Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

Saturday, 1:00-4:00 P.M.

Topics:
1. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Judges and Justices
2. Disciplinary Actions Against Lawyers
3. Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement to the Practice of Law

Group 6 Members:
Jansen, April B.
Omar, M.
Rosario, Eurika C.
Sanguyu, Christy M.
Tendenilla, Jizza Sofia Cristine T.
Trivino, Reycy Ruth Sia
Tugas, Richelle

1
 PART 1. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Judges and Justices

UPHOLDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE THE
MEMBERS THEREOF1

It has been said that a judge is the visible representation of the law or to put it differently,
the judge is the personification of justice and as such the judge must be “the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. (Agpalo, op. cit., p. 544, citing Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Gines, 224 SCRA 261 [1993])”
Because of the sensitive nature of the office of the judge Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct stipulate in no uncertain terms that “A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY and x x x SHOULD AVOID
IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.” Like
Caesar’s wife the judge should not only be beyond reproach but also has the APPEARANCE that
he is irreproachable both in public as well as in public life.

BASES ON THE COURT’S DISCIPLINARY POWERS OVER JUSTICES OF CA & SB AND

JUDGES OF REGULAR & SPECIAL COURTS

1. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 transferred the administrative supervision

of all courts and their personnel from the Department of Justice to the Supreme
Court. This was affirmed by Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. To
effectively discharge this constitutional mandate, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) was created under Presidential Decree No. 828, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 842 (and its functions further strengthened by a resolution of the Supreme
Court en banc dated October 24, 1996). Its principal function is the supervision and
administration of the lower courts throughout the Philippines and all their personnel. 2

2. Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

It grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and their
personnel. This grant empowers the Supreme Court to oversee the judges’ and court
personnel’s administrative compliance with all laws, rules, and regulations, ⁠ and to take
administrative actions against them if they violate these legal norms. ⁠

3. Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge
the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST JUDGES AND JUSTICES

A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC

DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND JUSTICES OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
SECTION 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special
courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of person who
have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate
said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable

1 Legal and Judicial Ethics, its Relevance Revisited by Alejandro M. Gozon, A.B., LL.B
2 https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/about/gov/judiciary/

2
integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and
omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules
of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
SEC. 2. Action on the complaint. - If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy
thereof shall be served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10)
days from the date of service. Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.
SEC. 3. By whom complaint investigated. - Upon the filing of the respondent's comment, or
upon the expiration of the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are
required, the Court shall refer the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report, and recommendation or assign the case for investigation, report, and recommendation to
a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a
Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial
Court if the respondent is a Judge of an inferior court.
SEC. 4. Hearing. - the investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day of the hearing and send
notice thereof to both parties. At such hearing the parties may present oral and documentary
evidence. If, after due notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte.
The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from
the date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant.
SEC. 5. Report. - Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating
Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and
recommendation. The report shall be accompanied by the record containing the evidence and the
pleadings filed by the parties. The report shall be confidential and shall be for the exclusive use
of the Court.
SEC. 6. Action. - The Court shall take such action on the report as the facts and the law may
warrant.
SEC. 7. Classification of charges. - Administrative charges are classified as serious, less
serious, or light.
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in
an appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. - Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;
2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
3. Unauthorized practice of law;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
7. Simple Misconduct.
SEC. 10. Light Charges. - Light charges include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;

3
 2. Gambling in public;
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. - Proceedings against Judges of regular and special
courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and
confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be attached to the record of
the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator.
These amendments to Rule 140 shall take effect on October 1, 2001 following their publication in
two newspapers of general circulation on or before September 15, 2001.

4
 FLOW CHART OF SECTION 1 TO SECTION 6

Otherwise,
dismissed.

motu proprio by the SC

Judges (Regular & Special Courts)

Sufficient in form & substance

START HERE

Justices (CA & SB)

may be instituted

verified complaint + affidavits

And

(person with knowledge of facts

alleged)/documents (substantiate
said allegations) copy of compaints
served upon
Respondent (R)
Within 10
days from
anonymous complaint + the date of
public records of indubitable service, the
integrity (R) shall be
required to
comment

If, (R) is a
Investigating Justice of
Justice/Judge the CA & SB Retired
(IJ) shall set a member of For:
day for 1. evaluation
SC
hearing and 2. report or
send notice 3. recommendation
to both parties

If, (R) is a Judge of

RTC or Special Courts
Parties may Court shall
of equivalent rank Office of the Court refer the matter
present oral & Administrator to
documentary Justice of
evidence CA
Upon:
1. Filing of
Or
respondent’s
1. assign the case
comment
Investigation for investigation
2. Expiration
ex parte for 2. report and
failure to
of time for
3. recommendation
appear after filing
to
due notice If, (R) is a Judge 3. Other
of Inferior Courts pleadings or
docs are
Judge of required
RTC

1. accompanied by record
containing evidence &
Terminate investigation pleadings filed by parties
wtihin 90 days from the 2. shall be confidential
date of its commencement 3. exclusive use of the court
or within such extension as
the SC may grant
Within 30 days, (IJ) shall submit the SC shall take action on the
report containing findings of fact & report as the facts and the END
recommendation law may warrant.

5
BASIS ON THE DISCIPLINARY POWERS OVER SC JUSTICES

Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution

The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Section 1, Rule I of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
These Rules shall apply to all proceedings for impeachment in the House of Representatives
against the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman for culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes or betrayal of public trust.

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDING AGAINST SC JUSTICES

Article XI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution

(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting
for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section.

SALIENT FEATURES ON RULES OF PROCEDURE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

- Any citizen with an endorsement of a member of the House of Representative may file
charges.
- The House Committee on Justice will decide by majority vote if the complaint

6
 ● has substance.
● sufficient in form.
● sufficient in grounds.
● probable cause in the complaint.

- The House Committee will refer it to House Plenary that will be voted upon with at least
one-third votes

● If the vote passes, the complaint will become the "Articles of Impeachment" and the House
will appoint prosecutors who may or may not be members of the House, they will be
headed by the Chairman of House Committee on Justice
● If the vote fails in any part of the procedure, the official accused can't be filed for
impeachment for one calendar year.

- The Senate will then try to convict the impeached official. Conviction requires a two-thirds
vote.
- If convicted, there are two punishments the Senate can mete out:

● Censure or a reprimand, or
● Removal from office and prohibition to hold any governmental office

DILEMMA ON CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO CASE

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject
act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or
omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official
cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to
disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
RULING ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES: 3

Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto against Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
- YES.
a. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section 5, Article VIII
of the Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo
warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the
venue for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when
commenced by the Solicitor General. While the hierarchy of courts serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified
considering that the qualification of a Member of the Court is in question, and the
issue is of public concern. The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental
importance. The instant petition is one of first impression and of paramount
importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and
appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are
being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto.
b. On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such that a quo
warranto petition cannot prosper, the Court held that the origin, nature and purpose
of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different. While both

3Quo Warranto Case Against CJ Sereno DIGEST: SUPREME COURT DECISION The digest prepared by the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law

7
 impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the
two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are
political in nature; while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding
traditionally lodged in the courts.

