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Power, Propensity to Negotiate, and Moving First in Competitive Interactions

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DOI: 10.1177/0146167206294413 · Source: PubMed

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 Power, Propensity to Negotiate, and Moving
First in Competitive Interactions
Joe C. Magee
New York University
Adam D. Galinsky
Northwestern University
Deborah H Gruenfeld
Stanford University
Five experiments investigated how the possession and expe-
rience of power affects the initiation of competitive interac-
tion. In Experiments 1a and 1b, high-power individuals
displayed a greater propensity to initiate a negotiation than
did low-power individuals. Three additional experiments
showed that power increased the likelihood of making the
first move in a variety of competitive interactions. In
Experiment 2, participants who were semantically primed
with power were nearly 4 times as likely as participants in
a control condition to choose to make the opening argu-
ments in a debate competition scenario. In Experiment 3,
negotiators with strong alternatives to a negotiation were
more than 3 times as likely to spontaneously express an
intention to make the first offer compared to participants
who lacked any alternatives. Experiment 4 showed that
high-power negotiators were more likely than low-power
negotiators to actually make the first offer and that making
the first offer produced a bargaining advantage.
Keywords: anchoring; competition; negotiation; power; prim-
ing; proactive behavior
A lthough a range of research has investigated how
people behave in competitive situations and the tac-
tics and strategies they use in negotiations (e.g.,
Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; De Dreu & McCusker,
1997; Hornstein, 1965; Olekalns & Smith, 1999;
Shapiro & Bies, 1994; Thompson, 1990; Weingart,
Hyder, & Prietula, 1996), little is known about what
determines who initiates competitive interactions and
who negotiates rather than simply accepting the deals
they encounter. This is true despite the fact that research
200
and practice show that negotiating over the price of
goods or one’s salary as well as making the first offer in
those negotiations can have a dramatic effect on one’s
financial outcomes. For example, the decision to nego-
tiate one’s initial job offer can have a substantial effect
on one’s lifetime wealth (Babcock & Laschever, 2003).
Related to moving first, the final outcome in a distribu-
tive negotiation depends largely on whether the buyer
or the seller is allowed to introduce a standard by
making the first offer: When a seller makes the first
offer, the final settlement price tends to be higher than
when the buyer makes the first offer (Benton, Kelley, &
Liebling, 1972; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Liebert,
Smith, Hill, & Keiffer, 1968). All in all, these kinds of
proactive behaviors have profound effects on the course
of negotiation. But what features of competitive social
interaction determine who takes the most proactive
stance? We argue that one of the most critical variables
is power and that people who experience more power
tend to behave more proactively in competitive situa-
tions than people who experience less power.
Authors’ Note: We thank Christina Appleton, Laura Kray, Gillian Ku,
Leigh Thompson, Jennifer Whitson, and Chen-bo Zhong, who helped
collect data for Experiments 2 to 4, and Jennifer Chang and Laura
Snyder, who coded the open-ended responses in Experiment 3.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Robert
F. Wagner, Graduate School of Public Service, New York University,
295 Lafayette St., 2nd Floor, New York, NY 10012; e-mail: joe
.magee@nyu.edu.
PSPB, Vol. 33 No. 2, February 2007 200-212
DOI: 10.1177/0146167206294413
© 2007 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
 Magee et al. / POWER, NEGOTIATION, AND MOVING FIRST
Recent research supports the claim that power
increases proactive behavior more generally. Keltner,
Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) argue that possessing
and lacking power differentially activate the behavioral
approach system (BAS), and in testing the power-
approach theory, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee
(2003) found that people with power were more action-
oriented, having less concern for the social consequences
of their action than people without power. Until now,
however, the impact of power on the tendency to negoti-
ate and on proactive behavior in competitive interactions
has not been explicitly demonstrated. The phenomena of
initiating negotiations and moving first in competitive
interactions are important because of their myriad poten-
tial downstream consequences. Those who behave proac-
tively might feel a surge of confidence and emboldened to
persist in demanding more value for themselves in nego-
tiations, or they might be more likely to reach an impasse
by continuing to make excessive demands. Another pos-
sible consequence is that individuals who make the first
offer in negotiations might simply appear more powerful
to their counterparts. Indeed, people tend to think proac-
tive behavior is a signal of an individual’s power (Magee,
2006), and these inferences of power might allow proac-
tive individuals to take advantage of their counterparts
throughout the interaction. By understanding who has a
propensity to see interactions as opportunities for negoti-
ation and who is likely to move first in competition, we
may be in a better position to predict whose interests are
likely to set the machinery of competitive interaction in
motion and, ultimately, whose interests drive outcomes.
DEFINITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF POWER
We define power as the capacity to control one’s own
and others’ resources and outcomes (for related defini-
tions, see Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003; Thibaut &
Kelley, 1959). Power is essentially the inverse of depen-
dence (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Burt, 1992; Emerson,
1962); those with high power depend less on the resources
of those with low power than vice versa and, thus, are
more easily able to satisfy their own needs and desires.
The literature on negotiation often relies on this notion
of power. Many bargaining experiments operationalize
power by providing one negotiator with an attractive
alternative to the current negotiation; thus, the negotiator
is no longer dependent on the current negotiation oppo-
nent to satisfy his or her interests (Bacharach & Lawler,
1981; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Mannix & Neale,
1993; Thompson, 2001; for a review, see Kim, Pinkley, &
Fragale, 2005). This definition and operationalization
of power make clear that one’s power can vary across
situations and depends on context-specific social relations.
