Gender Differences in Anticipated Pay Negotiation Strategies and Outcomes

Author(s): Vicki S. Kaman and Charmine E. J. Hartel

Source: Journal of Business and Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Dec., 1994), pp. 183-197
Published by: Springer
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JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY
Volume 9, No. 2, Winter 1994

GENDER DIFFERENCES INANTICIPATED

PAY NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES
AND OUTCOMES
Vicki S. Kaman
Colorado State University

Charmine E. J. Hartel
University ofTulsa

ABSTRACT: Business students were asked to indicate their pay expectations

and anticipated negotiation strategies for a specific management trainee job.
They also indicated expectations for their and the recruiter's target and resis
tance points for the negotiation process. Men, compared to women, indicated
higher pay expectations, a higher likelihood of active negotiation, less likelihood
of using traditional self-promotion strategies, and more opportunity for legiti
mate negotiations. Significant correlations were found between pay expectations
and negotiation strategies. Intervention strategies for changing women's pay
outcome and negotiation expectations are discussed, as well as the need for a
better understanding of effective negotiation behaviors.

Men fare better, overall, in the pay allocation process compared to

women (Freedman & Phillips, 1988), with gender differences in starting
salary accounting for most of the gender-related variation in salaries
(Gerhart, 1990). To explain why men and women with similar levels of
education and experience receive different starting salaries, researchers
have looked at individual choices, such as the number of years individ
uals plan to work (Blau & Ferber, 1991; Major & Konar, 1984), career
path specialties and college major (Dreher, Dougherty and Whitely,

This research was supported by the Colorado State University College of Business
Summer Research Grant Program. An abbreviated version of this article was presented at
the 50th Annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Women in Management Divi
sion, August 13,1990, San Francisco, California.
We gratefully acknowledge the critical comments of Kevin R. Murphy, Jeanette N.
Cleveland, and Russell Cropanzano on an earlier draft of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Vicki S. Kaman, De
partment of Management, College of Business, Colorado State University, Fort Collins,
Colorado 80523.

183 O 1994 Human Sciences Press, Inc.

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184 OF BUSINESSAND PSYCHOLOGY
JOURNAL

1989; Major & Konar, 1984; Gerhart, 1990); situational variables, such
as alternative job offers (Gerhart and Rynes, 1991); and factors inherent
in pay structures, including market rates, job evaluation points and the
gender composition of a job (Rynes, Weber & Milkovich, 1989). Despite
efforts to find systematic sources of discrimination in the way that pay
is allocated to individuals at the start of their careers, the evidence sug
gests that determination of pay is an interactive, interpersonal process,
and that gender differences in pay outcomes reflect subtle differences in
the ways that men and women think about pay and behave during the
recruitment and hiring period when pay is open to negotiation.

PAY EXPECTATIONS

One gender difference likely to affect pay outcomes is men's consis

tently higher pay expectations (Lathan, Ostrowski, Pavlock, & Scott,
1987; Keys, 1985; Lituchy & Kaman, 1988; Major & Konar, 1984). Even
after special training in negotiation techniques and goal-setting, women
set lower goals and negotiated lower salaries than men who had been
through the same training (Stevens, Bavetta and Gist, 1991). Labora
tory research has demonstrated that pay expectations are related to the
amount of pay offered (Major, Vanderslice, & McFarlin, 1984).
Explanations for men's higher pay expectations include (a) gender
differences in pay histories, indicating that women, from their first
high-school jobs, have experienced lower average pay than men (Green
berger & Steinberg, 1983); (b) women's lower performance expectations
(Lenney, 1977), and tendency to compensate themselves less compared
to men (Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979; Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon,
1984); and c) the tendency of individuals to use same-sex comparison
information when formulating their expectations (Major, 1989; McFar
lin, Frone, Major, & Konar, 1989).
If these explanations have merit, then gender differences in pay ex
pectations should appear among individuals considering a specific, en
if pay rates for the job are not standard or
try-level job, especially
widely known. Previous studies of pay expectations have generally as
sessed pay expectations by asking participants to estimate their future
yearly salaries, allowing them to base their expectations on whatever
jobs they anticipated. Although researchers have controlled for broad
differences in career fields statistically (Major & Konar, 1984), or by
including only individuals in one career field (Keys, 1985; Lituchy &
Kaman, 1988), the specific jobs that men and women had in mind could
account for gender differences in expectations. This study focuses on ex
pectations for a specific management trainee job in order to demonstrate
that gender differences in expectations reflect more than differences in

job choice.

