) released a video saying the group was
MUSLIMEEN (JNIM) responsible.

13 COUNTRY NIGER REGION TILLABERI DEATHS 37 Gunmen killed 37 civilians in an attack on the village of Daraidey in the Tillaberi province.
Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) claimed responsibility the following month, saying it
ISLAMIC STATE IN
DATE 16/8/21 GROUP had targeted militia members.
WEST AFRICA (ISWA)

BAGHDAD A bomb killed at least 35 civilians and wounded at least 60 others at a market in the
14 COUNTRY IRAQ CITY
GOVERNORATE
DEATHS 35
Baghdad governorate. The attack targeted a Shia majority neighbourhood on the eve of
the Eid Al-Adha holiday. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack and said it
DATE 19/7/21 GROUP ISLAMIC STATE (IS) was a suicide bombing. However, security forces said the device was a static explosive.

15 COUNTRY MALI REGION MOPTI DEATHS 33 Gunmen killed at least 33 civilians and injured at least seven others in an attack on a
public bus in the Mopti region on 3 December. No group had claimed responsibility at
DATE 3/12/21 GROUP UNKNOWN the time of writing, but jihadists operate in the area.

16 COUNTRY MALI REGION GAO DEATHS 33 Around 100 assaillants killed 33 soldiers and wounded 14 others in an ambush against
a military patrol in the Gao region. Security forces retaliated, allegedly killing 20
ISLAMIC STATE IN
DATE 15/3/21 GROUP assailants. Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) claimed responsibility.
WEST AFRICA (ISWA)

BAGHDAD
17 COUNTRY IRAQ CITY
GOVERNORATE
DEATHS 32 Two consecutive suicide bombings killed at least 32 civilians and wounded 110 more at
a market in the Baghdad governorate. Islamic State (IS) has claimed responsibility for
DATE 21/1/21 GROUP ISLAMIC STATE (IS) the attack.

18 COUNTRY MALI REGION SEGOU DEATHS 30

Gunmen killed at least 30 militia members guarding rice fields in the village of Sibi in the
Segou region. No group had claimed responsibility, but jihadists operate in the area.
DATE 6/10/21 GROUP UNKNOWN

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 11

Results
TERRORISM IN 2021

The total number of deaths from terrorism declined in 2021,
falling by 1.2 per cent to 7,142 (Figure 1.1). This is the fourth
consecutive year where deaths from terrorism remained fairly
constant. However, there has been a 33 per cent reduction since
the peak in 2015 when 10,699 people were killed in terrorist
attacks.
The primary driver of this reduction in 2021 has been a fall in
the intensity of conflict in the Middle East, and the subsequent
decline of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. However,
increases in the number of deaths were recorded in three of the
nine regions - Asia-Pacific, North America and South Asian
regions, which increased by 303, 66 and eight per cent
respectively. North America was off a very low base, recording
three deaths from terrorism in 2020 and five in 2021.
Despite the year-on-year fall in deaths, the number of attacks
rose from 4,458 in 2020 to 5,226 in 2021, a 17 per cent increase
and the highest number of attacks recorded since 2007, largely
due to violence in the Sahel region and instability in country
such as Afghanistan.
Although there was a substantial improvement in Nigeria and
sub-Saharan Africa, overall the Sahel recorded a noticeable
deterioration, with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger all recording
substantial increases in terrorism deaths in 2021. Six of the eight
countries in the Sahel are amongst the ten most impacted
countries for terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa.
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM
countries improved then deteriorated. In 2021, 25 countries
recorded reductions in terrorism deaths, while 21 countries
recorded increases and 117 countries recorded no change in the
number of deaths. One hundred and five countries did not
record any terrorism incidents.
The GTI assesses four measures, the number of attacks, deaths,
wounded and hostages, using a 5 year weighting system to
determine the level of impact for any given year. The weighting
system allows for the impact of the lingering effect of terrorism
on a country’s psyche.
Although the number of deaths from terrorism has remained
fairly constant for the last four years it is still a major global
threat. The number of terrorism incidents remains substantially
higher than a decade ago, while there has been a slight increase
in the number of countries experiencing terrorism, from 43 in
2020 to 44 in 2021.
FIGURE 1.1
Total terrorism deaths by country, 2020-2021
Total deaths from terrorism fell 1.2 per cent from 2020 to 2021.
8,000
7,000 257
393 588 Niger
Mali

666 574
Since COVID-19 was declared a global pandemic by the World 6,000
658 599 Somalia
Health Organization (WHO) in March 2020, a rise in terrorism
was anticipated. However, the evidence suggests that the 5,000 732 Burkina Faso
1,252
pandemic has had very little impact on terrorism in 2020 and
4,000 Afghanistan
2021. Despite this, the COVID-19 pandemic has presented new 1,426
and distinct counter-terrorism challenges. In particular, the
3,000
increase of government deficits caused by increased public
spending during the pandemic continues to impact on
2,000 4,002
counterterrorism budgets. It is still to be seen whether the All other
3,223 countries
economic impact of COVID on countries that are already fragile
will increase frustrations with governments, aggravating 1,000
existing political tensions and possibly leading to further civil
0
unrest. 2020 2021

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) found that slightly more Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 12

 FIGURE 1.2
Deaths from terrorism by country, 2021
Ten countries accounted for 61 per cent of deaths from terrorism.

8,000

7,000
39%
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

6,000

5,000

7%
4,000
8%
3,000 8%
8%
2,000
10%

1,000
20%
0
Afghanistan Burkina Faso Somalia Mali Niger Iraq Rest of
World
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

FIGURE 1.3
Largest decreases in deaths from terrorism, 2020–2021
Mozambique had the largest decrease in the number of deaths from terrorism, reversing seven years of consecutive increases.

0
-18
-50 -44
-53 -49
-67 -61
-100 -78
-95
CHANGE IN DEATHS

-150

-200

-250
-236
-300

-350

-400
-391
-414
-450
Mozambique Nigeria Syria Chad Colombia Somalia Cameroon Egypt India Philippines Tanzania

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

Mozambique recorded the largest decrease of terror related
deaths, from 507 deaths in 2020 to 93 in 2021 while Nepal
recorded no deaths for the first time since 2016.
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of deaths in the five countries
with the most deaths from terrorism in 2021, when compared to
2020. Of the five countries that experienced the highest levels of
terrorism, four countries, Afghanistan, Mali, Burkina Faso and
Niger, recorded an increase in the number of deaths, while the
total number of deaths fell only in Somalia.
The most deaths in a single country were recorded in
Afghanistan, accounting for 20 per cent of all deaths. This
represents a slight increase from 2020 when Afghanistan
accounted for 17 per cent of global terrorism deaths. Most of the
deaths were recorded prior to the Taliban taking control of the
country.
In December, seven deaths were recorded, compared to the
average monthly death rate of 133 for the prior 11 months.
Of the 5,226 terrorist attacks recorded in 2021, only 52 per cent
were attributed to a group.
INCREASE AND DECREASE IN TERRORISM
Figure 1.3 shows the countries that experienced the largest
decreases in terrorism deaths in 2021. Mozambique and Nigeria
experienced the two largest falls in 2021. In 2020, deaths rose by
48 per cent in Mozambique, before falling 82 per cent in 2021.
The fall in deaths in Mozambique was driven by a marked
decrease in deaths attributed to IS as a result of successful

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 13

 FIGURE 1.4
Largest increases in deaths from terrorism, 2020–2021

600

500
CHANGE IN DEATHS

400
331

300

200 181 174

100 76 74
70
34
16 12
0
Niger Mali Afghanistan Democratic Burkina Iraq Yemen Peru Pakistan
Republic of Faso
Congo
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

counter-terrorism measures by the Mozambican forces in
conjunction with Rwanda and the Southern African
Development Community.2 Deaths in Nigeria fell by 51 per cent
in 2021, following three years of successive increases. This
decline was due to a fall in deaths attributed to Boko Haram and
Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWA), particularly in the
Borno region where deaths fell by 71 per cent. ISWA overtook
Boko Haram as the deadliest terror group in Nigeria in 2021
and, with an increased presence in neighbouring countries such
as Mali, Cameroon and Niger, presents a substantial threat to
the Sahel region. The fall of Boko Haram coincides with the
death of its leader Abubakar Shekau in May 2021, and the
subsequent defection of his followers in favour of groups such as
ISWA.
by much more significant decreases elsewhere, there were still a
number of countries with significant increases.
While the number of attacks in Niger remained consistent
between 2020 and 2021, the number of terrorism deaths
increased by 129 per cent to 588, indicating increased attack
lethality. In 2021, attacks caused on average 7.9 deaths per
attack, compared to 3.8 in 2020. This is of particular concern
and highlights the growing sophistication and organisational
capabilities of ISWA.

Syria had the third largest total fall in deaths, with deaths from
terrorism falling by a third in 2021 to 488 deaths. The fall in
terror-related deaths in Syria can be attributed to the defeats IS
suffered in 2019, after the group was ousted from all of its
territories in the region. Despite this, IS is still a potent force.

Figure 1.4 highlights the countries with the largest increases in

deaths from terrorism in 2021. While the increases were offset

COVID-19 AND TERRORISM

Despite initial predictions that the COVID-19 pandemic would
worsen the impact of terrorism in certain regions, it seems that
the pandemic has had very little impact on terrorism in 2020
and 2021.
The decline is terrorism in the West coincided with the
COVID-19 pandemic. Restrictions on freedom of movement,
public gatherings, travel and an immediate threat on personal
health may help explain the fall. Public anger from the fringes of
the left and the right have been directed towards lockdown
restrictions and mandatory vaccinations. However, extremists
have sought to capitalize on many of the secondary effects that
the pandemic had created such as isolation, increased online
activity, and resentment over vaccines and lockdown.3 They have
looked to those with real or perceived grievances, with messages
that merge health care issues with ideological propaganda with
the purpose of amplifying anger and disenchantment.
Once the emergency measures are removed and societies start to
live with COVID there is the possibility of an uptake in terrorism
activity. To prevent this, society should pursue a systemic,
multi-sectoral, and synchronize response addressing such issues

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 14

 FIGURE 1.5
Four deadliest terrorist groups in 2021
Islamic State were the deadliest terrorist group of 2021.
15,000
14,000 Al-Shabaab JNIM
13,000 Islamic State Unknown
12,000 The Taliban All other groups
11,000
DEATHS FROM TERRRORISM
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations
as mental health, loss of faith in the political system, and lack of
economic opportunities. Adopting innovative programmes
aimed at empowering the youth would help respond to the
growing resentment and disillusionment.
Globally, terror groups such as JNIM in the Sahel region have
successfully exploited local grievances with governance,
economic and social conditions, particularly in northern and
central Mali to bolster recruitment. The recent coups in the
Sahel, including Mali, do not bode well for future stability.
National governments in the region are currently supported by
approximately 14,000 UN peacekeeping troops, as part of the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), currently at 2,400 French troops
and an additional 500 special forces from 13 European countries
under a newly established task force. The French
counterterrorism operation in the region, Operation Barkhane’s
goal is to counter the jihadist in order to allow states in the
Sahel to develop their own defence mechanisms. However, with
African economies being significantly affected by the pandemic,
it has impacted the ability of African countries, particularly in
the Sahel, to design and fund counter-terrorism strategies. This,
combined with the French government’s announcement that
Operation Barkhane will end in early 2022 will almost certainly
provide terrorist groups room to continue to gain local support
TERRORISM GROUPS
The four terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in
2021 were Islamic State (IS), Al-Shabaab, the Taliban and Jamaat
Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) as shown in Figure 1.5.
These four groups were responsible for 3,364 deaths from
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 15
6,000
Islamic State
The Taliban
JNIM
Al-Shabaab
DEATHS FROM TERRRORISM
4,000
2,000
0
2019 2021 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
by exploiting existing ethnic tensions and positioning
themselves as alternate service providers. It may also be the case
that in the long term, the pandemic and its socio-economic
consequences might increase the likelihood of terrorist threats.
One of the impacts of the pandemic on terrorism lies within the
Internet. The role of the online dimension has increased since
the beginning of the pandemic, terrorist and extremist groups,
like others, have partly shifted from a physical to a virtual
environment.4,5
With pandemic-related sociocultural restrictions in place across
the world, people are spending increasingly more time online,
terrorist groups have used the pandemic as an opportunity to
spread conspiracy theories and disinformation to undermine
confidence in governments and gather more support for their
ideology.
Notably, political groups continue to view the pandemic as an
opportunity to fuel existing narratives with a rise in racist,
anti-Semitic, Islamophobic or anti-immigrant hate speech.6
These groups often use internet forums and chatrooms to
spread their ideology and have been observed exploiting protest
movements against government restrictions and public health
measures to spread xenophobic and anti-Semitic narratives.7
terrorism, representing 47 per cent of total deaths in 2021.
Another 2,775 of terrorism deaths were not attributed to any
organisation. Three of these four groups were also the deadliest
groups last year, with JNIM replacing Boko Haram this year.
In 2012, just prior to the large global increase in terrorist
activity, these four groups were responsible for just under 16 per
cent of all deaths from terrorism.
Determining which terrorist groups are the most active and
responsible for the most deaths can be difficult, as many groups
have regional affiliates and other groups working in partnership
or partially under the same command. For the purpose of this
report, IEP includes chapters and provinces of terrorist groups
that are specifically affiliated under the same organisational
name. For example, IS refers to Islamic State, also known as
Daesh, as well as their affiliated chapters such as the Khorasan
Chapter and Islamic State in West Africa which are included.
When specifically referring to the affiliate group, the chapter
name will mainly be used.
The past decade has seen the largest surge in terrorist activity in
the past fifty years. However, of the four deadliest groups in
2021 only JNIM recorded an increase in the level of terrorism
incidents over the prior year.
Islamic State
Islamic State (IS) alongside its affiliate groups, were the
deadliest terror group of 2021. IS is a Sunni extremist group
which formed as an Al-Qaeda affiliate group in Iraq and Syria in
1999.8 Following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, IS participated
in the Iraqi insurgency. In 2014 the group declared itself a
worldwide caliphate.9 IS primarily adheres to a global jihadist
ideology, following an anti-Western interpretation of Islam and
promotes violence against those who do not align with their
ideology. IS original aim was to establish a Salafist-orientated
Islamist state spanning countries such as Iraq, Syria and other
areas of the Levant.10 IS used affiliate groups to promote their
ideology in other parts of the world including Islamic State –
Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan and Pakistan and later
the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), which operates in the
Sahel region. IS and its affiliates exploit tensions between Sunni
and Shia Muslims, using Sunni disenfranchisement to capture
and consolidate its control over areas of Iraq and Syria.
By the end of 2015, IS had captured significant territory in Iraq
and Syria, including Iraq’s second largest city Mosul. However,
constant pressure from international military efforts meant that
IS lost the last of its territory in March 2019.11 Though IS
remains unable to hold territory in Iraq and Syria, it continues
to operate, focusing its efforts on insurgency outside of the
Levant, particularly the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa.12
Changes since 2020
Islamic State (IS) and its affiliate groups Islamic State – Khorasan
Province (ISKP), Islamic State - Sinai Province (ISSP), and Islamic
State in West Africa (ISWA) recorded the most attacks and deaths
of any terrorist group in 2021. IS deaths represented 29 per cent
of all deaths from terrorism globally in 2021. Despite this, IS
attacks fell from 837 in 2020 to 794 in 2021, a decrease of five per
cent. Deaths as a result of IS attacks mirrored this trend,
declining almost two per cent between 2020 and 2021. IS
recorded attacks in 21 countries in 2021 compared with 30 in
2020. In 2021, IS attacks occurred in every region in the world
apart from North America and Russia and Eurasia. The country
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 16
most affected by IS terrorist attacks was Iraq, in which 327 attacks
occurred in 2021, a decrease from 353 attacks in 2020. Despite
this, Afghanistan recorded the most IS-related deaths, with the
country recording a quarter of IS casualties for 2021.
The deadliest attack attributed to IS occurred at Kabul
International Airport during the evacuation of US troops from
Afghanistan in August 2021. A suicide bomber detonated
explosives near the Abbey Gate area of the airport where civilians
were waiting to be placed on evacuation flights, followed by
another suicide bomb nearby. It is unclear how many people were
killed and injured in each attack, however it was estimated that
170 people were killed and at least 200 were injured in total,
including civilians, US soldiers and UK nationals. ISKP claimed
responsibility for the attack. It is also the deadliest attack
attributed to any terror group in 2021.
Tactics favoured by Islamic State
Armed attacks continue to be IS’s favoured tactic for the third
consecutive year, followed by explosive attacks. In 2021, there
were 479 armed attacks compared with 414 attacks the year
prior. Deaths as a result of these attacks declined by 12 per cent.
Conversely, despite explosive attacks decreasing between 2020
and 2021 from 271 to 240 attacks, casualties as a result of these
attacks increased by almost 50 per cent. The same trend was
mirrored in the number of suicide bombing attacks. While the
number of suicide bomb attacks decreased from 18 in 2020 to 16
in 2021, the number of casualties more than doubled in 2021.
The most common target for IS attacks continues to be the
military, representing 41 per cent of all IS attacks for 2021.
However, civilians recorded the most casualties with 971 civilian
deaths in 2021, an increase of 36 per cent when compared to
2020.
The Taliban
The Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in 1994 as a reactionary
group that combined the Mujahideen that had previously fought
against the 1979 Soviet invasion, and groups of Pashtun
tribesmen. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996.13
The group declared the country an Islamic emirate and
promoted its leader to the role of head of state. The Taliban
ruled Afghanistan until 2001 when an invasion by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) toppled the regime, which
was thought to be harbouring Al-Qaeda. After the regime was
overthrown, the Taliban regrouped across the border in Pakistan
and has since led an insurgency against the government of
Afghanistan and the US-led International Security Assistance
Force. Since the mid-2000s, the Taliban has steadily regained
territory across Afghanistan. In 2021, the Taliban returned to
power after regrouping in Pakistan and launching insurgency
attacks against the US-backed government in Afghanistan. By
August 2021, the Taliban had seized most major cities in
Afghanistan including the capital Kabul. The withdrawal of US
troops from Afghanistan as outlined in the 2020 peace
agreement between the US and Afghanistan made for the ideal
conditions for the Taliban to reassume control of the country
after 20 years of US-backed coalition rule.14 Now that the Taliban
is the government, terrorism deaths attributed to the Taliban
will dramatically decrease. However, it is unclear what the
future levels of terrorism will be in Afghanistan as this will be
dependent on how well IS can mobilise against the government.
Changes since 2020
The Taliban were responsible for 376 deaths in 2021, marking a
32 per cent decrease from 2020 and the lowest number of
deaths since 2016. There was a minor decrease in the total
number of terrorist attacks by the Taliban, decreasing from 242
in 2020 to 232 in 2021. Attacks became less deadly in 2021, with
an average of 1.6 deaths per attack, compared to 2.4 in 2020. Of
the 232 attacks attributed to the Taliban in 2021, 56 per cent did
not result in any fatalities while only three attacks resulted in
more than 10 deaths.
The Taliban is active solely in Afghanistan. Deaths and terrorist
attacks attributed to the Taliban in 2021 accounted for 26 and 27
per cent of the country's total, respectively, however 37 per cent
was not attributed to any group. In July 2021, gunmen stormed
the Spin Boldak district in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province and
killed at least 100 civilians from among at least 300 they forced
from their homes. The Ministry of Interior Affairs, which
announced the incident, did not give further details on the
location, but said that at least another 200 people remained
unaccounted for. The Taliban were thought to have committed
the attack, however they have denied having any involvement.
Tactics favoured by the Taliban
In 2021, the Taliban’s main targets were civilians, which
accounted for 47 per cent of attacks and 64 per cent of deaths.
While civilian deaths were the highest of any group targeted by
the Taliban in 2021, attacks on civilians decreased by 31 per cent
when compared to the year prior. Explosives continue to be the
Taliban’s weapon of choice, with explosives being used in 72 per
cent of all Taliban attacks in 2021. However, the Taliban’s armed
attacks are more lethal than explosive attacks, with on average
3.5 deaths per armed attack, compared to one death per
explosive attack in 2021. Suicide bombings also decreased
significantly, with only one attack with no casualties recorded in
2021. In 2020, the Taliban were responsible for 10 suicide
bombings which resulted in 55 deaths.
Al-Shabaab
Al-Shabaab, a Salafist militant group active in East Africa, first
emerged in a battle over Somalia’s capital in the summer of
2006. As an Al-Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia and Kenya,
Al-Shabaab pursues Islamist statehood aspirations in Somalia.
Al-Shabaab was estimated to have between 7,000 and 9,000
fighters in 2019. Al-Shabaab has gained global recognition
following a number of deadly attacks concentrated around the
capital city of Mogadishu, as well as attacks in the neighbouring
states of Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. African Union
peacekeeping forces known as the African Union Mission to
Somalia (AMISOM) have been fighting Al-Shabaab since 2007
with the help of US and United Nations (UN) support. In 2017,
the first wave of US troops and airstrikes were deployed in
Somalia to fight against Al-Shabaab.
Changes since 2020
In 2021, terrorism deaths attributed to Al-Shabaab continued to
decline, falling 17 per cent from the prior year. Of the 571 deaths
attributed to Al-Shabaab in 2021, 93 per cent occurred in
Somalia, compared to six per cent in Kenya. The total number of
terror incidents fell by 56 attacks to 303 attacks from 2020 to
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 17
2021. Over 51 per cent of the attacks in 2021 resulted in at least
one fatality. This marks a significant decline from 2020, where
81 per cent of attacks resulted in at least one death.
Deaths in Somalia decreased by 18 per cent in 2021. This was
mainly driven by a decline in terrorist activity in the capital,
Mogadishu, with 37 per cent less terrorism deaths. Mogadishu
has long been the epicentre of terrorist activity by Al-Shabaab
and in 2021, 16 per cent of Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia
occurred in Mogadishu, an increase of three per cent in deaths
and causing 115 fatalities. This includes one of the group’s
deadliest attacks of 2021 when a bomb targeting a military
training camp killed at least 20 soldiers in the Wadajir district,
Mogadishu.
In Kenya terrorism deaths attributed to Al-Shabaab decreased
by 14 per cent in 2021. This is the lowest recorded number of
Al-Shabaab casualties in Kenya since 2012. The majority of
terrorism deaths in 2021 occurred in Kenya’s Mandera region
which recorded 17 attacks in 2021, the same as the year prior.
This was followed by Wajir and Lamu counties, which
collectively recorded 18 deaths. The deadliest attack in Kenya in
2021 occurred in Lamu county where a roadside bomb killed 15
soldiers when it struck their convoy.
Tactics favoured by Al-Shabaab
Al-Shabaab have consistently utilised bombings and armed
assaults as its main modes of attack. Almost 68 per cent of
terrorism deaths attributed to Al-Shabaab in 2021 were the
result of bombings, while armed assaults accounted for 31 per
cent of deaths. The highest proportion of Al-Shabaab attacks in
both Somalia and Kenya were directed at the military, followed
by civilians. Overall, civilian deaths declined by 40 per cent
between 2020 and 2021.
Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)
Al-Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) was formed
in 2017 in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa as a coalition
of Salafi-jihadist insurgent groups, including Ansar Dine, the
Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun and the Saharan
branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.15 Since its
emergence, JNIM has expanded across West Africa while
committing acts of violence against civilians, local security
forces and counter-terrorism operations comprising of
international militaries and UN peacekeepers.16 JNIM claims its
aims are to incite Muslims to oppose oppression, expel
occupying powers from the Sahel region and implement Islamic
governance. JNIM’s leaders have declared its enemies to be
France and other countries assisting France as well as Jews and
Christians more widely.17
JNIM has successfully exploited local grievances with
governance, economic and social conditions, particularly in
northern and central Mali to bolster recruitment.18
Counterterrorism efforts against JNIM include France’s
Operation Barkhane, formed in 2014 with the aim of expelling
insurgent groups from the five co-operation countries, Burkina
Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. In 2021, France
announced its intention to end the operation and withdraw its
troops from the region by early 2022 due to it’s inability to work
with the national governments who continued to negotiate with
terrorist groups. While France intends to retain some military
forces in the region as part of a larger international mission, the
waning counter-terrorism effort in the region is likely to allow
JNIM to continue its violent campaign across the Sahel.19
Changes since 2020
In 2021, attacks and deaths as a result of JNIM activity reached
their highest level since the group’s emergence in 2007. JNIM
were responsible for 351 deaths in 2021, a 69 per cent increase
compared with 2020. Terrorism-related incidents also increase
by 71 per cent in 2021.
Of the 351 deaths attributed to JNIM in 2021, around 59 per cent
occurred in Mali, while 40 per cent occurred in Burkina Faso. A
further two attacks in Benin resulted in two deaths. In Mali,
JNIM attacks increased by 80 per cent between 2020 and 2021.
The majority of terrorist attacks in Mali in 2021 were directed at
the military, however civilians comprised the majority of
casualties. Malian civilian deaths as a result of JNIM attacks
more than tripled between 2020 and 2021.
Despite only 13 of JNIM’s 138 attacks in 2021 occurring in
Burkina Faso, 207 deaths were recorded in the country as a
result of these attacks. The level of activity is higher than in
2020, when Burkina Faso recorded 10 JNIM attacks with 43
casualties. This represents a significant increase with just over
four deaths per attack in 2020 to almost 16 deaths per attack in
2021. Like Mali, the group with the largest amount of casualties
caused by JNIM in Burkina Faso in 2021 were civilians,
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 18
representing 47 per cent of total deaths. In 2020, no civilians
were killed in Burkina Faso. JNIM’s deadliest attack of 2021
occurred in Burkina Faso’s Seno province where gunmen
attacked a military convoy escorting civilians between rural
towns near the Niger border. JNIM took responsibility for the
attack which killed 59 civilians, 15 security forces and six
pro-government militiamen and wounded 19 others.
Tactics favoured by JNIM
Over half of attacks perpetrated by JNIM were armed attacks,
resulting in 341 fatalities in 2021. Casualties as a result of armed
attacks represented over 97 per cent of JNIM fatalities for 2021.
Despite there being 26 JNIM-organised bombings in 2021, these
attacks only resulted in seven casualties, a decrease of 46 per
cent in JNIM bombing related deaths when compared to the
previous year.
JNIM’s usual targets are military and political figures, however
the tactics did change in 2021 with a marked increase in attacks
and deaths of civilians. Military attacks represented only a
slightly higher percentage than civilian-targeted attacks, with 29
military attacks and 24 civilian attacks recorded. There were
eight times as many attacks on civilians in 2021 than there were
in 2020. JNIM attacks on civilians became more deadly in 2021,
with an almost sevenfold increase in deaths to 173 from 23
deaths in the year prior. In 2021, JNIM recorded a decrease of 62
per cent in military deaths when compared to the year prior.
 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED
BY TERRORISM
10
Table 1.1 highlights the ten countries most impacted by
terrorism according to the 2022 GTI, and how they have ranked
on the index since 2011.
Despite a one per cent decrease in the number of deaths from
terrorism overall, the ten countries most impacted by terrorism
remained largely unchanged. Afghanistan and Iraq maintained
their positions as the two countries most impacted by
terrorism, for the third consecutive year.
The countries with the largest deterioration in rank since 2011
were all located in the Sahel region, including Burkina Faso,
Mali and Niger. Highlighting the extent of their fall, all were
ranked outside of the 20 countries most affected by terrorism
in 2011.
Nigeria, Syria and Somalia were the only countries amongst
the ten most impacted by terrorism to record an
improvement in score from 2020 to 2021.

There was some movement within the rankings with Burkina

Faso overtaking Syria and Nigeria to be the fourth most
impacted country, Pakistan moved from eighth most impacted
to tenth and Nigeria dropped two places to sixth most
impacted country. This is Somalia’s sixth consecutive
appearance amongst the five most impacted countries.

TABLE 1.1
Ten countries most impacted by terrorism, ranked by GTI score
Afghanistan had the highest impact of terrorism for the third consecutive year.

Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Afghanistan 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 1

Iraq 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2

Somalia 5 7 7 7 8 5 3 3 3 3 3

Burkina Faso 113 113 111 108 52 30 21 15 7 6 4

Syria 20 4 4 5 6 7 7 8 6 5 5

Nigeria 8 5 5 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 6

Mali 41 23 19 21 16 13 10 9 8 7 7

Niger 49 57 44 34 20 19 18 19 14 12 8

Pakistan 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 5 5 8 10

Source: START GTD, IEP calculations

GLOBAL
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 |­|­ 19
TERRORISM INDEX 19
10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM
GTI RANK
Afghanistan 1
Total deaths since 2007 Deaths by group
1,800
1,600 17,461
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0 Unknown
2007 2021
In 2021, Afghanistan recorded 1,426 deaths, the highest number
of terror-related deaths in the world, making it the country most
impacted by terrorism for the third consecutive year.
In 2021, terrorist incidents in Afghanistan increased by 33 per
cent, with deaths increasing by 14 per cent. Overall, Afghanistan
accounted for 20 per cent of deaths from terrorism globally in
2021. Civilians accounted for over half of these deaths.
In 2021, terrorism was widespread in Afghanistan with terrorist
incidents recorded in 32 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The
largest number of deaths from terrorism were recorded in Kabul
province with the majority of these as a result of attacks by the
Khorasan Chapter of Islamic State. Deaths in the Kandahar
region have almost tripled in the past year, with 282 deaths
recorded in 2021.
While the Taliban was the most active terrorist group in
Afghanistan, deaths attributed to the group fell by 32 per cent in
2021 as they made the transition into government after the fall
of the capital Kabul in August 2021.
The number of suicide bombings fell. There was only one
suicide bombing by the Taliban in 2021, resulting in no deaths,
compared to 2020 when ten attacks were recorded resulting in
55 casualties.
Armed attacks were the deadliest form of Taliban attack in 2021,
with 206 people killed in such attacks, compared with 164
fatalities as a result of Taliban bombings.
While the Taliban were responsible for the most attacks, the
Khorasan Chapter of Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISKP)
were responsible for the most deaths in Afghanistan in 2021.
ISKP were responsible for 518 casualties in 2021, including the
country’s deadliest attack of the year, when a suicide bomber
detonated explosives at Kabul International Airport, followed by
another suicide bomb nearby. The attack occurred during the
withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan and the
corresponding evacuation of civilians, resulting in 170 deaths
and over 200 injuries. It was the deadliest attack in Afghanistan
since 2007.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 20
GTI SCORE 1,426 DEAD
9.109 2,199
837
INJURED
INCIDENTS
Attacks by target
Islamic State - Private Citizens
Khorasan Province & Property
Islamic State (IS) Police & Military
Taliban Government
Unknown Religious Figures
and Institutions
Worst attacks
KABUL
A suicide bomber killed at least 170 people,
including 13 US soldiers and three UK
nationals, and injured at least 200 others,
including 15 US soldiers, when he detonated
his explosives near the Abbey gate area of
Hamid Karzai international airport, Kabul,
Kabul province at around 1800hrs on 26
August. The attack was followed by another
suicide bomb nearby. It is unclear how many
people were killed and injured in each
separate attack. There were also reports of
gunfire. The attack came after multiple
countries warned of an imminent terrorist
threat in the vicinity of the airport. Islamic
State - Khorasan Province claimed
responsibility for the attack.
Since its emergence in 2015, ISKP has viewed the Taliban as
both its strategic and ideological rival. ISKP has repeatedly
denounced the Taliban’s efforts to form an emirate based on
national boundaries, which directly opposes ISKP’s vision of a
global caliphate.20 It is expected that the new Taliban
government will continue to clash with the Khorasan Chapter,
resulting in more attacks and higher casualty rates.21 Since the
Taliban government came into force in August 2021, there have
been 32 attacks by the Khorasan Chapter against the Taliban,
resulting in 54 deaths.
The security situation in Afghanistan remains uncertain, with
an escalation in conflict between ISKP and the Taliban
remaining a strong possibility. With the Taliban appearing eager
to engage the international community in a bid to secure
international recognition and future economic assistance, it is
likely that ISKP will exploit this as a perceived dampening of its
ideology, using it to lure a variety of extremist militants to its
ranks including foreign fighters from neighbouring Syria and
Iraq, leading to larger, more widespread terror attacks.22,23
10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 524 DEAD

Iraq 2 8.511 836

833
INJURED
INCIDENTS

Total deaths since 2007 Deaths by group Attacks by target

7,000
6,000 34,043 Private Citizens
5,000 & Property
Islamic State
4,000 Police & Military
Kurdistan Workers’
3,000 Party (PKK) Critical
Infrastructure
2,000 Unknown
Government
1,000
Unknown
0
2007 2021

Iraq recorded 833 terrorist attacks in 2021, the highest of any Worst attacks
country. This is an increase of 33 per cent when compared to the
previous year. This is largely as a result of rising political unrest
and instability, which terror groups, particularly IS, are using to
their advantage.24 The number of deaths from terrorism
mirrored this trend on a smaller scale, with Iraq recording 524
deaths in 2021, an increase of 15 per cent when compared to the
prior year.

Overall, deaths from terrorism in Iraq have decreased 91 per

cent from their peak since 2007.

For the second consecutive year, the military were the target of
the most terrorist attacks and recorded the most casualties of SADR
any group, accounting for 43 per cent of all deaths in Iraq in A bomb killed at least 35 civilians
2021. Despite the number of attacks against the military and wounded at least 60 others
at Al-Wuhailat market in the Sadr
increasing by 60 per cent, the number of deaths amongst this City area of Baghdad, Baghdad
group decreased by six per cent. Civilian fatalities increased by governorate on the evening of 19
July. The attack targeted a Shia
28 per cent from 127 in 2020 to 163 in 2021. majority neighbourhood on the
eve of the Eid Al-Adha holiday.
Attacks were recorded in 18 of Iraq’s 19 governances in 2021, Islamic State (IS) claimed
responsibility for the attack and
with the north-eastern governances the most affected. The said it was a suicide bombing.
governances of Diyala, Sala ad-Din and At-Ta’min made up 48 However, security forces said the
device was a static explosive.
per cent of all terrorist attacks in the country.

Terrorist activity in Iraq continues to be dominated by IS, with

the group accounting for 71 per cent of all deaths in 2021. While
IS attacks in Iraq have fallen seven per cent in the last year, the
number of casualties has risen to the highest level since 2018, at
327 deaths in 2021.
IS claimed responsibility for the deadliest attack in Iraq in 2021,
when a bomb detonated at a market in a Shia-majority
neighbourhood in Baghdad. Thirty-five civilians were killed and
at least 60 others were injured.
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) were the only other named
group active in Iraq in 2021. PKK were responsible for 22 attacks
in 2021, which resulted in 21 deaths. This is an increase in
activity, with only eight attacks and four deaths recorded in
2020.
Another 484 attacks and 127 deaths were not attributed to any
organisation.
While IS activities have significantly declined since the Iraqi
government declared the military defeat of IS in Iraq in 2017, it
is clear that the group’s threat to the security of the region has
not disappeared. Though the group remains unable to hold
territory in the region, IS continues to wage a low-level
insurgency that regularly causes injury and death in remote
mountain and desert areas of Iraq.25 Like in neighbouring Syria,
the waning United States military presence is likely to allow IS
to reconstitute and reorganise, putting pressure on the Iraqi
government to continue counter-terrorism efforts while already
under considerable coronavirus and economic downturn-
induced stress.26

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 21

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 599 DEAD

Somalia 3 8.398 478

308
INJURED
INCIDENTS

Total deaths since 2007 Deaths by group Attacks by target

1,800
1,600 6,166
1,400
1,200 Private Citizens
Al-Shabaab & Property
1,000
Unknown Government
800
600 Islamic State (IS) Police & Military
400 Unknown
200
0
2007 2021

In 2021, terrorist attacks and deaths in Somalia fell from the Worst attacks
prior year with both attacks and deaths falling by ten per cent.
This continues an improving trend in terror-related deaths that
began in 2017 and is now only 17 per cent of the overall peak in
2014.

