UNCLASS~FIL:~!/F"C)](~ OBI+ICl.

~i, tiSE t7NL~'

I~ntelllgence Assessment

7 March ?011

UNCLASSIFIEDUFOR OF~ICIAI, USIA ONLY

304
(U} E~;ec~rtive Summary

(U//FOLIO) Analysis of all plotsa a;ainst the Unitcci States and US interests between 2001 and
2010 byaction-oriezlted indicted Islar~~ic extremistsh indicated there was an 11 percent increase
in the number of incidents after 2006 as compared to the earlier half of the decade. The FBI and
the Joint Regional Intelligence Center {,TRIG) assess ~~~ith. high confidence, based on available
and reliable. open soiree reporting, that US person activity> drove the post-2006 rise, as the group
vas five times more active than foreign nationals in the same timeframe.

(U//FOLIO)The FBI and the TRIG assess with high confidence, based on available aY7d reliable
open source reporting, that several events that en~er~ed d~lriilg the decade may have triggered
growing numbers ofaction-oriented indicted Islamic extremists to devise and sometimes execute
their plans. These events included, brit ~~~ere not limited to, a broadening US military presence
overseas and outreaciz by Islamist ideologues, especially those with specific appeal to En~lisll
speakers. In addition tp individually specific #riggers, information from. the dataset appeared'to
indicate much ofthe activity stemmed from a perception that the United States is at war with
Islam andjihad is the correct and oblibatory response.

(U!/FOLIO) Analysis of the dataset showed that as activity ~y US persons rose, acti~~iry by
foreign nationals dropped. Althoit~ it is difficult to assess tl~e debee to which legislative and
administrative factors influenced these demographic shifts, they coincided with eased regulations
oii the use of naiional sectuity levers, creation of the Te1-rorist Screening Center, and newly
established criteria for the no-fly list.

(U//FOLIO)The FBI and the JRIC assess with high confidence, based on available and reliable
open source reporting, that the Lip~vard trend in participation by the US persons named in t11e
dataset ti~~as due to self-selectioia, sometimes l~assive~ly influe~iced by Internet provocateurs, but
was not due to a fon~al, face-to-face recruitment plan by foreign violent extremists. The FBI and
the JRIC do not rule ou[ that a larger recitiutment strategy to .raclicalize US citizens exists;
howei~er, based on the current dataset, it was not a factor in i11e o~~era11 rise iri targeting by US
persons against the United States end US interests.

a(U)See Appendix A for a list of the 57 plus included in this assessment.

~(U)For the purpose of this assessment, the definition of an "aetio~il-oriented" indicted Islamic e.~tremist is a person
with expressed interesk in performing, oz- significantly supporting, a violent act against the United States or US
interest abroad.
"(U)High confidence indicates thatjudgments are based on high-qualit~~ information from multiple sources or from
a single highly reliable sotuce, and that the nah~re ofthe issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment.
Medium confidence means that fl7e information is credibly sourced and plausible, but can be interpreted in various
ways, or is not of sufficient q~iality~ or corroborated sufficizntly to warrant a higher level of contidenc~. Low
eonfide~nce means that the information's credibility and/or- plausibility is questionable, the information is too
fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analy-tie inferences, or that the FBI has si~niticant concerns or
problems with the sotu-ces.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR ~OFF,iCI_~L USE ONLY

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 UT~.T~~.~S~IF'I~D/IFiDR F~'[~IAL L1SlE O1~iL'

(LT) Scope 1_'~ote

(UI,~FOUO) This assessment responds ~to a request fio~il la~~ enforcement ~~ecuti~~es within tb~,
JRIC~ area. ofresponsib~ility.d It will attempt tp provide a bett-er understanding of ~d1e strategic
threat environment as it applies to an apparent increase in activity by action-ori~;ntecl indicted
Islamic extremists, hereaft-er ref~iTed to action-ori~;nted extremists, against tl~e United States and
US interests, particularly during the last two years. This assessment addresses the intelligence
question: Why are terrorist actions against the United States ai7d U5 interests increasing or
decreasing?

(U//FOLIO) The dataset assembled consisted of action-oriented extremists indicted between 1

January 2001 and 31 December 2010, which yielded 57 entities (see Appendix A). The size of
the dataset made it difficult to conduct meaningful statistical analysis. To establish a means of
comparison and add perspective, analysts divided the data ~iilto two five-year periods, 2001-2005
and ?006-2010.

(UI~"FOUO) A key assiunption is despite the limned size of the dataset, examiila~tion ~vil.l yield
sou7ld conclusions and repeatable results. The FBI and the JRIC acl~nowledge the process of
mobilization toward action-oriented extremism is highly individual; therefore, ui some cases,
addressing the llitelligeilce q~iestion required dividing an already small dataset into sub-sets that.
might not accurately describe the broader action-oriented extremist population. As approp~~iate,
the language used in the course of the narrative addresses these liiilitations.