201
Power has been hypothesized to alter the relative
activation of two fundamental behavioral systems—the
behavioral approach and inhibition systems (Keltner
et al., 2003). The BAS motivates scanning for rewards in
the environment, forward locomotion, and other
approach-related social behavior (e.g., Carver & White,
1994; Higgins, 1997). In contrast, the behavioral inhibi-
tion system (BIS) has been equated to an alarm system
that can be activated by threats or potential punishments
(e.g., Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1987; Sutton &
Davidson, 1997). The power-approach theory (Keltner
et al., 2003) posits that power increases activation of the
BAS and dampens the BIS. In support of the power-
approach theory, a number of studies have found that
power influences affective, cognitive, and behavioral cor-
relates of the BAS (for a review, see Keltner et al., 2003,
but see also Moskowitz, 2004). For example, people with
greater power notice more rewards and less threat in the
environment (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002) and actually
are more proactive in seeking rewards (Zander &
Forward, 1968) than are people with less power. In addi-
tion, high-power individuals also are more likely than
low-power individuals to take action consistent with
their goals (Galinsky et al., 2003).
All of the studies investigating the relationship between
power and action (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003) have only
considered this relationship among isolated or anonymous
individuals, situations in which the exercise of action
could not provoke a reaction or a retaliatory response;
however, many of the common characteristics of compet-
itive social interactions could alter the dynamics of power-
induced action. For example, negotiators typically know
who their opponents are and are aware that the two par-
ties at the bargaining table have competing interests
(Thompson, 2001), but they often have limited informa-
tion about the precise nature of their opponents’ true
interests and thus experience high levels of uncertainty.
Negotiations also typically involve an extended social
interaction with a great deal of give and take from both
sides. These additional factors could alter how power
affects individuals’ behavior. On the one hand, concern
about how one’s own behavior will be judged by one’s
counterparts, the inherent uncertainty embedded in most
negotiations, the extended social interaction, and the pos-
sibility of retaliation could dissipate the effect of power on
proactive behavior. On the other hand, negotiators could
view power as the primary force at one’s disposal to deal
with the uncertainty and to resolve the competing inter-
ests, thus increasing the magnitude of the behavioral
effects of power. In the current investigation, we sought to
explore how power determines the degree to which parties
in a variety of competitive contexts behave proactively:
whether to negotiate, to assert the opening position in a
debate, or to make the first offer in negotiation.
202 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
PREDICTIONS
It might seem that possessing power would be associ-
ated with less initiation of negotiation and a disinclina-
tion to move first. Our definition of power, which
emphasizes control over one’s own and others’ resources
and outcomes, can even be used to derive a negative
relationship between power and proactive competitive
behavior. Once two parties are engaged in competitive
interaction, the party with less dependence on the other
for resources also is less dependent on achieving any sort
of gain from the current interaction (Emerson, 1962;
Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The powerful have the luxury
to sit back and gain valuable information about the other
side’s position and clues about their ultimate intentions
(Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 2000), and this
approach in negotiations can result in a low-power party
expending effort to discover solutions that ultimately
benefit a high-power party (Kim, 1997; Mannix &
Neale, 1993). Some evidence for this hypothesis, that
power and proactive competitive behavior are negatively
related, emerges from primate studies in which lower-
status male vervet monkeys tend to be more impulsively
violent compared to their higher-status peers (Fairbanks,
Melega, Jorgensen, Kaplan, & McGuire, 2001). This
notion also brings into sharp relief the fact that low-
status individuals have less to lose by initiating competi-
tive interaction, suggesting that the powerful will be more
conservative in their action.
Despite this line of argument suggesting a negative
relationship between power and proactive behavior,
consideration of the psychological system that power
activates, the BAS, leads us to the opposite hypothesis:
High-power individuals will be more likely than low-
power individuals to negotiate the value of goods and to
move first in negotiations and other types of competi-
tion. With the BAS activated, we expect that high-
power individuals will be more focused on the rewards
(i.e., resources and positive outcomes) available for
them to claim and less focused on the potential threats
than will low-power individuals. Thus, we predict that
high-power individuals will be (a) more likely to seize
opportunities to engage in negotiations and (b) more
proactive in trying to obtain those rewards by making
the first move than will low-power individuals.
OVERVIEW
We seek convergent evidence of the effects of power on
initiating competition and moving first within a competi-
tion by using multiple operationalizations of power and
multiple competitive domains. In the first study, we prime
the experience of power (Galinsky et al., 2003) before
participants read scenarios in which they could choose
whether to negotiate. In the second study, we prime power
semantically (see Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995;
Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001) and measure participants’
subsequent likelihood of moving first in a debate compe-
tition scenario. Experiment 3 makes use of one natu-
rally occurring source of power in negotiations, the Best
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), and
measures whether participants with a BATNA are more
likely than individuals without a BATNA to sponta-
neously generate an intention to make the first offer.
Experiment 4 explores whether the experience of power
determines who actually makes the first offer in a face-to-
face negotiation. Experiment 4 also investigates an impor-
tant consequence of moving first: the procurement of
favorable outcomes.
EXPERIMENT 1A
In the first experiments, we tested the hypothesis that
high-power individuals would be more likely than low-
power individuals to enter into negotiation when pre-
sented with an opportunity to do so. Understanding the
propensity to negotiate is important because the decision
to negotiate the price of a good or an offer has been
shown to affect one’s short- and long-term financial out-
comes (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). We used a priming
procedure—having individuals recall an experience with
power (Galinsky et al., 2003)—that was designed to psy-
chologically reproduce one’s experience with power (for
similar manipulations of other constructs, see Gollwitzer,
Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Strack, Schwarz, &
Gschneidinger, 1985). This particular manipulation has
been found to produce similar effects to those obtained
using role-based manipulations of power (Anderson &
Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003).