Al-Shabaab remains the deadliest terrorist group in Somalia,

responsible for 534 deaths, which represents 89 per cent of all
terror-related deaths in the country in 2021. This is a decrease of
18 per cent when compared to the previous year. In 2021,
BA'ADWAYNE
Al-Shabaab turned their attention to targeting military
Gunmen killed at least 20
personnel in addition to civilians and government officials. soldiers and injured at least 12
Military deaths accounted for over half of terrorism deaths others when they stormed a
military base in the Shabellow
attributed to the group, followed by civilians at 13 per cent and area, Ba'adwayne town, Mudug
government officials, also at 13 per cent. region on the afternoon of 17
August. Al-Shabaab claimed
responsibility for the attack.
Al-Shabaab’s attacks mostly occurred in Somalia’s southern
provinces. Most attacks occurred in the provinces of Shabeellaha
Hoose and Banaadir, the latter of which contains the country’s 2021 also saw the withdrawal of US security and African Union
capital Mogadishu. Overall, 40 per cent of attacks committed by peacekeeping forces from Somalia after they successfully
Al-Shabaab in 2021 occurred in these provinces. reclaimed control of Mogadishu and other territories held by
Al-Shabaab.27 However, it is possible that this withdrawal could
However, its attacks are becoming more lethal. Although the embolden militants in Africa, sparking a resurgence of terror
number of attacks committed by Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu activity in the region.28
declined by 37 per cent, deaths in the capital city increased by 14
per cent. Six attacks in the Mogadishu area resulted in the death It is likely terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab will feel
of 10 or more individuals, with Al-Shabaab taking responsibility empowered by the political turbulence and reduction in
for five of these incidents. counterterrorism efforts, providing terrorists with additional
opportunity to conduct attacks and otherwise undermine
Somalia’s most devastating terrorist attack of 2021 occurred in Somali stability.29
the capital city Mogadishu when a car bomb exploded outside a
restaurant reportedly popular with government officials and
members of security forces. The attack killed at least 20 people
and wounded more than 40 others, including prison officers
from a nearby prison. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the
attack.

In 2021, Somali parliament extended the government’s term of

office without stating when the next election would occur, which
triggered violence across the country.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 22

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 732 DEAD

Burkina Faso 4 8.270 231 INJURED

216 INCIDENTS

Total deaths since 2007 Deaths by group Attacks by target

800
700 947 Jammat Nusrat Private citizens
600 Al-Islam wal Muslimeen & property
(JNIM) Police & Military
400
Islamic State
300 Government
West Africa (ISWA)
200 Unknown Other
100
Unknown
0
2007 2021

Terrorism incidents in Burkina Faso increased between 2020 Worst attacks

and 2021, from 191 to 216 incidents. This is the highest number
of attacks since the peak in 2019 after the declaration of a state
of emergency as a result of increasing Islamic terrorist activity
and the subsequent resignation of Prime Minister Paul Theiba.
Terror-related deaths mirrored this trend, increasing by 11 per
cent when compared to the previous year, with more than half
of the 732 deaths in 2021 being civilians. Burkina Faso recorded
the second highest number of deaths of any country in 2021.

The regions near Burkina Faso’s borders with Niger and Mali
experienced the most terror attacks, accounting for 72 per cent
of all attacks in 2021. Of the country’s 732 deaths in 2021, 491
occurred in the Sahel administrative region, including Burkina SOLHAN
Faso’s deadliest attack of 2021. In June, at least 160 people were Gunmen killed at least 160 people,
killed, including 20 children, and 40 people were wounded including at least 20 children, and
wounded at least 40 others in
when gunmen stormed a village along the northern border with Solhan village, Solhan department,
Niger. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, however, Yagha province, Sahel region at
around 0200hrs on 5 June. The
jihadists are known to operate in the area. This was the second
assailants first attacked members
most-deadly attack in the world in 2021. of a volunteer defence force militia
before attacking civilians and
burning down houses and a
Civilians were the most targeted group for the third consecutive market. No group had claimed
year. Over 65 per cent of terror-related deaths in Burkina Faso responsibility for the attack at the
time of writing but jihadists
were of civilians, which is an increase of 32 per cent compared operate in the area.
with the year prior which outstrips the increase in incidents.

Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) continue to be
the most prominent terrorist group in Burkina Faso. Despite
only taking responsibility for 13 terror attacks in 2021, JNIM’s
death toll rose to 207 deaths in 2021, almost five times the
amount recorded for 2020. JNIM’s lethality rate is now almost
16 deaths per attack compared with 4 deaths per attack in 2020.
JNIM’s preferred tactic remains armed assaults with 54 per cent
of their attacks targeting military personnel and law
enforcement.
Burkina Faso has one of the highest unclaimed terrorist deaths
at 71 per cent. It is feasible to assume that the majority of these
attacks would have been carried out by JNIM.
While JNIM took responsibility for more terror attacks than any
other group in Burkina Faso in 2021, 94 per cent of attacks and
71 per cent of deaths were linked to unknown jihadists.
While Burkina Faso continues to cooperate with other Sahel
countries in counter-terrorism efforts, they have failed to curb
the threat of jihadist groups such as JNIM. Despite the
downward trend in terrorism attacks and deaths, Burkina Faso
recorded the largest deterioration in peacefulness on the 2021
Global Peace Index, falling 13 places. Burkina Faso’s political
instability and high tensions due to civilian anger at the
government’s inability to stem terrorist attacks and violence
have led to an increase in riots and violent protests. This
increase in internal conflict has diverted the attention of
security forces towards combating Islamist insurgency,
weakening efforts to maintain law and order.30

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 23

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 488 DEAD

Syria 5 8.250 502

338
INJURED
INCIDENTS

Total deaths since 2007 Deaths by group Attacks by target

1,200

1,000
4,232
Islamic State (IS) Private Citizens
& Property
800
Kurdistan Workers’ Other
600 Party (PKK)
Police & Military
400 Unknown
Government
200 Other
Unknown
0
2007 2021

In 2021, the conflict in Syria passed its ten-year anniversary. Worst attacks
Following increased armed conflict after a period of de-
escalation, deaths from terrorism rose significantly in 2020.

In 2021, this trend reversed, with 488 terror-related deaths

recorded in Syria, a decrease of 33 per cent from the previous
year. The number of terrorism incidents mirrored this trend,
decreasing by 23 per cent between 2020 and 2021.

The military remains the most common target for attacks and
the group with the most casualties, followed by civilians. Syria’s
deadliest terror attack of 2021 occurred when gunmen killed 13
soldiers in an attack on a military vehicle in the Homs AL-SUKHNA - DEIR EZZOR
Governorate, north-east of Damascus. No group claimed Gunmen killed 13 soldiers
and wounded an
responsibility for the attack, however local media outlets unconfirmed number of
reported that IS was responsible. others in an attack on a
military vehicle on the
Al-Sukhna - Deir Ezzor
The northern provinces were the most affected by terrorism in highway, Homs governorate,
on 7 September. No group
2021, with 45 per cent of attacks occurring in Deir ez-Zor and had claimed the attack at
Aleppo governorates. This is a decrease of 32 per cent from the the time of writing, but local
previous year’s figures for the same provinces. These media outlets reported that
Islamic State (IS) was
governorates retained their positions as the governorates with responsible.
the highest number of terror attacks in 2021 with 77 and 75
attacks respectively. Aleppo recorded the same number of
attacks in the year prior, while attacks in Deir ez-Zor declined by
48 per cent when compared with the previous year.

IS remained the deadliest terrorist group in Syria for the eighth
consecutive year, accounting for 49 per cent of total deaths and
32 per cent of claimed incidents. Despite this, terror attacks and
deaths by IS fell by 34 per cent and 26 per cent respectively,
when compared with the year prior. However, 54 per cent of
attacks were not attributed to an organisation.
The lethality of IS attacks against civilians declined substantially
from an average of 30 deaths per attack in 2016 to just over 2
deaths per attack in 2021, a decline of 93 per cent. IS continues
to shift their focus from targeting civilians to targeting military
personnel, which comprised 79 per cent of IS casualties in 2021.
form of armed assaults. Explosive attacks have significantly
declined, from over a third of IS attacks in 2020 to only 16 per
cent of IS attacks in 2021. There were no suicide bombings by IS
in Syria in 2021.
Despite US and Syrian military forces reclaiming the final
territorial stronghold of IS in Syria in 2019, IS has maintained a
low-level insurgency. In Syria, IS appears to be consolidating in
desert regions and are awaiting the next stage of its insurgency.
With the US continuing to withdraw its forces from combat
roles in the area, it is possible IS will resume its activity in an
attempt to regain control of the area.31 

IS’ reliance on explosives continues to decline in favour of

armed assaults. In 2021, 72 per cent of IS attacks were in the

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 24

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 448 DEAD

Nigeria 6 8.233 161

204
INJURED
INCIDENTS

Total deaths since 2007 Deaths by group Attacks by target

2,500
8,915 Islamic State
2,000 West Africa (ISWA) Private Citizens
& Property
1,500 Boko Haram
Business
Indigenous People Police & Military
1,000 of Biafra (IPOB)
Unknown Government
500
Other Other
0
2007 2021

Total deaths from terrorism in Nigeria fell to 448 in 2021, the
lowest level since 2011. Terror-related casualties dropped by
almost half compared with the previous year. However, the
number of terrorist attacks increased by 49 per cent between
2020 and 2021.
36 per cent of attacks were claimed by ISWA, Boko Haram being
responsible for eight per cent and 44 per cent not attributed to
any group.
Law enforcement, including police and prison officers overtook
both military and civilians as the most targeted group of 2021.
Attacks against police and prisons increased substantially from
one recorded attack in 2020 to 75 in 2021, accounting for over a
third of all attacks in Nigeria in 2021. This was largely driven by
an increase in clashes between law enforcement and separatist
groups, such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Civilian
deaths dropped 62 per cent from 2020. Military deaths mirrored
this trend, with 2021 recording almost half the number of
terrorism deaths from the prior year.
In 2020, ISWA became the deadliest terrorist group in Nigeria.
The decline of Boko Haram continued into 2021, with Boko
Haram responsible for only 69 deaths, a decrease of 77 per cent
from the previous year. This is the lowest number of deaths by
the group for a decade.
Boko Haram’s decline has resulted in a substantial improvement
in terrorism in Borno State, which experienced a decrease of 71
per cent in terrorism deaths when compared with the prior year.
Attacks in the state also decreased from 121 to 86 respectively, a
decrease of 30 per cent. The state, however, remains the hardest
hit region in Nigeria for terrorism, accounting for half of all
terror-related deaths in 2021.
Boko Haram’s decline coincides with a number of factors, most
significantly the death of the group’s leader, Abubakar Shekau.
Shekau, who committed suicide by detonating an explosives vest
during a confrontation with ISWA in May 2021.32 Given the
demise of their leader, Shekau’s followers were faced with the
decision to either continue Shekau’s ideology or join ISWA. It
has been reported that as many as 18 former Boko Haram
Worst attacks
MAINOK
Gunmen killed over 30 soldiers
at an army base in Mainok,
Kaga area, Borno state, in an
attack that lasted from an
unspecified time in the
afternoon until about 00:00hrs
on 25 April. No group had
claimed the attack at the time
of writing, but local media
outlets said Islamic State in
West Africa (ISWA) were
responsible.
commanders have joined ISWA after Shekau’s death.33 Attacks
by ISWA as well as counter-terrorism efforts by the Nigerian
government and foreign military forces have significantly
weakened Boko Haram’s impact in Nigeria. These external
pressures resulted in an increase in Boko Haram attacks in
neighbouring countries, particularly Cameroon which recorded
37 attacks and 58 deaths in 2021. Cameroon recorded more
Boko Haram attacks than Nigeria in 2021 for the second
consecutive year.
In 2021, ISWA recorded their highest number of incidents and
third highest death toll since 2017. Overall, ISWA were
responsible of 39 per cent of all attacks in Nigeria in 2021.
Despite this, the lethality of ISWA attacks has continued to
decline from 10 deaths per attack in 2018 to almost three deaths
per attack in 2021.
ISWA was responsible for Nigeria’s deadliest attack of 2021, with
gunmen killing over 30 soldiers at an army base in the Borno
region. ISWA’s main target continues to be military personnel,
with the military being the target of over half of all attacks,
resulting in 45 per cent of casualties attributed to the group in
2021. Despite the civilian death toll decreasing, ISWA continues
to increase its attacks on civilians, from 11 in 2020 to 19 in 2021.
With the decline of Boko Haram in Nigeria and Shekau’s death,
it is expected that ISWA will continue to integrate surviving
members of Shekau’s group, bolstering its fight against the
Nigerian government’s counter-terrorism efforts.34

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 25

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 574 DEAD

Mali 7 8.152 551

333
INJURED
INCIDENTS

Total deaths since 2007 Deaths by group Attacks by target

450
400 1,478
Private Citizens
350 Jammat Nusrat & Property
300 Al-Islam wal Muslimeen
(JNIM) Peacekeepers
250
200 Islamic State Police and
150 West Africa (ISWA) Military
100 Unknown Other
50
Unknown
0
2007 2021

In 2021, Mali recorded the highest number of terrorist attacks Worst attacks
and deaths in the last decade. Rising political instability added
to the difficulties of fighting terrorism. Attacks and deaths from
terrorism in Mali increased by 56 per cent and 46 per cent
respectively, when compared with the previous year. This is the
largest year-on-year increase since 2017, continuing an upward
trend that began with the 2015 declaration of a state of
emergency in the wake of the Radisson Blu Hotel attack in
Bamako.

Most attacks were directed at the military and counter-terrorism

efforts, however civilians accounted for the most deaths in 2021.
SONGHO AND BANDIAGAR
The deadliest attack was an ambush against a military patrol in
Gunmen killed at least 33
the Gao region when around 100 assailants killed 33 soldiers civilians and injured at least
and wounded 14 others. Security forces retaliated, killing 20 seven others in an attack on a
public bus between Songho
assailants. ISWA claimed responsibility for the attack.
and Bandiagara, Bandiagara
cercle, Mopti region on 3
The tri-border area, which encompassed Mali’s border with December. No group had
claimed responsibility at the
Niger and Burkina Faso, continues to be the most plagued area time of writing, but jihadists
for terrorist attacks, representing over 70 per cent of Mali’s operate in the area.
attacks for 2021. The Mopti region, which shares a border with
Burkina Faso, recorded 148 attacks in 2021, an increase of 70 per
cent when compared with 2020.

JNIM continue to be the most prominent group in Mali, being
responsible for 72 terror attacks in 2021, an increase of 80 per
cent from the previous year. JNIM’s attacks largely target the
Malian military and peacekeeping operations, however, the
majority of deaths attributed to the group were civilians.
Armed assaults involving firearms continue to be the favoured
tactic of JNIM, with these accounting for over half JNIM’s
attacks for 2021. Explosives was the next most popular tactic,
with JNIM using bombs to inflict damage and disrupt French
Barkhane counter-terrorism operations and MINUSMA
peacekeeping efforts. However, the lethality of JNIM’s attacks
have continued to decrease, from 1.9 deaths per attack in 2021
compared to 3.9 deaths per attack in 2020.
opportunity to exploit dissatisfaction with the Malian
government.35 Despite the establishment of trans-regional
counter-terrorism forces such as G5 Sahel, there have been few
military victories over jihadist insurgency groups. The large
area covered by the tri-border region compared with the
relatively small numbers of Malian military personnel and
counter-terrorism forces means that resources are too stretched
to be effective in the area. The decision by France to withdraw
its troops and end Operation Barkhane by the first quarter of
2022 is likely to present further challenges for counter-terrorism
efforts in the region.36

Mali’s political instability in the wake of the coup of May 2021

will likely provide Islamic extremist groups with additional

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 26

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 588 DEAD

Niger 8 7.856 119

74
INJURED
INCIDENTS

Total deaths since 2007 Deaths by group Attacks by target

700
600 781 Government
500
Islamic State
400 West Africa (ISWA) Private Citizens
& Property
300 Boko Haram
Police & Military
200 Unknown Business
100
Other
0
2007 2021

Terrorist attacks in Niger were relatively comparable between Worst attacks

2020 and 2021, however, terror-related deaths almost doubled
during the same period. Niger is now amongst the ten countries
most impacted by terrorism in 2021 and for the first time.

In 2021, Niger recorded 588 deaths as a result of terrorism. This

is the highest terror-related death toll in the last decade.
Civilians accounted for 78 per cent of these casualties, resulting
in Niger becoming the country with the third-highest civilian
death toll in 2021.

Niger’s deadliest attack of 2021 occurred in a village in the

TCHOMBANGOU
Tillaberi region when gunmen on motorbikes killed 70 civilians
Gunmen on motorbikes killed
and wounded another 17. ISWA claimed responsibility, around 70 civilians and
indicating they targeted pro-government militia members. wounded around 17 others in
the village of Tchombangou,
Ouallam department, Tillaberi
The Tillaberi province recorded the highest number of attacks region on 2 January. One
official said the attack took
and deaths in Niger in 2021, with deaths more than doubling
place at around 12:00hrs,
between 2020 and 2021 in the region. Being the closest region to although another local source
the unstable tri-border area with Mali and Burkina Faso, the said 21:00hrs. Islamic State in
West Africa (ISWA) claimed
Tillaberi region has been the hardest hit by the Islamic responsibility, saying they
insurgency in the Sahel. Terrorist attacks occurred in five of targeted pro-government
militia members.
Niger’s eight regions, with Tillaberi recording half the country’s
terrorist attacks and 61 per cent of its casualties.

ISWA overtook Boko Haram as the most active terrorist group in
Niger in 2021. ISWA were responsible for 23 attacks, spread
largely across the Diffa and Tillaberi regions. Deaths as a result
of ISWA attacks accounted for 60 per cent of the total casualties
in Niger. ISWA largely targeted Nigerien civilians with this
group, accounting for 84 per cent of the casualties in 2021.
led to severely over-stretched and under-resourced security
forces attempting to balance counter-terrorism with internal
peacekeeping. It is likely that insurgency groups will capitalise
on this instability and terrorism in the Sahel region will
continue to rise.37

The lethality of ISWA’s attacks in Niger are now at their highest.

In 2021 the group executed 23 attacks with on average 15.2
deaths per attack. This compares with 13 attacks in 2020 with an
average of 9.4 deaths per attack in 2020. ISWA in Niger is the
most lethal group in the world in 2021.

Like other countries in the Sahel region, Niger faces a significant

threat to national security by growing Islamic extremist groups.
Internal political conflict, including a thwarted coup in 2021 has

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 27

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Pakistan
GTI RANK GTI SCORE 275 DEAD

10 7.825 469
186
INJURED
INCIDENTS

Total deaths since 2007 Deaths by group Attacks by target

1,800
1,600 13,432 Tehrik-i-Taliban
Government
1,400 Pakistan (TTP)
1,200 Balochistan Liberation Private Citizens
1,000 Army (BLA) & Property
800 Police & Military
Islamic State -
600 Khorasan Province
Business
400 Islamic State (IS)
200 Other
0
2007 2021

The impact of terrorism increased slightly in Pakistan, with the Worst attacks
country recording a five per cent increase in the number of
deaths in 2021 compared with the previous year. This is the
second consecutive year where an increase in terrorism deaths
was recorded. The number of terror related incidents remained
steady in 2021, with 171 incidents in 2020 and 186 in 2021.

The number of deaths and incidents are 71 per cent and 82 per
cent lower than their respective peaks in the 2011.

Pakistan’s military continued efforts to disarm and eliminate

terrorist sleeper cells in the form of Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad,
which meant that the military were the most common target of MOACH GOTH
attacks in 2021, with 44 per cent of all terror-related deaths A grenade targeting a truck
being military personnel. carrying civilian passengers
killed thirteen and wounded
seven more on Hub River
The Islamic resistance group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Road near Moach Goth,
overtook the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as the deadliest Baladia, Karachi, Sindh
province at around 2145hrs
terrorist group, with TTP accounting for 19 per cent of terror- on 14 August. No group had
related deaths in Pakistan in 2021. Terrorism deaths by TTP claimed the attack at the time
of writing, but police said
more than doubled between 2020 and 2021, with 62 per cent of they suspected an
the deaths occurring in the states along the border with unspecified banned
separatist group.
Afghanistan. Overall, attacks in this area amounted to 36 per
cent of Pakistan’s total attacks in 2021.

Two attacks, involving explosives, were Pakistan’s deadliest
terror-related incidents of 2021. In one incident a truck carrying
civilian passengers was destroyed by a grenade that killed 13
people and wounded 7 others near Karachi along the southern
coast. In another, 13 people were killed and another 28 injured,
when a bomb exploded on a bus carrying Chinese workers,
engineers and mechanics near the northern Afghanistan border.
No group claimed responsibility for either attack.
Pakistani military operations are expected to continue to reduce
the impact of terrorism in Pakistan. However, the withdrawal of
US forces from Afghanistan may cause an increase in regional
instability, providing terrorist groups with the opportunity to
cause more harm.42

Terror groups that were historically amongst Pakistan’s deadliest

terrorist groups particularly, IS and ISKP as well as the BLA,
continued to decline. Attacks by the BLA fell by 20 per cent,
compared with the prior year. Pakistani military resistance has
led to a seven per cent decline in IS attacks and a corresponding
86 per cent decrease in IS deaths since numbers peaked in 2018.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 28

 Trends in Terrorism
TRENDS SINCE 2007

There have been several distinct phases in terrorist activity over
the past decade, as shown in Figure 2.1. In 2007-2008, most
terrorist activity globally was concentrated in Iraq and
Afghanistan in response to the US and its allies’ activities. After
the events of the Arab Spring and the emergence of IS, there
was a surge in terrorism across the Middle East, most notably in
Syria and Iraq, and concurrently in Nigeria. At its peak in 2015,
over 10,000 people were killed in terrorist attacks in a single
year. The Sahel region has also experienced a significant
increase in the number of terror attacks and fatalities over the
past five years.
Although deaths from terrorism have declined in four of the
past five years, the declines have been minimal with the number
of deaths remaining fairly constant since 2018.
Overall, deaths from terrorism have fallen by over a third in
total since the peak in 2015. Two of the countries with the
largest decreases were Iraq and Pakistan. After recording the
lowest number of deaths in 14 years in 2019, terrorism deaths in
Pakistan increased to 275 in 2021. Despite this, the annual death
rate in Pakistan has remained consistently low as the Pakistani
military continues to focus on disarming and eliminating
terrorist sleeper cells. The winding down of the Syrian civil war,
the collapse of IS, and increased counterterrorism coordination
at both the state and international level have all played a role in
reducing the impact of terrorism around the world.
As the conflict in Syria subsided, IS and its affiliates have shifted
their focus to sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel region in
particular. The Sahel has become increasingly more violent
during this period, with deaths increasing ten times between
2007 and 2021. Three of the countries in the Sahel were among
the five countries with the largest increases in terrorism deaths

FIGURE 2.1
Deaths from terrorism, 2007–2021
Total deaths have decreased 33.5 per cent from their peak in 2015.

12,000
All other countries Pakistan
Afghanistan Sahel
10,000 Iraq Europe and
North America
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 29

during this period, with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger recording
732, 572 and 554 more deaths in 2021 than in 2007, respectively.
Groups such as IS continue to wage a violent campaign in the
region, with terrorism deaths in the Sahel accounting for 35 per
cent of the total of terrorism deaths globally in 2021, compared
to one per cent in 2007.
experiencing deaths from terrorism. In 2021, 44 countries
recorded at least one death from terrorism. This is down from
the peak of 55 countries in 2015. Of the 163 countries included
in the analysis, nearly two thirds or 105 recorded no attacks or
deaths from terrorism in 2020 and 2021, the highest number
since 2007.

In the West, total terrorist attacks peaked in 2018 at 182
incidents while deaths from terrorism recorded their highest
level in 2016, when 191 people died in terrorist attacks. Although
the impact of religious motivated and radical jihadist terrorism
has subsided in the West over the past four years, there has been
a rise in the level of politically motivated terrorism. In 2018, the
number of both deaths and incidents caused by political
terrorism was higher than any other form of terrorism for the
first time since 2007. In 2021, there were 40 politically motivated
attacks, compared with just three religiously motivated attacks.
There has also been a reduction in the number of countries
Conflict has been the primary driver of terrorism since 2007. In
2021, all of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism were
involved in an armed conflict in 20201. There were 120,359
deaths from terrorism between 2007 and 2020. Of these deaths,
92 per cent, or 111,191, occurred in countries involved in conflict.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the trend in deaths from terrorism by
conflict type. During the peak of terrorist activity in 2015, most
deaths from terrorism occurred in war zones, meaning countries
that had registered over one thousand deaths from conflict in a
single year.

FIGURE 2.2
Distribution of deaths from terrorism, 2007–2021
In 2021, 44 countries recorded at least one death from terrorism, two per cent higher than 2020.

70

1-24 25-99 100-499 500-999 1000+

60

50
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES

40

30

20

10

0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

"Of the 163 countries

included in the analysis,
nearly two thirds or 105
recorded no attacks or
deaths from terrorism in
2020 and 2021, the highest
number since 2007."

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 30

 However, over the past few years, the number of deaths from
terrorism in war-afflicted countries has dropped, with the
majority of terrorist activity now taking place in countries
involved in a minor armed-conflict, which is where there were
between 25 and 1,000 battle-related deaths in a single year. The
decrease in terrorism deaths in war-afflicted countries and
increase in deaths in minor armed-conflicts is shown in Figure
2.3.
Even in conflict situations, terrorism is a distinct form of
violence, with unique forms of attack type and differing targets
from conventional military or insurgent conflict. Figure 2.4
shows deaths from terrorism by target type in countries in
conflict, from 2007 to 2020.
In conflict-afflicted countries, more people are killed in terrorist
attacks that target civilians, than attacks targeting police, the
military, and infrastructure. Since 2007, 39,943 people have been
killed in terrorist attacks on police, the military, and
infrastructure targets in countries in conflict. By contrast,
42,964 people were killed in attacks targeting civilians in
conflict-afflicted countries.

FIGURE 2.3
Deaths from terrorism by conflict type, 2007–2020
Over 96 per cent of deaths from terrorism occurred in countries currently experiencing a conflict.

10,000 5,000 1,400

WAR MINOR ARMED CONFLICT NON-CONFLICT
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

9,000 4,500 1,200

8,000 4,000
7,000 3,500 1,000
6,000 3,000
800
5,000 2,500
4,000 2,000 600
3,000 1,500 400
2,000 1,000
200
1,000 500
0 0 0
20 7
20 8
20 9
10

20 1
20 2
20 3
20 4
20 5
16

20 7
18

20 9
20

20 7
20 8
20 9
10

20 1
20 2
20 3
14

20 5
16

20 7
20 8
20 9
20

20 7
08

20 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1

1
0

0
1

1
1

1
1

1
0

1
1
0

0
20

20

20
20

20

20
20
20

20
20

20
20

20

20

20
20

20

20

20
20
Source: UCDP, ACLED, Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.4
Deaths from terrorism by target type in countries in conflict, 2007–2021
Even in conflict situations, civilians are more likely to be terrorist targets.

6,000

5,000
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

4,000
POLICE, MILITARY,
INFRASTRUCTURE

3,000

2,000

CIVILIANS
1,000

0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Source: UCDP, Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 31

 IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS
IN THE WEST

Terrorism in the West represents only a small fraction of total

BOX 2.1
Definition of the West
This sub-section looks at terrorism in Western
Europe, North America, and Oceania, using the term
the West as a shorthand for this group of regions.
The term ‘the West’ is contested and has strong
political and emotional connotations, so it is
important to make clear how this term is defined in
the 2022 GTI.
terrorism globally. Between 2007 and 2021 there were 126,740
deaths from terrorism globally. Of these, 865 occurred in the
West, or just 0.68 per cent of the total. However, terrorism in
the West is notable because it occurs almost entirely outside
the context of an ongoing conflict or war. Outside of the West,
92 per cent of all deaths from terrorism took place in countries
involved in an ongoing conflict. In the West, not a single death
from terrorism occurred in a country involved in any level of
conflict.

While there is no one fixed definition of the West, Since 2007, 61 per cent of fatalities in the West have occurred
IEP’s definition of the West encompasses the from religious attacks. The deadliest religious attacks in the
following countries: West since 2007 were the vehicular attack in Nice on Bastille
Day of 2016 and the attacks in Paris in November 2015, which
Andorra Germany Portugal
both resulted in 87 fatalities each. Both attacks were claimed by
Australia Iceland Spain
Islamic State. Far-right groups account for 30 per cent of all
Austria Ireland Sweden
fatalities over the period. Notable are also the attacks in
Belgium Italy Switzerland
Norway by Anders Behring Breivik in 2011 which killed 77
Canada Luxembourg United Kingdom
people, as well as the Christchurch mosque attacks of March
United States of
Denmark Netherlands 2019 which resulted in 51 deaths.
America
Finland New Zealand Vatican City

France Norway
West Germany FIGURE 2.6
(1970-1990)
Terrorist fatalities in the west by ideology
2007–2021
Since 2007, 60 per cent of fatalities from terrorism have
IEP groups terrorist organisations and ideologies into three been from Islamic groups. This is followed by deaths from
broad categories: political, nationalist/separatist, and religiously far-right attacks which accounts for 30 per cent.
motivated terrorism. For example, far-right terrorism is
classified as a form of political terrorism. There are also a few
organisations that fall outside of this categorisation system, such 400
as environmental and animal rights related terrorism, although
FATALITIES

they can be claimed to be political as they ultimately have a

political aim. While there can be an overlap between these 200
categories, the vast majority of terrorist groups have a primary
purpose and self-understanding that fits into at least one of
these three groups. There are also attacks that occur where the 0
Religious Far-right Unclear Separatist Far-left
ideological basis is unclear.
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.5
Incidents and deaths from terrorism in the West by ideology, 2007–2021
Since 2017, there have been more attacks attributed to political groups than to religious groups in the West.

IDEOLOGY
Far-left Separatist
150
Far-right Unclear
Religious
NUMBER OF ATTACKS

100

50

0
2010 2015 2020
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 32

RELIGIOUS TERRORISM
The deadliest form of terrorism in the West over the past decade
has been religious terrorism, which has almost exclusively taken
the form of radical Islamist terrorism. Islamist terrorist groups
or lone actors inspired by Jihadist groups were responsible for
528 deaths from terrorism in the West since 2007. The most
notable surge in Islamist terrorism in the West occurred
between 2015 and 2017, with 63 attacks and 457 deaths
occurring in this period across 11 countries.
There were three attacks committed by religious groups in the
West in 2021, resulting in two fatalities. This represents a
decrease when compared to the prior year, which recorded 17
attacks and 18 deaths. Overall, 2021 recorded the lowest number
of attacks and deaths attributed to religious terrorism since
2013.
However, although religiously motivated terrorism has been the
deadliest form of terrorism in the West over the past decade, it
has not been consistently the most common form. Since 2017, at
a total of 351 attacks, there have been five times more politically
motivated than religiously motivated terrorist attacks.
NATIONALIST/SEPARATIST TERRORISM
Prior to 2015, nationalist or separatist terrorism was the highest
form of terrorism in the West, after which it was overtaken by
religious terrorism. At the peak of activity between 2007 and
2014, there were 145 attacks conducted by separatist groups
resulting in 13 deaths. Both deaths and attacks by separatist
groups fell after 2015, representing less than one per cent of
terrorism deaths and five per cent of attacks in the West. In
2021, only four attacks were attributed to separatist terrorist
groups, an increase of two attacks when compared to the year
prior.
The UK, Spain and France maintain the highest levels of
separatist terrorism in the West, recording 81, 61 and 35 attacks
respectively since 2007. The UK also has the highest overall
fatalities as a result of separatist attacks, with eight deaths in
the same period.
FIGURE 2.7
Far-left and Far-right terrorism in the west, 2007–2021
Since 2007, more attacks have been attributed to far-left groups than far-right groups in the west.
60
Far-right
Far-left
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
40
20
0
2010
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 33
The most active and deadliest separatist group in the West is
the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), responsible for 65
attacks and eight deaths since 2007. However, the group’s
activity fell significantly following the ceasefire declared in
2010, with only four attacks in the years afterwards. The Irish
Republican Army and its splinter groups in the UK and Ireland
recorded the second highest number of attacks, with 57 attacks
since 2007, followed by the Corsican National Liberation Front
(FLNC) in France, who were responsible for 32 attacks. The
decrease in separatist attacks within the last decade in the West
was helped by the disbanding of the ETA, with no attacks
claimed by the group since 2014.
POLITICAL TERRORISM
In 2018, the number of deaths and incidents from political
terrorism was higher than any other form for the first time
since 2007. Political terrorism in the West can be broadly
divided into two sub-ideologies, far-left terrorism and far-right
terrorism. Political terrorism has increased steadily over the last
decade, with 73 per cent of attacks in the West being attributed
to politically motivated groups and individuals. The majority of
the increase in politically-motivated terrorism in the West is a
result of rising far-left terrorism. In 2011, far-left groups and
individuals were responsible for two attacks while far-right
groups claimed five attacks. However, in 2021, far-left attacks
increased significantly to 38 attacks while far-right groups
claimed only two attacks. Of the politically-motivated attacks in
2021, none were attributed to any official far-right or far-left
terrorist group.
There were eight countries in the West that experienced at least
one instance of political terrorism in 2021, with Germany
recording 19 attacks, the highest of any Western country,
followed by Italy who recorded six attacks.
While the motivation can be inferred, most attacks driven by a
left or right ideology are perpetrated by individuals or groups
with no formal affiliation to a recognised organisation. Figure
2.7 shows of the 393 attacks in the West from far-right and
far-left groups, 95 per cent were perpetrated under no formal
affiliation.
2014 2018 2022
 FIGURE 2.8
Far-left and Far-right affiliations, 2007–2021
95 per cent of far-left and far-right attacks are perpetrated under no formal affiliation.

100
Affiliated
Unaffiliated
75
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS

50

25

0
2010 2015 2020

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

FIGURE 2.9
Weapons used in political terrorist attacks, 2007–2021
Incendiary devices have been the most common weapon for political terrorists in the West since 2015.

Incendiary,
fire bombs,
explosives

Knives and
offensive
objects

Other/ Unclear

Firearms IDEOLOGY
Left
Right
Vehicle

Chemical

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

PERCENTAGE OF ATTACKS
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

As shown in Figure 2.9, weapons used in far-left and far-right

attacks vary. Over 80 per cent of all far-left attacks involve
incendiary devices, bombs and other explosive devices. While
far-right attacks use explosives in only 40 per cent of attacks,
these types of attacks are more likely to use a wider array of
weapons, including firearms, knives and offensive objects.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 34

FIGURE 2.10
Targets of politically-motivated terrorism, 2007–2021
Both far-left and far-right often target government and political figures.

Religious figures and institutions

Private citizens and property

PROPORTION OF FAR-RIGHT ATTACKS (2007–2021)

y
rit
Pa
20% Target of more Far-right attacks

Government and political figures and institutions

Ethnic & minority groups

10%

Other Target of more Far-left attacks

Business (Media and Retail)
Public
gatherings Medical figures
and institutions Police and prisons
Transportation - Land
Business (Extractives) Business - Other business
0% Diplomatic Military Business - Financial Business - Construction Business (Critical Infrastructure)
0% 10% 20%
PROPORTION OF FAR-LEFT ATTACKS (2007-2021)

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

While far-left and far-right attacks are nominally carried out for highlighted in Figure 2.10 by moving away from attributing
distinct political agendas, there are overlaps in the targets terrorist activities to left-wing or right-wing groups. Instead,
chosen. Figure 2.10 shows far-right perpetrators target religious they focus on ideologically-motivated extremism and
institutions, private property and ethnic minorities more often religiously-motivated extremism. The change in terminology
than far-left perpetrators. Conversely, far-left groups attack addresses the fact that left-wing and right-wing groups hold
businesses, police and prisons more often. However, both similar attitudes, such as scepticism towards government and
ideologies target government institutions and/or political capitalism. Secondly, the change responds to a growing trend
figures, accounting for 17 per cent of their attacks. whereby no group or individual claims responsibility for an act
of terrorism, with the focus being on disruption.
Some security agencies, such as the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), have responded to the trend

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 35

 REGIONAL
TRENDS

The impact of terrorism fell in eight of the nine regions of the region had the second lowest. In 2021 there were seven
world in 2021. The largest improvement occurred in Russia and terrorism deaths and eight attacks.
Eurasia, with the region recording a 71 per cent fall in terror
related deaths. Table 2.1 shows the regions of the world by their In 2021, South Asia was the region with the highest average
average GTI score for 2021, as well as changes in score from the score on the GTI, a position it has held since 2007. Conversely,
prior year. Central America and the Caribbean recorded the lowest impact
of terrorism.
TABLE 2.1
GTI score, rank and change in score, A total of 33 deaths from terrorism have been recorded in the
2011-2021 Central America and the Caribbean since 2007, with 24 per cent
of those occurring in 2009. The region has not recorded a death
Average Change Change from terrorism since 2018. However, although the region has
Country
Score 2011-2021 2020-2021 recorded less loss of life from terrorism, it has suffered greatly
from other forms of violent conflict, most prominently an
South Asia 5.559 -0.783 -0.203
increase in homicide associated with organised crime and
North America 4.421 1.507 -0.298 drug-related violence
Middle East and North Africa 3.547 -0.616 -0.294
South America 2.903 0.275 -0.049 Between 2007 and 2021, the largest number of deaths from
terrorism was recorded in the MENA region, at more than
sub-Saharan Africa 2.400 0.433 0.004
49,000 deaths. South Asia recorded roughly 37,000 deaths over
Asia-Pacific 2.045 -0.146 -0.219
the same period, with another 30,500 occurring in sub-Saharan
Europe 1.368 -0.412 -0.284 Africa.
Russia and Eurasia 0.876 -2.460 -0.405
Central America And the Sub-Saharan Africa had the most lethal terrorist attacks,
0.202 -1.132 -0.052
Caribbean
averaging three people killed per attack respectively. Conversely,
in Asia-Pacific, Europe, South America, and Russia and Eurasia,
North America consists of two countries, the US and Canada, there were more terrorist attacks than total deaths from
and neither country has a high GTI score, however the region is terrorism. Figure 2.11 shows total deaths and attacks for all
the only region where no countries have a nil score for regions from 2007 to 2021.
terrorism. In terms of deaths and attacks the North America

FIGURE 2.11
Attacks and deaths from terrorism by region, 2007–2021
The largest number of deaths was recorded in the MENA region, with over 50,000 deaths from terrorism since 2007.

