Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

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Nation-Building in Contemporary Russia: Four

Vectors of Political Discourse

Boris Aksiumov & Viktor Avksentev

To cite this article: Boris Aksiumov & Viktor Avksentev (2022) Nation-Building in Contemporary
Russia: Four Vectors of Political Discourse, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 28:2, 186-205, DOI:
10.1080/13537113.2021.2001206

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NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS
2022, VOL. 28, NO. 2, 186–205
https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2021.2001206

Nation-Building in Contemporary Russia: Four Vectors of

Political Discourse
Boris Aksiumova and Viktor Avksentevb
a b
North-Caucasus Federal University; The Southern Scientific Centre of the Russian Academy
of Sciences

ABSTRACT
This article contributes to the research of nation-building in modern Russia. Unlike most stud-
ies in this area, based on the ethnic/civic dichotomy or using the nation/empire dilemma,
the rticle proposes a discursive model of nation-building in Russia, based on the interaction
of four types of nationalism: civic, multicultural, imperial and civilizational. The results of
content analysis of key political documents on nation-building in modern Russia (Strategies
of the state national policy, presidential addresses, Vladimir Putin’s articles) are presented
and discussed. It is shown that civic nationalism with rhetorical references to civil society and
its ability to build a nation from below is the most supported by the elite type of discourse
on nation-building. However, in practice policy preference is given to the hegemonic state
model of nation-building from “top to bottom,” dominated by a carefully veiled imper-
ial discourse.

Introduction
Nation-building in Russia has an incomplete character. It is still impossible to deter-
mine with certainty what modern Russia is—an empire, a nation-state, a multinational
federation, or something else. Discussions on national identity and nation-building are
typical for many countries, but, as Laruelle and Radvanyi note, the multiplicity of chal-
lenges facing Russia and its citizens in this sphere has no equal on the European scene.1
This article focuses on the analysis of the state discourse on nation-building: we tried to
show how the non-ethnic Russian (rossiiskii) nation2 is imagined and constructed in the
discursive practices of the Russian power elite. Several authors have noted that Russian
official documents and speeches draw on sometimes contradictory discourses, for
example, civic, Eurasianist and ethnonationalist.3 The main contribution of this study is
that we present a comprehensive analysis of the discursive field of Russia’s top-down
nation-building. The semantic and terminological diversity of this discourse made it
problematic to follow the traditional dichotomy of civic vs ethnic.4 The attempts of
some authors to follow this dichotomy result in its overloading with meanings. Shevel
identified two civic and three ethnic images that had prominence in Russia in the post-
Soviet period and argued that all five definitions of the Russian nation were problematic
and difficult to apply in practical politics. She claimed that terminological vagueness
and ambiguity allowed to pursue policies that fall in a broad range from ethnic to civic

CONTACT Viktor Avksentev avksentievv@rambler.ru The Southern Scientific Centre of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, Rostov-on-Don 344006, Russia.
ß 2021 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 187

to neo-imperial.5 Kølsto and Blakkisrud offered a two-axis model of analysis—predom-

inantly state and predominantly ethnic nationalisms.6
To clarify the issue of contemporary (referring to the period after Putin’s return to the
Kremlin in 2012) elite discourse on nationhood, we propose, and this is our second contri-
bution, a discursive model of nation-building, based on the interaction of four types of
nationalism: civic, multicultural, imperial and civilizational, which determine, respectively,
four vectors of political discourse. As a result of content analysis of official documents and
discourse analysis of Putin’s articles and his presidential addresses, we came to the conclu-
sion that these four types of nationalism form the basis of modern political discourse on
nation-building in Russia.
The article is based on the ideas of constructivism, first of all on the idea of performa-
tive functions of discursive practices in nation-building. In classical works on national-
ism,7 nations are represented as “imaginary communities” or the result of “social
imaginary,”8 in the construction of which “invented traditions” and the centralizing
efforts of the state are important. The theory of ethnosymbolism9 limits the constructivist
efforts of the elites by indicating the influence of premodern ethnic myths and symbols
on modern national identities. This limitation is important for Russia, whose political elite
presents the country as a “historical state” with a thousand-year history.
Yet the constructive efforts of the state and its political elite are the most important
stimulus for nation-building. As previous studies show, nation-building is based not on ran-
dom processes and not on objective social trends, but on concepts deliberately and pur-
posefully constructed by political elites that reflect their strategic interests.10 Hroch believes
nations exist “on two interrelated levels: on the level of a large social community that exists
in reality (it is a ‘sociological fact’) and on the level of an abstract community of (shared)
cultural values, i.e., as a specific cultural construct.”11 This second level of the nation’s exist-
ence, which can be correctly identified as discursive, is in most cases created by political
elites and significantly affects the first level through the dynamics of national identity.
When constructing a nation, elites set certain discursive standards that have a per-
formative meaning. The constructivist model of nation-building assumes that national
identities are not stable and can be reformatted as a result of persistent discursive prac-
tices of nationalization.12 The categorizations used by the state to designate groups on a
national or cultural basis, “may contribute to producing what they apparently describe
or designate.”13
Nationalism as a “discursive formation,”14 reflecting the strategic interests of the pol-
itical elite, is thus crucial for the construction of modern nation as discursive practice.15
On the contrary, the absence of a discourse on nationalism among the ruling elites is
the reason for the absence or insufficiency of nationalist practices in society. Rowley
shows this using the example of Russians. In his opinion, Russians were unable to
develop a national movement because their “discursive universe” did not include con-
cepts that are inherent in nationalist thought.16

