The military option

If the Indians are prepared to enforce military solutions, then Pakistan must simply up
the ante by providing active military support for the Kashmiri freedom fighters. With
the nuclear deterrence making an all-out war between Pakistan and India a receding
reality, the opportunity for limited warfare in Kashmir becomes a viable option. At the
very least, more material assistance can be given to the Kashmiri freedom fighters
while Pakistan waits for the Indians to eventually come to the table for talks on
Kashmir. After all, no military can hold on to a people by force alone - even the
powerful US could not do so in Vietnam - and India is already feeling the costs of its
military occupation in Kashmir on many fronts, including problems of discipline and
morale within the army. In other words, Pakistan can simply sit it out and let the
military struggle decide the future of Kashmir. On this issue time is on Pakistan's side
- for the freedom fighters do not have to defeat India militarily. As long as the Indian
military cannot put down the struggle, they are the losers.

However, such a solution is really 'no solution' - for in the process innocent Kashmiris
are losing their lives, children are being deprived of their basic human rights and
women are being raped and molested at the hand of Indian forces. Therefore, it
becomes morally imperative for Pakistan to seek new initiatives to resolve this dispute
- taking into consideration the ground realities of the freedom struggle that is being
waged against Indian forces for well over a decade.

Non-military options

The milieu

Finding the correct framework in which to float the non-military options becomes as
critical as the options themselves.

a - Pak-India bilateral talks: The secretary level talks have been used by India
primarily to buy time on Kashmir. Even as the secretaries talk, the Indian army
continues its action in Occupied Kashmir. If anything, it tends to increase the level of
its repression before and during the talks. Meanwhile the talks have so far yielded no
results on Kashmir and do not promise to yield any results in the near future.

There have been suggestions that bilateral talks on Kashmir be held between the
political leadership rather than bureaucrats, but here again such talks would be
meaningless unless Pakistan is able to get India to suspend its military operations in
Occupied Kashmir as a gesture of goodwill for the duration of the talks. Otherwise, no
matter at what level such talks are held, for India they will remain a means of buying
time.
Also, it makes little sense for Pakistan and India to continue to keep the Kashmiris,
out of the dialogue on Kashmir given the ground realities that prevail at present.
Whatever agreement is reached, and whenever, it can only be relevant if the
Kashmiris who have been fighting on the ground for over a decade find such an
agreement acceptable.

b - Third party intervention/mediation: There is increasing talk of third party

intervention, somewhat on the Camp David or Wye River accords on the Middle East,
where the US acted as the third party mediator. This is an approach that India will not
accept because it has always rejected great power intervention in what it sees as its
affairs. And presently, when India itself is seeking the status of a major actor in global
politics, it will not be able to accept US intervention on Kashmir - no matter how
favourable that may be for Indian interests.

From Pakistan's perspective, it would be a grave mistake to invite direct US

intervention/mediation on Kashmir. After all, the US has its own policy interests in
the region which do not rest on the principle of Kashmiri self-determination. All the
US wants is that this potential military flashpoint in the region be resolved so that it
can build up its interests in the region - which it now sees as heavily dependent on
some form of a cooperative relationship with India. Unofficial US studies like the
Report of the Kashmir Study Group point the direction of US preferences on this issue
- and they lean heavily in favour of the Indian option of transforming the military
situation into a political solution - i.e. gaining acceptance for the LoC as the
international border between Pakistan and India.

c- Proximity talks under the UN: This would bring the UN back into playing a leading
role on the Kashmir issue - a role it is bound morally and legally to play since the
Kashmir dispute has been on the Security Council agenda for over fifty years. Also,
UN activism on Kashmir in the form of instituting Proximity Talks between Pakistan,
India and the Kashmiris provides India with a face-saving since it would not have to
talk directly to Pakistan or the Kashmiris till it was ready to. Also, such talks allow all
parties a greater level of flexibility in considering various proposals. Finally, such a
model allows the Kashmiris to directly participate in any decision on the resolution of
the conflict.

Who would represent the Kashmiris? One way would be to have the APHC as well as
the Indian favoured Kashmiris in the talks; or, two, let there be elections held under
international supervision in all parts of the state of Jammu and Kashmir for the
election of negotiating representatives to such a conference.

Whichever way one looks at the options of what framework to adopt for
operationalising meaningful negotiations, the Proximity Talks model seems the most
rational and viable. On this score the US, as well as the European Community and
Japan, can all intervene at different levels to push India and Pakistan towards
accepting such a negotiating framework.