49,674
MENA
21,926

37,001
South Asia
16,765

30,557
sub-Saharan Africa
9,863

4,411
Asia-Pacific
4,560

2,322
Europe
2,779

1,835
South America
3,090

1,399
Russia and Eurasia
1,535 Deaths
273 Attacks
North America
153

33
Central America
and the Carribean 91

0 20,000 40,000 60,000

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 36

 Although the MENA region has had the highest number of
deaths from terrorism since 2007, the region has recorded a
substantial decline in the last four years. Deaths have fallen by
39 per cent since 2018, reaching the lowest level since 2007.
More recently, terrorist activity has been concentrated in South
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa with both regions recording more
terrorism deaths than MENA for the last three years.
Collectively, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 74
per cent of terrorism deaths in 2021. Figure 2.12 shows the trend
in terrorism deaths for these three regions since 2007.
Bombings and explosions were the most common tactic in the
Middle East, where they accounted for over 70 per cent of all
attacks since 2007. South Asia recorded the highest number of
explosive attacks in 2021 of any region in the world, with 67 per
cent of the 796 attacks in South Asia using explosives as the
primary weapon. However, in North America attacks using
firearms were the most common tactic used, accounting for over
80 per cent of all attacks. A similar trend was observed in
Central America and the Caribbean, which recorded the highest
percentage of attacks with firearms as the weapon, at almost 85
per cent of all attacks.

FIGURE 2.12
Trend in terrorism deaths by region, 2007–2021 Asia-Pacific
In 2018, the number of terrorism deaths in South Asia and
sub-Saharan Africa exceeded deaths recorded in MENA. Ten countries in Asia-Pacific improved in 2021, compared to two
that deteriorated, resulting in the impact of terrorism falling in
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia the region for the third consecutive year. Seven countries
sub-Saharan Africa showed no change in score last year.
6,000

The number of deaths in the Philippines fell for the second

consecutive year, from 97 deaths in 2020 to 53 deaths in 2021.
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

Overall, the Philippines has had the highest death rate over the
last decade, recording over 1,000 of the 3,250 terrorism deaths
in the region.
3,000

0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

There were also variations by region in the tactics used by

terrorist organisations. In most regions, the weapon used in the
majority of attacks were firearms, followed by explosives.

FIGURE 2.13
Type of attack by region, 2007–2021
Explosives and firearm assaults are most the common weapons used in terror attacks all all regions.

Explosives Firearms Incendiary devices and fire bombs

Knives and offensive objects Vehicles Other

sub-Saharan Africa

South Asia

South America

Russia and Eurasia

North America

MENA

Europe
Central America
and the Caribbean

Asia-Pacific

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 37

TABLE 2.2 Central America and the Caribbean
Asia-Pacific GTI score, rank and change in TABLE 2.3
score, 2011–2021
Central America and the Caribbean GTI
score, rank and change in score, 2011–2021
Overall Overall Change Change
Country
Score Rank 2011-2021 2020-2021
Overall Overall Change Change
Country
Philippines 6.790 16 -0.541 -0.284 Score Rank 2011-2021 2020-2021

Thailand 5.723 22 -1.711 -0.450

Mexico 2.428 61 -1.144 -0.626
Indonesia 5.500 24 0.206 0.116
Costa Rica 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
New Zealand 4.376 41 4.376 -0.523
Cuba 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Australia 2.438 60 2.438 -0.587
Dominican Republic 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Malaysia 2.247 63 1.956 -0.660
El Salvador 0.000 93 -3.146 0.000
China 1.863 67 -3.245 -0.704
Guatemala 0.000 93 -2.752 0.000
Japan 1.460 71 -0.787 -0.516
Haiti 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Vietnam 0.407 85 0.407 -0.276
Honduras 0.000 93 -2.985 0.000
Taiwan 0.227 92 0.227 -0.180
Jamaica 0.000 93 -0.509 0.000
Cambodia 0.000 93 -0.758 0.000
Nicaragua 0.000 93 -1.522 0.000
Laos 0.000 93 0.000 -1.968
Panama 0.000 93 -1.522 0.000
Mongolia 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Trinidad & Tobago 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
North Korea 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Regional Average -1.132 -0.052
Papua New Guinea 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Singapore 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 No countries deteriorated in the region with eleven of the 12
South Korea 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 countries recording a score of zero on the 2021 GTI, meaning
Timor-Leste 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 that they did not experience a single terrorist incident over the
past five years. Mexico was the only country to record any
Regional Average 0.231 -0.219
terrorist activity since 2017 and has been the poorest performing
country in the region since 2007.
Attacks in Indonesia became more lethal in 2021 and the
country recorded the second highest deterioration in the Over the last decade, seven of the 12 countries in the region
Asia-Pacific region. Attacks decreased by 24 per cent while recorded an improvement in their GTI score, with the remaining
deaths rose by 85 per cent. In 2021, there were on average 1.5 five countries recording no change. The Central America and the
deaths per attack, compared with 0.6 deaths per attack in 2020. Caribbean region had the second highest average improvement
Attacks in Indonesia were largely from separatist groups such as in the impact of terrorism over the past decade. However, it did
the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and West Papuan National start from a low base.
Liberation Army. IS were responsible for two attacks in
Indonesia in 2021, with one attack resulting in the death of four Mexico recorded an overall improvement in GTI score over the
farmers at the hands of an armed assailant. IS claimed past year, moving from 56 th place in 2020 to 61st place in 2021.
responsibility for the attack, stating it targeted Christians. This is the largest improvement that Mexico has seen since 2015.

Laos recorded the largest improvement in 2021, followed by
China and Malaysia. This is the first year Laos has not recorded
a terrorist incident since 2005 and now has a score of zero.
Thailand recorded the second highest number of deaths in the
region since 2011, with 776 fatalities. However, terrorism deaths
in Thailand have decreased steadily since the peak in 2011 at 178
deaths. In 2021, only seven terror-related deaths were recorded
in Thailand, half of the number of deaths in Thailand in 2020.
Terrorism in Mexico is predominantly politically motivated and
criminal activity by cartels is not included as terrorism in this
report. One such politically-motivated group is a radical
environmentalist group, Individualistas Tendiendo a lo Salvaje,
(Individuals Tending to the Wild) who claimed responsibility for
a number of explosive devices planted in commercial centre2 in
2018 and 2019.
Violence against politicians and journalists continues to
threaten stability in Mexico with a large number of
assassinations occurring in Mexico in the last two years. At least
102 politicians were murdered in the lead up to the election of
June 2021.3 Additionally, nine journalists were killed in 2021, the
same number as the year prior.4

While terrorism in Mexico has declined, cartel activity continues

to dominate the crime landscape, with almost six thousand
incidents of cartel violence resulting in over seven thousand
deaths in 2021.5

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 38

The remaining 11 countries in Central America and the
Caribbean have remained unaffected by terrorism since 2017,
despite the fact that El Salvador, and the Central America region
more widely, regularly register the highest homicide rates in the
world.
El Salvador and Honduras have recorded no terrorist attacks
since 2010.
Twenty-one of the 36 countries in Europe recorded
improvements in the impact of terrorism over the past year.
Europe is the third best performing region, after Russia and
Eurasia and Central America and the Caribbean. Only Greece
and the Netherlands deteriorated last year, while 13 countries
recorded no change in score. Fourteen European countries have
not experienced a single terrorist attack since 2017. Of the 113
attacks in Europe in 2021, only 18 per cent or 20 attacks were
claimed by known terrorist groups.

Europe Europe recorded nine deaths from terrorism in 2021, of which

six occurred in Turkey. Turkey remains the country most
TABLE 2.4 affected in Europe, although its score has substantially improved
Europe GTI score, rank and change in score, because of a significant reduction in deaths and attacks. Deaths
2011–2021 from terrorism in Turkey have declined rapidly from 587 deaths
in 2016, falling by 99 per cent to 13 in 2021. Attacks on civilians
declined by 59 per cent between 2020 and 2021, however attacks
Overall Overall Change Change
Country against the military rose from two attacks in 2020 to eight in
Score Rank 2011-2021 2020-2021
2021.
Turkey 5.651 23 -1.261 -0.820
Greece 4.849 29 0.397 0.186 Greece was the second most affected country in Europe, with
United Kingdom 4.770 31 -0.012 -0.398 the country recording 50 attacks, an increase of 22 per cent,
however the attacks resulted in no deaths. Greece recorded the
Germany 4.729 33 1.138 -0.388
most terror attacks in Europe in 2021. The anarchy group
France 4.562 35 0.617 -0.674
Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei was the only group to claim
Italy 3.687 50 0.127 -0.268 responsibility for attacks, of which they claimed three. The
Austria 3.261 52 1.201 -0.548 remaining 47 attacks have been attributed to unknown far-left
Spain 2.861 55 -1.052 -0.587 or anarchist groups. The majority of the terror attacks in 2021
Switzerland 2.522 59 0.446 -0.193 targeted police and prisons, followed by government and
political institutions and figures. Attacks targeting these groups
Netherlands 2.077 66 2.077 0.254
increased by 82 per cent in 2021.
Belgium 1.745 68 0.193 -1.843
Sweden 1.660 69 -0.316 -0.561 Germany recorded the second highest number of terror attacks
Norway 1.109 77 -5.072 -0.471 for the region in 2021, and has the fourth highest overall impact
Ireland 1.060 78 -1.238 -0.492 of terrorism in Europe. This is in spite of Germany recording a
34 per cent decrease in attacks between 2020 and 2021 and no
Romania 1.060 78 1.060 -0.463
deaths as a result of these attacks compared to the 11 deaths in
Finland 1.007 80 0.600 -0.453
2020. All of Germany’s 19 terror attacks in 2021 were conducted
Cyprus 0.922 82 -0.321 -0.472 by unnamed far-left terror groups and individuals, with the
Lithuania 0.827 83 0.827 -0.415 majority targeting business and critical infrastructure. Almost
Czech Republic 0.291 86 0.291 -0.218 all of the attacks involved the use of fire bombs or incendiary
Denmark 0.291 86 -0.951 -0.218
devices.

Kosovo 0.291 86 -2.925 -0.660

The Netherlands recorded the largest deterioration in score in
Albania 0.000 93 -0.509 0.000
2021. The Netherlands recorded two terror attacks in 2021 with
Bosnia and
0.000 93 -1.822 0.000 no deaths, compared to one attack and no deaths in the year
Herzegovina
Bulgaria 0.000 93 -1.243 0.000
prior. In the first incident of 2021, a pipe bomb was detonated
outside a COVID-19 testing centre in the North Holland region.
Croatia 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
No individual or group claimed the attack however, authorities
Estonia 0.000 93 -2.368 0.000 reported that anti-vaccination extremists were probably
Hungary 0.000 93 -0.509 -0.291 responsible. In the second incident, anarchist group
Iceland 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 Revolutionary Resistance set fire to two parked police cars. No
Latvia 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 one was injured or killed and the group claimed that the
vehicles were targeted as they were symbols of repression.
Montenegro 0.000 93 -0.892 0.000
North Macedonia 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
There were three religiously-motivated attacks in Europe in
Poland 0.000 93 0.000 -0.227 2021, with all three attacks committed by Islamic extremists.
Portugal 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 This is the lowest number of religiously-motivated attacks in
Serbia 0.000 93 -2.061 0.000 Europe since 2014 and represents a 75 per cent decrease when
Slovakia 0.000 93 -1.243 0.000
compared to the 12 attacks recorded in 2020. In 2021, deaths as
a result of attacks committed by religious extremists were at the
Slovenia 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
lowest level since 2007, with only two deaths recorded in 2021,
Regional Average -0.412 -0.284 compared with 15 deaths in 2020.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 39

 TABLE 2.5
Belgium recorded the largest improvement in score in 2021,
followed by Turkey and France. The wave of jihadist-inspired Middle East and North Africa GTI score, rank
terrorism in Western Europe has continued to subside, with and change in score, 2011–2021
France and Belgium recording no attacks for the third
consecutive year. Overall, since 2007, the impact of terrorism in Overall Overall Change Change
Country
Score Rank 2011-2021 2020-2021
Belgium has improved after peaking in 2016.
Iraq 8.511 2 -1.173 -0.184
France recorded a 72 per cent decrease in attacks between 2020
Syria 8.250 5 2.473 -0.050
and 2021, the largest decrease since 2013. Despite this, France
has recorded at least one terrorist attack every year since 2007. Egypt 6.932 15 1.632 -0.373

The only terror-related death in France in 2021 was of a police Yemen 5.870 21 -1.724 -0.261
administrative assistant, who was killed after being attacked by Libya 5.100 26 3.367 -0.541
an assailant armed with a knife in a police station in the Iran 5.015 27 -1.140 -0.452
Ile-de-France region. The assailant was killed by police shortly
Israel 4.778 30 -0.843 -0.181
after the attack. No group had claimed responsibility. Of the
Palestinian
remaining six attacks in France in 2021, five were committed by 4.736 32 -0.475 -0.238
Territories
unknown far-left groups and the separatist group Corsican Tunisia 4.447 38 0.801 -0.286
National Liberation Front (FLNC) took responsibility for one Algeria 4.432 39 -2.510 0.105
further incident.
Lebanon 3.566 51 -1.420 -0.517
Saudi Arabia 3.110 54 -0.752 -0.743
The United Kingdom was the third most impacted country in
the region for terrorism. The country recorded 12 attacks in Jordan 2.594 58 0.284 -0.837
2021, half the number of attacks from the previous year. Of these Bahrain 2.145 65 0.322 -0.475
attacks, two resulted in fatalities. In one incident, an assailant Morocco 1.156 76 -3.494 -0.478
stabbed a conservative member of parliament to death inside
Sudan 0.291 86 -5.378 -0.218
Belfairs Methodist church in Essex county. The suspect was
Kuwait 0.000 93 -1.460 -0.158
arrested at the scene and authorities reported that he was linked
to Islamic extremism.6 The other incident was a bombing that Oman 0.000 93 -0.827 0.000

killed only the assailant which was detonated inside a taxi near Qatar 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Liverpool Women’s Hospital. The target of the attack was United Arab
0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Emirates
unclear, but the incident occurred on Remembrance Sunday. No
group had claimed responsibility. Regional Average -0.616 -0.294

Conversely, while attacks by IS in Iraq dropped from 353 in 2020

Middle East and North Africa
MENA recorded an overall improvement in the impact of
terrorism last year, with 16 countries improving and three
recording no change. Algeria was the only country to record a
deterioration due to an increase in terror-related deaths. This is
the fourth year in a row that the region has improved.
Fatalities in MENA accounted for 39 per cent of the global total
deaths from terrorism between 2007 and 2021. However, since
the defeat of IS, the region’s share of the global total has
dropped substantially, and in 2021, it accounted for only 16 per
cent of total deaths, behind South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
Despite thirteen terrorist groups claiming responsibility for
attacks in the region in 2021, 57 per cent or 727 attacks remain
unclaimed by any known group.
In MENA, the largest improvement in fatalities last year was in
Syria, which recorded 488 terrorism deaths, 236 fewer deaths
compared to 2020, a decline of 33 per cent. The principal driver
of these improvements was the reduction in attacks perpetrated
by IS, which fell by 34 per cent.
to 327 in 2021, deaths increased by nine per cent, indicating an
increase in lethality. IS attacks in Iraq resulted in an average of
1.14 in 2021 compared to 0.98 deaths per attack in 2020.
IS have been the deadliest terror group in MENA, accounting for
over 11,500 terrorism deaths since 2014. Of the attacks in MENA
in 2021, IS and affiliate groups claimed responsibility for 463
attacks or 36 per cent, while another 57 per cent were not
claimed by any group. However, in recent years, coalition forces
have made significant progress in reducing the capacity of IS to
wage mass casualty attacks. In March 2019, the US-led
international coalition, alongside local forces, succeeded in
regaining the remaining territory held by IS in Syria. Later, in
October 2019, the US conducted a military operation that
resulted in the death of the then IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
and recently killing his replacement Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi
al-Qurayshi.7
Following the collapse of its “caliphate”, IS in Iraq and Syria
have reverted to clandestine tactics – operating in covert
networks with an insurgent presence in rural parts of Iraq and
Syria.8

Egypt followed Syria, recording the second best improvement
with 66 deaths in 2021 compared to 119 in 2020, a reduction of
over 44 per cent. IS and IS - Sinai Province were responsible for
57 per cent of attacks in Egypt, accounting for over half of
terrorism deaths.
Beyond Iraq and Syria, IS affiliate groups and supporters across
the MENA region remained active in 2021, including in Egypt,
Libya and Tunisia. Although Tunisia increased counterterrorism
efforts against IS-affiliated groups, it did record a slight increase
in IS-related deaths in 2021.9

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 40

In Libya, IS were responsible for all of the three terrorist attacks
in 2021, which resulted in four deaths. These deaths occurred as
a result of the same attack, in which a suicide car bomb
exploded, killing four police officers and wounding an unknown
number of others at a checkpoint.
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Libya had the largest improvements in
score in the region. Jordan has not recorded a single terror
attack since 2019, and has recorded a total of only 15 terror
attacks since 2007, resulting in 26 fatalities.
Saudi Arabia recorded one attack in 2021, when Saudi air
defences intercepted a missile or armed drone above the city of
Riyadh. No one was injured or killed during the attack and a
previously unknown, far-left group Alwiya Alwaad Alhaq,
claimed responsibility.
Algeria was the only MENA country to deteriorate in 2021.
Algeria recorded three attacks in 2021, an increase of one attack
when compared to 2020. Despite the marginal increase in
attacks, eight deaths were recorded in 2021, the highest number
of terror-related deaths since 2018. The deadliest attack in
Algeria in 2021 occurred when a roadside bomb killed five
civilians and wounded three others travelling in a pick-up truck
on a road in Tebessa. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
claimed responsibility.
Since 2007, Algeria has recorded approximately 400 terror
attacks and 870 deaths from terrorism. The majority of these
deaths were attributed to AQIM, accounting for 63 per cent.
North America
TABLE 2.6
North America GTI score, rank and change in
score, 2011–2021
Overall Overall Change Change
Country
Score Rank 2011-2021 2020-2021
United States 4.961 28 0.526 -0.576
Canada 3.882 48 2.488 -0.019
Regional Average 1.507 -0.298
The number of deaths from terrorism rose slightly in North
America, from five deaths in 2020 to seven deaths in 2021.
However, the total number of incidents fell from 13 in 2020 to
eight in 2021. Overall, terrorist incidents have fallen 69 per cent
since their peak in 2019 at 26 incidents. This is the third
consecutive year of overall improvement in the number of
incidents for the North America region.
The US recorded a significant improvement in the impact of
terrorism in 2021, recording its lowest GTI score since 2015. In
2021, there were seven attacks and three deaths in the US, a
decline in terrorism incidents when compared to the nine
attacks and two deaths in 2020. Notably, the riots on Capitol Hill
in January 2021 have not been classified as a terrorist act. This
marks the lowest number of terror attacks in the US since 2015.
Of the seven attacks, none were attributed to any known
terrorist group. This includes the assailant responsible for the
only terror-related death in the region in 2021, who killed a taxi
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 41
driver before driving to a police station and attacking officers in
the building. The assailant was shot dead by police, who believe
they were inspired by an unnamed foreign terrorist
organisation. The assailant was also the subject of
counterterrorism investigations from 2010 to 2013.
Over the past decade in the US there has been a shift away from
religiously motivated terrorism towards politically motivated
terrorism. Since 2007, there have been 84 attacks in the US
which IEP attributes to politically motivated groups and
individuals, compared to 19 attacks attributed to religiously
motivated groups. The shift from religious to political terrorism
has also been mirrored by a shift away from terrorism affiliated
with specific groups, towards individuals and groups who are
driven by a specific ideology, but are not formally affiliated with
an organised group. Of the 161 attacks recorded between 2007
and 2021, just 19 were affiliated with a specific terrorist group.
The overall impact of terrorism fell in Canada due to a decrease
in terror attacks between 2020 and 2021. Canada recorded one
terror attack in 2021, compared to the four recorded in 2020.
Despite this decrease in attacks, Canada recorded four deaths in
2021, an increase compared with the three recorded for 2020
and the highest death toll in the country since 2018. The 2021
attack was a car ramming incident in which an assailant hit and
killed four civilians and injured another in Ontario. No group
claimed the attack however officials believed that the victims
were targeted because of their Islamic faith.
Canada’s GTI score has deteriorated over the last decade,
recording at least one terror attack every year since 2014. Since
2007, there have been 29 attacks in Canada, resulting in 27
deaths. Unaffiliated far-left anarchist groups have accounted for
over a third of attacks, followed by IS inspired groups which
accounted for ten per cent. The most deaths have occurred as a
result of attacks by groups and individuals with links to the
‘incel’ (involuntarily celibate) internet subculture. An assailant
who claimed to be a member of the incel community was
responsible for the deadliest attack in Canada in the last decade,
when he deliberately drove his vehicle into a crowd of civilians,
killing ten and injuring 14 others.10
"Since 2007, there have
been 84 attacks in the
US which IEP attributes
to politically motivated
groups and individuals,
compared to 19 attacks
attributed to religiously
motivated groups."
Russia and Eurasia South America
TABLE 2.7 TABLE 2.8
Russia and Eurasia GTI score, rank and South America GTI score, rank and change in
change in score, 2011–2021 score, 2011–2021

Overall Overall Change Change Overall Overall Change Change

Country Country
Score Rank 2011-2021 2020-2021 Score Rank 2011-2021 2020-2021

Russia 4.219 44 -3.328 -0.465 Colombia 7.068 14 -0.189 -0.226

Tajikistan 3.988 47 -0.914 -0.596 Chile 6.496 18 3.315 0.515

Ukraine 2.304 62 -0.969 -0.653 Peru 4.471 37 -0.311 1.259

Armenia 0.000 93 -0.291 -0.158 Venezuela 4.005 46 1.107 0.010

Azerbaijan 0.000 93 -2.985 -0.158 Ecuador 2.766 56 2.257 -0.582

Belarus 0.000 93 -5.172 0.000 Argentina 2.657 57 -0.489 0.224

Georgia 0.000 93 -3.901 -0.460 Paraguay 2.194 64 -0.951 -0.757

Kazakhstan 0.000 93 -4.513 -1.756 Uruguay 1.322 72 0.000 -0.501

Kyrgyzstan 0.000 93 -2.568 -0.460 Brazil 0.951 81 -0.291 -0.476

Moldova 0.000 93 -2.493 -0.158 Bolivia 0.000 93 -1.428 0.000

Turkmenistan 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 Guyana 0.000 93 0.000 0.000

Uzbekistan 0.000 93 -2.390 0.000 Bhutan 0.000 135 0.000 -0.010

Regional Average -2.460 -0.405 Regional Average 0.275 -0.049

The average impact of terrorism score improved in the Russia
and Eurasia region, with all countries recording improvements,
apart from Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which
recorded no change. The region recorded the highest
improvement in the impact of terrorism globally. Overall the
region recorded just one terrorist attack and two deaths in 2021,
down from seven attacks and seven deaths in 2020. The number
of people killed in terrorist attacks in the region has fallen every
year for the past four years, and is down 99 per cent from the
peak of 317 deaths in 2010. Nine of the twelve countries in the
region received scores of zero in 2021, meaning that they did
not register a terrorist attack in the past five years.
In 2019, Russia overtook Tajikistan to become the country most
affected by terrorism in the region. Even though Russia
continued to improve, with the number of attacks falling by 83
per cent, and deaths from terrorism falling by 71 per cent in
2021 compared to 2020.
Russia recorded the region’s only attack in 2021. The attack
occurred when a gunman killed two civilians and wounded four
others after arguing with a security guard when the assailant
refused to put on a mask in a government building. Law
enforcement said that the gunman had planned this attack in
advance and believed the COVID-19 pandemic was a
conspiracy.11 No group had claimed responsibility for the attack.
There was an overall improvement in the impact of terrorism in
South America over the past year, with five countries improving
their score, four recording a deterioration and two recording no
change. Total deaths from terrorism fell by 41 per cent, from 157
in 2020 to 92 in 2021. However, the overall level of terrorism
remains much higher than a decade ago, with Chile, Peru and
Argentina significantly increasing their levels of terrorism in
2021, compared to 2011. In total, there have been 1,835 deaths
from terrorism in South America since 2007, the fourth lowest
total of any region.
Eight terrorist groups took responsibility for attacks in 2021,
with Mapuche extremists claiming 206 attacks, resulting in one
death. National Liberation Army (ELN) were the deadliest
group in the region in 2021, claiming 35 attacks that killed 28
people. Only two per cent or eight attacks remained unclaimed
by any terrorist group, the lowest of any region in 2021.
Colombia has the highest impact of terrorism in the region, a
position it has held for the past decade, despite a minor
improvement between 2011 and 2021. Deaths from terrorism
declined from 151 in 2020 to 73 in 2021, with the number of
incidents also declining, from 174 to 72. Of the deaths recorded
in 2021, half were attributed to the ELN, with the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) responsible for the other half
after break-away elements announcing a rearmament in 2019.12

Kazakhstan reported the largest improvement in its terrorism
score in the region in the past year. For the first time in the last
decade, Kazakhstan recorded a GTI score of zero, meaning it
has not had a terror attack or death in the last five years.
Between 2011 and 2016, Kazakhstan recorded 12 terror attacks
and 26 fatalities, with 73 per cent of deaths being of law
enforcement and military personnel.
Despite continuing to record the highest level of terrorism in
the region, the number of people killed in Columbia is at the
lowest level since 2017. The peace agreement between the
government and FARC signed in late 2016 reduced terrorist
attacks significantly, with only seven FARC attacks recorded that
year. Attacks by the group increased every year until 2019, when
FARC committed 138 terrorist attacks in Columbia. Break-away
elements were not happy with the peace accord. After this peak
in 2019, FARC attacks have declined, with 31 incidents recorded
in 2021, a decrease of 41 attacks when compared to the year
prior. Despite this, deaths as a result of FARC attacks spiked in

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 42

2020, with 90 deaths recorded, before falling to 36 deaths in Taliban accounting for 232 attacks, the most attacks. IS was the
2021. deadliest group in the region in 2021, recording 555 deaths.
Overall, 54 per cent of attacks and 39 per cent of deaths were not
Chile had the second highest GTI score in the region in 2021. claimed by any terror group.
There were 831 attacks and 11 deaths from terrorism recorded
over the past decade. There were 362 terrorist attacks in the The biggest improvement in the impact of terrorism in South
country in 2021, over half of which were attributed to extremists Asia occurred in Sri Lanka, with the country recording no
from the indigenous Mapuche. There has been an upsurge in the attacks or deaths for the second consecutive year. Nepal was the
conflict between the Mapuche and the Chilean government in second most improved country in terms of the impact of
the past few years, with 359 attacks attributed to Mapuche terrorism, recording only one terrorist attack and no fatalities
extremists since 2020. The majority of these attacks have been for the first time since 2014.
directed against businesses active in the region.
The region is home to two of the ten countries with the highest
After having no terror attacks or deaths in 2020, Peru recorded impact of terrorism, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of the seven
one terror attack in 2021 that killed 16 people. Revolutionary countries in the region, only Bhutan has a GTI score of zero,
communist party and terrorist organisation Shining Path meaning that it has not recorded a terrorist attack in the past
claimed responsibility for the 2021 attack, when gunmen killed five years.
at least 16 civilians in two bars in the Valley of the Rivers
Apurímac, Ene and Matero (VRAEM). The group reportedly left Afghanistan was the only country to deteriorate in 2021, which
pamphlets at the scene telling people not to vote in the saw deaths from terrorism rise to 1,426 from 1,252 in 2020. The
upcoming presidential election and vowed that the group would Taliban’s battle for control of Kabul in early 2021 saw a 29 per
clean the area of informants and traitors.13 Shining Path has cent increase in the number of terror attacks. Terrorist activity
been responsible for 95 per cent of all deaths in Peru since 2007, dropped considerably after the fall of Kabul, from 102 attacks
with 2021 being their most lethal year since 2008. per month on average to 25 attacks, largely due to the Taliban’s
focus on legitimising their leadership and strengthening ties
with neighbouring countries. The instability of 2021 has further
South Asia cemented Afghanistan’s place as the country most impacted by
terrorism in the world.
TABLE 2.9
South Asia GTI score, rank and change in Pakistan remained the second most impacted country in the
score, 2011–2021 region in 2021. When compared with the previous year, Pakistan
saw the number of attacks increase by nine per cent to 186
attacks in 2021. The number of deaths mirrored this trend, with
Overall Overall Change Change
Country Pakistan recording 275 deaths in 2021, an increase of 12 deaths
Score Rank 2011-2021 2020-2021
when compared with 2020.
Afghanistan 9.109 1 0.015 0.059
Pakistan 7.825 10 -1.388 -0.097
India 7.432 12 -0.691 -0.235 Sub-Saharan Africa
Sri Lanka 5.445 25 -0.722 -0.599
The impact of terrorism deteriorated slightly in sub-Saharan
Nepal 4.693 34 -0.617 -0.538
Africa in 2021. It was the only region to deteriorate globally. Of
Bangladesh 4.411 40 0.181 -0.011 the 18 countries globally that recorded a deterioration between
Bhutan 0.000 93 -2.260 0.000 2020-2021, eight of them were in the sub-Saharan region.
Regional Average -0.783 -0.203
Despite this deterioration as a region, 17 countries in sub-
South Asia has the highest average GTI score of any region, a Saharan Africa recorded an improvement in their GTI score in
position it has held throughout the last decade. The impact of 2021, while 22 countries recorded no terrorist incidents in the
terrorism improved in the region from 2020 to 2021, despite past five years. Deaths from terrorism in the region dropped
Afghanistan continuing to be the most impacted country in the slightly to 3,461, compared to 3,849 in 2020, a decrease of ten
world by terrorism. Afghanistan is also the only country in the per cent. The impact for the region is calculated from the
region to record a deterioration in score, with both the number average country score, therefore there can be a decrease in
of attacks and deaths increasing significantly prior to the fall of deaths in one country that is substantial and lowers the overall
Kabul in August 2021. Although only 11 per cent of Afghanistan’s deaths for the region, but is muted because of changes in other
attacks in 2021 occurred after the fall of Kabul, 31 per cent of countries.
Afghanistan’s total deaths for 2021 occurred after the Taliban
took power, mainly due to the lethality of IS bombing at Kabul In total, just over 30,000 people have been killed in terrorist
Airport. Despite this, there were improvements elsewhere in the attacks in the region since 2007.
region, with five countries registering an improvement in score
and one country, Bhutan, recording no activity for the last five Niger, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo and Burkina Faso
years. had the largest increase in the number of people killed in
terrorist attacks. Niger had the largest increase in deaths from
In 2021, 23 terror groups were active in the region, with the terrorism, more than doubling when compared to 2020, with the

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 43

TABLE 2.10
number of terrorism deaths increasing to 588 in 2021. This is
Sub-Saharan Africa GTI score, rank and the highest terrorism death toll in the country since 2007.
change in score, 2011–2021 Although 43 per cent of deaths and 53 per cent of attacks were
attributed to either unknown groups or to unspecified Muslim
Overall Overall Change Change extremists, it is suspected that these attacks could be the work
Country
Score Rank 2011-2021 2020-2021 of either ISWA or Boko Haram who were active in the country in
2021. There were 17 deaths attributed to Boko Haram and 349
Somalia 8.398 3 0.502 -0.091 attributed to ISWA in 2021. The increase in terrorist activity in
Burkina Faso 8.270 4 8.270 0.148 Niger is part of a larger increase across the Sahel region, with
similar surges seen in Mali and Burkina Faso over the past few
Nigeria 8.233 6 0.753 -0.188
years.
Mali 8.152 7 3.804 0.230

Niger 7.856 8 4.027 0.441 Uganda had the largest deterioration in score in 2021, as a result
of three incidents resulting in four deaths and 40 people
Cameroon 7.432 11 4.247 -0.193
injured. This is the first year Uganda has recorded any terror
Mozambique 7.432 13 6.923 -0.399 attacks since 2015. IS was responsible for two incidents, while
Democratic Republic the Allied Democratic Forces claimed responsibility for the
6.733 17 0.935 0.713
of Congo
remaining incident. Uganda’s deadliest incident was when a
Chad 6.379 19 2.861 -0.281
suicide bomber killed two police officers in the Central region.
Kenya 6.166 20 0.388 -0.192 Another attack involving two suicide bombers took place near
Tanzania 4.530 36 3.351 -0.300 the parliament building three minutes later. A fourth person
Burundi 4.310 42 4.310 0.026 was killed and a total of 37 people were wounded across both
locations. IS claimed responsibility for both attacks, attributing
Uganda 4.271 43 -1.073 1.158
them to its Central African Province.
Ethiopia 4.106 45 -1.136 4.106
Benin 3.759 49 -0.978 -0.595 Somalia returned the highest GTI score in the region, being
Senegal 3.164 53 3.164 1.261 ranked as having the third highest impact from terrorism in the
Togo 1.580 70 -1.235 -0.527 world in 2021. Despite this, Somalia recorded an improvement
Rwanda 1.243 73 -2.701 -0.490
over the past year, with terrorism deaths falling from 341 in
2020 to 308 in 2021, a ten per cent decrease. The primary driver
South Africa 1.243 73 0.351 -0.490
of the fall in terrorist activity in Somalia was the reclaiming of
Mauritania 1.243 73 1.243 1.243
the capital Mogadishu and other territories held by Al-Shabaab
Angola 0.509 84 -3.389 -0.318 by US security and African Union peacekeeping forces. However,
Al-Shabaab continues to be the most prominent terror group in
Gabon 0.291 86 -2.648 -0.218
Somalia, with almost 90 per cent of deaths being as a result of
Botswana 0.291 86 0.291 -0.218
Al-Shabaab attacks in 2021. This is still considerably lower than
Republic of Congo 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 during the peak of the group’s activity in 2017, when over 1,461
Côte d’Ivoire 0.000 93 -4.610 -2.464 deaths were attributed to them.
Djibouti 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Central African Republic was the most improved country in the
Equatorial Guinea 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
region in 2021, returning a GTI score of zero for the first time.
Eritrea 0.000 93 -3.734 0.000
The country has not recorded a terrorist attack since 2016.
Eswatini 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 Mozambique recorded the largest decline in the number of
Gambia 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 terrorist attacks between 2020 and 2021. Deaths from terrorism
Ghana 0.000 93 0.000 0.000 declined by 82 per cent, from 507 in 2020 to 93 in 2021, and are
Guinea 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
now at their lowest level since 2017. The fall in deaths in
Mozambique was driven by a marked decrease in deaths
Guinea-Bissau 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
attributed to IS, with the group being responsible for only seven
Lesotho 0.000 93 -2.273 -2.028
attacks in 2021, compared to 22 in 2020.
Liberia 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Malawi 0.000 93 0.000 -0.158
Namibia 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Sierra Leone 0.000 93 -1.179 0.000
South Sudan 0.000 93 -0.227 0.000
Zambia 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Zimbabwe 0.000 93 -1.201 0.000
Mauritius 0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Madagascar 0.000 93 0.000 0.000

Central African
0.000 93 0.000 0.000
Republic

Regional Average 0.433 0.004

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 44

Terrorism in the Sahel
SUMMARY
BOX 3.1
The Sahel
The Sahel region faces many converging and complex social,
Definitions of the Sahel vary. In this analysis, the Sahel
economic, political and security challenges. These are likely to
region denotes the semi-arid region of western and
continue to undermine the development of the conditions
north-central Africa, which comprises parts of ten
necessary for Positive Peace, ensuring the Sahel would remain
countries:
trapped in a cycle of violence and vulnerability.
• Burkina Faso,
The inability of several Sahelian governments to provide • Cameroon,
effective security has encouraged terrorist groups to continue • Chad,
their activities, making the Sahel increasingly more violent, with • The Gambia,
deaths rising ten times between 2007 and 2021. Figure 3.1 • Guinea,
highlights the increases in total deaths in Burkina Faso, Mali • Mali,
and Niger. Total deaths recorded in 2021 were 732, 574 and 588, • Mauritania,
• Niger,
respectively. Groups such as Islamic State (IS) continue to wage
• Nigeria
a violent campaign in the region, with deaths in the Sahel
• Senegal.
accounting for 35 per cent of global total of terrorism deaths in
2021, compared with just one per cent in 2007.