The “top-down” model of nation-building: the choice for Russia

Nation-building by its nature presupposes processuality and involvement of various
agents. The vector of nation-building efforts can be “top-down” and “bottom-up.” Most
188 B. AKSIUMOV AND V. AVKSENTEV

often, both processes take place. Hobsbawm argues that nations are “dual phenomena”17
constructed from both above and below. However, it is almost always possible to iden-
tify the dominant vector of nation-building.
In the classical theory of nationalism much attention was paid to the institutional
and structural factors of nation-building. The main agent of nation-building was the
state.18 Gellner believed that nationalism is necessary for the formation of new social
ties that meet the needs of modern industrial processes. He explained nation-building
as a concerted, state- or elite-driven effort to create “standardized, homogeneous, cen-
trally sustained high cultures.”19 This is achieved by various cultural and economic poli-
cies that construct the idea of a nation (regardless of its basic characteristics) and
reinforce the triad “nation-state-territory.” The state, in Gellner’s words, “creates nations
where they do not exist,” and the entire panoply of the state—education, mass conscrip-
tion, bureaucracy—is pressed into the service of a singular national vision.20
A strong initiative on the part of the state was necessary to create an appropriate
form of political imagination and actively promote the idea of nation embodied in
nationalist ideology. “‘Nationalisation’ and state-propagated nationalisms were thus the
products of deliberate decisions made by European rulers.”21 The development of
nations was simultaneous with industrialization and a militarization process led by the
elite.22 In this sense, nation-building can be defined as a hegemonic project or process
of ensuring the political, intellectual and moral leadership of the dominant upper
classes. On the other hand, nations exist only insofar as individuals believe that they
exist and only then nation-building becomes the reproduction of nationalist beliefs.23
The role of the state is no less important for modern nations, since nation-building,
at least from the point of view of the evolution of national identity, is continuous. In
the works of adherents of communication theories who rely on Weber, modern states
act as controlling and reflexive institutions, for the successful functioning of which a
political community and identity formed according to its model are necessary.24 The
key role of the state in nation-building, reproduction and framing of national discourse
is embodied in the concept of state nationalism. Dupr
e defines “state nationalism as a
type of nationalism that is articulated by state-ruling elites, puts a special focus on the
state as representative and aggregator of national interests, and thus presents itself as
the ‘official’ state narrative on nationalism.”25 State nationalism links nationalism as an
ideology to territorial boundaries and assumes the “constant reproduction and promo-
tion of the nation by state elites and institutions.”26
In recent decades, the study of nation-building according to “the bottom-up” model
has become very popular.27 Billig’s work on banal nationalism has produced a
Copernican revolution in the study of nationalism. The analytical focus of many studies
has shifted “down” to the everyday nationalism experienced by ordinary people. This
approach allows us to “better understand the lived experience of nationalism.”28
Top-down and bottom-up nation-building models, taken separately, are ideal
Weberian constructs: in practice, both models are intertwined. The prevailing trends in
nation-building are determined by the current situation in a particular state, national
traditions, strategic goals of the political elite, and the level of development of civil soci-
ety. For Russia, where the state has historically played a crucial role in social processes,
the top-down model of nation-building looks natural, although this does not exclude
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 189

the bottom-up movement. For the modern Russian political elite, the factor of the his-
torical past is of key importance. Today’s Russia is viewed as the heir to the Russian
Empire and the Soviet Union, and the concept of “historical state” symbolizes “the con-
tinuity of the thousand-year history of Russian civilization.” Kolstø and Blakkisrud note
that “the ‘new’ Russian nationalism has not been invented from scratch: it is an assem-
blage of various time-honored and well-known elements.”29 Therefore, before moving
on to the modern processes of nation-building in Russia, it is necessary to turn
to history.

The practice of nation-building in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union
Researchers studying nation-building in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union have
two main interrelated questions. The first one is whether Russia was an empire or a
nation-state. Second, and it is an important question about Russian nationalism—
whether it existed at all, and if yes, what character it had. Discussions on the first issue
were partly provoked by the fact that in Russian historiography Russia, although it had
the official name “empire,” was conventionally understood as a nation-state—no less a
“nation-state” than other European states.30 According to Greenfeld, Russia was striving
“to move steadily toward becoming one of the model ethnic nations.”31
However, most researchers understand tsarist Russia as an empire.32 Rowley’s proof
of the imperial character of the Russian state is the lack of nationalism among the rul-
ing elite, since “Russia’s political and intellectual elites were not nationalists but imperi-
alists.”33 This position of the elites did not mean the absence of Russian nationalism in
the empire at all.34 But purely ethnic projects of Russian nationalism were always in the
shadow of inclusive imperial projects. Not only the political elite, but also many conser-
vative thinkers and civil servants were inspired by a special kind of nationalism—
“imperial nationalism.” Kivelson and Suny point out that in the last decades of the 19th
century “a robust Russian nationalism—a fervent love for ethnic Russia and its imperial
ambitions—inspired both conservative intellectuals and many state officials.” This, they
maintain, could be called alternatively “imperial nationalism” or “national imperi-
alism.”35 After Kolstø’s convincing arguments, the combination of empire and nation in
one concept no longer seems to be an oxymoron, especially since “many researchers
and political actors and thinkers freely combine two terms, ‘Empire’ and ‘nation’, and
imperialism and nationalism, to cover the same entities, attitudes and actions.”36 As for
Russian (russkii) nationalism, it really existed, yet its main variant was not ethnic
nationalism, but, according to Hosking, the goal of this “national imperialism” was not
to build the Russian nation, but only to retain power through “greater administrative
unity and coordination.”37
The Soviet Union, which in many ways opposed itself to the Russian Empire, never-
theless inherited its imperial model. Soviet leaders did not abandon the imperial dis-
course, but reinterpreted the old universalist and religious categories of the Russian
Empire into an “equally universalist language of international socialism.”38 The
Bolsheviks were obsessed with internationalist ideology, dreamed of a world proletarian
revolution and, as Conquest and others emphasized, it would be ridiculous to accuse
Lenin of “ethnic exclusivism” or “nationalism.”39 Lenin was fully aware of the political
190 B. AKSIUMOV AND V. AVKSENTEV

power of ethnic minority nationalism and was ready to satisfy their needs by creating
the Soviet Union as a federation based on ethnicity.40 Later ethnicity was institutional-
ized at the individual level, when “natsional’nost” (ethnicity) was recorded in the pass-
port of every Soviet citizen.41 The Constitution of the Soviet Union established the
format for the coexistence of “nations” within the framework of a federal state and
determined the practice of managing national units in a special way that strengthens
this national identity.42 The USSR “was imagined as a supra-national entity, a federation
of free nations which, according to the Soviet constitution, had the right of self-deter-
mination, including independence.”43
To counterbalance these “centrifugal” factors, the Soviet leadership put forward the
concept of a single Soviet people. The introduction of the term “Soviet people” was an
attempt to resist the growing ethnonational consciousness of peoples and to create a
political community like in France and Great Britain. As Wimmer notes, “the regime
fervently tried to instill Soviet patriotism in its citizenry—not under the term ‘nation’,
to be sure, but referring instead to the ‘peoples of the Soviet Union’—in order to gener-
ate a state-focused civic identity superimposed on the nationalities.”44 However, despite
the centralizing efforts of national politics, the networks of political alliances remained
fragmented along ethnic lines, and ultimately the USSR disintegrated “along its ethnic
fault lines.”45