(U/%FOLIO) The 57 examined plots included those can-ied out in tl~e United States or against US
interests overseas by homega-own or international extremists ai~-ested or indicted «%ithin or by the
United States, including some persons indicted an ten~c~rism char;es, but not tried yet in US
courts. Analysts counted multiple arrests or i~ldictments stemming from a single plot arAtka-ek,
and the inclusion of multiple persons in the sa~~le indictment, as a single "incident_" Throughout
the assessment, analysts used the terms "an~est," "indictment,"' and "incident" interchangeably.

(U/r'FOUO) To reduce subjecti~~ity aa~dto creme consistency, analysts coun~~d lllcidents in the
year the subject or subjects wrere arrested, or, if the}- were still at. large, izlclicted, in the e~•ellt of
multiple arrests or iildickmeilts resulting from t11e same ii~cide~lt, analysts added the episode to
the year in v~rhich the fiat aiiest or indichnent occun~ed. Ideally, an incident would be coutlted in
the year that an inten7al or e~te;i-~a.1 "t~7ggez7ng' eveylt ~ecui~red, a specific instance t~iat a person
might identify moved hll~ or her from passivity to act-ion. One limitation of tiv,s standard is the
information is clot available in ev~.ry~ case. Another is the progression totivard action-oriented
extre~nisi171ikely consists of a series ofi~~cremental steps. It mi~l~t be difficult, even to the
incliti~idual, to name a specific evelit.

(U//FOLIO) Based on the parameters of the dataset, incidents in tivhich federal prosecutars did
not file terrarism chaY~ges against the subjects, or did not file charges as ofthe date ofthis

d(U} The IRIC area of responsibilit~~ minors that of the FBI Los Angeles Field OfFice, comprising Los ?~ngeles,
Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo counties.
(U} For the purpose of this assassmealt "plot" or "plotting" refers to plans or plaiming, as «ell as successfill or
unsuccessful. attacks.

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306
 U.~V~~~.S~~~~IE //FAR OF'~'I+L~~►.~, USE ONLY"

assessment, such as the 2Q09 shootings a~t Fort Hood an~i an Arkansas i~~ilitary recruitmt.nt
c~rlter, at-e nat included.

(U//FOLIO)In r~iost cases, ~trig~ering events that pre~;eded actiotl came from statements subjects
made in cotu-t and during interviews; some persons might lave intended their statements to
influence and might not accurately reflect them- motivations. Other constraints included the lack
of a single, formal ~uestiot~naire to guide interviews; and responses might have depended on
holy an inten~iewer framed a question.

(U//FOLIO) A number cif assessments have addressecl t11e rise ili ten-ori.st actions against the
United States or US interests. This is the first product to analyze together this set offive specific
factors US military action overseas, Intenlet radicalization, orgal7ized recruitment by foreign
figl~.ters, deinograpluc commonalities, and adrazinistrative factors—against this specific dataset.