The pervasive insecurity has also led locals to take action to

defend themselves with the appearance of localized militias, FIGURE 3.1
such as the Dan Nan Ambassagou Association (“those who put Changes in deaths in the Sahel, 2020–2021
their trust in God”) adding to the cycle of violence, raising the Deaths in Mali and Niger significantly increased between
prospects of semi-territoriality, where control of the territory is 2020 and 2021.
contested between government and non-state actors.1 Anecdotal
Burkina Faso Mali Niger
evidence and fieldwork research indicates that both Jama'at
Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the
Greater Sahara (ISGS) are solving family, land and cattle
disputes. They provide swift and effective justice non-state 600
actors provide security, justice, education and other core
services that locals need, adding to the accepted assumption
that state institutions are slow, inefficient, sporadic, and
NUMBER OF DEATHS

corrupt.2 400

In the Sahel, over the last few years, the terrorism environment
has gone through several changes, as new groups emerged,
200
other merged, adapting to the local, regional and international
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. This gave
rise to what has been termed the ‘jihadisation of banditry’ as
criminal groups look to use religion to defend their criminal 0
actions.3 Some of the groups had chosen to join the al-Qaeda 2020 2021
franchise or the Islamic State franchise, which may also explain Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations
the increase in violence. A closer look at the data also highlights
that most attacks occurred in border regions, where
governmental control is generally low and the military tends to
operate out of fortified bases.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 45

With its challenging terrain, distinct local practices, and porous
borders, local leaders in the Sahel have tremendous autonomy;
they operate as political entrepreneurs, making calculated
decisions as to where to operate, how, and against whom. They
exhibit greater willingness to negotiate or shift allegiances, as
their principal goal is survival.4 This type of pragmatism is also
present with those deemed as bandits, typified by the notorious
Dogo Gide, a Nigerian bandit, known to cooperate with Ansaru,
with the terrorists even supporting a raid against a rival gang.5
The implications for the security environment are substantial, as
the head of a terrorist group may not be theologically wedded to
the transnational jihadi networks. This raises the prospect of a
larger shift in jihadi strategic thinking in that historically,
jihadis commitment to ideological purity meant that they
weakened their ability to build and hold a state, but this
pragmatic shift raises the prospect of sustained, low-intensity
conflict that would facilitate a takeover sometime in the future.6
Figure 3.2 shows the trends in both terrorist incidents and
deaths from terrorism since 2007. Deaths and incidents
increased across every country in the region other than
Mauritania and Chad, and every country in the Sahel other than
Mauritania and Chad recorded at least 40 deaths from terrorism
in 2021.
Niger had the largest increase in deaths from terrorism, with
deaths more than doubling over the past year. This is the
highest terrorism death toll in the country since 2007. Although
FIGURE 3.2
Incidents and deaths from terrorism in the Sahel, 2007–2021
Both incidents and deaths increased by well over 1,000 per cent from 2007 to 2021.
Incidents
750
2,000
500
250
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 46
the majority of deaths were attributed either to unknown groups
or to unspecified Muslim extremists, it is suspected that these
attacks could be the work of either Islamic State in West Africa
(ISWA) or Boko Haram who were active in the country in 2021.
The rise in terrorist activity in Niger is part of a larger increase
across the Sahel region, with similar surges seen in Mali and
Burkina Faso over the past few years. One possible reason for
the rise in violence in Niger is that Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna
Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (JAS) and ISWA appear to operate in those
areas, whereas Ansaru seem to operate in Kaduna State, Nigeria.
There is also evidence of jihadi activity in the Cote d'Ivoire,
aimed at fermenting religious and ethnic tensions. A small
village along the border with Burkina Faso, Kafolo, had seen two
major attacks in 18 months. Locals and the Ivorian government
attributed the attacks to Fulani jihadis. The attacks led many
Fulanis to leave the area, as they feared reprisals (adding to the
already large displacement); and, second, it brought a large
military presence which has discouraged villagers from going to
the fields, as they fear being attacked.7
Terrorist activity has been primarily concentrated in the Lake
Chad Basin, comprising parts of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and
Nigeria, and the Central Sahel area along the Burkina Faso, Mali,
and Niger border. There is also evidence that the violence is
encroaching on the coastal states, with some activities occurring
in Benin and Togo.8
Deaths
1,000
0
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
FIGURE 3.3
Terrorist attacks in the Sahel, 2007–2021
Most terrorist attacks occur away from major urban centers.

MAURITANIA
MALI
Nouakchott
NIGER
SENEGAL CHAD

N'Djamena
GUINEA Niamey
Bamako Ouagadougou
NIGERIA

BURKINA FASO

CAMEROON

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of terrorist deaths in the Sahel
between January 2007 and December 2021. Burkina Faso
recorded 732 deaths from terrorism in 2021, its second highest
number of deaths (scoring 8.270 on the GTI). Although the
majority of deaths were attributed either to unknown groups or
to unspecified Muslim extremists, it is suspected that these
attacks could be the work of either ISWA or Boko Haram who
were active in the country in 2021. There were 17 deaths
attributed to Boko Haram and 349 attributed to ISWA in 2021. It
is therefore unsurprising that Burkina Faso recorded the largest
deterioration in peacefulness on the 2021 Global Peace Index
(GPI), falling 13 places.
Mali in 2021 recorded its highest number of terrorist attacks and
deaths since 2011. Attacks and deaths from terrorism in Mali
increased by 56 per cent and 46 per cent respectively, when
compared with the previous year. This is the largest year-to-year
increase since 2017, continuing an upward trend that began with
the 2015 declaration of a state of emergency in the wake of the
Radisson Blu Hotel attack in Bamako. This is possibly why
Burkina Faso and Mali are the epicentres of the Sahel crisis, in
part because groups such as JNIM and ISWA solidified their
presence in the region.

FIGURE 3.4
Positive feedback loops supporting terrorist organisations
This diagram shows the nodes and linkages of a terrorist support system.

Support by Financial and

Sympathisers Material
Resources

Density of
Recruitment Influence of Impact of
Terrorist
of Terrorists Network Attacks
Network

Feedback loops
Negative Media
Recruitment
Perception of Reports Funding
Countries Media
Motivation

Source: Schonenberger et al., (2014); IEP adaptation

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 47

The presence of these groups has had a cascading effect on the
general security, with an increase in intra- and inter-tribal
violence and a spike in the formation of militias looking to
provide self-defence, as government forces seem unable to
respond to the rise in terrorist and criminal activity. There has
also been more violence between the groups, possibly because
they are vying for supremacy and dominance.9 This is seen in
respect to Boko Haram which had broken into three groups
Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-Da‘wa wal-Jihad (the original Boko
Haram, known as JAS), the ISWA, and Ansaru.
Deaths in Nigeria fell by 51 per cent in 2021, following three
years of successive increases. This decline was due to a fall in
deaths attributed to Boko Haram and ISWA, particularly in the
Borno region where deaths fell by 71 per cent. ISWA overtook
Boko Haram as the deadliest terror group in Nigeria in 2021
and, with an increased presence in neighbouring countries such
as Mali, Cameroon, and Niger presents a substantial threat to
the Sahel region. One possible explanation for the decline of
Boko Haram was the death of their leader Abubakar Shekau in
2021.10
Following the 2012 Tuareg rebellion, the occupation of Timbuktu
by jihadis, and the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of
Azawad, the international community, with the consent of the
Malian government authorised the dispatch of a large French
and African Union-led forces. The operations have had some
tactical successes such as killing key leaders, although it did not
prevent AQIM and JNIM from growing and expanding their
operations. To escape, jihadis seem to have moved away from
Mali, establishing a presence in Burkina Faso, Central Mali,
northern Chad, and northern Nigeria, leading to an increase in
terrorist attacks in those areas. In July 2021, President Macron
announced that the number of French troops in Mali would be
reduced to approximately 2,500-3,000 by early 2022, which
could encourage a jihadi resurgence.11 However, some targeting
errors and human rights abuses by local troops have powered
AQIM’s recruitment and damaged support for governments.12
Thus far, international and regional responses to the violence
have failed to prevent rising levels of terrorism, made worse by
the region having some of the highest population growth,
significant increases in food insecurity and widespread
displacement.
There are indications that terrorism activities are spreading
westward, with some terrorist activity in Benin and Togo. One
possible explanation for the increase in activity is groups
looking to exploit internal political instabilities brought about
by coups or attempted coups in several coastal countries. For
example, for years, Benin had been one of Africa’s most stable
democracies however, differences between President Patrice
Talon and the opposition has led to some instability, public
demonstrations and insecurity.13 Moreover, the decision of the
transitional government in Chad in August 2021 to reduce its
security presence along the "three-border region" from 1,200
troops to just 600, could have given the groups more freedom to
operate,14 although the security situation in Chad seemed to
have improved from 2020 to 2021.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 48
TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL: CONTEXT
Terrorism usually occurs as a tactic within a conflict setting, and
as a tactic by groups looking to bring about political change.
Several factors are fuelling the current crisis in the Sahel.
Firstly, the presence of groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) which had been looking for the opportunity to
frame the struggle as part of a broader ideological, theological,
political, social, economic, and cultural movement. Over the last
decade, AQIM has reframed its engagement to gain support
from elements within the Tuareg,15 leading it to form ties with
groups such as Ansar al-Dine, al-Murabitoun, and Katiba
Macina.
Secondly, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS) and
its intention to have regional hubs led to the formation of ties
with local actors such as Boko Haram, which led to the
emergence of the ISWA and the ISGS.16
Thirdly, ecological degradation has affected the security
environment, forcing people to search for new grazing routes,
arable land, and water facilities, and general security.
Conversely, when looking at Northwest Nigeria, the terrain is
conducive to support an insurgency, as the forests provide both
security but also sources of revenue.17
Three types of terrorist groups operate in the Sahel. Firstly,
there are the transnational jihadi groups with official links to
al-Qaeda (AQIM, JNIM) or the Islamic State (ISWA, ISGS). The
second type of group focuses on local issues; framing their
actions through an ethnic-nationalist-religious paradigm (Ansar
Dine,18 al-Mourabitoun19, and the Katiba Macina20). The third
type of groups emerge as a response to specific situations and
events such as the Dan Nan Ambassagou Association. The
Association appeared around 2016, claiming to provide self-
defence to Bambaras who have a grudge against the Fulanis.21
Another example are the Koglweogos (Mooré: kogle ‘to protect’;
weogo ‘territory’) operating mainly in Burkina Faso of whom
there are around 50.22
MILITIAS TO JIHADISTS
The Sahel faces security challenges with ethnic-nationalist
insurgent groups, terrorist organisations, and criminal
enterprises. At times, they cooperate, at other times they fight,23
and sometimes they amalgamate or even cooperate in carrying
out operations.24
Although AQIM carried out one attack in 2021 it remains a
major threat as it increasingly operates as al-Qaeda’s main
franchising official, promoting al-Qaeda’s ideology, helping to
train recruits, as well as provide advice and support to new and
existing groups. The key purpose for AQIM is to infuse local
issues with al-Qaeda’s transnational jihadi campaign, as seen in
its decision to reach out and form strategic alliances with
elements within the Tuaregs, such as Ansar Al Dine and JNIM.
Figure 3.5 underlies the links between jihadis, as the groups
have evolved since the early 1990s when the dominant group
was the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, which had many
members who had travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s. Over
FIGURE 3.5
Evolution of Salafi-jihadi groups in the Sahel Salafi-jiahdi Sahel
Many terrorist groups split or merge into other groups.

GIA (1992-1998) GSPC (1998-06) AQIM (2006-)

MUJAO (2011-13) Ansar al-Dine al Mulathamun

(2011-) (2012-13)

ISGS

al Muwaqqin
al Murabitoun (2012-13)
(2013-17
ISWA

Ansar al-Islam Macina Liberation

(2016-) (2015-)

JNIM (2017-)

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations

time, as their influence wane or change, individuals leave to including a greater targeting of civilian populations, possibly, as
form their own groups. under the ISWA model combatants are given the right to do as
they pleased with the spoils that they get from an attack.29 Thus,
TERRORIST TACTICS: ALLIANCE with this in mind it was unsurprising that ISWA overtook Boko
FORMATION: PASTORALIST POPULISM Haram as the most active terrorist group in Niger in 2021, with
VERSUS HIERARCHICAL SYSTEM the group being responsible for 23 attacks in the country with
an average casualty rate of 15.2 deaths per attack. Deaths
A close look at some of the actions of the key Jihadi groups in because of ISWA attacks accounted for 60 per cent of the total
the region leads one to see two different strategies of alliance casualties in Niger. A similar trend is visible in Nigeria where
formation. Studies suggest that JNIM uses pastoral populism to civilian casualties from ISWA attacks were at 84 per cent.
form alliances, whereas ISWA employs a more hierarchical
system.25 The pastoral populism model resonated with many FIGURE 3.6
Fulanis as it highlights and exploits Fulani grievances on taxes, Attacks targeting civilians in Burkina Faso and
corruption, injustice, lack of resources, and discrimination.26 Mali compared to the rest of the Sahel
JNIM is more likely to attack military targets whereas AQIM is
The difference between the two approaches is significant and
more likely to engage in attacking targets that are neither
impacts the level of violence as under pastoral populism, the military, government nor private property.
focus is on horizontal local alliance building involving less
Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)
violence, as the group looks to persuade others to join, leading Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
them to not to claim sole responsibility for actions against Islamic State West Africa (ISWA)
civilians. This approach is a commonly used by al-Qaeda. It is
UXO and
worth noting that in 2010, bin Laden had warned Droukdel Mines
against toppling local governments before the jihadi movement Other/
had sufficient strength to establish and uphold an Islamic Unclear
State.27 AQIM has sought to embody the loose network Mortars
approach.28 The advantage is less violence, but it also means the
Incendiary
groups are working to undermine state institutions as they look devices and
to create their own sub-systems. Nevertheless, JNIM’s fire bombs
commitment to terrorise the population remains with the death Firearms
toll rising to 207 deaths in 2021, almost five times the amount
recorded for 2020. JNIM’s lethality seems to have increased as Explosives
in 2020 the rate was 3.9 deaths, but by 2021, it was 4.1 deaths. All other
Figure 3.6 shows the relative likelihood of AQIM and JNIM targets
attacking different targets. 0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ATTACKS
The ISWA model involves greater acts of violence and brutality, Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 49

 FIGURE 3.7
THE KILLING OF LOCAL LEADERS
Terrorist groups instability
A pattern seems to be emerging in the Sahel whereby terrorist A clear tactic of terrorist groups is to foster instability by either
demanding obedience or killing locals leader to create a power
groups are targeting chiefs, mayors, council members, and
vacuum that they fill.
religious leaders, creating a power vacuum in the area (see
Figure 3.7).30 Such a tactic adds to the political-economic-social-
cultural chaos as these leaders not only administered, manage,
and oversee many institutions and systems, they coordinate leading to more groups move
violence and into an area
between local, regional, and national governments and the displacement
people.31 An additional benefit of this tactic for the Islamists is
that the power vacuum leads to local power struggles between
different actors all vying for supremacy, leading the government
(military) to respond with greater force and polices that cripple
local economies.32
killing or removal
demand
HARD COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES of leader creates
obedience/
a power vacuum
that the group support
Since the 2012 Tuareg uprising, the region has seen an increase would seek to fill
in the use of hard counterterrorism measures, as governments
with the support of the international community had looked to failure to get
support, leads
challenge non-state actors. The local, national defence force and the group to
the international-led engagement either through Operation threaten/kill
Serval or the AU peacekeeping mission (African-led local leader
International Support Mission to Mali, AFISMA) have led to the Source: IEP
killing of many terrorists, including Abdelmalek Droukdel, the
head of AQIM and a member of AQ’s “management
committee”.33 However, decapitation programmes create new CRIME AND TERRORISM
challenges including internal competition as individuals first
fight for the leadership, and secondly, they go through a period Historically, criminal activity has been present in the Sahel. One
of having to cement their authority, which often means more centre is Northern Mali, which has served as a key crossroad in
violence.34 There is also the possibility that the new leader may transnational smuggling networks for licit and illicit goods
also be more ruthless than their predecessors. For example, Abu ranging from fuel, cigarettes and foodstuffs to drugs, arms, and
Ubaidah Youssef al-Annabi replaced Droukdel as the leader of people. The desire to sustain these routes impact corruption
AQIM. Throughout his life, Annabi has called for more attacks levels, as those engaged in these trades form ties with officials to
against France and French targets whereas Droukdel appeared facilitate the trade. There are indications that competition over
more pragmatic in his approach to promoting the jihadi the routes and the revenue gained from these illicit activities are
agenda, possibly because of his experience with the short-lived putting further pressure on already strained social structures
Islamic Emirate of Azawad. and inter-tribal, inter-ethnic relations.37

The international force and the training given to local security
forces have produced mix results because the regions
surrounding Burkina Faso’s borders with Niger and Mali have
experienced the most terror attacks, 72 per cent of all 2021
attacks in the Sahel. One explanation was the presence of the
international force in Mali, which has pushed the terrorists
across the border; a common method for groups to avoid
assaults, as these forces are limited in terms of where they may
operate.
Kidnapping it is a common tactic used by terrorist
organisations. There has been a substantial increase in these
activities across the region most notably in Burkina Faso. Figure
3.8 shows that terrorism is also associated with organised crime,
namely kidnapping, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and
narcotics. There has been a substantial increase in kidnapping
in the Sahel (Figure 3.9), with 7 reported incidents in 2016 to 111
in 2019. Looking at AQIM, kidnapping has reportedly netted the
group over US dollars 110 million since 2003.38

In line with the African Union and the Economic Community of

West African States rules on military coups, Mali has had
sanctions impose on it, in the hope of restoring elections and
democracy. The government responded by asking the Danish
force to leave, and expelling the French ambassador. There are
indications that Russian private military contractor Wagner
Group is in Mali suggesting that the government could be
looking to develop relations with Moscow.35 Moreover, there are
also indications of increased Chinese interest in the Sahel with
Beijing providing US$ 45.5 million to the security and
counterterrorism operations of the G5 Sahel Joint Force.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 50

 FIGURE 3.8
Correlation between GTI and Organised Crime Index Score, 2021
The higher the terrorism impact, the more likely is the presence of organised criminal activities.

r=0.46
NGA
7

CMR
NER
6 TCD
MLI
CRIMINALITY

GIN BFA
5
SEN
MRT
4

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5

GTI BANDED SCORE

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, OCI, IEP calculations

FIGURE 3.9
Kidnapping in the Sahel, 2007–2020
Over the last decade, the number of kidnapping incidents in the Sahel has increased substantially.

750
NUMBER OF KIDNAPPINGS

500

250

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, ACLED, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 51

ECOLOGICAL THREATS AND
TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL
Based on IEP's Ecological Threat Report (ETR), water risk is the
most severe catastrophic threat for six countries in the Sahel,
followed by food risk for three countries. Rapid population
growth is a multiplier for all countries in the region. In
particular, Niger has the highest projected population growth
with an increase of 161 per cent by 2050, or an increase from
25.1 million people to 65.5 million.
The Sahel holds the world’s highest concentration of hotspot
countries – these are the countries most likely to collapse when
exposed to further shocks. Six of the ten countries within the
Sahel are classified as “hotspots”, meaning they have low levels
of resilience and a high or extremely high catastrophic threat
score: Chad, Cameroon, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria.
Many of these areas are already experiencing armed conflict.
Table 3.1 details the ETR scores of the countries in the Sahel
region. The majority of countries in the region, six out of ten,
face extremely high and high risk from ecological threats, while
the remaining four face medium risk.

FIGURE 3.10
Ecological threat in the Sahel
The majority of countries in the Sahel region receive an extremely high or high ETR score.
Number of countries scoring ETR score by country Frequency of catastrophic threat
extremely high or high by indicator
10 7
9 9
6
6
8 8

7 5
Extremely High
6
5 5 4 and High 4

4 4 Medium 3
3
3 6
2 2
1 1
1 1
0
Water Food Rapid Temperature Natural
Risk Risk Population Anomalies Disasters 0
Water Food Rapid
Growth Risk Risk Population
Growth
Source: IEP Ecological Threat Report

FIGURE 3.11
Sub-national ETR score and deaths from terrorism, Sahel, 2021
The higher the ETR score, the higher the ecological threat .

TOTAL DEATHS
0

40

80

ETR SCORE

120 2

4
160
5

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 52

TABLE 3.1
Water risk is the most common threat in the region, with all ten
Overview of ETR scores, Sahel region, 2021 countries scoring extremely high or high on this indicator; this
Eight of the ten countries in the Sahel region rank in the bottom is because water has a strategic value. Consequently, water
half of the ETR.
scarcity has been the cause of conflict. Understanding the
context of water scarcity in relation to terrorism is key because
Projected
ETR ETR Population even though no group in the Sahel has yet to make water
Max Threat
Score Rank Change scarcity a reason for using violence, the lack of water or concern
(2021 – 2050)
Rapid Population
over access or issues relating to quality and quantity of the
Niger 5 177 177
Growth water contribute to the conditions in which terrorist groups
Burkina Faso 4 165 165 Water Risk operate and thrive.
Nigeria 4 156 156 Water Risk
Mali 4 153 153 Water Risk Conversely, water could be used as a tool of coercion
Chad 4 148 148 Food Risk exacerbating water insecurity, therefore those that have access
Mauritania 4 137 137 Water Risk to or control over the war could use it as a tool for recruitment.42
Gambia 3 129 129 Water Risk
Senegal 3 124 124 Water Risk
TABLE 3.2
Guinea 3 87 87 Food Risk
Cameroon 3 85 85 Food Risk Relationship between terrorism and
Source: IEP Ecological Threat Report
ecological threats
The impact of Terrorism is closely correlated with ecological
threats related to food and water insecurity. These are the two
Table 3.2 shows the correlation between the GTI and the ETR. It largest risks facing the Sahel.
shows that the presence of terrorism is most correlated with
food and water insecurity. These coincide with the two greatest
risks that the Sahel face.39 GTI 2022

Food Risk Score 0.438

WATER RISK AND TERRORISM
ETR Score 0.428
The Sahel size means that rainfall varies drastically when
Resource Scarcity Domain Score 0.39
comparing the north and south, with the latter having around
800mm annually whereas the north can receive at little as Water Risk Score 0.326

100-200mm chiefly in June, July, and August. Niger, Nigeria, and Rapid Population Growth Score 0.292
Mali are watered by the Niger River, whereas Senegal and
Natural Disasters Score 0.279
Mauritania by the Senegal rivers. Water scarcity and access to
only dirty water have caused enormous damage and harm to the Catastrophic Score 0.261
local population. It is worth noting that fetching water is
Natural Disasters and Temperature
considered a woman’s job, often falling to young girls who must 0.257
Change Domain Score
work on average six km to fetch water (each container weights
Temperature Anomaly Score -0.068
about 15kg40). The walk is arduous and dangerous, making girls
vulnerable to abduction and sexual violence.41 Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.12
Terrorist attacks in the Sahel, 2021
Terrorist incidents tend to occur near waterways and routes.

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 53

WATER RISK, FOOD INSECURITY AND
RAPID POPULATION GROWTH AND
TERRORISM
The changes in the climate have led to more droughts and
floods.43 These undermine food production in the region,
destroying diverse human settlements and causing widespread
displacement.44 Linked to the food risk element is the lack of
land protection. Reportedly, in 2020, over 43 million people in
the six Sahelian countries face45 food insecurity (Phase 2) and
almost 18 million people are in either crisis or emergency
(Phase 3+) state.46 One report looking at the water situation
around Lake Chad highlighted that not only are there around
30 million people across Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon
competing over dwindling water supplies but that Boko Haram
looks to exploit this situation.47 For example, by controlling the
water they can demand a tax for access, they can use it to
demand that families provide recruits; or they can use the need
for water to forcefully conscript individuals.
Historically, food insecurity had motivated insurgencies and
revolutions, but increasingly groups such as Islamic State, Boko
Haram and al-Shahab used food in their tactics, raising
questions as to whether there is a link between terrorism and
food availability.48 One possible link between terrorism and food
insecurity refers to the lawless environment that arises in areas
affected by prolong conflict, which influences the cost of the
production and distribution of food, market inefficiencies, and
poor or the lack of proper governance. Food insecurity could
"Many of the Sahelian
countries are experiencing
rapid population growth,
which puts more pressure
on fragile institutions and
limited resources."
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 54
also affect terrorist groups, as they would need to search for
food too, as was the case with Boko Haram, which created a
food crisis in Northern Nigeria and Lake Chad, which ended up
affecting it, compelling it to head to Cameroon as it searched for
food security.49 A separate issue relating to food security is
access or lack of, which could be a tactic, aimed at generating
anti-government sentiments and create a political void that the
group would seek to fulfil.
Many of the Sahelian countries are experiencing rapid
population growth, which puts more pressure on fragile
institutions and limited resources. Rapid population growth
could be a significant factor in facilitating terrorism activities as
it adds to the overexploitation of limited resources and
inhabitable spaces, which in turn intensifies socioeconomic
differences and possibly gives rise to more violence and
terrorism.50 In the mid-2010s, Cameroon authorities claimed
that high poverty rates, high levels of food insecurity and
malnutrition encouraged many young Cameroonians to cross
over to Nigeria. Reports indicate that Boko Haram sought to
take advantage of the poverty and lack of opportunity with
reports indicating that young men were faced with a stark
choice, join Boko Haram or stay at home, do nothing, and put
more pressure on the family, which was struggling to eat. Boko
Haram offered between US$600 – US$800 each month, whereas
those lucky to get a job could at best earn US$72 a month.51
BOX 3.2
Food insecurity and malnourishment

Food insecurity refers to a situation when people do not among the ten countries with the highest levels of
have secure access to safe and nutritious food that they terrorism in the region.
need for normal growth and development. Sub-Saharan
Ten per cent or more of young males suffer from very high
Africa as a region with very high rates of undernourishment,
levels of thinness in eight of the ten countries in the Sahel.
Figure 3.13 shows thinness by sex in the region. According to
this, males tend to have higher rates of thinness in the The connection between thinness, undernourishment and
region. conflict is an under-researched area with limited available
data. Analysing these relationships could be important to
In 14 of the 44 sub-Saharan African countries covered in the
better understand how malnourishment contributes to
GPI, more than ten per cent of young males suffer from very
broader conflict in society, particularly among its young
high levels of thinness. Seven of these are among the ten
men.
least peaceful countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and five are

FIGURE 3.13
Thinness in Africa by Sex, 2016
In sub-Saharan Africa, thinness in males in some countries is three times as prevalent when compared to females in the
5-19 age bracket.

Sahel countries in Bold Female Male

Ethiopia
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Niger
Senegal
Nigeria
Central African Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Angola
Mauritania
Chad
Namibia
Mali
Eritea
Kenya
Guinea-Bissau
Republic of the Congo
Togo
Benin
Burkina Faso
Guinea
Sierra Leone
Botswana
Burundi
Malawi
The Gambia
Cabo Verde
Liberia
Lesotho
Zimbabwe
Comoros
Ghana
Mauritius
Tanzania
Madagascar
Rwanda
Somalia
Gabon
Zambia
Uganda
Cote d’Ivoire
Sao Tome and Principe
Cameroon
Djibouti
Seychelles
Swaziland
South Africa
Mozambique
0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0%
PERCENTAGE WITH BMI < -2 STANDARD DEVIATIONS BELOW MEDIAN

Source: WHO, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 55

RESILIENCE IN THE SAHEL: SYSTEMIC
THREATS AND POSITIVE PEACE
The ETR shows that the Sahel faces high threats from water and
food security and rapid population growth. With low levels of
Positive Peace (see Text Box 3.3), the Sahel lacks the coping
capacity to adequately adapt to a changing risk landscape. This
combination of threats and low Positive Peace lead to the Sahel
to be identified as a regional hotspot in the ETR.
basic services. Issues with law and order have meant that militia
groups are formed either for an immediate defensive purposes
or for more long term reasons. A good example of this is the
proliferation of the Koglweogo in Burkina Faso.52 Alternatively,
as is the case in Northwest Nigeria, lack of governance has led
to the proliferation of banditry, with some reports suggesting
that there are as many as 30,000 bandits in the area, spread
over 100 gangs. Some gangs could have as many as 2,000
fighters.53

Figure 3.15 shows the levels of Positive Peace in the Sahel. The
Sahel scores lower than the global average across all eight
Pillars of Peace. Levels of Positive Peace have also remained
consistent with only moderate improvements and deteriorations
since 2009. The Sahel lags behind the global average the most in
High Levels of Human Capital, Acceptance of the Rights of
Others, Equitable Distribution of Resources and Sound Business
Environment.
Weaknesses in these pillars affect the regions’ ability to mitigate
the risks it faces. The remainder of this section highlights some
of the challenges these present.
Well-Functioning Government
Across the region, states (systems) are very fragile, which
creates a space for non-state actors to come and look to provide
High Levels of Corruption
There are many examples as to the link between corruption and
sustained conflict. Notably, the Sahelian countries’ security
services have faced countless allegations of corrupt practices,
which not only emphasises low confidence in their abilities, but
emphasise a strong possibility that defence aid would be
wasted. The situation is made worse by the fact that Mali, Niger,
Burkina Faso and Nigeria have adopted a doctrine that
identifies corruption as a strategic threat.54
Low Levels of Human Capital
A skilled human capital base reflects the extent to which
societies educate citizens and promote the development of
knowledge, thereby improving economic productivity, care for
the young, political participation and social capital. These are
absent in the Sahel which mean that individuals need to look
for ways to support themselves and their families.

BOX 3.3
Positive Peace

Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions and FIGURE 3.14

structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. It The Pillars of Positive Peace
encapsulates the set of developmental factors that
generate resilient societies, that is, societies that are A visual representation of the factors comprising Positive
Peace. All eight factors are highly interconnected and
capable of protecting their citizens from negative shocks
interact in varied and complex ways.
and recovering more rapidly and completely in their
aftermath.

The concept of Positive Peace was first introduced in the

1960s, as a complement to the traditional idea of peace.
This idea was predicated on the absence of violence and
fear of violence, and as such, it was known as a negative
interpretation of peace. As a counterpoint, Positive Peace
was defined as the presence of a number of factors that
promote socio-economic development and societal
resilience.

IEP has developed a conceptual and statistical framework

to measure Positive Peace in countries and communities,
based on eight critical areas, or Pillars, of socio-economic
development: Acceptance of the Rights of Others,
Free-Flow of Information, Equitable Distribution of
Resources, Good Relations with Neighbours, Well-
Functioning Governments, Low Levels of Corruption, High
Levels of human Capital and Sound Business Environment.
This is shown in Figure 3.14.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 56

 FIGURE 3.15
Positive Peace in the Sahel compared to global average
The Sahelian countries record a low score on the Acceptance of the Rights of Others, Equitable Distribution of Resources, and
Sound Business Environment Pillars.
Improvement between 2009-2020 Deterioration between 2009-2020
5
(1=BEST, 5=WORST)

4
PPI SCORE

1
Free Flow of Well-functioning High Levels Acceptance Equitable Good Low Levels of Sound
Information Government of Human of the Rights Distribution Relations with Corruption Business
Capital of Others of Resources Neighbours Environment
DIFFERENCE WITH
WORLD AVERAGE

0.00
-0.25
-0.50
-0.75
-1.00
Free Flow of Well-functioning High Levels Acceptance Equitable Good Low Levels of Sound
Information Government of Human of the Rights Distribution Relations with Corruption Business
Capital of Others of Resources Neighbours Environment

Lower than world average

Source: IEP

Equitable Distribution of Resources and Sound Business "Ongoing violence has taken
Environment
Peaceful countries tend to ensure equity in access to resources
a large toll on the civilian
such as education, health, and to a lesser extent, equity in population, leading to
income distribution. Moreover, Sahelian countries’ business
widespread displacement,
disruption of agricultural
environment is easily affected by climate change and by global
economic trends. For example, the Sahelian countries rely
heavily on livestock and agricultural markets, which are easily production, livelihoods
affected by ecological changes. Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and to
a lesser degree, Niger have also made great strands in
and cross-border trade,
developing their oil and/or minerals but these are impacted by and restricted affected
world market’s unpredictability resultant in highly volatile populations from accessing
basic services."
economic growth impacting development goals.