In the first experiment, we primed participants with
the experience of power and looked at whether they
would be willing to negotiate the price of a new car. We
chose this scenario because the new car buying experi-
ence tends to be an anxiety-producing situation for
many individuals. In fact, Saturn and Car Max, two
companies that do not negotiate the price of cars, were
created to appeal to the market segment of negotiation-
averse individuals. We predicted that priming the expe-
rience of power would lead individuals to be more likely
to negotiate the price of a car.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 38 university students and staff (11
men, 27 women) who took part in the experiment as
part of a larger testing session in exchange for $7.
 Magee et al. / POWER, NEGOTIATION, AND MOVING FIRST
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Participants were randomly assigned to either the
high-power or the low-power condition. Power was
manipulated following an experiential prime procedure
used by Galinsky et al. (2003, Experiments 2 & 3).
Participants assigned to the high-power condition saw
the following instructions:
Please recall a particular incident in which you had
power over another individual or individuals. By power,
we mean a situation in which you controlled the ability
of another person or persons to get something they
wanted or were in a position to evaluate those individ-
uals. Please describe this situation in which you had
power—what happened, how you felt, etc.
Those participants assigned to the low-power condition
saw the following instructions:
Please recall a particular incident in which someone else
had power over you. By power, we mean a situation in
which someone had control over your ability to get
something you wanted or was in a position to evaluate
you. Please describe this situation in which you did not
have power—what happened, how you felt, etc.
Participants were given a sheet of paper with 19 lines to
complete this task.
After completing the power manipulation, partici-
pants were presented with a simple consumer purchase
scenario followed by the dependent measure: “You are
buying a new car. How likely would you be to negoti-
ate the price?” Likelihood to negotiate was measured on
a 7-point scale anchored at 1 (not at all likely) and 7
(very likely).
Results
To check the effectiveness of the power prime manip-
ulation, we asked a coder blind to both condition and
hypotheses to rate how much power the participant had
in each essay on a 7-point scale (1 = very little, 7 = a lot).
This coder had established high reliability (a = .94) with
another coder using the same 7-point scale on a large
sample of essays from another set of studies (Galinsky
et al., 2003). As expected, participants described them-
selves as having more power in the high-power essays
(M = 5.42, SD = 1.39) than in the low-power essays
(M = 2.16, SD = 0.96), t(36) = 8.44, p < .001.
An independent samples t test revealed that high-
power participants (M = 6.58, SD = 0.69) did indeed
indicate that they were more likely to negotiate the price
of the car than were low-power participants (M = 5.84,
SD = 1.43), t(36) = 2.03, p = .05.1
203
EXPERIMENT 1B
In the next experiment, we wanted to use a more elab-
orate and ambiguous situation to explore the robustness
of power increasing the propensity to negotiate.
Participants were presented with a scenario in which they
were offered an airline voucher for being bumped off
their flight. This situation was chosen because of its
ambiguity about whether it is acceptable to initiate a
negotiation. We predicted that high-power participants
would be more likely to initiate a negotiation by asking
for a larger voucher and additional amenities such as an
upgrade to first class on the bumped flight.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 20 university students and staff
(7 men, 13 women) who took part in the experiment as
part of a larger testing session in exchange for $10.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Participants were randomly assigned either to the
high-power or the low-power condition. The power
manipulation was identical to the one used in the previ-
ous experiment. After completing the power manipula-
tion, participants were presented with an airline
voucher scenario followed by the dependent measure:
Imagine you are at the airport and the airline announces
that the flight you are scheduled to take is overbooked.
You are interested in possibly volunteering and ask what
type of compensation the airline is offering. The airline
representative says that you will receive a $300 voucher
for relinquishing your seat. You notice that not many
other people have offered to be bumped off this flight.
How likely are you to ask for a voucher of greater value
and/or amenities like an upgrade to first class?
Likelihood to negotiate the voucher offer was measured
on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 (not at all likely) and
7 (very likely). At the end of the experiment, participants
were asked, “It is helpful to us to know if you think that
any tasks influenced your performance on any subse-
quent tasks. Please take a moment to record any thoughts
you had (if any) about such an influence.” No partici-
pants reported a connection between the manipulation of
power and their responses on the airline measure.
Results and Discussion
We assessed the effectiveness of the power manipula-
tion using the same coder and scale used in Experiment
204 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
1a. Again, participants described themselves as having
more power in the high-power essays (M = 6.09, SD =
0.70) than in the low-power essays (M = 1.67, SD =
1.12), t(18) = 10.82, p < .001. An independent samples
t test revealed results similar to Experiment 1a and sup-
portive of the hypothesis. High-power participants (M =
5.27, SD = 1.01) indicated that they were more likely
than low-power participants (M = 3.67, SD = 2.18) to
negotiate the airline voucher offer, t(18) = 2.18, p = .04.
Experiments 1a and 1b demonstrate how power affects
the propensity to negotiate. Participants primed with high
power were more inclined to negotiate the value of a con-
sumer good and an offer of an airline voucher than were
participants primed with low power. Further analyses
conducted by combining the data from Experiments 1a
and 1b revealed a positive correlation between the
amount of power described by participants in their essays
(as rated by the trained coder) and their propensity to
negotiate, r(58) = .31, p = .02. Thus, not only does the
experience of having or not having power affect proactive
behavior but also the level of power seems to matter.