~,v C~~,:~~s5 u~'t ~~~~ u

(l'~) Sout~cc Si~u~au:~r~ State~i3~e~~t

~~~~ lI1 C. ljfll3 jOf l~ll~ tiCI;~V C~i C11C J~RI11 ~1 C1~1 j1~U[li COU~~ TCC Vi ~j,i~ tii?III~l11GC_i 1UL'.Ili Cll[Cil it ~' Ill~t}~:1 COb~i~;-1~?~ ffl:i f.
pr~,ti ids1 detail, o)~tlt~ subj«[,' h~~~4~~ruu~~~1~ that t~crit b~voit~; the s~o~~c ui ~~ro~. ~ut~>ri~l n~cd~_ ht U;~:sc cu,~~,.
i»ulti~~lc s~>urccs ~~cre u,e~ity e~~izub~,r~t~ lasts. "Ih~ I~B1 and _iKIC b~~i~~e the ~ ~uw~res pi.r~:ide ail accurate
<<~s~;~mcnt o"thy rca~oi~s tur the ri~~c in :.nti-US }~'~:Ctii,~r.

U~c~.ass~~~~~iiFo~ ~F~rc~~L ~sE a~vL~~

3a~
 L'NCLr~SSII~'~~D//~'OR O~P[CIAL LT~i+~ O?VL4'

{U} gpitrocl~ction

(U%~'~OUO) Analysis of 57 terrorist plots ~g~inst the United Stags and U~S interests that occun-ed
between 2001 and 2410 indicated an 11 percent increase in activity fi-oi7~ 2006 onward as
compared to the first five yeazs under examination. Two central themes gah~anized actors: anti-
US sentiment based on a perception that the United States was at war with Islam, and the belief
thaf violentjid~ad was the righteous, and in fact, requisite response. T~-t_y-rivo percents of those
w13o provided a justification for their actions described it as their religious duty to "defend
Islam" against perceived khreats. This motivation was expressed consistently,]whether the
extremist ti~~as a US person or foreign national.. Regardless of the consistent motivation, US
persons drove the post-2Q06 increase in anti-US activity.

{Ul/FOLIO) US Persons llrove Pas#-2006 ~2ise in Anti-US Activity

(U//FOLIO) The FBI and the JRIC assess with 1~igh confidence, based on available and reliable
open source reporting, that US persons were responsible for the rise in anti-US actin=ity that
characterized the post-20Q6 years. As seen in Graphs 1 and 2,foreign nationals led anti-US
tar~etirig prior to 2.006, ~2 percent to 44 percenth amonb foreign nationals and US persons,
respectively. How ever, at 70 percent, acti~rity by US persons and gr~~ips dominated post-2006
numbers.

UNCLaSSIFIEIDI/FOR OFFI~'I~L USE ONLY

U3 Persons Targeting the United States/ Foreign Nationals Targeting the United Statesl
US Interests US Interests
io to
8
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2GOi 2G02 2Q03 200A ?005 2006 ?007 2008 20D9 2010 2001 ?002 2003 2004 2005 2DG6 2007 2008 2GD4 2019

(1J!/FOLIO)I3etwee~n the first and second halves of the. decade,incidents involving LTS person ac#ion-oriented
extremists rose 7S percent(Graph 1, left]; during the same. period,incidents involving foreign nationals fell
71 perceo~t (G'raph 2, right). jSorarce: osigina7 work dy autlzorJ

t {U//FOLIO) Categories included "Duky,''revenge," "Afbhanistanilraq," "Hate United States!replace US government,"

"Ot11ez (local struggle)," arld "Unknown." Fifteen of the 57 entities, or 2b percent, fell into the latter catu~ory. In
some cases, the motives overlapped. In these cases, analysts judged the category that appeared to most closely tit the
motivation.
a (U;/FOLIO) US persons cited "duty" or "revenge" in 11 of 33 cases, or 33 percent, foreign natic~nais cited it in five
of 18 cases, or 28 percent; and mixed groups cited it in rivo oFsx cases, or 33 percent.
h (U.%!FOLIO} Percentages are based on 57 total incidents; ?7 prior to 3006; 30 after 2006. A graph of activity by
groups in which US persons and fareign natiozlals collaborated "mixed" groups--was not inclilded because of the
small numbers. Between 2001 and 201 D, six plots involved mixed groups.

L~NCLASSIFI~:~/IFt~R O~'FI~I.~L RISE fJN~,Y"

308
 Li1~CL~.~7~7I~~~.Y~Iil~l11R 1J~3'1L,itiL U~.1. ~~ lj

{U//FC)UO) U5 Persons: 1)i~~ara~e ``Triggers"; Disparate I3era3agraph~cs

(U//FOUL)The FBI end the JRIG assess with high con~tid~nce, based on a~~ailabl~ and reliable
open source reporting, the post-2006 rise resulted fram several factors that prompted responses
from action-oriented extremists. "Triggers," such as US military action overseas and the
influence of Islaanist ideologues i~~ith an Internet presence, contributed to the post-2006 rise, but
demonstrated minimll isl~pact when considered individually. A further breakdown amol7g the US
person group into sub-catebor~es, including tiheir backgroul~ds, choice oFtargets, and self-
described motivating factors, fouled feti~~ unifying features. They did appear to have a Breaker
tendency to target nulitary persons or facilities, as compared to foreign national or mixed groups;
amoi3g US persons, 58 percent of plans involved military targets or persoruael.` Beyond this
tendency, analysis found 110 common experiences or qualities among group members that inigl7t
explain why they acted when they ciid.

(U//FOLIO} ZISPe~~son I'iole~zt.7i17e~clists: No Dernogrc~~hic Pca~tte~~•rzs