DOCTRINES/JURISPRUDENCE

AGAINST JUDGES4
Administrative complaint against — A party’s recourse, if prejudiced by a judge’s orders in the
course of a trial, is with the proper reviewing court and not with the OCA, through an administrative
complaint. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

— An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed
aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available; a judge cannot be civilly,
criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, provided he acts
in good faith. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

— Ordinary remedies and extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities, enumerated;

disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory
of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with
finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed; application. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467,
Oct. 18, 2017)

Bribery — Whether direct or indirect, can seriously affect the public’s trust in every subdivision
and agency of government, more so in the judiciary. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge
Alinea, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574, Nov. 07, 2017)

Code of Judicial Conduct — A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities,

maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel; a judge should organize and
supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require
at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. (Re: Report on the
Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the RTC, Br. 170, Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-
RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

— Requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times in order to preserve public confidence in
the judiciary. (OCA vs. Judge Buyucan, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854, July 11, 2017)

Conduct — Mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is insufficient because bias and
partiality can never be presumed; bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment is adverse to a party. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct.
18, 2017)

Conduct unbecoming of a judge –– Judges must at all times conduct themselves in a manner
beyond reproach to ensure the public’s continued confidence in the judiciary; the judge’s act of
attempting to sell rice to his employees and to employees of other branches was highly improper;
imposable penalty. (Mendoza vs. Hon. Diasen, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900, Aug. 09, 2017)

Direct bribery — Involves the act of a public officer in accepting an offer or promise, or receiving
a gift, by himself or another, with a view to perform a crime or an unjust act, or commit an omission,
which is connected to his official duties; it is a crime involving moral turpitude, an act which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, and involves an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in

4 Supreme Court of the Philippines Case Index 2017

8
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman,
or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, and which renders any person
convicted of the said offense unfit to continue discharging his duties as a public official or a lawyer.
(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Alinea, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574, Nov. 07, 2017)

Discipline of — A disciplinary case against a judge or justice brought before the Supreme Court
is an administrative proceeding; it is subject to the rules and principles governing administrative
procedures. (Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017)

— Proceedings for the discipline of judges and justices of lower courts may be instituted in
three ways: by the Supreme Court motu proprio, through a verified complaint, and through an
anonymous complaint; a verified complaint must be supported by affidavits of persons who have
personal knowledge of the facts alleged or by documents which may substantiate the allegations;
an anonymous complaint, on the other hand, should be supported by public records of indubitable
integrity; while anonymous complaints should always be treated with great caution, the anonymity
of the complaint does not, in itself, justify its outright dismissal. (Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge
Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017)

Duties — As the administrative officer who has authority over the office of the clerk of court,
judges should be familiar with the different circulars of the Court as his duty is not confined to
adjudicatory functions, but includes the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising
the court personnel to secure a prompt and efficient dispatch of business. (OCA vs. Judge
Buyucan, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854, July 11, 2017)

— Includes the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising the court personnel
to secure a prompt and efficient dispatch of business; it is his responsibility to see to it that the
clerk of court performs his duties and observes the circulars issued by the Supreme Court.
(OCA vs. Judge Buyucan, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854, July 11, 2017)

— Should exercise judicial temperament in all dealings and must maintain composure and
equanimity at all times. (OCA vs. Judge Buyucan, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854, July 11, 2017)

— The acting judge may no longer promulgate decisions when the regular judge has already
assumed the position; Circular No. 5-98, however, provides an exception, i.e., the acting judge,
despite the assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge,
shall decide cases which are already submitted for decision at the time of the latter’s assumption
or designation. (Chua vs. People, G.R. No. 195248, Nov. 22, 2017)

— The judge must, at all times, remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala and should
adopt a firm policy against improvident postponements; importantly, he should follow the time limit
set for deciding cases. (Sps. Sibay vs. Sps. Bermudez, G.R. No. 198196, July 17, 2017)

Grave misconduct — Misconduct is considered grave where the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present. (Anonymous
Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017)

— Wanton disregard and mockery of the proper procedure in mediation of cases, as correctly
held by the OCA, was tantamount to misconduct; the misconduct committed by the judge was
grave since the circumstances obtaining established her flagrant disregard of the rules on referral
of cases for mediation. (Re: Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah Bandong, former
Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507, Oct. 09,
2017)

Gross ignorance of the law — A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where
the case is pending but approves an application for bail filed by an accused not arrested is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law; for purposes of determining whether or not the accused is in custody
of the law, the mode required is arrest, not voluntary surrender, before a judge of another
province, city, or municipality may grant a bail application; it is gross ignorance of the law if a
judge grants an application for bail in a criminal case outside of his or her jurisdiction without

9
ascertaining the absence or unavailability of the judge of the court where the criminal case is
pending. (Prosecutor Tejano vs. Presiding Judge Marigomen, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, Sept. 26,
2017)

— A serious charge, punishable by dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more
than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. (Recto vs. Hon. Trocino, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508,
Nov. 07, 2017)

— Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court;
under Sec. 11(A) thereof, it is punishable by: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits
except accrued leave credits and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office; (2) suspension from office without salary or other benefits for more than three (3) months
but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00. (Alfelor vs. Hon. Diaz, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883, July 11, 2017)

— The disregard of the basic rules and settled jurisprudence; a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply the law when the law or a rule is basic and the facts are evident; not to know it or to
act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Recto vs. Hon. Trocino,
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508, Nov. 07, 2017)

— The fact that he had served more than 21 years in the judiciary meant that he should have
known better than to haphazardly render a decision in a criminal case without regard to the
specific allegations in the offense charged and his jurisdiction, or lack thereof, to take cognizance
of the case. (Alfelor vs. Hon. Diaz, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883, July 11, 2017)

— There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross or
patent, deliberate or malicious; it may also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or
fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption;
gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.
(Alfelor vs. Hon. Diaz, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883, July 11, 2017)

Gross negligence –– The leniency of a judge in the administrative supervision of his employees
is an undesirable trait; the judge’s failure to meet the exacting standards of his position, as
evidenced by the number and different irregularities discovered to have been occurring in his
court, as well as his failure to eliminate these irregularities, establish that he was grossly negligent
in the performance of his duties. (OCA vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Aug.
01, 2017)

Immorality — A judge was dismissed from service for siring a child outside of wedlock and for
engaging in an extramarital affair; the absence of a public and private dichotomy when it comes
to the ethical standards expected of judges and justices has since become an unyielding doctrine
as consistently applied by the Supreme Court. (Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M.
No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017)

— Immorality is a valid ground for sanctioning members of the Judiciary because it: (1)
challenges his or her capacity to dispense justice; (2) erodes the faith and confidence of the public
in the administration of justice; and (3) impacts the Judiciary’s legitimacy; while a disciplinary case
for immorality may proceed even without the participation of the spouse, the children or the
alleged paramour, steps must be taken to protect their decision not to air out their grievances in
administrative proceedings before us. (Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-
16-1886, July 25, 2017)

Liability of — A judge becomes liable for gross ignorance of the law when there is a patent
disregard for well-known rules so as to produce an inference of bad faith, dishonesty and
corruption. (Erice vs. Presiding Judge Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407, Nov. 22, 2017)

— Absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action; as in the case of
disciplinary action of lawyers, acquittal of criminal charges is not a bar to administrative

10
proceedings; Supreme Court has reminded judges that their acts of immorality are proscribed and
punished, even if committed in their private life and outside of their salas, because such acts
erode the faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice and in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. (Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886,
July 25, 2017)

— Penalty may be increased where the judge had been previously found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. (Prosecutor Tejano vs. Presiding Judge Marigomen, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492,
Sept. 26, 2017)

— To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or
incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that
his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice; absent such proof, the judge is presumed to have acted in good faith in
exercising his judicial functions. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the
RTC, Br. 170, Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

— Use of an improvised system of counting the applicants (instead of the applications) in the
special raffle is simply unacceptable, as the Executive Judge, much less the Clerk of Court, has
absolutely no discretion to deviate from the prescribed ratio for the raffling of cases without prior
approval from this court. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the RTC, Br.
170, Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

Misconduct — A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public office; the misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of
the Spot Audit in the RTC, Br. 170, Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

Neglect of duty — Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal
from the service, even for the first offense, while simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense,
punishable by suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the
first offense. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the RTC, Br. 170,
Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

— Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want
of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences, in
so far as other persons may be affected. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit
in the RTC, Br. 170, Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary — Canon 6, Sec. 5 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that “judges shall perform all
judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness”; the speedy disposition of cases is the primary aim of the Judiciary; rationale. (Atty.
Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

Serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure — The Judge utterly
failed to decide the cases submitted for decision or resolve pending incidents within the
reglementary period as well as within the time frame that he himself fixed in the initial Action Plan;
the judicial audit team also found errors or irregularities in several orders he issued and noted
that his wife meddled or interfered with the court’s business; penalty. (Re: Judicial Audit
Conducted in the RTC, Br. 20, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, A.M. No. 14-11-350-RTC,
Dec. 05, 2017)

Simple neglect of duty — For failure to observe the procedure on the raffle of cases pursuant
to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, judge is guilty of simple neglect of duty which is defined as the failure to
give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference; simple