EXPERIMENT 2
In the next experiment, we moved from studying
propensity to negotiate to exploring the inclination to
assert oneself as the first mover. We explored whether
simply activating the semantic concept of power would
lead individuals to move first in a sequential, competi-
tive interaction. To do this, we created a scenario in
which participants had to decide whether they wanted
to go first or second in a debate. We predicted that
despite the ambiguity of whether moving first was in the
participants’ interest, power would increase partici-
pants’ likelihood of making the opening arguments in
the debate relative to a control condition.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 48 university students and staff (21
men, 27 women) who took part in a testing session that
included the materials for this experiment and multiple
others in exchange for $10.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Participants were assigned to one of two conditions:
a power prime or control condition. Participants were
greeted in the laboratory by an experimenter who
explained that they would complete several question-
naires related to decision making. The experimental
manipulation, a filler task, and the dependent variable
were embedded in the packet of materials that partici-
pants received.
Power priming manipulation. Participants were
given 15 word fragments and were instructed to “please
complete the following word fragments with the first
word that comes to mind. Try to work quickly, spend-
ing no more than a few seconds on each word.” In the
power prime condition, 6 of the word fragments could
only be completed with words related to power (author-
ity, boss, control, executive, influence, rich; see Chen
et al., 2001). In the control condition, words were selected
to be similar to these 6 words with respect to length and
difficulty to complete (automobile, blast, trinket, enve-
lope, mailbox, sing).
After completing the word fragments and on a new
page, participants were asked to circle each letter “B”
embedded in a grid of numbers and letters. This was
intended to function as a filler task to clear working
memory between the priming manipulation and the
dependent measure.
Moving first measure. After the filler task, partici-
pants were asked to consider the following scenario:
You are a member of a three-person debate team and
you are in the state finals. It has been a long and gru-
eling season and you find yourself in the final round.
The protocol of the final round is that each team’s
name is put into a hat and one name is drawn from
that hat. The team whose name is drawn gets to decide
whether to go first or second. Your team’s name is
drawn. The other two members of your team are in
disagreement over whether to go first or second. One
wishes to go first and the other thinks it is better to go
second. The person who wants to go first thinks it is
best because it allows your team to frame the debate.
The other person thinks going second is better because
it allows you to rebut specific arguments the other side
makes. The choice of whether your team goes first or
second is up to you.
To measure participants’ tendency to move first, they
were given a forced-choice item in which they had to
decide whether they wanted to “make the first argu-
ment (i.e., go first)” or “make the rebuttal argument
(i.e., go second).”
Next, participants were probed for suspicion about
whether they thought the word completion task affected
their later decisions. None of the participants indicated
that they were aware that the word completion task
might have affected their decision in the debate sce-
nario. At the end of the testing session, participants
were asked for demographic information and were paid
and dismissed.
 Magee et al. / POWER, NEGOTIATION, AND MOVING FIRST
Results and Discussion
As we predicted, a significant chi-square test revealed
that participants who were primed with power were
more likely to choose to go first in the debate than were
participants in the control condition, χ2(1, N = 48) =
8.42, p < .01. Only 14% (n = 3) of control participants
chose to go first, and 86% (n = 19) chose to go second.
Fifty-four percent (n = 14) of the participants primed
with power chose to go first, compared with 46% (n =
12) who chose to go second.
A hierarchical log-linear analysis showed there was
not a significant main effect for participant sex, χ2(1, N =
48) = 0.12, p = .73, or for the interaction between power
and participant sex, χ2(1, N = 48) = 2.76, p = .10.2
A subtle manipulation of power increased the pro-
portion of participants who chose to move first in this
competitive interaction: a debate scenario in which
participants were led to believe that both moving first
and moving second held distinct advantages. High-
power participants were significantly more likely than
were control participants to make this choice under
the assumption that this would give them the oppor-
tunity to frame the subsequent debate rather than
have an advantage in responding to the other party’s
arguments.
EXPERIMENT 3
Despite clear evidence that priming power led to a first
mover propensity, the previous study has a number of
limitations that prevent us from making strong claims
about the relationship between power and moving first in
competitive interactions. First, the scenario format of this
study prevented the inclusion of an essential component
of competitive interaction: the presence of a real oppo-
nent whose own behavior could preempt the high-power
actor from moving first. Therefore, in the next experiment,
we had participants prepare for an actual face-to-face
negotiation. Second, the forced-choice nature of the
dependent measure did not allow us to see if participants
would spontaneously generate the decision to move first.
Thus, we sought to understand whether power affected
the tendency to choose to be the first mover by capturing
participants’ thoughts in an open-ended response item.
Third, Experiment 2 used an unobtrusive manipulation
of power that was designed to activate the concept of
power, but this manipulation lacks external validity.
Thus, we used a naturally occurring, context-relevant
manipulation of power—the best alternative to a negoti-
ated agreement, or BATNA—in the current experiment.
Having a strong alternative to a negotiated agreement
gives a negotiator power because it makes her less depen-
dent on an opponent for acquiring desired resources
205
(Fisher et al., 1991; Mannix & Neale, 1993; Pinkley,
Neale, & Bennett, 1994; Sondak & Bazerman, 1991).
We manipulated power by assigning negotiators a
BATNA or not providing them a BATNA in a job negoti-
ation. We explored whether possessing power would
increase first mover tendencies by having participants
write down their strategies prior to negotiating and cod-
ing these thoughts for the intention to make a first offer.