Discursive vectors of nation-building in modern Russia

Modern Russia largely reproduces the state model of the Soviet Union and, in some fea-
tures, of Russian Empire. Russia’s political elite perceives itself as the owner of the leg-
acy of the millennial “historical state.” Accordingly, modern nation-building discursively
absorbs the diversity of the historical and cultural past. Tolz showed what intellectual
sources were used as the basis of the modern discourse on nation-building in the first
post-Soviet decade and argued that most ideas redeployed “old concepts, which had
emerged under circumstances markedly different from those of today.”46 Of the four
discursive vectors of nation-building that we have identified, three are a reflection of
the historical and cultural heritage, and only the discourse of civic nationalism is based
on Western concepts of nation-state. Tolz defined the advocates of civic nationalism as
“real innovators in Russian context” and emphasized the point that they were “still alien
to the majority of intellectuals.”47
Intellectual climate changed in Russia during the “Putin era.” There is a widely
shared point of view in the scholarly literature, that at a certain point the Russian elite
made a transition from implementation of the project of a civic nation to increasing of
ethnic components in the nation-building. According to Goode, “competitive authoritar-
ianism in the 1990s confounded the regime’s own efforts toward civic nation-building
and laid the groundwork for the ‘ethnic turn’ in Russian politics under Vladimir
Putin.”48 Blakkisrud considers that the traditional ethnopolitical correctness, associated
with a civic, multiethnic and multiconfessional identity has been increasingly challenged
by a shift in focus toward the traditional ethnocultural core of this identity: its
“Russianness” (russkost’).49
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 191

We argue that a shift indeed occurred, but its vector was somewhat different. There
was a terminological increase in the theme of Russianness in the elite discourse, yet it
was not an appeal to Russian ethnic nationalism. According to Kolstø, “it would cer-
tainly be an exaggeration to claim that Putin and his entourage have adopted ethnona-
tionalism as their state ideology. Their messages are mixed bags of often disparate
signals … ”50 The attitude of the Russian political elite toward ethnic nationalism is def-
initely negative. Putin’s position in this regard is unambiguous: “I am deeply convinced
that attempts to promote the idea of building a Russian ‘national’, mono-ethnic state
contradict our entire thousand-year history. Moreover, this is the shortest way to the
destruction of the Russian people and Russian statehood. As well as any other capable,
sovereign statehood on Earth.”51
The shift that took place should be viewed in a broader context of the reorientation
of state nationalism toward the imperial-civilizational discourse, which is traditional for
the Russian elite. Pain is absolutely right in stating that the revival of the “imperial syn-
drome” is the most convincing explanation for the failure of the project of building a
civic nation and the transition of the Russian elite to more familiar politics.52
Nevertheless, as we will show in further analysis, the Russian elite is not going to
abandon the rhetoric of civic nationalism. However, key nationalisms as a result of the
transition to a conservative policy of nation-building are on the other flank—imperial,
civilizational and multicultural. Each of the four nationalisms we identified is well
known in the scholarly literature, our contribution consists in analyzing their specific
combination in modern Russian nation-building.
After Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012 several doctrinal documents on nation-
building, national identity and identity politics were adopted, introducing or pretending
to introduce a new vision of the problem. As Kolstø and Blakkisrud aptly note, in order
to analyze the policies of state nationalism we do not have to look into the hearts and
minds of the rulers in order to determine what motivated them: we can focus on their
words and deeds.53
To determine the discursive potential of contemporary Russian elite, we chose three
main sources for empirical research. First, the program articles of Vladimir Putin, pub-
lished at the beginning of the 2012 presidential election campaign. In total, he wrote
seven articles on various topics, and the most important for nation-building was
“Russia: the national question.”54 Still all other articles were included into the analysis.55
Second, the Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly of Russia 2012–21.56 The
third source was the “Strategy of the state national policy of the Russian Federation for
the period up to 2025,” adopted in 2012,57 and its new 2018 edition.58 The entire texts
of the articles, addresses and strategies were used for content analysis. Thus, the period
from 2012 to 2021 was covered. This choice was not accidental, since it was in 2012 in
Putin’s articles and in the first edition of the “Strategy … ” that new principles of
national policy were defined, which replaced the outdated 1996 Concept of State
National Policy of the Russian Federation.59
The discursive practices of nation-building in modern Russia are diverse and cannot
be reduced to one form of nationalism. The four forms of nationalism shape four main
vectors of political discourse. Each form of nationalism is characterized by a special set
of basic discursive units, by means of which political elites seek to influence national
192 B. AKSIUMOV AND V. AVKSENTEV

identity. Civic nationalism is clearly identified on the basis of a classical set of key
words (civic nation, civil self-government, direct democracy, free choice, etc.). An
important marker of the discourse of civic nationalism is the phrase “the people of
Russia,” used in most texts synonymously for “the citizens of Russia.” The explication
of three other close but still different discursive practices is based on the following ana-
lytic techniques. The primary identifier of the imperial nationalism discourse is the
“Russian” (russkii) theme—the Russian people, the Russian language, the Russian cul-
ture, Russian cultural dominant, which for the modern Russian political elite serve as
pivotal elements of the multiethnic Russian nation. We argue that the exploitation of
the theme of "Russianness" (russkost’) has not an ethnic, but a political context—the
preservation and strengthening of a large historical state: the Russian Empire—the
Soviet Union—the Russian Federation. That is why, for example, the phrase “self-deter-
mination of the Russian people is a multi-ethnic civilization, held together by the
Russian (russkii) cultural core” was interpreted as an example of imperial, not civiliza-
tional nationalism. Explication of multicultural discourse is based on references to the
multiethnic nature of modern Russian state, to the fact that the Russian (rossiiskii)
nation consists not only of ethnic Russians, but includes many peoples with their
unique traditions and cultures. Civilizational discourse is based primarily on the idea of
a “special path” for Russia, on the recognition of Russia as a unique civilization with its
own civilizational code. Table 1 gives a generalized vision of discursive practices of the
political elite used in nation-building in modern Russia. Basic discursive units are key
words and phrases by means of which a particular discourse was recorded.