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 VICKI S. KAMAN AND CHARMINE E. J. HARTEL 185

Hypothesis la. Men's pay expectations for a specific job will be higher than
women's pay expectations.

Gender differences in expectations tend to be greatest when infor

mation on which to base expectations is not available, or when it is
ambiguous. This has been demonstrated in studies of performance ex
pectations (Deux, 1984; Lenney, 1977), and in studies of pay expecta
tions where gender differences have been greater for career peak salary
expectations than for more immediate salary rates (Lituchy & Kaman,
1988; Major & Konar, 1984). Another factor contributing to gender dif
ferences in performance expectations, which may influence pay expec
tations, is the awareness of being compared to others. Interactive sit
uations (Deaux, 1984), and those emphasizing social cues, such as
standards of performance or existence of competition (Lenney, 1977) are
more likely to elicit gender differences in expressed confidence.

Hypothesis lb. Differences in men's and women's pay expectations will be

greatest when no information is given about pay range or when available
information encourages social comparisons.

NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES

Another factor which may explain how men achieve higher starting
salaries is the approach individuals take when they have the oppor
tunity to negotiate for pay. Individuals who ask for more when pay is
being determined generally receive more. MBA students reporting that
they negotiated for salaries higher than those initially offered by com
panies from which they accepted job offers obtained significantly higher
salaries than those students who did not negotiate (Gerhart & Rynes,
1991). Managers allocated larger salary increases in a simulation study
when subordinates made "dependency threats" (e.g., reminding the
manager of their worth and threatening to leave if not rewarded as ex
pected) (Bartol & Martin, 1988, 1989). Student "employees" making
strong pay demands were given higher raises than those making no de
mands (Freedman, 1978, 1979), and upward influence strategies have
been used to significantly predict salary level of business school alumni
(Dreher et al., 1988).
Gerhart & Rynes (1991) found that male and female MBA gradu
ates negotiated for higher salaries at the same rate, but that male
MBA's who negotiated reported significantly higher final offers than fe
male graduates. Stevens, Bavetta and Gist (1991) found that, after
training in pay negotiation techniques, and again after additional goal
setting training, male students were able to negotiate significantly
higher salaries in a pay negotiation simulation. If men and women ob

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 186 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY

tain different results from their efforts to "negotiate," perhaps it is be

cause they engage in different behaviors during the negotiation process.
Based on observations of women's communication styles and the
fact that men and women are likely to match the sex-stereotyped expec
tations of others (Deaux, 1984), it can be hypothesized that women will
behave less aggressively in a negotiation situation and make greater
efforts to please the other party. Women have anticipated a less active
role in bargaining or discussion (Hesse-Biber, 1985), are more likely to
use an acquiescence strategy in stressful situations (Mainiero, 1986),
and have indicated a greater tendency to use compromise, accommoda
tion and avoidance of conflict than males (Baron, 1984). In studies of the
use of power in organizations by men and women managers, women
were less likely to use threatening and coercive tactics, were more likely
to accept power imbalances, and were less comfortable exerting power
than men were (Ragins & Sundstrom, 1989). Women have exhibited
fewer negotiation behaviors in simulated situations (Rubin and Brown,
1975), with male managers being significantly more likely than female
managers to engage in both competitive and positive problem-solving
behaviors, while women have been as likely as men to communicate
their own interests (Watson & Kasten, 1988).
If women and men behave differently in pay negotiation situations,
we would expect them to plan different negotiation strategies and to
hold different beliefs regarding the likelihood of success of any attempts
at negotiation. In general, individuals' expectations influence subse
quent behaviors and accomplishments (Bandura, 1982; Major, Van
derslice & McFarlin, 1984). Stevens et al. were not able to train their
women participants in a laboratory pay negotiation to achieve the same
negotiation success as their male participants until they offered self
management training which successfully changed the women's expecta
tions that they would have control over the negotiation process.
This study tests hypothesized differences in men's and women's
planned negotiation strategies. Specific negotiation behaviors are used, as
well as a specific job, which is a different approach from that of previous
studies, which have looked at overall "pay negotiation." In addition, the
study looks at gender differences in perceptions about the negotiation pro
cess and its likely success, since it is these differences in perceptions which
are likely to influence individuals' behaviors during the process.