Without a forced choice first offer measure, we risked
having participants in both the low-power and high-
power conditions report thoughts irrelevant to moving
first. This could lead us to reject the null hypothesis
because of an insensitive measure; however, if participants
reported any spontaneous thoughts about first offers, and
if these differed between conditions in the predicted direc-
tion, this would be strong evidence. Consistent with
Experiment 2, we predicted that possessing power would
increase the likelihood that negotiators would explicitly
and spontaneously state that they intended to make a first
offer in the upcoming competitive interaction.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 138 master’s of business administra-
tion (MBA) students (96 men, 36 women, 6 unknown)
enrolled in a course on negotiations; 132 students fol-
lowed instructions and submitted their materials to
their instructor.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The negotiation task took place as part of a class-
room exercise during the second class of a 10-week
course. We randomly assigned participants to a BATNA
or a no-BATNA condition and counterbalanced role
assignment (candidate, recruiter).
Negotiation exercise. Participants were given a
packet that contained their role information and the
experimental manipulation and were asked to read all
of the information carefully. The negotiation task, a
version of the “New Recruit” exercise, concerned an
employment negotiation in which a job candidate and a
recruiter attempted to negotiate several issues relevant
to both parties (i.e., salary, benefits, vacation time,
region of placement). The negotiation included eight
issues in total. Preferences were induced in negotiators
by assigning points to issues (i.e., issues with greater
points were preferred). Negotiators could earn between
–8,400 points and 13,200 points.
Experimental manipulations. After reading their spe-
cific role assignments, participants read a page that
206 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
comprised the experimental manipulation. The page
for all participants was labeled “Urgent Message.”
Participants in the BATNA condition were told either
that they had another job offer worth 4,500 points (for
candidates) or that they had another candidate worth
4,500 points (for recruiters). Participants in the no-
BATNA condition were told that they had no alterna-
tive to either the job (for candidates) or the employee
(for recruiters) that they were considering. Participants
in both conditions were told that the “goal in this nego-
tiation is to maximize the number of points the final
contract is worth to you.”
Dependent measure. The last page of the packet was
titled “Planning and Negotiation.” The instructions on
this page stated, “How are you planning to approach
this negotiation? In the space below, please list any rel-
evant thoughts and describe any strategies.”
Participants were asked to list their thoughts on a sheet
of paper with 19 lines and were told to take approxi-
mately 5 min to complete the task. No additional
dependent measures were collected during or after the
participants’ subsequent negotiation.
Results
CODING
Participants’ thoughts were coded by two judges who
were blind both to experimental condition and hypothe-
ses. To code the intent to make a first offer, each response
was assigned a 1 if the participant expressed an intention
to make the first offer, a 0 if there were no mentions of
first offers, and a –1 if the participant explicitly stated an
intention to not make the first offer. Reliability was high
(Cohen’s κ = .85). A first offer was counted as having
been explicitly referenced only if both coders agreed.
ANALYSES
A hierarchical log-linear analysis including BATNA
condition, role (candidate, recruiter), participant sex,
and the three-level first offer variable (do not make first
offer, no mention of first offer, make first offer) revealed
significant effects of BATNA condition, χ2(2, N = 132) =
16.14, p < .001, and role, χ2(2, N = 132) = 5.91, p = .05,
on references to first offers.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the pattern of results related
to BATNA condition was consistent with our predic-
tion. Twenty-nine percent (n = 15) of BATNA partici-
pants explicitly reported an intention to make the first
offer, whereas only 8% (n = 6) of no-BATNA partici-
pants did. However, 20% (n = 16) of no-BATNA
participants explicitly stated that they would not make
a first offer, whereas only 4% (n = 2) of BATNA
30
25
% Participants
20
15
10
5
0
First Offer No First Offer
BATNA No BATNA
Figure 1 Percentage of participants who spontaneously men-
tioned an intention to make or not make the first offer by
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)
condition, Experiment 3.
participants said that they would not make a first offer.
Most participants, whether they had a BATNA or not,
did not spontaneously mention first offers (67%, n =
35; 73%, n = 58, respectively).
We conducted additional chi-square analyses condi-
tional on having mentioned first offers to see how
power affected the way people think about moving first
when the timing of their actions was something they
explicitly considered. Among participants with a
BATNA who mentioned first offers, 88% (n = 15) indi-
cated an intention to make the first offer and only 12%
(n = 2) indicated that they had no such intention, χ2(1,
N = 17) = 9.94, p < .01. Among no-BATNA partici-
pants, only 38% (n = 6) indicated that they would make
the first offer and 62% (n = 16) said that they would
not, χ2(1, N = 22) = 4.55, p = .03.
The pattern of results associated with the main effect
of role was consistent with the notion that recruiters
have more power than candidates in job negotiations
(Galinsky, Thompson, & Kray, 2002). Twenty-four
percent of recruiters (n = 15) reported an intention to
make the first offer compared to only 9% (n = 6) of can-
didates, χ2(1, N = 132) = 5.62, p = .02. Explicit inten-
tions to avoid making the first offer did not differ
between the recruiters (11%, n = 7) and the candidates
(16%, n = 11), χ2(1, N = 132) = 0.65, p = .42. All higher
order interactions were not significant (ps > .2).
Discussion
Possession of a BATNA, which is a source of power in
a negotiation, increased the tendency toward moving
first. In free-form written statements concerning plans for
an upcoming negotiation, participants who possessed a
BATNA were more likely to express an intention to make
 Magee et al. / POWER, NEGOTIATION, AND MOVING FIRST
the first offer than were participants who did not pos-
sess a BATNA. This represents a strong test and valida-
tion of our hypothesis that actually possessing power
(via a BATNA) increases an individual’s inclination to
move first in competitive interactions. Recruiters also
were more likely to express an intention to make the
first offer than were candidates. In some negotiations,
the roles occupied by negotiators represent differential
sources of power. For example, in a job negotiation,
there may be symmetrical dependence over the trade-
offs and terms of an agreement but the fundamental
resource is a job over which recruiters possess control.