Table 1. The discursive field of top-down nation-building in Russia.

Vectors of political discourse
Civic nationalism
Multicultural nationalism
Imperial nationalism
Basic discursive units
Civic nation; the people of Russia; the people as the bearer of sovereignty and the main
source of power; civil identity; civil consciousness; civil patriotism; patriotic values;
state language; constitutional rights and symbols of citizens; equality of rights and
freedoms of man and citizen; free choice of nationality / language of education by
citizens; civil unity / civil consent / civil peace; civil solidarity; civil responsibility; civil
society; civil potential; non-governmental nonprofit organizations; civil self-
government; civil participation; social initiatives; popular legislative initiative; public
control; community councils; civil discussions [of governmental initiatives]; democracy;
democratic society; democratic principles; direct democracy; Internet democracy;
nondiscrimination; the inadmissibility of the creation of parties on the basis of race,
nationality or religion; intolerance to the propaganda and dissemination of ideas of
extremism, xenophobia, national exclusivity
The multinational people of the Russian Federation; peoples of the Russian Federation;
polycultural community; joint, organic life of different peoples within one state;
multinational state / country / society; polyconfessional state; “unity in diversity”;
ethnocultural diversity; cultural and linguistic diversity; diversity of national (ethnic)
composition; ethnocultural identity; preservation and development of cultures /
languages / traditions of the peoples of Russia; harmony of languages, cultures and
traditions; maintenance of interethnic peace and harmony; harmonization of
interethnic relations; development of interethnic cultural ties; dialogue of traditional
religions of Russia; national-cultural organizations / associations; the rights of
indigenous peoples and national minorities; respect for the national (ethnic) dignity
of citizens; development of ethnographic tourism; folk crafts; the unifying influence of
globalization on local cultures
The consolidating role of the Russian (russkii) people; hundreds of ethnic groups living
on their land together and next to the Russians (russkii); the Russian (russkii) people
are the core of the state; the Russian people are state-forming in fact the existence
of Russia; single Russian (rossiiskii) nation; Russian (russkii) cultural dominant; a single
(continued)
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 193

Table 1. Continued.
Vectors of political discourse
Civilizational nationalism
Basic discursive units
cultural and civilizational code based on Russian (russkii) culture and language; self-
determination of the Russian (russkii) people is a multi-ethnic civilization, held
together by the Russian (russkii) cultural core; Russian language [with functions other
than the state language]; outflow of the Russian (russkii) and Russian-speaking
population from the regions; the largest multinational state in the world; the
development of vast territories; complex national-territorial structure; state unity and
integrity of Russia; strengthening of Russian (rossiiskii) statehood; overcoming
disintegration processes; counteraction to separatism; exaggeration of regional
interests; opposition to the formation of closed enclaves; Russia, which in Soviet
times was called the Soviet Union; support for compatriots abroad; promoting the
development of ties between compatriots with Russia; cultural and spiritual affinity
with Russia of compatriots abroad; compatriots abroad as carriers of the Russian
language and Russian (russkii) culture; compatriots all over the world; expanding
Russia’s presence in the world humanitarian, informational and cultural space; visits
by young people to hero cities and cities of military glory
State-civilization; unique civilization; the uniqueness of the multinational people of the
Russian Federation; own development path; polyethnic civilization; common
achievements of the peoples of Russia; traditional moral values of the peoples of the
Russian Federation; civilizational community; “historical state”; one cultural
(civilizational) code; civilizational identity; the spiritual community of the peoples of
Russia; spiritual identity; common cultural space; richness of Russian (rossiiskii) culture;
historical and cultural experience of the formation and development of Russian
(rossiiskii) statehood; all-Russian (rossiiskii) history and culture; a single, indissoluble
thousand-year history; centuries-old experience of interaction between the peoples of
Russia; preservation of Russia as a civilization

Table 2. Political discourse of nation-building: quantitative results.

Vectors of political discourse Number of basic discursive units %
Civic nationalism 179 41.0
Multicultural nationalism 134 30.7
Imperial nationalism 68 15.5
Civilizational nationalism 56 12.8
Total 437 100.0

Based on the content analysis of the mentioned documents, the “density” of each dis-
course was revealed. 437 units of analysis (phrases, fragments of text) were identified,
which were distributed in accordance with four vectors of the political discourse on
nation-building in modern Russia (Table 2).
In quantitative terms, the discourse of civic nationalism is noticeably leading. In the
second place, but with a significant lag, is the discourse of multicultural nationalism. The
imperial and civilizational discourses are considerably less intense. However, a quantitative
analysis is insufficient to understand the discursive practices of Russian nation-building,
therefore, in accordance with the positions occupied, each form of nationalism will be ana-
lyzed separately.

Civic nationalism
The conceptualization of civic nationalism is traditionally carried out in its opposition
to ethnic nationalism.60 However, some researchers question the analytical relevance of
this dichotomy. These are not binary nationalisms, nor are they pre-given. Rather, these
nationalisms often perform roles as inclusive or exclusive mechanisms.61 Meanwhile
“the deep ambiguity of the terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ and in particular the uncertain
194 B. AKSIUMOV AND V. AVKSENTEV

60.00%
52.7%
50.00% 46.4%

40.00%

30.00%
20.3% 20.5%
18.8%
20.00%
14.3% 14.5%
12.5%
10.00%

0.00%
Civic naonalism Mulcultural Imperial Civilizaonal
naonalism naonalism naonalism

Arcles Addresses
Figure 1. Four types of nationalist discourse in Vladimir Putin’s articles and addresses.