Hypothesis 2a. Men, compared to women, will plan a more active, aggressive
negotiation strategy for a starting salary.

Hypothesis 2b. Men, compared to women, will expect to be more successful in

their negotiation for a starting salary.

Hypothesis 2c. Men will perceive more opportunity for legitimate negotiations
than women.

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 VICKI S. KAMAN AND CHARMINE E. J. HARTEL 187

Previous research on gender differences indicates that men and

women will differ in both their planned negotiation strategies and in
their anticipated starting salaries for a specific job. It also seems logical
that, if an individual believes that they will negotiate more actively for
pay that they will anticipate a higher salary. Therefore, we offer a third,
exploratory hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Anticipated use of negotiation strategies will be correlated with

starting salary pay expectations.

METHOD

Subjects
Participants in the study were 238 students in upper-level business
classes at a state university, 127 of whom were female. The mean age
was 23.3, with a mode of 21 (29%). The sample was 71% business ma
jors; 69% were seniors, 23% juniors, 5% graduate students, 3% sopho
mores.

Procedure

A hypothetical job description was written for the position of man

agement trainee in a food products manufacturing business. The list of
responsibilities was adapted from the job description for Management
Trainee from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of
Labor, 1977). The job involved working in various functional areas to
become familiar with line and staff operations, and assisting with man
agement responsibilities. Information on company size, sales, earnings
and salary range was adapted from statistics for an actual company de
scribed in Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors and Ex
ecutives (1988). Three versions of the job description were used: (a) A
version providing no information about salary; (b) A salary range ver
sion which stated a salary range of $19,000-$23,000/year; (c) A social
comparison version which stated that "Highly qualified individuals re
ceive, on the average, $21,000 per year."
Students were asked during their classes to review a job description
and complete a questionnaire related to the recruitment process. Each
student received one of the three versions of the job description in their
questionnaire. Participants were instructed to read the job description
and think about how they would approach the recruitment process for
the position if they were interested in the job after graduation. Follow
ing the job description, they completed the measures described below, as
well as demographic questions.

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 188 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY

Measures

Pay Expectations. Participants were asked to indicate the starting sal

ary they thought they would receive if they applied for and took the
position.

Negotiation Strategies. A list of pay negotiation behaviors was developed

using Lewicki and Litterer's (1985) model of the negotiation process, as
well as popular writings on how to negotiate for pay. Some of the items
described well-accepted job applicant behaviors, such as emphasizing
skills, experiences, personality and motivation (Cohen, 1983). Empha
sizing what one has to offer is also part of a negotiation process (Lewicki
& Litterer, 1985), although this behavior might not be perceived by ei
ther party as "active" negotiation for pay. More active approaches in
clude specific efforts to find out what has been offered by an employer in
the past (Irish, 1973), being firm and asking for a specific salary
(Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Rust, 1979), and asking for more than the
employer is expected to offer (Irish, 1973; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985).
Active negotiation might also involve a conscious timing of salary dis
cussions, with a commonly-recommended strategy being not to discuss
salary early in the recruitment process (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fermer &
Smith, Inc., 1987). A still more aggressive approach includes mention
ing other job offers (Cohen, 1983), or discussing what others have been
paid (Swift, Verseput, & Kleiner, 1985).
Participants were asked to indicate the probability (from 0 to 100%)
that they would use each of 34 pay negotiation behaviors during recruit
ment for the management trainee job. Listed in Table 1 are samples of
the negotiation behaviors which were derived from the literature cited
above.