Thus, recruiters appear to have power over candidates
in a job negotiation. Indeed, Galinsky et al. (2002)
found that the majority of MBA students consider
recruiters to have more power in a negotiation com-
pared to their candidate counterparts. Both powerful
roles and strong alternatives led participants to intend
to move first in the negotiation.
In the present experiment, the power-based intention
to assert one’s position early in negotiations surfaced
explicitly and spontaneously in negotiators’ general
plans for an upcoming negotiation. In the next experi-
ment, we sought to move from measuring intentions to
measuring behavior by exploring who actually made the
first offer in a negotiation.
EXPERIMENT 4
The fourth study was designed to look at who made the
first offer at the outset of a real negotiation and to explore
one potential consequence of power-holders making the
first offer: whether the first offer would serve as an anchor
that determines the final outcome (Benton et al., 1972;
Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Ritov, 1996). To test the
generalizability of the findings in Experiment 3, we decided
to use a different negotiation as well as a different manip-
ulation of power. As in Experiments 1a and 1b, we manip-
ulated power by having participants recall and write about
an experience in which they possessed power. We pre-
dicted high-power participants would be more likely than
low-power participants to make the first offer and that
making the first offer would lead to better outcomes
because the first offer would serve as an anchor that would
drive final outcomes in the negotiation.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were 62 MBA students (51 men, 11
women) who were enrolled in a course on negotiations.
Thirty-one dyads (21 male, 9 mixed-sex, and 1 female)
took part in the negotiation.
207
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The experiment was conducted as an exercise on the
first day of class. Each dyad was composed of one high-
power and one low-power participant; participants were
randomly assigned to power condition before the exercise.
We counterbalanced role assignment (buyer, seller).
Negotiation exercise. The negotiation involved the
purchase of a pharmaceutical plant. Both the buyer and
seller were given the same general information. This
information was included in the first page of their role
information (for more details about the negotiation exer-
cise, see Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Participants in
the role of buyer were informed that they were the chief
financial officer of a company in need of a new plant to
manufacture a line of highly specialized compounds and
that one of the company’s existing plants could not be
modified. Buyers were given a BATNA: They were told
that a new plant would cost $25 million to build and
would take a year to be fully operational (including Food
and Drug Administration [FDA] approval) but that it
would be closer to their firm’s headquarters.
Sellers were told that they were selling the plant
because the company they represented was phasing out
the product line that the plant produced. The sellers
also were given a BATNA: They were told that the main
alternative to this negotiation would be to strip the
plant and sell the equipment separately. The projected
profit would be $17 million if the plant were stripped.
Both negotiators had reasonably attractive alternatives
to the negotiation and thus this objective form of power
was held constant across roles.
Power manipulation. Power was manipulated fol-
lowing a procedure similar to the experiential primes
used in Experiments 1a and 1b. The procedure was
altered to have participants recall a particular negotia-
tion experience. Participants received the power manip-
ulation after they had read their role materials.
Participants assigned to the high-power condition saw
the following instructions:
Please recall a particular incident in which you had power
in a negotiation. Please describe this situation in which
you had power—what happened, how you felt, etc.
Those participants assigned to the low-power condition
saw the following instructions:
Please recall a particular incident in which you did not
have any power in a negotiation. Please describe this situ-
ation in which you did not have power—what happened,
how you felt, etc.
Participants were given a sheet of paper with 19 lines to
complete this task. Participants were unaware of the
208 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
power prime manipulation that the other participant in
their dyad received.
After the negotiation, each negotiating dyad was asked
to report three dependent measures: who made the first
offer, the first offer price, and the final sale price.
Results
MANIPULATION CHECK
We coded the power manipulations in the same man-
ner as in Experiments 1a and 1b. As we expected, high-
power participants described themselves as having more
power (M = 6.07, SD = 0.91) than did the low-power par-
ticipants (M = 2.00, SD = 1.00), t(57) = 16.37, p < .001.3
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
All statistical analyses were conducted using the dyad
as the unit of analysis. One dyad did not reach an agree-
ment, which accounts for fewer degrees of freedom in
this analysis and others that involve sale price. Role, sex
composition of the dyad, and sex of the high-power
participant did not have significant effects on who made
the first offer (ps > .4). Thus, we did not include these
variables in the remaining analyses.
POWER AND FIRST OFFERS
As predicted, participants primed with high power
made the first offer a greater proportion of the time
than did low-power participants. High-power partici-
pants made the first offer 68% (n = 21) of the time, and
participants primed with low power only made the first
offer 32% (n = 10) of the time, nonparametric χ2(1,
N = 31) = 3.90, p < .05. A logistic regression of who made
the first offer on the amount of power participants’
expressed having in their power prime essays revealed a
significant, positive relationship for the high-power
negotiator (b = 1.61, SE = 0.63, p = .01) and no effect
of the low-power negotiator (b = 0.40, SE = .62, p =
.52). These results suggest that it was the high-power
participant’s level of power rather than the low-power
participant’s level that determined who moved first.
FIRST OFFERS AND SALE PRICE
We have argued that making the first offer allows one
to control the negotiated outcome by providing an anchor
for the final sale price. Thus, when the seller makes the
first offer, the final sale prices should be higher than when
buyers make the first offer (Galinsky & Mussweiler,
2001). An independent samples t test supported this pre-
diction. When the seller made the first offer (52%, n = 16,
of the time), the sale price was indeed greater (M = 22.39,
SD = 2.50) than when the buyer made the first offer (M =
20.73, SD = 1.63), t(28) = 2.12, p = .04.