place of culture in the civic-ethnic scheme calls into question the usefulness of the dis-
tinction itself.”62 It is quite possible to consider civic nationalism as an independent
type of political discourse, associated not so much with alternative ethnic discourses,
but with the political organization of ethnically divided societies based on inclusive
ideas of democracy, civil society and liberal values. The civic concept of nation implies
membership in a group based on the acceptance of certain political values and institu-
tions.63 Thus, in the United States, the civic tradition of defining a nation is based on
the liberal vision of universalism, tolerance, equality of opportunity and the rule of
law.64 Democratic national citizenship means that the members of a nation not only
have equal rights and responsibilities, but also participate in the democratic polit-
ical process.65
In Russia the discourse of civic nationalism distinctly dominates in Vladimir Putin’s
articles and presidential addresses (Figure 1).
The model of a civil society that actively participates in governing the state, controls
power and has the right to initiate changes in legislation is clearly seen in the civic dis-
course in Putin’s articles and addresses.
Example 1.
The society needs to be ready to use democratic mechanisms. To make the majority of
people feel like citizens, they would be ready to spend their attention, their time, their
efforts on a regular basis on participation in the management process. Society must be
completely ready for using democratic mechanisms. The majority of people must see
themselves as citizens of their country, ready to devote their attention, time and efforts on
a regular basis to taking part in the process of governance. (Vladimir Putin, Demokratiya i
kachestvo gosudarstva)
Example 2.
… the course towards the development of the political system, the institutions of direct
democracy, towards increasing the competitiveness of elections is absolutely justified, and
we will certainly continue it. (The 2012 Presidential Address)
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 195

50.00%

45.00% 43.6%

40.00% 38.1%
36.0%
35,00% 32.5%

30.00%

25.00% 2012 edion

20.00% 2018 edion
16.2% 17.0%
15.00%

10.00% 7.7% 7.9%

5.00%

0.00%
Civic naonalism Mulcultural Imperial Civilizaonal
naonalism naonalism naonalism
Figure 2. Four types of nationalist discourse in the editions of the “Strategy of the state national pol-
icy … ” (256 discursive units in both documents).

Example 3.
… the opinion of people, our citizens as the bearers of sovereignty and the main source of
power must be decisive (The 2020 Presidential Address)
However, in the main doctrinal document in the field of national (ethnic) policy—the
“Strategy of the state national policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to
2025,” in both 2012 and 2018 editions—the discourse of civic nationalism no longer
occupies a leading position (Figure 2), and is meaningfully dissolved in imperial, civili-
zational and multicultural discourses. According to the 2018 edition, “civic identity is
based on the preservation of the Russian (russkii) cultural dominant inherent in all peo-
ples inhabiting the Russian Federation. Modern Russian (rossiiskii) society is united by
a single cultural (civilizational) code, which is based on the preservation and develop-
ment of Russian (russkii) culture and language, the historical and cultural heritage of all
the peoples of the Russian Federation, and in which such fundamental universal princi-
ples are included as respect for the original traditions of the peoples inhabiting the
Russian Federation and integration of their best achievements into a single all-Russian
(rossiiskii) culture.”
The instability of civic discourse in Russia testifies to its shallow nature, which can be
explained by the absence of traditions of democracy, the influence of the imperial and
totalitarian past, as well as the growth of authoritarian tendencies at present.

Multicultural nationalism
Multicultural nationalism indicates how multicultural societies can become united
enough to not fear their cultural differences and be at ease with them.66 In states with a
complex ethnocultural composition of the population, the central authorities seek to sat-
isfy ethnic and regional claims and at the same time pursue a policy of identity based
196 B. AKSIUMOV AND V. AVKSENTEV

on multicultural nationalism. Thus, an attempt is made to re-legitimize the nation as a

community that allows different cultural and ethnic groups to live together in har-
mony.67 A variant of discussing this problem is the framework of “multicultural feder-
alism.”68 In Russian political discourse, ethnocultural diversity is presented not as a
problem that calls into question the unity of the people (nation), but as an important
strategic advantage and a factor of historical continuity. Thus one of the goals of the
national policy is the preservation and support of the ethnocultural and linguistic diver-
sity of the Russian Federation, traditional Russian (rossiiskii) spiritual and moral values
as the basis of Russian society.
Example 4.
We treat with great attention and great respect, and must, and will treat every ethnic
group, every people of the Russian Federation. Our diversity has always been and is
our beauty and our strength (The 2012 Presidential Address)
Example 5.
The strength of Russia lies in the free development of all peoples, in diversity, harmony
and cultures, and languages, and our traditions, in mutual respect, dialogue between
Orthodox Christians and Muslims, followers of Judaism and Buddhism. (The 2015
Presidential Address)
Unlike civic discourse, the multicultural discourse in Putin’s articles and Addresses is
fully consistent with the “Strategy of the state national policy.,” that is, is embodied in
the real national policy of the state.
Example 6.
The ethnocultural and linguistic diversity of the Russian Federation, the historical
experience of intercultural and interreligious interaction are the property of the
multinational people of the Russian Federation (the Russian (rossiiskii) nation), serve to
strengthen Russian statehood and further develop interethnic relations in the Russian
Federation. (The “Strategy … ” 2018 edition).

Imperial nationalism
Imperial nationalism characterizes to the most the continuity of modern Russia in rela-
tion to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. According to Kolstø, “the ideal of the
Empire is alive and kicking among contemporary Russian nationalists of various hues.
Many Russians do not see any contradiction between empire-building and
nationalism.”69 Some researchers believe that Russian elite chose imperial nationalism
after the Ukraine crisis of 2013–14 because it best suited their goals. Imperial identity
eases ethnic tensions in Russia and rallies the nation around its government in the face
of perceived external threats.70 However, the analysis of the official sources refutes this
opinion. The discourse of imperial nationalism was conceptually framed before the
beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, in Putin’s 2012 program articles. This discourse can
be divided into internal and external. The first one is aimed at establishing a “Russian
(russkii)-centered” model of nation-building, when ethnic Russians, Russian culture and
the Russian language are declared to be the elements that bind the nation together. The
second one is associated with the concept of the “Russian-speaking space,” which was
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 197