Acceptance of the Rights of Others

Peaceful countries often have formal laws that guarantee basic
human rights and freedoms, and the informal social and
cultural norms that relate to behaviours of citizens. The GTI
indicates that there has been a substantial rise in civilian
fatalities in Burkina Faso (seven-fold between 2018 and 2019),
such violence could support recruitment because individuals
recognise that membership could provide security.55

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 57

REGIONAL CASE STUDIES
BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER BORDER
AREA
The last five years have seen a significant increase of terrorist
attacks in the Central Sahel, predominantly at the intersection
of the Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger borders, with over 1,600
terrorist deaths recorded in the three countries in 2021, up from
around 1,300 in 2020.
The incursion of jihadi groups, such as ISWA and JNIM, could
explain the increase. There have also been more clashes between
these two groups, culminating in the death of Abubakar Shekau
in mid-2021. One possible explanation for the uptake in terrorist
attacks around the Lake Chad area and in Maiduguri56 was the
reinstatement of Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the leader of ISWA
and the possible defection of Boko Harams fighters to ISWA
following Shekau’s death.57
Terrorist groups have sought to exploit intercommunal tensions
between agriculturalists and pastoralists, further exacerbating
the fragile security situation. For instance, JNIM has sought to
embed itself into local communities by portraying itself as a
defender of ethnic groups, such as the Fulani in Mali.58 Similarly,
ISWA has sought to take advantage of intercommunal conflicts
between the Fulani and Tuaregs in the Mali-Niger border area.59
By exploiting existing tensions, both groups have been able to
co-opt disaffected individuals into taking up arms against either
rival groups, or government forces.
Other interesting developments were terrorist activities or
attempts to carry out operations in some of the coastal
countries. Côte d’Ivoire had experienced six terrorist attacks,
with the use of improvised explosive devices.
FIGURE 3.16
Total incidents and deaths from terrorism in
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, 2007–2020
Terrorist activity in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger began to
increase considerably after 2016.
1,400
1,200
Incidents
Deaths
1,000
800
600
400
200
0 positioned themselves as alternative service providers and
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2020
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 58
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger share many challenges, including
weak institutions, corruption, lack of infrastructure, and
difficulty controlling their vast borders.60 In addition to growing
insecurity, the region has also faced prolonged periods of
drought and flooding, which has had a severe impact on fragile
livelihoods and people’s capacity to feed themselves in the
region.61 Moreover, these countries have some of the highest
population growth rates in the world.
In November 2019, the World Food Programme reported a
“three-country crisis” in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which
has led to the displacement of one million people, while 2.4
million require food assistance.62 In Burkina Faso, the most
affected administrative units – the Sahel and Centre-Nord –
account for almost 900,000 internally displaced people (IDPs).
These administrative units are also facing the highest threats
from water scarcity and population growth.
Similarly, in Niger, the country’s security challenges are
compounded by rapid population growth, and facing the
greatest threat from terrorism in the country. The
administrative units of Tillabéry, Diffa and Tahoua have the
largest population growth rates.
In Mali, the administrative units of Mopti and Gao, account for
the majority of terrorist activity in the country. Water risk is the
greatest threat for the Mopti administrative unit and
compounded by high population growth.
THE LAKE CHAD REGION
In the Lake Chad region, which comprises parts of Cameroon,
Chad, Niger and Nigeria, conflict is complicated by several
ecological threats including water scarcity, high population
growth, drought, desertification, land degradation and food
insecurity.63 Within the region, approximately 90 per cent of
livelihoods rely on lake water and rainfall.64
Worsening droughts, erratic rainfall and desertification,
confounded by an unprecedented security crisis driven by
persistent terrorist and violent extremist attacks, as well as
ethnic, religious, and farmer-herder conflicts over land use.65 At
the same time, the rise of Boko Haram has resulted in
thousands of deaths throughout the Lake Chad Basin region of
West Africa.
Boko Haram and ISWA have sought to exploit existing fragilities
by taking control of large areas of territory around Lake Chad.
The groups have also aligned with local communal conflicts and
their leaders to gain recruits by siding on divisions between
ethnic groups, such as the Fulani ethnic groups in Nigeria, as
well as the long-standing farmer-herder violence over water and
grazing areas.67
The deteriorating environmental conditions in the Lake Chad
Region and associated disruption to agricultural production,
and widespread poverty have enabled the spread of Boko
Haram and ISWA across the region.68 Both groups have
facilitated recruitment by offering employment to those whose
livelihoods have been impacted by recurring ecological threats,
particularly youths, and consequently been able to expand their
influence.69 In particular, ISWA has reportedly provided basic
FIGURE 3.17
Total incidents and deaths from terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin66, 2007–2020
Terrorism deaths in the Lake Chad region peaked in 2015, at over 2,200 deaths.
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations
services and law enforcement in areas under its control, thereby
building ties with local communities.70
Regional security forces have often struggled to contain the
militias and regain territory taken by Boko Haram and ISWA. In
2014, the African Union authorised a Multi-National Joint Task
Force (MNJTF) comprising of soldiers from Benin, Cameroon,
Chad and Niger to assist the Nigerian government in attacking
territory held by Boko Haram. The United States has also
provided military capacity-building assistance for national
security forces and logistics and advisory support for the
MNJTF.71 However, governments in the Lake Chad Basin region
face competing security priorities. For instance, in Cameroon,
personnel have redeployed from fighting ISWA in the north to
the west of the country following the outbreak of a separate
secessionist conflict in 2017. More broadly, governance deficits,
lack of public trust and socio-economic fragilities across the
Lake Chad Basin region may hinder lasting security gains.
Ongoing violence has taken a large toll on the civilian
population, leading to widespread displacement, disruption of
agricultural production, livelihoods and cross-border trade, and
restricted affected populations from accessing basic services.72
As of 2020, there were an estimated 2.7 million IDPs in the Lake
Chad Basin.73 The majority were in Nigeria, with an estimated
1.9 million IDPs in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe state.74 The
administrative units of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and Kano in
Nigeria and Extrême-Nord in Cameroon have recorded the most
deaths from terrorism since 2007. In particular, the state of
Borno in Nigeria has recorded the most terrorist activity of any
subnational area in the Sahel, with 867 attacks and 6,581 deaths
from terrorism. The number of attacks peaked in 2019, but has
remained consistent in the last 18 months.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 59
Incidents
Deaths
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CONCLUSION
Within the Sahel, there is a nexus between systemic failures,
violent conflict, resource degradation, and pervasive insecurity.
The countries suffering from the worst ecological degradation
are also among the most violent because people lack basic
security.
It is unlikely that the current actions taken by the local
governments and the international community will be enough
to reverse the vicious cycles of conflict, insecurity and resource
degradation in the Sahel. Particularly as it seems that local and
regional terrorist actors are adapting their tactics, increasing
their activities and the lethality of their campaigns, as they look
to exploit political vacuums, which suggests, at least when it
comes to JNIM a shift in tactics from terrorism to insurgency, as
the group looks to build alliances and create the condition for
limited governance. ISWA on the other hand seems wedded to
engage in terrorism, specifically using violence, fear, publicity,
and the targeting of civilians to spread its message and impose
its will on the public.
Addressing the multiple crises in the region calls for a systemic
approach, whereby key elements within the system are
identified and addressed as standalone cases, which will create a
better overall outcome. Put differently, it is more effective to
have four projects with a forty percent success rate than one
with an eighty percent rate. One way to address the insecurity is
through a systematic approach that would encourage the
development of Positive Peace, as moderate, local leaders are
political entrepreneurs, which raises the prospect of working
through established institutions to address the needs of the
people.
Terrorism and Conflict
Conflict is the primary driver of terrorism. All of the ten FIGURE 4.1
countries most impacted by terrorism in 2021 were involved in Percentage of deaths by conflict type, 2021
an armed conflict1 in the preceding year. Four of those, Most deaths from terrorism occur in the context of an armed
Afghanistan, Nigeria, Somalia, and Syria, had conflicts that conflict.
resulted in over 1,000 deaths in a calendar year. Countries Countries with minor
without conflict conflicts
The link between conflict and terrorism is strong because as the 2.42% 49.42%
intensity of the conflict increases, violence against both the
police and the military becomes more acceptable, as is violence
against civilians perceived to be associated with the enemy.
Other than a higher intensity of general violence, there are also
larger concentrations of weapons, and a lack of state control
over the territory.

Terrorism is generally used as a method for achieving tactical or

strategic goals, as seen in the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Syria. Furthermore, as the intensity of the conflict increases, the
psychological barriers against large-scale violence diminishes.

Terrorism appears to be contracting into conflict areas, with a Countries

in war
higher percentage of attacks happening in conflict zones. Since 48.18%
2007, 92 per cent of deaths from terrorism have occurred in a
conflict zone. However, over the last three years, 95.8 per cent of Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations
deaths from terrorism occurred in conflict affected countries,
increasing to 97.6 per cent in 2021.
FIGURE 4.2

Figure 4.1 shows the average lethality of terrorism attacks for Fatality rates of terrorist attacks by conflict
countries in conflict, countries with a minor conflict, and for type, 2020
countries not experiencing conflict. As the intensity of conflict Terrorist attacks in countries in conflict are six times deadlier
increases, so does the lethality of terrorist actions. Attacks in than in countries without conflict.
countries experiencing conflict are six times as lethal as in
countries not experiencing conflict, as shown in Figure 4.2.
Countries in war

The data reveals that not only has the lethality of individual 2.0 Countries without conflict
terrorist attacks increased as the conflict intensifies, but the Countries with minor conflicts
FATALITIES PER ATTACK

frequency of such attacks also rises. Figure 4.3 shows there is a

1.5
significant statistical relationship (r=0.51) between the intensity
of an internal armed conflict and the number of terrorist attacks
per year. Countries with the highest rates of battle related 1.0
deaths per year, such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, had higher
levels of terrorist activities. Moreover, in any given internal
armed conflict, a ten per cent increase in the number of terrorist 0.5
attacks per year is associated with a 4.7 per cent increase in the
number of battle deaths per year.2
0

In many conflict environments, violence is not only aimed at the Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations
government but rather takes place between extremists who look
to dominate a disputed territory. This competition influences a

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 60

 FIGURE 4.3
Conflict intensity and terrorism, 2007–2020
The number of terrorist incidents has a strong correlation with the number of battle deaths.

r=0.51
BATTLE RELATED DEATHS PER YEAR (LOG)

12.5
SYR AFG
ETH IRQ
LKA SOM
AGO NGA TUR IND
SDN DZA
10.0 UGA RWA PHL PAK
SLE BDI TCD UKR NPL COL LBY
AZE MMR
HRV TJK MOZ ISR
SLV SSD PER MLI
GEO IDN NER EGY
7.5 GNB SEN CMP
CAF IRN LBN THA
MDA UZB BFA
DJI NIC GTM BGD
MAR MEX KEN
5.0 ROU ERI LAO GBR
PAN VEN PRY TUN
COM MKD ESP
JOR MYS
MRT TZA CHN
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0
TERRORIST ATTACKS PER YEAR (LOG)
Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations

group’s strategy and tactics, as some would choose to use FIGURE 4.4
terrorist tactics against both the opposing group, but also Proximity of terrorist attacks from armed conflict
against citizens deemed to be aligned with the other group. This ADVA
80 per cent of terrorist incidents occur within 50 km of violent
approach was promoted by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his conflict.
group, al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad), as he was
looking to bring about a civil war in Iraq. Groups such as the 100%
Islamic State – Sinai Province, for example, would look to attack
PERCENT OF ATTACKS

80%
both military and civilians targets to provoke overreaction by
the state in the hope of aligning the civilian population with
60% 50km
them.3 In areas where a group may have more sympathisers, it
may want to focus its attacks against state institutions or the 40%
military and police and less against civilians as it looks to win
over the population. 20%

This was the case in Syria. The conflict began in Hama with a 0%
1km 10km 100km 1,000km 10,000km
popular demonstration that cascaded into one of the worst
DISTANCE TO CONFLICT (LOG)
conflicts in modern history. Attempts by the regime to crush the
demonstration with tanks galvanized opponents of the regime, Source: Dargonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations

who formed opposition groups, some with backing from foreign

governments. As the conflict intensified, groups such as Jabhat

"80 per cent of all terrorist

al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, Kurdish
People’s Protection Units, and others emerged, some of whom
fought each other as they looked to control contested territory. incidents have occurred
The legacy has been tragic, with hundreds of thousands dead
within 50 kilometres of a
zone where a conflict is
and 12 million people displaced.4

Geographically, Figure 4.4 shows that 80 per cent of all terrorist taking place."
attacks occur within 50 km of a conflict. Although 97 per cent of
terrorist deaths are in countries in conflict, there are many
countries where not all of the country is classified as being in a
conflict.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 61

 TERRORISM AND
INSURGENCY

In a conflict environment, the distinction between terrorism and
insurgency is at times difficult to perceive. Both insurgents and
terrorists look to bring about political change through violence.
A terrorist group and an insurgent group can be distinguished
on the following criteria:5
• An insurgent group is involved in conflicts with more than
1,000 casualties and where more than 100 members of the
group itself have died.
• Insurgent groups look to hold and seize territory, were they
can and do exercise control over a population. They also
operate in the open as armed units, and they can engage in
mass mobilisation.6
an insurgent group that is carrying out a campaign in more than
one country.
The patterns of behaviour and conflict engagement displayed by
insurgent groups are complex. Figure 4.5 shows that terrorist
groups and insurgent groups frequently target the police and
the military. This reflects the use of terrorism as a tactic, with
the police and the military considered as the main ‘enemy
forces’. In the Sahel, the group Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal
Muslimin (JNIM) is more likely to attack military targets to
achieve its goals, as it wants to impose its rule over the
population and therefore does not want to alienate the local
population. Groups like al-Shabaab attack both civilian and
military targets, whereas Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA)
prefers targeting civilian and private businesses.

Three per cent of groups in the GTI could be classified as
insurgent groups; they are listed in Table 4.1. Except for
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State – Sinai Province, all
other groups were involved in some form of armed conflict
against state authorities.7
Seven insurgent groups in Table 4.1 operate in the MENA or
sub-Saharan Africa regions. Table 4.1 also shows the longevity of
these groups. Notably, although many groups conduct activities
across multiple countries, they do not meet the criteria of an
insurgent group in multiple countries because of their limited
impact. Boko Haram is the only group that could be classified as
Figure 4.6 shows that insurgent groups are responsible for
nearly two-thirds of deaths from known groups. This occurs
despite the fact that insurgent groups represent only three per
cent of all terrorist groups.
In Niger, in 2021, attacks caused on average 7.9 deaths per
attack, compared to 3.8 in 2020. This is of particular concern
and highlights the growing sophistication and organisational
capabilities of ISWA. In Burkina Faso, the lethality rate of JNIM
attacks in 2021 was almost 16 deaths per attack, compared with
four deaths per attack in 2020.

TABLE 4.1
Terrorist groups that could be classified as insurgent groups
Most insurgent groups have been operating since 2007 in the sub-Saharan Africa and MENA regions.

Years of Terrorist Victims Total

Group Country Region Ideology Sub-ideology
Operation Deaths Deaths Deaths

Taliban Afghanistan South Asia 2007 - 2021 Religious Islamic 2156 9473 11629

Islamic State (IS) Iraq MENA 2007 - 2021 Religious Islamic 390 8418 8808
sub-Saharan
Boko Haram Nigeria 2007 - 2021 Religious Islamic 1049 7401 8450
Africa
sub-Saharan
Al-Shabaab Somalia 2007 - 2021 Religious Islamic 1213 6649 7862
Africa
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
Pakistan South Asia 2007 - 2021 Religious Islamic 1037 3939 4976
(TTP)

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Iraq MENA 2007 - 2013 Religious Islamic 124 3691 3815

Communist Party of India - Separatist/

India South Asia 2007 - 2021 Separatist 134 2006 2140
Maoist (CPI-M) Ethno-nationalist

Islamic State - Sinai Province Egypt MENA 2013 - 2021 Religious Islamic 227 1490 1717

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian

Yemen MENA 2009 - 2021 Religious Islamic 247 1344 1591
Peninsula (AQAP)
sub-Saharan
Boko Haram Cameroon 2014 - 2021 Religious Islamic 326 1224 1550
Africa
Kurdistan Workers' Party Separatist/
Turkey Europe 2009 - 2021 Separatist 309 1041 1350
(PKK) Ethno-nationalist

Revolutionary Armed Forces South

Colombia 2007 - 2021 Political Far-Left 153 1097 1250
of Colombia (FARC) America

Islamic State in West Africa sub-Saharan

Nigeria 2017 - 2021 Religious Islamic 269 954 1223
(ISWA) Africa

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 62

 FIGURE 4.5
Likelihood of attacking specific targets, insurgent vs terrorist, 2011–2021
Insurgent groups are more likely to target police, military or government officials.

Terrorists or
non-state militia

Private citizens
16,765
and property

Police, military, 9,863

domestic government
or officials

Other/Unclear

Insurgent groups

Government Terrorist groups

Food, water, utilities

or infrastructure

Businesses

0 20 40
PERCENTAGE

Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations

FIGURE 4.6 FIGURE 4.7

Comparison of fatalities, incidents and injuries Distribution of insurgent and terrorist group
between insurgent and terrorist groups survival
Insurgent groups are responsible for more fatalities than known Insurgent groups are active for significantly longer than terrorist
terrorist groups. groups.

Insurgent groups Terrorist groups

Insurgent groups Terrorist groups
3,000

Terrorist
groups
TOTAL NUMBER

2,000

Insurgent
1,000 groups

4 8 12

0
Fatalities Incidents Injuries
Source: Dargonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, UCDP, IEP calculations

Figure 4.7 shows the number of years in which insurgent and resources, it reverted back to using more traditional terrorist
terrorist groups have committed at least one attack. On average, tactics. To escape the Nigerian military, it was forced to Boko
insurgencies are active for 11.8 years. In contrast, the majority of Haram was forced to seek refuge in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger,
terrorist groups are on average active for around 4 years. It bringing violence to those areas.
should be noted that a terrorist group could transition to an
insurgent group, or transition back to a terrorist group,
reflecting the tactics it uses. Boko Haram underlined this, as at
one point (2014-2015) the group was responsible for over 1,000
casualties per year, making it one of the most dangerous groups
in the world. During that time, the group was more capable of
challenging the Nigerian military, but with fewer members and

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 63

 CORRELATES OF
TERRORISM

This section looks at the relationship between terrorism and
indicators from the Global Peace Index (GPI) and the Positive
Peace Index (PPI) for OECD countries and the Rest of the World.
The aim is to identify different motivators between wealthier
counties and less wealthy countries.
TABLE 4.2
Correlations with terrorism in OECD countries
and the Rest of the World
Political terror and the intensity of internal conflict are associated
with terrorism in both OECD countries and the rest of the world.

Rest of the
There were 24 indicators that had statistically significant levels Index Indicator OECD
world
of correlation with terrorism in OECD countries, compared to 15
Youth not in Employment,
indicators for countries in the Rest of the World category. PPI 0.62 0.18
Education or Training (NEET)
Although some factors are the same, there are many distinct GPI Political Terror Scale 0.55 0.57
differences between the two groups for the factors that correlate GPI Safety & Security 0.54 0.45
significantly.
GPI Militarisation 0.53 0.24
GPI Access to Small Arms 0.53 0.27
Some of the indicators in Table 4.2 are linked conceptually to
violence and are included in the GPI, such as the Militarisation, GPI Internal Peace 0.52 0.61
Internal Peace and Safety and Security domains. These Exclusion by Socio-economic
PPI 0.50 0.23
Group
indicators correlate with the level of terrorist activity.
PPI Acceptance of the Rights of Others 0.49 0.43
GPI Intensity of Internal Conflict 0.47 0.55
Other indicators that correlate across the OECD and the Rest of
the World are the Political Terror Scale, Acceptance of the Rights GPI Nuclear and Heavy Weapons 0.47 0.21
of Others from the PPI, and the Attitudes domain from the PPI. PPI Attitudes 0.45 0.40
In all, there were only eight non-conflict indicators that GPI Violent Crime 0.44 0.27
overlapped between the two groups. This is a very small group
GPI External Peace 0.44 0.35
of overlapping indicators, compared to statistically significant
PPI Freedom of the Press 0.42 0.16
indicators that were unique to each group.
Law to Support Equal Treatment of
PPI 0.40 0.27
Population Segments
It highlights that the drivers of terrorism are different between GPI Deaths from External Conflict 0.40 0.15
OECD countries and the Rest of the World. As such, different
PPI Equality of Opportunity 0.40 0.20
approaches are needed, depending on the context of a particular
PPI Free Flow of Information 0.39 0.28
country.
GPI Military Expenditure (% GDP) 0.39 0.19
The set of indicators shown in Table 4.2 is statistically linked to GPI UN Peacekeeping Funding 0.39 0.06
terrorism. Statistically significant correlations above 0.3 are GPI Perceptions of Criminality 0.38 0.04
shown. PPI Equitable Distribution of Resources 0.38 0.30
GPI Refugees and IDPs 0.37 0.29
Advanced Economies (OECD):
GPI Violent Demonstrations 0.37 0.40

The indicator with the highest level of statistical significance PPI Access to Public Services 0.35 0.32
was Youth not in employment, education or training. PPI Group Grievance 0.35 0.50
Interestingly, this indicator did not correlate significantly with PPI Individuals Using the Internet 0.34 0.28
the Rest of the World grouping. The lack of youth opportunity
PPI Gender Inequality 0.34 0.32
can fuel disenchantment that a terrorist group can exploit in its
PPI Quality of Information 0.33 0.13
recruitment campaigns.8 An active youth cohort, especially
through employment, is less likely to be persuaded to resort to PPI Factionalised Elites 0.32 0.38
acts of violence, particularly if political grievances are PPI High Levels of Human Capital 0.31 0.22
considered.9 However, addressing business development is a
GPI Ongoing Conflict 0.31 0.68
holistic undertaking and needs to be approached from many
GPI Deaths from Internal Conflict 0.29 0.77
directions.
PPI PPI Overall Score 0.27 0.35
Interestingly, many of the indicators with the highest statistical GPI Political Instability 0.22 0.35
significance could be classified as indicators of societal equity. GPI Internal Conflict 0.21 0.67
These include Acceptance of the Rights of Others, exclusion by
PPI Low Levels of Corruption 0.20 0.34
socio-economic group, equality of opportunity, and law to
PPI Rule of Law 0.18 0.30
support equal treatment of population segments.
PPI Institutions Domain 0.10 0.30

The other interesting grouping of indicators revolve around PPI External Intervention 0.10 0.31
political terror, access to small arms and militarisation. These GPI Neighbouring Countries Relations -0.06 0.32
indicate that the societies that are accustomed to violence more

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 64

likely to commit it. Political terror has one of the highest
correlations for both groups and involves extra-judicial killings,
torture, and imprisonment without trial.
Looking at the tens of thousands of Europeans that chose to join
Islamic State (IS), relative deprivation was an important factor.
Many were socio-economic underperformers, which contributed
to their radicalisation. A study of 378 German foreign fighters
found that only six per cent finished post-school training, two per
cent went into further education, and a third had criminal
convictions. One in five were registered as unemployed and just
12 percent had a job, although those who did have a job, had a
low-paying job.10 A study of over 2,000 citizens that joined al
Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11 showed that motivators were
frustration, status seeking, identity seeking and thrill seeking.11
Rest of the World: Most deaths from terrorism occur in the
context of broader violent conflict when compared to the OECD
DISRUPTING TERRORIST
GROUPS AND NETWORKS
It is important to understand some of the motivations behind
why some individuals join terrorist groups. For example, relative
deprivation and alienation serve as the pull and push factors for
some recruitment. IS looked to identify vulnerable young
European men and women, primarily ones feeling angry,
resentful and alienated, and it promised them a new life and
new opportunities. In the Sahel, different strategies were used.
For example, one of Boko Haram’s strategies was to offer
between US$600 – US$800 each month to those that joined its
ranks, whereas those lucky enough to get a job could at best
earn US$72 a month.12
Some groups such as IS also engage in incredible brutality, as a
way to keep individuals within their ranks, as members know
that attempts at leaving would be severely punished.13 The
ability to leave becomes even more challenging when the group
controls an area and operates away from urban centres.
The factors underpinning the workings of a terrorist group
could be represented as nodes in a network, and the linkages
represent the influence that each node has on the next. The
nodes and the linkages between them form feedback loops
allowing the group to operate and thrive, as shown in Figure
4.8. Disrupting these links can limit the group’s efficacy and lead
its members to abandon it.
Acts of brutality and violence can serve as recruitment tools, as
was the case with IS. While most of the population may reject
such attacks, some susceptible individuals may see it as a sign of
strength by a particular terrorist network. The network may
then use such perceptions to enhance its influence internally
and among potential recruits. In turn, this greater influence may
lead to more recruits, which enables the network to perpetrate
further high-impact attacks. This is known as the media and
influence feedback loop and is represented with red arrows in
Figure 4.8.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 65
countries. Therefore, as would be expected, conflict indicators
show a higher level of correlation with the GTI in developing
economies, which include Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia where
many of the victims of terrorism lived. Moreover, violence and
instability are likely to affect development outcomes, because the
lack of security means development projects are less likely to
start and to be successfully completed.
The factors that correlated the strongest for the Rest of the World
could loosely be classified as weak institutions and
fractionalisation. The two indicators with the strongest
correlations were political terror and group grievances. Other
statistically significant indicators were political instability, low
levels of corruption, and fractionalised elites.
High-impact attacks and the availability of funding to carry out
such attacks may also boost the number of non-affiliated
sympathisers. These individuals support the network financially
by promoting its agenda. This funding loop is represented with
yellow arrows in the figure. Similarly, the motivation and
recruitment feedback loops contribute to the maintenance and
cohesion of the network.
Disrupting one particular node could break a loop and seriously
hamper part of the network’s operations. The node
corresponding to the influence of the network is the only node
to participate in all loops. As such, it is potentially the most
critical for actions aimed at dismantling networks. However, the
most successful actions will look at the overall system and
attack it systemically.
Attempts to dismantle a network would need to recognise why
the network has influence with potential recruits, sympathisers
and funders. For instance, potential recruits could be youth
without proper employment who do not feel represented in
their societies. Joining a radical group could provide these
youths with a sense of engagement and identity. It is then
critical to assess the reason for this perceived lack of
representation, and what could be done through institutions
and encoded norms of a society to improve representativeness.14
 FIGURE 4.8
Positive feedback loops supporting terrorist organisations
This diagram shows the nodes and linkages of a terrorist support system.

Support by Financial and

Sympathisers Material
Resources

Density of
Recruitment Influence of Impact of
Terrorist
of Terrorists Network Attacks
Network

Feedback loops
Negative Media
Recruitment
Perception of Reports Funding
Countries Media
Motivation

Source: Schonenberger et al., (2014); IEP adaptation

THE LIFE SPAN OF A TERRORISM GROUP
Figure 4.9 shows there is a sharp decline in the number of active
terrorist groups after the initial year of operation. For example,
in 2007 there were 139 active terrorist groups. Of those, just 73
were active a year later, and by 2021, just 29 were active. There
is a similar pattern if 2015 is used as the base year, with 84
active groups diminishing to 46 in 2018, and down to 32 by
2021.
The terrorist groups that tend to survive for more than ten years
seem to have entrenched support networks, specifically in terms
of recruitment and funding. This may also affect the way they
use violence, extremist groups who are unable to rely on
external sources of support and must rely on the local
population focus their attacks on military, police, and
government entities as they look to create instability. Others
may choose to turn to mass casualty attacks on groups not
aligned with them as a way to publicise their agenda, their
growing sophistication, and reach as seen for example with
Al-Shabaab’s Westgate Shopping Centre attack (2013) and the
2015 Garissa University attack.

FIGURE 4.9
Terrorist group survival, 2007–2021
Most terrorist groups disband, merge with other groups or are dismantled within a year of being formed.
NUMBER OF TERRORIST GROUPS

100

ACTIVE IN 2007

ACTIVE IN 2015
50

2010 2015 2020

Source: Terrorism Tracker, IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 66

FIGURE 4.10
Main factors influencing terrorist group recruitment
To properly disrupt recruitment, both the method and the motivation would need to be addressed.
Recruitment
Method or
Mediums
Family or Online
Friends Propaganda
Source: IEP
RECRUITMENT
How terrorist groups recruit individuals is varied and changes
depending on whether the group operates within the OECD or
the Rest of the World. In the former, the groups would look to
identify vulnerable individuals, many of whom are angry and
alienated, in their recruitment agendas. In the Rest of the World,
the focus would range from offering economic incentives and
highlighting corruption and a lack of respect for basic human
rights on the part of the government.16
Two strategies commonly used to reduce recruiting involve
disrupting either the methods or mediums used for recruitment.
This means how potential recruits are approached and what
message is conveyed to them. In most cases, the approach is
done through the influence of family or friends or the influence
of online propaganda (Figure 4.10).
The proximity of an individual to members of a terrorist group
has a profound influence on whether or not the individual will
join. For example, around 58 per cent of current or former IS
members report being influenced by either immediate or
extended family, or close friends that were members.17
Interestingly, much in the same way families can be a source of
radicalisation; they can also guide members away from this
path, turn them to the authorities or limit the time spent in
terrorist groups.
Terrorist groups routinely utilise social media to promote their
political agendas and attract individuals to their cause. Nearly
50 per cent of current or former members of IS indicate they
were radicalised through passive consumption of material on
social media.18
Monitoring of social media feeds by law enforcement is thus
crucial in identifying key accounts and individuals who are
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 67
Motivation
Basic Needs
Helping Ideological Employment
accessing the material, seeking to recruit others, or expressing a
desire to provide financial or material aid to them.19 Social
network analysis has proven to be useful in identifying the
perpetrators.
Terrorist groups can also provide a powerful sense of belonging
to disenfranchised individuals. Being in a group is conducive to
survival because it offers protection from potential threats.
These groups have encoded norms and patterns of behaviour
that allow members to quickly determine who belongs and who
does not. In extreme circumstances, an individual’s identity may
become fused with their group, leading them to carry out
extreme self-sacrificing behaviour such as suicide bombings.20
IMPACT OF ATTACKS
Terrorist groups that carry out mass-casualty attacks receive
more coverage, and these can serve as a recruiting tool for a
group. This was something that began with 9/11 but was
promoted by Zarqawi, who not only oversaw many acts of
violence, such as the 2003 bombing of the Imam Ali Mosque in
Najaf that left more than 90 people dead and the 2005 Amman
bombing in which over 50 people died. The higher the degree of
notoriety a group has, the more likely it is to attract potential
recruits or become a source of inspiration for other would-be
terrorists.21
Limiting the media exposure of terrorist groups minimises their
opportunity for political influence. The media can also have a
positive impact following a terrorist attack by acting as a
peacemaker, communicating community solidarity and public
awareness of security threats in a non-dramatic way.
LEAVING A TERRORIST GROUP
Factors cited by many former terrorists for leaving a group
might dissuade others from joining in the first place. Some of
the primary reasons for leaving groups like IS are moral
apprehension with their treatment of civilians, women, foreign
fighters and their own members, a lack of food and poor living
conditions, and corruption. Interestingly, these issues are not
unique to IS. Similar factors have been cited by individuals
leaving other militant groups.22 This highlights the stark
difference between expectations and reality, and is an effective
counter-narrative for discouraging those seeking to join a
terrorist group.
This suggests that a potentially effective way to disrupt
recruitment is to educate vulnerable youth about the harsh
reality of belonging to and operating for a terrorist group.
Showing potential recruits the violence of the actions and the
emptiness of the promises may dissuade some of them from
joining.
POLITICAL PATHWAYS
One way that can lead to the end of a terrorist group is when
the group transitions into the political sphere. This was arguably
the case with the Irish Republican Army and the Nepalese
Maoists.23 This insight presents a persistent moral dilemma on
how willing a government should be to negotiate with violent
extremist groups in an attempt to cease violence.
Two recent and prominent examples of former terrorist groups
ending through political solutions are the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist)(CPN(M)) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC). While both groups ended using politics, the
means by which this was achieved varied considerably.
In the case of both FARC and the CPN(M), the effectiveness of
the government to implement the peace deal and provide for the
needs of the people is key to preventing further terrorism.
More generally, the CPN(M) and the FARC are not the only
groups that have transitioned into governments or political
parties. Over the years, other groups such as the Farabundo
Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) of El Salvador have
also entered into the political process.
REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF
COLOMBIA (FARC)
Founded in 1964 by Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas, the
FARC was the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party.
At the time, the FARC claimed to represent the interests of
Colombia’s rural population. Drawing influence from Marxism,
it claimed it was committed to redistributing wealth. It also
opposed the influence of foreign multinational corporations. The
conflict between the FARC, which by 2001 had around 17,000
combatants, and successive Colombian governments claimed the
lives of over 220,000 people. It also uprooted more than five
million people from their homes.
The FARC conducted a series of kidnappings, assassinations,
and bombings for several decades. The group also had links to
drug trafficking, which brought in millions of dollars of revenue.
Recruitment was done in part under duress and in part through
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 68
economic or ideological methods. One study suggested that 20
per cent of recruits were forced recruits, 20 per cent joined
because of the allure of weapons and uniforms, 16 per cent
joined because of promises of a salary and good treatment, and
12 per cent joined out of political convictions.24
There were many attempts to engage the FARC in peace talks.
One such attempt took place in Havana, Cuba, in November
2012. Although these talks made some progress, a series of
violations of ceasefires on both sides stalled the process.25
Nevertheless, diplomatic efforts by Cuba, Chile, Venezuela and
Norway helped prevent further deteriorations in relations.
A second breakthrough occurred in 2015 when the FARC
declared a month-long ceasefire. This prompted the government
to cease military activity against the group. The FARC
responded by extending the ceasefire, which ultimately led to
the government and the FARC agreeing to reach a peace
agreement within six months. A referendum to ratify the deal
was narrowly defeated due to the belief the agreement was too
lenient on the FARC.26 Despite this setback, the government and
the FARC continued efforts to develop a deal. Instead of
conducting another referendum, the new agreement was sent
directly to the national congress for ratification..
The peace agreement aimed to address poverty and inequality as
well as conflict and the political system. The agreement allowed
the FARC to transform into a political party through legal and
technical assistance from the government. The political party
operated under the name “Revolutionary Alternative Common
Force” which notably shares the FARC acronym in Spanish.27
The deal guarantees the political party five seats in the upper
house and five seats in the lower house until 2026 regardless of
electoral results. The peace agreement that ended more than 50
years of violence was so historic that it earned the then-
president, Juan Manuel Santos, a Nobel Peace Prize.
Late in 2021, the US recognised the legitimacy of the agreement
and lifted its designation of the FARC as a terrorist group
because “it no longer existed as a unified organisation that
engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or
intent to do so”. The move would allow for greater flexibility in
the US participating in aid and developments projects that
involve former fighters. For example, efforts to remove
landmines or replace illegal coca leaf crops.28
However, while the majority of the FARC have disarmed and
demobilised, not all members agreed, leading to the splintering
and creation of two dissident rebel groups, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) and
Segunda Marquetalia. These groups have both been designated
terrorist organisations by the US. The commander of the latter
group, Hernán Velásquez, has been reportedly killed in
Venezuela in an attack carried out by mercenaries seeking to
cash in on rewards for his capture or death.29,30
Although the FARC is no longer regarded as a terrorist group,
there are significant questions about the 2016 peace deal. In
2020, it was reported that only 4 per cent of the accord’s rural
reform measures had been completed.31 Likewise, the peace deal
included the eradication of coca crops on which many people
depend for their livelihoods. The eradication of crops had
unintended side effects such as damaging other plants and soil.
This has prompted some to consider turning back to violence.32
The loss of coca crops has also generated competition for control
of the dwindling supply of crops, gold mines, and smuggling
routes. Such activity represents a considerable challenge to the
2016 peace accords.
COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEPAL (MAOIST)
In 1996, the CPN(M), launched a "people's war" against the
Nepalese State. The conflict officially ended in 2006, though
some residual violence continued. Around 13,000 lives were lost
in the conflict.
Back in the 1990s, drawing influence from Mao Zedong, Nepal’s
Maoists intended to capture state power and establish "new
people's democracy." Before launching their military campaign,
the group issued a 40-point list of demands to then Prime
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. The demands were mainly
nationalist, concerned with improving the economic conditions
of Nepal’s poor and ending corruption and the caste system. The
Maoists also called for a new constitution, as they wanted to see
the replacement of the monarchy with a republic.33
The conflict underlined the high levels of poverty, low levels of
economic development, as well as deep social and political
grievances that many harboured against the Nepalese state.
Tactically, the Maoists pursued a hit-and-run strategy involving
armed assaults referred to as “people’s actions”. They also
carried out sabotage and guerrilla activity. They developed an
effective propaganda campaign that helped them recruit. In
1998, they adopted a military campaign aimed at controlling
rural areas from which they could launch more campaigns and
expand their influence.34 This change in tactics meant that once
they controlled areas, they undertook coercive recruitment,
particularly of young people, leading some human rights groups
to accuse them of employing child soldiers.35 Once they
controlled territory, they looked to establish local governments
and courts.36
A key event that impacted the violence occurred in June 2001
when Crown Prince Dipendra shot and killed King Birendram,
Queen Aishwarya, and eight other people. The Nepalese royal
massacre added to the growing political, social and economic
chaos and galvanised the Maoists who sought to capitalise on
the death of the respected king.
In November 2001, the Maoists initiated a military campaign
against military, police, and government facilities across the
country. They also attacked bridges and other critical
infrastructure, claiming that foreign imperialists were building
them. They also targeted government buildings and banks.37 It
was this campaign that led the United States to designate them
a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity under Executive
Order 13224, and as a "terrorist organization" from the Terrorist
Exclusion List (TEL) under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). Nevertheless, the increased insecurity led Prime Minister
Deuba to declare a state of emergency and to call on the Royal
Nepalese Army (RNA) to support the government against the
Maoists. The RNA had stayed out of the conflict, claiming it was
an internal matter for the police.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 69
With the military involvement, the nature of the conflict
changed, as the military undertook counter-insurgency
operations, which increased non-combatant casualties, with 85
per cent of the 13,000 fatalities occuring between 2001 and
2006.38
The deteriorating security situation led King Gyanendra to
suspend the elected parliament and install a caretaker prime
minister, which intensified the demands for political change.
Although the general population suffered, the rural population
identified the state as the cause for their hardship and they
continued to support the Maoists.39
In January 2003, facing increased pressure from international
isolation and losses in the field, the Maoists accepted a ceasefire.
Over the next three years, the king and the Maoists negotiated,
though the process was affected by King Gyanendra’s February
2005 coup, which compelled the Maoists to ally with the other
parties, as the goal was to change the political situation. The
Maoists recognised they were making no inroads in the urban
centres and their attacks on the military had little impact. It
seemed that the Maoist leadership appreciated that rising
anti-monarchy sentiments made the time ripe to promote a
republican campaign while emphasising that they intended to
support a peaceful transition.40
Eventually in November 2006, Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) was reached and the slow transition away from conflict
began. Key to the process was a decision by King Gyanendra to
reinstate parliament and invite the mainstream Seven-Party
Alliance (SPA) to implement its roadmap and a rewriting of the
constitution.
The CPA led to an internal split within the Maoist movement, as
factions became the rule of thumb. The largest faction was the
Communist Party of Nepal or CPN(M), which in 2009 changed
its name to the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
(UCPN-M). The party made it clear that it intended to promote
its agenda through the political process.
The ousting of King Gyanendra, whose policies seem to put
pressure on the brittle peace accords, enabled the Maoists,
mainly the UCPN-M faction and its allies, to form a government.
However, the government was relatively unstable due to failures
to demobilise and reintegrate combatants and tensions between
the different parties, which led to the government resigning in
2009. The resignation increased the risk of civil unrest.41
Concerns over the potential of conflict led the Maoists to work
with the Samyukta Loktantrik Madhesi Morcha (Morcha), an
alliance of five Madhes-based parties. They formed a
government in August 2011. The return of the Maoists to power
provided some stability, but more importantly, it facilitated an
agreement over what to do with the Maoist combatants. The
November 1 agreement gave the Maoist combatants a choice to
either integrate into the national army or take voluntary
retirement from the PLA with a cash package. Over 6,500
combatants opted to join the newly constituted Nepalese Army.42
In 2012, Mohan Baidya, an important Maoist leader, chose to
break away from the UCPN-M and created the Communist Party
of Nepal (Revolutionary Maoist) (CPN-RM). This faction,
popularly known as the ‘dash Maoists’, remained interested in
continuing the military campaign to bring about political
change. Two years later, Netra Bikram Chand, an important
leader within the CPN-RM broke away to form his own
movement.43 In 2019, the Nepalese government designated the
Netra Bikram Chand-led Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
(CPN-Maoist-Chand) as a criminal group because the group had
gone underground and Chand, who had started out with the
Maoists back in the 1990s, had said he wanted a return to
violence. He was in hiding for a couple of years but in 2021, he
signed a three-point agreement with the government and
appeared on stage with Prime Minister Oli highlighting the
rapprochement.