To further examine our claim that making the first
offer sets a standard for the negotiation that ultimately
predicts the outcome (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001),
we conducted a bivariate correlation between first offer
price and sale price. Indeed, first offer price did serve as
an anchor for sale price, r(30) = .58, p = .001.
POWER AND SALE PRICE
Although there was a tendency toward higher sale
prices when the seller was primed with high power (M =
22.14, SD = 2.56) than when the buyer was primed with
high power (M = 21.02, SD = 1.77), this difference was
not statistically significant, t(28) = 1.38, p = .18. Our
model proposes that the relationship between power and
sale price will be driven by first offers. Thus, the two rela-
tionships discussed above, (a) that power increased the
likelihood of making the first offer and (b) that making
the first offer predicted favorable sale prices, provide evi-
dence in support of our overall model.4
Discussion
This experiment demonstrates the profound effect
that power can have on how the early stages of com-
petitive interactions unfold. High-power individuals
were more than twice as likely as low-power individu-
als to engage their opponents by making the first offer
in this negotiation. In addition, moving first set an
anchor that determined the final sale prices, with first
movers gaining more favorable outcomes than second
movers. One reason we might not have discovered a
direct relationship between power and sale price is
that all parties in this negotiation were given another
source of power, a BATNA. Although we intended to
hold BATNA constant across conditions, this source
of power gave both high- and low-power primed nego-
tiators a form of objective power to draw on after the
early stages of the negotiation. In sum, the results of
this experiment and the other experiments presented
here suggest that this first mover advantage is avail-
able to all parties but that high-power parties are
more likely to seize the opportunity and make the first
offer and that moving first can lead to a bargaining
advantage.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The five experiments presented here provide con-
verging evidence that the possession and experience of
power lead directly to the initiation of, and moving first
in, competitive interactions. Using an experiential
power prime, Experiments 1a and 1b showed that
participants high in power also are high in their propen-
sity to negotiate relative to participants with low power.
 Magee et al. / POWER, NEGOTIATION, AND MOVING FIRST
These results are consistent with the theory that power
activates the behavioral approach system (Keltner et al.,
2003), leading individuals to focus on the rewards
available to them in situations and to bargain for
greater rewards than were initially offered to them.
In Experiment 2, we presented participants with a
different competitive situation, a debate scenario.
Rather than look at participants’ likelihood of entering
a competition, we were interested in how power
affected their preference for making the opening versus
the rebuttal arguments in a hypothetical debate. In this
experiment, subtle priming of the concept of power
increased participants’ rated likelihood of making the
opening arguments relative to a control condition. The
comparison to a control condition leads us to believe
that it is power that increases the tendency to move first
rather than a lack of power that decreases this tendency.
In the final two experiments, we sought to understand
whether this effect of moving first generalized to a more
common form of competitive interaction, the two-party
negotiation. In two different negotiations, high-power
individuals were more likely to intend to make the first
offer (Experiment 3) and actually make the first offer
(Experiment 4) relative to low-power individuals.
Furthermore, Experiment 4 replicated the finding that
making the first offer has a distinct advantage by anchor-
ing the final outcome (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001).
These experiments provide the first direct evidence that
by understanding who has recently experienced the con-
cept of power, one can predict who will decide to seize the
opportunity to take the first turn or make the first move
in competitive, sequential interactions. These findings are
consistent with and extend the power-approach theory
(Keltner et al., 2003). Power not only orients people
toward taking action (Galinsky et al., 2003) but affects
the timing of actions in competition. In sum, power-
holders are more likely to plunge headfirst into competi-
tion and to beat other parties to the punch.
Implications for Negotiations
The research presented here has a number of impli-
cations for the negotiations literature. One feature often
overlooked by researchers is who chooses to bargain at
all. Many people never reach the bargaining table, and,
even when bargaining is clearly an option, some may
choose not to negotiate. Adding to the work of Small,
Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman (2006), who found
that men have a greater propensity to negotiate than
women, we have illustrated that by understanding the
power dynamics in a situation, one can predict with
some accuracy who will assert themselves by negotiat-
ing rather than simply accepting what is given to them.
209
We have shown that power affects the initiation of
negotiation and the making of first offers, as well as a
positive effect of moving first on objective outcomes.
There are other mechanisms besides initiating negotia-
tions and making first offers by which the powerful
control social interactions and procure valuable
resources at the bargaining table. For example, Van
Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, and Manstead (in press) found
that high-power individuals, holders of strong BATNAs,
and managers in organizations pay less attention to the
anger and frustration of their negotiation counterparts
than do low-power individuals. This obliviousness to
a negotiating partner’s emotions is crucial because
expressions of these emotions typically induce conces-
sions; ignoring them allows power-holders to be persis-
tent in their demands and claim a greater share of
the pie.
Although ignoring one’s opponent can be instrumen-
tal in claiming value in some circumstances, negotiators
typically must consider the other side’s interests to con-
struct a deal that is mutually agreeable. The proactive
behavior of the powerful, for example, could irritate the
other side, leading them to walk away from the table
and leaving the powerful with no value to be claimed.
Another related hypothesis worth considering in future
research is that power decreases the capacity to find
integrative solutions in negotiations. Research showing
a negative relationship between power and the tendency to
engage in perspective-taking (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, &
Gruenfeld, in press) suggests that high-power individuals
might not be inclined to think sufficiently about their
low-power counterparts’ needs. Indeed, perspective-
taking is a strong predictor of reaching creative deals,
achieving Pareto efficient outcomes, and avoiding
mutually destructive impasses (Galinsky et al., 2006).