(U//FOLIO) Exalnivation of 33 US person entities amonb the 57-uniE dataset fotmd fe~v
identifiable unifying qualities. Subjects were mainly first- and second-generation im~7u~ral~ts to
the United States, but had varying ancestral ties to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and
Europe. Some were converts, others raised as Muslims, and some had no identifiable rel,i~ious
at'filiation. Ofthe converts, some adopted Islam in prison while others found it in their local
con~~un~ities. Some groups cflnsisted exclusively of co~~verts; others, eYcllisi~~ely ofthose raised
as Musli~2zs; still others, mixtures of the tu•~o. There ~~~as an age range of more than 50 years
between the youngest, bons izz 1988, and the oldest, born in 1937. Some acted singly, others with
associates, azid in one iust~nce, as a family unit. Tr~.g~ers ilicluded US lzulitary action in
Afghanistan and Iraq, hatred of the United States, and the belief thatjilzcrc~ was a reli~io~is duty.

(ZI//FOUO~ US ~~Llilitn~~t~~ Action Ovcr•,seas: Citec3'Less Fy~~queratly Post-?D06

(U//~OUO) Based on their own statements, US military action in Afghaziistan and Iraq' factored
into tl~e decision-making process of actiozi-oriented extremists ui approximately 25 percent of
cases ben~~een 2001 and 2010. ~~~ithili each of three cat~goi-i.es—US person, foreign national, ai d
mixed ~-oups—Afghanistan and I~a~q described ~s a trig~erinb e~cent decreased after 2006.k

(U//FOLIO} Be~yolz~i Afghaiustan and Iraq, action-oriented extremists named a variety of alleged
provocations, i~icluding the 2006 clash bet~,veen Hizb~llah and the Israelis, and the publication of

'(UiIFOUO') Among forei~ nationals, military targets factored into four of 18 plans, or?2 percent; among `'mixed°'
groups, military targets factorzd into two of six plans, or 33 percent.
{UiiFOUO) Subjects categoi7zzd as motivated by Afghanistan and/or Iraq specified US military involvement in
those countries. In some cases, subjects stated snore ;enerally their duty to tight invaders into iVluslims lands. These
cases a erg categorized "Duty,/revenge."
k (U,~,~FOUOj Behveen ?001 and '2006, LAS persons cited Afghanistan and/or Iraq in four of 12 incidents or 33
percent, but only Chree ~f21, or 14 percent post-2006. During the same period, foreib1 national actors cited it in four
of 14 cases, or 29 percent, prior to ?006, and in one of four cases, or 25 percent, after. "Nfixed" group actors cited
US inilitaiy action overseas in one of one. case prior to 2006, or 100 percent, and in one of five cases, or ?0 percent,
thereafter.

IIl'~oC'LASSI~'IE]!~/i~~+0~(~FFICIA~, I~SE +C~1'~LY

309
6
 E i !

cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed by a Danish ne~~~~paper.`'`' T~~c~ subjects, IZflrlald Allen
Gi~ec~lla {liS P~;rson) and Michael Curtis Rey7~olds(US Persan), both indicted il~ 2006, am-eed to
work with Islamist extremists dne tc~ personal issues, not religious ~r political c~rlviction.'

(rr//FOLrO) ~l~ac~ir~~rrtifiable: Exte~~t to I~'hich ~yativar~ al~.r.rlcrt~z (US~'ersora) ~~rzc~ Dtl~els

Corzt~•il~zrtec~ to Post-~Ot~S Rise ira ZIS Persor2 Ai-~~ests c~rac~ Irzc~iet~nents

(U//FOLIO)Islamist propaganda became increasingly availa:bl.e via. the Internet, e~speiially d~~ring
the second half of fl7e decade. It is difficult to quantify the c~e~~ee to which Is]amist materials and
ideologues—such as ~i~war al-Alilagi {US PerSon), Abd~illah el-Faisal, and Feiz Muhanunacl, all
of «horn appeal to English-speaking audiences—played a part in the radicalization of the
persons included in this assessment, specifically as these fi~nires might have contributed to the
rise ill terrorist activity. Generally, court doc~~meirts and open sotu~ce re~portin~ did nc~t indicate
uiterest b~y action-oriez3ted extremists u7 the sermons alid tl~e lectures of a1-Aulagi and others
until after mid-dec~de.~ While Intenlet personalities are ofte~l cited as a source ofradicalization,
factors outside the scope of this assessment—such as social enviroiunent and personal
psychology {liow a person processes both e~tenial and internal messaging}--were also
influential.

(U//FOLIO) ~,xpan~ed Use cif National. Security Letters, Creation of the Terrorism
Screening Center, and Implementatson of tie i'ao-Fry List ~C'oincided with Rise in Arrests of
US Persons, Drop in ArY~ests of Foreign Nationals

(U/%FOLIO) Altho~~gh there is Tlo mecha~iszn to measure the effect oflegislative end
aclminis~trative factors, the higher slumber of national security letters (~NSLs)issued mid-decade,
adjusted for investigative lag tin3e, appeared to coincide ~vitll the higher number of US persons
arrested and indicted in the latter half of the decade. The USA PATRIOT and Tet~orism