The presence of these groups sustained some of the political

violence in Nepal. Political parties had trouble in reaching a
conclusion about the future of Nepal and the constitution due to
a lack of support for identity based federal structures favoured
by the Maoists.43

The reform was finally achieved on 20 September 2015, when

507 of 598 of the Constituent Assembly members supported a
new constitution. The purpose of the new document was to
consolidate Nepal’s transformation from a centralised Hindu
kingdom to a federal and secular republic. However, many
Madhesi oppose the new constitution and new federal structure
as they felt they would face increased marginalisation.44 Clashes
between the security services and Madhesi activists left 60
people dead.

In 2017, a seminal event took place, which underlined the drastic

change throughout the Maoist movement, as the Communist
Party of Nepal–Maoist Centre allied with the United Marxist
Leninist (UML), to form what came to be known as the Left
Alliance, which laid the foundation for the emergence of the
Nepalese Communist Party. To many former Maoists, the event
emphasised a change into the kind of politics they could not
have imagined before the start of the war.45

The People’s War launched a process that brought about a

drastic change in Nepal, ending the monarchy, the
establishment of a federated republic and challenged many key
social hierarchies, such as caste, ethnicity, and gender.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 70

 EXPERT
CONTRIBUTIONS

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­|­| 71

GLOBAL TERRORISM 71
EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS
The Technology of Terror:
from Dynamite to the
Metaverse
DR CHRISTINA SCHORI LIANG, HEAD, TERRORISM AND
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, GENEVA CENTRE FOR
SECURITY POLICY
INTRODUCTION
We are currently witnessing a democratisation of new and
emerging technologies. In the past, advanced
technologies were only accessible to scientists,
government officials and the military. Today, advanced
technologies are available as an open source. Modern
technologies are ubiquitous, cheap, and easy to use. While
technology can be a driver of development and prosperity,
it can also be instrumentalised by extremists who can
exploit them in unanticipated and lethal ways.
Never in history have violent non-state actors been so
globally connected, resourceful, dynamic, well-funded,
and technologically savvy. There are three reasons for this.
The first is that in the past advanced technology was only
in the hands of the few; today two thirds of the world carry
in their hands a smartphone which is millions of times
more powerful than the Apollo 11 guidance computers that
sent humans to the moon in 1969. The second is that new
technologies have dramatically expanded terrorist groups’
global reach, the ability to indoctrinate and recruit
instantly at no cost and in relative anonymity anywhere in
the world. Thirdly, terrorists now have access to military
grade technology. Many of the technologies that exist
today are dual-use technologies that can be utilised for
both peaceful purposes and military goals.
Exploitation of modern technologies by non-state actors
can be traced back to the closing decades of the 19th
century. Terrorist groups have for more than a century
stuck to two primary weapons: dynamite and firearms
(most notably the Kalashnikov).1 Soon after Alfred Nobel
invented dynamite in 1867, anarchist movements shared
instructions on its use, unleashing a wave of attacks in
over 50 countries.2 The release of the Kalashnikov rifle
(AK-47) in the 1950s facilitated the second global wave of
political violence. Used by insurgents, organised criminal
groups, terrorists and “freedom fighters”, the
indestructible Kalashnikovs continue to kill a quarter of a
million people every year.3
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 72
Non-state actors have thus always been interested in
obtaining and mastering innovative weapons. According
to “lethal empowerment theory”, new technologies will be
rapidly adopted and adapted by violent non-state actors
when they are accessible, cheap, simple to use,
transportable, concealable, and effective. Terrorists are
interested in weapons that are useful in a wide range of
contexts - “that magnify effects, are symbolically resonant
and can be given to unexpected uses 4.” It is thus
important to be vigilant in analysing how actors will
leverage and innovate new technologies for malicious
purposes, in order to confront the “unknown unknowns”
and not repeat the mistakes based on a “failure of
imagination”, as highlighted in the 9/11 Commission
Report.5
One key example was Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
Between 2001-2006, IEDs were responsible for 70 per cent
of combat casualties in Iraq and 50 per cent in
Afghanistan. A rigorous study of declassified IED data
gathered between 2006 and 2014 in Iraq and Afghanistan
demonstrated that insurgents kept pace with the
expensive technological countermeasures. IEDs were
originally activated by pressure plates, but later modified
so that they could be set off with mobile phones. The
study revealed that IEDs were just as likely to detonate and
kill or maim in 2014 as in 2006. Moreover, use of IEDs
increased, from 1,952 in 2006 to 5,616 in 2009 in
Afghanistan.6
The US appropriated more than US$ 21 billion to the
anti-IED effort, but insurgents adapted with low-end simple
innovations accessible on the open market. The US failure
in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can be partly attributed
to the fact that although US defense forces were
formidable, they were ineffective against the asymmetrical
techniques of the non-state violent actors it was fighting.
As General Montgomery Meigs noted in 2007, “There’s a
three trillion dollar a year investment in information
technology…and our opponents can go to the world
marketplace in information technology and get literally for
free off of the Internet very robust codes, cryptographic
means, instant communications, sensors which they can
repurpose in multiple ways7.” It has, and will become,
increasingly difficult for conventional armed forces to
combat the technologically savvy capabilities of extremists
and terrorist groups in the grey zone that they are
operating in.
TECHNOLOGICAL AMPLIFICATION: THE
INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA
In 1991, the US National Academy of Sciences made the
now famous prediction that “tomorrow’s terrorist may be
able to do more harm with a keyboard than with a bomb.”
The internet and social media, and the hardware to access
it – the smart phone - have become new digital weapons
of war. Extremists have used these tools to conduct
psychological operations, recruitment, planning and
conducting attacks, financing and to ensure anonymity.
Technology for Psychological Operations
In the 5th century Sun Tzu wrote that, “all warfare is based
on deception.” Terrorists have long understood the power
of psychological operations. Osama bin Laden faxed his
diatribes and fatwas to the media. Today, technology
enables terrorists to have unprecedented access to the
eyes and neurons of millions of people via the internet and
social media.
While social media companies are only 20 years old, they
have reshaped modern life in both positive and negative
ways. Social media helped launch the #MeToo and
BlackLivesMatter social justice movements. Social media
also amplified extremist groups, feeding divisive
movements based on race, gender, culture, politics and
religion, including white supremacist groups, Incels,
extreme Salafi-Jihadists as well as others.8
The social media business model depends on harvesting
attention in order to monetise it. Algorithms are designed
to appeal to the human psyche and act as a mirror of our
deepest desires and fascinations. Content creators exploit
the algorithms of social media platforms and leverage the
power of human emotions by leveraging attention-
grabbing content.
As a result, social media collect data on everything and
everyone, facilitating groups to meet. While also
regrettably becoming an impressive tool to manipulate
and mobilise people to conduct crime, kill, terrorise, maim,
start an insurgency and support others to partake in
conflict and even war. The effective use of psychological
operations was proven by the ability of the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in recruiting worldwide and
41,490 people from 80 countries were affiliated with ISIL.9
Some were enticed into believing they were joining a
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 73
utopia or a humanitarian mission; others were promised
medical school and jobs.
Terrorists used master manipulators to inspire, and
mobilise tailoring specific messages according to
language and culture. Anwar al-Awlaki, a American-Yemeni
and leading propagandist for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), used Facebook and YouTube to recruit.
He radicalised many, including Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, who attempted to detonate a bomb on a
plane. This foiled terrorist attack justified ordering a drone
strike which ultimately killed al-Awlaki.10 His propaganda
remains nonetheless even more influential in the wake of
his killing than before his death. From 2016-2020 a total of
89 Western extremists indicated a connection to Al-Awlaki.
His ideology has survived, including his “44 ways to
conduct Jihad”, which has proliferated online like
“postcards from the dead.”11
Videos are used to terrorise opponents, muffle opposition
and radicalise others to join. In Afghanistan “snuff videos”
that record an actual murder being committed are used to
inflame and radicalise Afghanis to become extremists and
were used to warn and prevent would-be spies or traitors
from reporting across enemy lines. The Taliban recorded
IED attacks with mobiles and uploaded them on Twitter to
recruit, raise funds and build morale. A strategic mix of
intimidation and offers of amnesty were designed to
create the sense of an inevitable victory. In August 2021,
the Taliban’s strategic messaging based on both coercion
and persuasion may have led them to conquering and
winning without fighting in some of the best-defended
cities in Afghanistan in August 2021.12
Baby Wolves: recruiting the next generation of extremists
Social media act as an effective amplifier to attract naïve
youth to extremism. In 2016, social media platforms played
a role in 90 per cent of radicalization cases.13 In 2018, a
research report that analysed the strength of the ISIL
network on Facebook was able to map the connections
between 1,000 ISIL-supporting profiles among 96
countries, and concluded that ISIL’s presence on the social
media platform was pervasive, professionalized and
growing.14
Right-wing extremists are especially interested in
recruiting and shaping the next generation of extremists.
They recruit youth online in the places they frequent the
most, such as YouTube, Twitch, Steam, and DLive.
Together these platforms host around approximately two
and a quarter billion monthly users, providing terrorists a
huge base to recruit.
Over two billion active users visit YouTube every month
and watch more than one billion hours of videos daily.15
This provides extremists a vast recruiting ground; the
videos they create provide moral support, train, as well as
encourage viewers to launch attacks; including step-by-
step procedures for building improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) and the best places to plant them.
The EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) has
classified gaming (adjacent) platforms as ‘hotbeds’ for
radicalisation. Twitch is a livestreaming service focused on
gaming and eSports. It has 30 million average daily visitors
with 21 per cent between the ages of 13 – 17. Twitch was
used by the terrorist to livestream his attack on a
Synagogue in Halle, Germany. Steam is the largest digital
distribution platform for PC games, with 120 million
monthly users.16 It has games that include living out
extremist fantasies of Germany winning World War II.17
Discord, another platform tailored to gamers, is an
important part of the digital far-right ecosystem. With over
140 million monthly users, it hosts hundreds of private
servers where neo-Nazi ideology, far-right narratives, and
hateful memes are shared.18,19 The Charlottesville ‘Unite the
Right’ rioters connected and organised via Discord
servers.
Technology inspires copy-cat terrorism
Terrorists elicit copy-cat terrorism responses worldwide. A
string of Salafi-Jihadist attacks on soft targets that
terrorised entire cities began with the attack in Nice on
June 2016, which influenced the Berlin Christmas market
attack in December 2016 and the Barcelona attack in
August 2017. In March 2015, another string of far-right
terrorist attacks began with the attacks on two mosques in
Christchurch. The perpetrator killed 51 people while
livestreaming his deadly attack through Facebook Live.
During the first 24 hours after the attack, Facebook
removed 1.5 million copies of the video. It inspired
copy-cat attacks in El Paso, Poway, Baerum, Oslo and Halle.
Terrorists now follow a similar copycat modus operandi: 1)
post a manifesto online; 2) attack a target group while
live-streaming on the internet, and 3) post best practices,
lessons learned and calls for imitation.
Funding hate online
Hate is profitable. White supremacist groups raise funds by
monetising hateful content. They “industrialise” their
fundraising campaigns by soliciting for cryptocurrencies.
A FATFMENA report on money laundering claimed that
terrorists financed themselves using such platforms as
Facebook, YouTube, GoFundMe, Telegram and
WhatsApp.20 A UK Times investigation learned that
extremists – ISIL and Combat 18 - earned thousands per
month with big-brand advertising on their most popular
videos, including well-known companies - Mercedes Benz
and Waitrose.21
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 74
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
While policy makers need to counter the use of existing
technologies by violent non-state actors, they also need to
keep an eye on emerging technologies. In the past military
technology tended to develop in a closed system, whereas
today we have entered a stage of unprecedented open
innovation. Individuals and private groups are free to not
only buy, use, and distribute them, but also to invent and
repurpose them.”22 Already in 2008, the Lashkar-e-Taiba
group attacked Mumbai for 36 hours, with ten extremist
perpetrators who were able to plan, coordinate and carry
out their mission using advanced devices including GPS
and mobile phones to acquire real-time situational
awareness. It signaled a new brand of urban warfare
characterised by symbolic attacks, multiple targets, and
high casualties, resulting in over 170 dead, and more than
300 people injured. This event demonstrated how quickly
new technologies such as GPS could be repurposed for
nefarious aims.
3D Printing
Today, emerging technologies are accessible to extremists
who are actively following hackerspaces. Students used
3D printing technology to produce a drone they coupled
with an Android phone’s navigation system, allowing it to
fly without an expensive navigation system and shared
lessons learned. Hobbyists can turn to Amazon.AMU.Com
for multiple free technologies.
In 2020, a German right-wing terrorist in Halle used online
manuals and a 3D printer to print parts of his gun,
spending $50 dollars. The attempt failed but his goal was
to demonstrate the viability of improvised weapons.
Autonomous vehicles
In the future autonomous vehicles could lead to multiple
malicious attack scenarios including replicating the deadly
vehicular terrorist attacks conducted from 2016-2017 in
Barcelona, Berlin, London, New York, Nice, and Stockholm.
In 2011, Ansar al-Islam built a driverless car with remote
controlled machine guns. In 2016, ISIL turned a car into a
remote-controlled weapon with a heating unit to simulate
life.23
Drones
In 2011, an Al Qaeda sympathiser attempted to use a
grenade-laden remote-controlled plane to bomb the US
Capitol. Since 2016, ISIL has been using drones to carry
out intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions. ISIL conducted attacks with drones carrying
explosives,24 and formed an “Unmanned Aircraft of the
Mujahedeen” unit.25 It pinned down Iraqi security forces
during one 24-hour period in Syria executing 70 drone
missions.26
In November 2021, explosive-laden quadcopter drones
were used to try to assassinate the Iraqi prime minister,
Mustafa al-Kadhimi, at his home. The attack showed that
armed non-state actors can use drones to instill terror and
enforce political change. Recent drone attacks attributed
to the Houthi movement in Yemen involving multiple
drones engaged in long-range flights also signal how
violent non-state actors will engage in the future.27 In 2026,
more than a million drones will be carrying out retail
deliveries, creating new vulnerabilities. The Global
Counterterrorism Forum released the Berlin Memorandum
on Good practices for Countering Terrorist Use of
Unmanned Aerial Systems.28
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
AI will have a large impact on security and is the
quintessential dual-use technology. AI can benefit
terrorists by giving them access to widely available
high-tech products. These include launching
“slaughterbots”, autonomous vehicles to deliver explosives
in rapid, coordinated attacks. All the components to create
them are available off-the-shelf. AI potentially will allow
adversaries to act with micro-precision, but at macro-scale
and with greater speed. AI will enhance cyberattacks and
digital disinformation campaigns and can target vulnerable
youth in many new ways.
The Metaverse
The metaverse is a virtual reality world characterised by a
three-dimensional, multi-sensory experience. For terrorists
it can build their expanding arsenal. Today, someone
interested in discussing Siege Culture, a neo-Nazi
ideology, will most likely have to read about it on the Siege
Culture website which may no longer be online. In the
metaverse, people can actually meet with the author of
Siege, neo-Nazi James Mason, or his AI double. The
metaverse can also resurrect Anwar Al Awlaki or Osama
bin Laden, further expanding their extremist ideologies.
Coordinating attacks will be easier with extremists being
able to do preemptive reconnaissance missions in the
virtual world before engaging in the physical attacks.
THE WAY FORWARD
Combatting the nefarious use of new technologies is not
easy. Encryption technology shields terrorists from
companies’ attempts to deplatform them from social
media.29 Diffusion of dual-use technologies will continue to
empower extremists. It is therefore important to enforce
regulation as was done to reduce dynamite bombings in
Europe or deal with the social causes driving extremists
conduct bombings as was done in the US in the early 20th
century.
It is also paramount to inform the public of new risks, just
as was done in 2022 by the Department of Homeland
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 75
Security (DHS) that warned that domestic extremist
groups had developed credible and specific plans to
attack the US power grid, or similar warnings about
ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure by
Australia, US, and UK.30
One of the greatest priorities is to inoculate youth and
warn them of the subversive nature of the internet and
social media.31 This will have to be integrated into
education policies which can devote resources to “digital
citizenship” and critical use of social media as well
designing national action plans to prevent violent
extremism.32 At the same time it is important to work
together with the big five tech giants to create public-
private partnerships. Their combined market value of 9.3
trillion U.S. dollars enables them enough resources to help
create an internet that promotes democratic values
instead of destroying them.33
As we witnessed in the first modern terrorism wave,
Nobel’s invention of dynamite quickly let the proverbial
genie out of the bottle with 125 different dynamite
varieties.34 This was coupled with a reluctance of
governments to restrict and regulate it. The global
community must find better responses and build greater
knowledge of irregular and psychological warfare. Recent
conflicts have demonstrated that professional militaries
lack the operational agility commensurate with their size
and training in a security threat landscape that is being
driven by violent non-state actors, criminals, extremists,
hackers, bloggers and Youtubers who have successfully
harnessed technology to achieve their strategic goals.35
In the US, two decades of the “war on terror” and the
hardening of its domestic defenses have generated
unexpected consequences, including heightened
domestic extremism and social unrest. The exposure of
people to incitement via the web has caused a widespread
infection of resentment, misinformation and conspiracy
theories which is creating cycles of rage that are
weakening not only the US but democracies worldwide.
The greater public has lost trust in government and its
ability to create law and order’, and the global pandemic is
adding fuel to the fire.
Countries are now faced with one of the biggest dilemmas
regarding counter-terrorism: designing effective counter-
terrorism measures while at the same time preserving
liberal-democratic values. The security community needs
to wake up to the challenge of emerging technologies,
especially digital technologies. Although the internet and
social media look far more innocuous than dynamite, they
could be considered the social dynamite of this
generation.36
EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS
Why Morocco’s
Counterterrorism Evolution
Matters to Africa
CESAR A. VELASQUEZ,
PROGRAMME OFFICE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM
AND TRAINING IN AFRICA,
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM (UNOCT)
Following the 2003 Casablanca attacks, Morocco began a
profound transformation of the Kingdom’s
counterterrorism strategy. In the immediate aftermath,
legislators and policymakers confronted national security
challenges, including enhancing security for potential
vulnerable targets and addressing conditions conducive to
terrorism and violent extremism. This article outlines some
of Morocco’s noteworthy changes in the country’s
counterterrorism approach since 2003 and measures
results against the current African terrorism landscape. In
addition, it details how the newly opened United Nations
Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) programme office for
counterterrorism and training in Rabat will aid in
developing, strengthening and advancing law
enforcement and whole-of-society counterterrorism
responses for the African continent.
THE ATTACKS
On May 16, 2003, in Casablanca, Morocco, 12 members of
al-Salafiya al-Jihadiya, a Salafi-jihadi terrorist organisation
affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
attacked the Farah Hotel, the Jewish Community Centre, a
Jewish restaurant, a Jewish cemetery, and a Spanish social
club. The selection of targets suggested that terrorists
wanted to destroy the symbols of Morocco’s religious
tolerance and modernity1. The attacks left 45 people dead,
including 12 suicide terrorists, and wounded 1002.
Although considered small and unsophisticated compared
to other international terrorist operations, the five
bombings left an indelible mark on the country’s psyche.
The attacks marked the introduction of suicide terrorism in
Morocco, represented the expansion of the Al-Qaeda
terrorist threat to Morocco, and the end of the belief that
the country was immune to the political trends of the Arab
Middle East because of its Sunni heritage and open
approach to Islam3.
It is believed that the planning for the attacks began in
November 2002 in the Karian Toma district, considered to
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 76
be a hard-to-police Casablanca district with high
unemployment and illiteracy rates4. Within weeks terrorists
recruited a group of young men and introduced them to
suicide terrorism training material. Once indoctrinated,
recruits undertook physical conditioning training in the
proximity of Karian Toma, produced a small batch of
explosives and tested them at a cemetery before
embarking on large-scale production5.
With May 16 in sight, the terrorists prepared for the attacks
by watching videos evocative of the awaited afterlife.
Having prayed and promised to meet again in paradise,
they began the final stage of the operation.6
A TURNING POINT
In the lead-up to the May 16 attacks, Morocco had already
experienced a sharp increase in terrorist operations
against civilians, however, most of those operations did
not involve explosives or suicide terrorists7. The
Casablanca attacks set in motion a new wave of
internationally-inspired domestic terrorism that would be
eventually attested by the 2007 and 2015 Casablanca
attacks; the 2011 attacks in Marrakech as well as the 2018
attacks in Imlil.
The 2003 Casablanca—and subsequent—attacks
prompted the Moroccan government to enhance its
counterterrorism policies to address changing terrorist
tactics, accelerated operational tempo and increased
lethality. Law 03.03, passed two weeks after the 2003
attacks, became the first of a series of legislative reforms
enhancing Morocco’s legal counterterrorism framework8.
This law expanded the definition of terrorism to include
incitement. It introduced sentencings in line with the
classification of terrorism as a major crime for active
participation in terrorist related activities, including a
minimum of a 10-year sentence. In addition, Law 03.03
expanded the duration of police custody in cases of
terrorism and enhanced both intelligence-gathering and
counterterrorism investigations procedures9.
The Moroccan government also recognised that the 2003
attacks required a comprehensive response that went
beyond legal reforms. While many blamed economic and
social conditions for the attacks, the nature of the attacked
galvanised the will of the entire country to reject and
combat terrorism. At the government level, the attacks
exposed the need for improved security of vulnerable or
‘soft’ targets and tighter monitoring of suspects. To
impede the movement of terrorists in and out of the
country, there was a need for improved border
management and better trained and equipped law
enforcement and security forces10. Within the framework
of its preventive approach, the country embarked on
implementing what experts and analysts often refer to as a
tri-dimensional counterterrorism strategy that is largely but
not exclusively aimed at addressing different components
of the terrorist threat through security, socio-economic
development policies as well as supporting the religious
field.
FROM BENEFICIARY TO CONTRIBUTOR
Morocco’s multidimensional response has proven effective
even if the nature of the threat has meant it was not
possible to prevent all terrorist attacks or the damage they
caused to the tourism sector11. Nevertheless, results
suggest that despite more than 1,000 Moroccan nationals
joining the Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist groups in
war zones12, the country dismantled more than 200
terrorist cells and made more than 3,500 terrorism-related
arrests over the past two decades, thereby possibly
avoiding more than 300 planned terrorist actions13. While
no country can defeat terrorism with just arrests,
Morocco’s law enforcement actions have undoubtedly
weakened terrorist organisations in the country while
reducing the appeal of violent extremism at home14. It
reorganised its religious sector to counter terrorist
narratives and recruitment, adopted a proactive national
security strategy, updated its legislative and regulatory
texts, and strengthened its state agencies in charge of
security, human development, and international
cooperation15. It has spearheaded the integration of
women in Morocco’s prevention and countering of violent
extremism conducive to terrorism (PCVE) efforts, which
are now seen as a best practice in the Arab World and
globally16. The Kingdom also became much more active in
multilateral counter-terrorism activities, such as joining the
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and co-chairing the Foreign
Terrorist Fighter Working Group of the Global
Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)—whose Hague-Marrakech
Memorandum was the basis of the landmark UN Security
Council resolution 2178 (2014). In 2015 it went on to take
over the role of GCTF co-chair and to form a Group of
Friends to counter terrorism at the United Nations17.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 77
Morocco’s active role in fighting terrorism suggests the
country’s understanding of the threat; the
interconnectedness of its counterterrorism methods; the
application of combined soft and hard measures; the
facilitation of information sharing practices; and the
promotion of international cooperation as the sine qua non
of counterterrorism.
Besides being a member of the GCTF and the Global
Coalition, Morocco has aligned closely with US and
European counterterrorism efforts. For example, the
United States holds an annual joint exercise in Morocco,
Tunisia and Senegal known as Africa Lion—to increase
interoperability with international partners and counter
malign activity in North Africa and Southern Europe18.
More recently, Morocco has also shared intelligence that
helped lead to the arrest of terrorists or foil attacks in
France, Belgium, India19, Italy20, Spain21, Germany, Burkina
Faso, and Sri Lanka22. Morocco’s domestic and regional
PCVE efforts, such as its imam training programme, have
also been widely promoted and earned respect amongst
European countries as possible models for other parts of
the broader Middle East and North Africa region23. Such
integration and evolution of both hard and soft
approaches to counterterrorism have cemented the
country’s close cooperation with other countries including
its neighbouring countries of the Sahel and West Africa
regions.
NO ROOM FOR COMPLACENCY
Morocco's counterterrorism arrangements, capacities, and
commitment have catapulted the country into a different
category. Unsurprisingly, many see the Kingdom as a
strong international counterterrorism partner playing a
vital role in ensuring and promoting Africa’s peace,
security, and stability24. But as the continent confronts a
dramatic change in the scope, pace and proximity of the
terrorist threat, neither Morocco nor the rest of the
continent can afford to rest on its laurels. With 41% of all
IS-related attacks globally, Africa has replaced the Middle
East as the epicentre of the global terrorist threat25. Today,
it seems there is almost universal agreement amongst
academics, policy-makers, and practitioners that decades
of Western-backed efforts have not succeeded in blunting
the spread of terrorism in Africa, whether inspired by
Al-Qaeda, Islamic State or local groups26.
This is partly because the terrorism landscape in Africa has
changed in the post-colonial period from one marked
mostly by violent extremist groups focused mostly on local
objectives to one in which local groups have increasingly
aligned themselves and become networked with global
terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. With their
senior leaders subject to intense security pressure in the
core, these groups have themselves had to move from
pyramidal and centralised command-and-control
structures to more networked and decentralised models.
This has made local terrorists’ affiliations to ‘global’
terrorist networks a trend and a lifeline to increased
support, expertise, funding, recruitment, and reputational
standing. Operationally, closer, and stronger links between
long-lived insurgencies, opportunistic transnational
criminals, and violent extremists have improved terrorist
groups’ prospects of survival while diminishing the
long-term effects of military action against them.
Today, the African terrorist terrain is now more crowded
than four decades ago27. These groups are reported to
have been responsible for the deaths of 12,500 people
in 202028 showing that terrorist attacks are both more
frequent and lethal than previously. Terrorist violence
both feeds on and exacerbates the increased political
instability in West Africa and the Sahel, complicating
efforts to address underlying socio-economic
and humanitarian conditions conducive to violent
extremism. Regrettably, more than 20 years after 9/11,
the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban is bringing back the
nightmarish thought that global jihadi terrorist groups
may once again find a safe haven where they can
reorganize and thrive29.
ONE WAY FORWARD
Looking ahead, a comprehensive response, particularly
aimed at addressing the need for enhanced
counterterrorism investigative capacities is a good starting
point for consideration. No country in Africa, let alone
around the globe, will arrest itself out of the rising threat of
terrorism. But without strong counterterrorism law
enforcement-led interventions the fight is not likely to
succeed. Moroccan law enforcement successes in
thwarting attacks while adopting responses that observe
the rule of law and human rights provide a good example
for the rest of the continent.
security management; preventing and combating violent
extremism; prison management; and prosecution,
rehabilitation, and reintegration. The curriculum also
provides for train-the-trainer and higher-level courses as a
means of helping beneficiary countries sustain their
enhanced capacities over the long term.
Morocco, along with UNOCT, envisage that capacity-
building in these five areas will provide a steppingstone for
African countries to build more sustainable, human
rights-compliant and effect law enforcement responses to
the continent’s evolving terrorist threats.
The views and opinions expressed in this article do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Government of the Kingdom of Morocco.
"Morocco’s active role
in fighting terrorism
suggests the country’s
understanding of the threat;
the interconnectedness of its
counterterrorism methods;
the application of combined
soft and hard measures; the
facilitation of information
sharing practices; and the
promotion of international
cooperation as the sine qua
non of counterterrorism."

Morocco’s recent signing of a host country agreement

with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
(UNOCT) to establish a Programme Office for Counter-
Terrorism and Training in Africa offers one way forward.
UNOCT’s Rabat Office was officially inaugurated on June
24, 2021, with the support of and in close cooperation with
the Kingdom. The Programme Office in Rabat has been
established as a specialised training centre for the African
security, law enforcement and judicial communities. Since
its opening, the Office has developed a multi-level training
curriculum with foundational, intermediate, advanced, and
training-the-trainer levels to build specialised technical
capacities of Member States in Africa. Since many of the
countries in West Africa lack the resources to provide their
own specialised counter-terrorism training, UNOCT’s Rabat
Programme Office is focused on delivering
counterterrorism capacity-building programs on five main
specialised areas: counterterrorism investigations; border