The options

UN resolutions in toto: Pakistan has always maintained that it wants the

implementation of the UN resolutions on Kashmir. The two important components of
these resolutions are: One, an internationally supervised plebiscite where the
Kashmiris would be given the right of self-determination, to decide whether they
wished to opt for India or Pakistan. Two, the UN resolutions also called for a
withdrawal of all Pakistani forces from Kashmir and the bulk of Indian forces before
such a plebiscite could be conducted. It was the Indians who backed off from agreeing
to a timetable and the modalities for such a withdrawal. Whether India would agree to
such a timetable today in order for there to be one overall plebiscite to be conducted
within the whole state of Jammu and Kashmir (which would include the Northern
Areas) remains a major question mark. Since the timetable would have to be mutually
agreed to by both Pakistan and India, Pakistan should have far fewer objections -
especially with international observers first moving in and there being some equitable
proportional withdrawal in the initial stages.

Owen Dixon proposals: These really followed from the failure of the UN Commission
to implement the plebiscite in Kashmir. It reported failure and Owen Dixon was sent
as UN mediator to try and work out some modalities for demilitarisation. He failed
and instead came up with a new set of proposals with a view to resolving the conflict -
and submitted his report to the UN in September 1950. After discussing various
options, he suggested that the disputed territory be divided into three zones and
plebiscites be conducted separately for the three zones. In other words he envisaged
the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir taking into consideration the religious
makeup of the population. The three zones were: One, the Valley plus the Muslim
areas of Jammu - Poonch, Rajori and Doda. In addition, Ladakh's two regions would
be divided, with Kargil - predominantly Muslim - being considered with the Valley;
two, Jammu with the remaining district of Ladakh, Leh; and, three, AJK plus the
Northern Areas.

While the choice for the Kashmiris would still be to opt for either Pakistan or India,
these proposals offer a more pragmatic solution - especially from the Indian
standpoint. And today, given the manner in which the freedom struggle and Indian
repression has unfolded, the Owen Dixon model becomes increasingly more viable.
And it is an option which was instigated at the behest of the UN.
Choice of Independent Kashmir: There are those who believe that Kashmiris would
now prefer an independent state rather than opting for either Pakistan or India. Many
of those who advocate this viewpoint do so out of a sense of frustration with Pakistan
- as well as disillusionment with successive Pakistani governments. There are parties
such as Amanullah Khan's JKLF who advocate the Independence option. At the same
time they continue to lend support also to the APHC which Pakistan recognises as the
representative of the Kashmiris in Occupied Kashmir.

What Pakistan must do is to ensure that as a quid pro quo for acceptance of an
independent, the Northern Areas are detached from this entity and are accepted as an
integral part of Pakistan. This is the bottom line for preserving the security milieu of
Pakistan.

From a Pakistani perspective, while the notion of offering the Independence option in
a plebiscite would open up a Pandora's Box on many issues that arose with the end of
the British India colonial empire; the ensuing issues would be more problematic
politically for the Indian state. If the terms of the partition of British India are to alter
in such a fashion, many other states now part of the Indian Union may challenge this
status.

Also, again from a Pakistani perspective, any alternative to an Indian Occupied

Kashmir is preferable and it should be made clear to the international community that
an independent Kashmir would mean a state with close economic, political and social
ties to Pakistan - given the history of Kashmir and the area now comprising Pakistan.
So, it is India that should think hard before willy nilly encouraging this line of
thinking that Kashmiris by and large want independence.

The fact of the matter is that while one can debate on this point - whether Kashmiris
still prefer the Pakistan option or do the bulk of them now want to go their own way -
there is absolutely no debating the point that the vast majority of Kashmiris do not
want to have anything to do with India. Rejection of India is the main stark reality
within the Kashmiri situation today - so any which way you look at it, Pakistan has
nothing to lose by discussing all options that will end the Indian occupation of
Kashmir. So, if India seriously chooses to play a game of brinkmanship in
negotiations within a Proximity Talks milieu, and introduces the notion of widening
the scope of the plebiscite for the Kashmiris, Pakistan should not hesitate to go ahead
and call what would really be India's bluff. Even if it were not, the chances are that
most Kashmiris may still prefer the Pakistan option. The emotive ties Kashmiris in
Indian-held Kashmir continue to display towards Pakistan remain as strong as ever.

Overall, all three of the options are practicable and relevant as proposals for
discussion within a Proximity Talks framework.
All in all, if a political solution is to be found for the Kashmir issue then it is up to
Pakistan to float new initiatives which allow it to operationalise its principled stand on
self- determination for the Kashmiri people. And it must launch a massive diplomatic
campaign to convince the world to force India into such negotiations.

Such convincing must be at two levels: the governments and the people. Pakistan has
a convincing case on both counts on the issue of Kashmir - be it the legal and political
norms that govern inter-state behaviour or basic human rights that all societies
subscribe to. All that is needed is for the Pakistani political leadership to develop a
better coherence and statement of the issue before it lets the issue go by default.

And, finally, it must tell the world that if the military solution is the only option the
world's indifference leaves, then even on that count, Pakistan has a viable option. Not
only does it have a moral case for aiding the Kashmiri freedom fighters, but also a
political one for it is India that is running out of time on that count, also. In the final
analysis Pakistan's political elite has to realise that on the Kashmir front Pakistan
cannot lose unless its leaders wish it to.