Composite Variables. An exploratory principal components factor anal

ysis, with varimax rotation, of the negotiation strategies resulted in 5
easily interpretable factors which accounted for 39.8% of the variance.
The five-factor solution revealed no items with loadings of .40 or greater
on more than one factor. Six items did not have factor loadings as high
as .40 on any factor and were excluded from further analyses. Composite
strategy variables were created by computing the mean of the items
defining each factor. Labels given these composites, the number of items
in each and their internal consistency reliabilities were: (a) Active Ne
gotiation (9 items; r=.80), (b) Traditional Self-Promotion (9 items;
r=.68), (c) Aggressive Negotiation (4 items; r=.66), (d) Avoidance (3
items; r=.61), and (e) Acceptance (3 items; r=.32). Sample items and
mean composite scores for men and women are shown in Table 1.

Expectations for Negotiation Success and Opportunity for Negotiation.

Lewicki and Litterer (1985) discuss four reference points used by indi

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 VICKI S. KAMAN AND CHARMINE E. J. HARTEL 189

Table 1
Sample Items, Mean Composite Scores, and Mean Probabilities for

Negotiation Strategy Factors

Mean Probabilities

Composite/Sample Items Loading Males Females

Active Negotiation?9 Items

Negotiate to get the highest salary possible .75 71.7 69.3
Ask for more than expect employer to offer .66 50.2 40.6
Ask for more salary than company offers .65 49.4 43.8
Not accept first salary offer .64 54.0 47.8
Mean Composite Score 45.3 38.5
Traditional Self-Promotion?9 Items
relevance of my education .60 85.9 89.9
Emphasize
Emphasize my motivation to work hard .59 94.2 95.3
Show a willingness to do different things .59 93.1 94.8
Mean Composite Score 86.9 89.7

Aggressive Negotiation?4 Items

Say I had another job offer with a higher salary .70 32.0 33.7
Mention I have other job offers .66 49.6 37.4
Mean Score 32.8 29.3
Composite
Avoidance?3 Items
Mention salary only after a job offer .71 64.3 64.9
Not ask about salary recruitment .70 49.9 47.8
during
Mean Composite Score 51.1 52.7

Acceptance?3 Items
Ask for the salary I hope to get .62 67.5 68.5

salary offer above minimum .46 74.7 71.5

Accept
Mean Composite Score 68.2 67.5

viduals as- the basis for their negotiation strategies. These are (a) the
salary the applicant hopes to get (applicant target point); (b) the salary
the applicant believes the employer will offer (recruiter target point);
(c) the minimum salary the applicant will accept (applicant resistance
point); (d) the highest possible salary the applicant believes the em
ployer could offer (recruiter resistance point). Participants were asked to
indicate these four points. Expectations for negotiation success were
measured by calculating the difference between pay expectations and
applicant target points and the difference between expectations and ap
plicant resistance points. Larger differences between pay expectations
and applicant resistance points and smaller differences between pay ex
pectations and applicant target points indicated greater degrees of an
ticipated negotiation success.
Opportunity for negotiation was assessed two ways. The difference
between applicant and recruiter target points represented how far par
ticipants felt their desired outcome would be from that of the recruiter.

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 190 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY

The difference between recruiter target and resistance points repre

sented participants' beliefs about how far recruiters could move from
their targeted offer.

Additional Measures. Using 11-point scales (1= not at all, 11= very),
subjects rated (a) the job's desirability, (b) their qualifications for the job
and (c) their perceived chances of getting the job. They were also asked
to estimate the proportion of men and women holding the job.