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 78

EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS
Sub-Saharan Africa at a
Crossroad
DR ISAAC KFIR, RESEARCH FELLOW, IEP
ABSTRACT:
A perfect storm is brewing in Sub-Sahara Africa. Increased
terrorism activity, drastic climate change, persistent failures
of the ruling elites, and heightened ethnic tensions have
created the conditions to bring about several coups. These
coups pose a major challenge for security, stability, and
development, as they are underpinned by a willingness to
use violence to foster political change. Changes in
perceptions about peace and violence indicate there is the
danger that persistent insecurity would accelerate system
collapses across the region.
Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing massive changes. The
region, which is home to more than a billion people, is at a
major crossroads. The emergence of a technological savvy
middle class looking to capitalize on increased
connectivity, new working practices, and improved
communication underlines the tremendous progress that
has taken place throughout the continent.1 There have
been improvements in purchasing power parity-adjusted
per-capita income and primary education. And yet
Sub-Saharan Africa is facing the effects of the Covid-19
pandemic, amplified geopolitical tensions, the need to
contain irregular migration and the use of hard
counterterrorism measures to deter and destroy the rising
threat from Salafi-jihadi groups.
The overwhelming focus on governance as it relates to
security has led to reduced attention to addressing
systemic shortcomings across the region. This shift has
had disastrous consequences as it has meant that
development support is primarily centered on security,
and not on issues that exist outside of the security matrix.2
Salafi-jihadis and bandits have looked to exploit socio-
economic-political vacuums as they look to exploit
grievances. Furthermore, established political actors have
also been at work undermining much of the progress. This
is seen by the number of coups that had taken place
across the region since 2020, which have led to the
imposition of economic sanctions.
To help the region return to its pre-pandemic trajectory,
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 79
there is a need to challenge the encoded norms in relation
to aid and building state capacity. Such an approach is
seen in security stabilisation and the need for it before
undertaking aid work. Alternatively, there is a reliance on a
security-development nexus, which calls for aid work to
occur in conjunction with security operations.3 These
types of operations were visible in the Balkans in the 1990s
and in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Several factors call for a systemic approach to address
some of the critical issues currently affecting sub-Saharan
Africa. Firstly, an appreciation for the need for long-term
engagement, aimed at changing perceptions of violence
and how to foster change. Just because the region is
affected by coups and insecurity does not mean that its
people have turned their back on democracy. For instance,
the Afrobarometer indicates that 67 per cent of
respondents support the democratic process, though
many of those surveyed expressed serious concerns about
the abilities of political leaders to deal with difficult issues
like corruption.4 Secondly, the metrics upon which success
or failure are measured must be changed. There needs to
be a willingness to invest in many projects that only have a
moderate chance of success as opposed to only taking on
projects deemed to have a high likelihood of success.
Having several projects with modest success is more
effective than having a single one with a high degree of
success. Thirdly, developing a systemic approach that
looks to address ecological changes and create the
conditions for the demographic dividend is key to the
region’s survival.5
A GENERAL FAILURE TO RESOLVED CONFLICT
AND THE ‘SECURITY TRAFFIC JAM'
The 2021 Global Peace Index and the 2022 Global
Terrorism Index highlight the deteriorating security
situation in Sub-Saharan Africa and particularly in the
Sahel. Across the region, violence is rising, whether in the
shape of Salafi-jihadi activity, banditry, or coups. However,
what is of greater concern, is that there is little evidence
that the situation is likely to change soon, as insecurity
becomes more pervasive, which in turn leads to more
violence and a reduction in Positive Peace.
The February Revolution in Libya, which led to the
overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011,
precipitated a chain of events throughout North Africa and
the Sahel. His violent removal after 42 years empowered
the Salafi-jihadis who were to play an important role in the
2012 Tuareg uprising in Mali, which eventually led to them
capturing Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. The Salafi-jihadis were
ultimately defeated, and the Islamic Emirate of Azawad
came apart.6
The failure to properly resolve the conflict in Northern Mali
by addressing the root problems had a snowballing effect.
It gave rise to political, social, and economic tensions that
have spread from the north causing intercommunal
violence in the Mopti and Ségou regions between Dogon
and Fulani. It has also led to intercommunal violence and
jihadi activity in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger
exacerbating current instability.
Persistent inability by successive Malian governments to
resolve differences amicably gave rise to the emergence
of Dogon, Fulani, and Bambara militias. Communities were
compelled to arm themselves to ensure their safety as the
governments could not protect them. Similar
developments occurred in Burkina Faso between the Mossi
and the Fulani leading to several clashes. The most notable
example of how events have deteriorated relates to an
incident in January 2019, when a Koglweogo (‘guardians of
the forest’) group attack a Fulani village and killed over 40
people.7 The event led many to flee as they searched for
security.
The response by local and international actors to the rise
in instability has led to a focus on security governance,
creating what is referred to as a ‘security traffic jam’. This is
a situation when international actors look to
multidimensional and comprehensive approaches aimed
at rebuilding state capacity in fragile or failed states.8
Simply put, too many actors do similar things while
ignoring other vital issues.
Since 2012, several security operations have taken place in
the Sahel. These have ranged from the EU Training Mission
(EUTM) to the French-led counterterrorism operation
(Operation Serval, Operation Barkhane, and the Takuba
Initiative), and the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. In addition, there is
also the G5-Sahel Initiative and other unilateral, security
operations including an increase in private entities being
brought in to help end the insecurity.
The focus on stabilization makes sense, although what
tends to undermine such operations is a lack of uniformity.
For instance, Germany’s approach to security stabilization
is different from France’s. The German effort is more
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 80
civilian-oriented, aimed at linking the political process to
the security situation, with little developmental focus. This
is because the German Defense and Foreign Ministries
focus on the political, and they look for political dialogue.9
Moreover, and rather interestingly, Germany has opted for
a light footprint in advertising their engagement. There are
several possible explanations for this ranging from the
desire to limit liability, and a preference to work behind the
scenes. The problem is that such an approach could
discourage local elites from publically backing a project,10
which means there is less local buy-in.11 The French have
taken a different approach, centering their engagement
along military lines as they promote training and
counterinsurgency.12 The intention has been to defeat the
insurgents, leading to the killing of many jihadi fighters,
including the leader of the Islamic State in the Greater
Sahara, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi. The French have also
seized and captured many weapons.
Nevertheless, the security situation remains precarious as
shown in the 2021 Global Peace Index and the 2022 Global
Terrorism Index.
SYSTEMIC POLITICAL FAILURE AND THE RISE IN
MILITARY COUPS
Military coups are reaching epidemic proportions in
sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2020 and 2022, there have
been eight coup attempts, five of which were successful.
This development has raised concerns that Africa is sliding
back to the situation of the mid-1960s when the continent
was plagued by coups.13
Coups are products of systemic failures relating to
corruption, mismanagement, and poverty. Instigators of
coups frequently claim that their actions seek to address
these structural problems.14 The Afrobarometer highlights
that in 19 African countries, six in ten respondents noted
that corruption has increased. A similar number also
expressed that their governments were doing a poor job in
addressing corruption.15
The consequence of rampant corruption in government
institutions is a failure to provide society with basic
services that are fueling internal conflict and making the
state vulnerable to outside influences. In Mali, for example,
corruption has allowed a patronage system to blossom,
impunity to run wild, and ultimately undermined security
and development efforts, which is why the country
remains at the bottom of the human development index.16
Weak governance systems and a lack of sufficient
resources to provide basic public service which is
particularly poor in the Sahel, undermines development
and growth. For example, whereas in countries such as
France, there are 89 civil servants per 1,000 inhabitants,
Burkina Faso has eight civil servants, Mali has six, and in
Niger, three per 1,000 inhabitants.17 In a similar vein,
corruption also leads to poverty as business, governance
and everyday life is affected. It is unsurprising that
countries that rank at the bottom of the development
table, also experience high rates of corruption. Mali for
example ranks 184 out of 189 countries on the United
Nations’ Human Development Index with 50 per cent of
the population living on less than US$1.90 and trapped in a
vicious cycle.18
These big issues not only limit the ability of serious
reformers from entering the political arena, but paralyses
the system where although there have been political
transitions, the political class has not changed significantly
from the early 2000s.19 Such political-economic issues
may lead to two different forms of violence. Firstly,
individuals may be more prone to engage in terrorist
activity due to the potentially lucrative nature of
kidnappings which have been on the rise in the Sahel
region for over a decade. Secondly, ineffective governance
and a lack of change may prompt individuals to resort to
violence against government institutions as this is
perceived as the only way to change circumstances.
ECOLOGICAL THREATS AND POPULATION
MOVEMENT AS A SECURITY THREAT
The IPCC has identified Africa as one of the region’s most
vulnerable to the impacts of environmental changes,
placing over 180 million people at risk of dying.20
The region faces rising temperatures inland and
throughout the subtropics, increased frequency of
extreme heat events, increases in aridity, and changes in
rainfall. Notably, the effect of these ecological threats is
not uniform across Africa’s regions. On the one hand,
greater levels of rainfall in East Africa are likely to cause
more flooding, raising the incidence of water-borne
diseases and damaging infrastructure. On the other hand,
West Africa is expected to experience less rainfall, which
places more pressure on already strained food production
thereby undermining food security and harming human
health and development. Furthermore, Southern Africa is
likely to see a significant decline in rainfall and a greater
risk of drought that could lead to greater population
movement, as people search for security. What is a
concern is that not only is the region experiencing major
climate changes, but it is also home to youthful, fast-
growing, high-fertility populations, which add more
pressure on a fragile ecosystem and weak governance
system.
In some cases, the tensions between groups have grown
so severe that other actors have been encouraged to step
in to protect minority groups. For example, when
ecological threats compelled the Nigerian Djerma
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 81
sedentary farmers to migrate north because they faced
opposition from the Fulani and Daoussak who formed
militias similar to Ganda Izo (“sons of the soil”) to defend
themselves, it led to a rise in extrajudicial killings around
the Tillabéri region. A similar situation is occurring in
Burkina Faso. For example, when President Kaboré’s
government passed a law calling for the training of armed
militias (known as “volunteers for the defense of Faso”) to
help defend villages and sectors from possible Koglweogo
attacks, it led to intercommunal tensions. The focus on
arming militias did not address the ecological issues that
were causing population movement.
On a macro-level, it is evident that drastic ecological
changes are leading to violence between different
community groups in the Mopti Region, Mali. The Dogon,
who are sedentary farmers, make up around six per cent of
the region’s 1.6 million inhabitants, and Fulanis, the
seminomadic cattle herders who make up approximately
by percent of the population, clash. Changing climate has
led to greater competition for resources and compelled
the Fulani to search for new water sources.21 Similar issues
are occurring in Burkina Faso where many Mossis have
been forcibly displaced from their ancestral homes to the
western and northern parts of the country. In 2015, as the
Salafi-jihadis were being pushed out of Mali, they crossed
over to Burkina Faso where they found many aggrieved
Fulani who were to form a local Salafi-jihadi group, called
Ansarul Islam. Under the leadership of a Burkinabe Fulani
preacher, Ibrahim Malam Dicko, the group launched an
insurgency campaign.22
In sum, for many locals, the failure of the state to protect
them or to foster ethnic tensions stems from
mismanagement of the state by ruling elites.
THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS
There has been a large increase in terrorist activity in the
Sahel and also in criminal activity. The contours of the
groups normally match ethnic and social stratification
lines, which is common in segmented societies. Notably,
the bandits and the Salafi-jihadis position themselves not
only as being against the State but as offering an
alternative.23
There are several reasons why local and international
actors have been unable to end the Salafi-jihadi and
criminal threats. Firstly, the political-socio-economic
vacuum. The inability of Sahelian states to provide security
beyond the urban centers has allowed nefarious actors to
move in and provide the services that one would expect
from the government. For example, in 2021 the Islamic
State in West Africa has claimed that its zaket (charity)
office has raised US $157,000 during Ramadan and the
preceding month.24 This in turn allows the group – right or
not – to claim that it is forming a bond with the local
population as part of their rural engagement.25 The
purpose behind this strategy is twofold. Firstly, by
collecting zaket, Salafi-jihadis look to form a relationship
with the local community. They are not operating as
marauders, looking for instant treasure. Secondly, it is a
constant reminder that the state and its institutions are not
present in the rural areas and that the jihadis are working
towards creating their proto-states.
Both criminals and Salafi-jihadis have looked to exploit the
region’s youthful high population. Easterlin’s youth bulge
theory highlights the relationship between high levels of
entry-level job competition, youth unemployment, and a
youthful age structure.26 Möller added another dimension
to the youth bulge theory pointing to the way those
opposing the state, look to recruit these disgruntled youth,
by offering money, resources, security, and a promise of a
better future.27 These factors underlie why countries with a
youthful population that has little prospects for meaningful
employment are likely to see higher rates of conflict.28
POSITIVE PEACE
Systemic issues require systemic solutions. This is why
these issues should not be addressed individually but
rather concurrently as proposed through the Positive
Peace formula, an idea that first emerged in the 1960s.
Scholars such as Johan Galtung argued that peace was
predicated on the absence of violence and fear of
violence, and as such, it was known as a negative
interpretation of peace.29 The Institute for Peace and
Economics has taken the concept further looking at and
for factors that promote socio-economic development and
societal resilience, taking the view that the way to build
and sustain peaceful societies requires a revision in
attitudes, institutions, and structures. Positive Peace
identifies developmental factors that lead to resilient
societies.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
With proper support, assistance, and encouragement
sub-Saharan Africa would continue to see growth and
development. Many of the world’s key minerals lie there. It
is also the world’s largest free trade area with enormous
potential for growth and development. However, without
systemic and structural changes within the political, social,
economic sectors, and how the development and aid
community approach sub-Saharan Africa, the damage
caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, increased terrorism
activity, and the growing menace of organized crime,
many of the gains of the last three decades could easily
disappear.
There is an overreliance and focus on traditional
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 82
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies.
Somewhat unsurprisingly, although these policies have
improved the quality of Sahelian militaries and have
notched some major successes against terrorist leaders,
they have not facilitated greater security partially because
this counterterrorism architecture is meant to adapt and
react to specific events, as opposed to engaging in a
structural overhaul. It may also mean that key issues such
as corruption or ‘Big Man’ politics30 (individuals who exert
authority over autonomous sub-leaders through material
support and affirmation) have been addressed. Moreover,
the overreliance on security governance has meant that
innovative solutions are not considered. For example, one
way to deal with the ecological pressures is to invest in
forest restoration, which is significant as African forests
account for a third of the world's total tropical forests.31
Restoring these forests would not only assist in capturing
carbon but it has a monetary value of around $25 billion a
year, which Sahelian countries would be able to claim.
Restoring the forests and finding better options cooking
with wood and the use of kerosene lamps would also have
substantial health benefits.
In principle, security stabilisation and the security-
development nexus are sensible as it is not possible to
undertake development work when insecurity is pervasive.
However, security stabilisation is a challenging concept,
emerging at a specific time (the 1990s) and in a particular
region (the Balkans) where NATO and the EU faced very
different challenges from what is currently taking place in
the Sahel. Moreover, both the security and development
issues are very different from the Balkans. This is why there
is a need for new thinking, which Positive Peace provides.
Woven into the Positive Peace formula is first a call to
identify what are the pull and push factors contributing to
why individuals resort to or accept violent political reform.
Secondly, Positive Peace draws on a conceptual and
statistical framework that calls for the Acceptance of the
Rights of Others, Free-Flow of Information, Equitable
Distribution of Resources, Good Relations with Neighbours,
Well-Functioning Governments, Low Levels of Corruption,
High Levels of human Capital and Sound Business
Environment.
GTI Ranks & Scores, 2022
Change Change
GTI 2021 GTI score in score GTI 2021 GTI score in score
Country Country
Rank (out of 10) Rank (out of 10)
(2020–2021) (2020–2021)
1 Afghanistan 9.109 0.058 37 Peru 4.471 1.259

2 Iraq 8.511 -0.184 38 Tunisia 4.447 -0.286

3 Somalia 8.398 -0.091 39 Algeria 4.432 0.105

4 Burkina Faso 8.27 0.148 40 Bangladesh 4.411 -0.011

5 Syria 8.25 -0.05 41 New Zealand 4.376 -0.523

6 Nigeria 8.233 -0.188 42 Cote d' Ivoire 4.31 0.026

7 Mali 8.152 0.23 43 Burundi 4.271 1.158

8 Niger 7.856 0.441 44 Russia 4.219 -0.465

10 Pakistan 7.825 -0.097 45 Uganda 4.106 4.106

11 Cameroon 7.432 -0.193 46 Venezuela 4.005 0.01

12 India 7.432 -0.235 47 Tajikistan 3.988 -0.596

13 Mozambique 7.432 -0.399 48 Canada 3.882 -0.019

14 Colombia 7.068 -0.226 49 Ethiopia 3.759 -0.595

15 Egypt 6.931 -0.373 50 Italy 3.687 -0.268

16 Philippines 6.79 -0.284 51 Lebanon 3.566 -0.517

Democratic Republic of 52 Austria 3.261 -0.548

17 6.733 0.713
the Congo
53 Benin 3.164 1.261
18 Chile 6.496 0.515
54 Saudi Arabia 3.11 -0.743
19 Chad 6.379 -0.281
55 Spain 2.86 -0.587
20 Kenya 6.166 -0.192
56 Ecuador 2.766 -0.582
21 Yemen 5.87 -0.261
57 Argentina 2.657 0.224
22 Thailand 5.722 -0.45
58 Jordan 2.594 -0.837
23 Turkey 5.651 -0.82
59 Switzerland 2.522 -0.193
24 Indonesia 5.5 0.116
60 Australia 2.438 -0.587
25 Sri Lanka 5.445 -0.599
61 Mexico 2.428 -0.626
26 Libya 5.1 -0.541
62 Ukraine 2.304 -0.653
27 Iran 5.015 -0.452
63 Malaysia 2.247 -0.66
United States of
28 4.961 -0.576 64 Paraguay 2.194 -0.757
America

29 Greece 4.849 0.186 65 Bahrain 2.145 -0.475

30 Israel 4.778 -0.181 66 Netherlands 2.076 0.254

31 United Kingdom 4.77 -0.398 67 China 1.863 -0.704

32 Palestine 4.736 -0.238 68 Belgium 1.745 -1.843

33 Germany 4.729 -0.388 69 Sweden 1.66 -0.561

34 Nepal 4.692 -0.538 70 Senegal 1.58 -0.527

35 France 4.562 -0.674 71 Japan 1.46 -0.516

36 Tanzania 4.53 -0.3 72 Uruguay 1.321 -0.501

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 83

 Change Change
GTI 2021 GTI score in score GTI 2021 GTI score in score
Country Country
Rank (out of 10) Rank (out of 10)
(2020–2021) (2020–2021)
73 Rwanda 1.243 -0.49 93 Honduras 0 0

73 Togo 1.243 1.243 93 Croatia 0 0

73 South Africa 1.243 -0.49 93 Haiti 0 0

76 Morocco 1.156 -0.478 93 Hungary 0 -0.291

77 Norway 1.109 -0.471 93 Iceland 0 0

78 Ireland 1.06 -0.492 93 Jamaica 0 0

78 Romania 1.06 -0.462 93 Kazakhstan 0 -1.756

80 Finland 1.007 -0.453 93 Kyrgyz Republic 0 -0.46

81 Brazil 0.951 -0.476 93 Cambodia 0 0

82 Cyprus 0.922 -0.472 93 South Korea 0 0

83 Lithuania 0.828 -0.415 93 Kuwait 0 -0.158

84 Mauritania 0.509 -0.318 93 Laos 0 -1.968

85 Vietnam 0.407 -0.276 93 Liberia 0 0

86 Angola 0.291 -0.218 93 Lesotho 0 0

86 Czech Republic 0.291 -0.218 93 Latvia 0 0

86 Denmark 0.291 -0.218 93 Moldova 0 -0.158

86 Gabon 0.291 -0.218 93 Madagascar 0 -2.028

86 Kosovo 0.291 -0.66 93 Macedonia (FYR) 0 0

86 Sudan 0.291 -0.218 93 Montenegro 0 0

92 Taiwan 0.227 -0.18 93 Mongolia 0 0

93 Albania 0 0 93 Mauritius 0 -0.158

93 United Arab Emirates 0 0 93 Malawi 0 0

93 Armenia 0 -0.158 93 Namibia 0 0

93 Azerbaijan 0 -0.158 93 Nicaragua 0 0

93 Bulgaria 0 0 93 Oman 0 0

93 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 93 Panama 0 0

93 Belarus 0 0 93 Papua New Guinea 0 0

93 Bolivia 0 0 93 Poland 0 -0.227

93 Bhutan 0 0 93 North Korea 0 0

93 Botswana 0 0 93 Portugal 0 0

Central African 93 Qatar 0 0

93 0 -2.464
Republic
93 Singapore 0 0
93 Republic of the Congo 0 0
93 Sierra Leone 0 0
93 Costa Rica 0 0
93 El Salvador 0 0
93 Cuba 0 0
93 Serbia 0 0
93 Djibouti 0 0
93 South Sudan 0 0
93 Dominican Republic 0 0
93 Slovakia 0 0
93 Eritrea 0 0
93 Slovenia 0 0
93 Estonia 0 0
93 Swaziland 0 0
93 Georgia 0 -0.46
93 Turkmenistan 0 0
93 Ghana 0 0
93 Timor-Leste 0 0
93 Guinea 0 0
93 Trinidad and Tobago 0 0
93 The Gambia 0 0
93 Uzbekistan 0 0
93 Guinea-Bissau 0 0
93 Zambia 0 0
93 Equatorial Guinea 0 0
93 Zimbabwe 0 0
93 Guatemala 0 0

93 Guyana 0 0

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 84

47 Worst Terrorist
Attacks in 2020
Rank Country Date State/Province Organisation Fatalities Attack type

1 Afghanistan 26/8/21 Kabul Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISKP) 170 Explosives

2 Burkina Faso 5/6/21 Sahel Unknown - Jihadists 160 Firearms

3 Afghanistan 22/7/21 Kandahar Taliban 100 Firearms

4 Afghanistan 8/5/21 Kabul Unknown - Jihadists 86 Explosives

Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen

5 Burkina Faso 18/8/21 Sahel 80 Firearms
(JNIM)

6 Niger 2/1/21 Tillabéri Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 70 Firearms

Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen

7 Burkina Faso 14/11/21 Sahel 53 Firearms
(JNIM)

8 Afghanistan 8/10/21 Kunduz Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISKP) 50 Explosives

9 Afghanistan 15/10/21 Kandahar Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISKP) 47 Explosives

10 Afghanistan 15/10/21 Kandahar Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISKP) 47 Explosives

11 Niger 21/3/21 Tahoua Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 46 Firearms

12 Niger 21/3/21 Tahoua Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 46 Firearms

13 Niger 21/3/21 Tahoua Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 45 Firearms

Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen

14 Burkina Faso 23/12/21 Nord 41 Firearms
(JNIM)

15 Niger 16/8/21 Tillabéri Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 37 Firearms

16 Iraq 19/7/21 Baghdad Islamic State (IS) 35 Explosives

17 Mali 3/12/21 Mopti Unknown - Jihadists 33 Firearms

18 Mali 15/3/21 Gao Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 33 Other/Unclear

19 Iraq 21/1/21 Baghdad Islamic State (IS) 32 Explosives

20 Mali 6/10/21 Ségou Unknown - Jihadists 30 Firearms

21 Niger 2/1/21 Tillabéri Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 30 Firearms

22 Nigeria 25/4/21 Borno Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 30 Firearms

23 Niger 16/11/21 Tahoua Unknown - Jihadists 25 Firearms

24 Chad 4/8/21 Lac Boko Haram 24 Firearms

25 Nigeria 15/3/21 Borno Boko Haram 22 Other/Unclear

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 85

Rank Country Date State/Province Organisation Fatalities Attack type

26 Afghanistan 30/4/21 Logar Taliban 21 Explosives

Communist Party of India - Maoist

27 India 3/4/21 Chhattisgarh 21 Grenade
(CPI-M)

28 Niger 28/7/21 Tillabéri Unknown - Jihadists 21 Firearms

29 Mali 8/8/21 Gao Unknown - Jihadists 20 Firearms

30 Nigeria 19/12/21 Borno Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 20 Firearms

31 Somalia 17/8/21 Mudug Al-Shabaab 20 Firearms

32 Somalia 15/6/21 Banaadir Al-Shabaab 20 Explosives

33 Somalia 14/4/21 Shabeellaha Dhexe Unknown - Jihadists 20 Explosives

34 Somalia 5/3/21 Banaadir Al-Shabaab 20 Explosives

35 Burkina Faso 4/8/21 Sahel Unknown - Jihadists 19 Firearms

36 Mozambique 24/3/21 Cabo Delgado Islamic State (IS) 19 Firearms

37 Niger 17/4/21 Tillabéri Unknown - Jihadists 19 Firearms

38 Nigeria 13/3/21 Borno Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 19 Firearms

39 Burkina Faso 26/4/21 Sahel Unknown - Jihadists 18 Firearms

Democratic Republic
40 15/2/21 Nord-Kivu Islamic State (IS) 18 Firearms
of the Congo

41 Niger 31/7/21 Tillabéri Unknown - Jihadists 18 Firearms

42 Nigeria 7/7/21 Adamawa Boko Haram 18 Firearms

43 Nigeria 13/4/21 Borno Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) 18 Firearms

Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen

44 Mali 16/8/21 Mopti 17 Firearms
(JNIM)

45 Mali 8/8/21 Gao Unknown - Jihadists 17 Firearms

46 Niger 20/8/21 Tillabéri Unknown - Jihadists 17 Firearms

47 Somalia 9/1/21 Jubbada Hoose Al-Shabaab 17 Explosives

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 86

GTI Methodology
The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators weighted TABLE C.1
over five years. A country’s annual GTI score is based on a
Indicator weights used in the Global
unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of
incidents in the year. The four factors counted in each country’s
Terrorism Index
yearly score are:
Dimension Weight
à total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
à total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a Total number of incidents 1

given year
Total number of fatalities 3
à total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a
given year Total number of injuries 0.5

à total number of hostages caused by terrorists in a

Total number of hostages 0.5
given year

Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three, and a TABLE C.2
five year weighted average is applied in a bid to reflect the
Hypothetical country terrorist
latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time. The
attacks in a given year
weightings shown in Table C.1 was determined by consultation
with the GPI Expert Panel.
Number of
Calculated
Dimension Weight incidents for the
raw score
The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality. given year

Total number of incidents 1 21 21

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF
A COUNTRY’S GTI SCORE Total number of fatalities 3 36 108

To assign a score to a country each incident is rated according Total number of injuries 0.5 53 26.5
to the four measures. The measures are then multiplied by their
weighting factor and aggregated. This is done for all incidents Total number of hostages 0.5 20 10

and then all incidents for each country are aggregated to give
Total raw score 166.5
the country score. To illustrate, Table C.2 depicts a hypothetical
country’s record for a given year.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 87

 TABLE C.4
Given these indicator values, this hypothetical country for that
year would be assessed as having an impact of terrorism of Bands used in the GTI
(1×21) + (3×36) + (0.5×53) + (0.5×20) = 166.5.
Band Band cut Band Band cut
Bands Bands
number off values number off values

FIVE-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE 1 0 0 12 5.5 572.17

To account for the after effects of trauma that terrorist attacks 2 0.5 0.78 13 6 1020.02
have on a society, the GTI takes into consideration the events of
previous years as having a bearing on a country’s current score. 3 1 2.17 14 6.5 1817.8
For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway
4 1.5 4.65 15 7 3238.95
will continue to have a psychological impact on the population
for many years to come. To account for the lingering effects of 5 2 9.07 16 7.5 5770.53
terrorism, the prior four years are also included in the scoring
with a decreasing weight each year. Table C.3 highlights the 6 2.5 16.94 17 8 10280.19
weights used for each year.
7 3 30.95 18 8.5 18313.55

TABLE C.3
8 3.5 55.92 19 9 32623.89
Time weighting of historical scores
9 4 100.4 20 9.5 58115.81

Year Weight % of Score

10 4.5 179.62 21 10 103527.2

Current year 16 52 11 5 320.76

Previous year 8 26

Two years ago 4 13

Three years ago 2 6

Four years ago 1 3

LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES

ON A SCALE OF 1-10

The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the

world. There are a handful of countries with very high levels of
terrorism compared to most countries which experience only
low levels or no terrorism. To produce a more equally
distributed index, the GTI uses a base 10 logarithmic banding
system between 0 and 10 at 0.5 intervals.

As shown in table C.4 this mapping method yields a total

number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size 0.5
within the scale of 0-10. In order to band these scores, the
following method is used:

1. Define the Minimum GTI Score across all countries as

having a banded score of 0.
2. Define the Maximum GTI Score across all countries as
having a banded score 10.
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores
and calculate 'r' by:

a. root = 2 X (Highest GTI Banded Score

– Lowest GTI Banded Score) = 2 X (10–0) =20
b. Range = 2 X (Highest Recorded GTI Raw Score
– Lowest Recorded GTI Raw Score)
c. r = root
range -1 for all values of root between 1 to 21

This method produces the set of bands used in the GTI listed in
table C.4.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 88

Change in terrorism
data sources
Until the previous edition, the GTI used the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD) as a key source of data. However, internal
difficulties meant that GTD data was no longer up-to-date, which
prompted IEP to switch to the TerrorismTracker.
Both sources have similar definitions for terrorism, with data from
the GTD and the TerrorismTracker being broadly consistent.
However, the way the TerrorismTracker classifies violent events
means that the number of terrorism incidents and fatalities
obtained from this source tends to be lower in some countries
and regions than the GTD’s.
TerrorismTracker has a strict exclusion of acts of warfare from its
records. The effect of this can be seen by comparing the
incidents recorded in TerrorismTracker with those recorded in
the GTD in Afghanistan for the year of 2019.
In this year, the GTD recorded 5,725 terrorism deaths in the
country. Conversely, the TerrorismTracker recorded 1,169
terrorism deaths over the same period. Criminal acts are also
excluded by the TerrorismTracker but were computed in the GTD.
For example, if a terrorist organisation commits an act of
violence that is not necessarily terrorism, such as robbing a bank
to secure funding. Therefore, Mexico saw a reduction in incidents
in the TerrorismTracker when compared to the GTD.
The TerrorismTracker does not have a tendency to record less
terrorist events in more peaceful regions such as Europe and
North America.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 89