later transformed into the ideology of the “Russian (russkii) World.” The main ideas of
internal imperial nationalism were outlined in the article “Russia: the national question.”
Here are the typical ideas.
Example 7.
Historical Russia is not an ethnic state or an American “melting pot,” where, in general,
everybody is in one way or another a migrant. Russia arose and developed over the
centuries as a multinational state. A state in which there was a constant process of mutual
adjustment, mutual penetration, mixing of peoples at the family, friendly, and official level.
Hundreds of ethnic groups living on their land together and next to Russians (russkii). The
development of vast territories that filled the entire history of Russia was a joint affair of
many peoples.
Example 8.
The core that holds the fabric of this unique civilization is the Russian (russkii) people,
Russian (russkii) culture.
Example 9.
The Russian (russkii) people are state-forming – in fact the existence of Russia. The great
mission of the Russians (russkii) is to unite and fasten civilization.
In a clear-cut imperial style, ethnic Russians in modern Russia are assigned the same
role, which, according to Vujacic, was assigned to them in the USSR. Namely, the role of
“ethnic glue,” that is, the majority, which supported the integrity of a multiethnic society,
instilling some elements of Russian culture as universal.71 Kolstø argues that “some con-
temporary Russian imperialist nationalists clearly fall into the category of ‘nation-building
imperialists’ who strive to develop a unified national culture embracing all members of
society under a common Russian cultural umbrella.”72 Pain, one of the few Russian
authors who use the term “imperial nationalism,” considers imperial nationalism a com-
bination of Russian ethnic nationalism and imperial consciousness.73
The article “Russia and the Changing World” (Rossiya i menyayushchijsya mir) outlines
the vector of external imperial nationalism. The Russian-speaking space, according to the
author, includes “practically all countries of the former USSR and a significant part of
Eastern Europe.” Promotion of Russia in this space “is not an empire, but cultural
promotion … We must increase several times Russia’s educational and cultural presence
in the world, and tenfold in those countries where part of the population speaks or
understands Russian.” This fragment certainly falls under the rubric of imperial discourse,
despite the author’s attempts to mitigate its effect using soft power terminology.

Civilizational nationalism
Civilizational nationalism within the framework of Russian political discourse is charac-
terized by the mythology of a “special path,” which predetermines the authoritarian
model of political governance.74 The civilizational identity of Russia in the early post-
Soviet years was defined as European, but the Russian government ultimately proposed
a competing model based on the idea of a self-sufficient and unique Russian civiliza-
tion.75 The 2014 Address notes that “Every nation has an inalienable sovereign right to
determine its own development path.” The 2019 Address sets a task to “preserve Russia
198 B. AKSIUMOV AND V. AVKSENTEV

as a civilization with its own identity.” In the article “Russia: the national question” it is
claimed that civilizational identity “is based on the preservation of the Russian (russkii)
cultural dominant, the carrier of which are not only ethnic Russians, but all carriers of
such an identity, regardless of nationality. This is the cultural code that has undergone
serious tests in recent years.”
The idea of a civilizational code makes it possible to legitimize the main line of the
civilizational discourse of the ruling elite—the idea of historical continuity.
Example 10.
In order to revive national consciousness, we need to link historical eras and get back to
understanding the simple truth that Russia did not begin in 1917, or even in 1991, but
rather, that we have a common, continuous history spanning over one thousand years, and
we must rely on it to find inner strength and purpose in our national development (The
2012 Presidential Address)
Example 11.
Christianity was a powerful spiritual unifying force that helped involve various tribes and
tribal unions of the vast Eastern Slavic world in the creation of the Russian (russkii) nation
and the formation of a common state. It was thanks to this spiritual unity that our
forefathers for the first time and forevermore saw themselves as a united nation. (The 2014
Presidential Address)
The idea of historical continuity is constantly present in the discourse of the elite.
Belief in the historical continuity of nations makes it possible to use the past as an
instrument of nation-building. The “past” here means the constructed nature of people’s
knowledge of history, which results from systematic education, schooling and reading of
authorized textbooks, rather than actually remembering centuries of events and proc-
esses.76 As Billig notes, “nations not only have to be imagined, but also have to create
their own histories.”77 As a collective identity, national identity is closely tied to a col-
lective memory that locates the nation as an imagined community in a common past
and a shared history.78

Discussion and concluding remarks

When analyzing the results of the study, it should be borne in mind that the quantitative
dominance of a certain discourse does not automatically mean its dominant and norma-
tive position in real nation-building. The discursive and real practices of elites can differ,
sometimes significantly. The persistent promotion of civic nationalism and democratic
ideas by the Russian political elite may be a model of false discourse, the purpose of
which is to create a respectable image of the political system and the elite that personifies
it. The discourse of civic nationalism, actively supported by the elite, does not have a
solid foundation and is largely artificially built on other basic vectors of political dis-
course. In turn, multicultural, imperial and civilizational nationalisms, with all the appar-
ent differences, in fact act as a single bloc. Here are some of the most typical examples.
Example 12.
We must cherish the unique experience that our ancestors passed on to us [civilizational
discourse]. For centuries Russia was developing as a multinational state [multicultural
discourse] - initially it was a state-civilization [civilizational discourse], held together by the
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 199

Russian (russkii) people, the Russian language and Russian (russkii) culture [imperial
discourse], which all are dear for us, which unite us and do not allow to dissolve in this
diverse world [civilizational discourse]. (The 2012 Presidential Address)
Example 13.
Such a civilizational identity [civilizational discourse] is based on the preservation of the
Russian (russkii) cultural dominant [imperial discourse], the carrier of which are not only
ethnic Russians, but all carriers of such an identity, regardless of nationality [multicultural
discourse]. (“Russia: the national question”)
Example 14.
The Russian (rossiiskii) state was created as a unity of peoples, the backbone of which was
historically the Russian (russkii) people [imperial discourse]. Thanks to the unifying role of
the Russian people [imperial discourse], centuries-old intercultural and interethnic relations
[civilizational discourse], on the historical territory of the Russian state [imperial discourse]
formed a unique cultural diversity and spiritual community of different peoples
[multicultural discourse]. Modern Russian state is united by a common cultural
(civilizational) code based on the preservation and development of Russian (russkii) culture
and language [imperial discourse], historical and cultural heritage of all peoples of Russia
[multicultural discourse], which is characterized by a special desire for truth and justice
[civilizational discourse], and respect for original traditions of the peoples inhabiting
Russia [multicultural discourse] and the ability to integrate their best achievements into a
single all-Russian culture [imperial discourse]. (The “Strategy … ” 2012 edition)
These examples show that the main burden of integrating ethnically and culturally
heterogeneous Russian society falls on imperial nationalism, with which such active
elements of discourse as “to consolidate,” “to unite,” “to integrate” are associated.
Thus it can be argued that modern Russian political elite focus on imperial national-
ism, although the term “empire” is not used for obvious reasons. Just as in the
USSR the imperial discourse was disguised as the discourse of internationalism and
“friendship of peoples,” today it is diligently mixed with multicultural and especially
with civilizational discourse. Nevertheless, the articulation of the special mission of
the Russian (russkii) people, Russian (russkii) culture and the Russian language
makes it possible to confidently explicate imperial nationalism as the dominant vec-
tor of nation-building in the political discourse of Russian authorities. Multicultural
and civilizational discourses serve as a cultural-historical background for the articula-
tion of imperial nationalism.
Acknowledging the decisive role of imperial nationalism for the entire system of elite dis-
course on nation-building, the functions of multicultural and civilizational discourses should
not be underestimated. The discourse of multicultural nationalism, like on the civic one, is
aimed at strengthening the positive image of the political system. The narrative of the
authorities about the centuries-old cooperation among many peoples serves as a proof of the
effectiveness of the Russian (rossiiskii) model of multiculturalism, in contrast to its Western
models. Putin writes in the article “Russia: the national question” about the “failure of a
multicultural project” in Western Europe, behind which, in his opinion, lies “the crisis of
the very model of a ‘nation state’—a state historically built exclusively on the basis of ethnic
identity.” In contrast to the European model of the “ethnic state” and the American “melting
pot,” “Russia emerged and developed over the centuries as a multinational state.” Narratives
about Russian civilization are used for a positive reconstruction of the centuries-old history
200 B. AKSIUMOV AND V. AVKSENTEV