RESULTS

For both men and women, the mean estimated proportion of females
in the job was 32%. Mean desirability of the job was 6.1 (below "some
what desirable") on the 11-point scale. The mean rating of how qualified
participants felt was 7.5 (a little below "somewhat qualified") and mean
rating of chances of getting the job was 6.9 (below "somewhat good").
Males and females did not differ significantly on their ratings of the
job's desirability or chances of getting the job, but did differ on their
of how = 7.8 for males,
ratings qualified they felt (mean qualifications
7.2 for females; ?(235) = 2.17. p<.05).

Hypothesis la: Gender Differences in Pay Expectations

Mean pay expectations, target and resistance points for men and
women are shown in Table 2.
An analysis of variance was done with pay expectations as the de
pendent variable, and gender and job description version (i.e., how salary
information was given) as independent variables. Self-ratings of how qual
ified participants were for the job were incorporated as a covariate. Mean
expectations for men and women respectively were $21,400 and $20,700
for the ambiguous version, $21,200 and $20,600 for the salary range version,
and $21,300 and $20,200 for the social comparison version. As hypothe
sized, the main effect for gender was significant (F(l,228)=4.2, p<.05).

Table 2
Mean Pay Estimates for Males and Females in Thousands of Dollars

Males Females t

Applicant Target Point 23.5 22.4 2.49*

Applicant Resistance Point 20.9 19.9 2.28*
Recruiter Target Point 20.1 19.5 1.53
Recruiter Resistance Point 24.3 23.2 2.21*

Pay Expectation 21.3 20.5 2.09*

*p < .05

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 VICKI S. KAMAN AND CHARMINE E. J. HARTEL 191

Main effects for job description version and the predicted interaction
effect were not significant, although they were in the predicted direc
tion, with the greatest difference between mean expectations for males
and females being for the social comparison version ($1,100).

Hypothesis 2: Gender Differences in Pay Negotiation Strategies

a. Planned Strategies. Five separate analyses of variance were per
formed, with each strategy composite as a dependent variable, and gen
der and job description version as independent variables. In support of
the first hypothesis, men's mean probabilities were significantly higher
on Active = and women were
Negotiation (F(l,232) 8.1, p<.05), signifi
on Traditional Self-Promotion =
cantly higher (F(l,232) 4.96, p<.05).
Mean probabilities are presented in Table 1. Job description version and
interaction effects were not significant.
b. Anticipated Success. Overall, the students7 expectations for the pay
they would receive if they accepted the position were closer to their re
sistance points than to their target points. The mean differences be
tween pay expectations and resistance points were $552 for women and
$481 for men. Mean differences between expectations and target points
were $1,912 for women and $2,114 for men. The findings that women's
expectations were further from their resistance points and closer to
their target points than the men's expectations were not statistically
= =
significant (?(126) .7; ?(110) .26), and were contrary to the hypothesis
that men would expect greater success.
c. Opportunity for Negotiations. Mean differences between applicant and
recruiter target points were $3,402 for men and $2,850 for women
=
(?(235) 1.9, p<.05). Mean differences between recruiter target and re
=
sistance points were $4,209 for men and $3,636 for women (?(233) 1.7,
p<.05). These significant gender differences support the hypothesis that
men anticipate more opportunity for legitimate negotiations.

Hypothesis 3: Pay Expectations and Strategy

A stepwise regression analysis, using pay expectations as the de

pendent variable and the five composite strategy variables as indepen
dent variables, was used to explore the relative influence of each strat
egy on pay expectations. The best predictor of pay expectations was
Active = = JR2= .06), followed
Negotiation F(l,236) 15.8, p .0001, by
Avoidance, which increased R2 to .08 (?(236) = 2.3, p<.05).