 ENDNOTES
SECTION 1: RESULTS
1 United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate (CTED) “The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on terrorism,
counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism” Accessed February 21,
2022. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/cted_covid19_
paper_dec_2021.pdf.
2 “The United States Released the 2020 Country Report on Terrorism - U.S.
Embassy in Mozambique.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://mz.usembassy.
gov/the-united-states-released-the-2020-country-report-on-terrorism/.
3 United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate (CTED) “The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on terrorism,
counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism” Accessed February 21,
2022. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/cted_covid19_
paper_dec_2021.pdf.
4 Commission for Countering Extremism “COVID-19: How Hateful Extremists
Are Exploiting the Pandemic,” Accessed February 21, 2022, https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/906724/CCE_Briefing_Note_001.pdf.
5 “FSI | CISAC | MAPPINGMILITANTS CISAC - MMP: Islamic State.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/
islamic-state#text_block_18356.
6 Johnston, Patrick B., Jacob N. Shapiro, Howard J. Shatz, Benjamin Bahney,
Danielle F. Jung, Patrick Ryan, and Jonathan Wallace. “Foundations of the
Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005–2010.” RAND
Corporation, May 18, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR1192.html.
7 “Islamic State.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.
au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-
organisations/islamic-state.
8 Parliament House, Canberra. “The Fall of the ISIS ‘Caliphate.’” Text. Australia.
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/
Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook46p/
ISISCaliphate.
9 “Explainer: The Islamic State in 2021 | Wilson Center.” Accessed February 21,
2022. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/explainer-islamic-state-2021.
10 Council on Foreign Relations. “What Is the Taliban?” Accessed February 21,
2022. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/taliban-afghanistan.
11 Ibid.
12 “African Jihadi Groups Unite and Pledge Allegiance to Al-Qaeda.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.newsweek.com/al-qaeda-groups-unite-
sahel-563351.
13 “Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam Wal Muslimin.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/
examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin.
14 “Jama’at Nasr al-Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) | Center for Strategic and
International Studies.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.csis.org/
programs/past-projects/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-
backgrounders/jamaat-nasr-al-islam.
15 1“Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://
www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/
listed-terrorist-organisations/jamaat-nusrat-al-islam-wal-muslimin.
16 “The End of the Operation Barkhane, New Perspectives on the Territory –
Finabel.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://finabel.org/the-end-of-the-
operation-barkhane-new-perspectives-on-the-territory/.
17 “The Evolving Taliban-ISK Rivalry | The Interpreter.” Accessed February 21,
2022. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/evolving-taliban-isk-
rivalry.
18 The Strategist. “The Taliban Are Losing the Fight against Islamic State,”
December 6, 2021. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-taliban-are-losing-
the-fight-against-islamic-state/.
19 “How Will the Taliban Deal With Other Islamic Extremist Groups? - Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://
carnegieendowment.org/2021/08/31/how-will-taliban-deal-with-other-islamic-
extremist-groups-pub-85239.
20 “Trends in Terrorism: What’s on the Horizon in 2022? - Foreign Policy Research
Institute.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/12/
trends-in-terrorism-whats-on-the-horizon-in-2022/.
21 openDemocracy. “The Deadly Legacy of 20 Years of US ‘War on Terror’ in
Iraq.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/
north-africa-west-asia/the-impact-of-the-war-on-terror-on-iraq-state-
economy-and-civilian-deaths/.
22 “U.S.-Led Troops End Iraq Combat Mission, as Planned - Military Officials |
Reuters.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-
east/iraq-security-adviser-says-international-coalition-ends-combat-mission-
no-us-2021-12-09/.
23 Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford. “MMP:
Islamic State.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/
mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state.
24 Council on Foreign Relations. “Al-Shabab.” Accessed February 21, 2022.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab.
25 “Trump Orders Withdrawal of US Troops from Somalia - BBC News.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55196130.
26 “Examining Extremism: Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (al Shabaab).”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-
extremism/examining-extremism-harakat-al-shabaab-al-mujahideen-al-
shabaab.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 90
27 Institute for Economics and Peace. (2021). Global Peace Index 2021., https://
www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GPI-2021-web-1.pdf
28 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General. “Lead Inspector General
for Operation Inherent Resolve Quarterly Report to the United State.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/
Article/2833944/lead-inspector-general-for-operation-inherent-resolve-
quarterly-report-to-the-u/.
29 “Boko Haram’s Leader Is Dead: What Are the Humanitarian and Security
Implications?” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/
boko-harams-leader-dead-what-are-humanitarian-and-security-implications.
30 Ibid.
31 Council on Foreign Relations. “Nigerian Terrorist Abubakar Shekau: Dead or
Alive—and Does It Matter?” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/
blog/nigerian-terrorist-abubakar-shekau-dead-or-alive-and-does-it-matter.
32 “Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam Wal Muslimin.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/
examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-muslimin.
33 “French Forces Leave Mali’s Timbuktu after Nearly Nine Years | News | Al
Jazeera.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2021/12/15/french-forces-leave-malis-timbuktu-after-nearly-9-years.
34 “Murder in Tillabery: Calming Niger’s Emerging Communal Crisis | Crisis
Group.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/
niger/b172-murder-tillabery-calming-nigers-emerging-communal-crisis.
“Islamist Militancy in Pakistan | Global Conflict Tracker.” Accessed February 21,
2022. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/islamist-militancy-
pakistan.
SECTION 2: TRENDS
1 Defined as countries that had at least one conflict that led to 25 or more
battle-related deaths.
2 “Mexico - United States Department of State.” Accessed February 21, 2022.
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2020/mexico/.
3 “Etellekt | Análisis de Riesgos • Comunicación • Políticas Públicas.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.etellekt.com/informe-de-violencia-politica-en-
mexico-2021-J21-etellekt.html.
4 Committee to Protect Journalists. “Committee to Protect Journalists –
Defending Journalists Worldwide.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://cpj.
org/.
5 ACLED Cartel Violence, IEP calculations.
6 “Sir David Amess: MP Murder Suspect Held under Terrorism Act - BBC News.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-58943184.
7 “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi: IS Leader ‘dead after US Raid’ in Syria - BBC News.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-50200339.
8 “U.S. Report: ISIS Resilient in Iraq, Syria | Wilson Center.” Accessed February
21, 2022. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-report-isis-resilient-iraq-
syria.
9 U.S Department of State “Country Reports on Terrorism 2020,” December
2021, 318.
10 “Canadian ‘incel’ Killer Found Guilty of Murder over Toronto van Attack |
Toronto van Incident | The Guardian.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/03/toronto-van-attack-guilty-murder.
11 “Moscow Public Service Office Shooter Planned Attack in Advance — Law
Enforcement - Emergencies - TASS.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://tass.
com/emergencies/1372077.
12 Janetsky, M. (2019). How to Keep the Colombian Peace Deal Alive. Foreign
Policy. Retrieved October 22, 2019, from https://foreignpolicy.
com/2019/09/08/how-to-keep-the-colombian-peace-deal-alive-farc-
duqueuribe-colombia/
13 “Peru’s Shining Path Kills 16, Including Children, Ahead of Polls - BBC News.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-
america-57239680.
SECTION 3: TERROR IN THE SAHEL
1 Hansen, Stig Jarle. Horn, Sahel and Rift: Fault-Lines of the African Jihad.
London: Hurst & Company, 2018.
2 Boeke, Sergei. “Pathways out of the Quagmire? Perspectives for al-Qaeda in
the Sahel.” The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The
Hague (ICCT) i, August 2021. https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/08/
 ENDNOTES
Counter-Terrorism-Perspectives-for-al-Qaeda-in-the-Sahel-might-work-better.
pdf.
3 Nsaibia, Heni. “Insecurity in Southwestern Burkina Faso in the Context of an
Expanding Insurgency,” January 17, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.
int/files/resources/acleddata.com-Insecurity%20in%20Southwestern%20
Burkina%20Faso%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20an%20Expanding%20
Insurgency.pdf.
4 Thurston, Alex. Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and
Rebel Groups. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020; Skretting, Vidar
B. “Pragmatism and Purism in Jihadist Governance: The Islamic Emirate of
Azawad Revisited.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, January 2, 2022, 1–25.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.2007562.
5 Barnett, James, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz.
“Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a ‘Banditization’ of
Jihad?” CTC Sentinel 15, no. 1 (January 2022): 46–67.
6 Lia, Brynjar. “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9,
no. 4 (2015): 12; Hafez, Mohammed. “The Crisis Within Jihadism: The Islamic
State’s Puritanism vs. al-Qa`ida’s Populism – Combating Terrorism Center at
West Point.” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 9 (September 2020): 40–46.
7 Africanews with AFP. “Jihadist Threat Stirs Anti-Fulani Hostility in Ivory Coast |
Africanews,” January 26, 2022. https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/26/
jihadist-threat-stirs-anti-fulani-hostility-in-ivory-coast/.
8 Durmaz, Mucahid. “Sahel Violence Threatens West African Coastal States |
News | Al Jazeera.” Al-Jazeera, January 12, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2022/1/12/sahel-violence-threatens-west-african-coastal-states.
9 Raleigh, Clionadh, Héni Nsaibia, and Caitriona Dowd. “The Sahel Crisis since
2012.” African Affairs 120, no. 478 (2021): 123–43. https://doi.org/doi.
org/10.1093/afraf/adaa022.
10 Jones, Mayeni. “Abubakar Shekau: Nigeria’s Boko Haram Leader Is Dead, Say
Rival Militants - BBC News.” BBC News, June 7, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-57378493
11 Fink, Naureen Chowdhury, and Arthur Boutellis. “Between a Rock and a Hard
Place: Counterterrorism and Peacekeeping in the Sahel - Mali | ReliefWeb.”
Reliefweb, July 20, 2021. https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/between-rock-and-
hard-place-counterterrorism-and-peacekeeping-sahel.
12 Human Rights Watch. “Sahel: End Abuses in Counterterrorism Operations |
Human Rights Watch,” February 13, 2021. https://www.hrw.org/
news/2021/02/13/sahel-end-abuses-counterterrorism-operations.
13 Freedom House. “Benin.” Freedom House, 2021. https://freedomhouse.org/
country/benin/freedom-world/2021.
14 Melly, Paul. “Sahel Jihadists: West Africa Faces up to Policing Its Terror
Triangle - BBC News.” BBC News. September 4, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-58438905.
15 News Agencies. “Explainer: Tuareg-Led Rebellion in North Mali | News | Al
Jazeera.” Al-Jazeera, April 3, 2012. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/4/3/
explainer-tuareg-led-rebellion-in-north-mali.
16 In 2015, Abubakar Shekau announced that Boko Haram would join ISIS.
However, internal tensions led to a split, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
nominating Abu Musab al-Barnawi to lead ISWAP. Shekau remained Boko
Haram’s leader. In 2021, Shekau killed himself during a battle with ISWAP
fighters.
17 Barnett, James, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz.
“Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a ‘Banditization’ of
Jihad?” CTC Sentinel 15, no. 1 (January 2022): 46–67.
18 The group drew members from the Ifoghas tribe, which is Ag Ghali’s tribe,
and Tuareg jihadists.
19 Mainly composed of Tuareg.
20 Mostly Fulani
21 European Council on Foreign Relations. “Dan Na Ambassagou - Mapping
Armed Groups in Mali and the Sahel,” Undated. https://ecfr.eu/special/
sahel_mapping/dan_na_ambassagou. The group’s founder Youssouf Tolob has
confirmed that the former Malian Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga
supported the formation of the group. Baldaro, Edoardo, and Yida Seydou
Diall. “The End of the Sahelian Exception: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Clash in
Central Mali.” The International Spectator 55, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 69–83.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833566.
22 Kalfelis, Melina C. “With or Without the State: Moral Divergence and the
Question of Trust in Security Assemblages in Burkina Faso.” Journal of
Intervention and Statebuilding 15, no. 5 (2021): 598–613. https://doi.org/10.108
0/17502977.2021.1986255.
23 It seems that fratricide led to more fighters dying than from counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency operations, as seen when AQIM and ISGS begun
vying for power in mid-2020. Boeke, Sergei. “Pathways out of the Quagmire?
Perspectives for al-Qaeda in the Sahel.” The Hague: The International Centre
for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT), August 2021. https://icct.nl/app/
uploads/2021/08/Counter-Terrorism-Perspectives-for-al-Qaeda-in-the-Sahel-
might-work-better.pdf.
24 Nsaibia, Héni, and Caleb Weiss. “The End of the Sahelian Anomaly: How the
Global Conflict between the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida Finally Came to West
Africa.” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 7 (July 2020): 1–15.
25 Raleigh, Clionadh, Héni Nsaibia, and Caitriona Dowd. “The Sahel Crisis since
2012.” African Affairs 120, no. 478 (2021): 123–43. https://doi.org/doi.
org/10.1093/afraf/adaa022.
26 Raleigh, Clionadh, Héni Nsaibia, and Caitriona Dowd. “The Sahel Crisis since
2012.” African Affairs 120, no. 478 (2021): 123–43. https://doi.org/doi.
org/10.1093/afraf/adaa022; Benjaminsen, Tor A., and Boubacar Ba. “Why Do
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 91
Pastoralists in Mali Join Jihadist Groups? A Political Ecological Explanation.”
The Journal of Peasant Studies 46, no. 1 (2019): 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/0
3066150.2018.1474457.
27 Bøås, Morten. “Guns, Money and Prayers: AQIM’s Blueprint for Securing
Control of Northern Mali – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.” CTC
Sentinel 7, no. 4 (2014): 1–6.
28 In the late 2010s, there was unhappiness with AQIM’s strong Algerian identity,
which encouraged Taureg to break away and establish their own units, as
seen for example when a group of AQIM fighters, (mainly Malian and
Mauritanian), broke away to form the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West
Africa (MUJAO)
29 Baldaro, Edoardo, and Yida Seydou Diall. “The End of the Sahelian Exception:
Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Clash in Central Mali.” The International Spectator
55, no. 4 (October 1, 2020): 69–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.18
33566.
30 This is a tactic used by al-Qaeda and Islamic State to great effect in North
Africa and the Middle East.
31 Human Rights Watch. “Mali: Islamist Armed Group Abuses, Banditry Surge |
Human Rights Watch.” Human Righst Watch, January 18, 2017. https://www.
hrw.org/news/2017/01/18/mali-islamist-armed-group-abuses-banditry-surge.
32 For example following the killing of Boubacar Lawey, a 95-year-old chief of
Tchombangou village in southwest Niger. For 55 years, Lawey had been
resolving local disputes, collecting taxes, registering deaths and birth, and
more. Lawey’s murder led around sixty village chiefs to flee the area. The
government responded to the power vacuum and emerging local tensions by
outlawing motorbikes (as many insurgents use them) and the increased
insecurity has discouraged villages from visiting the markets, which has
ground the local economy to a halt. Mcallister, Edward, and Lena Masri.
“Extremists Target African Village Leaders in Wave of Assassinations.” Reuters,
October 8, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/
africa-islamists-sahel-leaders/.
33 Lafrance, Camille, and Marie Toulemonde. “France Says Its Army Killed
Al-Qaeda’s Abdelmalek Droukdel | News | Al Jazeera.” Young Africa, February
9, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/6/france-says-its-army-
killed-al-qaedas-abdelmalek-droukdel.
34 Albert, Isaac Olawale. “Decapitation Strategies and the Significance of
Abubakar Shekau’s Death in Nigeria’s Boko Haram Crisis.” International Affairs
97, no. 6 (November 1, 2021): 1691–1708. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab173.
35 News Agencies. “French FM Accuses Russian Mercenaries of ‘Despoiling’ Mali
| News | Al Jazeera.” Al-Jazeera, January 30, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2022/1/30/french-fm-accuses-russian-mercenaries-of-despoiling-mali.
36 ICG. “Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali.” Africa Report.
Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 13, 2018.
37 Boeke, Sergei. “Pathways out of the Quagmire? Perspectives for al-Qaeda in
the Sahel.” The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The
Hague (ICCT), August 2021. https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/08/Counter-
Terrorism-Perspectives-for-al-Qaeda-in-the-Sahel-might-work-better.pdf.
38 Lafrance, Camille, and Marie Toulemonde. “France Says Its Army Killed
Al-Qaeda’s Abdelmalek Droukdel | News | Al Jazeera.” Young Africa, February
9, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/6/france-says-its-army-
killed-al-qaedas-abdelmalek-droukdel.
39 Adelaja, Adesoji, Justin George, Takashi Miyahara, and Eva Penar. “Food
Insecurity and Terrorism.” Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 41, no. 3
(September 2019): 475–97. https://doi.org/10.1093/aepp/ppy021.
40 OCHA. “A Race to Adapt: The Climate Crisis in the Sahel.” OCHA’s Centre for
Humanitarian Data, 2021. https://data.humdata.org/visualization/climate-
crisis-sahel/.
41 Suriyaarachchi, Rashini. “This Girl Spends Eight Hours a Day Doing Something
That Takes Us Seconds.” UNICEF, August 27, 2020. https://www.unicef.org.au/
blog/stories/august-2020/this-girl-spends-eight-hours-a-day-doing-
something.
42 There had been reports that Boko Haram had poisoned water supplies in
2015, but no evidence that they had done so since.
43 OCHA. “A Race to Adapt: The Climate Crisis in the Sahel.” OCHA’s Centre for
Humanitarian Data, 2021. https://data.humdata.org/visualization/climate-
crisis-sahel/.
44 Blanco, Marta MONTERO. “The Implications of Water as a Strategic Resource:
Water Stress and Conflict in the Sahel Region.” IEEE, 35/2020, 2020, 12.
45 OCHA. “A Race to Adapt: The Climate Crisis in the Sahel.” OCHA’s Centre for
Humanitarian Data, 2021. https://data.humdata.org/visualization/climate-
crisis-sahel/.
46 OCHA. “A Race to Adapt: The Climate Crisis in the Sahel.” OCHA’s Centre for
Humanitarian Data, 2021. https://data.humdata.org/visualization/climate-
crisis-sahel/.
47 Nett, Katharina, and Lukas Rüttinger. “Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised
Crime in a Warming Climate.” Berlin: Adelphi, October 2016. https://
climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/CD%20Report_
Insurgency_170724_web.pdf.
48 Adelaja, Adesoji, Justin George, Takashi Miyahara, and Eva Penar. “Food
Insecurity and Terrorism.” Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 41, no. 3
(September 2019): 475–97.
49 Kah, Henry Kam. “‘Boko Haram Is Losing, But so Is Food Production’: Conflict
and Food Insecurity i in Nigeria and Cameroon.” Africa Development 42, no. 3
(2017): 177–96.
50 Coccia, Mario. “The Relation between Terrorism and High Population Growth.”
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 5, no. 1 (2018): 84–104.
 ENDNOTES
51 The New Humanitarian. “The New Humanitarian | No Shortage of Recruits for
Boko Haram in Cameroon’s Far North.” The New Humanitarian, March 5, 2015.
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/255134.
52 Kalfelis, Melina C. “With or Without the State: Moral Divergence and the
Question of Trust in Security Assemblages in Burkina Faso.” Journal of
Intervention and Statebuilding 15, no. 5 (2021): 598–613. https://doi.org/10.108
0/17502977.2021.1986255.
53 Barnett, James, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz.
“Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry, or a ‘Banditization’ of
Jihad?” CTC Sentinel 15, no. 1 (January 2022): 46–67.
54 Smith, Seán. “Building Integrity in Mali’s Defence and Security Sector.”
Transparency International, 2019. https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/TIDS_BuildingIntegrity_Mali.pdf.
55 GTI Report 2022
56 UNDP. “Measuring the Economic Impact of Violent Extremism Leading to
Terrorism in Africa.” UNDP, 2019. https://www.undp.org/publications/
measuring-economic-impact-violent-extremism-leading-terrorism-
africa#modal-publication-download.
57 Campbell, John. “Boko Haram Defections Spike in Nigeria and Cameroon |
Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, August 18, 2021.
https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-defections-spike-nigeria-and-
cameroon.
58 Nsaibia, Héni, and Caleb Weiss. “The End of the Sahelian Anomaly: How the
Global Conflict between the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida Finally Came to West
Africa.” CTC Sentinel 13, no. 7 (July 2020): 1–15.
59 Demuynck, Méryl, and Julie Colemam. “The Shifting Sands of the Sahel’s
Terrorism Landscape - ICCT.” ICCT, March 12, 2020. https://icct.nl/publication/
the-shifting-sands-of-the-sahels-terrorism-landscape/.
60 Buchanan-Clarke, Stephen, and Sibusiso Nkomo. “Violent Extremism in
Africa.” Afrobarometer Policy Pape. Afrobarometer, July 2021.
61 UN News. “35.8 Million Face Lean Season Food Crisis in West Africa and Sahel
| | UN News.” UN, December 7, 2021. https://news.un.org/en/
story/2021/12/1107302.
62 WFP. “Central Sahel Emergency | World Food Programme.” World Food
Programme, Undated. https://www.wfp.org/support-us/stories/central-sahel-
the-humanitarian-emergency-the-world-is-ignoring.
63 Middendorp, Tom, and Reinier Bergema. “The Warning Signs Are Flashing Red
The Interplay between Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Western
Sahel.” The Hague: ICCT, September 2019. https://icct.nl/app/
uploads/2019/10/PB-The-Warning-Signs-are-flashing-red_2e-proef.pdf.
64 Wezeman, Pieter, Alexandra Kuimova, and Siemon Wezeman. “Trends in
International Arms Transfers, 2020.” SIPRI, March 2021. https://www.sipri.org/
sites/default/files/2021-03/fs_2103_at_2020_v2.pdf; Middendorp, Tom, and
Reinier Bergema. “The Warning Signs Are Flashing Red The Interplay between
Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Western Sahel.” The Hague:
ICCT, September 2019. https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2019/10/PB-The-Warning-
Signs-are-flashing-red_2e-proef.pdf.
65 Frimpong, Osei Baffour. “Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Lake
Chad Basin: Key Issues and Way Forward.” Washington, DC: Wilson Center,
July 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/
documents/Climate%20Change%20and%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20
the%20Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Key%20Issues%20and%20Way%20
Forward_0.pdf.
66 Includes the administrative units of Adamawa, Borno, Diffa, Extreme-Nord,
Gombe, Lac, Yobe. OCHA. “Lake Chad Basin Area - Administrative Boundaries
for Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger - Humanitarian Data Exchange.” OCHA
Services, Undated. https://data.humdata.org/dataset/lac-chad-basin-area.
67 Bureau of Counterterrorism. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019,” 2019.
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Country-Reports-on-
Terrorism-2019-2.pdf.
68 Frimpong, Osei Baffour. “Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Lake
Chad Basin: Key Issues and Way Forward.” Washington, DC: Wilson Center,
July 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/
documents/Climate%20Change%20and%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20
the%20Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Key%20Issues%20and%20Way%20
Forward_0.pdf.
69 Frimpong, Osei Baffour. “Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Lake
Chad Basin: Key Issues and Way Forward.” Washington, DC: Wilson Center,
July 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/
documents/Climate%20Change%20and%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20
the%20Lake%20Chad%20Basin%20Key%20Issues%20and%20Way%20
Forward_0.pdf
70 Campbell, John. “Boko Haram Defections Spike in Nigeria and Cameroon |
Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, August 18, 2021.
https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-defections-spike-nigeria-and-
cameroon.
71 Campbell, John. “Boko Haram Defections Spike in Nigeria and Cameroon |
Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations, August 18, 2021.
https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-defections-spike-nigeria-and-
cameroon.
72 USAID. “Lake Chad Basin – Complex Emergency,” September 30, 2020.
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2020_09_30_-_USG_
Lake_Chad_Basin_Complex_Emergency_Fact_Sheet_4.pdf.
73 USAID. “Lake Chad Basin – Complex Emergency,” September 30, 2020.
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2020_09_30_-_USG_
Lake_Chad_Basin_Complex_Emergency_Fact_Sheet_4.pdf.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 92
74 USAID. “Lake Chad Basin – Complex Emergency,” September 30, 2020.
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2020_09_30_-_USG_
Lake_Chad_Basin_Complex_Emergency_Fact_Sheet_4.pdf.
SECTION 4: TERRORISM, CONFLICT AND INSURGENCY
1 Defined as countries that had at least one conflict that led to 25 or more
battle-related deaths in a calendar year.
2 This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.01 per cent level (p < 0.01)
3 “Egypt’s Counterinsurgency Success in Sinai | The Washington Institute.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/egypts-counterinsurgency-success-sinai.
4 “Syria’s War and the Descent Into Horror.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://
www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war.
5 “How ISIS Is Transforming | RAND.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.
rand.org/blog/2017/09/how-isis-is-transforming.html.
6 “How ISIS Is Transforming | RAND.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.
rand.org/blog/2017/09/how-isis-is-transforming.html.
7 Uppsala/ Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Database /
Armed Conflict Location Events Database (ACLED)
8 "Counterterrorism and youth radicalization in Jordan: Social and political
dimensions." CTC Sentinel 10.4 (2017): 25-30.
9 Izzi, Valeria. “PROMOTING DECENT EMPLOYMENT FOR AFRICAN YOUTH AS A
PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY,” n.d., 64.
10 “Germany’s Jihadists: Young, Male, Losers.” Accessed February 21, 2022.
https://www.thelocal.de/20140911/germanys-jihadis-young-male-failures/
11 https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR236Venhaus.pdf
12 “The New Humanitarian | No Shortage of Recruits for Boko Haram in
Cameroon’s Far North.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.
thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/255134.
13 “ISIS ‘Executes 100 Deserters’ in Syria’s Raqqa | Al Arabiya English.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2014/12/20/
ISIS-executes-100-deserters-in-Syria-s-Raqqa-report.
14 “Muslim Communities, Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation: A
Critically Reflective Approach to Engagement.” Accessed February 21, 2022.
https://www.infona.pl/resource/bwmeta1.element.elsevier-696be0bc-77e6-
3ce2-a0d3-c6bcad2e89b4.
15 “Analysing Terrorism from a Systems Thinking Perspective.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262826171_
Analysing_Terrorism_from_a_Systems_Thinking_Perspective.
16 “Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization Among Individuals Who
Joined Al-Shabaab in Kenya: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: Vol 37, No 11.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10
57610X.2014.952511.
17 “‘ISIS in Their Own Words’ by Anne Speckhard and Molly D. Ellenberg.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/5/.
18 “‘ISIS in Their Own Words’ by Anne Speckhard and Molly D. Ellenberg.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss1/5/.
19 “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida | RAND.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
MG741-1.html.
20 Fredman, Leah A., Michael D. Buhrmester, Angel Gomez, William T. Fraser,
Sanaz Talaifar, Skylar M. Brannon, and William B. Swann. “Identity Fusion,
Extreme Pro-Group Behavior, and the Path to Defusion: Identity Fusion and
Extreme Behavior.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 9, no. 9
(September 2015): 468–80. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12193.
21 “Ideology Isn’t Everything: Transnational Terrorism, Recruitment Incentives,
and Attack Casualties: Terrorism and Political Violence: Vol 28, No 5.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0
9546553.2014.961635.
22 “Why Radicalization Fails: Barriers to Mass Casualty Terrorism: Terrorism and
Political Violence: Vol 32, No 4.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2017.1409212.
23 “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida | RAND.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
MG741-1.html.
24 Wood, Alex Stephen. “Dangerous Allies: States, Paramilitary Violence, and
Civil War,” n.d., 86.
25 “FARC | History & Peace Deal | Britannica.” Accessed February 21, 2022.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/FARC.
26 “Colombia Reaches New Peace Deal with FARC Rebels | News | Al Jazeera.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/13/
colombia-reaches-new-peace-deal-with-farc-rebels.
27 “US Removes Colombia’s FARC from Terrorism Blacklist - CNNPolitics.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/30/politics/
farc-delisting/index.html.
28 “US Could Drop Colombia’s FARC from ‘Terror’ List by End of Month | Conflict
News | Al Jazeera.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2021/11/24/us-to-drop-colombia-farc-rebels-terror-list-end-of-month.
29 “Farc: Colombian Rebel Commander ‘El Paisa’ Killed in Venezuela - BBC
News.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-
america-59543742.
30 “US Removes Colombia’s FARC from Terrorism Blacklist - CNNPolitics.”
Accessed February 21, 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/11/30/politics/
farc-delisting/index.html.
31 https://curate.nd.edu/downloads/9c67wm14c71
 ENDNOTES
32 “Five Years After Peace Deal, Colombia Is Running Out of Time, Experts Say
- The New York Times.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/09/26/world/americas/colombia-peace-deal-farc.html.
33 “Poverty, Social Divisions, and Conflict in Nepal.” Accessed February 21, 2022.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7074.
34 “Dilemma and Factionalism in the Maoist Politics of Nepal.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326068400_
Dilemma_and_Factionalism_in_the_Maoist_Politics_of_Nepal.
35 “The Maoists’ Use of Child Soldiers in Nepal | HRW.” Accessed February 21,
2022. https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/02/01/children-ranks/maoists-use-
child-soldiers-nepal.
36 “Strategic Interaction Between Rebels and the State: A Study of the Maoist
Conflict in Nepal: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: Vol 36, No 7.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/105761
0X.2013.793592.
37 https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/50-nepal-backgrounder-ceasefire-
soft-landing-or-strategic-pause.pdf
38 https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/184-nepal-peace-and-justice.pdf
39 “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization
on JSTOR.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4620071.
40 https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/115-nepal-from-people-power-to-
peace.pdf
41 https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/173-nepal-s-future-in-whose-hands.pdf
42 https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b131-nepal-s-peace-process-the-
endgame-nears.pdf
43 “Terrorism as Method in Nepali Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2016: Small Wars &
Insurgencies: Vol 28, No 1.” Accessed February 21, 2022. https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2016.1265820.
44 “No ‘End of the Peace Process’: Federalism and Ethnic Violence in Nepal,
Cooperation and Conflict | 10.1177/0010836717750199 | DeepDyve.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/sage/no-end-of-the-peace-
process-federalism-and-ethnic-violence-in-nepal-WqwAwtVSyU?key=sage.
45 “No ‘End of the Peace Process’: Federalism and Ethnic Violence in Nepal,
Cooperation and Conflict | 10.1177/0010836717750199 | DeepDyve.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/sage/no-end-of-the-peace-
process-federalism-and-ethnic-violence-in-nepal-WqwAwtVSyU?key=sage.
46 “Maoist People’s War and the Revolution of Everyday Life in Nepal.” Accessed
February 21, 2022. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/maoist-peoples-
war-and-the-revolution-of-everyday-life-in-nepal/
B982826F24E6C75F7E50559B42F6C246.
EXPERT ESSAYS
The Technology of Terror: from Dynamite to the Metaverse
1 Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press, 2006.
Alternatively, Cronin, Audrey Kurth. Power to the People: How Open
Technological Innovation Is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists. Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2020.
2 Larabee, Ann. The Wrong Hands: Popular Weapons Manuals and Their Historic
Challenges to a Democratic Society. 1st edition. Oxford ; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2015.
3 Kahaner, Larry. “Weapon Of Mass Destruction.” Washington Post, November
26, 2006. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2006/11/26/
weapon-of-mass-destruction/72a246a2-4487-4162-b49d-8713f3bbb1c4/.
4 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. Power to the People: How Open Technological
Innovation Is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020.
5 States, Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United. “The 9/11
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report).” Government. govinfo.gov.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 22,
2004. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.govinfo.
gov%2Fapp%2Fdetails%2FGPO-911REPORT.
6 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. Power to the People: How Open Technological
Innovation Is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020.
7 “Pentagon Bomb Squad Chief Looks Back | WIRED.” Accessed February 22,
2022. https://www.wired.com/2007/11/the-other-day-i/.
8 Masys, Anthony J. Handbook of Security Science. Springer International
Publishing, 2022.
9 Cook, Joana, and Gina Vale. “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women
and Minors of Islamic State,” 2018, 76.
10 “Greater Cooperation Needed to Tackle Danger Posed by Returning Foreign
Fighters, Head of Counter‑Terrorism Office Tells Security Council | Meetings
Coverage and Press Releases.” Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.un.
org/press/en/2017/sc13097.doc.htm.
11 Mazzetti, Mark, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth. “Two-Year Manhunt Led to
Killing of Awlaki in Yemen.” The New York Times, September 30, 2011, sec.
World. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-
awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html.
12 Liang, Christina. “Cyber Jihad | GCSP.” Cyber Jihad, February 1, 2015. https://
www.gcsp.ch/publications/cyber-jihad.
13 Zucchino, David. “Collapse and Conquest: The Taliban Strategy That Seized
Afghanistan.” The New York Times, August 18, 2021, sec. World. https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/08/18/world/asia/taliban-victory-strategy-afghanistan.html.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 93
14 “The Use of Social Media by United States Extremists.” National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Accessed February 22,
2022. https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_PIRUS_
UseOfSocialMediaByUSExtremists_ResearchBrief_July2018.pdf.
15 Waters, Gregory, and Robert Postings. “Spiders of the Caliphate: Mapping the
Islamic State’s Global Support Network on Facebook,” May 2018. https://www.
counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/Spiders%20of%20the%20
Caliphate%20%28May%202018%29.pdf.
16 “YouTube User Statistics 2022 | Global Media Insight.” Accessed February 22,
2022. https://www.globalmediainsight.com/blog/youtube-users-statistics/.
17 “Number of Steam Users 2021 | Statista.” Accessed February 22, 2022. https://
www.statista.com/statistics/308330/number-stream-users/.
18 Anti-Defamation League. “This Is Not a Game: How Steam Harbors
Extremists.” Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.adl.org/
steamextremism.
19 Business of Apps. “Discord Revenue and Usage Statistics (2022),” September
9, 2020. https://www.businessofapps.com/data/discord-statistics/.
20 “FATF Annual Report 2019-2020.” Financial Action Task Force (FATF) i, 2020.
www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/annual-
report-2019-2020.html.
21 Investigations, Alexi Mostrous, Head of. “Big Brands Fund Terror through
Online Adverts,” sec. news. Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.
thetimes.co.uk/article/big-brands-fund-terror-knnxfgb98.
22 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. Power to the People: How Open Technological
Innovation Is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020.
23 “ALGORITHMS AND TERRORISM: THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES.” Cyber Security and New
Technologies Unit of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) in
the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the United
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) t, 2021.
un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/
malicious-use-of-ai-uncct-unicri-report-hd.pdf.
24 Washington Post. “ISIS Used an Armed Drone to Kill Two Kurdish Fighters and
Wound French Troops, Report Says.” Accessed February 22, 2022. https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/11/isis-used-an-
armed-drone-to-kill-two-kurdish-fighters-and-wound-french-troops-report-
says/.
25 “ALGORITHMS AND TERRORISM: THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES.” Cyber Security and New
Technologies Unit of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) in
the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the United
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) t, 2021.
un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/
malicious-use-of-ai-uncct-unicri-report-hd.pdf.
26 Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. “The Islamic State and Drones:
Supply, Scale, and Future Threats,” July 11, 2018. https://ctc.usma.edu/
islamic-state-drones-supply-scale-future-threats/.
27 Hambling, David. “Houthi Drone Strike Hits Saudi Plane At Airport— Again.”
Forbes. Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/
davidhambling/2021/09/01/houthi-drone-strikes-hits-saudi-plane-at-airport--
again/.
28 “Berlin Memorandum on Good Practices for Countering Terrorist Use of
Unmanned Aerial Systems.” Global Counterterrorism Forum. Accessed
February 22, 2022. https://www.thegctf.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=j5gj4fSJ4
fI%3D&portalid=1.
29 In 2020, the continued scope of terrorists’ online presence was visible when
on Europol’s Referral Action Day Europol and 17 countries removed in one day
1,906 URLs linking to terrorist content which were located on 180 platforms
and websites.
30 “2021 Trends Show Increased Globalized Threat of Ransomware | CISA.”
Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/
aa22-040a.
31 “White-Crusade: How to Prevent Right-Wing Extremists from Exploiting the
Internet | GCSP.” Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.gcsp.ch/
publications/white-crusade-how-prevent-right-wing-extremists-exploiting-
internet.
32 “GCSP Terrorism and Preventing Violent Extremism Course | Building a
National Strategy for Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) - A Virtual Learning
Journey 2022.” Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.gcsp.ch/courses/
building-national-strategy-preventing-violent-extremism-pve-virtual-learning-
journey-2022.
33 "Big Tech Has Outgrown This Planet", NY Times, Accessed February 28, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/29/technology/big-tech-profits.html
34 Cronin, Audrey Kurth. Power to the People: How Open Technological
Innovation Is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2020.
35 Masys, Anthony J. Handbook of Security Science. Springer International
Publishing, 2022.
36 “Topic: Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft (GAFAM).” Statista.
Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.statista.com/topics/4213/
google-apple-facebook-amazon-and-microsoft-gafam/.
Why Morocco’s counterterrorism evolution attacks matters to
Africa
1 Anneli Botha, "Terrorism in the Maghreb: The transnationalisation of domestic
terrorism," Institute for Security Studies Monographs 2008, no. 144 https://
www.files.ethz.ch/isn/103660/MONO144FULL.pdf
2 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), (The National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) ). https://www.start.umd.
edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_
max=&start_yearonly=2003&end_yearonly=2004&dtp2=all&country=136&chart
type=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc&expanded=yes#results-table.
3 Kalpakian, Jack. “21. Comparing the 2003 and 2007 Incidents in Casablanca.”
In The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat, edited by Bruce Hoffman and
Fernando Reinares, 498–518. Columbia University Press, 2014. https://doi.
org/10.7312/hoff16898-021.
4 Khalid Attaoui, “How the terrorists prepared to attack the peaceful city six
months before last may?” Al-Ahdath al-Maghribiya, Special Edition, No. 1689
(September 2003), p. 5.
5 Khalid Attaoui, “How the terrorists prepared to attack the peaceful city six
months before last may?” Al-Ahdath al-Maghribiya, Special Edition, No. 1689
(September 2003), p. 5.
6 Khalid Attaoui, “How the terrorists prepared to attack the peaceful city six
months before last may?” Al-Ahdath al-Maghribiya, Special Edition, No. 1689
(September 2003), p. 5.
7 See Global Terrorism Database. Five out of nine terrorist attacks carried out in
Morocco during the 90’s decade used a blunt object; one involved a firearm;
one an explosive device, and the weapon used in two of those nine attacks
remains is reported s unknown.
8 Jamal, Bahija. “Moroccan Counter-Terrorism Policy: Case of Moroccan Female
Migrants to ISIS.” International Annals of Criminology 56, no. 1–2 (November
2018): 145–56. https://doi.org/10.1017/cri.2018.12.
9 Accessed February 22, 2022. https://adala.justice.gov.ma/production/
legislation/fr/penal/luttecontreterrorisme.htm.
10 “Counterterrorism Cooperation in the Maghreb: Morocco Looks beyond
Marrakech | The Strategist.” Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/counterterrorism-cooperation-in-the-maghreb-morocco-
looks-beyond-marrakech/. Jamal, Bahija. “Moroccan Counter-Terrorism Policy:
Case of Moroccan Female Migrants to ISIS.” International Annals of
Criminology 56, no. 1–2 (November 2018): 145–56. https://doi.org/10.1017/
cri.2018.12
11 Kalpakian, Jack. “Against Both Bin Laden and Belliraj: Lessons from Moroccan
Counterterrorism.” Contemporary Security Policy 29, no. 3 (December 2008):
453–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260802514712.
12 Berrada, Kathya Kenza. “Morocco’S Response to Foreign Terrorist Fighters:,”
2022, 13.
13 Alvaro Escalonilla, “Morocco Dismantles a Daesh-Linked Terrorist Cell |
Atalayar - Las Claves Del Mundo En Tus Manos.” Accessed February 22, 2022.
https://atalayar.com/en/content/morocco-dismantles-daesh-linked-terrorist-
cell. Kathya Kenza Berrada. “Dealing with Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters:
Insights from the Moroccan Experience - European Eye on Radicalization.”
Accessed February 22, 2022. https://eeradicalization.com/dealing-with-
returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-insights-from-the-moroccan-experience/.
Alaoui, Assia Bensalah. “Morocco’s Security Strategy: Preventing Terrorism
and Countering Extremism.” European View 16, no. 1 (June 2017): 103–20.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-017-0449-3.
14 Sarah; Pollock Feuer, David, “Terrorism in Europe: The Moroccan Connection |
The Washington Institute.” Accessed February 22, 2022. https://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/terrorism-europe-moroccan-
connection.
15 El Moussaoui El Ajlaoui, "Security Challenges and Issues in the Sahelo-
Saharan Region: The Morocco Perspective," (July 2016), p.5-6.
16 Krista London Couture, “A gendered approach to countering violent
extremism: lessons learned from women in peacebuilding and conflict
prevention applied successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco”, (Center for 21st
Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings, 2014)., p. ix-x
17 Yahia H Zoubir and Djallil Lounnas, "European-North African Security: The
Complexity of Cooperation," in Transnational Security Cooperation in the
Mediterranean (Springer, 2021)., p.185
18 See "Africa Lion," https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/african-lion.
19 Ihssane Guennoun, "India and Morocco’s New Cooperation Areas: Focusing
on Security and Preventing Violent Extremism," (2019). Accessed on 22
February 2022, https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2021-01/
PB%20-%2026-19%20%28Ihssane%20Geunnoun%29.pdf
20 Michael Sauers, "DGST, Italian Intelligence Team Up to Arrest Senior
Moroccan ISIS Terrorist," (July 10 2021). https://www.moroccoworldnews.
com/2021/07/343343/dgst-italian-intelligence-team-up-to-arrest-senior-
moroccan-isis-fighter.
21 Cragin, Kim; Bartlett, Michael; Crass, Will. "Recalibrating U.S.
Counterterrorism: Lessons Learned from Spain." (October 10, 2021 2021).
https://www.lawfareblog.com/recalibrating-us-counterterrorism-lessons-
learned-spain. Kim; Bartlett Cragin, Michael; Crass, Will, "Recalibrating U.S.
Counterterrorism: Lessons Learned From Spain," (October 10, 2021 2021).
https://www.lawfareblog.com/recalibrating-us-counterterrorism-lessons-
learned-spain.
22 “Stronger Together: As Morocco and India Share Intelligence with Sri Lanka
More Is Needed to Stem Transnational Terrorism.” Accessed February 22,
2022. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/talkingturkey/stronger-
together-as-morocco-and-india-share-intelligence-with-sri-lanka-more-is-
needed-to-stem-transnational-terrorism/.
23 “Morocco Sees Sahel Jihadists as Magnet for Local Cells | Reuters.” Accessed
February 22, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-security-
idUSKBN2AV1QQ
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2022 ­| 94
24 The North Africa Post, "Global Coalition against ISIS: Morocco Co-Chairs
Africa Focus Group," (December 4 2021).; and "Africa Focus Group ", 2021,
Accessed February 22, 2022. https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/africa-focus-
group/.
25 Jeff Seldin, "Terrorism Spreading ‘Unabated’ Across Africa, Warns US
Commander," (June 30 2021). https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_terrorism-
spreading-unabated-across-africa-warns-us-commander/6207624.html.
26 Alex Vines, "Out of Africa: Exploring the roots of the 9/11 attacks," (2021).
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/out-africa-exploring-roots-911-
attacks.
27 Oumaima Latrech, "Morocco Renews Commitment to Combating Terrorism in
Africa," (December 03 2021). https://www.moroccoworldnews.
com/2021/12/345833/morocco-renews-commitment-to-combating-terrorism-
in-africa.
Sub-Saharan Africa at a crossroads
1 Malik, Nesrine. “How Facebook Took over the Internet in Africa – and Changed
Everything.” The Guardian, January 20, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2022/jan/20/facebook-second-life-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-
tech-company-in-africa#:~:text=In%202015%2C%20Facebook%20
launched%20Free,audio%2C%20photo%20and%20video%20content.
2 Alifo, Noble Mawutor K. “Combatting Humanitarian and Environmental Crises
in the Sahel Region— the Role of Sustainability and Co-Benefits.” McGill
Journal of Sustainable Development Law (MJSDL), February 23, 2021. https://
www.mcgill.ca/mjsdl/article/combatting-humanitarian-and-environmental-
crises-sahel-region-role-sustainability-and-co-benefits.
3 Stern, Maria, and Joakim Öjendal. “Mapping the Security—Development
Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence.” Security Dialogue 41,
no. 1 (2010): 5–29.
4 Monkey Cage. “Is Democracy in Mali Dying? Not If Citizens’ Voices Are Heard |
Afrobarometer,” August 28, 2020. https://afrobarometer.org/blogs/
democracy-mali-dying-not-if-citizens-voices-are-heard.
5 Bloom, David E., David Canning, and Jaypee Sevilla. The Demographic
Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population
Change. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003.
6 Skretting, Vidar B. “Pragmatism and Purism in Jihadist Governance: The
Islamic Emirate of Azawad Revisited.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, January
2, 2022, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.2007562.
7 Amnesty International. “Burkina Faso: Witness Testimony Confirms Armed
Group Perpetrated Mass Killings.” Amnesty International, March 20, 2020.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/burkina-faso-witness-
testimony-confirms-armed-group/.
8 Cold-Ravnkilde, Signe Marie, and Katja Lindskov Jacobsen. “Disentangling the
Security Traffic Jam in the Sahel: Constitutive Effects of Contemporary
Interventionism.” International Affairs 96, no. 4 (July 1, 2020): 855–74. https://
doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa093.
9 German Federal Foreign Office. “Implementation of the German Government
Policy Guidelines: Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace.”
German Federal Foreign Office, March 31, 2021. https://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/krisenpraevention/-/231878.
10 Goxho, Delina. “Pivoting Stabilisation in the Sahel: Competing Visions and
Implementation Checkpoints.” Security Praxis (blog), May 25, 2021. https://
securitypraxis.eu/pivoting-stabilisation-in-the-sahel-competing-visions-and-
implementation-checkpoints/.
11 Timothy Donais. Peacebuilding and Local Ownership Post-Conflict
Consensus-Building. New York: Routledge, 2012.
12 Goxho, Delina. “Pivoting Stabilisation in the Sahel: Competing Visions and
Implementation Checkpoints.” Security Praxis (blog), May 25, 2021. https://
securitypraxis.eu/pivoting-stabilisation-in-the-sahel-competing-visions-and-
implementation-checkpoints/.
13 Powell, Jonathan, and Clayton Thyne. “Global Instances of Coups from
1950-Present.” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (2011): 249–59. https://
www.arresteddictatorship.com/global-instances-of-coups.html.
14 Adekoya, Remi. “Why Are Coups Making a Comeback in Africa?” CNN,
September 13, 2021. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/12/africa/africa-coups-
resurgence-intl-cmd/index.html.
15 Keulder, Christiaan. “Africans See Growing Corruption, Poor Government
Response, but Fear Retaliation If They Speak Out.” Afrobarometer, November
10, 2021. https://kubatana.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ad488-pap2-
africans_see_growing_corruption-afrobarometer_dispatch-4nov21.pdf.
16 Smith, Seán. “Building Integrity in Mali’s Defence and Security Sector.”
Transparency International, 2019. https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/TIDS_BuildingIntegrity_Mali.pdf.
17 Thurston, Alex. “The Hollowness of ‘Governance Talk’ in and about the Sahel.”
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, April 13, 2021. https://www.
ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/hollowness-governance-talk-and-about-
sahel-30026.
18 Smith, Seán. “Building Integrity in Mali’s Defence and Security Sector.”
Transparency International, 2019. https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/TIDS_BuildingIntegrity_Mali.pdf.
19 Englebert, Pierre, and Rida Lyammouri. “Sahel: Moving Beyond Military
Containment.” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, Africa Center and Policy
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20 Rowan, Anthea. “Africa’s Burning Charcoal Problem.” BBC News, September
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 ENDNOTES

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23 Lia, Brynjar. “Understanding Jihadi Proto-States.” Perspectives on Terrorism 9,
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24 Thurston, Alex. “Why Jihadists Are Collecting ‘Zakat’ in the Sahel.” Political
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25 Rupesinghe, Natasja, Mikael Hiberg Naghizadeh, and Corentin Cohen.
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31 Rowan, Anthea. “Africa’s Burning Charcoal Problem.” BBC News, September
25, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8272603.stm.

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