11
neglect of duty is listed as one of the less grave offenses. (Ferrer, Jr. vs. Judge Dating, A.M. No.
RTJ-16-2478, Nov. 08, 2017)

Undue delay in rendering a decision or order — Every judge should decide cases with
dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for
delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary,
lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute; failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration
within the 30-day reglementary period is not excusable and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions upon him. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467,
Oct. 18, 2017)

— If the judge found himself unable to comply with the mandatory 30-day reglementary period
for resolving the Motion for Reconsideration, he could have asked the Court for a reasonable
extension of time to do so, but he made no such request; a judge cannot by himself choose to
prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge
Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

— The 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory; failure of a judge to decide a
case within the prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a
disciplinary sanction; the Court has allowed reasonable extensions of time needed to decide
cases, but such extensions must first be requested from the Court; penalty. (Fajardo vs. Judge
Natino, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2479, Dec. 13, 2017)

— Undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge; penalty. (Atty.
Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

Violation of Supreme Court Circulars, Rules and Directives — In Executive Judge Apita v.
Estanislao, the Court had the occasion to explain that: While the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks
of Court which defines the general functions of all court personnel in the judiciary provides that
court personnel may perform other duties the presiding judge may assign from time to time, said
additional duties must be directly related to, and must not significantly vary from, the court
personnel’s job description; Sec. 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
expressly states that court personnel shall not be required to perform any work outside the scope
of their job description. (Re: Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah Bandong, former
Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507, Oct. 09,
2017)

Administrative complaint against — A mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is
insufficient because bias and partiality can never be presumed; since bad faith or malice cannot
be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party, it is incumbent upon the
complainants to prove that respondent judge was manifestly partial against them. (Biado vs. Hon.
Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891, Feb. 15, 2017)
— An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a Judge deemed
aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available; it must be underscored that
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action; he cannot be civilly,
criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, provided he acts
in good faith. (Biado vs. Hon. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891, Feb. 15, 2017)
— Awards for outstanding performances as a professional and as a judge, far from accenting
her good qualities as a person, rather highlighted her unworthiness to remain on the Bench by
showing that her misconduct and general bad attitude as a member thereof has put the awards
and recognitions in serious question. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No.
MTJ-12-1813, Mar. 14, 2017)
— Good faith implies the lack of any intention to commit a wrongdoing; based on the totality
of respondent’s acts and actuations, her claims of good faith and lack of intent to commit a wrong
cannot be probable. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, Mar.
14, 2017)

12
— It is well-settled that “in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondents
committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant; extrinsic evidence is required to
establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be
inferred from the decision or order itself.” (Rizalado vs. Judge Bollozos, OCA IPI No. 11-3800-
RTJ, June 19, 2017)
— Misdemeanor as a member of the bench could also cause expulsion from the legal
profession through disbarment. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-
12-1813, Mar. 14, 2017)
— Respondent voluntarily waived her right to be present and to confront the complainants and
their witnesses and evidence during the administrative investigation. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, Mar. 14, 2017)
— The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions
of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial
remedy exists. (Rizalado vs. Judge Bollozos, OCA IPI No. 11-3800-RTJ, June 19, 2017)
— Voluminous records of cases constituted proof of administrative wrongdoings and sufficed
to warrant the supreme action of respondent’s removal from the judiciary. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, Mar. 14, 2017)
Archiving of a criminal case –– A.C. No. 7-A-92 enumerated the circumstances when a
judge may order the archiving of a criminal case as follows: (a) If after the issuance of the warrant
of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from the delivery of the warrant to the
proper peace officer, and the latter has explained the reason why the accused was not
apprehended; or (b) When proceedings are ordered suspended for an indefinite period because:
(1) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently, or to
undergo trial, and he has to be committed to a mental hospital; (2) a valid prejudicial question in
a civil action is invoked during the pendency of the criminal case unless the civil and the criminal
cases are consolidated; 3) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated to,
and is pending resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has issued
a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction; and 4) when the accused has
jumped bail before arraignment and cannot be arrested by his bondsman. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon.
Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)
Bias and partiality — The totality of the circumstances and the actuations of the respondent
judge attendant to the case, clearly lead to the inescapable conclusion that the respondent judge
evidently favoured a party is a clear indicium of bias and partiality that calls for a severe
administrative sanction. (Dr. Sunico vs. Judge Gutierrez, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457, Feb. 21, 2017)
Conduct of –– A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause; that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No.
RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)
–– Although a motion to dismiss the case or withdraw the Information is addressed to the court,
its grant or denial must always be in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative; for
the judge’s action must neither impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the
State and the offended party to due process of law. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M.
No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)
–– Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence; they are likewise mandated to be faithful to the law and to maintain
professional competence at all times. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-
2472, Jan. 24, 2017)
–– Courtesy is likewise expected of him, in his conduct and language, towards his
subordinates; the use of vile and demeaning words should be completely avoided. (Judge
Barcena vs. Clerk of Court II Abadilla, A.M. No. P-16-3564, Jan. 24, 2017)

13
–– Judges are duty bound to render just, correct and impartial decisions at all times in a
manner free of any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality or integrity; public confidence in the
Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges; the appearance of bias or
prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias
or prejudice. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)
— Presiding judges of all trial courts are mandated to wear a judicial robe during court
sessions; penalty for violation. (Mclaren vs. Hon. Gonzales, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1876, April 26,
2017)
— Public confidence in the judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel conduct
themselves in a dignified manner befitting the public office they are holding; judges should avoid
conduct or any demeanor that may tarnish or diminish the authority of the Supreme Court. (Re:
Findings on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet,
A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC, Mar. 07, 2017)
— Undue delay in the disposition of cases and motions erodes the faith and confidence of the
people in the judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes its stature. (Marcelo-Mendoza vs. Peroxide
Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 203492, April 24, 2017)
— The act of a judge of demanding for complainant’s firearms and in an aggressive manner
effectively harassed the already nervous police officer; regardless of the reason or motive behind
the altercation, a judge should observe judicial temperament which requires him to be always
temperate, patient, and courteous, both in conduct and in language; penalty. (PO1
Marcelo vs. Judge Barcillano, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2450, June 07, 2017)
Delay in rendering a decision — A judge is expected to keep his own listing of cases and to
note therein the status of each case so that they may be acted upon accordingly and without
delay; he must adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to monitor
the flow of cases for a prompt and effective dispatch of business. (Gamboa-Roces vs. Judge
Perez, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1887, Jan. 09, 2017)
— Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith
and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute;
failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. (Re:
Findings on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet,
A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC, Mar. 7, 2017)
— Judges and clerks of court should personally conduct a physical inventory of the pending
cases in their courts and personally examine the records of each case at the time of their
assumption to office and every semester thereafter; judges should know which cases are
submitted for decision and are expected to keep their own record of cases so that they may act
on them promptly. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-
2219, Mar. 07, 2017)
— Lower courts have three months within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted
to them for resolution; guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 provides, inter alia, that
judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Art. VIII, Sec. 15, of the Constitution
for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts; all cases or
matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower
collegiate courts, while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so. (Office
of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)
Duties — Judges are expected to closely follow the development of cases and in this respect to
keep their own record of cases so that they may act on them promptly. (Rapsing vs. Judge Walse-
Lutero, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894, April 04, 2017)
— While domestic concerns deserve some consideration from the Supreme Court, such
circumstances could only mitigate the liability of the respondent judge. (Rapsing vs. Judge Walse-
Lutero, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894, April 04, 2017)