Prevelit~ion Reauthorizat~ioil Act of2005 (passed into law in F~bruaiy 2006) eased restrictions on
I~1SLs, allowing i~lvesti~ators to obtain information about an in~iti~idual prior to confi~-min;fllat
individl~al's relationship to a foreign power. While statistics were missing fi-on12001 to 2002,"
figures for the rest of the decade show NSL numbers peaked behveen 2003 and 200b.' At-otnid
this same time, statistics revealed an increasing slumber ofrequests related to investigations of
US persons.

(U1,~FOUO) Du1-ing the same period that arrests and indictments of US persons rose, those of
fareimi i~ati.oilals fe11. Activity by foreign nationals dropped 71 percent after'?006. The fill
coincided with the creation of t11e Terrorist Screening Center in 2003, ne~~%ly established critez~ia
for the no-t1y List in 2004, and a period between 2005 and 2007 when selectees to tl~e no-fly list
were at an all-time high. As of200 , 95 percent ofnames on the consolidated terrorist watch list,
of which the no-fly and automatic selectee lists are a part, were not US persons.

~ (Ulr'~'OUO}Part of this is due to a change ni tone by al.Aulagi. Prior io 2004, his tone was moderate_ After moving
to the United Kingdom in ZOOM, and then on to Yemen, he incr~.asingly called for obligatoryjihnc~.
"'(LT!!FOU~} Proble-ms identified by the FBI with its iuternai NSL~ tracking system precluded the Bureau from
tracking statistics from. these years.

7 310
 ~J1''~~LASSI~'IED!lF012(~JE'FI~'lAL ~751+~ ~NI.Y

{U//I'OUwD} Setf=Sele.cti~ri: ~►'~'ithi~i tine lla~aset, US Persons Vol~inteered fir :~ctia~a

(U/~`FOUO) VJl~ile. some US persons, notably Bryant I~i~al Violas (STS Person),[avid Colel~aan
Hadley(US Personj, and ~iajibullah Zazi {US Person), worked oil operations ~tirith forei~i
contacts, a review' of court testimony and open source accounts suggested the subjects
themselves in7tiated the comi~lunication.~°9,10,1 ~,1'`,1~` This fmdin~ does not negate the possibility
that forei~ nationals have an ar~anized, fo~n~a.al recruihiient strategy° focused on US persons;
l~awever, the curreirt dataset dies not support this proposition.

(U//FOLIO) The dataset also revealed terrorist groups sometimes rejected US persons who
offered their sen~ices. 1n ?003, Tarek Mehanna(US Person) and flhrnad Abousa~nra {US Pzrson)
traGreled across Yemen trying to enlist in terrorist training without success.'` Abousanu-a
additionally traveled to Pakistan acid Iraq in an effort to join the r~zujc~l~aidee~~, bi t foreign
operatives told Abousamra he vas either "not needed" or would not be allowed to participate
because he was an American.l 'Although Abousamra and Mehanna hoped to attend camps
operated by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or the Taliban, they were ~~villing to fight anywhere groups
engaging in jil~crd would accept them.16

(U//F't~UO) Extr~pola~ting from anecdotal evidence ~ti~ithi~ the dat~set that subjects ruched out to
terrorist organizations, a~ld not the reverse, the FBI and the JRIC assess the post-2006 rise ii1
plotting was not due to an organized, formal campaign to enlist L'S persons for operations.
Recent~l_y, some groups, notably al-Qa'ida in t11e Arabian Peninsula(AQAP), appear to have
launched nfoi7nal or passive efforts° of encourabing action. Higher numbers in 20l0 did not
appear ~to be a result of these effoi`ts.

{IJ) Alternative ~inalysis

(U%/FOLIO) Tl~e preceding analysis slowed targeting by US persc~us u~as on the increase. As
seen in Gr1ph 3 {past 9,1eft), an alternative methodology, athree-period moving average,
confirnled tl~e up«~ard trend in targeting by US persons. The trend be~a~1 in 20U4 and continued
tu~ti12010, which eras the end pf the period studied.

(U/iFOUO)Hogsever, as seen. in Graph 4(page 9, right), activity by foreign Nationals, which

demonstrated a 71 percent decline Lased oil the previous anal}rsis, e~~iibited son~~ volatility
toward the end of the decade. Foreign nationals were irlvoh~ed in threep incidents between 2009
and 201.0. None were prompted tt~ act based on US military action in Afghanistan car Iraq; Wane
chose militaiS~ targets; demographics varied; and all self-selected. Tile data did not indicate a
common event sparked the small resurge~~~e of activity by foreign nationals. It coine~ided with

° (UG~F OLIO) F~or the purpose ofthis assessment, "recrui~iilent strategy' refers to a calculated, systematic decision
from a group's _command stnicture to increase the participation of US persons; "recruitment" refers to a specific
effort to enroll, or seek to enroll, persons lvho otherwise might not have sought a violent path.
°(U)In ?~10, Irzsp~~-e, an online magazine attz7blited to ~QAP and aimed at an English-speaking audience, bean
