RABBI MAIMONAIDES

God and the Via Negativa

Maimonides offers several proofs for the existence of God, all of which are versions of the
cosmological argument (GP 2.1). Rather than begin with a definition of God and try to show that
God’s essence implies existence, he begins with a description of the world as we know it and
tries to show that it implies the existence of God. According to one such argument, we assume
that the heavenly bodies are engaged in eternal motion. We then recognize that it is impossible
for there to be an infinite body or an infinite number of finite bodies. So every corporeal thing is
finite. If it is finite, it can only contain a finite amount of power. If it can only contain a finite
amount of power, it can only explain motion over a finite period of time. Because the heavenly
bodies are always moving, the only thing that can explain that motion is an infinite power.
Because an infinite power cannot be contained in a finite thing, it cannot be corporeal. If it is not
corporeal, it is not subject to division or change. Seeing that its power is infinite, it cannot derive
that power from something else. Thus the only way to explain the motion of the heavenly bodies
is to posit the existence of a being that is neither a body nor a force in a body.
Although Maimonides thinks this argument gives us sufficient grounds for saying that God is, he
does not think it provides any grounds for saying what God is. To see why not, we have to
recognize that God is not one in a way comparable to anything else: one person, one number,
one idea. According to Guide 1.51:
There is no oneness at all except in believing that there is one simple essence in which there is
no complexity or multiplicity of notions, but one notion only; so that from whatever angle you
regard it and from whatever point of view you consider it, you will find that it is one, not divided
in any way and by any cause into two notions …
If Maimonides is right, there can be no plurality of faculties, moral dispositions, or essential
attributes in God. Even to say that God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good is to introduce
plurality, if one means thereby that these qualities are separate attributes. The same is true if
we say that God is a composite of matter and form, genus and specific difference, or essence
and accident. All introduce plurality where none can be tolerated.
Aside from religious considerations, plurality is objectionable because it compromises logical
priority. If God were a composite of F and G, some reason would have to be found for what
brought them together and keeps them together. In short, if God were a composite, there would
have to be a cause prior to God, which is absurd (GP 2. Intro., premise 21). For the same
reason, God cannot be subsumed under a wider concept as man is subsumed under animal
(GP 1.52). Once God fell under a genus, there would be something prior to or more inclusive
than God, either of which is absurd. Without a genus or a minimal form of composition, there is
no possibility of defining God and thus no possibility of saying what God is. Even superlatives
are of no help. To say that God is the wisest or most powerful thing in the universe is still to
subsume God under a wider description.
Worse, to say that God is the wisest or most powerful thing is to imply that God’s wisdom or
power bears some likeness to ours. This Maimonides firmly denies (GP 1.56–57). The power
manifested by a body is finite and can be measured in foot/pounds. No matter how powerful it
is, we can easily imagine something whose power is greater. What is more, if we are talking
about the power of a body, it always makes sense to ask from what it derives its power or how
its power is related to something else, e.g. its goodness. None of this is true of God.
Maimonides therefore concludes (GP 1.56) that it is not true to say that God’s power is greater
than ours, that God’s life is more permanent than ours, than God’s knowledge is broader than
ours, or that God’s will is more universal than ours, if that means that God can be put on the
same scale as something else, that God is a bigger, stronger, better version of something in the
created order.
Does that mean that statements like “God lives” or “God is powerful” are nonsense? The answer
is yes if one insists on interpreting them as normal subject/predicate propositions. But they can
be understood if one analyzes them as disguised negations. Thus “God is powerful” should be
taken as “God is not lacking in power.” Maimonides’ appeal to negation (GP 1.58) is often
misunderstood because in normal speech a double negative usually indicates a positive. If I say
that this dog is not lacking in the power of sight, you would be justified in concluding that it can
see for the simple reason that sight is a power normally associated with dogs. What
Maimonides has in mind is a more extreme form of negation. Thus “God is powerful” means
“God does not lack power or possess it in a way that makes it comparable to other things.” Can
God do something like move a book off a shelf? Yes, to the extent that God does not lack power
but no to the extent that God does not have to move muscles, summon energy, or receive a
supply of food or fuel. The power to create the whole universe is so far beyond that needed to
move a book that any comparison cannot help but mislead.
From an epistemological standpoint, a statement like “God is powerful” is objectionable in so far
as it implies that we have insight into the essence of God. The advantage of the negative
formulation is that it implies nothing of the sort. To say that God does not lack power or possess
it in a way comparable to other things is to say that God’s power is beyond our comprehension.
And similarly for God’s life, wisdom, unity, or will. Thus most of the terms we use to describe
God are completely equivocal as between God and us. There is then no reason to think that
every time we praise God, we are identifying a separate part of the divine persona and
comparing it to something else.
As severe as Maimonides’ position is, even this is not enough. Although negation is preferable
to affirmation, even negation is objectionable to the degree that it introduces complexity: God is
neither this nor that. What then? Maimonides’ reply (GP 1.58) is that ultimately any kind of
verbal expression fails us. Rather than provide a precise metaphysical account of the nature of
God, the purpose of theological discourse is heuristic: to “conduct the mind toward the utmost
reach that man may attain in the apprehension of Him.” Theological language is important to the
degree that it eliminates error and sets us along the path of recognizing God’s transcendence.
Unless one could speak about God, she could easily fall into the trap of thinking that God is
corporeal. But in the end, the only thing it reveals is that God is beyond the reach of any
subject/predicate proposition. Thus GP 1.59:
Know that when you make an affirmation ascribing another thing to Him, you become more
remote from Him in two respects: one of them is that everything You affirm is a perfection only
with reference to us, And the other is that He does not possess a thing other than His essence
…
Citing Psalm 65, Maimonides concludes that the highest form of praise we can give God is
silence.
Maimonides knows (GP 3.32) that a religion based entirely on silent reflection would never
succeed, and insists that daily prayer is mandatory (MT 2, Prayer, 1.1). His point is that the
qualities mentioned in prayer are either negations or descriptions of the effects of divine activity;
in no case do they provide knowledge of God’s essence. To illustrate this point, he asks us to
consider the effect of fire on various things that could be put before it. It would soften wax,
harden clay, blacken sugar, and whiten other things. This does not mean that fire is soft, hard,
black, and white simultaneously but that it has these effects on various things.
Applying this analogy to God, we can say that God is merciful to the extent that the order of
nature (what God created) exhibits merciful characteristics and angry to the extent that it is
harsh toward things that do not take proper care of themselves. The point is not that God
possesses emotions similar to ours but that the effects of God’s actions resemble the effects of
ours. Maimonides refers to these qualities as attributes of action and identifies them with the
goodness God revealed to Moses at Exodus 33. In that passage, God refuses to let Moses see
the divine face (which Maimonides identifies with essence) but allows him to see God’s
backside (which Maimonides identifies with the consequences or effects that flow from God).
We can therefore praise God as long as we realize that all such praise is indirect and leaves
God’s essence undescribed and unknowable.