14
Gross ignorance of the law — Gross ignorance transcends a simple error in the application of
legal provisions; in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous; to
be liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed orders of a judge, who acts in his official
capacity, should not only be erroneous; it must be established that his actuation was attended by
bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or other similar motive. (Biado vs. Hon. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No.
MTJ-17-1891, Feb. 15, 2017)
— Not every error or mistake committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions
renders him liable, unless his act was tainted with bad faith or a deliberate intent to do an injustice;
to hold a judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed decision, order
or act of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing
law or jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption on
his part. (Ortega, Jr. vs. Judge Dacara, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2423, Jan. 11, 2017)
— Respondent judge manifested gross ignorance of the law as to the propriety or impropriety
of issuing a writ of preliminary injunction despite absence of basis in fact and in law. (Dr.
Sunico vs. Judge Gutierrez, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457, Feb. 21, 2017)
— Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules and that when
committed in good faith does not warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment; when the law or the rule is so elementary, not to
be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Dr.
Sunico vs. Judge Gutierrez, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457, Feb. 21, 2017)
Gross inefficiency — An inexcusable failure to decide a case or motion constitutes gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office
without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. (Dr. Sunico vs. Judge Gutierrez, A.M. No. RTJ-16-
2457, Feb. 21, 2017)
— Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate.
(Re: Findings on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, La Trinidad,
Benguet, A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC, Mar. 07, 2017)
— Failure to decide cases that were the subject of requests for extension of time to dispose
constitutes gross inefficiency; fine of ₱100,000.00, imposed. (Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Judge Aventurado, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212, April 18, 2017)
— On delay in rendering judgment, Sec. 15(1) and (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides
that all cases and matters must be decided or resolved by the lower courts within three months
from the date of submission of the last pleading; Sec. 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates judges to “perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness”; also, Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to dispose of the court’s business
promptly and to decide cases within the required periods. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)
Gross misconduct — Violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a case of; penalty.
(Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint vs. Judge Divina T. Samson, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Mabini-Pantukan, Compostela Valley, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1870, June 06, 2017)
Gross neglect of duty — Gross neglect of duty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal; the
penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service examinations.
(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07,
2017)
— Gross neglect of duty refers to negligence that is characterized by a glaring want of care;
by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully
and intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to consequences with respect to other
persons who may be affected; it is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property; in cases involving public officials, there is gross

15
negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)
Gross violation of Administrative Circular No. 43-2004 —When committed; fine of
₱100,000.00, imposed; the Administrative Circular required, among others, that the judge
applying for optional retirement should already cease working and discharging his functions as
judge even if on the date specified in the application as the date of the effectivity of the optional
retirement, he has not yet received any notice of approval or denial of his application. (Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Judge Aventurado, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212, April 18, 2017)
Incompetence –– When the inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental
a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties, the judge is either insufferably incompetent and
undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon.
Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)
Judicial clemency — Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the
erring judge; it can be granted only if there is a showing that it is merited; thus, proof of reformation
and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable;judicial clemency is not a privilege or
a right that can be availed of at any time, as the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it
is merited; clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with
the preservation of public confidence in the courts. (Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Presiding
Judge Villalon-Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, Feb. 14, 2017)
— Requirements to grant judicial clemency: 1. There must be proof of remorse and
reformation; these shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity; a subsequent finding of
guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation; 2. sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the
penalty to ensure a period of reformation; 3. the age of the person asking for clemency must show
that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance
to redeem himself; 4. there must be a showing of promise such as intellectual aptitude, learning
or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills, as well as potential for public service; and 5. there must
be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. (Concerned Lawyers of
Bulacan vs. Presiding Judge Villalon-Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, Feb. 14, 2017)
Liability of –– Although judges are generally not accountable for erroneous judgments rendered
in good faith, such defense in situations of infallible discretion adheres only within the parameters
of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the basic issues are so simple and the applicable
legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error. (Judge
Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)
— Cessation from office by reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to
dismiss the case filed against her at the time that she was still in the public service. (Re: Findings
on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, A.M. No.
14-10-339-RTC, Mar. 07, 2017)
— Judges cannot be excused by the acts of their subordinates because court employees are
not the guardians of a judge’s responsibility; judges should not merely rely on their court staff for
the proper management of the court’s business; being in legal contemplation the head of his
branch, he was the master of his own domain who should be ready and willing to take the
responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects, as well as to be ultimately responsible for order and
efficiency in his court. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-
10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)
— Making a drawing of a vagina and a penis and thereafter showing it to an employee of the
court of which he is an officer constitutes sexual harassment; it is an act that constitutes a physical
behavior of a sexual nature; a gesture with lewd insinuation. (Judge Arabani, Jr. vs. Arabani, A.M.
No. SCC-10-14-P, Feb. 21, 2017)

16
–– When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything
less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon.
Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)
New Code of Judicial Conduct — Enjoins the judges to devote their professional activity to
judicial duties and to perform them, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly,
and with reasonable promptness. (Gamboa-Roces vs. Judge Perez, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1887, Jan.
09, 2017)
— Judges are charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and
official documents in their custody are intact; they must adopt a system of record management
and organize their dockets to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business. (Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)
— Sec. 3, Canon 2 of the New Code of JudicialConduct provides: Sec. 3. Judges should take
or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may have become aware; the judge should have caused the
investigation of the unprofessional conduct committed by the court personnel under his
supervision. (Anonymous vs. Namol, A.M. No. P-16-3614, June 20, 2017)

JUSTICES5
Inhibition of –– Mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially
when the charge is without basis; respondent’s motion to require the inhibition of the Justices,
who all concurred to the main Decision, would open the floodgates to the worst kind of forum
shopping, and on its face, would allow respondent to shop for a Member of the Court who she
perceives to be more compassionate and friendly to her cause, and is clearly antithetical to the
fair administration of justice. (Rep. of the Phils. vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018)

JUDGES AND JUSTICES6

Administrative complaints –– Administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and
special courts as well as justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (1) by the
Supreme Court motu proprio;(2) upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who
have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate
said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with Attached Pictures) Against Associate Justice
Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)
–– Circular No. 4 issued by the Court on 27 August 1980 provides that the attention of the
Court has been invited to the presence of some judges in gambling casinos operating under P.D.
No. 1067-B; it reads as follows: (3-b) persons not allowed to play (a) government officials
connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its agencies; in accordance with
law and pursuant to the Resolution of the Court en banc in A.M. No. 1544-0, dated August 21,
1980, judges of inferior courts and the court personnel are enjoined from playing in or being
present in gambling casinos. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with Attached Pictures) Against
Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13,
2018)
–– The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary
must be accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of flimsy
and virtually unsubstantiated charges against them; this is consistent with the rule that in
administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their
complaints by substantial evidence; if they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or defense.
(Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with Attached Pictures) Against Associate Justice Normandie
B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018) –– The term “government

5 Supreme Court of the Philippines Case Index 2018

6 Supreme Court of the Philippines Case Index 2018

17
official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies” refers to any
person employed by the government whose tasks is the performance and exercise of any of the
functions and powers of such government or any agency thereof, as conferred on them by law,
without any intervening agency; a government official connected directly to the operation of the
government or any of its agencies is a government officer who performs the functions of the
government on his own judgment or discretion essentially, a government officer under Sec. 2(14)
of E.O. No. 292. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with Attached Pictures) Against Associate
Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)

18
 PART 2. Disciplinary Actions Against Lawyers

Legal Ethics has been defined as a branch of moral science which treats of the duties which an
attorney owes to the court, to his client, to his colleagues in the profession, and to the public.
Legal Ethics ensures that the utmost integrity and dignity accorded to lawyers will be upheld. It
also protects the society and the justice system from any abuses to the profession which may be
in the form of unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Furthermore, it raises the
standard of the legal profession because it sets out what is expected of a lawyer as well as the
corresponding consequences for non-performance of the duty.
Legal Ethics provides the duties and responsibilities of a lawyer as set out in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Code specifies the duties of a lawyer toward the society, the
legal profession, the court, and to his client. What then happens when the duties expected of a
lawyer are not met? What are the consequences of the violations of the Canons?
A lawyer may be held civilly or criminally liable. He may be civilly liable if the following requisites
are present: 1) attorney-client relationship, 2) want of reasonable care and diligence by lawyer,
and 3) injury sustained by client as a proximate result of the lawyer’s negligence. On the other
hand, he may be criminally liable if he commits either: 1) causing prejudice to client through
malicious breach of professional duty or thru inexcusable negligence or ignorance, or 2) revealing
client’s secrets learned in his professional capacity through malicious breach of professional duty
or inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
In addition to being either civilly or criminally liable, a lawyer may also be held in contempt of
court. This may be in the form of direct contempt – which means the act is committed in the
presence of or near a court, or through indirect contempt – which means that the act is not
committed within the presence of the court. The court’s power to punish contempt has two-fold
aspects: 1) for the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order,
and 2) to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he
refuses to perform.
In line with this, it can be said that membership to the Bar may be taken away or suspended from
the lawyer.

NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LAWYERS

SUI GENERIS
The disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. It means that there are no other
proceedings similar to disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. These proceedings are neither
purely civil nor purely criminal. It does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but it is one of an
investigation conducted by the Court into the conduct of the lawyers and judges. It is not a civil
action because what is involved is public interest. A real party-in-interest is not required and there
can be no redress for private grievance. It is also not intended to inflict punishment and as such,
not a criminal prosecution. The real question for determination is whether the attorney still
deserves the privileges of being one.
Illustrative Cases:
Ylaya v. Gacott
A.C. No. 6475, January 30, 2013
DOCTRINE: The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. Flowing from its sui generis character, it is
not mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant must adduce evidence.
FACTS:
Complainant Fe Ylaya claims that she owns two parcels of land in Puerto Princesa city. Before
they acquired the properties, it was already the subject of expropriation proceedings against its
previous owner, Cirilo Arellano. Respondent Atty. Glen Gacott represented Ylaya and her

19
husband. Ylaya claims that Gacott asked them to sign a “preparatory deed of sale” for their
property, but the space for the name of the buyer and the amount was left blank. Using the “deed”,
Gacott defrauded Ylaya and her husband by converting said deed into a Deed of Absolute Sale,
selling the property to Spouses So for P200,000. However, Ylaya claims that she had not received
said amount nor would they agree to selling the property for that low considering that she was
supposed to get P6M as just compensation. As such, complainant filed a disbarment case against
Gacott. The IBP Board of Governors ruled for the suspension of Gacott upon finding that he
violated several provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Gacott now claims that his
right to due process was violated because IBP concluded that the Deed was pre-signed and
fraudulently notarized without requiring complainant Ylaya to adduce evidence in formal hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP violated Gacott’s right to due process
HELD:
The Court ruled that IBP did not violate Gacott’s right to due process. Although Gacott was not
able to confront Ylaya face-to-face in the mandatory conference, she was able to fully participate
during the entire proceedings. She even submitted numerous pleadings before the IBP. As such,
she was given the chance to be heard. Her right to due process is not deemed to have been
violated.
The Court further added that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that they
are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. In the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney.
Furthermore, the complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. Flowing from its sui generis character, it is
not mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant must adduce evidence. From
all these, the Court stressed that the complainant is not indispensable to the disciplinary
proceedings and her failure to appear for cross-examination or to provide corroborative evidence
of her allegations is of no merit. What is important is whether, upon due investigation, the IBP
Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondent's misconduct to warrant the
exercise of its disciplinary powers.

Bernaldez v. Anquilo-Garcia
A.C. No. 8698, August 31, 2016
DOCTRINE: Because of the sui generis nature of administrative proceedings against lawyer,
these may proceed independently of the election case pending against the same person. There
is no need to await the final resolution of the election protest filed by the complainant before the
instant disbarment case may be acted upon.
FACTS:
Complainant Manuel Bernaldez claims that during the 2010 National and Local Elections,
respondent-attorney coerced and threated the registered voters in the Municipality of Biri,
Northern Samar to sign blank and ready-made affidavits stating that they were illiterate/disabled
voters when in reality, they were not. Bernaldez claims that Anquilo-Garcia did so in order to
ensure that her husband, Jaime Garcia, Jr., would win as mayor in the municipality. Bernaldez
charged respondent with gross misconduct, deceit, violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and abuse of
authority as notary public.
The court referred the case to the IBP for investigation. The IBP Commissioner sought to dismiss
the case against respondent because the alleged irregularities perpetrated by Atty. Anquilo-
Garcia are the subject of the election protest filed by the complainant before the RTC and made

20
subject of this disbarment case. Thus, it is premature to rule on the administrative liability of Atty.
Anquilo- Garcia pending resolution of the election protest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the disbarment case against respondent should be dismissed for being premature
HELD:
The Court ruled that the disbarment case should not be dismissed for reason of prematurity.
Because of the sui generis nature of administrative proceedings against lawyers, the present case
is distinct from and may proceed independently of the election case. E.P. Case No. 38 refers to
an election contest involving fraud or irregularities committed in the conduct of the elections, while
the present disbarment case seeks to discipline Atty. Anquilo-Garcia as a lawyer for her alleged
gross misconduct, deceit, violation of her oath as a lawyer, and abuse of authority as notary public.
Thus, there is no need to await the final resolution of the election protest filed by the complainant
before the instant disbarment case may be acted upon.
A COMPLAINANT IS NOT INDISPENSABLE TO THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In disbarment cases, the complainant is not a direct party to the case but rather, he is a witness
who brought the matter before the Court. There is also no need for a formal hearing where the
complainant is required to adduce evidence. What is only necessary is that the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondent’s misconduct to
warrant the exercise of disciplinary powers.
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS ARE CONFIDENTIAL
The disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are considered private and confidential until its final
determination. The reason for confidentiality is that: 1) to protect the personal and professional
reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible persons
or clients, 2) to enable the court and the investigator to make the investigation free from any
extraneous influence or interference and administrative case or portion thereto without authority,
and 3) to deter the press from publishing the charges or proceedings involved.
The Court ruled in Fortun v. Quinsayas that Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on
confidentiality is not a restriction on the right of the press. In these kinds of proceedings, there is
no legitimate public interest. As such, the media must preserve its confidentiality.
Illustrative Case:
Tan v. Carpio Morales
G.R. No. 173940, September 5, 2006
DOCTRINE: The confidential nature of the proceedings has a three-fold purpose, to wit: (i) to
enable the court and the investigator to make the investigation free from any extraneous influence
or interference; (ii) to protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless
charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting the
publication of such charges pending their resolution; and (iii) to deter the press from publishing
the charges or proceedings based thereon.
FACTS:
Petitioner Tomas Tan, a stockholder and director of co-petitioner CST Enterprises, learned that
two parcels of land of the corporation were used to obtain loans from the Philippine Business
Bank. The loans were mortgaged by a certain John Chua who was representing CST. Chua was
allegedly able to do so because he has been authorized by the Board of Directors of the
corporation as shown by the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate signed by respondent Atty. Jaime
N. Soriano. They claim that Soriano has never been elected as corporate secretary nor was he
authorized to act as such for CST Enterprises. During the course of the proceedings, petitioners
claim that they were able to gather more information and saw the “extent of the plot or
machinations” by respondent Soriano. Subsequently, respondent Soriano claims that petitioners
breached the rule that proceedings against attorneys should be kept private and confidential when
they disclosed the contents of his Verified Answer filed before the Commission, quoting in
verbatim the contents. This had the effect of announcing to the whole world the pending

21
disbarment case, respondent stresses, and is meant to harass and vex him, as well as to damage
his reputation even before a nal verdict is reached by the Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confidentiality rule of proceedings against attorneys was violated in the case
at bar
HELD:
The Court ruled that the confidential nature of the disbarment proceedings against Soriano has
been violated by petitioners. Disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are private and confidential
until its final determination. The confidential nature of the proceedings has a three-fold purpose,
to wit: (i) to enable the court and the investigator to make the investigation free from any
extraneous influence or interference; (ii) to protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys from baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons or clients by
prohibiting the publication of such charges pending their resolution; and (iii) to deter the press
from publishing the charges or proceedings based thereon.
In the case at bar, petitioners lifted and cited most of the amendatory averments in respondent's
Verified Answer in the administrative case as the core of their Amended Complaint in the civil
case. Petitioners had in effect announced to the world the pending disbarment case against
respondent. Not only did they disclose the ongoing proceedings, they also divulged most, if not
all of the contents of respondent's Verified Answer.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT APPLY
Double jeopardy is not a defense since disbarment proceedings do not partake of a criminal
proceeding.
DISBARMENT AS A PENALTY
Penalty in a disbarment proceeding cannot be in the alternative.
PRESCRIPTION
Prescription cannot be a defense in administrative proceedings against lawyer because the
administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe. This is in order to ensure
that the members of the bar would not be tempted to disregard the oath they took stemming from
the fact that as long as there is no private complainant that would come forward against them,
they can be exonerated from the administrative liability in which they should answer for.
Illustrative Case:
Calo v. Degamo
A.C. 516, June 27, 1967
DOCTRINE: The rule is that the ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment
proceedings.
FACTS:
Petitioner Tranquilino Calo filed a disbarment proceeding against respondent Esteban Degamo
for making a false statement under oath in connection with his appointment as Chief of Police in
Carmen, Agusan. Degamo allegedly swore that there was no criminal or police record against
him when in reality, there was a criminal case for illegal possession of explosive powder pending
against him. Prior to this, he was also charged for perjury. Subsequently, the Solicitor General
filed his report and recommended the disbarment of Degamo for gross misconduct. Respondent
Degamo now claims that defense of prescription. The complaint was filed on 1962 while the act
was committed on 1959.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of prescription by Degamo may prosper
HELD:

22
The Court ruled that Degamo’s defense cannot prosper. The rule is that the ordinary statutes of
limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts
set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in an original
proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding.