Furthermore, high-power individuals tend to think about
social interaction in terms of how their interaction part-
ners can satisfy their own needs and desires (Gruenfeld,
Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2006). This instrumental
thinking combined with a lack of perspective-taking
could lead to self-centered negotiation behavior that
fails to uncover win-win agreements in the short run and
build a negative reputation for high-power negotiators
in the long run.
Power, Moving First, and Competitive Outcomes
The relationship between power, moving first, and
competitive outcomes has not only been studied at the
behavioral level of negotiations but also has been
debated in the strategy and political science literatures.
Power is inextricably connected to contests over
resources; competitive interactions tend both to give rise
210 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
to and to result from power differences. Indeed,
researchers have recently recognized the importance of
understanding the ultimate consequences of the timing
and order of actions for a wide range of significant are-
nas, including publicly stated political positions (Box-
Steffensmeier, Arnold, & Zorn, 1997), policy-setting
activity (Howell, 2003), consumer preferences (Alpert &
Kamins, 1995), and new market entry (Lieberman &
Montgomery, 1998). For example, in the contextually
rich realm of politics, one observes a phenomenon con-
sistent with our results. Although U.S. presidents do not
need congressional support to sign and deliver an exec-
utive order—a unilateral, proactive policy-setting tool
that allows them to impose their preferred policies—
they are more likely to do so when the power of their
political coalition in government is stronger (i.e., under
a unified government) rather than weaker (i.e., under a
divided government; Howell, 2003). One probable rea-
son for this finding is that under unified government,
the president is less likely to face retaliation from a con-
gress that disapproves of his action. This is representa-
tive of many complex situations in the public and
private sectors where an array of power dynamics, in
addition to the specific psychological processes offered
here, play a role in competitive outcomes.
The experiments presented here shed light on the
intransigence of many power differences; through their
proactive behavior, the powerful are taking action
that ultimately helps them retain their power. Moving
first allows one to frame the interaction or prevent
interaction altogether by deterring later moves and to
set standards for behavior (Schroeder, Jensen, Reed,
Sullivan, & Schwab, 1983); however, moving first
might not always be a path to prosperity and the reten-
tion of power. Moving first also requires the actor to
take a chance, to overcome uncertainty about the nature
of the competitive environment, and to risk making a
mistake from which a second mover can learn and gain
a competitive advantage (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002;
Schnaars, 1994; Zhang & Markman, 1998). This coun-
terclaim is supported by data pointing to how moving
first does not guarantee that one achieves a superior
outcome relative to later movers (Helfat & Lieberman,
2002; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998; Shankar,
Carpenter, & Krishnamurthi, 1998). For example, an
overly proactive stance may produce sunk costs that
ensnare an organization in an irreversible escalation of
commitment over time. Future research would do well
to understand how the different dynamics of competi-
tion lead to first mover advantages or disadvantages
and when the psychological state of power allows one
to retain and secure more power and when it is a recipe
for disaster.
NOTES
1. To investigate the effect of sex on propensity to negotiate, we
combined the data from Experiments 1a and 1b and conducted an
ANOVA with three factors (power, sex, and scenario [car vs. airline]).
Consistent with the results reported for the individual experiments,
the main effect due to the power manipulation was significant,
F(1, 50) = 4.48, p = .04, and similar to the gender research on propen-
sity to negotiate (Babcock & Laschever, 2003); there was a significant
main effect for sex, F(1, 50) = 8.93, p < .01, such that men were more
likely than women to indicate that they wanted to negotiate. These
main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between power
and sex, F(1, 50) = 5.75, p = .02. Men appear to have reached a ceil-
ing in their propensity to negotiate and were not influenced by the
high-power (M = 6.17, SD = 0.98) or low-power (M = 6.17, SD =
0.87) manipulations. High-power women (M = 6.00, SD = 1.14)
showed a higher propensity to negotiate than did low-power women
(M = 4.86, SD = 2.08).
2. Because the interaction was marginally significant, we looked at
the pattern of means. The power prime tended to have a greater effect
on men’s (high-power: 64% vs. low-power: 0%) than women’s (high-
power: 42% vs. low-power: 20%) decisions to make the opening
arguments. This pattern of data was in a direction opposite to the pat-
tern we found in Experiment 1. There was no systematic relationship
between sex of participant and power across the studies reported here,
which is consistent with other research looking at the relationship
between power and the behavioral approach system (BAS; Galinsky
et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003); thus, we do not discuss it further.
3. Three participants did not turn in their manipulation materials,
which accounts for fewer degrees of freedom in this analysis.
4. Shrout and Bolger (2002) and others (Collins, Graham, &
Flaherty, 1998; MacKinnon, 2000) have argued that evidence of a medi-
ated relationship does not always require a statistically significant rela-
tionship between the independent variable and the dependent variable
(i.e., the direct relationship between power and sale price), as Baron and
Kenny (1986) have proposed. They point out that the expected correla-
tion between power and sale price given total mediation is the product
of the power-first offer and the first offer-sale price correlations. In the
current investigation, the expected direct effect is only .35*.37 = .13
(Shrout & Bolger, 2002). To be complete, we have presented the final
step for mediation analysis proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986). Note
that the independent variable (power) and the mediator (first offers) are
dichotomous variables, so the results of these linear regression analyses
should be interpreted with caution. Regressing sale price on power and
first offers revealed that making the first offer was marginally significant
(β = .32), t(28) = 1.73, p = .09, and power was not directly related to sale
price (β = .15), t(28) = 0.77, p = .45.
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Received January 18, 2006
Revision accepted July 13, 2006