publication.
(IJ) The three «>e~re I~osam Smadi, a Jordanian national tivho tulknowingly~ collaborated with federal agents to
attack a skyscraper in clo~mt~wn Dallas, Telas; Umar Farouk ~bduknutallab, a Nigerian national who allegedly
coliaborai~e~d titiith AQAP to bomb a Northwest Airlines flight into Detroit, Michigan; and Sarni Samir Hassoim. ~
Lebanese citizen w1~o allegedly planned to bomb targets in Chicago, Illinois.

UNC~ ^~SSTFIE~/iFOli OFFS-CI~L USE ONL~'

311
 ~rvc~„~ss~~~~~ri~r~ ~F~~Ic~~,~ u~E ~r~Lv

relatively high actiti~ity by US persons curing the same period, and confii~ned the disparate mature
of the threat..
UNCLASSIFI~DUFOR O~'F'1CiAL USE CINL~'

US Persons Foreign Nafionals

(as a percentage in ali targeting) (as a percentage in all targeting)
100%
100/ _..__.__ s ,'

....__ _ ~' _.
b~ 1 SDT
s•

'~ _ o
,': 203;; -;- -
i
0% -_. ~_ __~ ._-_-- .._,__ ._r __,_ .__... __,_. __._.. __.,

2Q01 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

(Li//FOLTOj Graphs 3(left) and ~4 (right) illustrate the value ofthe moving average method.I~1or~in~ averages
smooth. fluci~uations in data that vary widely, which can Mead to a clearer trend line.y[Source: ~rigit~al rtiork
b_y' a~rtl~vrJ

(U)Intelligence Gaps

{U//FOLIO) How might a potential lack of Muslun historical and culhrr~l context among
those new to Islam, ~~~hetller boi7i Muslim or not, have affected t11e actions of members of
the dataset?

(Ll) 1'he I'BI Intelligence Requirements addressed in this assessment are W~V-TERR-C'TD-SR-0149-10.I.B.1; and
AiVI-TERR-CTD-SR-0(~29-09.L A1.

(U)This assessment was prepared by the Joint Regional Intelligence Center'Los Alageles Division of the FBI.
Cotrmients and queries maybe addressed to t~ia Joint. Regional Intelligence Center at(Sb2) 345-i 100.

u {U1/FOLIO) These charts do not include targeting by mi_~e~d groups.

til'~CLASSIFI~D/IFOR O~FICI:4~, USE ONL~r

9 31a
 LTl*~CI.A~SII~I T~Ji O ~~+'I'~~I~L NSF ()I~L~'

~~) ~PP~~ndi~ A

(~T)I)ata~set of57 action-oriented indicted ~slaanic~ e:~tren~ists

U1'~CLASS~FIED
lc~r' ti ~l]t:
2001 US v. John Phillip Walker Lindh AKA Sul~yman al-Faris, Abdul Hamill
2001 US v. Zacarias Moussaoui AKA Shagil, Abu Khalid al Sahrawi
?001 US v Richard Colvin Reid AKA Abdul-Raheem, Abejul Raheem, Abu Ibrahim
2002 US ~~. Omar Ahmed I~hadr AKA Akhbar Farhad, Ahmed Muhammed Khali
?00? US v. Jeffrey Leon Battle AKA r'~hinad Ali, Abu Isa; Patrice Lumuinba Fora AKA Llimumba;
Ahmed lbrahir~i Bilal; Mu]ianunad Ibrahim Bilal; F~abis Abdiilla al-Saoub AKA Abu Tarek;
October Martinique Lewis AKA Khadijah
2002 US v. Karim I~oubriti; Ahmed Hannan; Youssef Hinimssa AKA Patrick J. Vuillaume, Michael
Sais~, Jalali; Abdel-Ilah Elmardoudi AKA Abdella LNU,J~.an Pien~e Tardelli, George Labibe,
I~i~issein Mohsen. Safiddine, Nabil Hayamm; Farouk Ali-I~~aunoi~d AIWA Khalil

20 2 US v. Mohanuned Mansour Jabarah AKA Abu Hafs al Kuwaiti, Sammy

2002 US v. Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani AKA Khaddafy Abubakar Janjalani, Abu Muktai; Isnilon
Totoni Hapilon AKA Abu Musab,the Deputy; Aldam Tilao AKA Abu Sabaya, Abu Catada,
Abu :~hmad Salaynddi.n; Jainal Ai~tel Sali, Jr. AKA Abu Solaiman, the Engineer; Hamsiraji
Marusi Sali AK~ Jose Ramirez, Tiberkis
200? US v. imran Mandhai; Shueyb Mossa Jokhan
2003 US v. Randall Todd Royer; Ihrah.im t~hmed al-Hamdi; 7~2asoud Alunad Khan; Yong Ki kwon;
Mohammed Aatique; Seifullah Chapman; ~Iainmad Abdur-Raheem; Donald Thomas Surratt;
Cali h ~3asha ibn .Abe~ur-Raheein, Kh~~~a~a Mallinood Hawn; Sabri Benkhala
?003 US v. tvinan Faris AKA_ Mohammad Rauf
?003 US v. Aluned Omar Abu tali
?003 US v. Nuradi3i Abdi
2003 US v. Adnan Gl~lshair el-Shukrij~unah
?003 US v. Majid Khan
2004 US ~v. Abdilllah Ahmed Kliadr AIWA Abu Bakr
3004 Ahmed Hassan al-Ugaily
?004 US v. R}pan flnderson
?0~4 Shaha4var Matn Siraj
US v_ Dl~iren Barot AK,A esa al-Britani, Abu Esa al-Britani, Esa al-Hindi, Issa al-F~~.indi;
~~Q`~ Pladeem Tarinohamed; Qaisar Sl~affi

2005 US v. Wesain al-Dela~ma AKA Wesam Khalaf Chay~d Delaetne

2005 US v. Kevin James; L-evar ~~ashington; Gregory Patterson; Haminad Riaz Samana
~pp5 US v. Michael Curtis Reynolds

(li) The information is arranged in c~hronolo~ical order by year arrested or indicted.

U~CI,~,SSIF~~,D//FOR OFFICIAL USE +ONLY

j~ 313
 Ul`VCL~~~S~F~E~//~+d~R ~l~k'~~'I ^~L USE +f)TM+~L'4'

,___ V.rr _._ __ _ V.__..._~..~_r~.__ _ .~.._ y_..__~

j 'Sc~;~~` ~ 1'~l~i~ i
2005 US tip. Antlzonius t~~alna~lg -~-- ~~~ ---~~~_
2.005 US v. Humid Hayat; Unger ~-Iayat
2005 US ~-. Ronal_d Allen Grecul~
US v. Tank Ibn Osman Shah AKA Tank Shah, Tank Jenki~g, Abu Musab; Rafiq S~bir AKA.
~~~5 the Doctor; IVlahimid Failiq Brent AI~t~ Mahin'uud al-Mutazzun