as a continuous progressive process and the basis for actual national integration. The dis-
course of civilizational nationalism in this sense can be seen as “an attempt to construct
unity across ideological, spatial, and societal cleavages associated with the disintegration of
the Soviet Union and earlier critical points in Russian history.”79
If multicultural and civilizational discourses are predominantly based on the historical
past and are used by the ruling elite to reconstruct an ideal model of Russian history,
the discourse of imperial nationalism serves as a relevant instrument of contemporary
nation-building. Moreover, the “Russian (russkii)-centric” rhetoric of the elite’s imperial
discourse, reinterpreted by a part of Russian society in ethnic terms, again puts on
Russian scholarly agenda the question whether modern Russia is an empire or a
nation-state.80
The key role of imperial nationalism in Russian nation-building requires that we
once again turn to the relationship between empire and nation. We prefer the position
of those researchers who do not make a binary opposition. Thus, Berger and Miller
conclude that most nations arose within empires, that nation-building usually took place
in an imperial context, and that nation-building and empire were closely intertwined.81
Berger’s and Miller’s collection of papers is called “Nationalizing Empires.” The same
term was used by Brubaker when discussing nation-building in the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after the fall of communism.82
The term “nationalization of empires” has a certain analytical value, since it reveals “the
close resemblance between nation-building in nation-states as described in the standard
literature, and in large conglomerate states – in empires.”83
Hosking, long before the current version of the nation-building discourse in Russia
was formed, wrote about four possible ways of its development: to turn back to the
traditional imperial mission; follow the path of integration with other Eastern Slavs; to
stand for all Russian-speakers; “to regard the Russian nation as consisting of all the citi-
zens of the Russian Federation.”84 Of these four possibilities, all but the second were
used in nation-building in Russia. The first and third options are being implemented
most clearly today, both of them fit into the format of imperial nationalism, and this
once again testifies to the key role of imperial discourse of the political elite in nation-
building in modern Russia.

Notes
1. Marlene Laruelle and Jean Radvanyi, Understanding Russia. The Challenges of
Transformation (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018).
2. The word “Russian” has two adjectives in Russian language: russkii (an “ethnic” Russian)
and rossiiskii (a citizen of the Russian Federation regardless of ethnic affiliation). In unclear
cases transliterations “russkii” and “rossiiskii” are added in italics in brackets after the
word “Russian.”
3. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, eds., The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity
and Authoritarianism, 2000-15 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016).
4. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944); Taras
Kuzio, “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Framework for
Understanding Nationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25, no. 1 (2002): 20–39; Bernard
Yack, “The Myth of the Civic Nation,” Critical Review. A Journal of Politics and Society 10,
no. 2 (1996): 193–211.
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 201

5. Oxana Shevel, “Russian Nation-building from Yel’tsin to Medvedev: Ethnic, Civic or

Purposefully Ambiguous?” Europe-Asia studies 63, no.2 (2011): 179–202.
6. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, “Introduction: Exploring Russian Nationalisms,” in Russia
Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010–2017, edited by Pål Kolstø and
Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 1–20.
7. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
8. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).
9. John A. Armstrong, Nations Before Nationalism (Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1982); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (London: Blackwell, 1986); Adrian
Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge
& New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Azar Gat, Nations: The Long History and
Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012).
10. Eleni Andreouli and Xenia Chryssochoou, “Social Representations of National Identity in
Culturally Diverse Societies,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations, edited
by Gordon Sammut, Eleni Andreouli, George Gaskell and Jaan Valsiner (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 309–22; Stephen Reicher and Nick Hopkins, Self and
Nation: Categorization, Contestation and Mobilization (London: Sage, 2001).
11. Miroslav Hroch, “The Nation as the Cradle of Nationalism and Patriotism,” Nations and
Nationalism 26, no. 1 (2020): 6.
12. Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, “The Discursive Construction of National
Identities,” Discourse & Society 10, no. 2 (1999): 149–73; Alan Finlayson, “Ideology,
Discourse and Nationalism,” Journal of Political Ideologies 3, no. 1 (1998): 99–118; Claire
Sutherland, “Nation-Building through Discourse Theory,” Nations and Nationalism 11, no.
2 (2005): 185–202.
13. Pierre Bourdieu, “Identity and Representation. Elements for a Critical Reflexion on the Idea
of Region,” in Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 220.
14. Craig Calhoun, Nationalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997).
15. Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Karin Liebhart, The Discursive
Construction of National Identity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); Francisca
Gromm
e and Stephan Scheel, “Doing Statistics, Enacting the Nation: The Performative
Powers of Categories,” Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 3 (2020): 576–93.
16. David G. Rowley, “Imperial versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia,” Nations and
Nationalism 6, no. 1 (2000): 23–42.
17. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), 10.
18. Anderson, Imagined Communities; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Eugene Weber,
Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural France, 1870–1914 (London: Chatto
and Windus, 1979).
19. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 55.
20. Ibid., 48–9.
21. Thomas Jeffrey Miley, “The Nation as Hegemonic Project,” Journal of Political Ideologies 23,
no. 2 (2018): 5.
22. Daniele Conversi, “Homogenisation, Nationalism and War: Should We Still Read Ernest
Gellner?” Nations and Nationalism 13, no. 3 (2007): 371–94.
23. Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern
Nation,” in Nation and Narration, edited by Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990).
24. Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: MIT Press, 1966); See
also: Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1975).
202 B. AKSIUMOV AND V. AVKSENTEV