RES IPSA LOQUITOR

The Court ruled in Prudential Bank v. Judge Castro that a lawyer may be disbarred even without
an investigation after considering his actions based on records which showed his unethical
misconduct. Cases that are sufficient enough to serve as basis for the determination of a lawyer’s
administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter can be relied upon by the
Court, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor.
In this instance, if the facts of the record can sufficiently serve as basis for the lawyer’s
administrative liability, he may be disciplined or disbarred by the Supreme Court without need for
further inquiry or investigation under the principle of res ipsa loquitor.
Illustrative Case:
The Christian Spiritists v. Mangallay
A.C. No. 10483, March 16, 2016
DOCTRINE: The referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be
decided on the basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the
conduct of formal investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the
protraction of the investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be
directed at the outset should the Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit.
FACTS:
The local minister of petitioner, Edwin Pante, claims that petitioner constructed its church building
on a land in Benguet, which was then owned by Maria Omiles. Subsequently, they received
summons requiring them to answer the complaint for unlawful detainer filed against them by
respondent Atty. Daniel Mangallay. Mangallay claims that he owns the land as evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale executed between him and a certain Pedro Loy. The MTC ruled in
Mangallay’s favor and said that he had a better right of possession over the land. Respondent
was able to obtain a writ of execution issued by the MTC after the petitioners and Pante did not
fulfill their promise of voluntarily vacate and surrendering the premises to respondent. Afterwards,
the writ of execution and writ of demotion were implemented.
Pante now asserts that the demolition proceeded even without a demolition order from the MTC.
To add, the dismantled materials were forcibly taken by Mangallay, who used his legal knowledge
to cause the premature demolition of the structure even without an order. Pante also claims that
respondent’s act of taking away the dismantled materials constituted robbery and malicious
mischief. For such, he must be disbarred.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Mangallay should be disbarred
HELD:
The Court ruled that Mangallay should not be disbarred based on the complaint filed by petitioner.
The administrative complaints against attorneys are generally not dismissed outright but are
instead referred for investigation, report and recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the Court or even a judge of a lower court. Such referral
ensures that the parties' right to due process is respected as to matters that require further inquiry
and which cannot be resolved by the mere evaluation of the documents attached to the pleadings.
Consequently, whenever the referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or other authorized
office or individual must conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint, and this
investigation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for valid and
compelling reasons because it serves the purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that no
cursory evaluation of the pleadings can determine.

23
However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be decided
on the basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the conduct
of formal investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction of the
investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be directed at the outset
should the Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit.
It is for this reason that the Court chose to dispense with the need to refer the complaint against
the respondent to the IBP for the conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he submitted
to substantiate his denial of professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and,
as such, are sufficient to establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful
entitlement to the demolition of the structures of the defendants in Civil Case No. R-1256.

DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS OR DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LAWYERS MAY BE

INITIATED MOTU PROPRIO
The Court may act on its own motion and initiate the proceedings against the lawyer. This is
because the proceedings for disbarment of members of the bar are not, in any sense, a civil action
where there should be a plaintiff, and the respondent is the defendant. In line with this, the Court
may also investigate the conduct of its own officers so as to protect the general public and promote
the purity of the administration of justice.

FORMS OF DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AGAINST A LAWYER

Disbarment – An act of the Philippine Supreme Court in which it withdraws the right to practice
law from an attorney. His name then is stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys.
Reprimand – It is a public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person at fault
by his superior officer or the body to which he belongs.
Admonition – It is a gentle or friendly reminder, mild rebuke, warning, reminder, or counseling on
a lawyer’s fault, error or oversight.
Warning – An act or fact of putting guard against any impending danger, evil consequence or
penalty.
Probation – Sanction which allows a lawyer to still practice law under specific conditions.
Interim Suspension – It is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pending
an imposition of final discipline against him.
Censure – It is an official reprimand
Suspension – It is the temporary withholding of the lawyer’s right to practice law for a certain
period or for an indefinite period of time.
GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT
Violation of Lawyer’s Oath
Statutory grounds in Sec. 27, Rule 138 of Rules of Court
Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
d. Violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE)
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Sec. 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court)
Feliciano v. Bautista-Lozada,
A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015

24
FACTS:
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled
"Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada" suspending Atty. Lozada for a period
of 2 years from notice (or from 2006-2008) for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
However, on June 5, 2007, Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband,
Edilberto Lozada, in an injunction case and actively participated in the proceedings before Branch
75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted
certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6,
2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and cross-
examination of the witnesses during the trial proceedings.
In her Comment dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by
circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal
dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto
Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband
and not a client.
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Lozada should be disbarred for her willful disobedience to the resolution of the court
and appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law
HELD:
The Supreme Court adopted the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modifications.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is
part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping
hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's
actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not
representing a client but rather a spouse, the Supreme Court deem it proper to mitigate
thesevereness of her penalty.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While
the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle.
The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe
punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of
violating Section 27, 19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period
of six (6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

HOW INSTITUTED

25
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that proceedings for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
IBP upon the verified complaint of any person. (Agno v. Cagatan, A.C. No. 4515, July 14, 2008)
QUANTUM OF PROOF
However, in consideration of the gravity of the consequences of the disbarment or suspension of
a member of the bar, we have consistently held that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the
allegations in his complaint through substantial evidence.(Goopio v. Maglalang, A.C. No. 10555,
July 31, 2018)

In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is
required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken
judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified. The Court has required that
a complainant has the onus of proving the charges against respondent by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. (Caspe V. Mejica, A.C. No. 10679 (Resolution), March 10, 2015)

PROCEDURE FOR THE DISBARMENT, SUSPENSION, AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

FORMAL INVESTIGATION (SEC. 8, RULE 139-B)
Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with
deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue
subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend
himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if
upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its
commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator
shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by
the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor
to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter
conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for
hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within
a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action
and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.
SERVICE OR DISMISSAL
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, unless the Supreme Court motu proprio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors, determines that there is no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or
suspension proceedings against the respondent. (Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court
Resolution dated May 27, 1993 re Bar Matter No. 356)
RULE 139-B. DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon
the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.