?pfl~, US v. Syed I~ashmi AI~t~ Fahad

2fl~~ US v. Kobie Diallo l~illan~s AKA r~bdul Kabeer, Abdul Kabir; Adnan Babar Mirza

US v. Nloha~~~rnad Zaki Atnawi; Matti~an Otlu3lan el-~Iindi; Wassim L 11!iazloul~i; Zubair A.

?006 ~iiEd; Khalee~l Atoned

?006 US v. Syed Haris Ahmed; Ehsanul Islam Sadequ e

?p~( US v. Derrick Sllareef
US v. Narseal Batiste ~A Brother Naz, Prance Manna; Patrick t~braham AKA Brother Pat;
~~~6 Stanley Grant Phanor AKA Brother Sunizi; Naudi~nar Herrera AIWA Brother i~~audy; Burson
~ugustu3 r'1I~.1A Brotl~e-r B; Lyglensc~n Lemorin AKA Brother Le~~i, Brother Levi-El and
Rotschild A.umistine AKA Brother Rot
?p~7 US v. Aluned ~bdellatif Sherif Mohamed and Youssef Sar~~ir Mc~ahed
~~~,~ US v. Mohazned Ibrahim Shnewer; Dritan Duka AID Distan Duka, Anthony Duka, Toizy
Dtiika; Eljvii- Duka AILA Eh~is Duka, SLtlayman; Slain DL~~a; Serdar Tatar; Aeon Abdullahu
US v. Russell Defreitas AKA Nlohamrned; Kareem Ibrahim AKA Alnir Kareem; Abdul Kadir;
2007 Abdel Nor