25. Jean-François Dupr
e, “Making Hong Kong Chinese: State Nationalism and Its Blowbacks in
a Recalcitrant City,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 26, no. 1 (2020): 10.
26. Daniel Cetra and Coree Brown Swan, “State and Majority Nationalism in Plurinational
States: Responding to Challenges from Below,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 26, no. 1
(2020): 3.
27. Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995); Tim Edensor, National Identity,
Popular Culture and Everyday Life (Oxford; New York: Berg Publishers, 2002); Jon Fox and
Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “Everyday Nationhood,” Ethnicities 8, no. 4 (2008): 536–63; Eric
Kaufmann, “Complexity and Nationalism,” Nations and Nationalism 23, no. 1 (2017): 6–25;
Guzel Yusupova and Peter Rutland, “Introduction: Transformation of Nationalism and
Diaspora in the Digital Age,” Nations and Nationalism 27, no. 2 (2021): 325–330.
28. Eleanor Knott, “Everyday Nationalism: A Review of the Literature,” Studies on National
Movements (2015): 1. Available at http://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/ (accessed 26
March 2020). See also: Jon Fox, “Banal Nationalism in Everyday Life,” Nations and
Nationalism 24, no. 4 (2018): 862.
29. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, “The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity
and Authoritarianism 2000–2015,” Nationalities Papers 45, no. 4 (2017): 718.
30. This point of view of Russian historiography is mentioned, in particular, in: Alexei Miller,
The Romanov Empire and Nationalism (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008),
173; Valerie A. Kivelson and Ronald Grigor Suny, Russia’s Empires (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 123.
31. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992), 238.
32. Rowley, “Imperial versus National Discourse”; Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Kivelson and Suny, Russia’s Empires; Miller,
The Romanov Empire and Nationalism; Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late
Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914 (DeKalb:
University of Northern Illinois Press, 1996); Vera Tolz, “Communicative Integration in
Nation-States and Empires,” Nations and Nationalism 25, no. 1 (2019): 85–89.
33. Rowley, “Imperial versus National Discourse,” 25.
34. Edward C. Thaden, Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1964); Andreas Kappeler, Die Russen. Ihr
Nationalbewustsein in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Koln: Markus, 1990).
35. Kivelson and Suny, Russia’s Empires, 199.
36. Pål Kolstø, “Is Imperialist Nationalism an Oxymoron?” Nations and Nationalism 25, no. 1
(2019): 39–40.
37. Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 397.
38. Rowley, “Imperial versus National Discourse,” 34.
39. Robert Conquest, Lenin (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1979), 14.
40. Gregory Gleason, Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the
USSR (Boulder: Westview, 1990).
41. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nation and the National Question in the New
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
42. Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-
Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account,” Theory and Society 23, no. 1 (1994): 47–78.
43. Tolz, “Communicative Integration,” 86.
44. Andreas Wimmer, “Response to Tolz and Green,” Nations and Nationalism 25, no. 1
(2019): 100–1.
45. Andreas Wimmer, Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall
Apart (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 113.
46. Vera Tolz, “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist
Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 6 (1998): 1017.
47. Ibid.
 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 203

48. J. Paul Goode, “Russia’s Ministry of Ambivalence: The Failure of Civic Nation-Building in
Post-Soviet Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 2 (2019): 140–60.
49. Helge Blakkisrud, “Blurring the Boundary between Civic and Ethnic: The Kremlin’s New
Approach to National Identity under Putin’s Third Term,” in The New Russian
Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism, 249–74.
50. Pål Kolstø, “The Ethnifcation of Russian Nationalism,” in The New Russian Nationalism:
Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism, 38.
51. Vladimir Putin, “Rossiya: nacional’nyi vopros,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 January 2012.
https://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-23/1_national.html (accessed 30 April 2020).
52. Emil Pain, “The imperial syndrome and its influence on Russian nationalism,” in The New
Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism, 46–74.
53. Kolstø and Blakkisrud, “Introduction: Exploring Russian nationalisms,” 7.
54. Vladimir Putin, “Rossiya: nacional’nyi vopros”
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Putin, “Nam nuzhna novaya ekonomika,” Vedomosti, 30 January 2012. https://www.
vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2012/01/30/o_nashih_ekonomicheskih_zadachah (accessed 27
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13 February 2012. https://www.kp.ru/daily/3759/2807793/ (accessed 29 April 2020);
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204 B. AKSIUMOV AND V. AVKSENTEV

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 NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 205

82. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed.

83. Kolstø, “Is Imperialist Nationalism an Oxymoron?,” 26.
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Notes on contributors
Boris Aksiumov, PhD, is an Associate Professor at the North-Caucasus Federal University,
Stavropol, Russia. His main research interests are ethnic problems, nation-building and identity
politics in modern Russia. He was project manager of the research project “Formation of civiliza-
tional identity as a strategy for overcoming interethnic and interfaith contradictions in modern
Russia” (2013–15), financed by a grant of Russian Foundation for Humanities.
Victor Avksentev, PhD, is a Chief Researcher at the Federal Research Center The Southern
Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Rostov-on-Don, Russia. Main research
interests are ethnic problems, conflict studies, identity politics, regional studies (North Caucasus).
He is a member of the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences on complex prob-
lems of ethnicity and interethnic relations. He is the project manager of the present research pro-
ject, financed by Russian Foundation for Basic Research.

Funding
This work was supported by Russian Foundation for Fundamental Investigations/Russian
Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), grant number [20-011-00132].

ORCID
Boris Aksiumov http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0024-7041
Viktor Avksentev http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0762-3529