DISCUSSION

As hypothesized, men reported a higher average probability that

they would use an active pay negotiation strategy during recruitment

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 192 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY

for the management trainee job. Women indicated significantly higher

expectations that they would prepare for the interview and promote
themselves by emphasizing attributes such as their education, experi
ence and motivation. Also as hypothesized, the men's pay expectations
were significantly higher than the women's for the specific management
trainee job, which was perceived as equally desirable by both men and
women. This gender difference remained even when perceptions of qual
ifications for the job were held constant, indicating that gender differ
ences in pay expectations do not merely reflect women's perceptions that
they are less qualified for a specific job.
The variance in pay expectations explained by gender and by antici
pated use of the negotiation strategies was small. It is the cumulative
nature of pay decisions, however, that makes even a small percentage of
explained variance important (Abelson, 1985). Previous research docu
ments that women, as early as during their high school years, receive
lower wages than men (Greenberger & Steinberg, 1983). The competi
tive, often ambiguous, and sometimes biased processes by which pay is
allocated throughout individuals' careers (Auster, 1989) may make it
difficult for women to catch up even when their specific job performance
is evaluated (Gerhart, 1990).
This study contributes to a growing body of knowledge indicating
that cognitions are important in accounting for gender differences in
pay outcomes. Expectations are often directly linked to outcomes (Ban
dura, 1982; Darley & Fazio, 1980; Major, Vanderslice, & McFarlin,
1984; Stevens et al., 1991), with aspirations or goals being likely inter
mediary variables (Major, 1989). The applicant target and resistance
points assessed in this study were goals which, like outcome expecta
tions, were higher for males than females. Understanding how to influ
ence these goals, possibly by influencing individuals' beliefs about their
ability to utilize various negotiation strategies and to influence their
own pay, may be an effective way to help women achieve pay equity at
job entry (Stevens et al., 1991).

Practical Implications

Pay Outcome Expectations. Persistent gender differences in expectations

have led to the suggestion that women be given realistic information
from which to formulate accurate expectations (Major, 1987, 1989;
McFarlin, Frone, Major, & Konar, 1989). The most obvious relevant in
formation would be the actual salaries received by individuals in a par
ticular job. When we supplied pay range information for our specific job,
however, we failed to eliminate gender-related expectations. Our results
extended those obtained by Martin (1989), who found that gender differ
ences in student pay expectations persisted despite availability of salary
range information for their specialty areas. Individuals are not as likely

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 VICKI S. KAMAN AND CHARMINE E. J. HARTEL 193

to use "generic" salary information (even information about a specific

job), as they are to use same-sex comparison information, which more
obviously characterizes workers who are similar, and which matches so
cial norms that indicate women are paid differently than men (Major,
1989; McFarlin et al., 1989).
Our inability to eliminate gender differences by providing salary
range information is even more understandable when we recognize that
men and women in our sample believed that a relatively low proportion
(32%) of women characterized the management trainee job. Men and
women have expressed similar self-efficacy and liking for the job of
manager (Clement, 1987), and have been equally likely to choose a
management trainee job (Blau & Ferber, 1991). Those who perceived
the job as male dominated, however, were more likely to have lower
performance expectations (Bridges, 1988), and less likely to perceive
that comparison pay information was relevant to them (Major, 1989).
Our largest gender differences in outcome expectations were for those
who were informed that the pay range applied to 'Tiighly qualified indi
viduals." This finding, which was consistent with our hypothesis, may
illustrate how women's lower sense of entitlement to pay can be exacer
bated by emphasizing that they will be competing directly with males
(Major, 1989). We might have seen stronger effects of our pay informa
tion manipulation if we had provided gender-specific salary figures.
If our objective is to influence women's pay expectations so that
they match those used by their higher-paid male counterparts, we
should also consider the related experiences and beliefs which lead to
those expectations. Major's (1989) model explains gender differences in
perceived entitlement for pay by pointing out that the sex segregation of
many jobs and the traditional underpayment of women in our society
has resulted in women having different
experiences and social compari
sons from which to formulate expectations about what is typical and
what is feasible for them. We can change women's expectations, there
fore, by pointing out how their past pay experiences (in jobs they have
held as students, for example) have reflected biases, by emphasizing the
similarity of their qualifications to those of their male counterparts, by
encouraging them to discuss their expectations with male peers, and by
helping them to get actual salary figures on which to base their expecta
tions and goals. An even more effective, but more difficult long-range
approach, would be to change women's early life experiences by pro
moting equity in the payment of younger workers, and/or by making
younger workers aware of inequitable practices and encouraging them
to expect equal pay for equal work.