26
 (b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend
to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action
against the respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.
(c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and
submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from
issuance of the resolution.
(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.
Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was given the
power to "issue a decision" if the lawyer complained of was exonerated or meted a penalty of
"less than suspension or disbarment." In addition, the case would be deemed terminated unless
an interested party filed a petition before this court.
The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the power to impose
disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
are recommendatory, subject to review by this court. ( Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis, A.C. No. 10868;
January 26, 2016)
QUIACHON V. RAMOS,
A.C. NO. 9317, JUNE 4, 2014
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Adelia V. Quiachon (complainant), against her lawyer, Atty.
Joseph Ador A. Ramos (respondent). The latter represented complainant, who was then the
plaintiff in a labor case filed before the NLRC and in a special proceeding case filed before the
RTC. Complainant charges respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation of Canon
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Comment, respondent averred that complainant was informed of the status of the case. He
claimed that he had told complainant that he "cannot cite any error of law or abuse of discretion
on the part of the Court of Appeals' decision that necessitates a Petition for Review with the
Supreme Court;" thus, he supposedly advised her to "respect the decision of the Court of
Appeals." Respondent prayed that a Decision be rendered dismissing the instant disbarment
Complaint for lack of merit.
In a Resolution, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation. During the pendency of the proceedings, complainant filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint.
IBP Commissioner Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case against respondent, even
after finding that the latter had been negligent. On the basis of this finding, the latter was declared
to have "been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being
handled by him in behalf of complainant." Still, Almeyda recommended the dismissal of the case,
because "without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding of liability." The Board
of Governors of the IBP affirmed the recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer is a valid ground for the
termination of the administrative proceeding initiated against him
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court remind the investigating commissioners and the members of the Board
of Governors of the IBP that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not
terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative
proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.
The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought
the matter to the attention of the Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary

27
proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. Public
interest is the primary objective. We explained why in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 18 viz.:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does
not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
has been duly proven . . . . The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges . . . .
In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, it should have imposed the appropriate penalty despite the
desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos is found GUILTY of negligence and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SANCTION
INDIRECT CONTEMPT
A willful failure or refusal to obey a lawful order issued by an Investigator of the IBP handling the
disciplinary proceeding constitutes indirect contempt (see Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 5 of Rule 139-
B of the ROC) subject to compliance with the rules provided
FINE AS PENALTY
In Sps. Regulto v. Teoxon (AC 10301, April 3, 2019), the Supreme Court adopted the BOG’s
recommendation to impose a fine of P5,000 for failure to comply with CBD’s directive to file a
comment to the disbarment complaint.

28
 PART 3. Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement to the Practice of Law

It is established that practice of law is a privilege imbued with public trust and interest as
granted and being exercised by the Supreme Court, it is but appropriate that the Supreme Court
should also have the power to discipline, suspend, disbar and reinstate its erring member upon
showing of reformation and rehabilitation. As provided by the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art
VIII, Sec 5 (5), the Supreme Court shall:

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."

JUDICIAL CLEMENCY

As defined in In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus Diaz, A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC, CLEMENCY as
an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is well merited.
Proof of reformation and showing of potential and promise are indispensable. (Castillo vs.
Calanog, A.M. No. RTJ-90-447)

Its primary purpose is to seek for the reinstatement, commutation of period of sentence or
removal of certain disabilities which the Supreme Court may grant to the members of the bench
and bar who seeks the compassion of the Court to be granted the privilege of being able to
practice law again. There must be a showing of clear remorse by the petitioner that he or she has
reformed and have redeemed himself/herself from his previous actions.

Forms of clemency
Reinstatement
Commutation
Lifting of disqualification

JURISPRUDENCE
a. JUDICIAL CLEMENCY Cases Involving Lawyers- JC Granted

In RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, 586 SCRA 373 (2009)
Atty. Danilo De Guzman was stripped his license to practice law for his alleged involvment
in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examination. As a consequence of his dire acts, he was later on
disbarred.
Petitioner now seeks for Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement to the Bar. Petitioner
submits various endorsements from individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral
character. A total of 14 Open Letters, Testimonial Letters and personal letters of certain
distinguished individuals were included. Citing In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he
be afforded the same kindness and compassion in order that his future may not be perpetually
foreclosed.
The Court was convinced that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected
on his transgressions. The penalty of disbarment may now be lifted and he be allowed to practice
of law. The Court further ruled that while it is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers,
it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose.

Maccarubo vs. Maccarubo (424 SCRA 42) Re: Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) of
Edmundo Macarubbo. (2013)

29
 Florence Macarrubo filed a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo
Macarrubo, alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting
marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. He was first suspended, then later on meted the
punishment of disbarment.
While the court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers,
concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed.
For resolution is the Petition for Extraordinary Mercy filed by respondent Edmundo
Macarubbo who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys. Eight years after, respondent filed
the instant Petition seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. Citing In
Re: Letter of Judge Agustus C. Diaz, the court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.
(In re: Atty. Tranquillo Rovero, A.C. No. 126, December 29, 1980, 101 SCRA 799, 801)
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledge his indiscretion in the
legal profession and in his personal life. Documents of respondent's reformed ways included
11 affidavits from persons and associations attesting to his reformed ways. At the age of 58, he
still has productive years ahead that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law
profession and the betterment of society. His petition is GRANTED.

b. JUDICIAL CLEMENCY Cases Involving Judges - JC Granted

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus Diaz, 533 SCRA 534 (2007)

Judge Diaz was an applicant for judgeship in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court
branches in Metro Manila. In connection therewith, he was interviewed by JBC. He was told to
seek judicial clemency due to the fact that he was once fined P20,000. He claims that this lapse
happened only one as a result of “oversight”. He requests judicial clemency and, in particular, that
he be allowed to “again be nominated to one of the vacant branches of the RTC of Metro Manila.
Rule 4 of the Rules of the JBC provides:
"SEC. 5.Disqualification. - The following are disqualified from being nominated for
appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
x x x
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative
case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000 unless he
has been granted judicial clemency.
X x x
As applied to the case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past
malfeasance. He humbly accepted the verdict of this Court, it is sufficient to ensure that he has
learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken
as proof of his dedication to the institution.

In re: Former Judge Ralph S. Lee, 580 SCRA 462 (2009)

The Court previously found Judge Lee, liable for undue delay in deciding cases for which
we imposed the penalty of fine of P20,000.00 He requested for judicial clemency because the
sanction imposed him precludes him from qualifying for a promotion in the Judiciary.
The Court applied the guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency laid down in
In re: Letter of Judge Augustus Diaz. The Court found these standards satisfied in the present
case based on the following reasons:

30
 First, Judge Lee in his letter expressed his deepest regrets and profound apologies to the
Court for his professional shortcomings.
Second, while only three (3) years have passed since the Court rendered the decision in
the case, Judge Lee showed his intent and the effects of his reformation within that short period
of time
Third, Judge Lee is only 51 years old and still has many productive years ahead of him to
render judicial service.
Fourth, Judge Lee has made substantial contributions to legal education.
Lastly, an exceptional catalytic factor that justifies the grant of clemency despite the lapse
of only three (3) years is the remarkable courage and bravery Judge Lee displayed during the
floods of tropical storm Ondoy in 2009 when he rescued flood victims in his neighborhood at the
risk of his own life.

In Re: Emma J. Castillo vs. Judge Manuel M. Calanog, 239 SCRA 268 (1994)
The Court in its decision on July 12, 1991 found Judge Calanog guilty of immorality and
ordered dismissed from the service "with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any
public office including a government-owned or controlled corporation, and forfeiture of retirement
benefits, if any."
As proof of his moral regeneration, Atty. Calanog alleges that he has become active in
religious and civic activities. In support of his allegations, he has submitted testimonials. Atty.
Calanog is a relatively young man of 54. If his contributions during the four years that he was an
RTC judge were any measure of his potentiality for public service, he has productive years still
ahead of him which should not be foreclosed. The penalty of disqualification from appointment to
any public office should be lifted so that the opportunity for public service in other fields may be
opened to him.

In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo vs. Nograles and
Limkaichong, 580 SCRA 107 (2009)
Through six letters filed by Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes, he sought the benevolence
of the Court to lift his indefinite suspension from the practice of law and disqualification to hold
public office. The said sanctions were recommended because Justice Reyes was found to have
prematurely leaked the ponencia in G.R. No. 179120.
The Court found that Justice Reyes’ espousal of much regret and sincere apology for the
incident, his thirty-five years of service in the government prior to the suspension, and considering
his advanced age, satisfied the guidelines. However, the Court only allowed Justice Reyes to
return to private practice and chose not to lift the suspension in holding of public office and he is
also not allowed to teach law in MCLE and to become a lecturer in the PHILJA.
The granting of these petitions still depends on the discretion of the Court, notwithstanding
the criteria and guidelines. For as long as the Court is satisfied that a member of the bar or the
bench suffering from suspension, disbarment or any other disabilities has shown strong proofs of
rehabilitation, he may be allowed or readmitted to the practice of law. However, this is without
prejudice to the authority of the Court to impose additional conditions to grant requests for judicial
clemency and/or reinstatement.

c. Cases where JUDICIAL CLEMENCY is not granted

In the Matter of Petition for Absolute Judicial Clemency of Former Judge Baguinda Ali A.
Pacalna, MTTC Marawi City (2013)

The Petition for Judicial Clemency filed by respondent Baguinda-Ali A Pacalna is DENIED for lack
of merit. Respondent’s petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed repentance.
His appeal for clemency is solely anchored on his avowed intention to go back to the judiciary on
his personal belief that “he can be x x x an effective instrument in the delivery of justice in the
Province Of Lanao del Sur because of his seventeen (17) years of experience,” and on his
“promise before the Almighty God and the High Court that he will never repeat the acts or
omissions that he had committed as a Judge.” He claims having learned “enough lessons” during

31
the three years he became jobless and his family had “suffered so much because of his
shortcoming.

