Paper #1

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samuel A. Badham
Philosophy 100D
Prof. K. Falvey
Descartes overall argument for the view that the mind is really distinct from the body begins with
the first premise that Descartes has a clear and distinct idea of himself and body as having
different essential properties and therefore conceivably able to exist apart from each other. The
second premise is taken as a given and is that God exists not as a deceiver. God would not give
Descartes faculties, when used carefully, lead him into error. Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas
of are brought about by God. The third premise is that it is possible for my mind and my body to
exist apart. Because of the idea that two things are really distinct if it is possible for them to exist
apart, this is called the definition of real distinction. Descartes first premise states that his mind
and body can conceivably exist apart from one and other since they have different essential
properties. So given the third premise, if his mind and body can exist apart then they are distinct.
Therefore Descartes concludes that his mind is distinct from his body.
Descartes’ first premise is proven by first showing that the only essential property of him is that
he is thinking, and second that his body’s only essential property is extension. For clarification
the phrase “essential properties” in this paper means properties that the mind and body can’t exist
without. Descartes searches for pieces of knowledge that cannot be doubted. Descartes strongest
argument, the demon argument, proposes that there is a demon who could be misleading him in
every direction, that everything he believes is wrong. Descartes however states that there is one
belief that escapes the demon doubt, the fact that he is thinking. This belief escapes the demon
doubt because it is impossible for the demon to make Descartes think that he is thinking, when
Descartes is really not. It is impossible for the demon to cause Descartes to think that he is
thinking, when Descartes is not thinking, because it is logically inconsistent to be thinking and
not thinking at the same time. Therefore Descartes argues that his mind’s only essential and
indubitable property seems to be thought and everything else can be doubted.
              The second part of Descartes proof for premise one is showing that the only essential
property of body is extension. Descartes seeks to find which properties are essential to the body.
Descartes uses a piece of wax as an example of a body. After applying flame to the wax he notes
that the shape of the wax had changed, so therefore shape was not an essential property. When he
put the wax to the flame the wax became liquid and extended further than it did when it was
solid. Because of this Descartes noted that size was not an essential factor either. After a series of
numerous tests on the wax Descartes find that really the only property that remains always
present is the general and abstract property of being extended. All the wax’s seemingly essential
properties (shape, size, motion, etc.) are actually modes of the fundamental property of
extension. Therefore by using the wax as an example of a body Descartes finds that the only
essential property of the body is extension.
              So given that Descartes proved his first premise, that he has a clear and distinct idea of
himself and body as having different essential properties and therefore conceivably existing apart
from each other. Descartes moves on two his second premise which is taken as a given.
Descartes second premise is that God exists not as a deceiver. God would not give Descartes
faculties, when used carefully, lead him into error, and that what Descartes has clear and distinct
ideas of are brought about by God.
              Premise two establishes that clear and distinct ideas are brought about by God and God
is not a deceiver. Given this, Descartes establishes premise number three. Premise number three
states that it is possible that my body and my mind exist apart. Because of the definition of real
distinction which states two things are really distinct if it is possible for them to exist apart.
              Premise number one is where Descartes establishes that he has a clear and distinct idea
of his mind and body as conceivably existing apart from one and other because they have
different essential properties, which he proves with the demon doubt example and the wax
example. The second premise states that whatever Descartes has clear and distinct ideas of are
brought about God. Premise three states it is possible for mind and body to exist apart. This
premise is inferred from the definition of real distinction. The definition states that two things are
really distinct if it is possible for them to exist apart. Following from these three premises
Descartes states the conclusion of his argument, which is that the mind is really distinct from the
body. Since his mind and body are made of different essential properties, it is conceivably
possible that they can exist apart. Then given the definition of real distinction, we arrive at
premise three, which states mind and body can exist apart from each other, because real
distinction states any two things that can exist apart are distinct. Therefore from this third
premise and the definition of real distinction comes Descartes conclusion that his mind really is
distinct from his body. 
              One person who had a problem with Descartes idea was Queen Elizabeth I of England.
Elizabeth asks how the soul can move the body if the soul has no extension and no surface to be
in contact with the body? Descartes says that she is thinking about the mind-body interaction in
the wrong way. She is using her imagination, says Descartes, and imagination is all made of up
of material causations. Descartes says that you cannot imagine and immaterial force like the
mind interacting with a physical body. Descartes says that the soul is best conceived by the
intellect, body is best conceived by the intellect and imagination. The substantial union, as
Descartes calls it, of the mind and the body is best conceived by the senses, especially internal
senses of pain, pressure, heat and cold. Descartes concludes by telling Elizabeth to go ahead and
think of this mind-body interaction as extension of the soul, for that’s what the substantial union
amounts to.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper 2:
              Descartes dualist perspective has two key points. The first is the metaphysical point.