Negotiation Strategies. Since planned negotiation strategies may be

closely connected to negotiation behaviors exhibited by men and women,
they offer a new, potentially productive avenue for changing behaviors

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 194 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND PSYCHOLOGY

and, therefore, pay outcomes. This study's definition of five separate

types of behaviors, which men and women expected to utilize differ
ently, begins to explain why men and women experience different out
comes when they have the same propensity to negotiate (Gerhart &
Rynes, 1991) or have been given the same training in pay negotiation
techniques (Stevens et al., 1991). If men are more successful because
they are more active negotiators, and are more likely to ask for the
salary they desire, rather than sticking to traditional discussion of their
qualifications, women can benefit from developing skills and self-con
fidence in these behaviors. It also may be worthwhile to encourage
women to formulate target and resistance points which match their
qualifications and goals, and to anticipate the goals of their potential
employers. Just as behavioral self-management techniques were neces
sary to bring women's goals and results up to men's in a negotiation
training simulation (Stevens et al., 1991), knowing which specific nego
tiation behaviors are more effective and being able to set target and
resistance points may provide women with the feelings of control and
efficacy needed for effective negotiation behaviors.
As with outcome expectations, behavioral expectations for the pay
negotiation process and actual negotiation behaviors will be most effec
tively influenced by the learning and reinforcement that comes from
successful experiences. Before we can design experiential training or con
vince women to try out effective negotiation behaviors, we must have a
better understanding of what these are. The fact that the most effective
influence techniques for men may not be the most effective for women
(Dreher et al., 1989) makes this understanding more complicated.

Limitations and Future Research

Additional research is needed to enhance the generalizability of our

findings. Although our management trainee job provided a standard,
specific framework for our respondents, it also allowed for more ambi
guity than is present in some job search situations. There is already
evidence that gender differences in pay expectations for professional
groups, such as accountants, where there are clearly-defined career
paths, are not significant at the entry level, but only for more distant
career points, about which less information is available (Lituchy & Ka
man, 1988). A study which directly compares entry-level pay expecta
tions for a more general job, such as that of management trainee, to
those for more specific jobs, such as those relevant to professional or
technical school students, would provide more conclusive information
about the role career ambiguity plays in eliciting gender differences. We
also need data on the effect of different jobs and careers on individuals'
propensities to engage in different negotiation strategies.

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 VICKI S. KAMAN AND CHARMINE E. J. HARTEL 195

Future research could also extend that of Keys, who surveyed Certi
fied Management Accountants (1985), to examine pay expectations and
negotiation strategies of adults, rather than students, so that
working
we can learn how and whether these change for individuals at different
points in their careers. Perhaps our failure to find gender differences in
anticipated success of pay negotiations can be explained by our students'
lack of experience and confidence in their negotiation skills.
Finally, this study asked participants their expectations and plans
for a hypothetical job. There is a strong need for studies of actual pay
negotiation behaviors in real-life settings. A needed addition to percep
tion-based studies, such as this one, lab studies (e.g., Stevens et al.,
1991) and studies which simply ask whether or not individuals have
engaged in "negotiation" ( e.g. Gerhart & Rynes, 1991) is research based
on actual observations or detailed reports of what actually takes place
as men and women negotiate for pay. Perhaps research along the lines
of that discussed by Ragins and Sundstrom (1989), which examined the
approaches of successful female executives, could be used to discover the
specific strategies which work for men and women at different points in
their careers. In the meantime, we can make both men and women more
aware of the beliefs and expectations which might be influencing the
financial outcomes of their careers.

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