REINSTATEMENT

Black’s Law Dictionary defined reinstatement as to place again in a former state,

condition, or office; to restore to a state or position from which the object or person had been
removed. In the practice of law, reinstatement is the restoration in disbarment proceedings to a
disbarred lawyer the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court has the exclusive authority to
reinstate a disbarred or indefinitely suspended lawyer to the office of attorney-at-law. It may
reinstate him for reasons and upon assurance satisfactory to the court. The power of the Supreme
Court to reinstate is based on its constitutional prerogative to promulgate rules on the admission
of applicants to the practice of law. [Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, 1987 Philippine Constitution]

“The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer
has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the applicant
shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the
Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she
is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which
he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.” Re: Petition for
reinstatement of Rolando S. Torres as a member of the Philippine Bar, A.C. No. 5161, August 25,
2015

Conditions in reinstatement
The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is
a person of good moral character – a fit and proper person to practice law.
According to the IBP, a member undergoes suspension or disbarment “to protect the public and
the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are
unlikely to discharge properly their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and
the legal profession”.

READMISSION TO THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED

Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified minimum period
of time. Generally, suspension should be for a period of time equal to or greater than six months,
but in no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three
years. Procedures should be established to allow a suspended lawyer to apply for reinstatement,
but a lawyer who has been suspended should not be permitted to return to practice until he has
completed a reinstatement process demonstrating rehabilitation, compliance with all applicable
discipline or disability orders and rules, and fitness to practice law.

Types of Suspension
Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pending
imposition of final discipline. Interim suspension includes:
suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime” or,
suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely to cause immediate and serious
injury to a client or the public.
Indefinite Suspension is the removal of the right of a lawyer to practice law for an undefined
period of time.

Jurisprudence: Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 7, 1993

Gonzales’ contrition, so noticeably absent in his earlier pleadings, has washed clean the
offense of his disrespect. His remorse has soften his arrogance and made up for his misconduct.
Gonzales’ suspension has given him ample time and opportunity to amend his erring ways,
rehabilitate himself, and thus, prove himself worthy once again to enjoy the privileges of
membership of the Bar.

32
Lifting of Suspension
The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the
Court’s decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is
necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession. ( J.K. Mercado and
Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Atty. De Vera, et al. and Atty. de Vera v. Atty. Encanto,
et al.)

Thus, according to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), a suspended lawyer must first
present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law
during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable
recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus
allow him to resume the practice of law. (Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30,
2010)

Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order of suspension

After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;
Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of
said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating there in that he or she has desisted from
the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;
The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension;
Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground
for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

READMISSION TO THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN DISBARRED

Disbarment terminates the individual’s status as a lawyer. Where disbarment is not

permanent, procedures shall be established for a lawyer who has been disbarred to apply for
readmission, provided that:
no application should be considered for five years from the effective date of disbarment;
the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence:
successful completion of the bar examination;
compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders or rules; and
rehabilitation and fitness to practice law

Conditions in reinstatement
The applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment;
The nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred;
His conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement; (Prudential Bank v. Benjamin Grecia, A.C. No. 2756,Dec.
18, 1990)
His efficient government service; (In re: Adriatico, G.R. No. L-2532, Nov. 17, 1910)
Applicant’s appreciation of the significance of his dereliction and his assurance that he now
possesses the requisite probity and integrity; and
Favorable endorsement of the IBP and pleas of his loved ones. (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No.
144, Feb. 24, 1989)
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests on the discretion of the court. (Prudential
Bank v. Benjamin Grecia, A.C. No. 2756,Dec. 18, 1990)
The court may require applicant for reinstatement to enroll in and pass the required fourth year
review classes in a recognized law school. (Cui v. Cui, In Re: Resian A.C. No. 270, Mar. 1974)

33
Effects of reinstatement
In the reinstatement of a lawyer to the practice of law and roll of attorneys, reinstatement
wipes out the restrictions and disabilities resulting from a previous disbarment (Cui v. Cui, G.R.
No. L-18727, Aug. 31, 1964). It recognizes the moral rehabilitation and mental fitness of the
lawyer to practice law again. He or she shall be subject to same law, rules and regulations as
those applicable to any other lawyer and he/she must comply with the conditions imposed on his
readmission.

Effects of pardon
"When proceedings to strike on attorney’s name from the rolls are founded on, and depend
alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has
been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding
for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted.“ In re: Disbarment
proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962
“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense.

Effect of conditional pardon

The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of no
moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal consequences of
his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when he is being
disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he had been convicted by final
judgment. In re: Atty. Jose Avanceña, A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967
Conditional pardon merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the
offense itself. - In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July
31, 1962

Effect of Executive Pardon

If during the pendency of disbarment proceeding, the respondent was granted executive
pardon, the dismissal of the case on that sole basis will depend on whether the executive pardon
is absolute or conditional.
Absolute or unconditional pardon – the disbarment case will be dismissed. An absolute pardon
by the President is one that operates to wipe out the conviction as well as the offense itself. The
grant thereof to a lawyer is a bar to a proceeding for disbarment against him, if such proceeding
is based solely on the fact of such conviction. (In re: Parcasio, A.C. No. 100, Feb. 18, 1976)

Conditional pardon - the disbarment case will not be dismissed on the basis thereof. But
where the proceeding to disbar is founded on the professional misconduct involved in the
transaction which culminated in his conviction, the effect of the pardon is only to relieve him of
the penal consequences of his act and does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding,
inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not
possess good moral character. (In re: Lontok, 43Phil. 293, Apr. 7, 1922)

Pardon granted before conviction

“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense.

If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent
upon conviction, from attaching;
If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to
all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.”-
In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962

Once an applicant’s conduct raises an issue of fitness to practice law, especially if prior
misconduct involved unlawful acts, he or she may be obliged to demonstrate rehabilitation. One

34
significant factor in determinations of rehabilitation and fitness is whether the applicant expresses
and demonstrates remorse.

In the light of recent court pronouncements that a lawyer may be disciplined even for non-
professional misconduct, one may argue that a lawyer convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and subsequently receives absolute pardon, may still be proceeded against under the
Code of Professional Responsibility even if the acts of which he was found guilty did not involve
professional misconduct (A modification of In Re: Lontok).

READMISSION TO THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN REPATRIATED

The loss of Philippine citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. Filipino citizenship is a continuing requirement for the practice of law, loss of which
means the termination of one’s membership in the Bar and the privilege to engage in the practice
of law. However under Sec. 5(4), RA 9225, lawyers who reacquire their Philippine citizenship
should apply to the Supreme Court for the privilege or license to practice law as their profession.

Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country but later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar

Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay

Generally, a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship can no longer practice law in the
Philippines under the exception when a Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to R.A. 9225. But, there is no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues. One must first secure from the SC the authority
to do so, conditioned on:
The updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP.
The payment of professional tax
The completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education.
The retaking of the lawyer’s oath

Conclusion
Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement are not deemed filed together in a petition in all cases.
It can be observed on the cases cited, that when a lawyer/judge has been suspended or disbarred,
he prays for both. Meanwhile, in cases wherein a judge or lawyer was merely reprimanded and
punished but not suspended or disbarred, these individuals only seek judicial clemency. The
reasons for the petition vary, from eligibility for a higher position, commutation of period of
suspension or to be able to hold public office again.

35