The body is a substance defined by its extension. The mind on the other hand exists intangibly
outside the physical universe. Yet some how the two are in “substantial union” and can affect one
and other. The second is a systemic point. We have special knowledge of our own mental states
that know one else has access to. Yet we do not have access to other minds or even know
whether or not other minds exist.
              This dualist perspective is challenged by this notion of other minds. As mentioned
before, one problem of the dualist idea is the systemic problem. Given the dualist perspective
there is no way we can know or have direct access to the events of an inner life of another. Direct
access to the thoughts and events of the mind are the exclusive privilege of that mind itself. The
second problem is the metaphysical one. How are other bodies moving? Are there other minds in
people that are similar to mine making them move? Or are people robots or zombies? Even if
Descartes believed that other bodies were controlled by other minds similar to his, there would
be no way to prove it because of the systemic problem of not being able to access the inner mind
of another. Only our bodies and not our minds can meet. Even if you attempted to make
inferences based on the behavior of another individual, there would be no way to corroborate this
truthfully since you have no access to the mind of others. Because of this fact the dualist position
cannot verify the existence of any other minds except its own.
              Ryle feels that the fact that dualism gives rise to the problem of other minds shows that
something has gone wrong with the idea. Ryle argues that we do in fact apply mental conduct
terms to others reliably. The mentalistic words and concepts that we use in ordinary life to
describe the mental states of others, such as happy or sad, are meant to signify special
occurrences that have happened in the private life of the individual. When a person says that
another person is happy, they have no way of knowing if this is true, but they usually are right
and accurate when they approximate another’s feelings. Because we do in fact know how to
make such comments and that we make these observations with relative accuracy, it must be that
these mentalistic words and concepts have publically observable criteria for their application.
Since whenever people say that someone is happy or angry, they are using a term that applies
directly to that persons’ stream of consciousness. Because often times when we make these
statements we are correct about the person’s mental state and given that people do not, for the
most part, constantly misunderstand each other, it follows that there must be some sort of
observable criteria for their application. There has to be some public criteria of happiness that we
can all see, because we all seem to apply the mentalistic word of “happiness” accurately for the
most part. Since there is no way to see into other peoples inner minds, the only way we could
apply the term happiness to another person accurately is if we had the same publically
observable criteria of happiness as the other person. It follows from these reasons that there must
be some sort of observable criteria for people to correctly apply mentalistic words and concepts.
              This idea leads to behaviorism. Since we all apply these mentalistic words and concepts
correctly for the most part, what is the publically observable criteria that allow their correct
application? The answer is a theory known as behaviorism. This search for a public criteria to
explain the application of mentalistic vocabulary led to the idea that behavior could be the
criteria. The fact that we all can observe other peoples behavior and use that to make inferences
about their mental states, leads some to believe that behavior is the criteria which people observe
to learn the correct application of mentalistic words such as happiness or anger. Behaviorism
solves this problem of other minds that dualism struggles with. The problem of other minds
disappears because there are clearly stated criteria for attributing mental states to others. The
systematic aspect being that behavior is the way in which one can observe the supposed private
mental state of another person. The metaphysical aspect that behaviorists put forward is that the
body acts in certain dispositions, depending upon the mental state. The mental state of a person
creates a certain disposition toward a certain behavior. For example, when some ones mental
state is angry, the disposition is violent behavior.
              Hillary Putnam objects to this idea of behaviorism. She brings up an example of another
world in which “super Spartans” have conditioned themselves not to react to any involuntary
pain behavior. They do not wince, growl, groan, scream, etc. Yet they still feel pain, even though
they do not exhibit the behaviors that suggest pain. Taking the behaviorist perspective, Putnam
says that in this society there could be no word for pain because according to the behaviorist
perspective there would be no publically observable criteria or behavior that could be seen as
pain. Putnam believes if pains are logical constructs out of behavior, then our “super Spartans”
behave as if they don’t have pains, but of course they do have pains, and they know perfectly
well they have pains.  Putnam states that it is absurd that a society that clearly can feel pain
would not be able to ascribe to these people a capacity for feeling pain