US v. Christo~lier Paul AIiA Abdul, Abdul Malek, Abdul Malik, Abdul Melik,
~~~~ Abciuhnaled, Abdel lVlalek, Abdul Malek Kenyatta, Paul keuyatta Laws,Paul La~~~s

~pp~ US v. Bt-,~ant Neal Vinas Ah'A Ibrahim, Bashir a1-Aineriki, Ben Yameen ai-Iiauadee
Zp09 US v. Najibullah Zazi (Adis l~Tedunjanin; Zarein Al~nedzay)
2009 US v. Betim Kaziu
~?pp9 US v. Michael Fenton .AIWA 7,a3ib Islam
?{~(}9 US v. Tarel Mei~allna and Alinzad Abousamra
US v. Daniel Patrick Bogd; Hysen Shcrifi; Apes Subasic; Zakariya Boyd; Dylan Boyd;
2fl09 ~,toliammad Omar Aly Hassan, Ziyad Yagl~i

US v. James C~~omitic.AKA Abdul Rahman, Abdul Rehr~ian; David Williams AKA Daoud,
2009 DL; Onta Williams AKA Hainza; Laguerre Payee AKA r'1min, Ahi3ondol
2049 US v. Hasam Maher Hi~sein Smadi
?009 US v. Uular Farouk Abduhnutallab
US v. Ily~as Iiashmiri; Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed AKA Major Abdur Rehman,Pasha; David
2~~9 Coleman F~eadley AKA Daood Gilani; Taha~~~~u- Hussain Rana

?009 US v. Colleen LaRose; Jamie Paulin. Ramirez

2.010 US v. Faisal Shalizad
?010 US v. Raja Lalirasib Klan

UI'~CLASSIFIE~~//Ft~R ~I~FIC~~~ USE ~NL~Y

~1 314
 UN~L~~~S~~'I//ff+t3~~'. t7FF'I~CI~1, ~JSE tJN,"~'

1 '.'ifi'~ `.`.~~~E

?010 US v. Bari-~j Walter Bujol ^~ y ^

2010 U5 v. Abdel Hameed Sh~hadel~
2010 US v. Paul Gene Rockwood
2010 US v. Saini Samir Hassoun
?010 US v. Mohamed Osman Mohamed
20]_0 US v. ~itonio Martinez AKA Muhammad Hussain
?O10 US v. Farooque Ahmed

UNC~L~.SSIF~I~UFOR ~I'FICI~L~ USE t)NL,Y

j? 315
 g11\'CLAS~IFIED//I+t~~ (?~~F~_~'IA~, US7E~ 4~N~Y

(IT) Ei~dnotes

i (UjInternet site; NEF~1; FD-302 IntErvizws of DsiYiek Shareef'; 7 December 2006;

htt~:;/n~fafoundation_or~imiscellaneouslFeaturedDocslU.S_ _v Abuiihaad FBIInvus.ptlf, accessed on 27 October
?010; NFFA is atax-exempt, c17aritable organization developed after the 9/ll attacks.
'" (LT) FBI, Press Release; "Tw-o Chicago Men Charged in Connection with Alleged Roles ui Foreign Terror Plot
That Focused on Targets in Denmark"; 27 October '?009 http:!,''c~iicago.fbi.gov/dojpressrellpre~ssre109/eg102709.hri~i;
accessed 01127 October ?010.
3 {'U)Internet site; Bria~,1 Michael Jenkins; RAND Corporation; `tiVould-be Warriors"; 2010;
http:ihvww.rand.or~lpubs/occasional papers/2010/RANL~ OP292.pdf; accessed 27 October 2010; RAND
Corporation is an established tliii~lc tank and independent, nonprofit organization.
~ (U}Internet site; Atuia C. Henning, Elizabeth B. Bazar, C11arl~s Doyle, and Edward G Liu; Conbe;ssional
Research SErvice; "Crovernm~nt Collection ofPrivate Information: Background and Issues Related to the USA
PATRIOT Act Reauthorization"; ?3 December 2009; htt~/%assets.opencrs.conv'rpt~/R40980 ?0091223.pdf;
accessed ?7 October ?0]0.
s(U}Internet site; Office off~~e Inspector General; "Statemznt of Giem1:~. Fins befare the House Conunittee on the
Judiciary Subcommittee on tl~e Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties concerning the FBI"s Use t~fNational
Secmzty Letters and Section 21 ~ Orders for Business Records"; 15 Apri12008;
littp:;/~•tiv~~.justice.~ovioi~/testimon,~/t0804;finai.~df; accessed on 27 October 2010.
`'{U) Internet site; Office of tine Inspector General; "Statement of Glenn A. Fine before the House Committee on the
Judiciary Subconm7ittee on the Constitution, Civi( Rights, and Civil Liberties concerni~ug the FBI's Use of National
Sectin-ity Letters and Section 21 ~ Orders for Business Records"; 1~ Apri12Q0~;
http:/%www.jti~stice.Qov/oi~/testimony/t080~/finaL~df; accessed ou 27 October ?010.
(i_T) Inten7e~t site; TSA;"Myth Buster: TSA's Watch List is More Than One Million People Strong";
http:!;'r~~v~~~.tsa.~oviapproact~lmvthbusters,•`tsa watch list.shtm; accessed on ?7 October X010.
s {U)Internet site, NEFA; USDC Eastern District of NY;"US v. Vinas, Guilty Plea"; 28 January 2009;
http:i/w~vw.i7efafoundation.or~imiscellaneouslFeahiredDocs~[JS v Vinas gnilh~transcript.pdf; accessed on 27
October 2010; NEFA is atax-exempt, charitable organization clevelaped after the 9.il l attacks.
9(U)Online newspaper article; Michael Powell; Netiv YoT-k Tzn~es; "US Recruit Reveals How Qaeda Trains
Farei~e~rs"; 23 July 2009; hrip:/iw~~ryv.nvtime~s.com/2009107'2=~,hivreQio~,~24teiTor.htrnl? r=2;acce-sse.d; accessed 2~
October- ?O 10.
10 (TJ) Online newspaper article; Ginger T1lompson; Netii~ York 7`ifraes; "A Terror Suspect with Feet in East and WesY';
Zl_ November ?009; http://wti~~~.n}~times.com/2009/11!22/us/22ten-or.hhnl`?~a~ewant~~d=1& r=1; accessed on 27
October ?010.
~ ~ (U)Internet site; NEF'A; USDC Northeni District ofIL;"US v. Headley"; 7 December 2009;
h~:/lunvw.nefafoundation.or~!misce113neous/t1S v Neadlev infonl~ation.pdf; accessed 27 ~Octo~er ?07.0; NEFA is
a tax-exempt, charitable organization developed after the 9/11 atCacks.
(U)Intei~iet site; NEFA; USDC Eastern Disfrict of N~';"US v. Najibullah Zazi-Order cifDctention~'; 2~
September 2009;
htfp:ihvw~~.nefafoundtation.orb/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs,/US v Na~bullahZazi deteutionmcmo.~df; accessed
on 27 October 2010; NEPA is a tai-~x~mpt, charitable organization developed after tl~e 9ill attacks.
i3(U)0~lirac ne~vspape~r article; Ivliehael l~'ilson; N~i~~ Yorh Tunes; "Front Sil~iling Coffee Vendor to Terror
Suspect°'; ?~ September 2009; http://w~ryv.nvtiaies,cam/2009~09.%26/nvre~ i~'osli~2bprofile.hhnl; accessed on 27
October 210.
~~(Uj Itltenlet site; NEFA; USDG District ofi~1A; US v. Meharma; 31 October 2009;
http:/,!ww-w.nefafouudation.or~miscellaneous!US v Mehann3 fbiaffidavit~df; accessed 27 October 2010; NEFA is
a tax-exempt, charitable argaz~izatioi7 developed after the 9/11 attacks.
's(U)Ibid.
'~(U)Ibid.

Uii~CLASSII~'~EI~//FAR (3~'~IC~AL LJSE ONLY

13 3z~
 L1N~1,~1,SSIFI~I~//~'t~~2 C)~+F~CI<~L ~TSE C)1'dLY

~lSti'1bLlt1fl13

Executive ~ssis~aut Du~ctor, National Security Branch, FBI

Associate Elecutive Assi.stal~t Director, National Security Bral~ch, FBI
Assistant Di~ectoY-,Directorate of Intelligence
Assista~it Director, Countez-terroiism Ditirision
Depu~ry Assistant Dir~ct.or, Analysis Branch, Di7-ectorate ofIntelligence
NCTC CLirrent
FBI Intranet
OCA
LNI
LEO
Joint R~;giolial Intelligence Center

UI'VCLASSIFI~D//FAR ()~FICI~,L ~iSE fJ!tiL.4'

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